SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 152436. June 20, 2003.]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION , petitioner, vs . SPOUSES IGMEDIO

and LIWAYWAY CHIONG and the HEIRS OF AGRIFINA ANGELES,
represented by FRANCISCO MERCURIO , respondents.

Rainier B. Butalid for petitioner.

Pejo Aquino & Associates for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals a rming the order of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales which directed petitioner to pay the value of the land
expropriated from respondents for use in petitioner's Northwestern Luzon Transmission
Line Project. Among others, petitioner claimed that the appellate court gravely erred in
a rming the trial court's order directing it to pay the respondents the compensation
recommended by the majority report of the commissioners. According to petitioner, it was
denied due process as it was not afforded a chance to raise its objections to the majority
report in a hearing held for that purpose. Among others, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner was estopped from claiming that it had been denied due process.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court held that it was a bit too late in the day for
petitioner to be asking for a hearing on the pretext that it had not been afforded due
process. Record showed that the majority report was submitted to the trial court on March
9, 2000, while the minority report was submitted on May 5, 2000. After petitioner obtained
copy of the majority report, it did nothing. The trial court issued its order adopting the
majority report on June 7, 2000. Petitioner had ample time to make its objections or
ventilate its opposition to the majority report before the trial court. According to the Court,
a formal hearing or trial is not required for the petitioner to avail of its opportunity to
object and oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have led a motion raising all
possible grounds for objecting to the ndings and recommendations of the
commissioners; or it could have moved the trial court to remand the report to the
commissioners for additional facts, or to expunge the majority report, for reasons
petitioner could muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the opportunity to register its
opposition or objections before the trial court. What is repugnant to due process is the
denial of the opportunity to be heard. Petitioner failed to make use of this opportunity;
hence, it cannot justifiably claim now that its right to due process had been violated.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ELEMENTS;

ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — The elements of due process are well established, viz:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) The defendant must be
given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
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 What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As pointed
out that the petitioner was afforded this opportunity is beyond question. Having failed to
make use of this opportunity, the petitioner cannot justi ably claim now that its right to
due process has been violated.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EMINENT DOMAIN; ACTION UPON
COMMISSIONERS' REPORT. — The duty of the court in considering the commissioners'
report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its nal
judgment in the matter, and in order to ful ll its duty in this respect, the court will be
obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances
of the case may require. Rule 67, Section 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
shows that the trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners' report in any
of the following ways: (1) it may accept the same and render judgment therewith; or (2) for
cause shown, it may: [a] recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of
facts; or [b] set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report
in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation,
and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS IN COMMISSIONERS' REPORT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED
ABSENT ANY OPPOSITION THERETO. — From March 9, 2000 to June 7, 2000, petitioner
did not object to the majority report. On record, it did not, at the time, signify its opposition
thereto, or specify that not all of the evidence, pertinent and material thereto, had been
considered by the commissioners or presented to the court. The option of recommitting
the report of the commissioners, which petitioner now claims, was not ventilated before
the trial court. No claim appears on record that fraud or prejudice tainted the majority
report. When it still had the opportunity below, herein petitioner did not challenge the
majority report on the ground that the commissioners concerned disregarded the
evidence before them, or used an improper rule of assessment, in their submission to the
trial court. As previously held, where there was no opposition led to the Commissioners'
Report in the lower court, the ndings in said Report will not be disturbed. Absent the
objections raised by the petitioner, it became the duty of the trial court to make a nal
order and judgment in which the proper award will be made and thus end the controversy.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUST COMPENSATION; RULE WHERE ONLY A PART OF A CERTAIN
PROPERTY IS EXPROPRIATED. — In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is
entitled to is the market value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous
but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on
as a price to be given and received therefor." The aforementioned rule, however, is
modi ed where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner
is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market
value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if
any, to the remaining part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation
must be deducted the value of the consequential benefits.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OWNER'S VALUATION, NOT BINDING; NATURE AND CHARACTER
OF LAND AT TIME OF TAKING, PRINCIPAL CRITERION TO DETERMINE JUST
COMPENSATION. — In xing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of
Appeals noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and
the proofs submitted by the parties. This included the fair market value of P1,100.00 per
square meter proferred by the respondents. This valuation by owners of the property may
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 not be binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a ceiling
price for the compensation to be awarded. The trial court found that the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature
and character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine
just compensation to the landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the owner's
valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only P500 as recommended in the majority
report of the commissioners.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS WITH RESPECT
THERETO, BINDING ON PARTIES AND SUPREME COURT, ABSENT ANY SHOWING THAT
VALUATION IS EXORBITANT OR OTHERWISE UNJUSTIFIED. — In nding that the trial court
did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor
did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority
report's valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair. Said factual nding of the Court of
Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or otherwise unjusti ed, is
binding on the parties as well as this Court. SEIacA

