1.

INTRODUCTION

1.1. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP.

Costco Wholesale Corp. (from now on Costco) operates a membership
warehouses that provide different types of products such as food, electrical
appliances, office supplies, pharmaceutical medicines, furniture, and automotive
supplies among others. Until August 31st 2009, Costco operated 527 membership
warehouses, eight regional offices in the United States, two regional offices in
Canada and five regional offices internationally. In addition, it operates regional
cross-docking facilities (depots) for the consolidation and distribution of most
shipments to the warehouses, and various processing, packaging, and other
facilities to support ancillary and other businesses. Costco has also the following
subsidiaries: Costco Wholesale Canada Ltd, Costco Canada Holdings Inc., NW Re
Ltd, Costco Wholesale Membership Inc and Costco Wholesale United Kingdom
Ltd. Company got its new name on Aug.30, 1999, before it was called by the name
of Price/Costco. Company has joint ventures with Controladora Comercial
Mexicana, S.A. de C.V, The Price REIT, Price Club Mexico, Shinsegae
Department Store Co., Ltd. ("Shinsegae"). Finally, its mission statement is to offer
its members low prices on branded and selected label products, producing high
sales volumes and rapid inventory turnover (Mergent Online, 2010).

1.2. WAL- MART

Wal-Mart operates retail stores. Its operations comprise three segments: Wal-Mart
U.S., Sam's Club and International. Wal-Mart U.S. segment includes its discount
stores, supercenters and neighborhood markets in the U.S. as well as
walmart.com. Sam's Club segment consists of membership warehouse clubs in the
U.S. and the segment's online retail operations, samsclub.com. As of Jan 31 2009,
Co.'s International segment consisted of its operations in Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India,
Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico and the U.K., and included retail stores and
restaurants that operate outside the U.S. Wal-Mart has the following subsidiaries:

1
Wal-Mart Stores East LP, Wal-Mart Property Company, Wal-Mart Real Estate
Business Trust and ASDA Group Limited in United Kingdom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
is committed to saving people money so they can live better by providing quality
merchandise and services at everyday low prices (Wal-Mart and Mergent On Line,
2010).

2. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS THROUGH RATIO ANALYSIS

2.1. RATIOS
Financial ratios are important to analyze since it helps to identify problems and
opportunities within a firm. The following section analyzes the performance
measurement and analysis through ratio analysis of Costco and Wal-Mart stores
as well as a comparison with its industry ratios. The information for the companies
ratios are calculated from Bloomberg 2010 and for the industry ratio are calculated
from Yahoo Finance 2010 and Source Capital IQ 2010, as shown in Annex I.

2.1.1. PROFITABILITY
Costco, in the last year, has decline in the growth of its sales in 1.5%, after having
grown in a sustainable way for more than four consecutive years, being 2008 the
year of maximum sales (US$ 72 438 millions). This fall is due to a decrease of 4%
in its sales (sales in warehouses open for at least one year, including relocated
warehouses). As well, net sales were impacted by the drop in the price of petrol
which resulted in a 30% decline of the average sales per gallon; by the fall of the
Canadian, American and Korean currency exchange rate (Costco Annual Report
2009 p.28); and by a lower number of warehouse openings year-over-year (Costco
Annual Report 2009, p.27).

Costco is one of two companies that are in the top ten stores of the retail and
warehousing industry that diminished its sales in 2009 and whose gross margin
was placed below the median of the industry (12.7% opposite to 28.9 % of the top
ten retail and warehousing industry), far below 28.6% of Target Corp (third rank
company in the industry) and 24.5% of Wal-Mart. Nevertheless, in the last five

2
years, the gross margin reached its maximum point of 12.7% in 2009 due to the
fact that the cost of goods sold felt -1.8% more than the sales, having an increase
of 1.2% of the gross profit being this the highest growth of the company in last five
years. The graph below shows the relationship between gross margin and sales
(Graph N° 1).

The increase in the gross margin is due to the raise in the food and sundries
departments and gasoline and pharmacy departments and in spite of the type of
unfavourable change in Canada, the United Kingdom and Korea which negatively
impacted gross margin for 2009 by approximately US$ 258 millions (Costco Annual
Report 2009 p.29-30).

GRAPH N°1: GROSS MARGIN & SALES

COSTCO WALT-MART

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own

%
On the other hand, Wal-Mart has kept a sustainable growth in its sales during the
last five years, though from 2007 a minor step back is observed passing from a

12.8
rate growth of 11.6% to 7.2% in 2009. Last year increase was a product of its
global store expansion programs, comparable store sales increases and
acquisitions (Wal-Mart Annual Report 2009 p.16), specifically due to an increase in
customer traffic, as well as increase in average transaction size per customer (Wal-
Mart Annual Report 2009 p.20). The gross margin presents the same rising trend
due to the fact that total revenue is always greater than the cost of goods sold.
Gross margin has grown in higher rates than the total revenue which guarantees a
sustainable growth of the first one. A well-known difference between both
companies is that Costco has diminished its operating income in the last year in
7.39% and Wal-Mart on the contrary has increased it in 4.59%.

In spite of the fact that both companies possesses a minor gross margin compare
to the top ten retail and warehousing stores of the industry, Wal-Mart EBIT Margin
in 2009 (5.7%) had a superior median of that of the industry (5.6%), while Costco
was only 2.5%. The reason that Wal-Mart could not obtain better results is because
the low performance of its operating units, International and Sam’s Club. The
International segment fell short of this objective due to fluctuations in foreign
currency exchange rates and due to increases in operating expenses (Wal-Mart
Annual Report 2009 p17).

This is reflected in the behaviour of its indicators of profitability. In Costco, in spite

of the increase in its ROA; ROE and ROC during 2008, in 2009 it decreased
reaching the minimum of the last five years in ROA and ROE indicators (5.3% and
11.3%, respectively). This is because last year net income decreased in 15.4%,
whereas asset and equity increased in 6.3% and 9.0%, respectively. In 2009, net
margin (or profit margin) was the lowest of the last five years, diminishing in 25
basic points approximately in regard to 2008. Wal-Mart profitability ratios show an
acceptable performance since its net income has a sustainable growth in the last
five years under analysis, concluding with an amount of US$ 13 400 millions.

