Rule 58 Preliminary Injunction Pelaez

Rule 58 – Preliminary Injunction
1. PNB vs RJ Ventures Realty & Development

G.R. NO. 164548; September 27, 2006
Facts:
First Womens Credit Cooperative (FWCC) was awarded with the bid of the property
located at Paseo de Roxas cor Sen. Gil Puyat Makati owned by PNB with an amount of
P455,000 per square meters or a total of P3,640,000. The notice of award sets condition that
FWCC shall tender payment of the 90% balance of the purchase price 30 days after receipt in the
form of managers or cashiers check. FWCC seek a loan from PNB for the balance price. Pending
such application, it assigned its rights, claims, interest and title over the Buendia property and the
obligation of FWCC to PNB. Afterward, PNB approved the 80% of the purchase price on the
condition that RJVRD will deposit additional 10% of the purchase price for the first 10%
downpayment. Provided further that after the transfer of property to RJVRD such will be
mortgaged in favor of PNB. RBN secured a loan from PNB in the amount of P100,000,000 part
of it is paying the interest for the loan secured in favor of RJVRD and by way of security
assigned all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued by NTC in its 8
branches. RJRVD and RBN become delinquent which lead to redenomination as a condition for
its loan restructuring agreement with PNB. RJVSD received a notice of Extra judicial sale of the
Buendia property and a planned take over of RBN radio facilities in Baguio City. This was
countered by the respondents with application for the issuance of TRO and alleged that RJVRD
and RBN will suffer great and irreparable injury by the extra judicial foreclosure of the property
and take over of RBN’s radio facilities on Baguio. They manifest their willingness to post a bond
for whatever damages PNB may sustain. RTC ruled in favor of PNB opined that evidence failed
to proved that respondents will suffer irreparable injury if the foreclosure is not enjoined for
respondents have 1 year from the date of registration of the sale with the ROD to recover the
property. Subsequently, respondent filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order which the RTC granted. RJVRD and RBN maintained that if the foreclosure
be allowed its determination of the right of PNB to foreclose will be moot and academic. In PNB
Motion for Reconsideration it averred that the auction sale would lower the past due ratio by 2%
thereby, allowing no legal impediment to PNB’s resumption to full lending operations since
Banko Sentral recommendation for stoppage of grants of loans is anchored on PNB’s high
current “past due ratio.”
According to the respondents the damage to RBN’s image, lost of listenership,

advertisers, staff and employees is unquantifiable in monetary terms. RTC issued order granting
PNB’s Motion for Reconsideration lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the grounds that
the failure of RBN to pay the three credit facilities it obtained from the defendant. RBN made a
express admission to such default and submit to the court that there was no reason to disturb the
preliminary injunction as there was no showing of a manifest abuse. RTC denied such motion
leading respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari before CA under rule 65. CA issued a
Resolution temporarily enjoining PNB from foreclosing any collateral pledged or mortgaged and
from taking possession and control of the latter’s radio facilities.
Issue:
Whether or not Court of Appeals correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals correctly reinstated the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The sole
object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final
order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a
preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive rights or interests pending
the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of
a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the
outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
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For a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be present, to
wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession
of the subject collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be
extrajudicially foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof.
Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an
injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence adduced by respondents more than
satisfies the legal and jurisprudential requirements of irreparable injury. It behooves this court to
appreciate the unique character of the collaterals that stand to be affected should the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and inevitable result would
be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio stations, consequently, losing its
listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time.
2. First Global vs Agustin

G.R. No. 144499; February 19, 2002
Facts:
The subject matter is a parcel of land, including a house built thereon, covered by a TCT
issued in the name of respondent’s mother , Lilian San Agustin, who, together with his parents,
brothers and sisters have been in possession of the same since 1967 up to the resolution of the
instant case.
Respondent intended to sell the subject property to Camacho spouses for Php2.5M. The
couple initially paid Php100K, with the agreement that the balance would be paid when they
would have secured a loan using the property as collateral. To facilitate their procurement of a
loan, the title of the property was transferred to them. Using the property as collateral, the
Camachos were able to obtain a loan of Php1.19M from petitioner. Upon former’s failure to pay
the loan, petitioner sought to foreclose the mortgage. Before the foreclosure, the parties agreed
on a dacion en pago, in which spouses Ceded ownership of the property in favor of petitioner. in
consideration of the payment of the loan.
Petitioner then demanded the payment of rentals from respondent, whose family was still
in possession of the property. Because respondents did not heed the demand of petitioner, the
latter filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession before Branch 143 Makati. Respondent
filed the instant action (Branch 141) to enjoin petitioner from taking possession of the subject
property.
RTC : RTC denied the application of respondent for a preliminary injunction to prevent
petitioner from evicting him from the subject property.
CA: Reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief prayed for by respondent.It held that
petitioner should not be given possession of the property pendente lite, because it knew of the
agreement between respondent and the Camachos. Moreover, the fact that the property remained
in the possession of respondent’s mother at the time the couple sold it to petitioner should have
warned it of a defect in its claims.
Issue:
Whether or not Agustin is entitled to the possession of the property while the main
case for rescission is pending in the RTC.
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Ruling:
Yes. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued
to preserve the status quo ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded
the actual controversy.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is ―to prevent threatened or continuous

irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard
fully.‖ Thus, it will be issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is
violated. Moreover, an urgent and permanent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the
applicant.
In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is the possession of the
property by respondent and his right to use it as his dwelling, pending determination of
whether or not he had indeed sold it to the Camachos and, consequently, whether the latter’s
transfer of its ownership to petitioner via dacion en pago should be upheld.
The factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts show that respondent
intended to sell the subject property to the Camacho spouses for the sum of P2,500,000. The
couple initially paid P100,000, with the agreement that the balance would be paid when they
would have secured a loan using the subject property as collateral. To facilitate their
procurement of a loan, the title to the property was transferred to them.
Using the subject property as collateral, the Camachos were able to obtain a loan of
P1,190,000 from petitioner. Upon the former’s failure to pay the loan, the latter sought to
foreclose the mortgage over it. However, before the property could be foreclosed, petitioner and
the couple allegedly agreed on a dacion en pago, in which the latter ceded ownership of the
property in favor of the former in consideration of the payment of the loan. Respondent contends
that when petitioner conducted an on-site investigation of the property in connection with the
couple’s application for a loan, the latter learned that the former was living in the subject
premises and was thus in actual possession of it. The CA found, in fact, that petitioner was aware
that respondent -- the previous owner -- remained an unpaid seller.
The records show that the dacion en pago signed in 1994 was registered only in 1997. It
was executed in lieu of the foreclosure of the property when the Camachos failed to pay their
loan obligations. The amount stated in the dacion as consideration was the P1,190,000 loan that
they had obtained from petitioner. It is therefore strange that the couple would buy a parcel of
land for P2,500,000, obtain a loan to help finance payment for the same, and finally cede the
same property for an amount much lower than that for which they purchased it. Moreover, by
executing adacion, the sellers effectively waived the redemption period normally given a
mortgagor.
In sum, we hold that respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the relief
demanded in his Complaint. The Camachos’ nonpayment of the purchase price agreed upon and
the irregularities surrounding the dacion en pago are serious enough to allow him to possess the
property pendente lite.
Respondent has shown that to allow petitioner to take immediate possession of the
property would result in grave injustice. As we have stated above, the ownership of the property,
the validity of the sale between respondent and the Camachos and the legitimacy of the dacion en
pago executed by the latter in favor of petitioner are still subject to determination in the court
below. Furthermore, there is no question that respondent has been in possession of the premises
during all this time -- prior to and during the institution of the Complaint. He and his family have
long owned, possessed and occupied it as their family home since 1967. To dispossess him of it
now would definitely alter the status quo to their detriment.
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3. DOH vs. Phil. Pharmawealth

G.R. No. 182358; February 20, 2013
Facts:
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the
Philippines.
22 Dec ’98: Secretary of Health Romualdez, Jr. issued AO No. 27, s. 1998, outlining the
guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical
products. AO No. 27 was later amended by AO No. 10, s. 2000, providing for additional
guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can
transact business with DOH. It provided that “only products accredited by the Committee shall
be allowed to be procured by the DOH and all other entities under its jurisdiction.”
9 and 29 May 2000: Phil. Pharmawealth submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G
Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by DOH, it appears that processing of and release
of the result of Phil. Pharmawealth request were due on Sep 2000, the last month of the quarter
following the date of its filing.
Sep 2000: DOH, through Lopez, issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of
1.2M units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine. Phil. Pharmawealth submitted its bid for the
Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on 11 Oct 2000, only two
companies participated, with Phil. Pharmawealth submitting the lower bid at P82.24/unit,
compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories’ bid of P95.00/unit. In view, however, of the non-
accreditation of Phil. Pharmawealth’s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded
to YSS.
Phil. Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, praying that the RTC “nullify
the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, and direct DOH,
Romualdez, Galon and Lopez to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible
bidder for the Benzathine contract, among others.
DOH filed Manifestation and Motion to dismiss, praying for the outright dismissal of the
complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. Phil. Pharmawealth’s contention: The
doctrine of state immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being sued
both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the non-suability of the state applies in this case
Ruling:
No. The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was
acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance
of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the
first case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official
concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party.  In its complaint, Pharmawealth
sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their official capacity. Since
judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed
by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.
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Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by Pharmawealth is the enjoinment of the
implementation, as well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of which may not be
enforced against individual petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities as
officials of the DOH.
As regards DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58, preliminary injunction may be
directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity
from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial
liability against the State.
As regards individual petitioners’ suability for damages, the following discussion on the
applicability of the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant. The rule that a state may not
be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now adopted as part
of the law of the land.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against
the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to
perform a positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages
awarded against them.
However, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither
does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied
a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of "illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract which act was done in bad faith
and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on
him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability
personally.
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in
no way reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to Pharmawealth. The mere allegation
that a government official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically remove
the same from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand,
does the mere invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and
liability for an act committed without or in excess of his or her authority. These are matters of
evidence which should be presented and proven at the trial.
4. Levi Strauss & Co., & Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. vs. Clinton Apparelle, Inc.
G.R. No. 138900; September 20, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Levi filed a complaint for Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages
against respondent Clinton Apartelle alleging that respondent were using a design similar to their
"Dockers and Design" trademark owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without its
consent.
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Hence, petitioner prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, ordering
respondents to to cease and desist from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising, or otherwise using denims, jeans or pants with the design herein complained of as
substantially, if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs' "Dockers and Design" trademark.
Petitioners further prays that after notice and hearing, and pending trial on the merits, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining defendants, their officers, employees, agents,
dealers, retailers, or assigns from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale,
advertising, jeans the design herein complained of as substantially, if not exactly similar, to
plaintiffs' "Dockers and Design" trademark. For failing of the respondents to appear during the
summary hearing, the court granted the issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners LS and Co. and LS Philippines are entitled to the reliefs
prayed for in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong
arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of
the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An
extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and
is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be
heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or
interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to
only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation. The resolution of an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special recourse before
the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.
Further, under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial
protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract,
or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right.
There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that
the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
The Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing proof adduced by petitioners to support its
application for the issuance of the writ. While the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion must be exercised
based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the
trial court in injunctive matters is generally not interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse.
And to determine whether there was abuse of discretion, a scrutiny must be made of the bases, if
any, considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief. Be it stressed that injunction is the
strong arm of equity which must be issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases
of great injury where there is no commensurate remedy in damages. In the present case, we find
that there was scant justification for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
5. Gomos vs. Adiong