7. ID.; ID.; CERTIORARI; NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST RIGHT OF APPEAL. —

Moreover, after its receipt of the trial court's order dated June 7, 2000, which decided the
issue of compensation as delineated at the pre-trial, petitioner resorted to a special civil
action, rather than an appeal before the Court of Appeals. As aptly pointed out, petitioner
could not utilize certiorari as a substitute for its lost right of appeal. We also agree that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the very issue of just compensation for
the land taken, as delineated by the party themselves at the pre-trial.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated October
26, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 60716, a rming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, dated June 7, 2000 in Civil Case No. 1442-1. The trial court
directed petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) to pay the value of the land
expropriated from respondents herein for use in NPC's Northwestern Luzon Transmission
Line Project. Likewise assailed in this petition is the resolution 2 of the appellate court,
dated February 26, 2002, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6395, 3 as amended, for the purpose of undertaking the
development of hydroelectric power, the production of electrical power from any source,
particularly by constructing, operating, and maintaining power plants, auxiliary plants,
dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines, power stations, and similar works to tap
the power generated from any river, creek, lake, spring, or waterfall in the country and
supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof. In order to carry out said purposes, NPC
is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain.
On February 19, 1998, NPC led a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba,
Zambales. It sought the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of
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 agricultural lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of Agri na 4
Angeles, as represented by Francisco Mercurio, to be used in its Northwestern Luzon
Transmission Line Project. The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1442-I,
prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and an order of expropriation, the
appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine the just compensation, and to
adjudge NPC as having a lawful right to enter, take, and acquire an easement of right-of-
way over portions of the properties owned by herein respondents.
In their answer, the Heirs of Agri na Angeles did not dispute the purpose of NPC in
instituting the expropriation proceedings. However, they pointed out that NPC had already
entered and taken possession of a portion of their realty with an area of 4,000 square
meters, more or less (Lot "A") and wanted to occupy another 4,000 square meters of the
adjacent property (Lot "B"). Respondents averred that the fair market value for both
properties was P1,100.00 per square meter or a total of P8,800,000.00 and prayed that
the trial court direct NPC to pay them said amount.
On March 31, 1998, NPC led an ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which the trial court granted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that the controversy would be limited
to determining the actual land area taken by NPC and the just compensation to be paid by
petitioner. IATHaS

On September 28, 1999, the trial court appointed as commissioners, Atty. Henry P.
Alog, Atty. Regalado Castillo, and Ms. Roselyn B. Ragadio, Legal Researcher of the trial
court, to determine the fair market value of the land, as well as the total area taken by NPC
from respondents.
On March 9, 2000, Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio submitted their report to the court
nding that the property classi ed as "unirrigated riceland shall have a fair market value of
P500.00 per square meter" 5 considering that "the property is situated at Baytan, Babali,
Lomboy, Sta. Cruz, Zambales which is more than 900 meters from the town proper." 6
On May 5, 2000, Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending that NPC pay the
Heirs of Agri na Angeles an easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses Chiong be paid
total easement fees of P9,187.05. 7 The affected properties of the Heirs of Agri na
Angeles were assessed by Atty. Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per square
meter, while those of the Spouses Chiong were assigned a fair market value of P15.75 per
square meter. 8
After considering the reports of the Commissioners, the trial court on June 7, 2000
decreed as follows:
The Commissioner's Report dated March 9, 2000 led by Commissioner
Roselyn B. Ragadio and Atty. Regalado Castillo is given due course.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is directed to pay the defendants Mercurio their

land containing an area of 4,000 square meters at P500.00 per square meter and
an interest of six (6%) percent per annum from April 16, 1998 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 9

Dissatis ed, NPC led a special civil action for certiorari with the appellate court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60716. NPC averred that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it: (a) directed NPC
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 to pay just compensation for the land taken without rst issuing an order of expropriation;
(b) adopted the compensation recommended by the two commissioners without a
hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full market value of the property instead of a
mere easement fee.
On October 26, 2001, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 60716 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 1 0