4
Regarding the top ten retail and warehousing stores of the industry, in 2009,
Costco was left behind in its profitability indicators, being the median of the
industry’s ROA 6.5% (1.2 percentage points over Costco) and the median of the
industry’s ROE was 14.5% (greater in 3.2 percentage points over Costco). Wal-
Mart situation is opposite since both indicators (ROA of 8.9% and ROE of 20.4%)
overcome the median of the industry. The graph below represents the relationship
between ROA, ROE and ROC (Graph N °2).

GRAPH N°2: RETURN ON ASSET, RETURN ON EQUITY & RETURN ON CAPITAL

COSTCO WALT-MART

16
%
14
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

2.1.2. LIQUIDITY
For Costco, primary sources of liquidity are cash flows generated from warehouse
operations and existing cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investment

12
balances, which were US$ 3 727 and US$ 3 275 at the end of 2009 and 2008,
respectively (Costco Annual Report 2009 p.34). In that case, Costco presents a
fluctuating behaviour in its indicators of liquidity during the last five years, placing
the current ratio of 2009 below the median of the industry, which affected its debt
capacity and payment in short term. As well, cash conversion cycle increased in

10
0.89 days, passing from 2.63 to 3.54 days between 2008 and 2009, being the latter
year the greater one of the last five years. The graph below (Graph N° 3)

5
demonstrates that the trend in Costco is increasing (with exception of 2008), but
the number of days for any of the five years are low enough for the company to
operate efficiently.
In Wal-Mart case, the ratios of liquidity are low as demonstrated in the graph
below (Graph N° 3). During the last five years, Wal-Mart, has not overcome its
threshold of 0.90x from the year 2005 and on the contrary this one has fallen down
even more 0.82x in 2008 and it recovered only in 2009 with 0.89x. This situation
worsens in 2009 due to its quick ratio (0.2x) since it is far below the median of the
industry (0.5x), demonstrating that the company does not manage with efficiency
its current liabilities with its current assets. This deficit of working capital can be
explain by the use of cash in funding operations and in providing returns to
shareholders in the form of stock repurchases and payment of dividends (Wal-Mart
Annual Report 2009 p.22).

GRAPH N°3: CURRENT RATIO, QUICK RATIO AND CASH CONVERSION CYCLE

COSTCO WAL-MART

Curre
Source: Bloomberg Financail LP 2010

Tim es
Elaboration: Own

2.1.3. ASSET UTILIZATION

1.4
6
Costco efficiency of its inventory, measured by the inventory turnover, has
diminished in almost a point in the last year. Costco is the leading store, in asset
utilization, of its industry during 2009 (11.9x in Costco against the industry median
of 5.5x), in spite of the fact that the sales decreased in 1.5%, whereas the industry
sales decreased in 0.7%, as sow in the graph below (Graph N° 4). This means that
Costco will delay approximately 30 days in selling its inventory, whereas the
median of the industry does it in 69 days approximately.

On the other hand, Wal-Mart presents an increasing trend in its inventory turnover
during the last five years demonstrating good management, in spite of the
deceleration of the growth of its sales. Nevertheless, in 2009 Wal-Mart is three
points below Costco (8.8x versus 11.9x, respectively), as show in the graph below
(Graph N°4).

GRAPH N°4: INVENTORY TURNOVER VS SALES GROWTH

COSTCO WALT-MART

Inven
Tim es
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

13
Both companies possesses a period of cash collection more rapid than that of the
industry, which is shown in its accounts receivable turnover ratios, being Wal-Mart
in 2009 107.5x and Costco 90.2x opposite to 83.3x of the median of the industry.

7
Wal-Mart and Costco takes almost 3.3 days and 4 days, respectively to collect the
receivable accounts (days of outstanding sales), which means 4.3 days in that the
industry is delayed in collecting receivable accounts. In both cases, the accounts
receivable turnover ratio diminishes, increasing the number of days of the on hand
inventory, passing from 2.9 to 4.0 days among 2005 and 2009 for Costco and from
1.8 days to 3.3 days in the same period for Wal-Mart. In 2009 the number of days
that Costco takes in paying its suppliers is 30.9 days and for Wal-Mart is 35.4 days.
This implies that both companies are managing efficiently its relationship between
its accounts receivables turnover and sales. The graph below shows the
relationship between account receivable turnover and sales (Graph N° 5).

GRAPH N°5: RECEIVABLES TURNOVER VS SALES GROWTH

COSTCO WALT-MART

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own

2.1.4. LEVERAGE AND CAPITALIZATION

Times
Since 2007 Costco long term borrowings grew significantly, spending US$ 215
millions in 2006 to US$ 2 107 millions in the following years and to US$ 2 206

140
millions in 2009. Nevertheless, last year the equity grew in 9%, which motivated
the ratio debt/capital to diminish (from 20.1% to 18.5% among 2008 and 2009),
indicating a strengthening in its solvency and a minor risk in its equity holders.

8
Also, this demonstrates a good indicator of its solvency. In spite of the fact that this
ratio is over the median of its industry (19.4%), it is below Walt-Mart, which has a
top leverage, being 64.7% in the year 2009. However, both companies are below
their third major competitor leverage, Target Corp's, in 136.8%.

Likewise, Costco's financial leverage measured by the asset/equity ratio has

improved in last two years, reassuring its solvency, passing from 2.25x in 2007 to
2.17x in 2009. Nevertheless, the reduction of the asset/equity ratio for Wal-Mart
was minimal of 2.45x to 2.42x among 2008 and 2009. In both cases, tolerable
levels of leverage are demonstrated in Walt Mat and Costco as demonstrated in
the graph below (Graph N° 6).