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863; October 22, 2004
Facts:
On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action No. 690-01 for
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against Find for Assistance for
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Private Education (FAPE). He alleged that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum
College, Inc. under the Educational Service Program of the DECS; that although the DECS has
already released to FAPE the total amount of P746,000,000.00 for payment to different
participating schools, FAPE refused to release to Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of
P1,845,040.00 which represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said institution for the
school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by FAPE to release the said amount has caused
the school to fail in its obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3 months. On the same
day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction upon the posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond in the amount of
P200,000.00.On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order, writ of
mandamus, directing the president of FAPE, Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to prepare and issue a
check for P1,845,040.00 representing the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. payable to its
president and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner herein." FAPE, in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, contended ,among others, that the RTC of Marawi City has no
jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its
principal office in Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it
belongs. Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent judge from enforcing the
orders of February 26, 2001. Despite the TRO, respondent judge ordered the arrest of Dr.
Borromeo and certain FAPE employees for failure to comply with his directive. Upon a
complaint filed by herein petitioner before the OCA, the OCA found that the respondent judge
was liable for gross ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority; that the respondent,
as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to enforce a preliminary injunction
in Makati City where the principal office of FAPE was located.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasum’s application for preliminary
mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01 was filed on
February 26, 2001. Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is very
explicit that the writ of preliminary injuction may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon
the adverse party. In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the application was filed and
considering that the person against whom the same was to be served was located in Makati,
summons could not have been served upon them or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of
the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.
Respondent judge’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his
total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi
City, he should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial
jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the
issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as
explained in Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, is "that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed
outside its territorial jurisdiction."
In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere
deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant
disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The responsibility of judges to
keep abreast of the law and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme
Court, is a pressing need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute
and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one –
not even judges.
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6. Gabriel dela Paz vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857; November 23, 2004
Facts:
Gabriel dela Paz, Officer-in-Charge of Fund for Assistance to Private Education charged
Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, Branch 8 of gross ignorance
of the law and/or abuse of authority. Pacasum College, Inc., filed a petition for mandamus with
application for a preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE.
Respondent judge issued an Order of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction requiring

FAPE and its officials to prepare and issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00 representing
the entitlement of the petitioner for School Year 2001-2002, payable to its President/Chairman
Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum. FAPE in its motion claimed that the issuance of writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements under Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority as correctly claimed by the complainant,
respondent judge had indeed issued the two (2) orders of March 4 & 5, 2002 without complying
with the mandatory requirement of notice and hearing under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that: "No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined x x x."
Issue:
Is the Respondent Judge guilty of grave abuse of authority when he issued the orders
dated March 4 and March 5, 2002?
Ruling:
Yes, the rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the
same can only be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined. It is also
provided that no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may
be issued effective for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to be
enjoined.
The Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent conducted a hearing
before the injunction was granted or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In fact,
complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all served with summons before the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted
a bond and the same was approved before the order granting the preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued. The Order merely stated that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance without even stating the facts which would support the granting of the injunction. This
is a clear violation of the rule.
Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:
SEC. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;
… … …
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Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding
office in Makati City to issue a check payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the
territorial jurisdiction of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by the respondent is void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited
only to and operative only within his respective provinces or districts.
Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati to serve the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent
can only enforce his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.
7. Decano v. Edu
G.R. No. L-30070; August 29, 1980
Facts:
On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications
issued to Federico Decano, herein petitioner-appellee, a temporary appointment to the position of
janitor in the Motor Vehicles Office, Dagupan City Agency. He served therein for almost four
years, or until April 29, 1966 when herein respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting
Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City, received a telegram from
respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in his then capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land
Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's) services effective as of the close
of business on that day.
Shortly thereafter, the aggrieved petitioner-appellee filed before the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the
aforementioned officials of the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing
him from the service.
As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at the
commencement of the proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and refrain from
disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as a janitor in the Land
Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding
salary from the date of notice of said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court."
After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioner's appointment as janitor
was temporary and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position at any time with or
without cause, the lower court nevertheless declared in its judgment of October 29, 1968 that
petitioner's removal was null and void upon the ground that under the law, respondent
Commissioner of Land Transportation was not the appointing authority insofar as the position of
petitioner and another minor positions in his office were concerned; and thus lacking the power
of appointment, said respondent had neither the power of removal.
Issue:
Whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
Yes Petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent
Edu, mandamus and injunction being then merely coronary remedies to the main relief sought,
and what is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction,
is the implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of
dismissal was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his
subordinate officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar,
therefore, as respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a
fait accompli and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is
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question, consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's
order by his co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial
boundaries of the trial court's jurisdictional district.
Respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan court for
a complete determination of the issues involved, the legality of Edu's order of dismissal being the
pivotal issue to determine the merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In
other words, Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for testing
the legality of his dismissal order and his transmittal thereof to his co-respondent registrar at
Dagupan City to implement the same and terminate the services of the petitioner in Dagupan
City.
8. Dagupan Electric Corp. vs. Paño

G.R. No. L-49510. January 28, 1980
Facts:
DECORP is a domestic corporation with a principal office in Quezon City, although its
generating plant is located in Pangasinan. MC Adore is also a domestic corporation with office in
Cubao, Quezon City. MC Adore owns and operates the MC Adore Int’l Palace Hotel at Dagupan
City. MC Adore entered into a contract for power service with DECORP. DECORP rendered full
power services.
MC Adore Int’l Palace Hotel failed to pay its September and October 1978 bills to
Dagupan Electric Corp. Due to this, DECORP served a Notice of Disconnection that unless
payment is made within the usual period of 48 hours, the disconnection service will be made.
Indeed, DECORP disconnected the electrical services of MC Adore.
6 Dec ’78: MC Adore filed a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against DECORP in CFI Rizal. On the same day, Judge issued an ex parte order for a
preliminary injunction, commanding DECORP as well as its agents in Dagupan City to "restore
immediately not later than 5-M p.m., December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the MC Adore
International Palace Hotel and resume the electrical supply of and the electrical services and
facilities to said hotel to enable it to operate it fully, under pain of contempt.
8 Dec: MC Adore also moved that its "cash bond in the sum of P50k represented by
Check No. 12100 of the BPI payable to the clerk of court" be substituted by a surety bond. For
failure of DECORP and its agents in Dagupan City to comply with the aforesaid preliminary
mandatory injunction, MC Adore filed a petition to declare DECORP and its corporate officers
in contempt of court, also on the same day.
The judge issued an order, stating: “DECORP’s corporate officers, except Atty. Leonardo
Baro may be held in custody until the order is complied, as the Court finds no valid justification
for this contumacious disobedience. Defendant Corporation has its head offices in Quezon City,
and although the plant is in Dagupan City, the plant can only act upon orders of the Quezon City
head office.”
11 Dec: On the hearing for preliminary mandatory injunction, DECORP appeared and
moved for reconsideration of the orders for want of jurisdiction or GAD. 19 Dec: MR was
denied. Judge ordered the enforcement of the preliminary mandatory injunction. The Court
issued a resolution temporarily restraining DECORP from enforcing or continuing to enforce the
orders of 6 and 12 Dec ’78 .
21 Mar ’79: MC Adore manifested that it had filed a counterbond of P225k. 12 May:
DECORP filed an urgent supplemental motion reiterating their prayer that they be allowed to
redisconnect the electric power from the hotel of MC Adore on the ground that MC Adore had
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failed and refused to pay its electric power consumption based on the actual meter readings as
directed by the Court. Granted.
MC Adore filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the compliance with the resolution
on the ground that the current monthly bills being presented by DECORP to MC Adore are the
result of readings taken from the electric meter which was tampered and asked that it be allowed
to continue depositing the regular payment in the amount of P35k per month with the court until
such time that the issue on the tampered meter and questionable bins shall have been finally
resolved. Granted.
DECORP’s contention: CFI Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction over the case
because the act of disconnecting the power to the hotel of the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.
MC Adore’s contention: The act of disconnection was the result of an order issued by
DECORP from its business office in Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Paño acted with GAD in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
ordering DECORP to restore the connection of the electric power of MC Adore in Dagupan City
Ruling:
No. Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction. DECORP has its
principal office in Quezon City where the business of the corporation is managed by the Board of
Directors. Decisions of the said corporation are made in Quezon City. The employees of
DECORP in Dagupan City merely carry out the orders issued by the officials of said corporation
in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be restrained are being committed in Quezon City.
Judge Pano did not commit GAD in issuing the questioned order directing DECORP to
restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel owned by MC Adore. The record shows
that Judge Pano conducted hearings and gave the parties full opportunity to present their
evidence before issuing the orders sought to be set aside.
Judge Pano’s findings: On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of
Quezon City, as they have their principal offices in Quezon City. The disconnection order was
initiated and had its life and source in Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is addressed to the
corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon order of its officers in Quezon
City. In the cases where the Supreme Court ruled that the district court has improperly issued the
writ, no private right of ownership was involved. Rather they involved licenses or privileges
granted by government agencies with offices located beyond the district court's territorial
jurisdiction. Where private rights are involved, the Supreme Court had upheld the issuance of the
writ. Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights, with situs in Quezon
City by a corporation with situs in Quezon City. The exercise of will by defendant had its origin
in Quezon City. This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable
prejudice.
It is clear from the foregoing order that Judge Pano did not act capriciously or
whimsically in ordering DECORP to restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel in
Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc..
The various incidents regarding the correctness of the monthly bill presented by
DECORP to the MC Adore can be better heard and resolved by Judge Pano. The correct amounts
due prior to June 1979 shall be resolved by Judge Pano after hearing the parties.
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9. Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., et al.
G.R. No. 159296; February 10, 2006
Facts:
Allgemeine filed a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
a writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of possession granted to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) by Branch
276, RTC of Muntinlupa. Allgemeine alleged in its petition that its complaint-in-intervention
pending in Branch 256 is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276
from implementing the writ of possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no
choice but to file the petition with the appellate court.
The CA issued a Resolution which granted the issuance of a temporary restraining order
but denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a
clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of Allgemeine’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is proper.
Held:
Yes. An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
however. Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for
annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether
or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to

actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of
a court, are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Clearly, what
petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction which is
a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard.
Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been
dismissed outright.
10. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque City vs. Mario Ebio and his Children
GR No. 178411; June 23, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Mario Ebio is the successor in interest of the land adjoining Cut-cut Creek.
The land said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondent Ebio’s predecessor-in-interest
occupied the land since 1930. A proposal from the local government of Paranaque to construct a
road that will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot
occupied by the respondent. The said construction was opposed by herein respondent however
some of the coconut trees planted in the respondent’s land were cut in preparation for the
construction of the proposed road.
92
It was later learned that the land accretion was registered under the name of Guaranteed
Homes Inc. and have been donated to the City Government of Parañaque. Threatened being
evicted respondent Ebio filed and action for injunction against City of Parañaque.
Issues:
1. Whether the State is an indispensable party to respondent’s action for prohibitory
injunction.
2. Whether the character of respondent’s possession and occupation of the subject property
entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction
Ruling:
1. No. The SC cites Article 457 of the Civil Code which states that “to the owners of land
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters”. This means that alluvial deposits along the banks do
not form part of the public domain as it is automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it have been added. However it is provided for by law that the owner of
the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system, otherwise the
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
It is undisputed that the accretion was formed adjacent to the land of the respondent’s
predecessor in-interest and where the house of herein respondent has erected.
Respondent’s predecessor-in-interest possessed and occupied the same since 1930 as
against the registration by Home Guaranteed only in 1978. Under the foregoing facts
respondent acquired the land through acquisitive prescription having been in possession
for more than 30 years in which case the law vested him rights of ownership over the
land. Hence the State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where
no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligations shall be imposed upon it.
2. The respondent having been acquired the land by virtue of acquisitive prescription it has
a right in esse which means clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail on an
injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or
existing. Even though the land was not yet registered under respondent’s name, the latter
can assert such right because registration was never intended as a means of acquiring
ownership but it merely confirms.
11. OWWA v. Chavez