In holding that NPC was not entitled to a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals
found that the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it failed to issue
an expropriation order. The appellate court pointed out that as early as the pre-trial,
respondents did not question NPC's right to expropriate their properties. Hence, the only
matter to be addressed by the trial court was the amount of just compensation to be paid.
Second, NPC could not claim that it was denied due process because the trial court issued
the order without rst conducting a hearing on the commissioners' report. The court a quo
noted that formal-type hearings are not necessary in expropriation proceedings, as long as
the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard before the order to
pay compensation is issued. NPC was afforded ample time or opportunity to object to the
commissioners' report before said order was issued. This it failed to do. It likewise failed
to move for reconsideration or to appeal the trial court's order. Hence, NPC was now
estopped from claiming that it had been denied due process. The appellate court likewise
found the assessed value of P500.00 per square meter to be fair as opposed to the NPC-
appointed commissioner's valuation of P22.50 per square meter. Finally, the CA held that
as NPC failed to appeal the trial court's order, certiorari could not be a substitute for a lost
or lapsed right to appeal.
NPC moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the appellate court in its
resolution of February 26, 2002.
Hence, the instant recourse to this Court, with petitioner submitting the following
issues for our resolution:
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN

UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IN DIRECTING THE
PETITIONER TO PAY THE COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED WITHOUT FIRST ORDERING ITS EXPROPRIATION.
II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR

WHEN IT UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ADOPTING IN TOTO THE
UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORT OF THE APPOINTED COMMISSIONERS MS.
REGARDIO AND ATTY. CASTILLO, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE THIRD
COMMISSIONER, ATTY. ALOG AND WITHOUT CONDUCTING A HEARING. DCaEAS

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR
WHEN IT UPHELD THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DIRECTING
PETITIONER TO PAY THE FULL MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND INSTEAD OF THE
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 EASEMENT FEE AS PRAYED FOR IN THE COMPLAINT AND PROVIDED UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6395 AS AMENDED, WHICH IS OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED NPC CHARTER. 1 1

In sum, we nd that the pertinent issues before us are the following: (1) whether
petitioner NPC was deprived of due process; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the Order of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, dated June 7, 2000, by dismissing NPC's
petition for certiorari.
On the rst issue , petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred in
a rming the trial court's order directing it to pay the respondent the compensation
recommended by the majority report of the commissioners. Petitioner points out that
there were two reports submitted by the commissioners, with con icting ndings as to
the market values of the expropriated properties. It insists that, given said situation, the
trial court should have conducted hearings on the two reports, as required by Rule 67,
Sections 7 1 2 and 8 1 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, before accepting the majority
report. In failing to do so, the trial court not only blatantly violated the Rules; it likewise
denied petitioner due process, as the latter was not afforded a chance to raise its
objections to the majority report in a hearing held for that purpose. It was, thus, grievous
error for the appellate court to have sustained the trial court.
The respondents, Heirs of Agri na Angeles, point out that the petitioner's
contentions are without basis, since it was given ample time and/or opportunity by the trial
court to object to the questioned order. The respondents assert that the petitioner, had it
been so minded, could have moved for reconsideration or led an appeal therefrom within
the reglementary period, but it did not. Instead, it opted for the wrong remedy by ling a
special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, after the period to appeal had
lapsed. Having made an erroneous choice in its remedies, petitioner cannot now come to
this Tribunal crying that it was denied due process.
On record we nd that the majority report of Commissioners Ragadio and Atty.
Castillo was submitted to the trial court on March 9, 2000, while the minority report of
Commissioner Atty. Alog, was submitted on May 5, 2000. It is not disputed that petitioner
was furnished copies of said reports. After petitioner NPC obtained its copy of the
majority report, it did nothing. The records do not disclose any objection thereto or any
comment opposing the ndings and recommendations of the two commissioners in their
report.
The majority report was submitted on March 9, 2000. The trial court issued its order
adopting the majority report on June 7, 2000. Clearly, petitioner had ample time to make
its objections or ventilate its opposition to the majority report before the trial court. A
formal hearing or trial was not required for the petitioner to avail of its opportunity to
object and oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have led a motion raising all
possible grounds for objecting to the ndings and recommendations of the
commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to remand the report to the
commissioners for additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge the majority report,
for reasons petitioner could muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the opportunity to
register its opposition or objections before the trial court. It is a bit too late in the day now
to be asking for a hearing on the pretext that it had not been afforded due process.
The elements of due process are well established, viz:
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
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 determine the matter before it;

