PEOPLE VS WONG CHENG
agreement under an international treaty.
FACTS:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an
appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court
of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The
defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel
was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of
the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.
HELD:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters
thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said
offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a
breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce
pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the demurrer is
revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
US VS LOOK CHAW
FACTS:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu
and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the
steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks
containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he
had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his
hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered
two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly
constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality,
that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via
the call ports in Manila and Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over
foreign vessels stationed in its port.
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on
account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality. However, the same rule does not apply when the article,
whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a
can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of
the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said
place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
US VS AH SING
FACTS:
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel
which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8 cans of
opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his
possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the
ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who
made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The defendant
confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had
purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose
in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import
the prohibited drug.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the
Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person
who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this
person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty
of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary
circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
AAA VS BBB
FACTS:
AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their
union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and
DDD on October 1, 2009.
BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired
permanent resident status
BBB sent little to no financial support,... compelled her to fly extra
hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant... allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her
and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters
worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean
woman
AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during her visit with their kids.
AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who
continued to evade the warrant of arres
Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissing the case, the trial court
Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissing the case, the trial court r
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial
jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A.
No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and the alleged
illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.
HELD:
Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is
also common."[30] In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it
a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of
violence that may be committed against women and their children...
what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but
the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on
the wife.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by
which psychological violence may be committed... the mental or
emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element
in the commission of the offense.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory
or continuing crimes
We say that even if the alleged extra- marital affair causing the
offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad,
the same does not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely
beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
PADILLA VS DIZON
FACTS:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist
and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention
to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least
the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International
Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation
of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided
by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall
take out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign
exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization
by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out
or send out from the Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not
exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them.
Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall
declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central
Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing
laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the
crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and
maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman
from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to
invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that
he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in
and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo
Chi Fai was urged by his business associates to come to Manila to
bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint
against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that the
accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent
to violate the law.
HELD:
Yes. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and
foreign currency instruments found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai
when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency
declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial, and that these
currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to
justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again
diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is
nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority
for the trial court to release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi
Fai.
PEOPLE VS OANIS
FACTS:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a
notorious criminal and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive. They went to the suspected
house then proceeded to the room where they saw the supposedly
Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the
victim’s death. The supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio
Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE:
1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no liability due to innocent mistake
of fact in the honest performance of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the
performance of their duty.
HELD:
1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does not apply to the case at bar.
“Ignorance facti excusat” applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. The fact that the supposedly suspect
was sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have checked whether it is the
real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this:
(1) the offender acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office, (2) that the injury or offense committed
be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first
requisite is present.
US VS AH CHONG
FACTS:
The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort McKinley, Rizal Province
Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy
or muchacho
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters
from the nearest building. No one slept in the house except the two
servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running
along the side of the building
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length
and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent
bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit
of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by
placing against it a chair
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room
He called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by
someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant
warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the
room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual
Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept
in the next house and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind
up Pascual's wounds
Pascual died from the effects of the wound the following day. The
roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior
to the incident, and had an understanding that when either returned
at night, he should knock that the door and acquaint his companion
with his identity. The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under
his pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in
Fort McKinley
Defendant admitted to stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)" because he
forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's
warnings
Defendant was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with
extenuating (mitigating) circumstances, and sentenced to 6 years and
1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible
HELD:
No. By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act
for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were
as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief, he will
not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense),
but would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the
actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that it was
actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination)
The defendant's ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to
negligence or bad faith
"The act itself foes not make man guilty unless his intention were so"
The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it
cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him."
If one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will
justify a killing, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them,
he is legally guiltless of the homicide
The defendant was doing no more than exercise his legitimate right
of self-defense
He cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts.
US VS VALDEZ
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the
anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez
and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel.
During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive
words. Gargantel complained, saying that it would be better if he
would not insult them. The accused took this as a display of
insubordination, thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife
in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had
attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently
believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the
water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by
drowning, as a consequence of having thrown himself into the water
and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The
Judgment rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as
the author of the homicide, the accused alleged on appeal that he was
only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at
most of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio
Gargantel.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated
the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be
considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave
wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery ,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the
persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary,
in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the
accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the
aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause
the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and
putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision
appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as
consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the
death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of
the death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of
the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit
so great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
PEOPLE VS ALMONTE
FACTS:
the accused lived maritally with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a
married man. Because one Miguela Dawal, with whom he had also
lived maritally, threatened to bring suit against him unless he rejoined
her, the Chinaman and the accused voluntarily agreed to separate.
From that time on Te Sue lived in the barrio of Guinlajon, municipality
of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, together with the said Miguela
Dawal. On the morning of October 1, 1930, the accused visited her
former paramour and on entering the house, found him with Miguela.
When Te Sue saw her, he approached and told her to go away at once
because her new paramour might get jealous and do her harm. The
accused insisted upon remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue and
Miguela, feeling that she was being unjustly treated, took hold of a
small penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the abdomen.
Horrified, perhaps, at her deed, she fled to the street, leaving the
blade sticking in her victim's abdomen, and, taking the first bus that
chanced to pass, finally went home.
ISSUE:
Is she liable for the death of Felix?
HELD:
Yes, the patient's nervous condition when the complication or
internal hemorrhage which caused death set in, was an inherent
physiological condition produced by the wound in the abdomen. It
goes without saying that if he had not been wounded he would not
have undergone that extraordinary state and condition, nor have had
to leave his bed during the critical stage of his illness.
PEOPLE VS TOLING
FACTS:
The appellants Antonio and Jose Toling, identical twins and both
farmers from Barrio Nenita, Northern Samar were convicted of
multiple murder and attempted murder. Antonio had known through
a letter that his daughter Leonora who was working in Manila would
give him money. Together with his twin brother Jose, Antonio went
to Manila. The twins arrived in Manila on January 8, 1965. In Manila,
Antonio received a total of 80 pesos from his daughter and his
grandson, Sencio Rubis. The same day, the twins took the Bicol
express train coach no. 9 on the way home. After leaving the station
in Cabuyao, Laguna, Antonio with a pair of scissors went into a
stabbing frenzy along with his brother who was wielding a knife. The
incident amounted into a total of 8 wounded and 12 dead, 4 of which
died from jumping off the train allegedly to avoid being killed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twins are liable for the death of the four victims
who jumped off the train.
HELD:
The Court modified the decision of the lower court. Homicide for the
4 other victims who jumped off the train and died thereafter was
dismissed by the Court. Proximal cause for their deaths could not be
established as there were no witnesses to support that the 4 victims
jumped off because of the stabbing frenzy of the appellants. The
Court ruled that "if a man creates in another man's mind an
immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape,
and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state
of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.” However, since
no proximal cause was established, the appellants could not be held
liable. As the presumption was “a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act” , Sec 5 (c) Rule 131, Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS ORTEGA
People vs Ortega (276 SCRA 166)
Facts:
In 1992, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia and a certain John Doe
were charged with murder for the killing Andre Man Masangkay. As
narrated by a witness, the victim answered the call of nature and
went to the back portion of the house where they were having a
drinking spree. Accused Ortega followed him and later they heard the
victim shouting for help and when they ran towards the scene he saw
the accused on top of the victim and stabbing the latter with along
bladed weapon. Thereafter, Ortega and Garcia brought the victim to
a well and dropped him and placed stones into the well. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
appealed averring that the trial court erred in holding them criminally
liable because at the time the victim was dropped into the well, he
was still alive.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be held criminally liable for the
death of the victim which is not attributable to the stab wounds but
due to drowning?
Decision:
A person who commits a felony is criminally liable for the direct
natural and logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the
resulting crime is more serious than that intended. The essential
requisites for this criminal liability to attach are as follows:
1. the intended act is felonious.
2. the resulting act is likewise a felony
3. the unintended graven wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts.
URBANO VS IAC
FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to
his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated
portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who
opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right
palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On
October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement.
Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw
and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by
tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died
the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found
guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the
Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish
in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was
denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate
cause of the latter’s death
HELD:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected
by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him
was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he
died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural,
and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with
tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
PEOPLE VS ABARCA
FACT:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his
wife having sexual intercourse with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the
Abarca residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them and so
Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later,
Abarca, armed with an armalite, went to the gambling place where
Koh usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh
died instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the
adjacent room. These two other persons survived due to timely
medical intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of
murder with frustrated double murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.
HELD:
No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca
caught his wife with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was
still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage. Therefore, Abarca is not
liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two
other persons he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not
be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill
the other two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime
when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art. 247. Abarca
was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to
make sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less
serious physical injuries through simple negligence for the injuries
suffered by the two other persons who were in the adjacent room
when the incident happened.
PEOPLE VS ULEP
FACTS:
Macario Ulep, accused, elbowed her wife on her breast, upon being
drunk and uttering indecent words. Subsequently, the victim vomited
and then went to bed. The accused then left for the fields and upon
returning home, found his wife dead. He immediately reported this
death to their barrio captain. Medical reports show that the victim’s
cause of death is due to cardiac arrest and primary shock.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is criminally liable for the death of his wife.
HELD:
Yes. Even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any
external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have
been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with
the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is
responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and
unlawfully inflicted.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell
the blame for these in human acts on his wife. He should answer for
her tragic death.
Though, the appellant presented a witness to prove that
sometime,his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side
portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor
called an arbularyo. This witness said that two (2) ribs on each side of
the chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were
so affected. However, it was being held that even if the victim is
suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused —
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.
Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale
in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal
liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."
PEOPLE VS BINDOY
FACTS:
Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for
appelant was stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000.
The crime charged against the accused is homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba
wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife
Tibay. She refused because she already have one, but Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to
defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s
happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened
when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused and with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
HELD:
Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused,
Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When
Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew
towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam
came up and who was therefore hit in the chest without Bindoy seeing
him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without
malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the
bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct
was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on
the facts stated.
BELBIS VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano,
Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose
left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir,
Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and
went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was
there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner
Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed
him. Jose was brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was
confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital on January
7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had inflamed due to
infection. He died the next day.
Version of the Defense:
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a
store in engaged in a conversation with other people when Jose went
to them and told them to go home. While on their way home, they
heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo
asked Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, “What about?”
Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter was able
to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a
scabbard. Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was
merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of the
bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took him to the
hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a
reasonable doubt which would warrant his acquittal
HELD:
No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that
he had done the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an
accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea
by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction
would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of
the victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the
bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon,
already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means
employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate
to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression. In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the
victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged continuous unlawful
aggression from the victim as the latter was already without a
weapon.
Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and
the death of the victim is not controlling since what really needs to be
proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his
death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without
the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an
infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his
death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if
his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of
the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of homicide.
PEOPLE VS GONA
FACTS:
On the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas
celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There
seems to have been liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the
men present became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took
the place between the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and
his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by
Mapudul and one Award. The defendant left the house about the
same time with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of
the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, the
mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound
with a bolo.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is criminally liable even though he killed one
man instead of the person he intended to kill?
HELD:
The mistake of the defendant in killing one man instead of another
did not relieve him from criminal responsibility and could not even be
considered a mititgating circumstance.
PEOPLE VS CAGOCO
FACTS:
On July 24, 1932, Manila, the accused willfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
without any just cause therefor and with intent to kill and treachery,
assaulted and attacked Yu Lon by suddenly giving him a fist blow on
the back part of the head, treacherously, under conditions which
intended directly and especially to insure, the accomplishment of his
purpose without risk to himself arising from any defense the victim Yu
Lon might make, thus causing him to fall on the ground as a
consequence of which he suffered a lacerated wound in the scalp and
a fissured fracture on the left occipital region, which were necessarily
mortal and which caused the immediate death of the said Yu Lon.
Defendant was found guilty of murder in the CFI, for which the
defendant made an appeal. Counsel enumerated the following
assignment of error: (1) that the trial court erred in finding the true
assailant of Yu Lon, (2) assuming that the appellant is such person, the
trial court erred in finding that the appellant struck his supposed
victim, (3) assuming that the appellant is such person, and that the
appellant did indeed strike Yu Lon, the trial court erred in that the
blow was struck in the rear, (4) the trial court erred in finding that the
identity of the appellant was fully established, (5) the trial court erred
in convicting the appellant of murder (Art 248) rather than
maltreatment (Art 266).
DECISION – COURT OF ORIGIN
Defendant was found guilty of murder by Judge Luis P. Torres
ISSUE:
W/N a naturally resulting injury from a direct consequence of an
unlawful act would make the aggressor criminally liable
HELD:
Yes. The Court referred to paragraph 1, Article 4 of the RPC which
provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from what he intended; but in order that a person be
criminally liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) that a
felony was committed, and (2) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
offender. There is no doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon,
which occurred as the direct consequence of the blow dealt by the
appellant, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so
great an injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his
unlawful act but is merely a mitigating circumstance (US vs Rodriguez,
23 Phil 22).
PEOPLE V. MABUG-AT
FACTS:
The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. Juana had been
jealous of the accused on account of the latter having frequently
visited the house of one Carmen. Their relations were such that the
accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9,
1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the
third day, or the night of August 11th, the accused went to the
threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to
take part in some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand,
requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come downstairs and as
Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go
upstairs, I will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill
him." The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo
came downstairs, when they went in the direction of their house. The
accused, who was seen by the two girls, followed them without saying
a word. It is only a short distance from the house where the devotion
took place to that of the offended party, the houses being adjacent.
As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at
the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded
Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having
entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left
eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical
attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses who
testified at the trial of this case. The defense, without abandoning its
allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends
that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a
firearm, with injuries, it not having been proven that it was the
accused's intention to kill. The relations existing between the accused
and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting his
invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand,
went to look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was
being held, later following her to her house, and especially having
aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit
of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the
accused's intention to kill
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for frustrated murder
HELD:
Yes. Although the mere act of firing at a person is not a proof per se if
intent to kill, yet when the surrounding circumstances of the act are
such that they leave no room for doubt that the intention was to kill
the person fired upon, the crime is not simply “discharge of firearm,”
but homicide or murder as the case maybe.
The qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be properly
taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed
to kill was different from the one who became his victim.
PEOPLE V. BINDOY
FACTS:
Appeal from a judgement of the CFI of Occidental Misamis, for
appelant was stenced to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased with the amount of P1,000.
The crime charged against the accused is homicide.
In the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba
wineshop. Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Faustino Paca's wife
Tibay. She refused because she already have one, but Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to
defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he
carried. Emigdio Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s
happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This happened
when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused and with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Omamdam's chest who was then behind Bindoy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bindoy is criminally liable?
HELD:
Corroborated by Gaudencio Cenas of the testimony of the accused,
Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo. When
Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently that it flew
towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam
came up and who was therefore hit in the chest without Bindoy seeing
him. Bindoy alleges that it was caused accidentally and without
malicious intent because he was only defending his possession of the
bolo which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct
was perfectly lawful. The Court therefore acquitted Bindoy based on
the facts stated. The injury was accidental and the defendant should
be acquitted.
"In many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing
the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the
mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."
INTOD ET AL VS CA
FACTS:
• February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio
and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house and asked
him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan.
Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land
dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
• February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at
Palangpangan's house and fired at Palangpangan's bedroom but
there was no one in the room.
• RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony
of the witness
ISSUE:
W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime
under Art. 4 (2)
HELD:
YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs
• Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility
shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on
the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.
• The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School,
recognizes in the offender his formidability to punish criminal
tendencies in Art. 4(2)
• Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime
• Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation
of the law
2. there is intention to perform the physical act
3. there is a performance of the intended physical act
4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount
to a crime
o Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
• Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime – this case
o Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty
• United States: where the offense sought to be committed is
factually impossible or accomplishment - attempt to commit a crime;
legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any
crime
PEOPLE VS DOMASIAN
FACTS:
• March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso
Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.
Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to
Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a
building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and
started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man
flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the
while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned
to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they
walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and
handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's
father. The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente. As
Enrico was crying and being firmly held, Alexander Grate, the tricycle
driver became suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship
with the boy who told him they were brothers. Their physical
differences and the wide gap between their ages made Grate doubt
so he immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when
his passengers alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went
after the two and saw the man dragging the boy. Noticing that they
were being pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico
behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met
his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already
looking for him.
• At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's
return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note
demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that
otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in
the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the
hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI
for examination
• March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a
ransom note demanding P1 million otherwise Enrico will be killed. .
Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred
it to the NBI for examination and it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tan’s
signature.
• Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon
o Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a
mahjong game in a friend's house and later went to an optical clinic
with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
• Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian.
• RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties
• Appealed
ISSUE:
W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with
serious illegal detentio
HELD:
YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only
in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending
of the ransom note was an impossible crime which he says is not
punishable.
Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article,
which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended.
• Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been
committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime
because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment
or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The sending
of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the
penalty to death under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this
too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
• On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through physical
volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts
were complementary to each other and geared toward the
attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the
ransom of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
• The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to
Agra, Tan approached him 6 days before the incident happened and
requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at
that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra
could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help.
JACINTO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed Banco De Oro (BDO) a postdated check
amounting to P10,000 as payment for her purchases from Mega Foam
Int’l, Inc. to Gemma Jacinto, being the latter’s collector. Somehow,
the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso
Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle. Jacqueline is the sister of
Gemma and the former inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam received a
phone call from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The latter
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of
Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable to cash. The
customer had apparently been instructed by Capitle to make check
payments payable to cash. Another phone call was received from
Land Bank for the purpose of informing Capitle that the BDO check
issued by Aquino bounced.