G.R. No. 169802,; June 8, 2007
Facts:
A Welfare & Training Fund for Overseas Workers in DOLE provides social & welfare
services to OFW, insurance coverage, social work, legal & placement assistance, cultural &
remittances services which was renamed as the OWWA. Since there was still no formal OWWA
structure, the OWWA Board of Trustees passed a Resolution for the organizational structure &
staffing pattern of the OWWA to stablize the internal organization. DBM approved the said
resolution. Sec of DOLE issued Admin Order No. 171 creating a Placement Committee to
evaluate qualifications of employees, and to recommend their appropriate placement in the new
organizational chart, functional statements and staffing pattern of the OWWA.
Respondents then filed a complaint to annul that organizational structure of the OWWA
w/ prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against OWWA & its Board of
Trustees arguing that the resulting decrease in the number of employees due to Organizational
Structure will result in the constructive dismissal of at least 110 employees.
· RTC granted the injunction by respondents and ruled that Resolution no 1 was not a
formal structure and only disrupts the existing organization & disturbs & displaces a number of
regular Employees.
·
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CA: Affirmed RTC. It was proper for RTC to restrain, for the meantime, the
implementation of OWWA’s reorganization to prevent injury until after the main case is heard
and decided. The anxiety of being dismissed or displaced is not premature, speculative and
purely anticipatory, but based on real fear which shows a threatened or direct injury, it appearing
that the reorganization of the OWWA is already slowly being put into motion.
OWWA argued that it already implemented the new organizational structure as the
advertisement, recruitment have been accomplished; none of the respondents in this case have
been dismissed; the act sought to be prevented has long been consummated, hence, the remedy
of injunction should no longer be entertained.
Issue:
May a preliminary injunction be issued despite the fact that the act sought to be
prohibited has been accomplished?
Ruling:
No. Injunction will not lie here because the acts sought to be enjoined have already been
accomplished/consummated. A preliminary injunction’s objective is to preserve the status quo
until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. In this case, RTC didn’t maintain such
when it issued the injunction. What RTC did was to preserve the state of affairs before the
issuance of Resolution No. 001 (which approved the structure of the OWWA). RTC forgot that
what is imperative in preliminary injunction cases is that the writ cannot be effectuated to
establish new relations between the parties. It didn’t maintain the status quo but restored the
landscape before the implementation of OWWA’s reorganization. In thus issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, the substantive issues of the main case were resolved by the trial court.
RTC similarly prejudged the validity of the issuances released by the OWWA Board of Trustees,
as well as the other governmental bodies (i.e., DBM, DOLE), which approved the organizational
structure and staffing pattern of the OWWA (apply the presumption of regularity of the
government issuances)
Also, a mere blanket allegation that they are all officers and employees of the OWWA
without a showing of how they stand to be directly injured by the implementation of its
questioned organizational structure does not suffice to prove a right in esse. There was no
showing that they are the employees who are in grave danger of being displaced. Injunction is
not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect
a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an action which did not give rise to a
cause of action.
Again, as to the question of the validity of the OWWA reorganization remains the subject
in the main case pending before the trial court. Its annulment can’t be raised in this petition.
Assuming the respondents stand to be in danger of being transferred due to the

reorganization: the law provides that any EE who questions the validity of his transfer should
appeal to the CSC. And admin remedies should be exhausted before resorting to regular courts.
FINALLY, the acts sought to be prohibited had been accomplished. And injunction will
not lie here the acts sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished/consummated. In
here, reorganization already started upon approval by the Board of Trustrees of its Resolution
No. 1 and DBM, OWWA Administrator and DOLE issued a series of issuances approving the he
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the agency. Hence, the act sought to be enjoined
is a fait accompli.
12. Manila International Airport vs CA

G.R. No. 118249; February 14, 2003
Facts:
94
K Services began providing porters for the domestic passenger terminal of the Manila
International Airport (now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport) under a provisional permit
for the period from January 1, 1976 to April 30, 1976. MIAA and K Services subsequently
executed a contract effective from May 1976 to April 30, 1977 that was renewed yearly until
December 1984.
Although the parties did not renew their contract for the succeeding year, K Services
continued as porterage contractor from January 1985 until February 1987. Sometime in February
1987, however, MIAA gave notice that the services of K Services would be terminated on
February 20, 1987. In response, K Services filed a petition for injunction on February 26, 1987
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
On December 26, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, rendered a decision
ruling that MIAA could terminate its contract with K Services at any time. K Services appealed
the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals also denied K
Services’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. As K Services did not appeal, the decision of
the Court of Appeals became final and executory. Thus, the issue as to whether MIAA could
terminate the contract with K Services became res judicata.
Shortly after, K Services received a letter dated May 31, 1991 from then MIAA General
Manager Eduardo Carrascoso, the relevant portion of which stated: "Due to certain
administrative problems that are preventing us from taking over, please continue operating said
service until further notice from us. In connection thereto, please be advised also that PAL
Authorities and the MIA Authority have come to an agreement whereby the latter shall operate
and manage the Domestic Terminal II which necessarily includes the operation of the porterage
and other concessions therein. In this regard, you may take over the operation of the porterage
service therein since the flights being operated in this Terminal II used to be a part of your
contract. Please coordinate this with the Manager of the Domestic Passenger Terminal and the
PAL Authorities concerned. Please understand however that in continuing the operation of the
porterage service, you will be charged the monthly Concession Privilege Fee in the amount of
P45,000.00 for each Terminal or a total of P90,000.00 per month; further, you will also abide by
the terms and conditions of your expired contract."
K Services alleged that it was initially hesitant to accept MIAA’s offer. However, it
continued to provide porters for Domestic Terminal I and expanded its operations to cover
Domestic Terminal II upon the alleged verbal assurance of MIAA’s officers that MIAA’s policy
was to relinquish porterage operations to the private sector. K Services likewise claimed that
MIAA officers also gave verbal assurance that K Services would not be replaced with another
porterage contractor without a public bidding in which K Services could participate. In support
of its contention, K Services cited the memorandum dated August 28, 1992 from General
Manager Guillermo G. Cunanan to the MIAA Board of Directors which stated that
"Management has decided to relinquish the management of these concessions and award them to
the private sector at fair and reasonable fees . . .."
The memorandum recommended to the MIAA Board of Directors the approval of a

schedule of concession fees chargeable to concessionaires of porterage and other services.
However, on December 1, 1992, General Manager Cunanan gave written notice to K Services to
"wind up" its operations as "Management has decided to take over the aforecited services at the
Domestic Passenger Terminals I and II." K Services opposed the takeover. It filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
the trial court issued on a temporary restraining order against MIAA.
The OSG filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by K Services on the grounds that:
(1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; or (2) assuming the existence of a cause of
action, a prior judgment barred the same. At the time MIAA filed the instant petition before the
Court, this motion to dismiss, opposed by K Services, was pending consideration by the trial
95
court. K Services filed a motion to cite MIAA’s General Manager Cunanan for contempt as the
latter ostensibly attempted to oust and replace K Services with another porterage contractor. It
was only upon receipt of a copy of the contempt motion that the OSG supposedly learned of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not K Services was entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction granted by
the trial court. (NO)
Held:
No. K services is not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the old Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time,
prescribed that a preliminary injunction could be granted provided: "(a) That the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work
injustice to the plaintiff; or (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."
The requisites necessary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the
case before it. In the instant case, however, the trial court’s order was, on its face, bereft of basis
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. There were no findings of fact or law in the
assailed order indicating that any of the elements essential for the grant of a preliminary
injunction existed. The trial court alluded to hearings during which the parties marked their
respective exhibits and the trial court heard the oral arguments of opposing counsels. However, it
cannot be ascertained what evidence was formally offered and presented by the parties and given
weight and credence by the trial court.
The basis for the trial court’s conclusion that K Services was entitled to a writ of
preliminary injunction is unclear. In its order of August 5, 1993, the trial court stated that it
issued the injunction to prevent irreparable loss that might be caused to K Services. Once more,
however, the trial court neglected to mention what right in esse of K Services, if any, was in
danger of being violated and required the protection of a preliminary injunction.
The trial court stated merely that K Services was servicing MIAA as a porterage
contractor and that a notice of termination was sent to K Services. Absent a preliminary finding
by the trial court that K Services possessed the right to continue as MIAA’s concessionaire,
MIAA’s termination of K Services’ was not sufficient in itself to establish that there was an
invasion of K Services’ right.
Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
should have exercised more prudence and judiciousness in its issuance of the injunction order.
We remind trial courts that while generally the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on
the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme caution must be
observed in the exercise of such discretion. The discretion of the court a quo to grant an
injunctive writ must be exercised based on the grounds and in the manner provided by law.
96
13. Unilever vs CA
G.R. NO. 119280; August 10, 2006
Facts:
On August 24, 1994, Procter and Gamble filed a complaint for injunction with damages
and a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioner Unilever alleging that Unilever substantially and materially imitated P&G’s key visual
double tug or tac tac in its televison commercial for Unilever’s Breeze Powerwhite" laundry
product called "Porky”. The double tug or tac tac was P&G’s key visual in the advertisement of
its laundry detergent and bleaching products. Tac tac was demonstrated by the fabric being held
by both hands and stretched sideways.
On September 16, 1994, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. Later, P&G received the order for the issuance wherein it also stated the fixing a bond
of P100,000. P&GP filed the required bond issued by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
On the other hand, Unilver alleges that: (1) the writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by the trial court (and affirmed by the CA) without any evidence of P&G’s clear and
unmistakable right to the writ; and (2) Unilever was denied of the opportunity to present evidece
since the preliminary injunction issued against it already disposed of the main case without trial.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the issuance of the writ by the court violated Section 58 of the Revised
Rules of Procedure.
(2) Whether or not the issuance of the writ deprived Unilever of procedural due process
when it issued the writ.
Rulings:
(1) No. Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide protection to
parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the pendency of the principal
action. Thus, Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Preliminary
injunction defined; classes.—A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of
an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. Injunction is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation. As correctly ruled by the CA, there was an extreme urgency to grant the
preliminary injunction prayed for by P&GP considering that TV commercials are aired
for a limited period of time only. In fact, this Court takes note of the fact that the TV
commercial in issue—the Kite TV advertisement—is no longer aired today, more than 10
years after the injunction was granted on September 16, 1994.
(2) No. The sole objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A writ of preliminary injunction is
generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. Thus, it was impossible for the
court a quo to fully dispose of the case, as claimed by petitioner, without all the evidence
needed for the full resolution of the same. To date, the main case still has to be resolved
by the trial court.
14. Hernandez, et al. vs. National Power Corporation