(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
property which is the subject of the proceedings;

(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and

(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. 1 4

What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. 1 5 As

pointed out that the petitioner was afforded this opportunity is beyond question. Having
failed to make use of this opportunity, the petitioner cannot justi ably claim now that its
right to due process has been violated.
The duty of the court in considering the commissioners' report is to satisfy itself
that just compensation will be made to the defendant by its nal judgment in the matter,
and in order to ful ll its duty in this respect, the court will be obliged to exercise its
discretion in dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case may
require. 1 6 Rule 67, Section 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that the
trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners' report in any of the following
ways: (1) it may accept the same and render judgment therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it
may: [a] recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or [b] set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and reject
it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the
defendant just compensation for the property so taken. 1 7
From March 9, 2000 to June 7, 2000, petitioner did not object to the majority report.
On record, it did not, at the time, signify its opposition thereto, or specify that not all of the
evidence, pertinent and material thereto, had been considered by the commissioners or
presented to the court. The option of recommitting the report of the commissioners,
which petitioner now claims, was not ventilated before the trial court. No claim appears on
record that fraud or prejudice tainted the majority report. When it still had the opportunity
below, herein petitioner did not challenge the majority report on the ground that the
commissioners concerned disregarded the evidence before them, or used an improper
rule of assessment, in their submission to the trial court. As previously held, where there
was no opposition led to the Commissioners' Report in the lower court, the ndings in
said Report will not be disturbed. 1 8 Absent the objections raised by the petitioner, it
became the duty of the trial court to make a nal order and judgment in which the proper
award will be made and thus end the controversy. EHTISC

Moreover, after its receipt of the trial court's order dated June 7, 2000, which
decided the issue of compensation as delineated at the pre-trial, petitioner resorted to a
special civil action, rather than an appeal before the Court of Appeals. As aptly pointed out,
petitioner could not utilize certiorari as a substitute for its lost right of appeal. We also
agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the very issue of just
compensation for the land taken, as delineated by the party themselves at the pre-trial.
Nevertheless, we shall now take up the matter of valuation and just compensation if
only to avoid any further delay in its resolution.
The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters occupied by the petitioner was
xed by the trial court in its order of June 7, 2000 at P500.00 per square meter. The
appellate court affirmed the said valuation.
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 In contesting the valuation, petitioner argues now that the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in upholding the RTC order requiring it to pay the full market value of the
expropriated properties, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an
easement of right-of-way. The petitioner points out under Section 3-A 1 9 of RA No. 6395,
where only an easement of right-of-way shall be acquired, with the principal purpose for
which the land is actually devoted is unimpaired, the compensation should not exceed ten
percent (10%) of the market value of the property. Thus, in sustaining the order of the
lower court directing the petitioner to pay the respondents the full recommended value of
their properties, the Court of Appeals completely violated and disregarded RA No. 6395, as
amended.
Petitioner averred in its complaint in Civil Case No. 1442-I, that it sought to acquire
"an easement of right-of-way" over portions of the properties owned by respondents, for a
total of 10,950 square meters. 2 0 However, a perusal of its complaint shows that petitioner
also stated that it would erect structures for its transmission lines on portions of the
expropriated property. In other words, the expropriation was not to be limited for the
purpose of "easement of right-of-way." In fact, in their Answer, the Heirs of Agri na
Angeles, alleged that petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000 square meters
wherein it constructed structures for its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy
another 4,000 square meters. 2 1 Petitioner failed to controvert this material allegation.
Justi ably, the market value of these 4,000 square meters allegedly occupied by the
petitioner has became the very crux of the present case.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. 2 2 Market value is "that sum of money which a person desires but not compelled to
buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received therefor." 2 3 The aforementioned rule, however, is modi ed where only a part
of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the portion actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion
taken, he is also entitled to recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining
part of the property. At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the
value of the consequential benefits. 2 4
In xing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, the Court of Appeals noted that
the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and the proofs submitted
by the parties. This included the fair market value of P1,100.00 per square meter proferred
by the respondents. 2 5 This valuation by owners of the property may not be binding upon
the petitioner or the court, although it should at least set a ceiling price for the
compensation to be awarded. 2 6 The trial court found that the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal improvements. It is the nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking that is the principal criterion to determine just
compensation to the landowner. 2 7 Hence, the trial court accepted not the owner's
valuation of P1,100 per square meter but only P500 as recommended in the majority
report of the commissioners.
As to the price of P22.50 per square meter recommended by the minority report of
Commissioner Atty. Alog, the Court of Appeals found it unconscionably inadequate. It was
rightly rejected by the trial court.
In nding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence
and the reports placed before it nor did it misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the
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 Court of Appeals found the majority report's valuation of P500 per square meter to be fair.
Said factual nding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is
exorbitant or otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated October 26, 2001 as well as its resolution of February 26, 2002,
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, in CA-G.R. SP No. 60716 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. STaIHc