Ricablanca phoned Anita Valencia asking the letter to inform Capitle
about the bounced check. Valencia told Ricablanca that the check
came from Aquino. Ricablanca was instructed to ask for the check’s
replacement. Ricablanca was further told the plan of taking the cash
and dividing it equally into four: for Valencia, Ricablanca, Jacinto and
Capitle. It was reported to Joseph Dyhengco -- Mega Foam’s owner.
Dyhengco, with the help of the National Bureau of Investigation,
planned an entrapment operation. The plan is to dust ten pieces of
P1,000 bills and to give it to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend
that she was going along with Valencia’s plan. The latter went to
Aquino’s factory who pretended that she would be replacing the
check for cash, when in fact she is going to use the marked money and
divide it between Valencia and Jacinto. Valencia and Aquino were
immediately arrested by the NBI.
The RTC found them guilty for qualified theft. The CA modified the
penalty as to Valencia. A partial motion for reconsideration was
denied, thus they filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Jacinto and the others now contend that they cannot be charged of
qualified theft because the check has no value, it being subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the element of intent to gain from the thing stolen
in qualified theft is absent.
Held:
No qualified theft (lack of intent to gain)
1. The elements of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article
308, in relation to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code are the
following:
a. The taking of personal property
b. The said property belonged to another - the check belonged to
Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made
c. The taking was done with intent to gain
d. It was done without the owner's consent
e. It was done with grave abuse of confidence
2. The personal property subject of the theft must have some value,
as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is
further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of
the thing stolen.
3. In this case, Jacinto unlawfully took the postdated check belonging
to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. The element of intent to gain is absent.
Impossible crime of qualified theft
4. The elements of an impossible crime are:
a. That the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property
b. That the act was done with evil intent
c. That its accomplishment was inherently impossible, OR the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
5. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must
be either legal impossibility or physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
6. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if
completed, would not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility on the
other hand occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime.
7. In this case, Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Her evil
intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would
have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the
check being unfunded, a fact unknown to her at the time, that
prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken
by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the
check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the
cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. Jacinto should
only be held liable for the impossible crime of theft.
Crime must be alleged in the information
8. The fact that Jacinto further planned to have the dishonored check
replaced with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent
scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or
covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot
pronounce judgment on her; otherwise, it would violate the due
process clause of the Constitution. The fraudulent scheme could have
been another possible source of criminal liability
CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry
with an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale
or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but
to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against
Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being
a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry
should be returned and the date when crime occurred is different
from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction
ISSUES and RULING
Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without
violating the best evidence rule (only original documents, as a general
rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose
a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence
at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by
Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to
the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted having
signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse
of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the
RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not
a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period
and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates
that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July
1991,” such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of
confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as
follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.
Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
“demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was
tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility
of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court
for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity
denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the
case.
 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by
the CA. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by
the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered.
PEOPLE VS PANCHO
Facts:
On August 1, 1994, at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning, Michelle,
who was then only ten years old, went home after spending the night
at her aunt's house. While she was about to undress, appellant
suddenly dragged her and forced her to lie down on the floor.
Although frightened, she struggled by kicking and boxing him.
However, he forcibly removed her clothes and underwear. Then he
took off his clothing. Appellant started kissing and holding her breast
and eventually had carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain when he
inserted his organ into her vagina which bled. She tried to resist but
he held her both arms. He was on top of her making push and pull
movements for four (4) minutes. Then he dressed up, threatening to
kill her should she complain or tell anyone about the incident.
Sometime in December, 1995 at the family's new residence at
Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan, appellant arrived from work. When
Michelle opened the door and saw him, she got scared. While he was
approaching her, she managed to hit him. Then she attempted to
jump out of the window, but he dragged her by her feet. At that
instance, her uncle (Tito Onio) suddenly arrived.[3] Immediately,
appellant stopped, thus thwarting his bestial desire. She told her
mother, but she ignored her so she confided to her grandmother.
Held:
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335,of the Revised Penal Code, rape
is attempted when the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. There is no attempted rape in this case because the
accused just dragged the victim and held her feet, which are not
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.
PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG
Facts:
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who
was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C. R. Fuentes streets of the
City of Iloilo, caught the accused Aurelio Lamahang in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside
with another Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking
one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him
under custody.
The CFI of Iloilo found Lamahang guilty of attempted robbery.
Held:
In order to be considered an attempted offense, there must be
connection between the act performed and the offens
1. The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes
is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense;
that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt
acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not
a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
2. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through
the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to
commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman
Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution.
But it is not sufficient that an act objectively performed constitute a
mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the
cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will
develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code;
it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.
3. In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting,
the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the
acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be
such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related,
by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that
they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of
double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit,
and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and
can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated
crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to
produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the
facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from
them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This
must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in
order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the
acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an
offense, they would be meaningless. (Groizard)
4. Viada holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts
leading to the commission of the offense, are not punishable except
when they are aimed directly to its execution, and therefore they
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense
Offense committed is not attempted robbery but attempted trespass
to dwelling
5. In case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means
of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an
attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender
clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some
personal property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is
nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may
reasonably be inferred. From the fact established, that the accused
was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan
Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his
evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against
the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in
entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to
justify a concrete finding.
6. We hold that the fact under consideration does not constitute
attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling. Under article
280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a
private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's
will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to
commit this offense in accordance with the evidence. Under the
circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is
presumed.
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances
7. Against the accused must be taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, -
inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for
robbery and theft have been rendered against him - and in his favor,
the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the
wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating
circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case
constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.
VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of
a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a
push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where
his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned
inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of
detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading
the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the
security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise.
The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently
apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela
and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela
appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose
of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus
the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.
Held:
No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when
all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be
present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent
to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held
that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property
by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is
able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has
already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from
the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot
have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
CANCERAN VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Canceran was charged with "Frustrated Theft." Damalito Ompoc
(Ompoc), a security guard. (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer...
on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc saw Caneeran approach one of
the counters in Ororama. Canceran was pushing a cart which
contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00
Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had... been
checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they found
out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits,
but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627.20
Canceran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching... the
Don Mariano gate, Canceran stumbled as he attempted to ride a
jeepney
Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal... belongings were
deposited in the office of Arcenio. Canceran vehemently denied the
charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser
On his way out, after buying medicine and mineral water, a male
person of around 20... years of age requested him to pay for the items
in his cart at the cashier; that he did not know the name of this man
who gave him P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic
Flakes... he obliged with the request of the unnamed person because
he was struck by his... conscience; that he denied knowing the
contents of the said two boxes; that after paying at the cashier, he
went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney...
consummated Theft
The RTC wrote that Canceran's denial deserved scant consideration
because it was not supported by sufficient and convincing evidence
and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate his claims.
Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of
double jeopardy for the first time.
The CA affirmed
Issues:
Whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was
not charged in the information... whether there was double jeopardy.
Ruling:
The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.
A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show
that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated Theft" only. As stated
earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can
never be read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the
indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead,
the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was...
being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily,
Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted
Theft.
"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with
which he was charged in the complaint or information and on which
he was tried.
Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly
proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the information
filed against him.
In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove
the crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted
Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming... evidence to convict him
for consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him
with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would
violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
allegations against him, as he so protests.
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined,... but by the
actual recital... of facts in the complaint or information.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the
additional allegation, but, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason... of some cause independent of accused's will, that is, they
were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who
prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds
White Beauty Cream, x x x
This averment, which could also be... deemed by some as a mere
conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous.
There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of
the accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed
that the charge against him was consummated theft.
No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached
PEOPLE VS ERINA
Facts:
The RTC convicted Erinia of the crime of consummated rape. The
victim was a child of 3 years and 11 months old. There was doubt as
to whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being
disturbed by the timely intervention of the mother and the sister of
the child. The physician who examined the genital organ of the child
a few hours after the commission of the crime found a slight
inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an
effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying before the
court, he expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been
effected. The mother of the child testified that she found its genital
organ covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be considered
conclusive evidence of penetration.
It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that
penetration was impossible and that, therefore, the offense
committed should be treated only as abusos deshonestos.
Held:
1. There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the offended party, the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape.
2. Complete penetration is not essential to the commission of the
crime of rape. It is sufficient if there is a penetration of the labia
3. In view of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of
the child as their guest, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be imposed in its
maximum degree
Note: Relate this case with People vs Orita [G.R. No. 88724, April 3,
1990] where the court finally did away with the offense of frustrated
rape and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to
remain in our statute books.
PEOPLE VS ORITA
FACTS:
March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old
freshman student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding
house after her classmates brought her home from a party. She
knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of
another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite
pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since
the door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they
used the back door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped
around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck,
he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he
commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room.
They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on
the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He
then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-
shirt, bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor
and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her
vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she kept
moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid down on
his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of
his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands
flat on the floor. She dashed out to the next room and locked herself
in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she ran to another
room then another then she jumped out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of
the boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no
answer, she ran around the building and knocked on the back door.
When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door,
they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, took
off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw
somebody running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness.
She was taken to Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was
physically examined.
Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE:
W/N there is frustrated rape.
HELD:
NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the
victim in the amount of P30,000
Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted
and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator's will
Attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a
foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop
prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his
intention to perform
If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding
further, it cannot be an attempt.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient
to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ
The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible.
Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the
victim.
PEOPLE VS LABIAGA
Doctrine: In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that
the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without
timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
FACTS:
Sometime in December of 2003 in Iloilo, accused Regie Labiaga
(Regie) and three others conspired, confederated and helped one
another, with an unlicensed firegun, willfully and unlawfully shot Judy
Conde (Jojo) in different parts of her breast whiched caused her death
thereafter. The same individuals also conspired to kill Gregorio
Condea and later succeeded.
Appellant said that the shooting of Conde was an act of self-defense
Conde challenged him to a gunfight. RTC ruled out his defense.
RTC convicted the appelant of murder adn frustrated murder. CA
affirmed the decision with modifications as to civil indemnities.
ISSUE: WON Regie is guilty of frustrated murder.
RULING: NO. In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing
that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without
timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by
Gregorio Conde was mortal. Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not
mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised
Penal Code, the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be
two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder
under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law provides:
Appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and shall
suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
FERNAN JR. ET. AL VS PEOPLE
Facts:
This petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving 36 former officials and
employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH) and several
suppliers of construction materials for defalcation of public funds
arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway
Engineering District in 1977. The incident is popularly known as the
“86 million highway scam.”
The conspiracy to defraud the government was formed in February
1977 when accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia
Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and
Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII, met at the Town and
Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched their plan. The
fraudulent scheme involved the splitting of Letters of Advice of
Allotments (LAAs) and Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE)
so that the amount covered by each general voucher is less than
P50,000.00 to do away with the approval of the Regional Auditor; the
charging of disbursements to unliquidated obligations due the
previous year to provide the supposed source of funds; and the
manipulation of the books of account by negation or adjustment, i.e.,
the cancellation of checks through journal vouchers to conceal
disbursements in excess of the Cash Disbursement Ceiling (CDC), so
as not to reflect such disbursements in the trial balances submitted to
the Regional Office.
In 1978, a Commission on Audit (COA) investigation confirmed the
suspected issuance of fake LAAs in the Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd
and the Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts (HED). They
discovered that two sets of LAAs were received by the districts. One
set consists of regular LAAs which clearly indicated the covering sub-
allotment advices and were duly signed by Mrs. Angelina Escaño,
Finance Officer of the MPH Regional Office. The other set consists of
fake LAAs which do not indicate the covering sub-allotment advice
and were signed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat and Engr.
Jose Bagasao, instead of the Finance Officer. Mangubat, however, had
no authority to approve them because since October 1977 he had
already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. There were
indications that the practice had been going on for years.
The fake LAAs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds
amounting to P3,839,810.74 for the purchase and delivery of
materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the
national highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the enormous
additional expenditure, the testimonies of barangay captains of the
afftected areas disclosed that were no actual major repair works
undertaken on the national highway except the filling of potholes by
crushed limestone (anapog).
Rolando Mangubat and others were found guilty in all 119 counts and
were accordingly sentenced by the Sandignbayan.
Petitioners Simon Fernan, Jr. and Expedito Torrevillas were both Civil
Engineers of the MPH assigned to the Cebu First HED. Petitioner
Fernan, Jr. was included among the accused in 6 of the criminal cases
allegedly for having signed six tally sheets or statements of deliveries
of materials, used as bases for the preparation of the corresponding
number of general vouchers. Fund releases were made to the
suppliers, contractors, and payees based on these general vouchers.
The Sandiganbayan found Fernan, Jr. guilty in all 6 criminal cases as
co-principal (with Mangubat et al) in the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of Public Documents under Articles 318 and 171, in
relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Torrevillas
was similarly convicted under the same offense in 9 criminal cases.
Petitioner interpose the instant petition claiming that their guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the State was
unable to show that government funds were illegally released based
on alleged ghost deliveries in conjunction with the false or fake tally
sheets and other documents which they admittedly signed.
Held:
Meaning of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
1. Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. This means proving the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not
mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such
uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review
and consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present
when after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges] in that condition that they
cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
Complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
elements of the offense
2. Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under
Articles 318 and 171 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.
3. The elements of estafa are:
(a) Deceit: Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in
any false representation or contrivance whereby one person
overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. There is deceit when
one is misled, either by guile or trickery or by other means, to believe
to be true what is really false.
(b) Damage: Damage may consist in the offended party being
deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation,
disturbance in property right, or temporary prejudice.
4. The elements of falsification are:
(a) That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
(b) That he takes advantage of his official position;
(c) That he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts defined
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
5. The fake LAAs and general vouchers were supported by signed tally
sheets that pertained to alleged ghost deliveries of road construction
materials for non-existent or illegal projects. For their part,
petitioners admitted that they signed the tally sheets and/or delivery
receipts and other related documents which became part of the
supporting documents that led to the issuance of general vouchers
and eventually the disbursement of public funds for the ghost
deliveries.
6. The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public
documents are present in the cases against petitioners, as follows:
(A) Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that
supplies for road construction and maintenance were delivered by
suppliers allegedly in furtherance of alleged lawful projects when in
fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual asphalting or
repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners:
(i) Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission
of the offenses;
(ii) Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; and
(iii) Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact.
(B) Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of
Fernan, Jr. and PhP 337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as payments
to various suppliers for the delivery of non-existent supplies.
Guilt of petitioners were proven beyond reasonable doubt
7. By way of defense, petitioners posit that the tally sheets and other
documents could in fact be traced to genuine LAAs that were in the
custody of the NBI. Unfortunately, these genuine LAAs were not
introduced in evidence. It is an age-old axiom that s/he who alleges
something must prove it. Petitioners' assertion that the documents
they signed were all genuine and duly covered by genuine LAAs was
substantiated only by their own self-serving and uncorroborated
testimonies. Petitioners could have easily procured the compulsory
process to compel the production of said documents. However,
petitioners miserably failed to avail of subpoena duces tecum which
the court a quo could have readily granted.
Direct evidence is not required to establish conspiracy
8. The burden of proving the allegation of conspiracy falls to the
shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in
establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds
no need to prove it by direct evidence.
9. Direct proof of prior agreement is not necessary. After all, secrecy
and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and
design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more
persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must
be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (see People v.
Pagalasan)
Two structures of multiple conspiracies
10. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of
multiple conspiracies, namely:
(a) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a
single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and
(b) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer.
Petitioners, as c-conspirators, are liable as co-principals in the crime
(estafa through falsification of public documents)
11. The conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel"
conspiracy. The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive
conspiracy to defraud the government were controlled by a single
hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz
(Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy.
Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.
12. The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the anti-graft
court that petitioners are co-conspirators of the other accused,
headed by Chief Accountant Rolando Mangubat, who were similarly
convicted in practically all the 119 counts of estafa. Petitioners' acts
in signing the false tally sheets and/or delivery receipts are
indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Moreover, the fake delivery receipts
and tally sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general
vouchers upon which check payments were made to the suppliers
who were found guilty of participating in the fraud.
13. Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link
in a chain and the desistance of even one of them would prevent the
chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its
consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But when each
and everyone of the accused in the instant cases performed their
assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision and accuracy, by
individually performing essential overt acts, so much so that the
common objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal release of
public funds under the guise of fake or simulated public documents,
then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as co-
principals under the well-established and universally-accepted
principle that, once a conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the
act of one is the act of all and such liability exists notwithstanding no-
participation in every detail in the execution of the offense. (People
v. Mangubat)
GO-TAN VS TAN
Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married.
Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and
Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in
conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2)
(3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-
in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of
a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.
Held:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of
RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal
principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such
as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
PEOPLE VS ABRAZALDO
Facts:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant, then
intoxicated,[4] attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but
instead, hit the post of the latter's house. The incident was reported
to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo
Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay
tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the
place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle, "I will
kill you!" Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of
Quinto's house with blood oozing from his forehead. At that time, the
place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist
accused-appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant
and Guban shouted at each other and grappled "face to face."
Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the
abdomen and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter
said, "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo." Fajardo, together with the
other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison
Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a
Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales
issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was
"stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right."