G.R. No. 145328; March 23, 2006
Facts:
97
NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers to support

overhead high tension cables for a Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes
through the homes of the Hernandez et al., which proved to be the bane of their existence.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, Hernandez et al. got hold of published articles
and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
These illnesses range from cancer to leukemia. They aired this growing concern to the
NAPOCOR. Negotiations between Hernandez et al. and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé,
with Hernandez et al. vying for the relocation of the transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on one
hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement widening, on the other. Thus,
Hernandez et al. Thus, Hernandez et al. filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
NAPOCOR.
RTC issued a TRO against NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the CA assailing the
Order of RTC. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818 (1981),"Prohibiting Courts from
Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and
Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government,"
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
jurisdiction. In the interregnum, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against NAPOCOR. RTC articulated that an injunction was necessary to stay NAPOCOR’s
activation of its power lines due to the possible health risks posed to Hernandez at al. Asserting
its jurisdiction over the case, RTC was of the view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and
jurisprudence proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects do not find application in the
case at bar because of the health risks involved. CA reversed RTC and ruled that the proscription
on injunctions against infrastructure projects of the government is clearly mandated by Sec. 1 of
PD 1818.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC may may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or
towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding PD No. 1818.
Ruling:
Yes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act
or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or
interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies
upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided
for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the
writ is concerned.
PD 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government infrastructure

projects. While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the
implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure, natural resource development and
public utilities, this rule, however, is not absolute as there are actually instances when PD 1818
should not find application. The prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or
restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of
law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to
restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill consciousness among them.” To boot,
Hernandez et al., moreover, harp on NAPOCOR’s failure to conduct prior consultation with
them, as the community affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local
Government Code which provides: "no project or program shall be implemented by government
98
authorities unless the consultations mentioned are complied with, and prior approval of the
Sanggunian concerned is observed." From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of
Hernandez et al.’s constitutionally protected right to health and whether NAPOCOR had indeed
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with the affected
communities are veritable questions of law that invested the RTC with jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case
from the protective mantle of PD 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction finds legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires
that unless restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to render
the judgment ineffectual. Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that
the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of Hernandez et al. so as to
justify the issuance by the RTC of a writ of preliminary injunction. Equally important, the SC
took judicial notice that the area alluded to as location of the NAPOCOR project is a fragile zone
being proximate to local earthquake faults, particularly the Marikina fault, among other zones.
This is not to mention the risks of falling structures caused by killer tornadoes and super
typhoons, the Philippines, especially Central Luzon, being situated along the typhoon belt.
After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that
the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require
is that the act complained of be probablyin violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the
Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which
is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as
basis for a final and permanent injunction. Pending the final determination of the RTC on the
main case for damages, of whether or not the NAPOCOR Project infringes on Hernandez at al.’s
substantive right to health and pending determination of the question of whether there was non-
observance of the prior-consultation proviso under the Local Government Code, it is prudent to
preserve the status quo. In the present case, the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety
should be the primordial concerns over presumed economic benefits per se as alleged by the
NAPOCOR.
15. Universal Motors Corporation v. Rojas

A.M. RTJ 03-1814; May 26, 2005
Facts:
UMC had a dealership agreement with Nissan Specialist Sales Corporation (NSSC).
Pursuant thereto, NSSC ordered 5.4M worth of Nissan spare parts from UMC. However, the
checks used for payment were all dishonored. Despite demands, no payment was made. As a
result, UMC terminated its agreement with NSSC and filed a complaint for BP 22 and Estafa
against NSSC.
On the other hand, NSSC filed a case in the RTC of CDO denominated as Complaint for
Breach of Contract, Damages, with
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against UMC and its officers and was raffled to the sala of
Judge Rojas. Thereafter, judge ordered a summary hearing on the propriety of the issuance of a
TRO. Subsequently, NSSC filed an Amended Complaint which inserted a prayer for TRO which
was not found in the original complaint. After hearing, the judge issued a 20-day TRO against
UMC.
Thereafter, the judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction after NSSC posted its bond.
Aggrieved, UMC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in the CA assailing the issuance of
said Writ. Later on, CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. It also stated that it
issued a TRO without requiring a bond and that NSSC never applied for a TRO in their
complaint.
99
As a result, UMC filed an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rojas for Serious
Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Partiality, and Grave Abuse of Discretion. In
his defense, the judge denied the charges and claimed that the fact that the caption included a
“TRO,” it was already tantamount to an express application for said TRO. Nonetheless, the OCA
found him guilty of Grave Abuse of Discretion and fined him 20K.
Issue:
Whether or not judge Rojas is administratively liable for issuing a TRO even if it was not
prayed for in the complaint.
Held:
Yes. The Court was not impressed with Judge’s argument that the caption and the body
of the complaint showed an intent to include a prayer for a TRO. Nowhere in the allegations in
the complaint was it shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the NSSC, pending
hearing on the preliminary injunction.
Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued
only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
heard. In addition, Section 4(a) of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the
procedure to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary
injunction or TRO may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is
verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.
We note that the relief sought by NSSC in the original complaint consisted mainly of its
reinstatement as dealer of Nissan vehicles and spare parts in Northern Mindanao, and the
termination of the dealership agreement between UMC and NICAD.
NSSC did not allege facts to support an urgent need to issue a TRO to prevent any great
or irreparable injury that it might suffer while the preliminary injunction is being heard. In one
case, the Court penalized a judge who awarded reliefs to plaintiffs without any showing that such
reliefs were applied for.
In addition, the judge issued the TRO without requiring the plaintiff to post a bond. Sec.
4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order. — A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only
when:
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to
be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining
order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon
approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued.
While Section 4(b) of Rule 58 gives the presiding judge the discretion to require a bond
before granting a temporary restraining order, the Rules did not intend to give the judge the
license to exercise such discretion arbitrarily to the prejudice of the defendant. Certainly, each
member of the Bench is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of
law. The bond under Rule 58 is intended to pay all the damages which the party or person
against whom the temporary restraining order or injunction is issued may sustain by reason
thereof should the court finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Hence, it
follows that unless it appears that the enjoined party will not suffer any damage, the presiding
judge must require the applicant to post a bond, otherwise the courts could become instruments
of oppression and harassment.
100
The present Rules now regulate the issuance of temporary restraining orders, not only by
requiring a hearing, but also by imposing a bond on the applicant to prevent the abuse of this
relief by litigants. The TRO issued by the judge effectively enjoined the defendants therein,
UMC and NICAD, from doing business as dealer of Nissan vehicles in Northern Mindanao. It
does not require deep thinking to realize the losses that these companies will suffer if the court
orders them to freeze operations. Not only will they be deprived of potential earnings from sales
but they will also have to expend for their overhead even if they are not able to do business.
16. Valencia, et al. vs. CA

G.R. No. 111401; October 17, 1996
Facts:
PETITIONER FILES COMPLAINT FOR RESCISSION IN RTC BULACAN: Bagtas
and Bunye (respondents) were lessees of a 24-hectare fishpond owned by Eriberto (petitioner as
substituted by his heirs) and located in Bulacan. The lease was covered by a lease contract which
was to expire on March 1982. However, before said date, petitioner filed a complaint for the
rescission of the lease contract in the RTC of Bulacan.
·
CA ORDERS MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO: RTC Bulacan issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction ordering respondents to surrender possession of the fishpond.
To which respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and to which the CA issued a
restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the injunction. At the hearing in the CA, the
parties agreed to maintain status quo and that the fishpond hut would still be utilized by
respondents until resolution of the case.
·
BUT PETITIONER FILES MOTION LEADING TO RESPONDENTS’ BEING
EJECTED FROM THE FISHPOND: However, despite this order, petitioners filed an ex-parte
motion for the designation of a member of the Philippine Constabulary to maintain order in the
place. The RTC granted this motion and petitioner, with the aid of PC men, was able to eject
respondents from the main hut, dry up a portion of the leased property where respondent
previously scattered chemicals and fertilizer and as a result, no fish food grew causing damage to
respondents. Respondents were also prevented from transferring the bigger fish to a more
spacious portion resulting in the death to many fishes again causing damage to respondents.
There was also another person who introduced himself as the new lessee. Thus, the RTC ordered
another order declaring that the fishes should remain as property of respondents subject to their
disposal. This order wasn’t honored by petitioner.
· RESPONDENTS FILE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES IN RTC MANILA:

Respondents now seek exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. This and the subsequent MR was denied. Respondents’
presented their evidence but petitioners instead of doing the same, filed a second motion to
dismiss which was denied.
· PETITIONER FILES A MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN RTC MANILA;

RTC RULES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS: Petitioners state that the proceedings in RTC
Manila should be suspended until after the case in Bulacan which was appealed to the CA has
been resolved. RTC denied this and gave petitioners time to file the necessary pleadings.
Petitioner and his counsel didn’t appear at the subsequent hearing so the court deemed petitioner
to have waived his right to present evidence and considered the case submitted for decision. The
RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
· BOTH PARTIES APPEAL TO THE CA: Petitioner alleges litis pendentia and contests
the award of damages while respondents contest the RTC’s failure to award actual damages.
· CA AFFIRMS RTC MANILA: According to the CA, there was no litis pendentia. The
CA also denied petitioner’s MR.
101
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI: Petitioner alleges that the rule on litis
pendentia bars the action for damages in Manila, respondents committed forum shopping,
respondents’ claim for damages should’ve been made through a compulsory counterclaim in the
same action for rescission, and lastly, the bond he posted for the issuance by the Bulacan RTC of
the writ of preliminary injunction could’ve answered for the damages claimed by respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the injunction bond was sufficient protection.
RULING:
No. (1) The bond petitioner posted was for the issuance by the Bulacan RTC of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction. It was only supposed to answer for damages arising from
the issuance of the injunction and not for damages caused by the actuations of petitioner. (2)
Purpose of the injunction bond is to protect defendant against loss/damage by reason of the
injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff wasn’t entitled to it.
17. Bagong West Kabulusan N. A. Vs. Judge Lerma

