1. [G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997.
] wrapped the same with a white sheet
ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Topic: Search and seizure, when unreasonable
Doctrine: When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and
potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search
warrant, policemen should employ limited, exible
responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which are graduated in
relation to the amount of information they possess, the
lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or
to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against
unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
FACTS:
1. "At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11,
1988, policemen from the Anti-Narcotics Unit of
the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a
surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
2. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat.
Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold
3. The surveillance was being made because of
information that drug addicts were roaming the
area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
4. When they arrived at the cemetery, the policemen
alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced
upon a male person in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs.
5. The male person was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
6. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police.
7. The policemen then asked the male person what
he was holding in his hands. The male person tried
to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male
person if he could see what said male person had
in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and
allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same.
Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
aisadc
8. The male person was then brought to the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police
Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo
Tamondong for investigation.
9. Espiritu also turned over to Tamondong the con
scated wallet and its suspected marijuana
contents.
10. Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected
marijuana residue from Espiritu, Tamondong
11. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed
to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a
chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue
Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of
the apprehending policemen.
12. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip NBI,
including the subject marijuana residue for
chemical analysis.
13. The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received
the aforesaid referral slip and the subject
marijuana residue. It was NBI Aida Pascual who
conducted the microscopic and chemical
examinations of the specimen. Mrs. Pascual
referred to the subject specimen as 'crushed
marijuana leaves' in her Certification.
14. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to
the City Fiscal of Kalookan City.
15. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a
tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery
when he was apprehended.
ISSUES: (petitioner-manalili lost in this case)
16. petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the
evidence against him, (2) the credibility of
prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial
and the appellate courts of the defense of
extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to sustain his conviction.
SC RULING: petition bereft of merit. Search was valid.
RULE:
a. a stop-and-frisk was definned as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for weapon. (terry v ohio)
b. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that
a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained in
violation of the mentioned provision is legally
inadmissible in evidence as a "fruit of the
poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary
rule. (sec 2 & 3, Art 3 of ’87 Consti)
c. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent
case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search
and seizure, (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
 d. People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained
that "in these cases, the search and seizure may be
made only with probable cause as the essential
requirement. Although the term eludes exact
definition, probable cause for a search is, at best,
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged; or the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched."
e. Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that there were many
instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk.
APPLICATION:
 Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that Manalili had red eyes and was
wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City
Cemetery, which according to police information
was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
 From his experience as a member of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug
addicts who were "high."
 The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to
stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high
on drugs.
 We concur with the Solicitor General's contention
that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained
when he failed to raise this issue or to object
thereto during the trial.
 A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search,
requires the concurrence of the following
requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed;
(2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an
actual intention to relinquish the right.
 manalili is deemed to have waived such right for his
failure to raise its violation before the trial court.
 2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Major General
Josephus Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano
 SEARCH AND SEIZURE, WHEN UNREASONABLE
 DOCTRINE: Search warrants must specify the
items to be seized. When not included in the
search warrant but is confiscated, it is deemed
inadmissible.
 (MAHABA DIGEST KASI MAHABA DIN CASE)
 (PERO MAY MGA RED NA NAKA HIGHLIGHT,
PARANG SUMMARY SYA)
 FACTS:
 After the EDSA Revolution, When Aquino became
president, she issued E.O. No. 1, creating the PCGG
or Presidential Commission on Good Governance.
PCGG was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.
 EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to
conduct investigation as may be necessary in order
to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this
order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG,
through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board")
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.
 Record showed that respondent is the owner of a
house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista,
Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and
lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.
 The value of the property located in Quezon City
may be estimated modestly at ₱700,000.00.
 These items could not have been in the possession
of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Army.
 Aside from the military equipment/items and
communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
 Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit,
Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna,
disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and
stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City
and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986,
a person who rode in a car went to the residence
of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases
filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
 Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that
Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
 and is supported by respondent for she was
formerly a mere secretary.
 Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano
could not have used the military equipment/items
seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the
consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible
for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the
₱2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had
no visible source of income.
 Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen.
Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried
for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as
"The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property."
 But the complaint was ammended, whereby
Dimaano was included in the complaint
 PETIONER’S RGUMENT:
 The properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house
as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioner’s case since these properties comprise
most of petitioner’s evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much
evidence to support its case against private
respondents if these properties are inadmissible in
evidence.
 Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice
that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution."39Petitioner argues
that a revolutionary government was operative at
that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice
President Laurel were "taking power in the name
and by the will of the Filipino people."40 Petitioner
asserts that the revolutionary government
effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents’ exclusionary right.
 (Basically the Republic is saying that Dimaano is
not entitled to the exclusionary right provided for
by the Bill od rights because the 1973 constitution
is not inoperation by virtue of the successful
overthrow of the Marcos’s regime”)
 ARGUMENT FOR THE PETITIONER (BY FR.
BERNAS):
 He argued that of PCGG believes that their action
is legal, then why are they asking protection from
the CONCOM. It is because they know that what
they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary
due process.
 The whole point of the February Revolution and of
the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the
heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one
breath, ask for constitutional normalization and
at same time ask for a temporary halt to the full
functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical;
that would be a repetition of Marcosian
protestation of due process and rule of law. The
New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is
tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
 Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits
tend to become ingrained. The committee report
asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of
Rights for six months after the convening of
Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.
 Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds
repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the
new government to acquire the vice of
disregarding the Bill of Rights.
 Vices, once they become ingrained, become
difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice
begin to think that they have a vested right to its
practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep
the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic
revolution.