GRAPH N°6: TOTAL DEBT/TOTAL EQUITY

COSTCO WAL-MART

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own
%
Nevertheless, the coverage ratios for Costco show a diminishing behaviour from
the year 2007, observing a significant and permanent decrease in the

30
EBITDA/Total Interest Expense and EBIT/Interest Expense ratios. This behaviour
indicates that the company has lost solvency throughout time, which reflects
insecurity in its obligations. This is explained by the performance of the interest
expenses, diminishing in 63% in 2006, increasing in 400% in 2007, and achieving

25
a growing tendency of up to US$ 108 millions in 2009 (Costco Annual Report 2009
p.34).

The increasing effect of this variable in 2007 is due to the issuance of the 2007
Senior Notes in February 2007. Meanwhile the increment in the interest expenses
in 2009 is owed to a decrease in capitalized interest related to reduced new
warehouse and remodel construction activity year-over-year (Costco Annual
Report 2009 p.32). Compared with the industry it can be observed that it is below
the medians of 27.7 and 4.7 for the EBITDA/Total Interest Expense and
EBIT/Interest Expense ratios, respectively. Nevertheless, Costco is over Wal-Mart
which confirms its solvency due to the fact that other companies from the industry
have a minor capacity. Wal-Mart, in spite of its last year recovery in its solvency
indicators EBITDA/Total Interest Expense (13.7x) and EBIT/Interest Expense
(10.6x), represents a diminishing trend due to the fact that the interest expenses
have sustainably grown up to US$ 2,184 millions in 2009 year (Wal-Mart Annual
Report 2009 p.49). This situation affirms the little solvency that Wal-Mart has,
increasing shareholders risk. The relationship of the interest coverage is shown in
the graph below (Graph N° 7).

GRAPH N°7: INTEREST COVERAGE

COSTCO WAL-MART

10
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

3 .5
2.1.5. MARKET VALUATION
A market valuation will confirm which company has a greater profitability, liquidity,
asset utilization and leverage over the others of the same industry.

GRAPH N°8: PE RATIO AND BASIC EARNINGS PER SHARE

COSTCO WALT-MART

3
2 .5
Tim es
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

24 11
From the graph above (Graph N° 8), it can be observe that Wal-Mart shows a
diminishing trend in its P/E ratio, passing from 21.7x to 13.8x, therefore the
investors are ready to pay less for every dollar of reported dividends. Wal-Mart P/E
ratio, in spite of the step back in 2009, is still greater than Costco, reaching 20.4x,
after achieving its maximum peak in the year 2007 (23.4x).

The earnings attributable to each share of common stock (Basic EPS) of Costco
have turn around its growth in 2009 after sustaining it during its last five previous
years and though it is over the median of the industry, it is below Wal-Mart in US$
3.4 millions. The same behaviour is presented by Diluted EPS of Costco, coming to
US$ 2.46 millions in 2009 after reaching its maximum in 2007 with US$ 2.89
millions, whereas for Wal-Mart it is US$ 3.3 millions, being this the maximum in the
last five years. This can be appreciated in the graph above (Graph N° 8).
In both companies it is observed that the future profitability exceeds the rate of
return needed by the market. This is explains because both company’s present a
price to book ratio superior to 1 throughout these five years. Specifically, both
overcome the median of the industry of 2.51x, being in 2009, 2.52x and 2.99x for
Costco and Wal-Mart, respectively. This ratio is greater for Wal-Mart due to the fact
that it supports a higher rate of performance on its patrimony. The price of book
value (P/B) can be appreciated in the graph below (Graph N° 9).

GRAPH N°9: PRICE TO BOOK VALUE (P/B)

4.50x

4.00x

3.50x

3.00x

2.50x

2.00x
dic-05 dic-06 dic-07 dic-08 dic-09

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. Costco

12
 Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

2.2. CRUCIAL SOURCES OF IMPROVEMENT OR DETERIORATION

COSTCO
Liquidity ratios are accepted by the industry (inventory turnover and receivables
turnover) allowing the company to possess the necessary liquidity to meet
requirements of some current obligations. Specifically, Costco enjoys an inventory
rotation over the average of its industry. This situation agrees with the fluency that
a company must have since the products that Costco offers are for basic needs
(food).

Costco is a company with solvency and could assume long term debts, diminishing
its investor risk allowing the company to obtain a better competitive advantage over
others competitors since it has a superior inventory rotation over the average of its
industry. All this gives Costco the possibility of a continuing growth in the market.

Nevertheless, profitability ratios, ROE and ROA, are in an unfavourable situation

for the company, which indicates that the management of the company has not
been efficient. This is why it is recommended to carry out a detailed analysis of the
costs and expenses of the company in order for these to diminish and improve this
way the profitability of the company in order to obtain better benefits.

WAL-MART
The indexes of profitability for Wal-Mart are in a favourable position of that from the
industry, which indicates that the management of the company has been efficient;
nevertheless, the company is left behind in its position of solvency and liquidity.
Long run debts include a great percentage in the company’s administration in
relation to its equity and it will increase the investor’s risk. The company must try in
a possible way to restrict its obligations in long run due to the fact that Wal-Mart is
depending economically of third parties.

13
This negative situation in long term debts is due to unfavourable conditions of
liquidity supporting a negative working capital. Nevertheless, the turnover and
receivable turnover ratios compensate this situation, helping the company to meet
its current debts.

2.3. DUPONT ANALYSIS: THE DECOMPOSITION OF ROE

COSTCO
In 2009 ROE reached its lowest point of the last five years. The explanation of this
situation is due to the fall of its 5 components. The table above shows the
decomposition of ROE into its five elements (Table N° 1).
TABLE N°1: DU PONT ANALYSIS

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own

The reason for the fall in the tax burden is that the net non-operational gains
diminished considerably in 78.8%, passing from US$ 132 527 millions to US$ 28
millions, in spite of the fact that the income tax expenses also fell down, but only in
12%. In previous years of 2009, net non-operational gains had made EBT to
become greater than EBIT, reason for which the interest burden was greater than

14
100% until 2009, year where EBT is less than EBIT. This is the reason why the
interest burden diminishes to 95.5%. In the same way, EBIT Margin also falls down
due to the fact that sales fell in a minor proportion than EBIT, being these 1.4%
and 8.8%, respectively. The graph below shows the relationship of these
components (Graph N° 10).