A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1904 : February 18, 2005
Facts:
CST Enterprises, Inc. filed before the Muntinlupa Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
thirty eight (38) complaints for ejectment against 39 individuals2 (the defendants) who were
occupying lots located at West Kabulusan, Barangay Cupang, Muntinlupa City.
Branch 80 of the Muntinlupa MeTC, by decision of March 17, 2000, rendered judgment in favor
of CST Enterprises, Inc., ordering the defendants to vacate the lots and surrender possession
thereof to CST Enterprises, Inc. The judgment became final and executory following which writs
of execution were issued and served on the defendants on June 14, 2000.
It appears that the defendants refused to vacate the lots. Thus, by Order of November 8, 2000,
the MeTC directed the defendants to demolish their "respective structures" within 5 days from
notice thereof.5 A writ of demolition6 dated November 9, 2000 was accordingly issued directing
the sheriff to remove and demolish the houses and improvements introduced by the defendants
on the lots.
The Complaint for injunction alleged that under R.A. No. 7279 (Urban Development and
Housing Act of 1992), it is mandatory that before demolition or eviction can be effected,
adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent, be undertaken by the City of Muntinlupa
and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other concerned government agencies.
The Association's complaint for injunction in Civil Case No. 00-233 was raffled to Branch 256
of the Muntinlupa RTC presided by respondent, Judge Alberto Lerma. Summons dated January
2, 2001 was thereafter issued to Sheriff Camacho requiring him to enter his appearance and
answer the Association's petition within 15 days from service thereof, which summons was
served on him on January 15, 2001.
Notice dated January 8, 2001 setting for hearing on January 17, 2001 the Association's
prayer for a TRO was issued. The notice addressed to Sheriff Camacho was, however, served on
him the day after the hearing or on January 18, 2001.14 As he was not present during the hearing,
respondent, on motion of the Association, considered the matter of the issuance of TRO
submitted for resolution.
By Order of February 5, 2001, respondent denied the Association's prayer for a TRO, he
finding that no great or irreparable injury would result if a TRO is not issued immediately.
Copies of this order were sent to the parties by registered mail on February 16, 2001.17 In the
meantime, notice of hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2001 was
issued.
102
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
on March 9, 2001, respondent noted Sheriff Camacho's absence.
On motion of the Association, the hearing of "the main case for injunction" in Civil Case
No. 00-233 was set for hearing on April 19, 2001 during which the defendant sheriff again failed
to show up. The hearing was thus reset23 to June 22, 2001 during which respondent, on motion of
the Association, declared its "Motion to Declare Defendant in Default" submitted for resolution.
On September 14, 2001, the Association filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Resolve
Complaint for Injunction," setting the motion for hearing on September 17, 2001. The
Association was later to allege in its present complaint that the staff of respondent refused to set
the said motion for hearing.
Alleging that respondent, "with manifest bias and partiality and with gross ignorance of
R.A. 7279 and gross neglect of duty, deliberately delayed the resolution of [Civil Case No. 00-
233] in order for . . . [Sheriff] Camacho [to] EFFECT THE DEMOLITION before the resolution
of [said] case
Respondent, in his Comments dated November 29, 2001, claimed that several actions
were instituted by complainant and/or the defendants to stop at all cost the enforcement and
implementation of the decision rendered by the MeTC.
That the defendants elevated the case on December 4, 2000 to the Court of Appeals via
petition for annulment of judgment with injunction and very urgent motion for the issuance of a
restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 61991) challenging (1) the MeTC Decision dated March 17,
2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715; (2) the RTC Order dated August 23, 2000 dismissing on
motion of CST Enterprises, Inc. the petition for certiorari in S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085; (3) the
RTC Order dated October 18, 2000 in S.P. Civil Case No. 00-085 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants; (4) the MeTC Order dated November 8, 2000 in Civil
Case Nos. 4678-4715 granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition; (5) the MeTC
Writ of Demolition dated November 9, 2000 in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715; and (6) the Notice to
Vacate and Demolish dated November 20, 2000 issued by MeTC Sheriff Camacho in Civil Case
Nos. 4678-4715.
Respondent further claimed that a week after the defendants filed their petition before the
appellate court or on December 11, 2000, complainant again filed the Complaint for "Injunction
with Very Urgent Petition for the Issuance of Restraining Order to Preserve and Maintain the
Status Quo"
Respondent furthermore alleged that on August 27, 2001, five months after the Court of
Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 61991, complainant filed a motion to suspend proceedings
in Civil Case Nos. 4678-4715 before Branch 80 of the MeTC for the same purpose, that is, to
hold in abeyance the enforcement of the notice to vacate and demolish dated November 20,
2000.
In the main, respondent stressed that all these cases filed after a writ of demolition was
issued by the MeTC were filed for the purpose of restraining the sheriff from enforcing the
notices to vacate and demolish, in violation of the rule against forum-shopping under Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, they involving the same parties, causes of action,
and reliefs.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Lerma violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular
20-95 for failure to call a hearing on its application for a TRO within 24 hours after the case has
been raffled to his sala.
Ruling:
103
The period within which to conduct a summary hearing is not 24 hours after the case has
been raffled but 24 hours after the records are transmitted to the branch to which it is raffled.
Pertinent paragraphs of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 are quoted hereunder:
1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary
injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court,
such complaint or initiatory pleading shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party
and in the presence of such party or counsel.
2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately
after raffle.
This circular is now incorporated in the present Rules of Court as Rule 58, Section 4 as
follows: Sec. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary injunction or restraining order. -
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only when:
xxx
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining
order is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multi-
sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or
the person sought to be enjoined. In any event, such notice shall be preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy of the
complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant's affidavit and bond, upon the adverse
party in the Philippines.
xxx
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall thereafter be acted upon only
after all parties are heard in a summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty
four (24) hours after the sheriff's return of service and/or records are received by the
branch selected by raffle and to which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
Î±lÎ±Ï‰lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Clearly, the circular and the Rules of Court seek to minimize the ex-parte, precipitate and
improvident issuance of TROs. Again, granting arguendo that respondent may have erred in not
taking a more suitable course of action, given the circumstances surrounding the case, not to
mention the palpable intent of the defendants to trifle with judicial processes, any lapse on his
part can be seen as mere error of judgment, of which he may not be held administratively liable
in the absence of a showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.
As for complainant's imputation to respondent of falsification of court records by making

it appear that he already resolved the application for the issuance of a TRO as early as February
5, 2001 when the application was yet to be heard on February 28, 2001: The records before this
Court disclose that the February 5, 2001 Order denying complainant's prayer for a TRO was sent
to the parties by registered mail on February 16, 2001.
It is thus possible that when complainant filed on February 21, 2001, its "Motion to
Resolve the Pending Incident of Temporary Restraining Order with Motion to Declare Defendant
in Default," the hearing of which motion was set by complainant-movant on February 28, 2001,
complainant had not yet received the February 5, 2001 Order of the Court.
18. In Re: Admin Complaint vss Hon. Abesamis, et al.
Facts:
Petitioners, employees of Year Jan Industries, Phil., Inc. and members of the Year Jan
Industries of Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(ANGLO-KMU), charge respondent Court of Appeals Justices Abesamis, Labitoria and
Asuncion, with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
104
An alias writ of execution was issued against the Company to collect P5,437,992.00
constituting the computed backwages, 13th month pay and sick and vacation leave pay of the
petitioners. A notice of garnishment was issued against the Company's account in the RCBC.
The Company filed a "Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction" to enjoin the implementation of the writ of
execution and the order of garnishment, and if the same has already been implemented, to
restrain RCBC from transferring the garnished amount to the NLRC Sheriff, or if the garnished
amount has already been transferred, to enjoin the NLRC from releasing the same to the
petitioners.
On September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining order. On February

29, 2000, the Company's application for preliminary injunction was granted upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P5,437,992.02. The Company, however, failed to post the bond required.
The Company filed another Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and/or Preliminary
Injunction, this time, to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from implementing the alias writ of execution
dated September 19, 2000, for the collection of P8,401,103.36 representing additional
backwages/salaries of the petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals deprived them
of their right to be reinstated and to be paid their lost income. They also assert that the issuance
of the TRO without requiring the posting of the required surety bond and without defining the
period of its effectivity or duration transgresses Sections 5 and 7 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
and the Canon of Judicial Ethics.
Respondents, upon the other hand maintain, viz: (1) that the TROs never enjoined nor
restrained the reinstatement of the complainants; (2) that under Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, the bond is posted only when required by court; (3) that the phrase ―until further orders
of this Courtd id not make the period of the TROs indefinite; and (4) that the charges averred in
the complaint have already been passed upon and considered by this Court
Issues:
1. Whether or not the failure of the court to require posting of bond violated the rules of
court.
2. Whether or not the TRO was issued for an indefinite period.
Rulings:
1. No. The failure of the respondents to require the Company to post a bond did not
violate the Rules of Court. Paragraph (b) of Section 4, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, gives the court discretion to require such bond.[2] The court may, in
proper cases, exempt the applicant from filing the bond normally required.[3] In
issuing the October 11, 2000 Resolution, respondents were merely exercising a
discretion granted them by law. Certainly, we find no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave or patent abuse of judgment when they issued the assailed Order. It must be
stressed however, that respondents in their Resolution dated February 29, 2000,
required the Company to post a bond for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Unfortunately, the Company failed to comply, hence, the writ was never issued.
2. No. The TRO dated October 11, 2000 was not issued for an indefinite time. Under
Section 5, Paragraph 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals shall be effective for sixty (60) days from
service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. It automatically terminates upon
the expiration of the 60 day period without need of any judicial declaration to that
effect. In the assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered, among others, that
―the public respondent NLRC is also restrained and enjoined from surrendering or
releasing the garnished amount to the private respondents, until further orders of this
105
Court.‖ As it is clear under the Rules that the effectivity of a TRO issued by the Court
of Appeals is only for a period of 60 days, it must be stressed that the phrase ―until
further orders of this Court‖ embodied in said resolution should be understood in such
manner that the Court of Appeals may, in the exercise of its discretion, shorten the
lifespan of the TRO when circumstances so warrant. Applying the foregoing, we find
petitioners’ allegation that the questioned resolution transgresses the pertinent rules
erroneous.
19. Llamzon vs. Logronio, et al.