 (What Fr. Berams is saying is that the Revolutionary
government cannot say that the bill of rights or that
the constitution is not effective as of the moment
because in the first place the reason why there was
an EDSA Revolution was to overthrow the
oppresive regime of Marcos and by saying that the
bill of rights cannot afford you protection for now
is like going against the very purpose of the
revolution. They are becoming the monsters they
sought to defeat, they are violating what they
promised to protect and that would just be
hypocritical. And also by allowing the PCGG to do
this they are basically consenting to future
encroachment of the rights of the people because
by allowing this to happen once they’re opening
the floodgates to the future violations of the Bill of
rights.)
 ISSUE: WON THE ITEMS CONFISCATED FROM
DIMAANO ARE ADMISSABLE
 (But there’s actually an issue that must first be
answered before the issue relating to the topic is
answered WON The present government is bound
by the bill of rights under the 1973 constitution
during the interregnum.)
 RULING:
 The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
not operative during the interregnum. However,
we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.
 During the interregnum, the directives and orders
of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by
the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum.
 To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration
orders issued by the Philippine Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption
of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration
orders, which direct the freezing and even the
take-over of private property by mere executive
issuance without judicial action, would violate the
due process and search and seizure clauses of the
Bill of Rights.
 During the interregnum, the government in power
was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.
 To rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision
excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration
orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless,
even during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
 The revolutionary government, after installing
itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance
with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires
each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present
Covenant." Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,
the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence."
 The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a
signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."
Although the signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only
a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the
State.46 Thus, the revolutionary government was
also obligated under international law to observe
the rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
 The revolutionary government did not repudiate
the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration
is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice
it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.
 During the interregnum when no constitution or
Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued
by government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted them
by the revolutionary government. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.
 However, the Constabulary raiding team seized
items not included in the warrant.
 The seizure of these items was therefore void, and
unless these items are contraband per se,53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner
of these items, merely that the search and seizure
 warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus
hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
 (The Supreme Court ruled that indeed during the
interregnum or during the period by which thhe
revolutionary government of Aquino was not yet
established as the De Jure government of the
Philippines the Bill of rights under the 1973
constitution is ineffective and thus, does not apply
it’s limitations to the present government (this is
because the Aquino Administration was
established in violation of the provisions of the
1973 constitution, so therefore the same would
not apply to them.) BUT despite the fact that the
1973 constitution does not apply to the present
government. There is a declaration in International
Law which calls for the protection of the people
from the unlawful seizure of their property, where
the Philippines is a signatory. Such declaration was
not repudiated by the present government and
therefore is considered applicable, furthermore it
is actually considered as GAPIL Generally Accepted
principle under International Law and therefore is
binding to the Philippines.)
 (So basically, the Supreme Court said that the
things confiscated was not entirely inadmissible.
The only things that may be used as evidence
against Dimaano are those which was included in
the search warrant, which are the firearms, the
other things which were confiscated such as the
money is inadmissible as evidence because it was
not included in the warrant.)
 (The Supreme Court reached their decision, not
because it was a violation of the bill of rights, but
because it was provided for under International
law.)
3. Laud vs. People GR No. 199032
Topic: Search Warrant, defined
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property described and bring it before the court.
Facts: The PNP applied with the RTC of Manila for a search
warrant to search r caves located inside the Laud
Compound in Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao City, where the
alleged remains of the victims of summarily executed by the
so-called Davao Death Squad (DDS) may be found. In
support of the application, a certain Avasola was presented
to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed
the killing of 6 persons in December 2005 and was part of
the group that buried the victims.
Judge Peralta found probable cause for the issuance of
search warrant. The search of the Laud Compound caves
yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.
The petitioner, retired SPO4 Laud filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and to suppress the Illegal Seized Evidence.
Manila MTC Ruling: Granted the Motion of Laud.
The CA Ruling: Granted the Petition of the People and
annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for
having been tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
(a) whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge
Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407;
(b) whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the
said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling
reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court;
(c) whether the requirements of probable cause and
particular description were complied with and the one-
specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was violated; and
(d) whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the
PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping
Ruling: The petition had no merit.
A. The Effect of Peralta’s Administrative Penalties.
(There’s no mention of any admin penalties in the
provided facts and I don’t know why it was raised as an
issue hehe)
The imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-
Executive Judge of an administrative penalty of at
least a reprimand shall automatically operate to
divest him of his position as such.
While the Court does agree that the imposition of
said administrative penalties did operate to divest
Judge Peralta's authority to act as Vice-Executive
Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of
such authority would not, by and of itself, result in
the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407
considering that Judge Peralta may be considered
to have made the issuance as a de facto officer
whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as
a de facto officer when he issued Search Warrant
No. 09-14407, hence, treated as valid as if it was
issued by a de jure officer suffering no
administrative impediment..
B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue a Search Warrant;
Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirements
under Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC states the requirements for the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special
criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous
crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
 the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs
Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that
may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and
included herein by the Supreme Court." Search
warrant applications for such cases may be filed by
"the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-
Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally
endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in
ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall
particularly describe therein the places to be
searched and/or the property or things to be seized
as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive
Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges"
are authorized to act on such applications and
"shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be
served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the said courts."
The Court observes that all the above requirements
were complied with in this case.
The fact that a search warrant application involves
a "special criminal case" excludes it from the
compelling reason requirement under Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the
Issuance of Search Warrant and the One- Specific-Offense
Rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued
except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident
from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims.
The court also conclude that there was compliance with
the constitutional requirement that there be a
particular description of the place to be searched and
the persons to be searched.
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident
from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims.
"Personal property" in the foregoing context actually
refers to the thing's mobility, and not to its capacity to
be owned or alienated by a particular person.|||
Considering that human remains can generally be
transported from place to place, and considering
further that they qualify under the phrase "subject of
the offense" given that they prove the crime's corpus
delicti, it follows that they may be valid subjects of a
search warrant under the above-cited criminal
procedure provision.