GRAPH N°10: REVENUE, EBIT, EBT AND NET INCOME

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own

The efficiency of the company, measured across the asset turnover, also
diminished in 2009, for what it is possible to affirm that Costco generates less

15
revenue for every dollar invested in its assets. This is due principally to the
reduction of sales in 1.46% opposite to an increase in the total asset of 6.2%.
Finally, the solvency measured across the leverage ratio, slowly increases during
the last year of the present analysis, due to an increase registered in the equity.

WAL - MART
For Wal-Mart, its ROE has increased in the last two years. The increase of last
year can explain by the raise in the asset turnover and the tax burden. The table
above shows the decomposition of ROE into its five elements (Table N° 2).

TABLE N°2: DUPONT ANALYSIS

Ratio
Elaboration: Own

ROE
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

The fact that the tax burden has increased it implies that the company can support
a higher percentage of its pre-tax profits. Even though the income tax rate was

Tax Burde
maintain in 34.3% for the last two years, the Earnings of Discontinued Operations

16
that have been negative until 2008, US$ (132) millions, went to be positive in 2009,
US$ 146 millions. This way the company income increase, in spite of the fact that
the income rate tax was greater in 2009 that in 2007, of 33.5%, and equally the
same for 2008.

The slight increase of the asset turnover in the last year indicates a greater
efficiency in the uses of its assets, obtaining a small increase in the quantity of
income that Wal-Mart generates for every dollar of assets. Meanwhile the fall in the
interest burden is due to the impact of the increase of the interest expenses in
3.9% on the company ROE. Also, the fall of the EBIT Margin is due to a constant
increase in the general selling and administrative expenses, been in 2009 US$ 76
299 millions. Finally, leverage is reduced by implying that the company is gaining
solvency, for that reason the company uses less debt to finance assets. The graph
above shows the relationship between revenue, EBIT, EBT and Net Income
(Graph N° 12).
GRAPH N°12: REVENUE, EBIT, EBT AND NET INCOME

Others
17
25000
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

2.4. S&P BOND RATING CRITERIA

COSTCO

Utilizing the most recent available criteria of Standard and Poor’s (Corporate
Rating Criteria 2006 p. 43 -Table 1) it has been concluded that the rating for
Costco is A. This rating is obtained because of the low performance of ROC, in
spite of the fact that the rating grade of the interest coverage ratios are
concentrated with AA. Even though the company has an average capacity to
satisfy payments for acquired obligations it is not generating acceptable
profitability. The table below shows the ratios rating grade for Costco in the last five
years (Table N° 3).

TABLE N°3: RATIOS RATING GRADE

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own

WAL - MART
Using the same criteria as the previous case it is concluded that Wal – Mart rating
of Wal-Mart is A-. The reason of this rating is due to the low performance of the

18
ROC and the concentration of the rating grade A in the interest coverage ratios.
This average rating grade indicates that the company is not very solvent nor it
obtained an acceptable profitability. The table below shows the ratios rating grade
for Wal - Mart in the last five years (Table 4).

TABLE N°4: RATIOS RATING GRADE

Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

Elaboration: Own
Blo
EBIT/ T
3. WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL
Cost of capital is the rate of return that the suppliers of capital (bondholders and
owners) require as compensation for their contribution of capital. The most
common way to estimate this required rate of return is to calculate the marginal
cost of each of the various sources of capital and then calculate a weighted

EBITDA
average of these costs, that is, weighted average cost of capital.

In both companies, Costco and Wal-Mart, and according to Bloomberg, the

marginal cost of the equity has been obtained by using CAPM method, using a risk

T12
free rate of 3.65% for Costco and 3.64% for Wal-Mart, being the beta of the first
one 0.85 and of the second one 0.66. With this result Costco's operations presents
a greater sensibility to the fluctuations of the market. The tables below show the
Equity, Debt and Preferred Equity of Costco and Wal-Mart (Table N° 5 and N° 6).

TABLE N°5: COSTCO WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL

19
T12
 Equity
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

TABLE N°5: WALT-MART WEIGHTED AVERAGE COST OF CAPITAL

Debt
Elaboration: Own
Prefit
EquEqyuity
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010

In both companies there is no preferred equity (or preferred stock), as well as in

Debt
both cases the shareholders demand a greater rate of return. What is observed is
that third parties demand a major rate from Costco, that is to say and according to
the perception of third parties, this company has a greater cost of opportunity than

PrefEquity
Walt-Mart, 2.93% of Costco against 2.48% of Wal-Mart. Also, shareholders of Wal-
Mart demand a minor rate of return (7.90%) than the shareholders of Costco
(9.15%). From the analysis of both companies, Costco possesses a greater WACC
than Wal-Mart, 8.67 % versus 6.82 %, respectively.

This conclusion might sound contradictory with the analysis of ratios, but it is in this
type of analysis that a person can commit mistakes when the risk of a company is
inference and where a limitation of the cost of opportunities comes out. These are
two big companies that commercialize products and belong to different sectors,
where it is not easy to develop comparisons and evaluations. Additionally, the
analysis realized in the document S&P Bond Rating Criteria is only centred on the
coverage of interests (Standard and Poor’s Corporate Rating Criteria, 2008).

20
In conclusion, not only Wal-Mart possesses a minor WACC, but additionally with
the resources obtained from its shareholders and third parties Wal-Mart obtains a
greater profitability of 12.94% against 8.80% of Costco.

4. WORKING CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

In this section an exhaustive analysis of the ratios of liquidity has been made.
Likewise, it will be considered the results obtained in the “The 2009 Working
Capital Scorecard” given by CFO, since both companies are in the Food and
Staples Retailing Industry. As it can be observed, the results from the Scorecard
are slightly different from the ratios showed in Bloomberg, in that case the
comparison with the industry’s median will be realized under CFO's parameters
(CFO Magazine, 2009).