G.R. No. 167745; June 26, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Llamzon, an employee of the Industrial Relations Unit, Bataan Economic
Zone, was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service for having billed Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration Corporation overtime fees for
unloading of fuel for the dates 28 February 2000 and 20 March 2000, despite knowledge that the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) had discontinued billing registered
locator/enterprises for overtime fees since 17 December 1999.
Petitioner requested that the PEZA Central Board Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline to
allow the PNP Crime Laboratory (PEZA- CBIID) to examine the written contents of the billings
for overtime fees. However, it was denied by PEZA- CBIID considering that the NBI had
already issued a finding that the signatures appearing in the billings are those of the petitioner.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent, with a prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, for allegedly depriving him of his rights to present
witnesses for himself and to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in an
administrative investigation.
On same date, the presiding judge issued a TRO for 20 days for the maintenance and
preservation of the status quo and scheduled hearing for preliminary injunction.
Respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Vianzon in: (i) his conduct of the proceedings before him; (ii)
vacating his earlier order of inhibition; (iii) issuing the status quo order dated 28 November
2002; and (iv) issuing the 11 December 2002 Order denying their motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Judge Vianzon failed to observe Section 5, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning applications for preliminary injunction and TRO.
According to the appellate court, Judge Vianzon granted a TRO for 20 days instead of only 72
hours, and he did not conduct a summary hearing within 72 hours to determine whether the TRO
should be extended. The status quo order was issued also in violation of the aforementioned
Rule, specifically the portion which provides that the TRO shall not exceed 20 days and is
deemed vacated if the application for preliminary injunction is not resolved within the 20-day
period and that no court has the authority to extend or renew the TRO on the same ground for
which it was issued. Petitioner now proposes that the Court of Appeals erred when it: (i) ruled
that the TRO and status quo order were wrongfully issued; and (ii) did not dismiss respondents'
petition despite several defects which should have merited the outright dismissal thereof.
According to petitioner, the TRO and status quo order were made in compliance with Sec. 5,
Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, he claims that a 20-day TRO can be
issued without prior notice or hearing if it is shown that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant. On the other hand, he justifies the status quo order by saying that it was issued
on a ground different from that for which the earlier TRO was made.19 He adverts to several
infirmities in respondents' petition which the Court of Appeals disregarded when it gave due
course to the petition.
106
For their part, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that an ex-
parte TRO is issued only in extremis, and has a lifetime of only 72 hours. In the instant case, the
trial court issued the TRO ex-parte for a full term of 20 days, and despite there being no clear
showing that the applicant had a clear legal right that should be protected by the writ being
sought. Furthermore, respondents see the status quo order issued by Judge Vianzon as very much
akin to a writ of injunction, forbidding respondents from prosecuting the case against petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of a temporary restraining order for twenty days of Judge
Vianzon was proper.
Held:
No. The rule thus holds that before a TRO may be issued, all parties must be heard in a
summary hearing first, after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The only
instance when a TRO may be issued ex parte is when the matter is of such extreme urgency that
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless it is issued immediately. Under such
circumstance, the Executive Judge shall issue the TRO effective for 72 hours only. The
Executive Judge shall then summon the parties to a conference during which the case should be
raffled in their presence. Before the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding Judge to whom the case
was raffled shall then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard, which
period shall in no case exceed 20 days including the original 72 hours. It thus becomes apparent
that Judge Vianzon erred in issuing a TRO effective, not for 72 hours as prescribed by law in
cases of extreme urgency, but for the maximum of 20 days; and he did so without conducting
beforehand a summary hearing, and without showing that it falls under the exceptional
circumstances enumerated by the Administrative Circular No. 20-95 where a TRO may be issued
by the Executive Judge before assignment by raffle to a judge without first conducting a
summary hearing.
As for the issuance of the Status Quo Order, the same was also improper. It was, for all
intents and purposes, a mere continuation of the 20-day TRO erroneously issued. Indeed, this
Court has ruled that a status quo ante order has “the nature of a temporary restraining order.” A
TRO shall be effective only for a period of 20 days from notice to the party or person sought to
be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the
propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. If no action is taken by the judge on the application
for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the TRO would automatically expire on the
20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary. In the
instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued; in fact, as stated in the Order, “the
hearing on the propriety on the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is still pending,”
hence, the TRO earlier issued, assuming arguendo that it was indeed validly issued,
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.
20. City of Butuan vs. CBS

G.R. No. 157315; December 1, 2010
Facts:
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its support for her decision to deny the application for
mayor’s permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and to
eventually close down CBS’s radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBS’s
operating its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had
violated the City’s zoning ordinance. By virtue of Temporary Use Permit (TUP) allowed them
to operate in the area but only for a very limited period, renewable every year. Accordingly,
the office of the city mayor received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation of
private rights, inciting people to go rise against the government, malicious imputations,
insinuations against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc. The SP issued a
107
Resolution strongly supporting the City Mayor's decision. On February 19, 2002, CBS and its
manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and damages against
the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing
its station, or from disturbing and preventing its business operations.The case was raffled to
Branch 2, presided by Judge Rosarito P. Dabalos. However, the presiding judge inhibited from
handling the case because of personal issues against the Radio Station. The complaint had been
re-raffled for several times as the judges inhibited from handling the case. Vice Executive Judge
Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the
inhibition. He also issued a TRO against herein complainant on the ground that there was a need
to maintain the status quo until all the other issues in the complaint had duly heard and
determined without necessarily implying that CBS was entitled to the prayers for injunction.
Judge Dabalos set a hearing on March 11, 2002 for CBS's application for preliminary injunction.
On a scheduled hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice of hearing and prayed that the
TRO be lifted, insisting that Judge Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on the case by
virtue of his inhibition. On March 12, 2002, Judge Dabalos granted CBS’s prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner's Special action for certiorari and Prohibition in the CA was
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction without requiring the applicant to submit evidence.
Ruling:
No. Upon finding legality of the respondent judge's re-assumption of the case, the Court
found Judge Dabalos' resolution granting CBS’s application for preliminary injunction without
first requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application proper.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior

to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from
a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction
is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction
commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party
who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is
proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments
must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and
may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent
the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to
the injunctive writ, the writ was nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts
that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the Legislature, and that the acts of denying it's
permit and the subsequent closure of the station were imminent and, unless enjoined, would
curtail or set at naught CBS’s rights under the franchise. It was error on the part of the petitioners
to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge Dabalos issued
the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the
shoulders of the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why
the application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue, thus: Section 5.
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Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall
be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a
temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place,
why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to
comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their evidence to that effect, the
petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
21. Spouses Yap v. International Exchange Bank

G.R. No. 175145; March 28, 2008
Facts:
Respondent International Exchange Bank filed a collection suit with writ of preliminary
attachment against Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go. The trial court rendered a Decision in
favor of respondent iBank and found Alberto Looyuko and Jimmy T. Go liable, ordering them to
pay the amount of ninety-six million pesos (₱96,000,000.00). Thereupon, respondent Renato C.
Flora, Sheriff of the RTC of Makati City, issued a Notice of Sheriff’s Sale notifying all the
parties concerned that the subject real properties allegedly owned by Mr. Go will be sold at
public auction on 22 August 2000 was issued.
Petitioner-spouses Alfredo and Shirley Yap filed a Complaint for Preliminary Injunction
which sought to stop the auction sale alleging that the subject properties are already owned by
them by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Jimmy Go in their favor. The RTC of
Pasig City issued an order denying petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
As scheduled, the public auction took place for which respondent sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale stating that the subject properties had been sold at public auction in favor of
respondent iBank.
Petitioners filed with the RTC the instant case for Annulment of Sheriff’s Auction Sale.
The Complaint was amended to include a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. A hearing was held on the application for
preliminary injunction. An Order was issued by Judge Janolo granting petitioners’ application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents iBank and Sheriff Flora filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which the
trial court denied.
Petitioners argue that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the dissolution
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, there being an Order by this Court that the injunction
issued by the trial court was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the dissolution of said
writ is a clear defiance of this Court’s directive.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the trial court has the authority and
prerogative to set aside the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They add that the continuance of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction would cause them irreparable damage because it continues to
incur damage not only for the nonpayment of the judgment award, but also for opportunity losses
resulting from the continued denial of its right to consolidate title over the levied properties.
109
Issue:
Whether or not the under the circumstances obtaining in this case, may the trial court
recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction it issued despite the rulings of the Court of Appeals
and by this Court that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court may still order the dissolution of the preliminary injunction it
previously issued. The issuance of a preliminary injunction is different from its dissolution. Its
issuance is governed by Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure while the
grounds for its dissolution are contained in Section 6, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As long as the party seeking the dissolution of the preliminary injunction can prove
the presence of any of the grounds for its dissolution, same may be dissolved notwithstanding
that this Court previously ruled that its issuance was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Section 6 of Rule 58 reads:
Section 6. Grounds for objection to, or for motion of dissolution of, injunction or
restraining order. – The application for injunction or restraining order may be denied,
upon a showing of its insufficiency. The injunction or restraining order may also be
denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, on other grounds upon affidavits of the party or
person enjoined, which may be opposed by the applicant also by affidavits. It may further
be denied, or, if granted, may be dissolved, if it appears after hearing that although the
applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the issuance or continuance
thereof, as the case may be, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person
enjoined while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer, and the former files a bond in an amount fixed by the court conditioned that he
will pay all damages which the applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of
the injunction or restraining order. If it appears that the extent of the preliminary
injunction or restraining order granted is too great, it may be modified.
Under the afore-quoted section, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears

after hearing that although the applicant is entitled to the injunction or restraining order, the
issuance or continuance thereof, would cause irreparable damage to the party or person enjoined
while the applicant can be fully compensated for such damages as he may suffer, and the former
files a bond in an amount fixed by the court on condition that he will pay all damages which the
applicant may suffer by the denial or the dissolution of the injunction or restraining order. Two
conditions must concur: first, the court in the exercise of its discretion, finds that the continuance
of the injunction would cause great damage to the defendant, while the plaintiff can be fully
compensated for such damages as he may suffer; second, the defendant files a counter-bond.
In the case at bar, the trial court, found that respondents duly showed that they would
suffer great and irreparable injury if the injunction shall continue to exist. As to the second
condition, the trial court likewise found that respondents were willing to post a counter-bond
which could cover the damages that petitioners may suffer in case the judgment turns out to be
adverse to them. The Order of the trial court to recall and dissolve the preliminary injunction is
subject to the filing and approval of the counter-bond that it ordered. Failure to post the required
counter-bond will necessarily lead to the non-dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The
Order of Dissolution cannot be implemented until and unless the required counter-bond has been
posted.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and its action shall not be disturbed
on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
or, otherwise, in grave abuse of discretion. In the case on hand, the trial court issued the order of
dissolution on a ground provided for by the Rules of Court. The same being in accordance with
the rules, we find no reason to disturb the same.
110
22. Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc vs. Visayan Surety