D. Forum Shopping
There is forum shopping when a litigant
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been
committed in this case considering the various points of
divergence attending the search warrant application before
the Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the
witnesses presented in each application were different.
Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection
with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any
crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be
searched were different — that in Manila sought the search
of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a
particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There
being no identity of facts and circumstances between the
two applications, the rule against forum shopping was
therefore not violated.

4. People vs. Pastrana
Requisites for valid issuance
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill), the Court stressed two
points which must be considered in the issuance of a search
warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
Facts:
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) led a
Sworn Application for a Search Warrant 5 before the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a
search of the office premises of respondents Amador
Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that
he received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of
their employees would call prospective clients abroad
whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based
company by purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed
to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the
payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were
actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was
allocated as follows: 42% to respondent Pastrana's personal
account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients,
who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost
of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan
averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan
attached the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the
complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of
respondents' former employees who actually called clients
abroad; the articles of incorporation of domestic
corporations used by respondents in their scheme; and the
sketch of the place sought to be searched.
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search
Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection
with two (2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the
other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance
contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal
procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon
a finding of probable cause in connection with one specific
offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to
describe with specificity the objects to be seized.
On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the
motion to quash the search warrant, respondent Abad
moved for the inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She
contended that the lapse of three (3) months without
action on the motion to quash clearly showed Judge
Salvador, Jr.'s aversion to passing judgment on his own
search warrant.
In an Order, 16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador,
Jr. voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the
case was re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.
RTC: search warrant was null and void because it violated
the requirement that a search warrant must be issued in
connection with one specific offense only.
CA: affirmed RTC and added that it failed to pass the test of
particularity. It reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase
"other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the warrant
all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of
respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the
implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion
as to what property should be seized.
Issue: Is the search warrant null and void for having been
issued for more than one offense and for lack of
particularity in the description of the things sought for
seizure?
Ruling:
1. YES.
Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been
issued for more than one offense and for lack of
particularity in the description of the things sought for
seizure.
SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost
a codification of various rules and regulations governing
securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a
clear delineation between use and possession of illegal
drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be
lumped together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to
specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated. In
this case, the core of the problem is that the subject
warrant did not state one specific offense. It included
violation of the SRC which covers several penal provisions
and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.
Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for
having been issued for more than one specific offense.
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The constitutional requirement of
reasonable particularity of description of the things to be
seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers
serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to
be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however,
required that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on
the part of the searching authorities.
It could not have been possible for the issuing judge as well
as the applicant for the search warrant to determine that
the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime,
since they failed to state the specific offense. Moreover,
even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for violation
of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the
documents, articles and items enumerated in the search
warrant failed the test of particularity. The terms used in
this warrant were too all- embracing, thus, subjecting all
documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents,
whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the
phrase "and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" does not
support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant No.
01-118 was indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations'
certificate of registration with the SEC and not just to
respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or
dealers.
5. AGCAOILI,
complainant,vs. MOLINA,respondent.
Doctrine: Probable Cause
Facts:
This case is about a complaint filed by Judge Emerito
Agcaoili regarding a decision made by Judge Adolfo Molina
alleging grave ignorance of the law in relation to Criminal
Case No. 10-435, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Rolando Anama," for homicide.
Complainant’s Argument:
He alleged that respondent, in conducting the
preliminary investigation of the above-mentioned criminal
case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando Anama,
based as it was, merely on the statements of two witnesses
who had no personal knowledge of the commission of the
offense charged.
Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear
violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which requires that before a warrant of arrest
is issued, "the judge must personally determine the
existence of probable cause from an examination under
oath of the complainant and his witnesses."
Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that
probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There
must be something more concrete.
Respondent’s Argument:
He admitted that he was the inquest judge in the
preliminary investigation of the above entitled case and
finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as
the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri,
Cagayan.
Respondent explained that since the case was
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office, which has the final say and disposition
on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court, should carry the brunt of the
responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause.
RTC Decision:
On 17 November 1993, RTC denied with finality the
motion filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melencio
Unciano for reconsideration of the 9 August 1993 order of
then Presiding Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili and dismissed the
aforestated criminal case provisionally on grounds of
absence of probable cause against the accused.
Office of Court Administrator’s Recommendation:
In its report and evaluation dated 26 April 1995,
the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that
respondent be admonished to be more careful in the
determination of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant of arrest.
Supreme Court’s Decision:
We concur with the findings of the Office of the
Court Administrator.
Section 6(b),Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued
only when the "municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination A: Rosita Castillo, 52 years old, married,
in writing in the form of searching questions and answers, housekeeper and resident of
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of Parada-Batu, Sta. Ana, Cagayan.
placing the respondent under immediate custody in order
COURT:
not to frustrate the ends of justice."
Q: And you do not know the day when
This is in conformity with the constitutional
mandate that "no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon Rogelio Anama killed Virgilio
Capa isn't it?
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the A: Yes, sir.
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”
Q: You were only informed by Wilma
In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a Anama the sister of the herein
warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and accused about the killing of
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and Virgilio Capa isn't it?
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. 8 A: Yes, sir.

Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant Q: Aside from that report made by
judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in Wilma Anama what else did
determining probable cause, an elementary legal principle Wilma Anama tell you if there
must not be compromised — hearsay evidence cannot be be any?
the basis of probable cause. A: No more sir, those were only the
The rules on evidence are explicit. A witness can things told to me by Wilma
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal Anama, but she even revealed
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own that Virgilio Capa, was buried by
perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative her brother Rogelio Anama
value whatsoever. after killing him.

Yet, in the case at bench, respondent judge found Q: How about the mother of Virgilio
probable cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the Capa was she present at that
basis of the testimonies of Mencelacion Padamada and time when Wilma Anama
Rosita Castillo which were obviously hearsay. Consider the reported the incident to you?