On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-
appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay, Pangasinan. Together with
SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of Francisca
Velasquez, accused-appellant's aunt, and recovered the knife.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different
version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening, he was
making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and
Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then
drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, "Get out Feding
I will kill you!"[16] When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him
with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house and got
his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and
they grappled for its possession. In the course thereof, both fell down.
It was then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-
appellant did not know which part of Guban's body was hit.
Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.
Issue:
Is he correct?
Ruling:
No. While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order
to preserve his own life, he maintained that the victim
accidentally stabbed himself while they were grappling for the
knife. The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be
appreciated considering the accused-appellant’s flight from the
crime scene, his failure to inform the authorities of the incident
and his failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The
aforesaid circumstances are inconsistent with having a clean
conscience and, instead, indicatehis culpability tothe crime charged
In the present case, accused-appellant's tendency to invoke a
melange of defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he
admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own
life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This
shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab
the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only
by necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural
course of action was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report
the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance
of self-defense or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be
appreciated considering accused-appellant's flight from the crime
scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.
Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is
inconsistent with a clean conscience and, instead, indicates his
culpability of the crime charged.
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it
is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack
of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable
means to prevent and repel an aggression.
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show
that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he testified that it was Guban
who went to his house, threatened to kill him, hit him with an iron
pipe, and attacked him with a knife.
PEOPLE VS DURAN
Facts:
The Information charging Duran with Murder partly alleges that the
accused, using an unlicensed firearm, employing treachery,
feloniously shoot GILBERT GRIMALDO on the back of his head and
thereafter as the victim lay helpless and wounded on the ground shot
him another three times, which cause his instantaneous death.
Upon his arraignment, Duran entered a plea of not guilty. Duran
invoked self-defense and testified that while on his way to buy fish,
he was blocked by two persons. One of them turned out to be the
victim Gilbert Grimaldo who poked a gun at him, and said that they
only needed his money. When Grimaldo attempted to get the money
from his belt bag, they wrestled for the possession of the gun. Then
Duran was able to take the gun away from Grimaldo. When Grimaldo
moved backward, he pulled the trigger of the gun and hit Grimaldo.
Issue:
Is the self-defense valid?
Ruling:
No. There was no unlawful aggression
An accused who pleads self-defense admits the commission of the act
charged as a crime. The burden of proving self-defense rests on the
accused. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself or at least any provocation executed
by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim's aggression.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present.
The Court agrees with the RTC and CA that Duran was unable to prove
the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Even if
Duran's account of an attempted robbery against him is to be
believed, his testimony also shows that Grimaldo, albeit the initial
aggressor, ceased to be the aggressor as Duran had successfully
wrested the weapon from him. Thereafter, Duran shot the gun at
Grimaldo four times; three of which hit Grimaldo on vital parts of his
body. At this moment, actions of the accused were already done in
retaliation and not self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression initiated
by the victim had already ceased when the accused attacked him; in
self-defense, the aggression from the victim is continuing.
The imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter.
After the former had successfully seized it, there was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful
aggressor when he stabbed the victim. When an unlawful aggression
that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense
has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.
DELA CRUZ VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Petitioner claimed that on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the
afternoon, more or less, petitioner, together with his children, went
to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene),
located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati
City, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and
celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the
Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular
security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty
manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found
in his possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and
surrendered a valid I.D. Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same
building, a security guard manning the entrance once again frisked
petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he
was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard
also pointed to him the direction towards his wife’s table. However,
as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain
man and asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene.
The person whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim,
Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene,
Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he
answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response given by Jeffrey
shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo
sinusundo mo pa!" Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey,
petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey
suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up
something in his chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the
same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The gun,
however, did not fire. Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner
grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While grappling,
the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did
not fire. Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and
tried to run away to avoid any further confrontation with the
latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and
shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big
fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the same on
petitioner’s head. Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack
while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying, the gun
accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his
parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single
bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter
to fall on the floor and die. Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe
premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator. On his
way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong
nangyari?", but he was not able to answer. After said incident,
Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2)
young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had
an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene,
dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
Issue:
Is there self-defense?
Ruling:
No. In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the
gun.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that he wrested the gun from the
victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard,
guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful
aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to
run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of
the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased
when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is
settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer
has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation and not self-defense is committed. A person making a
defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful
aggression has ceased.
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one
who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer
persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression
that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender.
Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation
when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on
Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already
ceased.
Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not
reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged
attack, which he sought to avert. The victim was holding the fire
extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the
alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that
the means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack
and the defense.
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him,
he should have just run, despite any obstruction, considering that he
was already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately
sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard
stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact,
he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he
had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-
preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
PEOPLE VS APOLINAR
Facts:
Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant
Anastacio Apolinar alias Atong was at that time the occupant of a
parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz,
Umingan, Pangasinan. Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over
said land when he observed that there was a man carrying a bundle
on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendant
called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the air
and then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was
able to get back to his house and consequently narrated to Angel
Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back by
a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the
spinal column - which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger
than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical report of Dr.
Mananquil. Petras died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant
surrendered to the authorities immediately after the incident and
gave a sworn statement before the Justice of Peace of Umingan on
December 23, 1936.
Issue:
WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property
Held:
No; the right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and
defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only
when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with
said property.
PEOPLE VS NARVAEZ
Facts:
Mamerto Narvaez hailed from Luzon and chose to relocate to
Mindanao in 1937. Mamerto settled in the area known as Celebes
Plantation.
Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American
landowner in Negros Oriental, filed a sales application over the same
area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation
Company.
300 hectares of land was awarded to Fleischer and Company, which
the settlers, including Mamerto, protested. The settlers filed a civil
case in court to annul the land award to Fleischer and Company but
they lost. This resulted in the ouster of the settlers, including
Mamerto, by an order of the court. Mamerto voluntarily dismantled
his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000, and transferred
to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway.
He also transferred his store from his former residence to the second
house near the highway.
Another case was filed to revoke the land award to Fleischer and
Company. While the said case was pending, Mamerto entered into a
lease contract with the company over a 100-140 sqm portion of Lot
No. 38 (where his house and ricemill were located) for a consideration
of P16 monthly. Mamerto failed to pay a single rent for six months
which prompted Davis Fleischer to write him a letter terminating the
lease and giving Mamerto six months (until December 31, 1968) to
remove the constructions on the occupied lot otherwise the same will
be demolished by the company.
On August 21, 1968, Davis Fleischer and Flavaino Rubia, together with
their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts
along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were
planted right on the concrete drier of Mamerto, thereby cutting
diagonally across its center. The fence, when finished, would have the
effect of shutting off the accessibility to Mamerto's house and rice
mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the
Fleischers' side.
At that time, Mamerto was taking his rest, but when he heard that
the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw
the fencing going on. Mamerto addressed the group, saying -'Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it
over - what is good,' addressing Flaviano Rubia, who is his compadre.
Davis Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go
ahead.'
Mamerto lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Davis
Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Flaviano Rubia ran
towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, Mamerto
fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a
result of the shooting. Mamerto surrendered to the police thereafter,
bringing with him the shotgun and claiming he shot two persons.
The lower court convicted Mamerto Narvaez of murder qualified by
treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Mamerto admits having shot Fleischer and Rubia from the window of
his house with a shotgun. He claims, however, that he did so in
defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be
exempt from criminal liability.
Issue:
Is the self-defense valid?
Held:
No.
The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the
part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the
person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. The
argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable
only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression - In the case at bar, there was unlawful
aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had
given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in
peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's
house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also
provides that possession may not be acquired through force
or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession.
2. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or
repel attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the
attack.
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending
himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6)
RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and
passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide
(2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account
of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was
also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC:
Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to
mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered
three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
PEOPLE VS GENOSA
Facts:
Marivic Genosa suffered maltreatment from her husband Ben Genosa
for over eight years. She was 8 months pregnant, when, one evening
Ben came home drunk and started to batter her. Furious by her
nagging, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun but
was not able to open the same as it was locked. Marivic escaped from
Ben by hitting him on the arm and nape with a pipe.
Thereafter, while her husband was asleep, Marivic, thinking of all the
sufferings that she went through with her husband and of the fear
that he might really kill her and their unborn child, ‘distorted’ the
drawer and got the gun. She went to their room and shot Ben who
died on the bed.
She testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her
husband at least five times but he would always follow her to
reconcile. She also said that every time her husband came home
drunk, he would provoke her into quarreling and would beat her.
Marivic was interviewed by specialists who later on became expert
witnesses in relation to her psychological and psychiatric condition.
They said that she is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
Marivic admitted the killing thus she was found guilty of parricide.
Ruling that treachery was present , the trial court imposed the penalty
of death upon Marivic Genosa. It inferred this qualifying
circumstances from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been
found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located
at the back of his head.
Marivic raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense to exculpate
her from liability.
Issue:
Is self-defense valid?
Ruling:
Battered Woman Syndrome
1. A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman
may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined
as a battered woman.” Battered women exhibit common personality
traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the
family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the
dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.
2. It is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence” which has
three phrases
a. tension-building phase- During this phase, minor battering occurs.
It could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way.
What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways
that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the
escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her "placatory" and
passive legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the
first place.
b. acute battering incident- It is characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems
this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence.
Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so
are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that
she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only
exacerbate her condition.
c. tranquil, loving phase- During this period, the couple experience
profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and
nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been
viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness
and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the
battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for thebetter; and
that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom she
loves.
3. In this case, records for specific evidence failed to establish that she
is suffering from battered woman syndrome. The defense fell short of
proving all the three-phases. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. But she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Unlawful aggression should be present to raise self-defense
4. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides the requisites and
effect of self-defense:
“Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself."
5. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.
It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent
danger on the life or safety of a person.
6. In this case, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and Marivic’s fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape. During that night, Ben already went to bed. Thus the
imminence of the danger which is required for it to be considered as
a justifying circumstance ended altogether.
“Psychological paralysis” leading to “diminution of freedom of action,
intelligence or intent” appreciated as mitigating circumstance
7. The cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
Marivic resulted in "cumulative provocation which broke down her
psychological resistance and natural self-control," "psychological
paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished the
exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving
her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting
diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant
to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a
mitigating factor.
Passion and obfuscation appreciated as mitigating circumstance
8. In addition, the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation is present. It has been held that this state of mind is
present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.
9. To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind;
and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity
10. Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the
unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had
further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards
a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. Since she was pregnant at the
time, the attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus. His
abusive and violent acts, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a
separate room, her emotional and mental state continued.
Treachery (alevosia) not appreciated when a killing is preceded by an
argument or a quarrel
11. There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against
persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. In order to qualify an act as treacherous,
the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the
killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.
12. There is no showing of the victim's position relative to appellant's
at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that
when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant
13.Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked. There is no showing, though, that Genosa
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the
gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing
proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, this
Court resolves the doubt in her favor.
[Note] People vs Genosa (2004) characterized Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS) as an incomplete form of self defense (absent the
element of 'unlawful aggression') and therefore, if invoked, entitled
the female victim only to a mitigation of the penalty but not an
acquittal.
However, the passage of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004) on March 8, 2004, amended
the ruling in People vs Genosa by expressly stating that: “Victim-
survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code”.
[Section 26, RA 9262]. In other words, BWS is now treated as a
complete self-defense, notwithstanding the absence of immediate
unlawful aggression.
TY VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Vicky Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un and sister Judy Chua were both
confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital. The total hospital bills of the
two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory
note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.
She drew seven postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the
hospital, each covering the amount of P30,000.
The checks were all dishonored and returned unpaid to the hospital
due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. The
hospital sent demand letters to Ty which were not heeded. The
hospital filed the criminal suit against Vicky Ty.
Ty claimed the defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury." She averred that she was forced to sign a
promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the
checks to comply with the demands of the hospital which will refuse
to discharge her mother and will discontinue her medical treatment.
The trial court convicted Ty of seven counts of violation of BP 22
(Bouncing Checks Law) and sentenced her to a prison term. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty from
imprisonment to fine, equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check.
Held:
Exempting Circumstance (Uncontrollable Fear of Greater Injury)
1. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) the fear must be real and imminent; and
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed
2. It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear
is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it.
3. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's
life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should
not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.
4. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting
not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.
5. The fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty
claims that she was compelled to issue the checks -- a condition the
hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged for fear that her mother's health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother
might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. Moreover, there was no
showing that the mother's illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical
treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death.
6. Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no
choice but to commit a crime. She herself admitted that the collateral
or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother
may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.
Justifying circumstance (State of necessity)
7. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the
actor from liability under this paragraph:
(1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it;
(3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
8. In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected
or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable. Ty had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security
instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
9. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the
greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the
negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.
In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about
by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
Issuance of check for consideration
10. It is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
consideration Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law creates a
presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for
a consideration or for value.
11. In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks
were issued without consideration. She must present convincing
evidence to overthrow the presumption.
12. Valuable consideration may, in general terms, be said to consist
either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration
means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party
who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
13. Ty's mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of
the hospital. For the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate
obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them
and by force of her signature on her mother's Contract of Admission
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory
note she executed in favor of the hospital.
14. It is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker
to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial to him
personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred
upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the
instance of the promissor.
Law punishes mere issuance of worthless check
15. The law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of
an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.
16. The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks
and putting them into circulation. What is primordial is that such
issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is
known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required
element under BP 22.
Presumption of Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds
17. The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. (see Section 2 of BP 22). Such knowledge is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of
funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.
Offense is Mallum Prohibitum (deceit not an element)
18. The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds
of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as deceit is not an
essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen
of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent
in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.
Preference for Penalty of Fine
19. Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular 13-2001, establishes a rule of preference in the application of
the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances
of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a
fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
20. The determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the
judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a
hindrance.
21. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment
as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22.
22. Moreover, should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable
to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the
Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
PEOPLE VS DOMINGO
Facts:
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her
children were sleeping inside their house when Domingo when she
was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed with a
screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the
mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using the six-inch
screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She screamed and was
heard by her sister-in-law, whose house was contiguous to theirs.
When her sister-in-law asked her for the identity of the assailant, she
immediately identified herein appellant as "Doser," a name by which
he is known in the community. Appellant was angered by her reply
and said, "Anong Doser?" and thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from
his right side and stabbed her on the stomach. When she tried to
escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She
then grabbed him and ran towards the gate. However, before
reaching the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg.
The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice
on the arm and twice on his left chest that caused his death. After
stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back to the house, towards
Raquel's two daughters Michelle and Melissa. When Raquel pleaded
that the appellant spare her daughters' lives, he retorted: "Ngayon pa,
nagawa ko na." Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the
appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle, who was able to hide under
the papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. The appellant
also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the
screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquel's
sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant
followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue
and tried to subdue the appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost
consciousness. She also relayed that she was later informed that a
struggle ensued between appellant and Galvez. Appellant inflicted
wounds on Galvez's upper left chest and arms, after which Galvez was
able to hit appellant with a piece of wood, which rendered the latter
unconscious. Raquel, Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer, Galvez and the
appellant were taken to the hospital.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the
commission of the crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of
appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill.
Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had
already passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They
submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as
evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental
disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or
hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse
control and low frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out
when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of
Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that
he suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined
the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of
insanity of the appellant.
Issue:
Is the defense of insanity valid?
Held:
No. Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental
disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind immediately before or at
the very moment of the commission of the crime. This was not the
case in the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of appellant’s
mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at
the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it
crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel
Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, “Ngayon pa,
nagawa ko na.”
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
while committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of
reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not
enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane
person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.
Even assuming that appellant's testimony is credible, his
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his hearing imaginary
voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be
equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to
discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude
imputability. The popular conception of the word "crazy" is used to
describe a person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony
that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the
commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally
insane and will not grant him or her absolution.
PEOPLE VS ALCABAO
Facts:The accused in this case was a minor who 11 years old. The
accused caught the offended party shooting his mango fruit, thus, the
minor hit the victim back with a slingshot. The minor hit the victim’s
eyes and uttered the words “Putang ina mo, mabuti matikman mo”
after he committed the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment
Ruling:
The accused acted with discernment. The perverted character of the
accused is a factual circumstance which manifests that the minor
acted with discernment.
LLAVE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Debbielyn arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes
and proceeded to her mother's store. Marilou asked her daughter to
bring home the container with the unsold quail eggs. Debbielyn did as
told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she saw
petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks
which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from
the lamp post. She resisted to no avail. Petitioner ordered her to lie
down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts
and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her. She felt
his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. She felt pain
and cried. She was sure there were passersby on the street near the
vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girl's
cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn,
naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the
latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her
parents about what happened. She told her father about the incident.
Her parents later reported what happened to the police authorities.
Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he
was a rapist.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay
City South High School. He had been one of the three outstanding
students in grade school and received awards such as Best in
Mathematics.
Issue:
Was there discernment on the part of the accused?
Held:
Yes. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason
behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential
element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the
power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act. [84] On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that
the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's cunning and
shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged
the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant
house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his
dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who
shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape
arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his
grandmother's house to avoid being arrested by policemen and
remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into
custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade
school student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was
the best in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class
in a quiz bee contest. At his the age of 12, he finished a computer
course.