G.R. No. 212025; July 01, 2015
Facts:
Petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. (petitioner), then represented by Max L.F. Ying
(Ying), Vice-President for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden, Treasurer, entered into a contract
with Multi-Rich Builders (Multi-Rich), a single proprietorship, represented by Wilson G. Chua,
its President and General Manager, for the construction of a garment factory within the Cavite
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (CPEZA). Included in the contract was an Arbitration
Clause in case of dispute.
On January 26, 2004, Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioner and Ying before the RTC. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment,
claiming that Ying was about to abscond and that petitioner had an impending closure.
Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond from respondent Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation (Visayan Surety). The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win
Multi-Rich. To prevent the enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner a check
payable to the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion, seeking to discharge the attachment.
Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC due to the presence of the Arbitration
Clause in the contract. The motion, however, was denied by the RTC.
On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim before the RTC. It
denied the material allegation of the complaint and sought the immediate lifting of the writ of
attachment. It also prayed that the bond filed by Win Multi-Rich to support its application for
attachment be held to satisfy petitioner's claim for damages due to the improper issuance of such
writ.
On April 29, 2004, the RTC issued another order directing the deposit of the garnished funds of
petitioner to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
Win Multi-Rich then filed a motion to release petitioner's cash deposit to it. Notably, the motion
was granted by the RTC. Win Multi-Rich posted Surety Bond issued by respondent Far Eastern
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (FESICO) to secure the withdrawal of the cash deposited by
petitioner. Thus, Win Multi-Rich was able to receive the funds of petitioner even before the trial
began.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before
the CA. Petitioner then filed its Supplemental Manifestation and Motion, asserting that its cash
deposit with the RTC was turned over to Win Multi-Rich.
On March 14, 2006, the CA rendered a decision, annulling the orders of the RTC. It ruled,
however, that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case inspite of the arbitration clause because it
was a suit for collection of sum of money.
On February 10, 2009, in G.R. No. 175048, the Court promulgated a decision in favor of
petitioner and held: first, that Win Multi-Rich was not a real party in interest; second, that the
RTC should not have taken cognizance of the collection suit because the presence of the
arbitration clause vested jurisdiction on the CIAC over all construction disputes between
petitioner and Multi-Rich; and lastly, that Win Multi-Rich could not retain the garnished amount,
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as the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the questioned writ of attachment and to order the
release of the funds.
Win Multi-Rich filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court. Pursuant to an
entry of judgment, the Court's decision became final and executory on June 2, 2009.
On June 26, 2009, petitioner moved for execution thereof, praying for the return of its cash
deposit and, in the event of refusal of Win Multi-Rich to comply, to hold Visayan Surety and
FESICO liable under their respective bonds.
Win Multi-Rich, Visayan Surety and FESICO were served with copies of the motion for
execution.
On October 15, 2009, Win Multi-Rich opposed the motion for execution because the cash
deposit awarded to it by the RTC had been paid to suppliers and the said amount was long
overdue and demandable. The RTC granted the motion for execution in an Order and issued a
writ of execution. Visayan Surety and FESICO separately moved for reconsideration of the RTC
order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Visayan can be held for damages under sec. 20, Rule 57
2. Whether Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. (FESICO) bond is not covered by
Section 20, Rule 57
Rulings:
1. Preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to
enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the
main or principal action. As such, it’s available during pendency of the action to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition of a final judgment.
Also, attachment is availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or
constructive seizure of property in instances where personal/substituted service of
summons on defendant can’t be effected.
Party applying for order of attachment must then give a bond executed to the adverse
party in the amount fixed by Court in its order granting the issuance of the writ. Purpose
of attachment bond is to answer for all costs and damages which adverse party may
sustain by reason of attachment of court finally rules that applicant is not entitled to the
writ.
Here, the attachment bond was issued by Visayan in order for Win to secure issuance of
writ of attachment. So any application for damages arising from improper attachment is
governed by Sec.20, R57.
The current provision of Sec.20, R57 covers application for damages against improper
attachment, prelim injunction, receivership, replevin.
Requisites under Sec.20, R57 in order to claim damages against the bond:
1. Application for damages must be filed in the same case where bond was issued, either
a. Before trial
b. Before appeal is perfected, or
c. Before judgment becomes executory
2. Application for damages must be filed before entry of judgment
3. After hearing with notice to surety OR incorporate the application in the answer with
compulsory counterclaim
Here, PET sufficiently incorporated an application for damages against wrongful

attachment in its answer with compulsory counterclaim filed before RTC.
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But as to the 3rd requisite, PET’s answer with compulsory counterclaim, which contained
the application for damages, was not served on Visayan. Visayan was only notified of
application when the motion for execution filed by PET after the judgment had become
final and executory.
2. As to Far Eastern, PET issued check to forestall enforcement of WPI. PET’s garnished
funds where then deposited to the cashier of the clerk of RTC. But Win filed motion to
release PET’s cash deposit to it. RTC then granted motion and directed Win to post bond
in favour of PET to answer for damages which latter may sustain should court decide that
Win was not entitled to the relief sought. Subsequently, Win filed surety bond of Far
Eastern and was able to obtain cash deposit of PET even before trial commenced.
SC held that the surety bond of Far Eastern is not covered by Sec.20, R57 because Win
should not have filed motion to release cash deposit of PET and RTC should not have
granted the same.
Chief purpose of remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on DEF’s property

until plaintiff can by appropriate proceedings obtain judgment and have such property
applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where
means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond jurisdiction, or improperly
disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond reach of creditors. The garnished
funds or attached properties could only be released to attaching party after a judgment in
his favour is obtained. Under no circumstance can garnished funds to attached properties
under sheriff’s custody or clerk of court be released to attaching party before
promulgation of judgment.
Cash deposits and counterbonds posted by DEF to lift writ of attachment is a security for
payment of any judgment the attaching party may obtain; they are mere replacements of
property previously attached. So PET’s cash deposit, as replacements of properties to be
attached, should never have been released to Win.
The cash deposit or counterbond was supposed to secure payment of any judgment that
attaching party may recover. But here, Win was able to withdraw the cash deposit and in
exchange, posted a surety bond of Far Eastern in favour of PET to answer for damages
the PET may sustain. So the surety bond of Far Eastern substituted the cash deposit of
PET as security for judgment. Thus to claim damages form surety bond of Far Eastern,
Sec.17, R57 could be applied. A surety on a counterbond given to secure payment of
judgment becomes liable for payment of amount due upon:
1. Demand made upon surety
2. Notice and summary hearing on the same action
Unlike Sec.20, R57, which requires notice and hearing before finality of judgment in an
application for damages, Sec.17, R57 allows a party to claim damages on the surety bond
after the judgment has become executory. Why? Sec.20 – damages sought to be enforced
against surety bond are unliquidated. Sec.17 – liquidated (final judgment had already
determined the amount to be awarded to winning litigant).
Here, a demand against Far Eastern had been made and it was given due notice and
opportunity to be heard: Pet filed motion for execution, copy furnished Far Eastern.; PET
filed manifestation that Far Eastern was duly served with said motion and notified of the
hearing; during the hearing on the motion for execution; counsels for Far Eastern were
present; in an Order, Far Eastern was given 15 days to submit comment/opposition to the
motion for execution, which it did.
So Far Eastern can’t escape liability. Purpose of Far Eastern’s bond is to secure
withdrawal of cash deposit and answer any damages that would be inflicted against PET
in the course of proceedings. IT can’t escape liability by invoking that it was not a party
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to the first case. From the moment it issued the surety bond to Win, and it was posted
before RTC, court had acquired jurisdiction over the surety.
23. Bacolod City Water District vs. Labayen

G.R. No. 157494; December 10, 2004
Facts:
Bacolod City Water District (BCWD) issued a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates
Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The City of Bacolod filed a case for Injunction
With a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against BCWD before the RTC of Bacolod City. It alleged that the proposed water rates would
violate due process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing. BCWD filed a motion
to dismiss. It opined that original jurisdiction over cases on rate review is vested in the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA); appellate jurisdiction is vested in the National Water
Resources [Board] (NWRB) whose decisions shall be appealable to the Office of the President.
After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, the City of Bacolod filed an Urgent Motion for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of Preliminary. The RTC heard the
application for TRO and issued an Order commanding BCWD to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000. BCWD filed for the dissolution of the
TRO because it was infirmed with procedural and substantive defects. The RTC issued an Order
stating that the motion of BCWD is moot and academic since it was already complied by the
BCWD. The RTC issued a Decision granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed the
previous preliminary injunction.
BCWD then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA where
it held that the assailed Order is in fact a preliminary injunction because the period of the
restraint was not limited. CA further held that by its wordings, it can be safely inferred that the
increased water rates must not be effected until final disposition of the main case. This note of
semi-permanence simply cannot issue from a mere temporary restraining order.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC’s Order commanding BCWD to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000 is a preliminary injunction.
Held:
No. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction. A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to
preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which
cannot be issued ex parte.
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order
with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty
(20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining
order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining
order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial
declaration to that effect being necessary
In the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining
order granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that
respondent court merely ordered "the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person
acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water
rate increase which will start on March 1, 2000" without stating the period for the restraint does
114
not convert the temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
24. China Banking Corporation, et al. vs Co, et al.

G.R. No. 174569; September 17, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold lot located in Pampanga to petitioner-spouses
Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro. Two other lots also located in the same to petitioner-spouses
Richard and Editha Nogoy. The lots of the Castro spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly
bound on their southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E of respondent Benjamin Co and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent Three Kings Construction
and Realty Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, a subdivision project
covering Lot No. 3783-E and adjacent lots. Respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on
Lot # 3783-E. Petitioners asked respondents to stop constructing the wall, and remove all
installed construction materials and restore the former condition of Lot # 3783-E which used to
be a road lot.
They also claimed that the construction obstructed and closed the only means of ingress
and egress of the Nogoy spouses and their family, and at the same time, caved in and impeded
the ventilation and clearance due the Castro spouses’ residential house.
RTC: Petitioners’ demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file a complaint for
injunction, restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, alleging
that the construction of the perimeter wall was almost finished and thus modifying their prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, viz: Before
trial on the merits, a temporary restraining order be issued immediately restraining the
defendants from doing further construction of the perimeter wall on the premises, and thereafter,
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued enjoining the defendants from perpetrating
and continuing with the said act and directing them jointly and severally, to restore the road lot,
Lot 3783-E to its previous condition.
RTC denied the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without prejudice to its
resolution after the trial of the case on the merits. After a judicious evaluation of the evidence,
the Commissioner’s Report on the Conduct of the Ocular Inspection as well as the pleadings,
RTC is of the opinion that a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued at this
time: Plaintiffs have not clearly shown that their rights have been violated and that they are
entitled to the relief prayed for and that irreparable damage would be suffered by them if an
injunction is not issued.
Whether lot 3783-E is a road lot or not is a factual issue which should be resolved after the
presentation of evidence.
Physical evidence reveals that lot 3783-E is not a road lot.. Plaintiffs failed to prove that
they will be prejudiced by the construction of the wall. The ocular inspection showed that they
will not lose access to their residences. This is indeed an issue of fact which should be ventilated
in a full blown trial, determinable through further presentation of evidence by the parties.
CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari which was dismissed and denied their
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of petitioner’s application for writ of preliminary injunction
was proper.
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Ruling:
Yes. It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound
discretion of the court, and the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not
be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners must establish

the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does

not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified
only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is
improper.
In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction on
Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential
Decree 1529, and their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
The best evidence that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot would be a memorandum to that
effect annotated on the certificate of title covering it. Petitioners presented TCT No. 185702-R
covering Lot No. 3783-E in the name of Sunny Acres Realty Management Corporation which
states that the registration is subject to "the restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act 496, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 440.” The annotation does not explicitly state, however, that Lot No.
3783-E is a road lot.
The ocular inspection showed that petitioners will not lose access to their residences. As
a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as an access road to their residences and there is an
existing secondary road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access road to
the highway, With respect to the blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps.
Castro, suffice it to state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of
the defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its front entrance is still open and
freely accessible
The absence of a showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such
writ. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.
25. Estares vs. CA

