Lisha Villacanas

Legal Ethics JD-1

CANON 1 CASES

In re: Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661

Facts: Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal
mayor of Calapan, he and other co-conspirators murdered the former
municipal mayor of Calapan, for which they were held guilty and sentenced to
the penalty of death. Upon review by the Supreme court the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence,
Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted
portion of the prison term was remitted on condition that they shall not violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. The widow of the murdered victim filed
a complaint with the Supreme Court asking that Gutierrez be removed from the
rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.

Issue: W/N conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of
disbarment.

Held:
 Under section 5 Rule 127, member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt,
such a crime. “Moral Turpitude” includes everything contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
 In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok, was
granted absolute or unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime of
crime of bigamy. It was held that such pardon releases the punishment
and blots out existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is
as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
 In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It was not a full pardon which
could have blotted out the offense committed.
 The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having
committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position, and with the
use of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude warrants disbarment.
 Admission of a candidate to the bar requires academic preparation and
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal.

People vs. Tuanda [A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

[Per Curiam]

FACTS:

Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in

violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez. Respondent
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the
practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court. The respondent
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted
respondent’s Notice of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum.” In the said motion,
responded stated:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a

not painful penalty aggravating the lower court’s penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant’s action on the case during
the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the
offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD:

NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.

RATIO:

[T] he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit and
violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of the land.” Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense.

ROYONG VS. OBLENA

AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a
member of the bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately
conducted an investigation and found out that there was no rape, the carnal
knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of
other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another complaint charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission
to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18
year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying
that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the
respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and
the adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants
disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires
suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as
ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy
of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly
may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble
profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice
law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced
to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no
moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not
fit to remain a member of the bar.

Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union vs. Lo Bu, 63 SCRA 313 (1975)
G.R. No. L-40136 March 25, 1975

FACTS:

Despite the finality of the decision of the SC, petition was made that Lo Bu filed
an urgent motion to recall the writ of execution alleging lack of jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the sale, followed by another motion praying for the
return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union
failed to put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow the sheriff
to keep the levied properties at his factory, all of which were denied by the
Court.
Counsel Busmente had the temerity to deny such allegations.

ISSUE:
Whether the actions are mere dilatory tactic and not commendable

HELD:
Yes. The conduct of denying the facts alleged in a petition is far from
commendable. A lawyer should not act like an errand boy at the beck and
call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding; failure to keep this
in mind puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY
INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491
October 6, 1989
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention
Center, the newly-elected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4,
1989 before the Supreme Court en banc. However, disturbed by the
widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments
published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys
Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of
government
planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the
voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit
such activities, the Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision
over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP
officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports. The prohibited acts
are against the IBP By-Laws more specifically Article I, Section 4 of the IBP
ByLaws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Sec. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections
and Section 12[d] of the By-Laws
prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules: Any violation of the rules
governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and practices
defined in Section 14 [Prohibited Acts and Practices Relative to Elections) of
the By-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a
candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice to the
imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar.

ISSUE Whether or not the candidates violated the IBP By-Laws.

DECISION: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not
only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of
Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed
to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush
aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. The
unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of
lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not
uphold the honor of the profession nor
elevate it in the public's esteem. The Court notes with grave concern what
appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that tainted the
statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial
hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those
parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired
among themselves to deceive it or at
least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed
during the campaign.

CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975
(glaisa po)
NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of
Manila to recover certain machineries.
-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s
motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the
sale, Ago moved to
stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC ffirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff
from enforcing the writ of
execution; his motions were denied
- 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed
to redeem
- 1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to
the properties
- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the
replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in
their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC
issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda
the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale;
the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from
enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with
the CA which
also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which
gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
WON the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy
HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment
of the sheriff’s sale, justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their
lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial
process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of
the petitioners.
- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become
an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
- A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not
and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of
his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit
or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his
duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client’s propensity to
litigate.

Samar mining Co Inc. V Arnado 24 SCRA 402

Rufino Abuyen had filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, a
Notice of Inquiry or Sickness and Claim for Compensation for a disease
allegedly contracted while in the service of petitioner, Samar Mining Co., In.
The latter received from respondent Tan, as Labor Attorney, a notice setting
said claim for hearing at Carbalogan, Samar. Petitioner assailed the validity of
said notice and the authority of respondent Tan to hold the aforementioned
hearing, upon the ground that the authority therefor was vested by
Reorganization Plan 20-A and Executive Order No.218 of the President in the
Department of Labor Regional Office No. VI, located in Cebu, of which
respondents Arnado and Tan are Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney,
respectively and was beyond the functions of respondent Tan, as such Labor
Attorney. Tan rendered a “decision” against Samar mining Inc., The
corporation filed with said Regional Office a motion for reconsideration and
reopening of the case by said office, based upon the alleged lack of authority
of respondent Tan to hear it.

Issue: W/O Atty. Tan has the authority to hear petitions regarding workmen’s
compensation claim of Abuyen.