JOSE VS PEOPLE
Facts:
November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional
Narcotics Unit received an information regarding a big time group of
drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of Shabu at
Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna. Police
officers planned a buy-bust operation in which they arrested Sonny
Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of “money bills” and the
shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim
for investigation and the shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination by P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean
Geronimo who testified that the specimen was a second or low grade
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine
years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if
charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged
with a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such
case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to
be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is
that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a
crime – the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from
what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the
sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.[9] However, such
presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be
criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened[11] to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted
with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that
it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the
utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the
commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon
used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness;
his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of
age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment
relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence
of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car with
his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from
the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy
shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the
accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the
shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The petitioner handed
over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed
the same to the poseur-buyer.
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the
poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused
Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside
from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused
Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other
participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused
Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the
petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper
before and at the time he handed over the same to his cousin.
Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions
for illegal drugs.
US VS MARALIT
Facts:
While walking along in a road with a bundle of zacate, Maximo
Maralit, less than 15 years of age, passed along Florentino Luistro, 15
years old, and ended with a fist fight. They soon separated but Maralit
ran to Florentino quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife.
Maralit and his companion then ran away. The witnesses and
Florentino went home. Florentino died a few days later as a result of
the wound thus received.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
No. It is true, as counsel asserts, that it must appear from the evidence
that the accused acted with knowledge of the nature of his acts and
of the results which would naturally follow therefrom; but to establish
that fact it is not necessary that some witness declare directly and in
words that he acted with such knowledge. It is sufficient that, from
the evidence as a whole, it is a necessary inference that he so acted.
The trial court taking into consideration all of the facts and
circumstances presented by the record, together with the appearance
of the accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the conclusion
that he was of sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed
with judgment to know that the act which he committed was wrong
and that it was likely to produce death. In pursuance of that
conclusion the court made the finding that the accused in committing
the act complained of acted with discernment.
PEOPLE VS CORTEZANO & CORTEZANO
Facts:
Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo ordered their
niece Leah to sleep in their parents' room. Leah protested because it
was hot in that room. Joel threatened to whip her if she refused. Leah
had no choice; she went to the room and slept. Leah suddenly awoke
when she sensed pressure on her arms and legs. When she opened
her eyes, she saw her uncles Joel and Bernardo; they were holding her
hands and feet as she was being undressed. Leah struggled but was
easily overpowered by her uncles. She threatened to shout, but she
was told that nobody would hear her. Joel and Bernardo wet her
vagina with their saliva. Bernardo then held her hands as Joel
mounted her. Joel inserted his penis into her vagina, while Bernardo
stood by the window to serve as a lookout. Leah felt something
slippery inside her vagina. After Joel dismounted, Bernardo went on
top of Leah and inserted his penis into her vagina. It was Joel's turn to
stand by the window as a lookout. Leah once more felt something
slippery in her vagina. Bernardo then stood up.
Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel and
Bernardo were doing to Leah. Joel and Bernardo ordered Boyet to
rape Leah and threatened to box him if he refused. Joel and Bernardo
laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo
then called Leah Lou and Lionel into the room, letting them see their
sister naked.
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the
family if she told anyone about what happened to her. Joel, Bernardo
and Boyet left the room together. Leah went out of the room and
washed her vagina.
Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to
her. After that first harrowing incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected
her to sexual abuse daily. After every sexual intercourse they had with
Leah, Joel and Bernardo would threaten to kill her and her family if
she told anyone what they had been doing to her.
On June 10, 1990, Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah to go to her
grandparents' room. She did as she was told. Joel and Bernardo
undressed her. Leah was told to lie down, and Joel and Bernardo again
wet her vagina with their saliva. Joel then laid on top of her, holding
her hands and pinning her legs with his, as he inserted his penis into
her vagina. Bernardo stood by the window as a lookout. Leah tried to
fight Joel, but the latter was enraged. She was about to shout, but Joel
told her that it would be futile to do so because their neighbors were
far away. Joel dismounted and Bernardo had his turn, with Joel
standing by the window to see if anyone was coming. Joel and
Bernardo again threatened to kill Leah if she told anyone about the
incident.
The next day, June 11, 1990, was Lionel's birthday. Lourney arrived at
Brgy. Azucena and brought her children back to Caloocan City, in time
for Leah's enrollment at the Kalayaan Elementary School in Brgy.
Silang, Caloocan City. Because of the sexual abuse she suffered at the
hands of her uncles, Leah felt pain in her lower abdomen (puson).
Every now and then, she would feel numbness on the left side of her
body.
Issue:
Is there discernment?
Held:
Yes. The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when they
committed the offense. At the time, Joel was 13 years and 6 months
old, while Bernardo was 12 years and 4 months old. Nevertheless,
they are not exempt from criminal liability.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability. - The following
are exempt from criminal liability:
...
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he acted
with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the
time of the commission of the crimes is exempt from criminal liability
only when the said minor acted without discernment. It is the burden
of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted with discernment
when he committed the crime charged. In determining if such a minor
acted with discernment, the Court's pronouncement in Valentin v.
Duqueña[34] is instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine,
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records
in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the
appellants acted with discernment when they raped the victim, thus:
(a) they wetted the victim's vagina before they raped her; (b) one of
them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the victim; (c) they
threatened to kill the victim if she divulged to her parents what they
did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed
as Boyet was raping the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel
to look at their sister naked after the appellants had raped her.
PEOPLE VS CAPISTRANO
Facts:
Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that the
defendant was a so-called Yoin, which means an armed soldier of the
Japanese. Wearing a Japanese military uniform, he rendered services
to the Japanese army as a guard of a Japanese garrison. To the same
effect, the witness Placer Canada testified.
The defendant argued at the trial court that there was no evidence
showing that he had been appointed a Yoin or that he was a Makapili.
While no written formal appointment was introduced in evidence, yet
it is clear that he was engaged in the work of guarding the Japanese
garrison, armed with a gun and wearing a Japanese uniform and
taking part in the military drills of the Japanese army.
At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the
defendant with other Filipino members of the Yoin and several
Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the house of Carmen
Verdera in barrio Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas
(now Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to open the door. The
appellant and his companions entered the house, raised the mosquito
nets and ordered the inmates to rise. The appellant and his
companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera, Alejo Enriquez
Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada, Remedios
Anastacio, Dolores Enriquez, Teodora Zamora, Presentacion
Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope which was used as a
clothesline. The intruders then searched the premises and seized
from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000, U. S. currency, and P4,000,
Philippine currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and the other
inmates to the Japanese garrison at Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and
then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The motive for the raid
was that Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant
in Lopez and Salvador Fortuna, son of Graciano, was a soldier in the
said organization. One night, during the detention of Placer and her
companions in the Yoin garrison, the appellant attempted to sexually
abuse Placer and her girl companions, but when the women cried and
the Japanese came, the defendant escaped. Placer and her
companions were released after one month when they paid to the
Chief of the Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2,500 in Japanese war
notes. This charge was testified to by the several victims.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of minority present?
Held:
No. The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15)
years of age at the time that he committed the crime charged.
However, the court which had the opportunity to see and hear the
accused at the trial found that he acted with discernment. It should
be noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the leader or commander
of the raiding party. Although his minority does not exempt him from
criminal responsibility for the reason that he acted with discernment,
yet it may be considered as a special mitigating circumstance lowering
the penalty by two (2) degrees.
ESTIOCA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an
elementary school. One of which is Boniao who was 14 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime. They were found guilty by
the lower court. When the case was appealed to the CA, RA 9344 took
effect and Boniao was acquitted since he was a minor at the time of
the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability. Custody was given
to his parents.
Issue: Whether of not RA 9344 can retroact to Boniao’s case
Held:
Yes, the reckoning point in considering minority is the time of the
commission of the crime. In this case, Boniao is 14 years old hence
exempted from criminal liability without prejudice to his civil liability.
Art 22 of the RPC provides that penal laws may be given retroactive
effect if they are in favor of the accused.
SIERRA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA[5] was playing with her friend
BBB in the second floor of her family's house in Palatiw, Pasig. The
petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he
wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed
BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to
AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by
inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to
tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her
teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who
both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later
subjected to physical examination that revealed a laceration on her
hymen... consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of
the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged
with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual...
intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen years of age,
against the latter's will and consent.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the
defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes
at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only
invented her story because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he
gave her.
The parties' mother (CCC) supported the petitioner's story; she also
stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that
the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped
her; she confirmed the petitioner's claim that AAA bore her brother a
grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA's
credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him from
criminal liability considering that he was... only 15 years old at the
time the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner's conviction with
modification as to penalty as follows
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting
Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM.
The award of damages are likewise affirmed.
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the
CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General
that Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was not clearly
established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years old
or below at the time of the commission of the crime. It was...
incumbent for the defense to present Robert's birth certificate if it
was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344.
The CA denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No.
9344 on the petitioner's exemption from criminal liability;
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the
defense to present the petitioner's birth certificate to invoke Section
64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the
prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v.
Hon. Gubaton thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
Ruling:
We grant the petition.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground - i.e., exemption
from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 - that implies an admission
of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made
above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative... defenses
available to it, even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the
defense's claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time
in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential
change of theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons... of
fairness,... no essential change is really involved as the claim for
exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence
submitted below and with the lower courts' conclusion that the
petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting...
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities
exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words,
the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally
liable therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In
admitting... this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too,
that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45)
opens the whole case for review, even on questions that the parties
did not raise.
By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we... are bound to look into
every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.
It is with these considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct
and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how the cases of
children in conflict with... the law should be handled that we rule in
this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable
law on exemption from liability compelling because of the patent
errors the CA committed in these regards. Specifically, the CA's
findings of fact on the issues of age and minority, premised on the
supposed... absence of evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on
record; it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that
the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are
material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for
purposes of his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under
R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in characterizing
the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that
R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing
that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed
the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of
a child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child... himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on
the accused's minority and age upon the concurrence of the following
conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as
the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents... that
would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary...
evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies
are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and
CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was
committed.
Second, the records before us show that these pieces of testimonial
evidence were never... objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the
prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the
petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in
his favor.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the
accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from
criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite
his exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil... liability
depends on the crime he would have been liable for had he not been
found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC,
as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of
his relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of
consanguinity and the latter's minority.
Principles:
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect
on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a
child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system
that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner...
appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition
measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs
and other alternatives to institutional care.
In providing... exemption, the new law - as the old paragraphs 2 and
3, Article 12 of the RPC did - presumes that the minor offenders
completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so
that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be
held... accountable.
The current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative
justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as
formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their
wrong through diversion and... intervention measures.
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence,
refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the
burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused... falls upon the
prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients
of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has
presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required
elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts... to the defense
to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove
by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not
commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable
therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence
and... had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden
of evidence has now shifted to the defense which now claims, by an
affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt
from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the
crime. The... defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden
of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less
when he committed the rape charged.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took
effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old
when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of
total exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15
years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development... officers (LSWDO).
What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the
age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
MADALI VS PEOPLE
Facts: Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel Madali, 16 years old, along
with Jojo Bernardino, were charged with homicide for the killing of
AAA of Romblon.
Jovencio, a cousin of the victim who witnessed the killing, claims that
on the night of April 13, 1999 Raymund and Rodel Madali, Bernardino,
AAA and him were gathered near the National high school up in the
hagdan-hagdan. Bernardino blindfolded AAA with a handkerchief
from Raymund. Bernardino gave the first blow using a coconut frond,
next by Raymund and when AAA wobbled, Rodel punched him while
wearing brass knuckles. All Jovencio could muster was say “enough”
twice. Yet the three did not stop but instead hanged AAA on the tree
using the handkerchief and the dog chain. Before leaving the area,
Rodel threatened Jovencio to not tell anyone or else he will be next.
The corpse of AAA was found a few days later. The body was
decomposing and stinking.
Jovencio filed an information against the three but recanted it and
refiled it again. After the final judgement was pronounced,
Bernardino filed for probation. Raymund’s case on the other hand
was dismissed due to RA 9344 also known as Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 for being only 14 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Rodel’s case however, was sustained but
was suspended pursuant to RA 9344.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners should be exempted from criminal
liability.
Ruling: Yes, the petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability
by virtue of RA 9344.
Petitioners should be exempt from criminal liability due to the
provisions of RA 9344. Although it was only passed on 2006, it can be
applied to petitioners since laws favorable to the accused can have
retroactive effect. Section 38 of the act also provides for the
automatic suspension of sentence. The exemptions however, differ.
Raymond’s case is dismissed for being only 15 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime. Rodel’s case was sustained since he was
16 at the time of the commission. His sentence was however
suspended. And since he acted with discernment, he shall be under
an intervention program.

ORTEGA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Joemar Ortega was charged with the crime of Rape for allegedly
raping AAA. At the time of the incident, Joemar was then about 13
years old while the victim AAA was then about six years of age.
The families of Joemar and AAA were friends and neighbors.
According to AAA, Joemar raped her three times. The first two
incidents occurred when AAA and her brother (BBB) was left in the
care of Joemar's mother (Luzviminda) for two nights since their
mother had to care for their other brother in the hospital. On each of
the two nights, Joemar raped AAA, once in the sala and the second in
the comfort room. AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal since
Joemar threatened to spank her.
The third incident occurred in the house of AAA. While the rest of
AAA's siblings were watching television, Joemar dragged AAA to one
of the rooms and proceeded to undress and rape her. They were
caught by BBB who reported the incident to their mother. AAA's
mother confronted Joemar's mother regarding what happened. They
brought AAA to the doctor for examination. The first doctor found no
evidence of molestation. A second doctor reported minor abrasions
on AAA's vagina.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement was reached between the two
families. Part of the settlement required Joemar to depart from their
house to avoid contact with AAA. Joemar stayed with a certain priest
in the locality. However, a few months later, Joemar went home for
brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. This
infuriated AAA's father and confrontations occurred. AAA's parents
went to the NBI which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of
rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant
case.
Joemar denied the allegations of rape and stated that BBB just saw
him and AAA dancing and hugging in a playful act and got the wrong
impression.
The lower court found Joemar guilty of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to prison. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction.
Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
took effect on May 20, 2006 while petitioner's case was pending
before the Supreme Court. The OSG posited that petitioner is no
longer covered by Section 64 of RA 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed
by the CA in 2001. RA 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the
petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as
a child as defined under the law.
Issue:
Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A.
9344) should be applied, in the resolution of the case.
Held:
Section 6 of RA 9344 provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the
crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer
(LSWDO).
What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the child in conflict with the law (CICL), is not the
CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's
age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue
of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old.
The Court accords retroactive application to the provisions of RA 9344
pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia
sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. The principle has been given
expanded application in certain instances involving special laws. RA
9344 should be no exception.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.
In this case, the plain meaning of RA 9344's unambiguous language,
coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein
petitioner. The simple language of the law itself demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the CICL
Petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was only 13
years of age. Under RA 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no
concomitant exemption from civil liability.
REMIENDO VS PEOPLE
Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines
GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)
Facts:
Petitioner was a minor whose age is above15 but below 18 years old
when he raped a minor when the latter was left alone in her house.
In violating the minor, he threatened to kick the latter if she would
shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked
a suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was
convicted by the trial court and before the case was elevated to the
CA, he was already 22 years old.
Issues:
Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.
Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec.
38 and 40 of RA9344.
Held:
No. Since his age is above 15 and below18, the finding of discernment
is necessary to determine if he would be exempt from criminal
liability. In this case, his act of waiting for the victim’s parents to leave
the house before defiling the latter and threatening to kick her if she
should shout prove that petitioner can differentiate what is right and
wrong.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence, can no longer
be availed since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial
court, he was already 22 years old. Sec 40 provides that If the child in
conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
PEOPLE VS HERMIE JACINTO
Facts:
Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the rape of the then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed
when appellant was only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant
was already 25.
Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344
regarding criminal liability of an accused who was a minor during the
commission of the crime and the suspension of sentence of one who
is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.
Held:
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the
straightforward testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he
was only 17 during the commission of the crime since, in view of the
circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it was proved
that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing
that the accused understood the consequences of his action.
Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with
reclusion perpetua instead of the death penalty.
As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to
the decision of the Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for
damages.
However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the
suspension of his sentence provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which
made no distinction to an accused found guilty of a capital offense.
The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act
to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to
be considered was the fact that accused committed the crime at a
tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp
or any training facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case
was remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate action in
accordance to the said provision.
HUBILLA VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Rosal Hubille was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed
Jayson Espinola with a knife. He was charged with Homicide.
RTC - convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty of
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four years and one day
of prision correcional as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six
months and one day of prision correctional as minimum, to six years
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. The civil aspect was also
modified
On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal
and imposed on him the penalty of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in accordance
with RA 9344; that he is entitled to probation or suspension of
sentence
Held:
Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide. His minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that
lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable
penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional. So the CA imposed
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioner insists that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence
should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable
him to apply for probation under PD 968.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal liberty of the
child shall be limited to the minimum
Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the sentence is
available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age.
Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction in the
RTC, suspension was no longer feasible. RA 9344 reveals that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means
prohibited. Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest
appropriate period of time
Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last recourse after
holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for
the shortest duration permitted by the law.
PEOPLE VS ROXAS
In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No.