CASH CONVERSION CYCLE, this indicator is a measure of the cash cycle calculated as
the sum of a firm’s inventory days and account receivable days, less its account
payable days. The cash cycle, is the length of time between when a firms pay cash
to purchase its initial inventory and when it receives cash from the sale of the
output produced from that inventory (Berk et al, 2010).

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Costco 2.56 2.91 3.09 2.63 3.54
Walt-Mart 14.93 14.13 11.39 9.70 9.59

Whereas Costco is located in a position higher than Wal-Mart because the

industry’s median was 11.7 days for the year 2008, Wal-Mart is place in a position
below, in spite of the fact that Wal-Mart has reduced its measure from 14.93 in the
year 2005 to 9.70 in the year 2008.

INVENTORY CONVERSION PERIOD

It is observed that the number of days that the inventory delays in rotating in
Costco is less than in Wal-Mart throughout the last five years, in spite of the fact
that Wal-Mart is reducing this indicator since 2006. Under CFO's Scorecard, in the

21
year 2008, Costco has remained below the median of the industry, whereas Walt
Mart would be located over the median (26.9 days).

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Costco 30.07 30.19 30.46 28.43 30.49
Walt-Mart 46.94 47.58 45.51 43.88 41.64

RECEIVABLES COLLECTION PERIOD

Receivables collection period or days sales outstanding (terminology used by
CFO) is always greater in Costco than in Walt-Mart, both with an increasing trend
and according to CFO, would be located above the industry range (median for the
year 2008 was 4.9 days) indicating a good performance in both companies.

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Costco 2.97 3.38 3.75 3.79 4.03
Walt-Mart 1.90 2.56 2.88 3.13 3.41

PAYABLES DEFERRAL PERIOD:

Payables deferral period for Costco is always less than Walt-Mart, but both
companies would be, according to CFO, above the median of the industry which is
20.0 days for the year 2008, indicating a good performance.

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Costco 30.48 30.65 31.12 29.59 30.99
Walt-Mart 33.92 36.00 37.00 37.30 35.46

From the mention above, the main difference is in the inventory conversion period,
indicating that Costco has a better management of its inventories. This implies that
Costco receives cash quickly while paying their supplier close to its due dates. On
the other hand, Wal-Mart has a better payables deferral period. Therefore, Costco
is efficient in its internal operations with the availability of net cash flow meaning
that this company has liquidity to manage its activities. Whereas Wal-Mart might
reduce its period of inventory rotation by selling its products in a faster way.

22
5. DIVIDEND POLICIES
Wal-Mart demonstrates to grant a greater quantity of dividends per share
throughout the last five years, enlarging the distance between both companies.
From having a difference of only 0.09 points in the year 2005, it passed to be a
difference of 0.27 in the year 2009. This explains why Wal-Mart presents a deficit
of working capital (Wal-Mart Annual Report 2009 p.22). Wal-Mart paid dividends of
US$ 0.95 per share in 2009 that is a 8.0% over 2008. For the same company, the
expected capital needs depends on the payment of dividends, in that way if
resources were remaining short to pay dividends, the company could anticipate it
by funding commercial paper and long-term debt. Walt Mart during 2009 issued
US$ 6.6 billions of long-term debt. The net proceeds from the issuance of such
long-term debt were used to repay outstanding commercial paper indebtedness
and for other general corporate purposes (Wal-Mart Annual Report 2009 p.24). It is
inferred throughout this behavior that Wal-Mart policy is “Steadily Increasing
Dividends Policy” and that it has a stable growth and profit which increases every
year. Since this is a mature company, it should keep on paying dividends.
Meanwhile, Costco determines the size of its dividends on the basis of its
profitability and expected needs. In spite of the fact that its net sales and net
income diminished the dividends per share in the last year it still demonstrates to
be a mature company and that it will continue to pay dividends to its shareholders.
The percentage of earnings that Costco pays as dividends to the shareholders is
measured by the payout ratio that has grown considerably in the last year,
reaching to be 27.3%, which is closely to the 28% of Walt Mart for the same year.

Additionally, both companies present an increasing behaviour in this ratio which

indicates a decrease in its retention rate (1-dividend payout ratio). Therefore, both
companies are considered to be mature and have a stable behaviour. From the
table and graph below it can be appreciated both industries dividends analysis for
the last five years (Table 6 and Graph 13).

TABLE N°6: COSTCO AND WALT-MART DIVIDENDS

23
 Costco
Dividends (US$
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010 and Source Capital IQ 2010
Elaboration: Own

Dividends per S
GRAPH N°13: COSTCO AND WAL-MART DIVIDENDS PER SHARE

Payout Ratio %
Walt-Mart
1
Source: Bloomberg Financial LP 2010
Elaboration: Own

Dividends (US$
STOCKS REPURCHASE PROGRAM

24
Costco repurchase program is conducted under authorizations made by its Board
of Directors. In October 2004 an inception of the program occurred, through 2009
fiscal year, the Board has authorized the total of US$ 6 800 for stock repurchases,
including US$ 300 and US$ 1 000 authorized in September 2007 and November
2007, which expired in August 2010 and November 2010, respectively, and US$ 1
000 authorized in July 2008, which expires in July 2011 (Costco Annual Report
2009 p. 41).

Given this inception of the program, Costco repurchased US$ 88.7 millions of
common stock shares for a total cash investment of US$ 4 798 (US$ 54.08 per
share) through 2009 fiscal year end. The maximum remaining dollar value of
shares that may be purchased under the stock repurchase program is US$ 2 002.
There was no common stock repurchase program activity for the fourth quarter of
2009 (Costco Annual Report 2009 p.24).