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

Footnotes
1. C A Rollo, pp. 113-124. Penned by Tria Tirona, J., with Abesamis and Barcelona, JJ.,
concurring.
2. Id. at 184.
3. Entitled "An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation."

4. Also spelled as "Agripina" in other part of the records.

5. Supra, note 1 at 61.
6. Id. at 62.
7. Id. at 69-70.
8. Ibid.

9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 123.
11. Rollo, pp. 18-19.
12. SEC. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon. — The court may order the
commissioners to report when any particular portion of the real estate shall have been
passed upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and direct the
commissioners to proceed with their work as to subsequent portions of the property
sought to be expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such property. The
commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings,
and such proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have accepted their
report and rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations. Except as
otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report shall be led within sixty (60) days
from the date the commissioners were noti ed of their appointment, which time may be
extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the ling of such report, the clerk of court
shall serve copies thereof on all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten
(10) days from which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so desire.
13. SEC. 8. Action upon commissioners' report. — Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10)
days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but
after all the interested parties have led their objections to the report or their statement
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 of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render
judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential
to the exercise of his right of expropriation; and to the defendant just compensation for
the property so taken.
14. Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 934 (1918).

15. Garments and Textile Export Board v. Court of Appeals , 335 Phil. 723, 765 (1997) citing
Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114061, 23 August 1995, 247 SCRA
599, Bermejo v. Barrios , G.R. No. L-23614, 27 February 1970, 31 SCRA 764, and Caltex
Phil., Inc. v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-24657, 27 November 1967, 21 SCRA 1071.
16. Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 298 (1915).
17. City of Manila v. Battle, 27 Phil. 34, 38 (1914).
18. See Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic , G.R. No. L-71412, 15 August 1986, 143 SCRA
466, 477-478.
19. SEC. 3-A. In acquiring private property or private property rights through expropriation
proceedings where the land or portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines,
only a right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the principal purpose for
which such land is actually devoted will not be impaired, and where the land itself or a
portion thereof will be needed for the projects or works, such land or portion thereof as
necessary shall be acquired.
In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired
through expropriation proceedings, the same shall —
(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not exceed the market value declared
by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such
market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

(b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion thereof, not
exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower.
In addition to the just compensation for easement of right-of-way, the owner of the land or
owner of the improvement, as the case may be, shall be compensated for the
improvements actually damaged by the construction and maintenance of the
transmission lines, in an amount not exceeding the market value thereof as declared by
the owner or administrator, or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such
market value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower; Provided, That in cases
any buildings, houses, and similar structures are actually affected by the right-of-way for
the transmission lines, their transfer, if feasible, shall be effected at the expense of the
Corporation: Provided, further, That such market value prevailing at the time the
Corporation gives notice to the landowner or administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, to the effect that his land or portion thereof is needed for its
projects or works shall be used as basis to determine the just compensation therefor.
20. CA Rollo, p. 26.
21. Id. at 36.
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 22. Metropolitan Water District v. Director of Lands , 57 Phil. 293, 294-295 (1932); Municipality
of Tarlac v. Besa , 55 Phil. 423, 425 (1930); Manila Railroad Co. v. Caligsihan , 40 Phil.
326, 328-329 (1919); Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, supra , at 314; City of Manila v.
Corrales, 32 Phil. 85, 92 (1915); City of Manila v. Estrada , 25 Phil. 208, 214 (1913);
Manila Railway Co. v. Fabie, 17 Phil. 206, 208 (1910).
23. City of Manila v. Estrada, supra, at 215.
24. Republic v. Lara, 96 Phil. 170, 177-178 (1954).
25. CA Rollo, p. 36.
26. Republic v. Narciso , G.R. No. L-6594, 18 May 1956 (Unreported). See 99 Phil. 1031 (1956)
for synopsis of the decision.
27. National Power Corporation v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 751,
756.

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