GR no. 144755; June 8, 2005
Facts:
(1) The spouses Estares obtained a loan from Prominent Lending & Credit Corp. (PLCC)
secured by a real estate mortgage over a 363 sq. meter parcel of land with improvement.
(2) The spouses defaulted payment of the loan thus the PLCC initiated a foreclosure
proceeding over the mortgaged property.
(3) The spouses questioned the contract of loan alleging that the promissory note as well as
the mortgage were falsified contending that the interest and the penalties were not being
agreed by them.
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(4) The spouses prayed for writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
enjoining the sheriff to conduct the public auction sale over the mortgaged land.
(5) The lower court denied the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the
spouses Estares have no factual basis for filing the same.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has acted grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for writ
of preliminary injunction and not declaring the public auction sale made by the sheriff null and
void.
Ruling:
No. The SC upheld the decision of the CA in denying the petition for writ of preliminary
injunction filed by the spouses Estares.
The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a

special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard and the essential condition
for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to
be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from
both sides, it appears in view of all the circumstances that the injunction is reasonably necessary
to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending litigation.
The spouses Estares had the burden to establish the following requirements: (1) the
existence of right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed
are violative of such right. In the present case the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to
injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC. PLCC provided them the
Statement of account appearing therein the amount of the loan as well as the corresponding
interest and penalty. This has not been questioned by the Estares spouses in fact when demand
letter was received by them, they even request for the extension of 3 months to pay their
obligation.
The foregoing facts clearly failed to prove that Estares spouses have the right to be
protected and the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
The CA was justified in not enjoining the conduct of the auction sale for the necessity of
the writ of injunction has been found wanting.
26. Buyco vs. Baraquia

GR No. 84034; December 22, 1988
Facts:
Baraquia (respondent) filed a complaint before the RTC of Iloilo against the Buycos for
the establishment of a permanent right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road
within their property which was used by him to access his poultry farm from the public
highway.
RTC granted Baraquias application for preliminary injunction but later dismissed the
complaint for failure to establish the requisites for right of way under Art. 649 and 650 of the
Civil Code, thus, the preliminary injunction as lifted.
RTC resolved the issue by saying that the writ of preliminary injunction remained to be valid,
efficacious and obligatory, when Buyco closed the road on March 1, which is an indirect
contempt of court.
117
Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that a preliminary injunction, once

quashed, ceases to exist, and that they cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt by a mere
motion.
Court granted the petitioners motion for reconsideration stating that there must be a
verified petition for them to be held in contempt. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the
complaint immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal.
Ruling:
Yes. A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case
subject to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary
remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the
ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or

mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually
granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be
had on the merits of the case.
Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the
lower court upon respondents showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the
closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not
entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites
for such entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the
writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been
served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondents
favor, the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was
automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.
27. Heirs of the late ex-justice Jose B.L. Reyes, et al. vs. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 135425-26; November 14, 2000
Facts:
Brothers Justice Jose Benedicto Luna Reyes (also known as Justice J. B. L. Reyes) and
Dr. Edmundo A. Reyes were co-owners of a parcel of land located at Taft Avenue, Pasay City,
near Buendia, with a land area of more than one hectare, covered by two Transfer Certificates of
Title.
118
The brothers entered into a 25-year lease contract with Metro Manila Builders, Inc.
(MMB, Inc.) at a very low rate of rental (P15,000.00 to P30,000.00 a month) in consideration of
the fact that the lessee would cover all present and future improvements in the property with
insurance against certain risks and maintain the premises in good, sanitary and tenantable
condition at all times.
However, in the course of the lease, petitioners found out that respondent MMB, Inc. had
not properly maintained the premises or covered the same with an adequate insurance policy.
Worse, respondent MMB, Inc. had sub-leased the property to third parties and was earning
therefrom about P500,000.00 a month. Petitioners served on respondent MMB, Inc. a notice
terminating the lease contract and demanding that they vacate and surrender the premises subject
of the lease to petitioners. Failing to do so, on February 3, 1997, petitioners filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 45 a complaint for unlawful detainer based on
breach of the contract of lease. The MTC decided in favor of Petitioners. Petitioners filed with
the MTC a motion for execution of the judgment of eviction. The trial court issued the
corresponding writ of execution. However, on December 8, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order against the execution of the ejectment judgment. The Court of
Appeals issued a resolution restraining petitioners from enforcing the writ of execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the said resolution pertaining to the preliminary injunction from
enforcing the writ of execution valid.
Ruling:
No. The resolution was not valid. Incidentally, the resolution was signed by only two
members of the Court of Appeals. Hence, the resolution is void.
By law, the attendance of three members of the Court of Appeals shall constitute a
quorum for the sessions of a division. The unanimous vote of three members of a division shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, or final resolution which shall be reached in
consultation before the writing of the opinion by any member of the division.This rule applies to
interlocutory resolutions.
True, any member of the Court of Appeals may issue preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order. However, this power is exercised only in case of extreme urgency, and in the
tradition of the Supreme Court, the Court en banc or division ratifies or confirms the act of the
single justice at the very next session of the Court.
29. Brocka vs Enrile
Facts:
Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a
demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners
arrested by Northern Police District Officers – Jan 28 ’85. Petitioners were charged with Illegal
Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 criminal cases filed before RTC QC. All petitioners released on
bail – P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos
(Brocka, et al.), who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for
whom no bail was recommended. Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily
hearings held between Feb.1-7 ’85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 ’85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor
Santiago ordered Brocka, et al.’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each Brocka,
et al filed respective bail bonds but despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in
detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly
issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 ‘1985 neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA
was shown to Brocka, et al. On February 11, 1985 – Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to
Sedition in 3 criminal cases; hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows: 10:30
AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought before the QC Fiscal at
119
2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call subsequently received informing counsel
that appearance of Brocka, et al. was to be at 2:00PM. Brocka, et al. released provisionally on
Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres. Marcos a release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition
for habeas corpus filed by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:o In Return of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released a four on Feb15’85 and
one on Feb.8 ’85o Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and
academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of
inciting to sedition.Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contended that the bad faith and/ or
harassment is sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution and second offense of
Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal.
Issue:
Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined.
Ruling:
Yes. the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez
vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-
G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto
vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Rañoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October
8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
and
"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438).
"7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
120
In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the
criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials
in bad faith.
30. Medina, et al. vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

G.R. No. 140228; November 19, 2004
Facts:
Medina, et al. are the grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages. Pedro, his
brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Alberto's daughter) executed a notarized
Contract to Sell in favor of Greenfield Development Corporation for Lots 90-A and 90-B. These
properties were consolidated with other lots and were eventually registered in the name of
Greenfield. Medina, et al. instituted an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance,
damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against Greenfield and ROD of
Makati. Medina, et al. alleged in their complaint that they are co-owners of these two parcels of
land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and
Gregoria, all surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof.
They also maintained that the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and
the signatures of the vendors therein were fake. Despite the transfer of the title to Greenfield’s
name, they remained in possession thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a certain Santos Arevalo
and his family still reside on a portion of the property.
Medina, et al. caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the titles. After discovering the
annotation, Greenfield constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring
their ingress and egress. Thus, Greenfield sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Greenfield and its agents and
representatives from preventing Medina et. al to exercise their rights over the properties.
RTC granted the injunctive relief. However, CA nullified RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance by the RTC of injunctive relief is proper.
Ruling:
No. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds justifying the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of
the case can be heard fully. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the
burden to establish the following requisites:
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.
Hence, Medina et al.’s entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal
right to the properties subject of the present dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is
based solely on the parties' allegations in their respective pleadings and the documents attached
thereto. We have on one hand, Medina et al.’s bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of
the properties sold by their predecessors to Greenfield, and on the other, Greenfield’s claim of
ownership supported by deeds of conveyances and Torrens titles in their favor. From these alone,
121
it is clear that Medina et al. failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed,
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing
right is not a ground for an injunction.
The well-settled rule is that a document acknowledged before a notary public enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To overcome
this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such
evidence, the presumption must be upheld.19 In addition, the titles in the name of Greenfield,
having been registered under the Torrens system, are generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that the titles are
regularly issued and valid. Therefore, until and unless Medina et. al show that the documents are
indeed spurious and the titles invalid, then the presumptions must prevail at this juncture.
Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. Even
assuming that Medina et. al.’s allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in the case at
hand because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery
of the property to Greenfield, and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required.
Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction, which in effect, would dispose of the main case without trial. The ground relied upon
by the RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its doubt over the
acquisition of the properties by Greenfield. Such basis would be virtually recognizing Medina, et
al.’s claim that the deeds of conveyances and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the
detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity in favor of these documents. There would, in
effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since
it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove.
122

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Rule 58 – Preliminary Injunction

1. PNB vs RJ Ventures Realty & Development

According to the respondents the damage to RBN’s image, lost of listenership,

2. First Global vs Agustin

The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is ―to prevent threatened or continuous

3. DOH vs. Phil. Pharmawealth

5. Gomos vs. Adiong

6. Gabriel dela Paz vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong

Respondent judge issued an Order of Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction requiring

Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:

8. Dagupan Electric Corp. vs. Paño

The appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to

11. OWWA v. Chavez

Assuming the respondents stand to be in danger of being transferred due to the

12. Manila International Airport vs CA

The memorandum recommended to the MIAA Board of Directors the approval of a

14. Hernandez, et al. vs. National Power Corporation

NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers to support

PD 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government infrastructure

15. Universal Motors Corporation v. Rojas

16. Valencia, et al. vs. CA

· RESPONDENTS FILE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES IN RTC MANILA:

· PETITIONER FILES A MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN RTC MANILA;

17. Bagong West Kabulusan N. A. Vs. Judge Lerma

As for complainant's imputation to respondent of falsification of court records by making

18. In Re: Admin Complaint vss Hon. Abesamis, et al.

On September 23, 1999, respondents issued a temporary restraining order. On February

19. Llamzon vs. Logronio, et al.

20. City of Butuan vs. CBS

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior

21. Spouses Yap v. International Exchange Bank

Under the afore-quoted section, a preliminary injunction may be dissolved if it appears

22. Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc vs. Visayan Surety

Here, PET sufficiently incorporated an application for damages against wrongful

Chief purpose of remedy of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on DEF’s property

23. Bacolod City Water District vs. Labayen

not convert the temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction.

24. China Banking Corporation, et al. vs Co, et al.

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the petitioners must establish

Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does

25. Estares vs. CA

The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a

26. Buyco vs. Baraquia

Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that a preliminary injunction, once

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or

29. Brocka vs Enrile

30. Medina, et al. vs. Greenfield Development Corporation

RTC granted the injunctive relief. However, CA nullified RTC’s decision.

(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

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