On the other hand, Wal-Mart has repurchased common stock shares of under US$
10.0 billions share repurchase program authorized by its Board of Directors in
September 2004. On May 31 2007, its Board of Directors replaced the US$ 10.0
billions share repurchase program, which had US$ 3.3 billions of remaining
authorization for share repurchases with a new US$ 15.0 billions share repurchase
program announced on June 1 2007. Under this new program, there is no
expiration date or other restriction limiting the period over which Wal-Mart can
make its share repurchases, which will expire only when Wal-Mart repurchased
US$ 15.0 billions of its shares under the program (Wal-Mart Annual Report 2009
p.24). Wal-Mart, fixes its repurchase of shares on the basis of current cash needs,
its capacity for leverage, its cost of borrowings and the market price of its common
stock.

According to the previous analysis, a recommendable policy in view of their stable

profits might be “Low Stable Dividend and Premium Payout Policy” in which stable
dividends plough paid first and the premium is paid when the company's profit is

25
higher than expected. This policy would you have to positive impact on the owners
giving priority to current and future consumption (the capital gain) (Alekneviciene V.
et. al, 2006).

CONCLUSION

Though, it is true that by analyzing Costco’s ratios it can be demonstrated that this
company has a more efficiency administration, a better liquidity, solvency and a
superior administration of working capital, Wal-Mart utilizes in a better way the
resources given by its shareholders measured by EVA. Additionally, Wal-Mart is a
company that has resisted in a better way the economic crisis in such a way that it
increased its net income in the last year obtaining a better profitability indicators
measured by ROA and ROE. Therefore, in spite of the best performance made by
Costco, it is considered that Wal-Mart is a more profitable company and that it
manages its resources better.

REFERENCES

• Alekneviciene V. et. Al (2006) The Development of Company Dividend

Policy in Respect of Profit Distribution Priorities. Engineering Economics
[Internet], 2006, Vol. 50 Issue 5, p17-25. Available from:
<http://ezproxy.mala.bc.ca:2048/login?
url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&AuthType=ip,cookie&db=bth&AN=23654107&site=ehost-live >
[Accessed 5 February 2010].

• Berk, J., DeMarzo, P., and Stangeland, D. (2010) Corporate Finance,

Toronto, Pearson Education.

• CFO Magazine (2009) The 2009 Working Capital Scorecard. Available from:
<http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13720061> [Accessed 16 February 2010].

26
• Costco (2010) Investor Relations [Internet], Costco Wholesale Corporation
Annual Report 2009. Available from:
<http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=83830&p=irol-
irhome&cm_re=1_en-_-Bottom_Nav-_-Bottom_investor&lang=en-US>
[Accessed 20 January 2010].

• Mergent Online (2010) Company Details: Costco Wholesale Corp. [Internet],

Available from: <http://ezproxy.mala.bc.ca:2102/compdetail.asp?
company=16720&Type=financials&DataType=Ratios&DataPeriod=Annuals
&DataArea=BS&DataRange=7&Footnotes=off&Currency=AsRep&Scale=10
00> [Accessed 20 January 2010].

• Mergent Online (2010) Company Details: Wal-Mart [Internet], Available

from:<http://ezproxy.mala.bc.ca:2102/compdetail.asp?
company=91348&type=financials&DataType=Ratios&DataRange=7&Submit
=Refresh > [Accessed 20 January 2010].

• Standard and Poor’s Corporate Grading Criteria (2006) [Internet], Available

from:
<http://www2.standardandpoor.com/spf//pdf/fixedincome/corporateratings_0
52007.pdf> [Accessed 2 February 2010].

• Standard and Poor’s Corporate Grading Criteria (2008) [Internet], Available

from: < http://www.nafoa.org/pdf/CorprateCriteriaBook-2008.pdf> [Accessed
10 February 2010].

• Yahoo Finance (2009) Costco Wholesale Corp. [Internet], Available from:

<http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=cost> [Accessed 22 February 2009].

• Yahoo Finance (2009) Wal-Mart[Internet], Available from:

<http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=wm> [Accessed 22 February 2009].

27
ANNEX I: FINANCIAL RATIOS OF THE TOP 10 RETAIL STORES AND WAREHOUSING OF THE
INDUSTRY BY REVENUE BASED ON YAHOO FINANCE RANKING AND SOURCE CAPITAL IQ
Return on Assets
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Dollar Tree Inc NA 11.2% 9.9% 10.6% 11.3% 12.0%
Nasdaq
Big Lots Inc NYSE 4.4% 2.4% 1.1% 6.9% 9.3% 11.1%

Family Dollar Stores 11.8% 9.1% 9.2% 9.4% 8.6% 10.4%

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 9.4% 9.6% 9.1% 8.8% 8.8% 8.9%

BJ s Wholesale Club 6.5% 6.3% 6.9% 4.8% 6.1% 6.8%

Target Corp NYSE 6.6% 7.1% 8.0% 8.8% 8.0% 6.2%
TG
Costo 6.2% 5.9% 6.0% 5.2% 6.0% 5.3%
Dollar General Corp 13.1% 12.8% 14.2% 6.9% 4.2% 4.4%
NYSE
Fred s Inc Nasdaq 8.1% 5.6% 5.2% 5.3% 3.6% 3.7% Median
99 Cents Only Stores NA NA NA 0.6% (0.6%) 2.5%
NYSE 6.5%

Return on Capital
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Big Lots Inc NYSE 6.0% 3.4% 1.6% 10.4% 15.3% 19.4%

Family Dollar Stores 19.2% 15.3% 15.7% 16.9% 15.6% 17.9%

Dollar Tree Inc NA 13.9% 12.3% 13.5% 15.4% 16.5%
Nasdaq
BJ s Wholesale Club 13.0% 12.7% 13.6% 9.3% 12.3% 14.0%

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 13.6% 14.1% 13.4% 13.1% 12.9% 13.1%

Costo 10.2% 10.0% 10.5% 9.3% 10.8% 9.4%
Target Corp NYSE 9.2% 10.1% 11.6% 12.7% 11.3% 8.5%
TG
Dollar General Corp 18.7% 18.4% 20.9% 10.3% 5.4% 5.5%
NYSE