9344, what is important is the chronological age of the accused. If the
actual age of the child is 15 years old or under, he is exempt from
criminal liability. In People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014
- In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability,
Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary
of one’s birth date, and not the mental age.
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN VS QUEZON CITY
Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their
curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were
publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents:
Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive
parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process;[16] and (b) fail to pass
the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
HELD:
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a
valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance
to promote the welfare of minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a
formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the
minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what
actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws
and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have
passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State
has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the
Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides
for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
has also been construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit. In fine,
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and
thus, null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as
constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
PEOPLE VS BANDIAN
FACTS:
At About 7 in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentine Aguilar, the
apellant’s neighbor, saw the appelant go to the thicket about four or
five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that
purpose. A few minutes later, he then again saw her emerge from the
thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in front and back,
stagerring and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and having noted that she was very weak
and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed
her in her bed.
Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what had
happened to her, the appellant answered that she was very dizzy. Not
wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom who lived nearby to be there and help him
and the appellant. He asked Comcom to take bamboo leaves to stop
the hemhorrage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had
scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn
baby near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone
a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and the latter
told him to bring the body to the appellant’s house. Upon being askes
whether the babywhich was shown to her was hers or not, the
appellant answered in the affirmative.
In the afternoon of the said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of
the sanitary division went to the appellant’s house and found her still
lying in bed still bleeding. In his opinion, the physician declared that
the appellant gave birth in her house, and afterwhich, he threw the
child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she was married to,
because the child was not his but with another man with whom she
had previously has amorous relations. Nepomuceno testified that the
appellant admitted killing her child.
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by appellant?
RULING:
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant , in causing
her child’s death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the
thicket, did so willfully, consciously, or imprudently. She had no cause
to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a
former lover, Luis Kirol took place three years before the incident. The
husband of the appellant testified at the trial affirming the belief that
the child was his.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable must be
committed willfully and consciously, or at least it must be the result
of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases
where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental facilities, or must be conscious of his acts,
in order that he may be held liable.
The law exempts from criminal liability any person who acts under the
circumstances in which the appellant acted in this case, by giving birth
to a child in the thicket and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other cause than that she was overcome by severe
dizziness and extreme debility, with no fault or intention on her part.
She has in her favor the fourth and the seventh exempting
circumstances.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of her
involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take
her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes
entirely independent of her will, it should be held that… under such
circumstances, appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in her favor.
PEOPLE VS FALLORINA
Facts:
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an
eleven-year old minor and the third child of Vicente and Felicisima
Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon
City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play
outside. She agreed. Together with his playmate Whilcon “Buddha”
Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an
abandoned carinderia beside the road.
Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year
old witness Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, were playing
basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming
from the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo
of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina, a Philippine National Police
(PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG), knew
that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one of his friends was
previously been scolded by the appellant before.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof.
When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the former stopped his motorcycle, he
shouted and badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent
was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard
the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As
soon as Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof,
suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45 caliber pistol towards the
direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying
prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the
basketball court.
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless
body in a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General
Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single
gunshot wound in the head.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability?
(b) Whether or not the appellant can offset the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position from a mitigating
circumstance of his voluntary surrender? PEOPLE VS AYAYA
Facts:
About 1 o'clock in the morning of January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the
chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that
one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house
in said municipality. Said chief of police went to the place and found
Benito, the deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and
unconscious, for he did not answer the questions put to him. When
his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as to the
cause of that wound, she replied that she, with her husband Benito
de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in the store of one Felicidad
Losloso; that afterwards they went to a cinema; that while returning
home and without any warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave
her a blow which she dodged; that then her husband went home,
preceding her and her son and when they arrived at the house they
found the door closed; that she and her son pushed the door and
attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside, prevented it;
that then the door gave way somewhat and her son Emilio succeeded
in putting his head between the opening of the door and the wall and
;n order to prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it; that
Benito then poked his head out of the opening of the door and when
she saw him, she jabbed him with the umbrella she carried; that she
does not know where she jabbed him although she thinks it was in the
body; and that when she and her son finally succeeded in entering the
house, they found that Benito was already in bed with a wound in the
forehead. Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon
examining Benito, found he had a wound on the left upper eyelid
which was bleeding; that his pupils were dilated and, from the odor
of his breath and from his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was
drunk. In view of the wounded man's condition he was later taken to
the provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he died four days after the
incident.
Held:
The appellant Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she hereby is, acquitted. In
thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question, she did
so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head
crushed or being strangled; and if she thus caused her husband's
injury, it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to
cause it. This being so, we believe that she incurred no criminal
liability in accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because,
it being a licit act to free her son from the grave danger threatening
him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her husband, who
was behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does not make
her criminally liable.
PEOPLE VS GENITA
Facts:
On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, while
the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon were loading firewood
in a truck in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City, appellant who was
drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas
gift. Reynaldo told him to just come back because they were still
loading firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long after, he returned
and fired his gun at Jesus' feet, hitting his left leg. He immediately
jumped into the truck. Appellant then went near its bumper and fired
at the tire near the chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun
and fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg. Reynaldo ran
away, his right hand covering his head. Appellant chased him and fired
at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After the commotion, the
victims' co-workers who were able to take refuge from the cascade of
bullets returned to the scene and found the dead body of Reynaldo.
Jesus was immediately brought to the Butuan City General Hospital
but died thereafter.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance?
Held:
No. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code. It must be stressed that in raising this defense,
appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon
him to establish that he was exempt from criminal liability. He must
show with clear and convincing proofs that: 1) he was performing a
lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident,
and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering
appellant's evidence, it is clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven.
First, appellant's manner of carrying his M-14 rifle negates his claim
of "due care" in the performance of an act. Knowing that his rifle was
automatic, he should have seen to it that its safety lock was intact.
Worse, he admitted that his finger was constantly on the trigger. With
the safety lock released and his finger on the trigger, how can we
conclude that he acted with due care?
Second, the number of wounds sustained by the victims shows that
the shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims sustained more
than one wound. While it could have been possible that the first
wound sustained by both victims was by accident, however, the
subsequent wounds sustained by them in different parts of their
bodies could not have been similarly inflicted. And third, appellant
manifested an unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he
reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus
had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when another
bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was already running away when he
was shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant chased the
victims and shot them several times clearly show that he had the
intent to kill them.
AMPLOYO VS PEOPLE
Facts:
Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997, having
celebrated her eighth year the day before. A grade III student, she was
walking to school (which was just a short distance from her house) at
around seven o'clock in the morning when she was met by petitioner
who emerged from hiding from a nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine
Joy were neighbors. Petitioner approached Kristine Joy, touched her
head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it then moved down to
touch her breast several times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine Joy
not to report to anybody what he did to her.
This was not the first time that the incident happened as petitioner
had done this several times in the past, even when Kristine Joy was
still in Grade II. However, it was only during this last incident that
Kristine Joy finally told somebody - her grandmother, who
immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera, Kristine Joy's mother.
Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who said that petitioner
would sometimes even insert his hand under her shirt to caress her
breast. Mother and child then reported the matter to the barangay.
From the barangay, the case was referred to the DSWD then to the
Police Department of Subic, Zambales.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
No. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has
conveniently left out details which indubitably prove the presence of
lewd design. It would have been easy to entertain the possibility that
what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such
is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very
same act to the very same victim in the past.[20] Moreover, the
incident could never be labeled as accidental as petitioner's hand did
not just slip from Kristine Joy's shoulder to her breast as there were
times when he would touch her breast from under her shirt.[21]
Finally, the theory that what happened was accidental is belied by
petitioner having threatened Kristine Joy to keep silent and not tell on
him.
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
Facts:
Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his wife
with a dart from a rubber sling, hitting her at the neck and causing her
instantaneous death. In his defense, the accused said that he had no
intention of killing his wife and that he was practicing the use of the
weapon when his wife was accidentally hit by the arrow. However,
the trial court nonetheless found him guilty on the ground that the
evidence showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon his wife
was preceded by a quarrel between her and the appellant, thus
negating the latter’s defense. The same was affirmed on appeal. In
the present petition, the appellant contends that assuming that he
was the one who killed his wife the same was accidental and not
intentional.
Issue:
Is the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the instant
case?
Held:
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to
prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The defense miserably
failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for this
exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling
and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this
ground alone, appellant's defense of accident must be struck down
because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As
correctly found by the trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under
the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration
that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict
injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this
crude weapon cannot attain the standards as an instrument for
archery competitions. To sustain the accused's assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is
patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo
Antiporta's testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and
arrow inside his house.
PEOPLE VS ABRZALDO
Facts:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay
Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant, then intoxicated,
attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post
of the latter's house. The incident was reported to the barangay
authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro
Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois
to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-
appellant shouting at his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw
accused-appellant coming out of Quinto's house with blood oozing
from his forehead. At that time, the place was well lighted by a
flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant. However,
for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each
other and grappled "face to face." Accused-appellant pulled out his
knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen and ran away. When Fajardo
got hold of Guban, the latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.
Fajardo, together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to
the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where he was operated by
Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours,
Guban died.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-
defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is
extremely doubtful. In the present case, accused-appellant's
tendency to invoke a melange of defenses renders his testimony
dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to
preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed
himself. This shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack of
intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes
voluntariness, induced only by necessity. Indeed, if there is truth to
either of his claim, his natural course of action was to assist the victim,
or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly,
the justifying circumstance of self-defense or the exempting
circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated considering accused-
appellant's flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the
authorities of the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender
the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience
and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.
PEOPLE VS LATOSA
Facts:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and
her husband Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with
two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa (Sassymae) and Michael
Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr.
was then asleep when Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.'s
gun from the cabinet and leave. She asked her mother where she was
going and if she could come along, but appellant refused.
Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice
cream at the commissary. Appellant gave her money and asked her to
leave. After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his
sister, but he refused as he was hungry. Appellant insisted and further
told Michael not to make any noise as his father was sleeping.
Nevertheless, appellant went back inside the house and turned up the
volume of the television and the radio to full. Shortly after that, she
came out again and gave Michael some money to buy food at the
grocery.
Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the
barracks located at the back of their house. Michael thereupon saw
his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that he saw appellant
running away from their house. Michael did not pay any attention to
his friend's comment, and simply continued eating his ice candy.
Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something
had happened in their house. Michael replied in the negative then
entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed
with a hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about
what happened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant had reported the
shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office. Then, Sassymae
arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun
near his left hand.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of accident?
Held:
No. In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and
extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming
arguendo that appellant has never learned how to fire a gun and was
merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle is never
pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant is
deemed to have already known since she admitted, during trial, that
she sometimes handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming
further that she was not aware of this basic rule, it needed explaining
why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there
was pressure on the trigger.
PEOPLE VS MORENO
Facts:
The appellant was at the outbreak of the war a prisoner serving
sentence in the San Ramon Penal Colony Farm, situated in the City of
Zamboanga. During the Japanese occupation, he befriended and
gained the confidence of the Japanese naval authorities, was released
from prison, and appointed Captain of a semi-military organization
known as Kaigun Jeutay, composed of Filipinos and sponsored by the
Japanese navy. On October 23, 1944, the defendant was appointed
by the Japanese naval authorities as section commander of the San
Ramon Penal Colony with plenary powers of supervision and control
over said colony and its environs.
On November 23, 1944, a group of defendant's soldiers went to the
house of Paciano de los Santos, and too with them two single young
daughters of said Paciano, and on the next day, when the deceased
went to San Ramon Penal Colony, he was confined in a cell by order
of the defendant.
On the night of December 1, 1944, defendant gathered all the prison
officials and employees of San Ramon Penal Colony in a meeting in
the house of P. D. Dellosa then Assistant Superintendent of the
institution, and in that gathering the accused arrogantly announced
that he was not afraid to cut the head of anybody, ordered all those
present to witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos the
following day, and instructed Gregorio Magalit, a prisoner employee
of said institution to prepare the grave for said Paciano and issue a
formal memorandum to that effect. And in the morning of December
2, 1944, Paciano de los Santos was taken to a place known as Fishery
Division of the colony with both hands tied at the back, and there the
defendant ordered the victim Paciano to kneel down with the head
bent forward by the side of the grave already prepared for him by
order of the accused, and in that position the accused with a Japanese
sobre held in the handle by his both hands, hacked the head of
Paciano de los Santos, and immediately kicked the prostrate body of
the victim into the grave.
Issue:
Is there a mitigating circumstance of uncontrollable fear?
Held:
No. Because it is plain that there was no compulsion of an irresistible
force that compelled the defendant to kill the victim against his will;
nor was there any threat of such a serious character and imminence
as to create in the mind of the defendant an uncontrollable fear that
an equal or greater evil or injury would be inflicted upon him if he did
not comply with the alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part
of the defendant's testimony relating to a sort of a threat is the
following: "As they insisted and I informed them that I could not do it,
then Capitan Susuki told me: You have to comply with that order of
Major Sasaki; otherwise you have to come along with us." It is evident
that the mere alleged statement of said Susuki that if the accused did
not comply with the order, he had to come along with them, is not
such a threat as contemplated by said provision of the Revised Penal
Code; especially, taking into consideration that the defendant himself
declared that the captain told him "that they could not be present (at
the execution of the deceased) because they had to return that same
day to Zamboanga."
PEOPLE VS FIELDAD
Facts:
Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista, and Edgar
Pimentel are detention prisoners who are charged with the murder of
two jail guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the CA found
petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.
Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2
Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. JO2
Niturada answered the telephone in the administration building and
upon returning, he saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2
Gamboa, who was seated, and Chan shot the latter with a short
firearm.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of an Armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of
the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with
JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took the
Armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada
returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel
boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin Bauzon,
without the latter’s knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico
Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. The group then transferred to
a Mazda pick-up truck. Eventually, they abandoned the vehicle and
ran towards a cane field where they were arrested.
Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of carnapping,
they allege that they were under the influence of uncontrollable fear
from Leal, who forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his
flight from jail. With regards to the crime of murder, accused-
appellants allege that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and that there can be no treachery in the
case since the jail guards were all issued with firearms to protect
themselves from danger.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear?
Held:
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that
Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from
jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to prosper the
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.50 A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well.51 It is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
escape or self-defense in equal combat.52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first
place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarily followed him
to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they
stopped to transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants’
testimonies, only Leal was armed.
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.54 The circumstances under which appellants
participated in the commission of the carnapping would not justify in
any way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances
establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously
concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep
without the consent of its owner.
PEOPLE VS LICAYAN
Facts:
In an On-August 15, 2001 Decision, the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed
the RTC Decision convicting Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda
Manaysay, and sentencing them to the penalty of death. A Writ of
Execution was issued ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on
January 30, 2004 at 3:00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, two of
their co-accused in the original Information were arrested. Pedro
Mabansag, a double arm amputee and suspected mastermind of the
kidnapping, and Rogelio Delos Reyes.
The Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with the Supreme Court an
Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case which the SC granted on the
condition that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned,
the evidence already taken shall stand, although additional evidence
may be introduced to be taken and considered.
The prosecution evidence showed that the victim Joseph Tomas Co
owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Mami House with branches in
Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him
and Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer,
to make the rounds of the three branches for inspection and
collection of left-over food and cash sales.
On August 9, 1998, while Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising
the loading of left-over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX service
vehicle, three men approached him from behind. The men were
armed with two caliber 45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of the men
wore any mask. Co told the men that if they wanted money, they
could get it from the store. They refused. One of the men's guns went
off. When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out. Co and Manaysay
were amde to board the Tamaraw and their hands were tied and their
eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps over their heads.
They were brought inside a room of a house and the masking tape
was removed from their eyes. Accused Lara was left to guard them
inside the room.
On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan who was guarding
them at that time fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow
managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside
their room. Complainants took refuge in a house from which Co was
able to call the Marikina Police Headquarters.
Lara and Licayan were thereafter identified by Co and Manaysay in a
line-up. Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, also
testified that he was twice called in his office by unidentified persons
who demanded P10 million for the release of complainants.
In 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The
trial against Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. In 2009, the
RTC of Marikina City rendered its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and
Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced them each to
reclusion perpetua.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Licayan,
Lara and Delos Reyes in toto. In the appeal now before the Supreme
Court, accused Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while
accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction
on the basis of the newly discovered evidence presented during their
retrial.
Issue:
Is there an exempting circumstance of irresistible force?
Held:
No. Delos Reyes claimed that he went to the house of Pedro
Mabansag on August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend who would buy
a fighting cock. Inside the house, he was met by a certain Tata and
Jojo and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He
saw two persons inside the house near the kitchen and the woman
was hand tied. Delos Reyes claims that when Tata and Jojo poked a
gun at him and was told not to leave and not to report to the police,
he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. The Court begs
to disagree. Delos Reyes testified that even before August 10, 1998,
he knows already Tata and Jojo because they went to the house of his
Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three times. Since they all
know each other, then the court cannot comprehend whyTata and
Jojo still need to poke a gun at Delos Reyes and threatened him. This
is only a last ditch effort of said accused to deny any participation in
the conspiracy in kidnapping the two victims. The Court also observed
the demeanor of said accused when he testified and he is obviously
lying through his teeth. Manifest falsehood and discrepancies in the
witnesses' testimony seriously impair their probative value and cast
serious doubts on their credibility
A mere examination of the transcript of his testimony convinces us of
the hesitation and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept
on changing details and correcting himself even without inducement
from opposing counsel. The content of the testimony was itself
incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who
accidentally discovers kidnap victims would be held at gunpoint by
the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a mastermind of a
kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling
activities in the regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate
to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did not
find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
Held:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for
exemption from a criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for
a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault
or negligence.
Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to
another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.
In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating
exculpatory and inculpatory facts and circumstances which should
have been considered in favor of the accused. The court also failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of the accused since it was only after three days that the
appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And
lastly, the court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of his position by the accused.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
appellant-accused of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated
by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor
of the appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, found the accused
PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the
RPC, as amended by the Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the
accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, RPC). Hence, the
accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of late Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of actual damages of P49,174.00 (paid for
funeral services); P50,000.00 for moral damages; P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The court a
quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the Death Penalty.
PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE
FACTS:
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado
Capiña lived in the barrio of Sta. Isabel, city of San Pablo, Province of
Laguna. The former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on
one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capiña
snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname
"Aveling,: while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
While Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached
her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he
thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her
breast, on account of which Avelina, a resolute and quick- tempered
girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the
matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her
mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife,
whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection. One night,
Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and
surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her
forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her. She
immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and
brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden
under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue,
her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made
an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so,
stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was doing.
Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and
for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came
to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of
their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end
the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself. Avelina
received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in the
neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she
had even asked him to elope with her and that if he should not marry
her, she would take poison.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly
after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending
religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest
the door. Amado Capiña was seated on the other side of the chapel.
Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capiña went
to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side,
and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capiña, Avelina
Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with
her right hand the fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress,
with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado
seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her
left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the
neck, inflicting upon him a wound.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado
Capiña, when the latter climbed up her house late at night on
September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom,
undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his
previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she
could have been perfectly justified in killing him.
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the
learned trial court in this case, when the deceased sat by the side of
defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the
barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right
thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric
lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them,
inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant
and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the
circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped. And when she gave Amado Capiña a thrust at the base
of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 41/2
inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive;
and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be
legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily
and unconditionally surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said
chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the
incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to
remain there subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an
agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472);
and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication
of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and
upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or
temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as
mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331;
People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to
kill the deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with
her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one
single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which
should be considered in her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil.,
310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
US VS AMPAR
FACTS:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San
Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served.
The accused, an old man, Clemente Ampar, proceeded to the kitchen
and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer
was; "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you."
The effect of this on the accused as explained by him in his confession
was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was
squatting down, the accused came up behind him and struck him on
the head with an ax, causing death the following day.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
Yes. The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate
would to the average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to
this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be
made the but of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is
believed that the lower court very properly gave defendant the
benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to
the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime of murder.
PEOPLE VS IGNAS
FACTS:
Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La
Trinidad, Benguet, where he operated a bakery. He is married to
Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age. Wilma Grace
used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by
Pauline Gumpic. Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he
whom appellant fatally shot.
On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and
Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio were sending off
Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was
leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in
Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma
Grace sharing a room. All three of them stayed at the inn until October
18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan. Romenda received from
Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various dates.
Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them
were meant by Wilma Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio. In
the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to reveal to
appellant her affair with Nemesio. It was only sometime late in
February 1996 that Romenda informed appellant about the
extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Appellant
became furious. He declared "Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio,
patayek dayta nga Nemesio" (There will be a day for that Nemesio. I
will kill that Nemesio). Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma
Grace from Romenda.
On March 10, witness Bayanes said she was at the unloading area
(bagsakan), conversing with another dealer at the latter's booth,
when suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening. Initially,
she only saw the gunman's profile, but when he turned, she caught a
glimpse of his face. She immediately recognized him as the appellant
June Ignas.
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo said that the appellant came to
her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served refreshments,
appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty
shells from the chamber. Appellant then told her to throw the empty
cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she complied.
Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had just shot
his wife's paramour.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No. There was literally no "immediate vindication" to speak of in this
case. Appellant had sufficient time to recover his serenity following
the discovery of his wife's infidelity. Nor could passion and
obfuscation be appreciated in appellant's favor because the killing
was not proximate to the time of the offense. Appellant became
aware of the treatment offensive to his dignity as a husband and to
the peace and tranquility of his home two weeks earlier. This interval
between the revelation of his wife's adultery and the fatal shooting
was ample and sufficient for reason and self-control to reassert
themselves in appellant's mind. As to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the OSG stresses that his supposed surrender at
Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya was actually due to the efforts of law enforcers
who came looking for him. There he did not resist, but lack of
resistance alone is not tantamount to voluntary surrender, which
denotes a positive act and not merely passive conduct.
The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant
to have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his
mind. The established rule is that there can be no immediate
vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time
to recover his serenity. Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be
considered in appellant's favor.
The alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is
inexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication
of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at
the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other
words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a
grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that
passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and
obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks
which spanned the discovery of his wife's extramarital dalliance and
the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and
cool off.
For voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstance to be valid, the
following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.Records
show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for
information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police
investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva
Vizcaya to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return to
Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the victim. Clearly,
appellant's claimed surrender was neither spontaneous nor
voluntary.
PEOPLE VS BENITO
FACTS:
Benito, 26, a native of Naga City, in his sworn statement, which was
taken, about five hours after the shooting, by Corporal E. Cortez and
Patrolmen J. de la Cruz, Jr. and H. Roxas of the Manila Police.
According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil
Service Commission and was suspended for dishonesty. After two
months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for Qualified
Theft, Malversation of Public Funds, Estafa and Falsification of Public
Documents and administratively charged for 'DISHONESTY'
culminating in his dismissal from the Civil Service.
On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service and requested
the victim to help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to
the suspect “UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO
AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO”. The suspect left and returned the
following morning at 11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969, and when they met
again, the victim allegedly remarked in the presence of many people,
'NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW'. The suspect who
was humiliated and incensed, left. At about 5:25 p.m. of that same
day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect who was armed with an unlicensed
firearm, waited for the victim inside the Civil Service compound. The
victim showed up and drove his car along P. Paredes St. The suspect
with evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and
when the latter's car was at a full stop at the corner of Lepanto and P.
Paredes Sts. due to heavy traffic of motor vehicles, the suspect
without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot
the victim eight (8) times on the head and different parts of the body
at close range which consequently caused the latter's death on the
spot inside his car.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No. The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense
cannot be appreciated in Benito's favor. Benito had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did
resent it.
The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed
by Moncayo against Benito and the assassination was more than
sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using
that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating
Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just
a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with
treachery and evident premeditation in penetrating the cold-blooded
murder.
The facts of the strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to
assassinate Moncayo was not the latter's alleged defamatory remark
that Civil Service Commission was a hangout for a thief or for thieves
but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito.
Benito did not act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to
himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed the
alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for
obstinately refusing to change his report.
PEOPLE VS DAVID
FACTS:
The herein defendant-appellant Leovigildo David is the son of
Teodoro David, a democrata candidate for municipal president of
Dinalupihan, and the offended party Jose V. Reyes is the brother of
Emilio Reyes, nacionalista candidate for member of the provincial
board of Bataan, both during the general elections of 1931.
While Emilio Reyes and Teodoro David were engaged in an argument
after the former had quarreled with the aforesaid defendant-
appellant, then an election inspector, because said Emilio Reyes
wanted to see the list of registered voters, Jose, the brother of Emilio,
arrived at the scene and asked who was making trouble. Upon hearing
him, Teodoro David, in a contemptuous tone, said in Tagalog: "Phse,
ichura mong lalake" (Pshaw, you are but a shrimp) and, opening the
door of the car where he was, rushed upon his interlocutor and the
two engaged in a hand-to-hand fight during which both fell to the
ground. Teodoro David fell on his right side, face downwards, Jose V.
Reyes on top of him.
While Jose V. Reyes was on top Teodoro David, there was heard a first
shot, which did not hit its mark, fired by the herein defendant
Leovigildo David, second and third shot hit Reyes. There rang a fourth
shot which hit the left axilla of the boy German Pinili, who was
perched on top of a fence witnessing the fight between Jose V. Reyes
and Teodoro David. Jose V. Reyes was immediately brought by his
brother Emilio Reyes.
The constabulary soldiers seized the revolver of the defendant
Leovigildo David and placed him under arrest. In the chamber of the
revolver of the defendant Leovigildo David were found four empty
cartridges. Constabulary Captain Cirilo Legaspi, who had been notified
of the incident, immediately ordered the seizure of Jose V. Reyes'
revolver which was found in a box in the latter's house, while he,
accompanied by his brother Emilio Reyes, was being treated by the
doctor.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No. It has been shown that when the said defendant fired at Jose V.
Reyes, the aggression had already ceased and, therefore, the motive
for defense; and in firing at his victim, the defendant's intention could
not have been only to repel the aggression against his father but also
to kill Jose V. Reyes. Therefore, the intention of the defendant
Leovigildo David to kill Jose V. Reyes is obvious.
US VS HICKS
FACTS:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907,
Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustinal Sola, a Christian
Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang,
Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the
last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's house, and,
separating from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Lues
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another
negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went
to live with her in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7.30 p. m., Augustus
Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said
house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her
room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the
Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal appeared at the
door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached
Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following
question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to
live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you
can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made
up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when he said
this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him
by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said:
"Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding
himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired
at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet
struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and
died in a little more than an hour later.
Hicks immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the
chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in
jail; and, when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and
reported that Hicks and fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of
police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw
eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by
a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the
cartridges to chief.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No mitigating circumstance is present, not even that mentioned in
paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit, loss of reason and
self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch
as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not
those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
SANICO VS CA
The accused who raped a woman is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of "having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion" just because he finds himself in
a secluded place with that young ravishing woman, almost naked, and
therefore, "liable to succumb to the uncontrollable passion of his
bestial instinct."
US VS DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
Dela Cruz in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had
theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering
her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual acquaintance.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
Yes. The impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally
"produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman
declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation
that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the
arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above
cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and
natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation
which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to
be taken into consideration by the court.
PEOPLE VS RABAO
FACTS:
The defendant and the deceased Salvacion Agawa were married; they
have a child. Since their marriage they had made their home in the
house of Urbano Rellora, who lived maritally with the mother of the
accused. On the morning of December 15, 1937, when the defendant
was hardly awake after staying up late the previous night on account
of the elections held in the municipality of Naga, he noticed that his
wife was preparing water with which to give the child a bath. He told
his wife not to bathe the child because it had a cold. but the wife
insisted and a quarrel arose in the heat of which the accused punched
his wife on the abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of rice nearby and
immediately suffered an attack of which she died in spite of the aid
rendered her by the accused himself and other persons who had
arrived.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
Yes. The defendant did not really have the intention of committing so
grave a crime as parricide. The quarrel that led to the aggression had
its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a
father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a
bath. If, under the circumstances, he transgressed the law by an
unjust attack on his wife, he is, nevertheless, deserving of the
mitigating circumstances allowed in his favor.
PEOPLE VS DAWATON
FACTS:
On 20 September 1998 Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in
his house in Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora. His brother-
in-law Edgar Dawaton and kumpadre Leonides Lavares dropped by at
about 12:00 o'clock noon followed by Domingo Reyes shortly after.
All three (3) guests of Esmeraldo were residents of Sitio Garden. They
started drinking soon after. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they went to the house
of Amado Dawaton, Edgar's uncle, located about twenty (20) meters
away from Esmeraldo's house. They stayed at the balcony of the
house and continued drinking. Amado Dawaton was not in.
Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden
bench, lying down on his right side facing Domingo and Edgar using
his right hand for a pillow. Edgar, Domingo and Esmeraldo continued
drinking until they finished another bottle of gin.
At about 3:30 in the afternoon, twenty (20) minutes after Leonides
had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up and left for his house. When he
returned he brought with him a stainless knife. Without a word, he
approached Leonides who was sleeping and stabbed him near the
base of his neck.[4] Awakened and surprised, Leonides got up and
blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?"[5] Instead of answering, Edgar again
stabbed Leonides on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on
Leonides' arm.
Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar who was much bigger grabbed
the collar of his shirt and thus effectively prevented him from running
away. Edgar then repeatedly stabbed Leonides who, despite Edgar's
firm hold on him, was still able to move about twenty (20) meters
away from the house of Amado Dawaton before he fell to the ground
at the back of Esmeraldo's house. But even then, Edgar still continued
to stab him. Edgar only stopped stabbing Leonides when the latter
already expired. Edgar then ran away towards the house of his uncle
Carlito Baras situated behind the cockpit.
Domingo and Esmeraldo were positioned a few meters away from
where Leonides was sleeping when he was initially assaulted by
Edgar. They were shocked by what happened but other than pleading
for Edgar to stop they were unable to help Leonides.
Domingo left for his house soon after the stabbing started as he did
not want to get involved. Nonetheless he felt pity for Leonides so he
returned a few minutes later.
By then, Leonides was already dead and people had already gathered
at the site. The mayor who was in a nearby cement factory arrived
and instructed them not to go near the body. They pointed to the
direction where Edgar fled. Edgar was later arrested at the house of
his uncle, Carlito Baras, at Sitio Aves, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan.
The conclusion that accused-appellant murdered Leonides Lavares
was sufficiently proved by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez who both witnessed the fatal
stabbing. This was not refuted by the accused himself who admitted
that he stabbed the victim three (3) times before his mind went blank
and could no longer recall what he did after that.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No. While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide, he was charged with murder for which he had already
entered a plea of not guilty. It was ruled that an offer to enter a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating
circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal
Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense
charged.
Furthermore, Sec. 2, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor before an accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a
lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The
prosecution rejected the offer of the accused.
Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender as he himself admitted that he was arrested at his uncle's
residence.[18] The following elements must be present for voluntary
surrender to be appreciated: (a) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority, and, (c) the surrender must be voluntary.
Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested
but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the policemen when they
came for him. This attempt at semantics is futile and absurd. That he
did not try to escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody
by the authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender. A surrender
to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and
capture. It is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated where the evidence adduced shows that it was the
authorities who came looking for the accused.
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the prosecution belies the
claim of the accused that he intended to submit himself to the
authorities. The joint affidavit of the arresting officers, the veracity of
which was admitted by the parties and evidenced by a 20 October
1999 Order of the trial court, revealed that they chanced upon the
accused trying to escape from the rear of the cockpit building when
they came looking for him.
Similarly, there is no factual basis to credit the accused with the
mitigating circumstance of outraged feeling analogous or similar to
passion and obfuscation. Other than his self-serving allegations, there
was no evidence that the victim threatened him with a grenade.
Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez testified that there was no
prior altercation or disagreement between Edgar and Leonides during
the drinking spree, and they did not know of any reason for Edgar's
hostility and violence. On the contrary, Esmeraldo Cortez even
recalled seeing the two (2) in a playful banter (lambingan) during the
course of their drinking indicating that the attack on the accused was
completely unexpected.

PEOPLE VS VIERNES
FACTS:
Catherine, 12, was raped by his mother’s common-law husband. The
third rape happened in appellant's house in Tibig, Lipa City, around
noontime of August 18, 1997. Appellant then bidded the two brothers
and a step-brother of Catherine Linatoc to clean the his tricycle, which
was parked on the side of the street across his house. They followed
his order. Appellant also instructed Catherine Linatoc to fetch water
for the house toilet. She obliged, returning with two pails of it. She
deposited them by the door of the toilet. Turning about, Catherine
Linatoc was surprised to find appellant behind her. In quick
succession, appellant pushed her to the wall, pulled her skirts up, drag
her panty mid-way her lower leg, and rushed his own pants down.
Grasping her hands tightly with one hand, appellant began inserting
his penis into her vagina. She resisted to no avail. His penis established
a comfortable slide into and out of her [organ], as the pace quickened
for about three minutes. The gyration was furious. After appellant
spurted out, he backed off and left saying nothing.
Frightened and crying, Catherine Linatoc went to her great-
grandmother's abode in San Guillermo, Lipa City. She reported the
incident to this elder, and recounted some more. Catherine Linatoc
told her great-grandmother of two other acts of sexual abuse by
appellant.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
No. The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and the expense that search and capture would require.
Going to the police station "to clear his name" does not show any
intent of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
PEOPLE VS ABOLIDOR
FACTS:
The victim, Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her
deceased husband, Primo Subosa. Subsequently, she cohabited with
her common-law husband Warlito Huesca and lived together with
some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena, Ilo-ilo.
Thereafter, Warlito Huesca also died.
In the early morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried,
the victim, her children namely, Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn,
Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and Milagros Huesca, the younger sister of
Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the forcible opening of the door
of their house. Four men entered the house and declared a "hold up".
The victim pleaded not to be harmed. Instead, accused Ronnie
Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her. Then
appellant Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing
her instantaneous death.
ISSUE:
Is there a mitigating circumstance?
HELD:
Yes. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven,
namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges
his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance.[22] In People v. Viernes,[23] we held that
going to the police station to clear one's name does not show any
intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more
than one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the
government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a
pending warrant of arrest against him.[24] Hence, he should not be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
PEOPLE VS CALISO
FACTS:
Magdalena Caliso is accused of the crime of murder of a 9-month-old
boy, in La Carlota, Negros Occidental, on February 8 of this year, 1932.
The complaint alleges that the accused, being a servant of the Messrs.