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge: A: The mother was not present.
Q: So is the court made to understand Q: So it was you to whom Wilma Anama
that you were not present related the killing of Virgilio
during the killing of your Capa by Rolando Anama?
son, isn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir. I was not present because I
was at home. xxx xxx xxx

Q: So it is understood that you were only The court is as perplexed as complainant

informed about the death of
your son?
A: Yes, sir, because his sister Wilma
Anama, came to me and
reported the incident regarding
the death of my son Virgilio
Capa.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Please state your name and other
personal circumstances?
judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently
witnessed the alleged crime or has personal knowledge
thereof, was not summoned by respondent for
investigation. She could have been the key to determining
whether or not Rolando Anama was the probable
perpetrator of the grisly killing.
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to
the provincial prosecutor. The determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge and is not for the provincial
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the
judge alone makes this determination.
6. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN
LANUZA, respondents.
Doctrine: To establish the existence of probable cause
sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the
applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
Facts:
Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal,
Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau
of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance
of a search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose
de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City," after receiving
reports that the accused sold various drug products without
a license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD which is in violation of Article 40
(k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the
Philippines).
The application, however, ended with the statement that
the warrant is to search the premises of another person at
a different address (Belen Cabanero’s address)
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent
Judge issued Search Warrant. The search warrant was
served at private respondent Lanuza's residence at the
indicated address
The present petition, however, narrates a different account
of what actually happened during the implementation of
the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: "At
the commencement of the search, the members of the
team discovered that the premises described as 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a
five thousand (5,000) square meter compound containing
at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased
residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouse. The
policemen proceeded to search the residence of private
respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no
drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a nearby
warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and
address above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52)
cartons of assorted drug products which were then
inventoried in due course. . . . ."8
Judge noted the inventory of the seized drugs and
authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have
samples of the drugs analyzed and be brought to the
registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing. Aiden
Lanuza filed a verified motion praying that Search Warrant
No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be
declared inadmissible in any proceeding and ordered
returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export &
Import Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound
at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City.
Lanuza’s Argument:
The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant
is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was applied to
search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier
Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the
residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San
Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a
non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas
was not duly authorized by applicant BFAD to apply
therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized; (5) the applicant's
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon
which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was
unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong
place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong
person.
Issue: WON the search warrant was valid.
Ruling:
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of
the respondent Judge that the application for its issuance
suffered from a "grave" defect, "which escaped (her)
attention," considering that it was applied to search the
premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village,
Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of
herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de
la Montana St., Cebu City
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application
by saying that on the same day applicant Atty. Lorna
Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June
27, 1995, another application for search warrant was also
filed against one Belen Cabanero at her residence at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City.
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name
and address of one Belen Cabanero were erroneously
copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such
defect, as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call
for the invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the
search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying
the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was
probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the
applicant to present documentary proof indicating that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell
drugs.
The said application for SW was supported by the affidavit
of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he
declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry
of licensed persons or premises" and discovered that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell
drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty.
Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have submitted
documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza
had no such license. Although no explanation was offered
by respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that
to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to
justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must
show "facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched."2
The facts and circumstances that would show probable
cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence
is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the
existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged
— for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as
in the present case — and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be
secured at the time of application, the applicant must show
a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge. n the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under
the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that
effect from the Department of Health.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been
described with sufficient particularity in the questioned
search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San
Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs
sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No.
38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is
owned by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge
is correct on this point.
In the present case, it must be noted that the application
for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the
compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square.
Within the same compound are residences of other people,
workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe
the residential house of private respondent with sufficient
particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings
or structures inside the same compound. But the search
warrant merely indicated the address of the compound
which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City.
This description of the place to be searched is too general
and does not pinpoint the specific house of private
respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the
residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general
warrant, which is violative of the constitutional
requirement.
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the
motion to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED
7. Stonehill v. Diokno G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967
TOPIC: Search and Seizure, when unreasonable; Requisites
for valid issuance; probable cause defined.
REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT: Two
points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. No specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of
our criminal laws.
FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government
Respondents-Prosecutors and Respondents-Judges —
issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, directed to the peace officer, to search
the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null
and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants —
petitioners filed an action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors from using the effects seized as
aforementioned in the deportation cases already adverted
to, and that a decision be rendered quashing the contested
search warrants and declaring the same null and void.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that
the contested search warrants are valid and have been
issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3)
that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and
seizures.
The Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for in the petition. However, the writ was partially lifted,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from
the offices of the corporations, but the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of herein petitioners. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in
the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned
resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from
using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof,
are valid or not, and
(2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.
RULING:
The search warrants are in the nature of general warrants
and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority there of are null and void.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that
the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners.
It would be the legal heresy to convict anybody of a
violation of a law without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or to uphold the validity of the
warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
Under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The warrants in the case at bar authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether
the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of
the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case
must be abandoned.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,
but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime
by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply
with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then,
this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of
evidence to establish a probable cause.
The Court holds that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants
for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners
are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein
made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in connection with the documents, papers and other
effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned;
that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied,
as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized
in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises
enumerated in the same Resolution.
8. People v CA
Topic: Probable Cause
Facts: UP Iloilo bought 27 units of distribution transformers
of various sizes from Varona Trading (which were already
delivered and paid). Varona pulled out the units on the
excuse that they had certain factory defects that had to be
repaired. When Varona failed to comply with UP's demand
for their return pending their replacement, UP referred the
matter to the NBI, which found that the properties were in
the warehouse of Ruben Siao, herein private respondent.
NBI applied for and secured the questioned search
warrant,1 which was issued by Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila on September 25, 1987.
On the strength of this warrant, NBI seized the said
transformers, which were later ascertained to be the same
transformers sold to UP, not only by their serial numbers
but also because the crates where they were contained
were marked "UP-Iloilo."