28
 Fred s Inc Nasdaq 11.2% 7.8% 7.3% 7.4% 5.0% 5.1% Median
99 Cents Only Stores NA NA NA 0.8% (0.7%) 3.1%
NYSE 11.2%

Return on Equity
% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Big Lots Inc NYSE 8.0% 2.9% 1.5% 10.2% 17.1% 21.9%

Family Dollar Stores 19.6% 15.7% 14.8% 20.4% 19.2% 21.6%

Dollar Tree Inc NA 16.6% 14.9% 16.4% 18.7% 20.5%
Nasdaq
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 21.3% 22.5% 22.2% 21.2% 20.4% 20.4%
Target Corp NYSE 15.7% 15.6% 17.7% 18.7% 18.4% 15.3%
TG
BJ s Wholesale Club 13.2% 13.4% 13.9% 9.1% 12.1% 13.8%

Costo 12.4% 12.9% 12.2% 12.2% 14.4% 11.3%

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 12.2% 9.3% 8.0% 7.5% 2.9% 4.4%

Dollar General Corp 21.0% 21.3% 20.6% 8.0% (0.6%) 3.9%
NYSE Median
99 Cents Only Stores NA NA NA 1.9% 0.6% 1.6%
NYSE 14.5%

Gross Margin % 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Big Lots Inc NYSE 41.9% 40.7% 39.1% 39.9% 39.5% 40.0%
99 Cents Only Stores 40.0% 38.4% 37.5% 39.2% 38.4% 39.3%
NYSE
Family Dollar Stores 33.8% 32.9% 33.1% 34.0% 33.6% 34.8%

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 36.4% 35.6% 34.5% 34.2% 34.4% 34.3%
Dollar General Corp 29.4% 29.5% 30.0% 26.5% 27.8% 29.3%
NYSE
Target Corp NYSE TG 30.7% 31.3% 31.2% 30.1% 30.0% 28.6%

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 28.2% 28.1% 28.2% 28.1% 28.1% 28.0%

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 23.2% 23.7% 23.9% 24.2% 24.3% 24.5%

Costo 12.5% 12.5% 12.3% 12.2% 12.4% 12.7% Median

BJ s Wholesale Club 10.1% 10.3% 12.1% 12.1% 11.8% 11.7% 28.9%

EBIT Margin % 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 10.5% 9.4% 8.4% 7.8% 7.8% 7.9%

Target Corp NYSE TG 7.5% 7.7% 8.2% 8.5% 8.3% 6.8%

Family Dollar Stores 7.6% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.2% 6.2%

Dollar General Corp 7.5% 7.3% 7.7% 3.6% 4.1% 5.9%
NYSE
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 5.8% 6.1% 6.0% 5.9% 5.8% 5.7%

Big Lots Inc NYSE 3.1% 1.7% 0.7% 3.9% 5.1% 5.5%

Costo 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.4% 2.7% 2.5%

BJ s Wholesale Club 2.5% 2.5% 2.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.2%

99 Cents Only Stores 10.0% 2.6% 1.2% 0.6% (0.5%) 2.0%
NYSE Median
Fred s Inc Nasdaq 3.8% 2.7% 2.5% 2.4% 1.7% 1.8% 5.6%

Current Ratio 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

29
 Fred s Inc Nasdaq 2.5x 2.8x 2.6x 2.9x 3.2x 2.9x

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 2.7x 3.3x 3.2x 2.5x 1.9x 2.6x
99 Cents Only Stores NA NA 2.8x 3.0x 2.6x 2.6x
NYSE
Dollar General Corp 2.2x 2.1x 2.1x 2.1x 1.8x 1.7x
NYSE
Big Lots Inc NYSE 2.7x 2.5x 2.3x 2.4x 1.8x 1.7x

Target Corp NYSE TG 1.6x 1.7x 1.5x 1.3x 1.6x 1.7x

Family Dollar Stores 1.6x 1.5x 1.4x 1.4x 1.3x 1.5x

BJ s Wholesale Club 1.2x 1.3x 1.3x 1.2x 1.2x 1.2x

Costo 1.2x 1.2x 1.1x 1.1x 1.1x 1.1x Median

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 0.91x 0.90x 0.90x 0.90x 0.82x 0.88x 1.7

Quick Ratio 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

99 Cents Only Stores NA NA 1.2x 1.2x 0.9x 1.0x
NYSE
Target Corp NYSE TG 0.7x 0.9x 0.8x 0.7x 0.9x 0.9x
Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 0.6x 1.1x 1.1x 0.8x 0.2x 0.9x
Fred s Inc Nasdaq 0.3x 0.3x 0.3x 0.4x 0.5x 0.6x
Costo 0.6x 0.6x 0.4x 0.5x 0.5x 0.5x
Family Dollar Stores 0.3x 0.2x 0.2x 0.3x 0.2x 0.4x
Dollar General Corp 0.6x 0.3x 0.3x 0.3x 0.2x 0.4x
NYSE
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 0.17x 0.17x 0.18x 0.20x 0.16x 0.20x
BJ s Wholesale Club 0.2x 0.3x 0.3x 0.2x 0.2x 0.2x Median
Big Lots Inc NYSE 0.5x 0.0x 0.0x 0.6x 0.1x 0.1x 0.5

Accounts Receivable
Turnover 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Costo 108.0x 122.5x 109.9x 208.7x NM NM

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 181.6x 191.5x 145.5x 128.7x 116.8x 107.5x

99 Cents Only Stores NYSE NA NA NA NM NM NM

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 67.7x 73.0x 79.3x 71.1x 59.3x 60.1x