Emerald (Emilio), voluntarily, illegally and criminally and with the
purpose of satisfying a vengeance, I administer a certain amount of
concentrated acetic acid, which is a poisonous substance, to Emilio
Esmeralda, Jr., a 9-month-old boy, causing him burns in the mouth,
throat, intestines and other vital parts of the internal organs that
necessarily caused the death of the victim, who succumbed a few
hours later; that in the commission of this crime, the aggravating
circumstances of alevosia have concurred.
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance In this case?
HELD:
We agree to the conclusions of fact reached by the trial court. As to
the application of the law to the facts of the case, we are inclined to
the proposition advanced by the Attorney-General that in the
commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse
of confidence was present since the appellant was the domestic
servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah.
The circumstance of the crime having been committed in the dwelling
of the offended party, considered by the lower court as another
aggravating circumstance, should be disregarded as both the victim
and the appellant were living in the same house. Likewise, treachery
cannot be considered to aggravate the penalty as it is inherent in the
offense of murder by means of poisoning. Similarly the finding of the
trial court that the appellant acted under an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation should be
discarded because the accused, in poisoning the child, was actuated
more by a spirit of lawlessness and revenge than by any sudden
impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury and because such sudden
burst of passion was not provoked by prior unjust or improper acts of
the victim or of his parents since Flora Gonzalez had the perfect right
to reprimand the defendant for indecently converting the family's
bedroom into a rendezvous of herself and her lover.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence being offset by
the extenuating circumstance of defendant's lack of instruction
considered by the lower court, the medium degree of the prescribed
penalty should, therefore, be imposed, which, in this case, is
perpetual reclusion.
PEOPLE VS LORA
FACTS:
On May 26, 1975, accused Belinda Lora, using the name "Lorena
Sumilew," applied as a housemaid in the household of the spouses
Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at 373 Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao
City. The spouses had a store on the ground floor; a mezzanine floor
was used as their residence; while the third floor was used as a
bodega for their stocks. They had two children, Emily and Oliver Yap.
Oliver was 3 years and five months old.
Belinda Lora was accepted as a housemaid in the residence of the
Yaps and reported for work the following day, May 27, 1975. Her
duties were to wash clothes and to look after Oliver Yap.
On May 28, 1975, Mrs. Myrna Yap returned home from the market to
find her mother-in-law and her husband panicky because their son,
Oliver, and the maid, accused Belinda Lora, were missing. The
mother-in-law had found a ransom note at the stairway to the
mezzanine floor. The note said that Oliver was to be sold to a couple
and that the writer (defendant therein) needed money for her
mother's hospitalization.
In the evening of May 28, 1975, the Yaps received two telephone calls
at their residence. The first call was received by Mrs. Yap's mother-in-
law while the second call was received by Ricardo Yap. Lorena
Sumilew (defendant), the caller, instructed Ricardo Yap to bring the
amount of P3,000.00 to the island infront of the (Davao) Regional
Hospital and to go there alone without any policeman or companion,
after which his son (Oliver) would be left to the security guard of the
hospital at the emergency exit.
She asked for money however she was apprehended later on. May
30, 1975, upon waking up at around 6 o'clock in his house, Ricardo
Yap noticed that blood was dripping from the ceiling. He went
upstairs, which was being utilized as a bodega, to verify, and found his
son placed inside the carton of Marlboro cigarettes. The head of the
child was inside the carton while his feet protruded outside. [14] His
mouth was tied with stockings. [15] The child was already dead. He
had died of "asphyxia due to suffocation."
ISSUE:
Is there aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. There is treachery because the victim is only a 3-year old child.
The commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating
circumstances of lack of respect due to the age of the victim, cruelty
and abuse of confidence.
The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where
the victim is of tender age as well as of old age. This circumstance was
applied in a case where one of the victims in a murder case was a 12-
year-old boy. In the instant case, the victim was only 3 years old.
The gagging of the mouth of a three-year-old child with stockings,
dumping him with head downwards into a box, and covering the box
with sacks and other boxes, thereby causing slow suffocation, is
cruelty.
There was also abuse of confidence because the victim was entrusted
to the care of the appellant. The appellant's main duty in the
household is to take care of the minor child.
There existed a relation of trust and confidence between the
appellant and the one against whom the crime was committed and
the appellant made use of such relation to commit the crime.
When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and
was sometimes the deceased child's amah, the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence is present.
PEOPLE VS LAGUARDIA ET AL
FACTS:
On September 6, 1979, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Dante
Bartulay and Baltazar Beran, the herein accused-appellant, signaled
to a stop a truck owned by Fortune Tobacco Corporation then being
driven by Miguel Chua on the zigzag road in Kilometer 36 inside the
Iwahig Penal Colony at Puerto Princesa in Palawan City. Beran
approached one side of the truck and pretended to borrow a
screwdriver and while Chua looked for the tool Bartulay shouted from
the other side of the truck, "This is a hold-up!" With guns drawn, the
two men ordered Chua and his three companions, Benigno Caca,
Frank Morante, and Eduardo Aniar, to alight. Bartulay forced Chua to
lie face down on the ground about 3 meters away from his
companions. Bartulay was pointing a gun at Chua's head. On orders
of Bartulay, Beran got the wallets and watches of the four. Bartulay
asked about the money they were carrying and Chua pointed to its
location. Beran got it and gave it to Bartulay. The money amounted
to about P100,000.00. Then, again on orders of Bartulay, Beran
herded the three companions inside the panel where they were
locked. It was while they were still inside the panel that Beran and the
others heard two gunshots. When Beran got off the truck, he saw
Chua still lying on the ground but now bleeding in the head.
Thereafter, Beran drove the truck from the scene of the crime while
Bartulay followed in a motorcycle. Somehow, Caca and Morante
managed to escape by jumping from the truck through a secret exit
of the panel. They subsequently reported the occurrence to the law-
enforcement authorities who, returning to the scene of the crime the
following day, found Chua already dead. 1 Beran was arrested on
September 8, 1979, with the amount of P4,500.00 in his possession
and upon questioning pointed to the place where he had hidden the
pistol he had used during the hold-up. 2 Further investigation
disclosed that the motorcycle and guns used by Bartulay and Betan
were owned by Rosalio Laguardia, who was identified by Beran as the
mastermind of the crime. The money stolen was supposed to have
been divided in the house of Raymundo Bartulay, Dante's brother.
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes, the crime committed by Beran was aggravated by despoblado
and justified the imposition on him of the death penalty as prescribed
by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence shows that the
accused lay in wait for the truck being driven by Chua at an isolated
portion of Highway 36, choosing that particular spot where they could
commit the crime they were planning without disturbance or
discovery and with easy opportunity for escape. The use of motor
vehicles is also appreciated because the conspirators drove away
from the scene of the crime to facilitate their escape and also to
prevent the other passengers of the truck, whom they took with
them, from reporting the offense to the authorities.
Nighttime is rejected, however, because it was not especially sought,
as Chua's trip schedule and not the discretion of the culprits
determined the time of its commission. Evident premeditation is, of
course, inherent in the crime of robbery and was not proved in the
commission of the killing. As for treachery, there is no evidence of its
employment as none of the witnesses actually saw the shooting of
Chua, being all inside the panel when they heard the fatal shots.
PEOPLE VS ZETA
FACT:
On or about the 28th day of October 1995 in Quezon City, Angelo Zeta
and his wife Petronilla Zeta was found conspiring together,
confederating with and helping one another, with intent to kill,
attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence to Ramon Garcia
by shooting the latter with a .45 caliber pistol hitting him on the
different parts of his body which ultimately caused his death.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that Ramon’s killing was attended by
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
nocturnity.
On December 24, 2002, Petronilla filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Regional Trial Court stating that there are no testimonial evidence
presented before the lower court that could sufficiently served as
justifiable basis to warrant the reversal of the appealed decision
rendered insofar as Petronilla is concerned but then upon being
informed of the health predicament of the undersigned counsel,
Petronilla voluntarily decided to withdraw the appeal, the appeal is
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
No, the court held that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated. Evident premeditation
qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the following evidence are
present: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (b)an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his
resolve; and (c) a sufficient interval of the time between the
determination or conception and the execution of the crime to allow
him to reflect upon the consequence of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to
hearken to its warning.
In the case at bar, the third element of premeditation is lacking. The
span of 30 minutes or half an hour from the time appellant shot
Ramon could not have afforded them full opportunity for meditation
and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. The
court held that the lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to
commit a crime and the execution is insufficient for a full meditation
on the consequences of the act.
PEOPLE VS MACBUL
FACTS:
Appellant pleaded guilty for information of theft of 2 sacks of paper
amounting to Php 10. He was convicted and sentenced for penalties
prescribed for theft and that for habitual delinquency. This is because
he has been convicted of the same crime twice, in 1928 and in 1942.
The trial court also took into consideration 2 mitigating circumstances
which are voluntary surrender and extreme poverty. However, the
trial court also took into account the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism.
ISSUE:
Is aggravating circumstance present in this case?
HELD:
The issue raised by appellant is not to be considered at all since what
should be considered is whether he actually falls under habitual
delinquent. It is to be noted that the crimes were committed 14 years
apart. This is beyond the 10-year limit. This means that it is only the
1942 crime which should be considered. Thus, he is not to be
considered as a habitual delinquent. The Court affirmed the
consideration of the mitigating circumstance of extreme poverty as it
is obvious that the appellant committed the crime by reason of
necessity having several minor children to feed and selling the paper
for 2.50. The Court still recognizes the importance of life over
property. The court affirmed the principal penalty and removed the
additional penalty.
PEOPLE VS ESPINA
FACTS:
On July 1, 1993, at about. 12:00 in the evening, Tolentino A. Colo was
sleeping inside a jeepney parked at a garage. Suddenly, he was
awakened when a woman cried out "Aruy!". Colo stood up and saw
appellant coming out of a hut located some eight (8) meters away
from the garage. Appellant was holding a curved knife in his hand. His
t-shirt, hands, and knife were drenched with blood. Colo saw a
woman inside the hut fall down on her face. Although it was
nighttime, there was a light inside the hut and a mercury lamp some
three (3) meters away which cast enough illumination for Colo to
recognize appellant and the woman as Ma. Nympha Belen. When
appellant saw Colo, he shouted "panglima ire" referring to the victim,
and "panganim ka!” referring to Colo. Scared out of his wits, Colo
immediately jumped out of the window of the jeepney and hid in the
roof of a nearby house. Appellant gave chase but when he could not
find Colo, he finally gave up and left. Colo remained on the roof for
five (5) long hours. At around 6:00 the following morning, he gingerly
went down and drove the jeepney in his usual route. On July 2, 1993,
at around 7:00 in the evening, Colo was arrested by the police and
brought to the station for investigation. The following day, Colo told
Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the victim, that it was
appellant who killed her daughter.
ISSUE:
Is there aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. The Information alleged three qualifying circumstances - abuse
of superior strength, evident premeditation, and treachery. The trial
court appreciated abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation without specifying which one qualified the crime to
murder. However, SC said that only abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing to murder.
An attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that
superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. This is
the exact scenario in this case.
Evident premeditation, however, was not sufficiently proven by the
prosecution. The following requisites must be established before
evident premeditation may be considered in imposing the proper
penalty: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.
Treachery likewise did not attend the commission of the crime. The
qualifying circumstance of treachery can not be taken into
consideration in the absence of evidence showing the manner of
attack and what ensued inside the hut. Nobody witnessed the actual
killing, only its immediate aftermath. Where treachery is alleged, the
manner of attack must be proven.
Here, other than the time of the crime, there is nothing else to suggest
that appellant deliberately availed himself or took advantage of the
circumstances of nighttime. Further, when the place of the crime is
illuminated by light, as in this case, nighttime is not aggravating.
PEOPLE VS BOQUILA
FACTS:
On October 8, 1996, around 3:30am,Cresencio Demol, a taxi driver
was shot inside his taxicab. Allegedly, Demol’s wristwatch was also
stolen. Three days later, Ruben Logalada Boquila, a security guard,
went to the police and confessed to the commission of the offense.
Boquila was charged before the RTC of Cebu City with the crime of
robbery.
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
No. Nighttime would be a modifying element only when (1) it was
specially sought by the offender; or (2) the offender took advantage
of it; or (3) it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the
offender's immunity from identification or capture. The mere fact
that the killing was committed at night would not suffice to sustain
nocturnity for, by and itself. The facts do not show that accused-
appellant purposely sought or took advantage of the darkness to
perpetrate the crime or to conceal his identity. Witness Sechem
Dagangan testified that the area where the crime was committed was
illuminated by lights coming from the surrounding residence. Under
these circumstances, nighttime cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
PEOPLE VS DEMATE
FACTS:
Felipe Demate is the stepbrother of his co-appellant Dante Morales.
Morales was employed by the spouses Jaime and Violeta Ricablanca
in their poultry business. However, he quit in April 1996. The
Ricablancas had a maid, Jimbie Alfaño, who had been working with
them for three (3) years. Morales introduced Demate to Jimbie and
the latter began courting her. Jimbie did not spurn his affections and
the two became quite close and Demate would usually visit her to pay
court in the evenings.
At about eight o'clock in the evening of May 24, 1996, Jimbie was
outside the house of the Ricablanca’s. She was doing the family
laundry when Demate engaged her in a conversation. Demate told
her to open the door in front of the garage of her employer at 3:00
a.m. of May 26, 1996, a Sunday. However, Demate did not tell her the
reason for his request.
Suddenly Jimbie heard loud thuds coming from the middle room
where her master, Jaime, was sleeping. The commotion also woke up
Violeta, who heard her husband, Jaime uttering, "Papatayin mo ako,
bakit mo ako papatayin?". Violeta immediately rushed to Jaime's
room, followed by his son. When she looked inside the room, Violeta
saw Demate astride Jaime, who was still lying on the bed. Demate was
repeatedly stabbing her husband. She was around two (2) meters
away from the bed and could clearly recognize Demate as the room
was brightly lit by a 100-watt fluorescent lamp immediately outside
the door. Joseph Ryan peeped in and also saw Demate stab his father
many times. Jimbie also looked in and saw Demate stab her master.
Violeta was about to enter the room when Demate turned towards
her. On meeting her, he hacked her face with a bolo. Violeta then ran
outside to call for help. She then saw Morales near the garage of her
house and she discovered that the garage door was unlocked. On
seeing her, Morales immediately fled.
Meanwhile, Jimbie saw Demate run outside, jump over the terrace
railing,[34] and follow Morales, whom she had earlier noticed near
the area of the house where she usually washed clothes. Morales had
run away when he caught sight of Violeta approaching and shouting
for help.
May 1996, between 3:00am and 4:00am, Felipe Demate and Dante
Morales, armed with a bladed instrument, conspiring and
confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually
helping each other, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the
said bladed instrument, one Jaime Ricablanca y Husmillo, suddenly
and without warning, thereby inflicting upon the latter hack wounds
on his back which directly caused his death.
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution has the burden
to prove that: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the offender consciously adopted
the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. SC
find that both elements have been proven in this case.
The victim was in bed, flat on his back, when the killer went on top of
him and stabbed him several times. The killing occurred at three
o'clock in the morning, an hour when generally people are asleep.
The victim had been awakened when the killer entered the room and
on seeing the latter armed with a bolo, he remarked, "Papatayin mo
ako, bakit mo ako papatayin?" Evidently the victim was caught
unaware totally defenseless against the armed invader. Even when
the victim was warned of the danger to his person as long as the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate, treachery could be appreciated. the assault
made by Demate on her person, lasted only five seconds or less. In
other words, the assault was executed with swiftness, which caught
the victim helpless. In his position (lying in bed) and condition (newly
awakened from sleep), the victim was deprived of any real chance to
defend himself, much less retaliate against his attacker. What is
decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is tasked to show:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the
crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. Evident premeditation is not presumed
from the mere lapse of time. It may only be appreciated when the
execution of the crime is preceded by cool thought and deliberate
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the felonious intent during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. SC is not
prepared to accept that evident premeditation can be appreciated
against appellants. The record is less than clear as to when and how
the killing was planned. Whether the plan was only to steal valuables
from the victims, or to kill them as well if they got in the way, is not
discernible from the record. Jimbie testified that Demate did not tell
her the reason why he wanted her to open the door of the Ricablanca
house come 3:00 a.m. of May 26, 1996. SC is not free to speculate
that the request was made by appellants with murder or robbery or
both in their minds. Absent a clear showing of its requisites, we are
here constrained to rule out evident premeditation.
SC cannot appreciate nighttime as an aggravating circumstance in this
case. First, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is already
absorbed by treachery. Second, the Information in this case did not
specifically allege the aggravating circumstance of nighttime.
PEOPLE VS VENTURA
FACTS:
Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila where he had been
working as a security guard, he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who
had previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja
spouses, was wearing a new ring. When he confronted her, she said
that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it was because
Jaime’s wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she
had been dismissed from the Bocateja household.
At around 2:00 a.m., Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant
Ventura who, together with his nephew appellant Flores, had
stealthily entered the couple’s room after they gained entry into the
house by cutting a hole in the kitchen door. Appellant Ventura
pointed a revolver at Jaime’s face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on
the head with the gun and asked him for his keys
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help
and tried to grab the revolver. The two men then struggled for
possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting
possession of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant
Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he was carrying, appellant
Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun,
threw a nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window causing it to
break and cried out for help.
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for
help as she saw her husband in mortal danger. Appellant Flores
stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to
defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued
stabbing her.