Siao filed an urgent motion to quash the search warrant on
the ground that Nissen-Denki Philippine Corporation, of
which he was the manager, had bought the said
transformers from Varona for the sum of P702,483.00. The
motion was denied after a lengthy exchange of pleadings
between the parties. However, on July 7, 1988, again after
a spirited debate between the petitioner and the private
respondent, Judge Dayrit granted Siao's motion for
reconsideration and dissolved the search warrant. He also
ordered the NBI to return the seized transformers to Siao.
Meanwhile, UP had filed a complaint for estafa against
Varona and Siao and the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City had
lodged the corresponding information before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo. Upon re-investigation of the complaint,
however, it was found that there was no cause to hold Siao
for trial and accordingly, on motion of the prosecution, the
case against him was dismissed by the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Dayrit complied with all the
requirements set out on Art III, Section 2, of the Bill of Rights
Judge Dayrit’s contention in justifying his dissolution of the
search warrant:
a) The warrant earlier issued omitted (perhaps by
inadvertence) to indicate clearly what specific offense had
been violated;
(b) While it did mentioned that the subjects of the offense
are "stolen or embezzled" goods or proceeds thereof, this
Court recognizes that the offense possibly committed from
that description may either be robbery, theft, qualified
theft, or estafa;
(c) Furthermore, Danilo Varona's deposition, on which this
Court relied heavily when it first issued the warrant, stated
that the transformers in question were brought to
defendant Ruben Siao for repair; but during the hearing on
the motion to quash and after the evidences adduced
therein, this Court discovered that defendant Siao had
strong evidence tending to establish his claim that he
bought the transformers in good faith and in the ordinary
course of business from Varona Trading which was a
merchant of such products;
(d) There was, therefore, no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant in the first place; and
(e) The Court would not have issued the warrant if it had
been confronted with that fact.
Ruling: Yes, As correctly observed by the private
respondent:
The search warrant issued by the trial
court left the space in the caption
intended for the nature of the offense in
blank, indicating the uncertainty of
petitioner and the court as to the crime
committed and for which the search
warrant was issued. On the other hand, all
that the body of the search warrant stated
was that the transformers were "Stolen or
Embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense, used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense."
But, since the particular offense was not
mentioned, the reason for the issuance of
the search warrant could be anything
under the sun.
There is no question that the search warrant did not relate
to a specific offense, in violation of the doctrine announced
in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 of Rule 126 providing
as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to searched and the things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied.)
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable
cause, omitting to continue that it was in connection with
one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the
warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in
Judge Dayrit's own words "to robbery, theft, qualified theft
or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrant was
totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by
the very judge who had issued it.
Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the
search warrant and has merely said that there was probable
cause, omitting to continue that it was in connection with
one specific offense. He could not, of course, for the
warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in
Judge Dayrit's own words "to robbery, theft, qualified theft
or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrant was
totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so by
the very judge who had issued it.
Probable cause is defined as referring to "such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant
that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious
person to rely on them, and to act in pursuance thereof. At
the time he issued the search warrant, there was in Judge
Dayrit's view probable cause that a crime had been
committed by Siao, who had possession of the subject
properties. However, such probable cause no longer exists
now because the information for estafa against Siao has
already been dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila on motion of the prosecution itself. Siao's guilt is no
longer open for conjecture.
What is whether the search warrant could be issued against
Siao, assuming he was an innocent purchaser for value, in
connection with the prosecution of Varona for estafa. But
this is a question we need not decide here. It is clear that,
even if it were resolved affirmatively, the search warrant in
question would still have to be annulled for its failure to
state therein the specific offense for which it was being
issued.
The Solicitor General complains that unless the search
warrant is reinstated, the properties subject thereof cannot
be used in the criminal action for estafa against Varona. The
trouble is that the search warrant is invalid as already
demonstrated, and the Constitution clearly says that any
evidence taken in violation of its Article III, Section 2, cannot
be used for any purpose in any proceeding. Moreover, as
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the subject of the
warrant no longer exists, having been converted to other
articles not answering to the specific description of the
properties ordered to be seized under the search warrant.
Both the petitioner and the respondents agree that
ownership of the transformers is a question that cannot be
determined in search civil action. They are correct. Of
course, UP is not left without recourse, for it may still claim
restitution of the transformers or their value in the civil
action impliedly instituted with the criminal action for
estafa against Varona or in a separate civil action if it has
been reserved. Any statement made by the trial court
resolving that question shall be considered mere obiter
dictum and not conclusive in any such recovery case.
9. Fenix vs. CA, GR No. 189878
Topic: Personal Determination by a Judge
“When judges dismiss a case or require the prosecutor to
present additional evidence, they do so not in derogation of
the prosecutor's authority to determine the existence of
probable cause.”
Facts: Technical Sergeant Vidal D. Doble. Jr., a member of
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP), charged petitioners (Wilson Fenix, Rez
Cortez, and Angelito Santiago) with serious illegal
detention.
According to Doble, Santiago brought him to the San Carlos
Seminary where they met petitioner Rez Cortez and Bishop
Teodoro C. Bacani, Jr. Doble heard Ong over the radio
making a press statement about the existence of an audio
tape of a conversation between President Arroyo and a
COMELEC commissioner regarding the alleged rigging of the
2004 presidential elections. On the afternoon of the same
day, Ong arrived at the seminary and told Doble that the
latter would be presented to the media as the source of the
audio tape. From there, Ong and his men proceeded to
transfer him from one room to another and closely
monitored and guarded his movements. When he
approached Santiago and said, “pare, ayoko na, suko na
ko,” the latter told him to stay put and not go out of the
room.
On June 13, 2005, Doble informed a group of priests who
had gone to his room that he was being held against his will.
