Mind Association

Statements about Universals

Author(s): Frank Jackson
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 343 (Jul., 1977), pp. 427-429
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253615 .
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 StatementsAboutUniversals
FRANK JACKSON

A featureofmanyversionsof Nominalismis the claimthatall statements

putativelyabout universalscan be translatedas statementsabout par-
ticulars.This is certainlypossible in some cases, forinstance,'Wisdom
was a characteristicof Plato' is equivalent to 'Plato was wise'. I will
argue that it is not, however,always possible; in particular,that it is
*notpossible for 'Red is a colour' and 'Red resemblespink more than
blue'.
The usual nominalistsuggestionis that 'Red is a colour' is equivalent
to somethinglike 'Everythingred is coloured'. There is a standard
objectionto this translation(see, e.g., A. N. Prior,'Existence',Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy,New York, I967, vol. 3, p. 146). Consider the
scattered location, L, of all the red things. EverythingL-located is
coloured,but evidentlyL-location is not a colour. Likewise,everything
red might have been triangularand vice-versa, so that everything
triangularwas coloured; but triangularity still would not have been a
colour.
The nominalistparticularistcan, however, side-step this objection
by offering'Necessarily,everything red is coloured' as his translationof
'Red is a colour'. For it is, at best,onlycontingently truethateverything
L-located or triangularis coloured.This replygivesa hostageto fortune,
namely,the ontic commitmentsof such assertionsof necessity.But it is
arguablethatthese do not include a commitmentto universals.
It is, thus,importantthatthe following,apparentlydecisive,objection
is availableto the realistabout universals.Everythingred is both shaped
and extended,but red is neithera shape nor an extension.And, further,
it is necessarilytrue that everythingred is shaped and extended.This
is not to deny that 'Red is a colour' entails that necessarilyeverything
red is coloured.But the formersays more than the latter.If red's being
a colourwere nothingmore than a matterof everyred thingnecessarily
being coloured, then red's being a shape and an extensionwould be
nothingmore than the fact that necessarilyeveryred thing is shaped
and extended.And red is not a shape and not an extension.It seems that
'Red is a colour' says, as realists maintain,somethingabout red not
reducibleto somethingabout red things.
The nominalistmighthave recourseat this point to the distinction
betweenanalytictruthin the Fregean sense of reducibilityto a logical
truthby synonomysubstitutionand necessityin the wide sense. He
might,that is, suggest'It is analyticthat everythingred is coloured' as
his translation.However, there are difficulties in the way of reducing
'Everythingred is coloured' to a logical truth.For instance,one cannot
replace 'is coloured' by 'is yellow or red or. . .'. Because one cannot
427

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428 FRANK JACKSON:

complete the disjunction,there being no finitelist of all the possible

colours; and further,the nominalistcannotexplicatethe dots by saying
'and so on for all the colours' forthis onticallycommitshim to all the
colours (as well as being circular).
In general,appeal to relations(of synonomyor whatever)between
linguisticentitiesis beside the point when seeking an analysis of red
being a colour.Red did not become a colourthe day we firstcommented
on thefactin our languages,and its beinga colouris in no way dependent
on the existenceof Englishor Frenchor whateverlanguagethe linguistic
entitiesmay belong to.
Similar difficultiesface nominalist attemptsto give a particularist
translationof:
(i) Red resemblespink more than blue.
Following ArthurPap ('Nominalism, Empiricismand Universals: I,
Philosophical Quarterly, 9 (I959)), (i) is notequivalent
to 'Anything red
resemblesanythingpink more than anythingblue'. For some red things
resemblesome blue thingsmorethansome pinkthingsbecause offactors
other than colour. For example, a red ball resemblesa blue ball more
than a pink elephant.The nominalistmustofferinstead:
(2) Anythingred colour-resembles anythingpink more than any-
thingblue.
The standard realistobjection to (2) (again fromPap, ibid.) is that
'x colour-resemblesy' is analysableas 'x resemblesy in colour', where
the latteris obtained from'x resemblesy in z' by substitutionfor 'z'.
Hence (2) is onticallycommittedto universals,albeit in disguise,for it
containsa three-placerelationwitha place fordesignationsof universals.
Notoriously,the trouble with this objection is that it is hard to prove
the realist'sanalysisof colour-resemblance withoutbeggingthe question
of the existenceof universals.There is, however,a furtherobjectionto
(2) which avoids this difficulty.
Consider the possible world in which 'red' and 'triangular'are co-
extensive,'pink' and 'sweet' are co-extensive,and 'blue' and 'square'
are co-extensive.In this world, anythingtriangularcolour-resembles
anythingsweet more than anythingsquare. But no-one will want to say
thatin thisworldtriangularity resemblessweetnessmorethansquareness.
Hence, arguingalong the same lines as before,there is more to red's
resemblingpink more than blue than the fact that red things colour-
resemblepink thingsmorethan blue things.For triangularthingsmight
colour-resemblesweet thingsmore than square thingswithouttriangu-
larityresemblingsweetnessmorethan squareness.
It may be suggestedthat I am here misconstruingthe nominalist's
suggestion.It is not that 'AnythingF +-resembles anythingG more
than anythingH' is invariablyequivalentto 'F resemblesG more than
H', it is only equivalentto the latterwhen F, G, H are all +. Now I
have no doubt this is true,but it is not somethinga nominalistcan say.
It re-introducesuniversals,forit is theywhich are requiredall to be +.
The obvious response for the nominalistis to point out that (2) is
true in all worlds,and so to advocate 'Necessarily,anythingred colour-