Big Lots Inc NYSE 252.7x NA NA NA NA NA

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq NA NA NA NA NA NA

Family Dollar Stores NA NA NA NA NA NA

BJ s Wholesale Club 94.2x 88.7x 83.9x 83.2x 82.8x 83.3x

Dollar General Corp NYSE NA NA NA NA NA NA Median

Target Corp NYSE TG 8.0x 9.4x 9.6x 9.8x 8.6x 7.8x 83.3

Inventory Turnover 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

30
 Costo 12.1x 12.1x 12.3x 12.0x 12.8x 11.9x

BJ s Wholesale Club 9.0x 9.0x 8.8x 9.0x 9.2x 10.2x

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 7.8 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.3 8.8

Target Corp NYSE TG 6.1x 6.3x 6.3x 6.8x 6.7x 6.6x

Dollar General Corp NYSE 4.3x 4.3x 4.2x 4.6x 5.0x 5.5x

99 Cents Only Stores NYSE NA NA NA 4.6x 5.1x 5.5x

Family Dollar Stores 3.8x 3.8x 4.0x 4.3x 4.4x 4.8x

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq NA 3.5x 3.7x 4.4x 4.5x 4.6x

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 4.3x 4.0x 3.9x 4.1x 4.0x 4.1x Median
Big Lots Inc NYSE 2.9x 2.9x 3.1x 3.6x 3.7x 3.8x 5.5

Total Asset Turnover 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

BJ s Wholesale Club 4.2x 4.1x 4.1x 4.3x 4.5x 4.9x

Costo 3.4x 3.3x 3.5x 3.5x 3.6x 3.3x

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 3.5x 3.3x 3.3x 3.5x 3.3x 3.3x

Big Lots Inc NYSE 2.3x 2.3x 2.6x 2.8x 2.9x 3.2x

Family Dollar Stores 2.5x 2.5x 2.6x 2.7x 2.6x 2.7x

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 2.6x 2.5x 2.4x 2.4x 2.4x 2.5x

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq NA 1.9x 1.9x 2.2x 2.3x 2.4x

99 Cents Only Stores NYSE NA NA NA 1.7x 1.9x 2.0x

Target Corp NYSE TG 1.4x 1.5x 1.6x 1.6x 1.5x 1.5x Median
Dollar General Corp NYSE 2.8x 2.8x 2.9x 3.0x 1.6x 1.2x 2.6

Total Debt/Equity 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Dollar General Corp NYSE 18.1% 16.1% 16.2% 15.5% 161.4% 148.3%

Target Corp NYSE TG 99.0% 73.2% 69.5% 64.2% 111.6% 136.8%

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 60.7% 62.9% 72.8% 63.4% 69.1% 64.7%

Costo 17.3% 8.7% 6.2% 25.8% 25.5% 23.0%

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 18.3% 24.2% 22.9% 23.0% 27.2% 21.4%

Family Dollar Stores NA NA 20.7% 21.3% 19.9% 17.4%

Big Lots Inc NYSE 18.4% 14.8% 0.5% NA 25.6% 8.8%

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 2.8% 7.9% 2.3% 0.8% 9.7% 1.3%

BJ s Wholesale Club 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% Median

99 Cents Only Stores NA NA 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% 0.1%
NYSE 19.4%

EBIT / Interest Exp. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

BJ s Wholesale Club NM 219.7x NM 233.7x NM NM

Big Lots Inc NYSE 7.4x 2.8x 4.7x NM 94.1x 48.4x

31
Fred s Inc Nasdaq 110.8x 49.1x 40.0x 53.0x 22.9x 45.4x

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 39.2x 32.0x 18.3x 18.9x 19.3x 39.5x

Family Dollar Stores NA NA 27.7x 22.3x 25.0x 35.3x

99 Cents Only Stores NM 109.1x 102.1x 5.6x NM 27.7x
NYSE
Costo 38.1x 43.5x 130.5x 24.2x 18.9x 16.7x

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 15.1x 14.6x 13.2x 11.3x 10.5x 10.6x

Target Corp NYSE TG 5.8x 7.2x 8.8x 8.5x 7.9x 4.9x Median
Dollar General Corp NYSE 14.6x 19.4x 25.2x 9.5x 1.5x 1.6x 27.7

EBITDA / Interest Exp. 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

BJ s Wholesale Club NM NM NM NM NM NM

Fred s Inc Nasdaq 171.1x 84.2x 67.7x 89.2x 43.9x 82.3x

99 Cents Only Stores NM 231.7x NM 33.2x 28.8x 64.3x
NYSE
Big Lots Inc NYSE 12.8x 6.7x 23.0x NM 127.2x 62.4x

Dollar Tree Inc Nasdaq 53.5x 46.0x 27.4x 28.5x 28.5x 56.8x

Family Dollar Stores NA NA 37.9x 30.6x 35.3x 47.7x

Costo 50.1x 57.5x 171.5x 33.0x 25.3x 23.4x

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 19.0x 18.1x 16.4x 14.3x 13.5x 13.7x

Target Corp NYSE TG 7.8x 9.7x 11.7x 11.0x 10.4x 7.0x Median
Dollar General Corp 18.9x 25.1x 32.3x 15.2x 2.4x 2.2x
NYSE 47.7

P/BV dic-04 dic-05 dic-06 dic-07 dic-08 dic-09

Dollar Tree Inc
Nasdaq 2.97x 2.26x 2.78x 2.93x 3.12x 3.28x
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 5.18x 4.04x 3.45x 2.98x 3.24x 2.99x
Family Dollar Stores 3.57x 2.64x 3.58x 2.83x 2.84x 2.78x
Dollar General Corp
NYSE 2.69x
Costco 2.87x 2.61x 2.65x 3.39x 2.52x 2.52x
Big Lots Inc NYSE 1.30x 1.27x 2.37x 2.55x 2.22x 2.50x
Target Corp NYSE TG 3.64x 3.55x 3.42x 3.08x 2.00x 2.46x
BJ s Wholesale Club 2.23x 1.95x 1.94x 2.18x 2.08x 1.90x
99 Cents Only Stores
NYSE 2.22x 1.37x 1.67x 1.25x 1.45x 1.60x Median
Fred s Inc Nasdaq 2.30x 1.84x 1.39x 1.08x 1.12x 1.10x 2.51x

32
33