The priests brought him to another room in another
building away from Ong and the latter’s men. At 2:30 PM,
Doble was fetched by Bishop Socrates Villegas and turned
over to the custody of ISAFP in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon
City.
Counter-affidavits: Cortez denied the allegations in his
counter-affidavit. He averred that he had stayed at the San
Carlos Seminary to provide moral support for Ong.
Ong stated in his counter-affidavit that Santiago gave him
an audio tape that came from the latter’s friend, Doble. Ong
was told that the audio tape was a product of the wiretap
of calls made to COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and
that several of those calls had been made by President
Arroyo. Before taking steps to make the audio tape public,
Ong looked for someone who could arrange for sanctuary
for him and Doble. Ong was introduced to Cortez, who
made arrangements for them to be accommodated at the
Seminary. He denied the allegation that he had armed men
guarding Doble during his stay. He and Santiago were
unarmed while Doble had his .45-caliber pistol. All of them
were free to roam around the seminary. On June 13, Ong
was informed that Bishop Villegas fetched Doble upon the
request of a woman claiming to be his wife.
Santiago essentially corroborated the statements of Ong.
Santos recanted all her previous affidavits in support of
Doble’s complaint. Santos said she was only made to sign
the affidavits at the ISAFP office. She and Doble had
voluntarily sought sanctuary in the Seminary, and that at no
point were their movements restricted or closely
monitored. They were only transferred from room to room
as a safety measure after an ISAFP agent had been seen
around the premises.
Bishop Bacani narrated that he agreed to give sanctuary to
Ong and his group and that Doble and Santos never
intimated to him that they were being detained against
their will. Rather, they feared that government forces
would find them. No armed guards accompanied Doble and
Santos in their room during their stay.
Panel: There is probable cause to charge petitioners and
Ong with serious illegal detention. The evidence on hand
sufficiently established the fact that the offense had indeed
been committed against Doble, who was a public officer
detained for more than three days.
The panel did not give any serious consideration to the
counter-affidavits with annexes because they had failed to
appear and affirm the counter-affidavits before the panel.
The panel was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to
ask clarificatory questions to test the credibility of Ong and
Santiago.
RTC Ruling: The RTC evaluated the evidence including the
counter-affidavits and stated that there is a lack of probable
cause. It saw no justifiable reason why the panel did not
give serious consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong
and Santiago. It also recognized the importance of the
recantation of Santos because she was the only one who
truly knew about the incident, as she was with him the
whole time.
CA Ruling: Reinstated the Information for serious illegal
detention. While a judge is required to personally
determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, this determination must not extend
to the issue of whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial. In this case, the CA found that the
RTC had delved into the evaluation of the evidence, which
should have been held in abeyance until after a full-blown
trial on the merits.
Respondents’ Arguments: OSG manifested that the RTC did
not merely rely on the findings and recommendations of
the panel, but took into consideration certain supervening
events such as the recantation of Santos, the panel’s refusal
to consider the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago, and
the affidavit of Bishop Bacani. From the point of view of the
OSG, this act was pursuant to the court’s mandate and
could not be regarded as an unlawful intrusion into the
executive functions and prerogatives of the panel. RTC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in finding that the
RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal case
Ruling: We grant the petition. The orders of the RTC are
reinstated.
Rule: The power of the judge to determine probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
It implies that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon a
judge's personal determination of the evidence against the
accused. Thus, when Informations are filed before the
courts and the judges are called upon to determine the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, what should be foremost in their minds is their
constitutional mandate to order the detention of a person
rightfully indicted or to shield a person from the ordeal of
facing a criminal charge not committed by the latter.
Further supporting the proposition that judges only have to
concern themselves with the accused and the evidence
against the latter in the issuance of warrants of arrest is
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
the accused has already been arrested pursuant to
a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
 cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the
court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint or information.
Indeed, under the above-cited provision, judges may very
well (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record has
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause; or (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of
probable cause. When judges dismiss a case or require the
prosecutor to present additional evidence, they do so not
in derogation of the prosecutor's authority to determine
the existence of probable cause.
First, judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause. That falls under the office
of the DOJ Secretary. Second, once a complaint or an
Information has been filed, the disposition of the case is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, subject only
to the qualification that its action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People
to due process of law. Third, and most important, the
judge's determination of probable cause has a different
objective than that of the prosecutor. The judge's finding is
based on a determination of the existence of facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. The
prosecutor, on the other hand, determines probable cause
by ascertaining the existence of facts sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
To be sure, in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not compelled
to follow the prosecutor's certification of the existence of
probable cause. As we stated in People v. Inting, "[i]t is the
report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes
(if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
[prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting
the [j]udge to make his determination."
Application: In this case, it bears stressing that the RTC
never considered any evidence other than that which the
panel had already passed upon. The only difference was
that unlike the RTC, the panel did not give any serious
consideration to the counter-affidavits of Ong and Santiago,
the recantation of Santos or the affidavit of Bishop Bacani.
That the trial court did so spelled the difference between
the divergent findings.
As said by the RTC, there was no justification for the
rejection of the counter-affidavits upon the failure to
subscribe and swear to them before the panel. Under Sec.
3 (a) and (c ) of Rule 112, counter-affidavits may be
subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oaths or, in
their absence and unavailability, before any notary public.
Notably, the affidavits in this case were all subscribed and
sworn to before government prosecutors.
Also, the failure of Ong and Santiago to appear before the
panel did not justify the exclusion of their duly-submitted
counter-affidavits. Under Sec. 3(e) of Rule 112, the conduct
of a clarificatory hearing is not indispensable. That hearing
fulfills only the purpose of aiding the investigating
prosecutor in determining the existence of probable cause
for the filing of a criminal complaint before the courts. The
clarificatory hearing does not accord validity to the
preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, nor does its
absence render the proceedings void. Under the rules, an
investigating prosecutor may resolve a complaint based
only on the evidence presented by the complainant if the
respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does
not submit a counter-affidavit within the prescribed period.