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw
the knife wielding appellant Flores whom she recognized as a former
employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses. Pleading with
appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs into Rizza
Mae’s room, and the two called to their neighbors for help. Appellants
Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house, bringing
nothing with them.
Ventura and Flores who were being pursued by neighbors of the
spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo. Ventura explained that he
suspected his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime.
ISSUE:
Is there aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the
criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve
to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical manner by which they
sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, unless shown to be customary, appellants’ act of arming
themselves with a gun and a knife constitutes direct evidence of a
careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing.
We have established jurisprudence to the effect that evident pre-
meditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than
the intended victim was killed (or wounded, as in this case), if it is
shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the
intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent
resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such violent resistance
against the conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate
him from their path.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these
cases, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation
of law, the act of one is the act of all. By stabbing Jaime Bocateja
pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the
commission of murder directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts,
however, they failed to inflict a mortal wound on Jaime, hence, their
liability only for attempted murder.
While appellants’ original objective may have only been the killing of
Jaime, the trial court correctly held both of them responsible for the
murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such other crimes
which could be foreseen and are the natural and logical consequences
of the conspiracy.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy
that the law accords to human abode. Thus, it has been said that the
commission of the crime in another’s dwelling shows greater
perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling
was correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the
place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate
provocation.
This Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in
connection with both crimes. While the bedroom where the crimes
occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance of their
murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of
nighttime, as well as the fact that the household members were
asleep, in order to gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed,
their own testimony indicates that while they were already outside
the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they pur posely waited until
2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the
attention of the Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that
appellants deliberately took advantage of the darkness of the night,
not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal
their actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the
victims’ home would be undetected.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties,
and is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected
or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. Hence,
the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on her and her
husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at
appellant Flores does not automatically negate the possibility that the
latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength. The
accused Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and
strong, standing about five feet and six (5’6”) inches tall. His weapon
was a 14 inch dagger. Aileen Bocateja [stood] only about five (5’0”)
feet tall. The disparity of their strength is enormous
PEOPLE VS OCO
FACTS:
Surviving victim Herminigildo Damuag testified that at around 9:30
p.m. of November 24, 1997, he was driving his motorcycle (referred
to as the first motorcycle in the Records) along V. Rama Avenue, Cebu
City with the late Alden Abiabi riding with him at the back. When they
reached the vicinity of Pica Lumber, a white Tamaraw FX AUV
overtook their motorcycle (first motorcycle) and blocked their path,
forcing him to slow down.13Another motorcycle (second
motorcycle), with two (2) riders on it, appeared behind the first
motorcycle. From a distance of about two (2) to three (3) meters, one
of the riders of the second motorcycle suddenly fired two (2) shots in
close succession. Damuag attempted to look at the tires of his
motorcycle, thinking that they have exploded. Suddenly, Abiabi
pushed him with his body. Abiabi fell from the first motorcycle and
slumped on the pavement face down. The Tamaraw FX AUV sped
away.
As Damuag was trying to control his motorcycle, he noticed another
motorcycle (third motorcycle) passed by from behind him. His
motorcycle zigzagged towards the gutter. Damuag was thrown off
and hit the ground. He stood up and realized that he was hit at the
right side of his body. He then heard a burst of gunfire from behind.
Damuag saw the third motorcycle at about two (2) to three (3)
meters. It was on a stop. Appellant was at the back of the third
motorcycle, holding a short firearm in his right hand. Appellant fired
his gun at him but missed. Although wounded, Damuag was able to
run. However, the third motorcycle chased him. Upon reaching the
vicinity of Five Brothers restaurant, Damuag stopped because he
could not pass anymore. From a distance of about four (4) to five (5)
meters, the appellant again fired two (2) more shots at Damuag. The
third motorcycle sped away towards B. Rodriguez Street. Damuag was
initially rushed to the Southern Islands Hospital. About three (3) hours
later, his wife brought him to the Sacred Heart Hospital. He survived
the attack due to the timely medical attention given to him at the
latter hospital.
Alden Abiabi did not survive the ambush. He sustained eight (8)
gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body.
Damuag testified that he did not recognize the driver and the
passenger of the second motorcycle and the driver of the third
motorcycle because they were wearing their helmets. He, however,
recognized the appellant as one of the triggermen because the
appellant was not wearing helmet at the time of the shooting
incident. Instead, he had a towel tied around his forehead. The
appellant was wearing a sleeveless undershirt (sando) and maong
short pants.
ISSUE:
Is there aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the killing
of Abiabi and the wounding of Damuag. There is treachery “when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might take.” For treachery
to exist, two conditions must be found: (1) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form
of attack employed by him. In the case at bar, the motorcycle driven
by Damuag (first motorcycle) was suddenly blocked by a white
Tamaraw FX. Without any warning, the backrider of the second
motorcycle, coming from behind, suddenly fired successive shots at
Damuag and Abiabi. While Abiabi was helplessly laid at the pavement
face down due to the wounds he sustained, appellant mercilessly shot
at him. On the other hand, Damuag, already wounded, tried to escape
but appellant pursued him and shot at him three more times. The
unexpected and sudden attack on the victims, rendering them unable
and unprepared to defend themselves, such suddenness having been
meant to ensure the safety of the gunman as well as the success of
the attack clearly constitutes alevosia.
The trial court also found that the offenses were committed with
abuse of superior strength. The malefactors not only outnumbered
the victims; at least two of them were armed. More, the
circumstances clearly show that the assailants deliberately took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
crime. Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is absorbed by treachery.
We also agree with the trial court that the generic aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle is present. The appellant and his
companions used motor bicycles in going to the place of the crime, in
carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape.
We do not agree with the trial court, however, in its appreciation of
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. This circumstance is
considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the
crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused
for the purpose of impunity. The essence of this aggravating
circumstance is the “obscuridad” afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was
committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor
when the place is adequately lighted, and thus could no longer insure
the offender’s immunity from identification or capture. In this case at
bar, a lamp post illuminated the scene of the crime.
We find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A crime is
deemed to have been committed by a band or en cuadrillawhen more
than three armed malefactors take part in its commission. The four
armed persons contemplated in this circumstance must all be
principals by direct participation who acted together in the execution
of the acts constituting the crime. The Code does not define or require
any particular arms or weapons; any weapon which by reason of its
intrinsic nature or the purpose for which it was made or used by the
accused, is capable of inflicting serious or fatal injuries upon the victim
of the crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law on
cuadrilla. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged that the accused
and his three other coconspirators used unlicensed firearms in the
perpetration of the offenses. However, the evidence on record shows
that only two of them carried firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating
circumstance, cannot therefore be appreciated.
There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses were
committed with the aid of armed men. Aid of armed men or persons
affording immunity requires that the armed men are accomplices
who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly. We note that
all four accused were charged as principal. The remaining suspects—
John Doe, Jane Doe and Peter Doe—were never identified and
charged. Neither was proof adduced as to the nature of their
participation.
PEOPLE VS BUMIDANG
FACTS:
On September 29, 1996, at around 2:00 a.m. while father and
daughter, namely, Melencio and Gloria Imbat, were already asleep in
their house, the accused Baliwang Bumidang y Baohan aged 19 years
and half-naked, loudly called Melencio Imbat and asked the latter to
open the door. Melencio was aroused from his sleep and he opened
the door downstairs because Bumidang threatened to kill them if the
door was not opened. Accused Bumidang entered and asked the old
man to bring him upstairs. While they were upstairs, Bumidang asked
him where he was sleeping. When Melencio indicated that he slept at
the place where they were, Bumidang got a spear at the side of his
(Melencio’s) bed. Pointing the weapon at him in a threatening
manner, the accused ordered him to lie in a prone position which he
obeyed because he was afraid. Then Bumidang asked the room of his
unmarried daughter, Gloria, aged 56. Melencio, 80 years old, pointed
the room of his daughter which was in the same room but separated
by an aparador. Bumidang went to Gloria’s room, still carrying the
spear. Suddenly, Gloria screamed for help, but the octogenarian
remained in a prone position as Bumidang threatened to kill him if he
would help his daughter. Bumidang, a betel nut-chewing man,
approached Gloria and poked the spear at her. She recognized him
because he was lighting the room with a flashlight. The accused
ordered her to stand up and removed her pajama, with the panty
going along with it. While the accused was removing her clothes, she
sat and struggled. Bumidang then removed his shortpants and
became completely naked. He used the flashlight to examine her
genital. He placed the spear beside her and whenever she attempted
to move, he would point the spear at her. The accused then went on
top of her, inserted his penis into her pudenda. At this instant, Gloria
shouted to her father but the accused pointed the spear at her, and
told her, “can you see this?” The accused then made a pumping
motion. After he was sated, having satisfied his lust, the accused held
her breast and kissed her lips. After resting on top of her, he went to
the door and left. Melencio helplessly saw the accused on top of her
daughter but he could not move because he was too afraid and weak.
He did not see how the accused consummated his beastly desire
because he was too ashamed to look at what he was doing to her
daughter. Before the accused left, he made the following threat: “If
you will report to the authorities, I will come back and kill all of you.”
Gloria then put on her dress. She was trembling. So she went to her
father and slept with him as she was afraid to be alone. She did not
immediately report the incident in the morning because they were
afraid of the threat. She reported her ordeal to Kagawad Rodolfo
Pontillan who handed a note to be given to the authorities (security).
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance in this case?
HELD:
Yes. The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. There was a clear violation of the sanctity
of the victim’s place of abode when Gloria, who apparently did not
gave any provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is
considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the
sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.
Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially
sought by the offender; (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it
facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender’s
immunity from capture. In this case, other than the fact that the crime
was committed at about 2:00 o’clock in the morning, nothing on the
record suggests that BALIWANG deliberately availed himself or took
advantage of nighttime nor proved that BALIWANG used the darkness
to facilitate his evil design or to conceal his identity.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy shall be taken into account
if means are employed or circumstances brought abeut which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime was
committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more
humiliating to the victim, that is, add to her moral suffering. It was
established that BALIWANG used the flashlight and examined the
genital of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial
deed in the presence of Gloria’s old father. These facts clearly show
that BALIWANG deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria,
thereby aggravating and compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy
was appreciated in a case where a woman was raped in the presence
of her betrothed, or of her husband, or was made to exhibit to the
rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her.
The crime of rape is defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the case at bar, the prosecution
established that BALIWANG committed the crime charged with the
use of a deadly weapon, i.e., with a spear. Accordingly, pursuant to
the 3rd paragraph of Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, a rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and ignominy having been duly proven, the
greater penalty of death shall be imposed, applying Article 63,
paragraph 2, no. 1, Revised Penal Code, which provides that when an
aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of an offense,
the penalty for which is composed of two indivisible penalties, the
greater penalty should be imposed.
PEOPLE VS CARMINA
FACTS:
Victoriano testified that he and Billy were on their way home from
their farm when they were intercepted at gunpoint by Valero, his wife
Ernita, their son Israel, and Aileen Masanguid at about 2:30 o’clock in
the afternoon of November 15, 1986. Valero had a carbine, Israel a
Garand rifle and a hunting knife, and Ernita a bolo at her waist. The
group accused Billy of being a “pulahan” because of the red t-shirt he
had wrapped around his head to cover it from the rain. The two of
them were taken to the nearby house of Dionisio Megriño, where Billy
was struck in the forehead by Valero and in the chest by Israel with
the handle of their respective firearms.
The group stayed there for about thirty minutes, and then Victoriano
and Billy were ordered to march to their brother Alfredo’s house, with
their captors trailing them closely. He, Billy and Alfredo, together with
two other persons named Pilo and Roger, who happened to be in the
house at the time, were ordered to fall in line and sing “Bayang
Magiliw.” When they reached the line “Ang mamatay nang dahil sa
iyo,” Valero and Israel told them, “You shall die.” Twenty minutes
later, they were all taken to a cousin of the Agotanos from whom the
Carminas demanded tuba, rice and chickens. Alfredo, Roger and Pilo
were forced to drink the tuba with Valero and Israel. The drinking
lasted for two hours. Then the Carminas decided to leave, taking with
them Victoriano and Billy, who were ordered to carry a kettle, the rice
and the chickens.
The group walked to the house of Ramon Katiad about one and a half
kilometers away and arrived there at 6:30 p.m. Katiad was not there
at the time but came home at about seven o’clock. The Agotanos
cooked the rice and roasted the chickens which they and the
Carminas ate. Katiad and his family had their own supper later.
At about ten o’clock, Israel told Billy, “You can no longer be home,
Do.” When asked why, he replied: “Because you are wearing a red
cloth around your head.” Katiad pleaded that Israel not do anything
in his house but Israel said, “I am going to kill him.” In desperation and
fear, Victoriano told Billy to kneel before Israel and beg for his life,
which Billy did. But to no avail. Israel took Billy with him downstairs
while Valero detained Victoriano in the house, pointing his rifle at
him. In the yard, Israel pushed Billy from behind and then shot him,
hitting him in the nape. Billy died as he fell to the ground. Israel then
stripped and exposed the dead body. He went back to the house to
get his mother’s bolo and ordered Victoriano to go down and look at
his brother’s corpse. The Katiad family (including the children) was
also told to go to the yard. When everyone had gathered around the
dead body, they watched in horror at the gruesome acts that
followed.
Israel chopped off Billy’s arms and legs. Then he beheaded the corpse
and, raising the severed head, shouted “Taganlang,” meaning God. He
cut open the stomach and pulled out the intestines. He hung these
around Victoriano’s neck, saying, “You use this as your necklace, the
intestines of your younger brother.” Going back to the dismembered
corpse, he pulled out the liver and the lungs. Triumphantly raising
them, he shouted. “We will use this as pulutan!”
Having done all this, Israel then turned his attention to Victoriano and
said, “I will kill you next!” He lunged at Victoriano but lost his balance
and the latter was able to parry the blow. Victoriano ran for his life. It
was, as he put it later, “a suicide run.” Israel pursued and took a shot
at him but missed. Victoriano made good his escape. Arriving at about
two o’clock in his mother’s house, he reported what had happened
and warned the family that the Carminas were after them. Under
cover of darkness even as deathly fear stalked them, they took refuge
in a neighbor’s house. Later in the morning, they reported the killing
to the authorities.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. While it is true that it was not he who actually shot and later
dismembered Jose Agotano, the evidence has clearly established a
conspiracy between him and his son that makes him equally guilty
with the latter. The two of them acted in concert in the conception
and execution of the killing. The decision to kill Billy was reached by
the two of them although it was Israel who personally implemented
it. While Israel did his part in the killing yard, Valero detained
Victoriano in the house at gunpoint and watched the shooting and
dismemberment of Billy. As a father, Valero made no move to restrain
his son; on the contrary, he watched with approval as Israel carried
out their joint decision.
The crime was qualified with treachery because, although the victim
was forewarned of his impending death, he was shot in the back while
he was entirely defenseless and the killers were under no risk
whatsoever from any retaliation the victim might make. In People v.
Barba, the accused pointed a rifle at the victim from a distance of six
meters and said, “Pardong, stand up, we are going to shoot you!” with
hands raised, the victim pleaded, “Do not kill me, investigate first
what was my fault!” This Court held there was treachery when the Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest
accused shot and killed the victim. and still remain at large.

Even if treachery were not present in this case, the crime would still
be murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of
the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of
the Revised Penal Code is “outraging or scoffing at (the) person or
corpse” of the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy
Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off
of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the
intestines, lungs and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the
intestines were removed and hung around Victoriano’s neck “as a
necklace” and the lungs and liver were facetiously described as
“pulutan.”
We agree with the trial court that evident premeditation should be
disregarded because sufficient time had not elapsed between the
determination to commit the crime and its execution, to enable the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act. It is not certain
that when early in that afternoon, Valero told the captives in
Megriño’s house that they would die, the Carminas had already
definitely resolved to commit the murder. In fact, although the threat
was made to all of the captives, only Billy was killed in the end.
Moreover, there was no showing that they had coolly and
dispassionately planned the execution of the offense. The events
leading to the murder suggest that the Carminas were from the start
busy with oppressing the Agotanos or drinking tuba, leaving no time
for that detached and undisturbed premeditation of the murder. It
was only when they were in Katiad’s house that the decision to kill
Billy was made, the justification being that “we have already
maltreated him, this time we will just finish him because he might
retaliate.”
But it was incorrect to appreciate adding ignominy to the offense
because the victim was already dead when his body was
dismembered. This aggravating circumstance requires that the
offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more
humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering.
PEOPLE VS MANERO
ISSUE:
Is there an aggravating circumstance?
HELD:
Yes. Superior strength and treachery. The other six accused, all armed
with high powered firearms, they were outside of the carinderia by
the window near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto
Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified members
of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that
morning, they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan
and drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and
Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near
the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot
Robles. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles
fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told them to leave
as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to
Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later they stood guard with their firearms
ready on the road when Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali.
Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in
their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest.
It is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but
were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali
and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers
and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting
stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance
to the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to
stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that the
wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were
overt acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in
furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted in
concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of
Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the
fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed acommon
intent to commit the criminal acts.

FACTS:

This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before

sundown. A hapless foreign religious minister was riddled with
bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of
his executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry,
chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song,
kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that
was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their
manslaughter, their leader picked up pieces of the splattered brain
and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some
accounts swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were
not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat,
the gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priestkiller".
But what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed
for no apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic
missionaries laboring in their vineyard in the hinterlands of
Mindanao.

In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive

manhunt which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except