Held: Petitioner’s pretense is clearly untenable. TO begin with, section 4 of rule

67 is entitled “Where petition filed”. It obviously contemplates venue, not
jurisdiction, although it makes the former coterminous with, or dependent upon,
the latter. Secondly, the jurisdiction therein alluded to is that over “the
corporation, board, officer or person” whose acts are in question, not
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Thirdly, the rule-making power
of this Court is limited to matters of “pleading, practise and procedure” and to
the “admission to the practice of law” (Art. VIII Sec 13 of the Constitution),
whereas the power to “define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts” is within the exclusive province of Congress (art VII sec 2 of the
Constitution)

VDA. De Bacaling v Laguna 54 SCRA 243

Facts:Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a

residential land where petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon Bacaling,
constructed a residential house. Unable to pay the lease rental an action for
ejectment. The filling of said case spawned vrious court suits as petition for
certiorari, which further prolong the litigation process.

Issue: Should the petitioner’s counsel deserved condemnation before SC

Held: Yes. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous
attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the
ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the
part of the petitioner and her counsel deserve the vigorous condemnation of
this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy or certiorari
which should only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy
and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well
devote to really meritorious cases.

Case Digest: Roxas v. CA

MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 92245, 26 June 1991.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"),

although they are already estranged and living separately.

Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr.

Cayetano") their conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and
consent.

Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the
contract of lease between Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.

Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the
complaint states no cause of action.

The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.

ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease
involving conjugal real property without the consent of the wife.

Ruling: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)

Even if the husband is administrator of the conjugal partnership, administration

does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the
conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal
realty.

As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means "the transfer
of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one
person to another ... The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily
assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form
prescribed by law." While encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to,
or interest in, the land which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of
the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the
conveyance; any (act) that impairs the use or transfer of property or real
estate..."

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance

and/or alienation.

Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the
parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a
price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite...." Thus,
lease is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession.

In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his right of use in favor of the
lessee. The lessor's right of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected
by the lessee if the lessor uses the leased realty.

Therefore, lease is a burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. The

concept of encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes
construed broadly to include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but
also attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights, water rights, easements,
and other RESTRICTIONS on USE."

Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a qualified alienation,

with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to its
terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease.

Thus, in case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by
law, the wife has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the
contract.

CANON 2 CASES

DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS v. Estanislao Bayot

A.C No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

Facts:
Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in
the Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of the provision of Section 25, Rule 127
which imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain
either personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes
malpractice. Law is a profession and not a trade. A member of the bar degrades
himself or herself in adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising
his or her services like a merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he
promises to refrain from repeating the same misconduct, the Court exercised
leniency. He was merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded
that the most effective advertisement possible is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity as well as fidelity to
trust.

IN RE: LUIS B. TAGORDA 53 PHIL 37 3/23/29- MALPRACTICE

The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of the provincial board of

Isabela, admits that in the last general elections he made use of a card written
in Spanish and Ilocano, which in translation, read as follows:

“LUIS B. TAGORDA” Attoney; Notary Public; CANDIDATE FOR BOARD

MEMBER, Province of Isabela. (NOTE.- as notaty public, he can execute for a
deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office, can
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final
requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town Echague,
Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a

lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter
reads as follow:

“ I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some
people are in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in
Iligan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer
and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am
free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence
here in Echague, I would request your kind favor to transmit this information
to your barrio people in any of your meeting or social gatherings so that they
may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of
their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge
only three pesos for every registration.”

Issue: W/N Tagorda’s actions constitute malpractice.

Held:

Application is give to se. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act

NO. 2828, providing “ The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokets, constitutes
malpractice, “ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar Association in
1917, to the case of the respondent lawyer. The law is a profession and not a
business. The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.

1. Respondent Tagorda is suspended from the practice of law for 1 month.

2. For advertising his services in the Sunday Tribune respondent attorney
is reprimanded.

PEOPLE vs. McCable 18 Colo. 186

Facts: Respondent caused the publication of the following

advertisement in a newspaper: “If you like a divorce, communicate with
me, and your desire will be gratified. No one will know it. You see I
advertise anonymously. I did not even subject myself to criticism.
Everything will be done very quietly and you will be able to secure the
dissolution of the disagreeable marriage tie without public scandal and
hence without reproach. Good everywhere. Box 2344, Denver.”

Held: This advertisement is highly reprehensible. It is well calculated to

encourage people to make application for divorces who might otherwise
have refrained from doing so. It is against good morals public or private.
It is a false representation and a libel upon the court of justice.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order the respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining
to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law.” The
advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of
the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and
that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before
quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice
of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further
argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly
decidedby the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the
same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered by the respondent
constitute practice of law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the
case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:Black defines "practice of law"
as:"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent.
It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
thelaw." The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering.
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely
involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to
justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that
respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof
to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law."
Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation
does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the
corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What
is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtueof the nature of
the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. The canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is rightand proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and
the unwholesome result of propaganda.