The panel’s act of resolving the complaint on the basis of
Doble’s evidence, and in spite of the timely submission of
the counter-affidavits, was clearly committed with grave
abuse of discretion.
We have stressed that the court’s dismissal of a case for lack
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
must be done when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause; that is, when the records readily
show uncontroverted and, thus, established facts that
unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the
crime charged.
In People v. Soberano, we ruled that the act of holding a
person for an illegal purpose necessarily implies an unlawful
physical or mental restraint against the person's will,
coupled with a willful intent to so confine the victim. The
culprit must have taken the victim away against the latter's
will, as lack of consent is a fundamental element of the
offense, and the involuntariness of the seizure and
detention is the very essence of the crime. Given that
principle, there is no illegal detention where the supposed
victim consents to the confinement.
.
In this case, the disinterested narration of Bishop Bacani
clearly shows that Doble and Santos were not seized and
detained against their will. They all sought sanctuary at the
seminary and they were brought there out of fear for their
security following the magnitude of the impact of Ong’s
revelation.
10. [G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000.]
MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA ,
petitioners, vs HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, respondent.
TOPIC: WARRANTLESS SEARCH
DOCTRINE:
The extent of the judge's examination depends on the
exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had
before him two different informations and resolutions
charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these
conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the
certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value.
The circumstances thus require that respondent look
beyond the bare certification of the investigating
prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
FACTS:
On 24 June 1994, a complaint for murder was filed against
petitioners and 6 other persons in connection with the
death of Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of
Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that
herein petitioners paid the 6 other respondents the total
amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Abdul Dimalen.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda,
dismissed the charges of murder against herein petitioners
and five other respondents on a finding that there was no
prima facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda
recommended the filing of an information for murder
against 1 of the respondents, Kasan Mama. An information
for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before
the sala of respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge ordered that the case be returned to
the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation.
Respondent judge noted that although there were 8
respondents in the murder case, the information filed
"charged only 1 of the eight 8 respondents in the name of
Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to
show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a
conclusion." The respondent judge reasons, the trial court
cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama.
Upon the return of the records to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant
Prosecutor Dimaraw. In addition to the evidence presented
during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two
new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the
charge of murder. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the
same as a refiling of the murder charge and pursuant to law,
issued subpoena to the respondents named therein. On
December 6, 1994, herein petitioners submitted and filed
their joint counter-affidavits.
After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw,
found a prima facie case for murder against herein
petitioners and 3 other respondents. He thus
recommended the filing of charges against herein
petitioners Bai Unggie Abdula and Odin Abdula, as
principals by inducement, and against the 3 others, as
principals by direct participation.
On 2 January 1995, an information for murder was filed
against the petitioner spouses and Kasan Mama, Cuenco
Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of respondent
judge.
The following day the respondent judge issued a warrant
for the arrest of petitioners. Upon learning of the issuance
of the said warrant, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest.
Petitioners argued that the enforcement of the warrant of
arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the
information was prematurely filed and that the petitioners
intended to file a petition for review with the DOJ.
A petition for review was filed by the petitioners with the
Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said
filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner's
pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
ISSUES:
Whether or not the second information for murder filed
before respondent's court was legal?
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued against
petitioners was valid?
[It must be noted that petitions for certiorari and
prohibition require that there be no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
available to the petitioner. In the instant case, it cannot be
said that petitioners have no other remedy available to
them as there is pending before the lower court an Urgent
Motion praying for the lifting and setting aside of the
warrant of arrest. Ordinarily, we would have dismissed the
petition on this ground and let the trial court decide the
pending motion. However, due to the length of time that
the issues raised in the petition have been pending before
the courts, it behooves us to decide the case on the merits
in order to preclude any further delay in the resolution of
the case. (due to the lapse of time, the respondent judge
has already retired thus it has become moot and academic)]
First issue
PETITIONERS ARGUMENT:
Petitioners aver that it is the respondent judge himself who
is orchestrating the filing of the alleged murder charge
against them. In support, petitioners cite 5 instances
wherein respondent judge allegedly issued illegal orders in
a mandamus case against petitioner a. These allegedly
illegal orders formed the basis for a criminal complaint and
in this complaint, herein petitioners alleged that the
respondent judge illegally ordered the release of
P1,119,125.00 from the municipal funds of to a certain
Bayoraiz Saripada, a purported niece of respondent judge.
Petitioners further state that respondent judge exhibited
extreme hostility towards them after the filing of the said
complaint before the Ombudsman. Petitioners claim that
immediately after the issuance of the Order of the
Ombudsman requiring respondent judge to file his counter-
affidavit, respondent allegedly berated petitioner Bai
Unggie Abdula in open court when she appeared before
him in another case.
Petitioners next argue that the act of respondent in motu
proprio ordering a reinvestigation of the murder charge
against them is another indication of the latter's bias and
prejudice. They claim that the filing of their complaint
against respondent motivated the latter's Order which
ordered the return of the records of the murder case to the
provincial prosecutor. Furthermore, they posit that the
latter had no authority to order the reinvestigation
considering that same had already been dismissed as
against them by the provincial prosecutor in his Resolution.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT:
Respondent judge argues that petitioners' enumeration of
"incontrovertible facts" is actually a list of misleading facts
which they are attempting to weave into Criminal Case for
the purpose of picturing respondent as a partial judge who
abused his discretion to favor petitioner's accuser.
Respondent vehemently denies having personally profited
from the release of the municipal funds. Moreover,
respondent points out that the allegations in the complaint
seem to imply that the Vice Mayor of Kabuntalan, Bayoraiz
Sarupada, was a party to the mandamus case when in truth,
there was no such case filed. Finally, respondent denies
berating petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula. According to
respondent, the last time petitioner Abdula appeared in his
sala, it was in connection with the lifting of an order for her
apprehension in another case, he neither berated nor
scolded her and in fact, he even lifted the said order of
arrest.