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STATEMENTS ABOUT UNIVERSALS 429

resemblesanythingpinkmorethananythingblue' as his translationof(i).

(This also has the advantage of avoiding difficulties arising fromthe
possibilityof therebeingno red,pink,or blue thingsmaking(2) trivially
true in some worlds.)
This responsehas, however,a crucial shortcoming.It cannot handle
'The colour of ripe tomatoesresemblesthe colour associated with girl
babies more than the colour associatedwith boy babies'. For this state-
ment is true, while 'Necessarily, anythingwith the colour of ripe
tomatoescolour-resemblesanythingwith the colour associatedwith girl
babies morethan anythingwiththe colourassociatedwithboy babies' is
false. The statementgovernedby 'necessarily'is true, but only con-
tingentlyso-tomatoes and baby lore mighthave been such that it was
false.(Of course,thenominalistwillwantto write,forexample,'anything
same-colouredas ripe tomatoes' ratherthan 'anythingwith the colour
of ripe tomatoes',but thisis not germaneto the presentpoint.)
Finally,the line of argumentjust outlined can be modifiedto apply
to our firststatement,'Red is a colour'. Red is, let us suppose, the most
conspicuous propertyof ripe tomatoes; then the most conspicuous
propertyof ripe tomatoesis a colour. This cannot be nominalistically
translatedas 'Everythingwith the most conspicuous propertyof ripe
tomatoesis coloured'. (I leave aside the question of what furthertrans-
lation the nominalistmightattemptto eliminate'the most conspicuous
property.. .'). Because the most conspicuouspropertyof ripe tomatoes
might have been their smell while it remained true that all tomatoes
were coloured(thoughnot so conspicuously);then 'Everythingwiththe
most conspicuouspropertyof ripe tomatoesis coloured' would be true
togetherwith the falsityof 'The most conspicuous propertyof ripe
tomatoes is a colour'. And, of course, it would be wrong to offer
'Necessarily,everythingwith the most conspicuous propertyof ripe
tomatoesis coloured'as thetranslationof'The mostconspicuousproperty
of ripe tomatoesis a colour'. The formeris false, there is no necessity
about it: the most conspicuous propertyof ripe tomatoes mighthave
been, as we have just noted,theirsmell,and some thingswiththatsmell
mighthave been transparent,so that some thingswith the most con-
spicuous propertyof ripe tomatoesmightnot have been coloured. On
the other hand 'The most conspicuous propertyof ripe tomatoes is a
colour' is true.
It seems then that-though some criticismsin the literatureof par-
ticularisttranslationsof 'Red is a colour' and 'Red resemblespink more
thanblue' and the like may not be decisive-there are decisivecriticisms
of these translationsavailable to the realist.
LA TROBE UNIVERSITY

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