RULING:
The OSG states that petitioner's allegation that the
respondent judge was biased and prejudiced was pure
speculation as no proof was presented that respondent
assumed the role of prosecutor. Moreover, the fact that the
respondent judge and petitioners had pending cases
against each other did not necessarily result in the
respondent's bias and prejudice.
A review of the pertinent dates in the petition however
show that respondent could not have been motivated by
the Ombudsman's complaint when he issued the 13
September 1994 Order. Petitioner Bai Unggie Abdula filed
the complaint before the Ombudsman of Cotabato City on
October 6, 1994 or about a month after the issuance of the
13 September 1994 Order. As such, when respondent
issued the said Order, the same could not have been a
retaliatory act considering that at that time, there was as
yet no complaint against him.
With respect to the allegation that the respondent had no
legal authority to order a reinvestigation of the criminal
charge considering that the said charge had been previously
dismissed as against them, we hold that respondent did not
abuse his discretion in doing so.
It is true that under the circumstances, the respondent
judge, upon receipt of these records, respondent judge
would then have sufficient basis to determine whether a
warrant of arrest should issue. However, from the bare
terms of the questioned order alone, we fail to see any
illegal reason that could have motivated the judge in issuing
the same. The order merely stated that the records of the
case should be returned to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for further investigation or reinvestigation. He
did not unduly interfere with the prosecutor's duty to
conduct a preliminary investigation by ordering the latter to
file an information against any of the respondents or by
choosing the fiscal who should conduct the reinvestigation
which are acts certainly beyond the power of the court to
do. It was still the prosecutor who had the final say as to
whom to include in the information.
Petitioners likewise allege that the information charging
petitioners with murder is null and void because it was filed
without the authority of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioners' contention is not well-taken.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on this matter
state that "(n)o complaint or information shall be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal
or chief state prosecutor (italics ours)." In other words, a
complaint or information can only be filed if it is approved
or authorized by the provincial or city fiscal or chief state
prosecutor.
In the case at bench, while the Resolution and the
Information were not approved by Provincial Prosecutor
Salick U. Panda, the filing of the same even without his
approval was authorized. Both the Resolution and
information contain the following notation:
"The herein Provincial Prosecutor is inhibiting
himself from this case and Investigating
Prosecutor Enok Dimaraw may dispose of the
case without his approval on the following
ground:
That this case has been previously handled by
him, and whose findings differ from the findings
of Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw; and the
victim is a relative by affinity, he being a father-
in-law of his son.
(Signed) Salick U. Panda
Provincial Prosecutor
It must be stressed that the Rules of Court speak of
authority or approval by the provincial, city, or chief state
prosecutor. The notation made by Prosecutor Panda clearly
shows that Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw was
authorized to "dispose of the case without his approval." In
issuing the resolution and in filing the information, the
investigating prosecutor was acting well within the
authority granted to him by the provincial prosecutor. Thus,
this resolution is sufficient compliance with the aforecited
provision of the Rules of Court.
Second Issue
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
Petitioners argue that the warrant for his arrest should be
recalled considering that the respondent judge "did not
personally examine the evidence nor did he call the
complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible
accounts." As proof, he points to the fact that the
information was filed at around 4:00 p.m. of the January 2,
1995 and the order of arrest was immediately issued the
following day or on January 3, 1995. Moreover, petitioner
argues, respondent judge did not even issue an order
stating that there is probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, a clear violation of the guidelines.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:
Respondent denies any irregularity in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. He argues as follows:
"Written authority having been granted by the
Provincial Prosecutor, as required by the third
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of (the) Rules on
Criminal Procedure, and there having been no
reason for the respondent to doubt the validity of
the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor
that a preliminary investigation was conducted and
that probable cause was found to exist as against
those charged in the Information filed, and
recognizing the prosecution's legal authority to
initiate and control criminal prosecution (Rule 110,
Section 5) and considering that the court cannot
interfere in said prosecution's authority, the
respondent issued the warrant for the arrest of the
accused pursuant to paragraph (a), section 6, Rule
112;"
RULING:
After a careful analysis of these arguments, we find merit in
the contention of petitioners.
"Section 2 [Article III of the 1987 Constitution].
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the
judge to determine probable cause "personally," a
requirement which does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous constitutions. What the
Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the
questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to
doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant
Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted
and that probable cause was found to exist as against those
charged in the information filed." The statement is an
admission that respondent relied solely and completely on
the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause
exists as against those charged in the information and
issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of
the prosecutor's findings and recommendations.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duties, which in
turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy, nothing
less than the fundamental law of the land commands the
judge to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this
constitutionally mandated duty if he relies merely on the
certification or report of the investigating officer.

The extent of the judge's examination depends on the

exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. In the case at bench, the respondent had
before him two different informations and resolutions
charging two different sets of suspects. In the face of these
conflicting resolutions, it behooves him not to take the
certification of the investigating prosecutor at face value.
The circumstances thus require that respondent look
beyond the bare certification of the investigating
prosecutor and examine the documents supporting the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause. The
inordinate haste that attended the issuance of the warrant
of arrest and respondent's own admission are
circumstances that tend to belie any pretense of the
fulfillment of this duty.

Clearly, respondent judge, by merely stating that he had no

reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the
investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the
Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable
cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Consequently, the
warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for

certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order we issued on 20 February 1995 in favor of
petitioners insofar as it enjoins the implementation and
execution of the order of arrest dated 3 January 1995 is
made permanent. Criminal Case No. 2376 is REMANDED to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City for a
proper determination of whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued and for further proceedings.