TAN TEK BENG v. DAVID
P-06-2261 : October 30, 2006]
A.C. No. 1261
December 29, 1983
FACTS: Tan Tek Beng and Atty. Timoteo David entered an agreement. Where in the
agreement lawyer David did not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to
an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly
with the clients.
However, mutual accusations of doublecross ended such.
Hence, Tan Tek Beng denounced David to the President Assistant, Office of the Civil
Relation and to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said agreement is tantamount to malpractice.
RULING: The Court held that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to
malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers”
The practice of law is a profession and not a business.
A lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others.
The Court censures David for entering such void and unethical agreement and
discountenances his conduct, not because of the complaints, but because David
should have known better.
Respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
[A.M. NO.
[OCA-IPI No. 04-1905-P]
ELPIDIO SY, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation, Complainant, v.
EDGAR ESPONILLA, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, and JENNIFER DELA
CRUZ-BUENDIA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a verified Complaint1 dated March 30, 2004, Elpidio Sy, President of Systems Realty
Development Corporation, charged Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-
Charge of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Atty. Jennifer Dela
Cruz-Buendia, Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty in connection with the
withdrawal of the deposits in the form of monthly rentals in Civil Case No. 90-55003,
entitled Maria Gagarin, et al. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands and Systems Realty
Development Corporation.
Records show that upon motion by counsel for plaintiffs, Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag,
issued an Order dated November 11, 1994 allowing the withdrawal of the deposits in
the concept of rentals amounting to P260,000.00 more or less, based on the finding
that a sufficient supersedeas bond was already posted in a related case pending before
Branch 32.
The November 11, 1994 Order reads:
Finding the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by plaintiffs, thru
counsel, to be well-taken, the same is hereby GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court, or her
duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to release to plaintiffs, or their duly
authorized representative, the deposits made by such parties in the concept of rentals
from May, 1989 to August, 1994 in the estimated aggregate sum of P260,000.00.
It is well to emphasize here that such deposits were made in the concept of monthly
rentals for the plaintiffs' occupancy of the premises in controversy, here and in the
ejectment suit now on appeal with Branch 32 of this same Court. It would appear,
however, from the attachments to the Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits that
sufficient supersedeas bond was already posted in that appealed ejectment case by the
plaintiffs hereto, defendants therein, in the total sum of P260,000.00. Surely, the rental
deposits made in this case become superfluous and serve no legal purpose. It is
actually duplicitous and its non-release would actually prejudice the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.3
Thereafter, Jaime Ang, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003, withdrew the
amount of P256,000.00 from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila.
Complainant averred that the withdrawal of the deposits was irregular because the
allegation by plaintiffs' counsel, Atty. Walfredo Bayhon, in the ex-parte motion that the
amount sought to be withdrawn from Branch 54 was superfluous and duplicitous as
there is already a sufficient supersedeas bond posted with Branch 32, is false.4 He
claimed that the rental deposits made in Branch 54 covered the period from June 30,
1989 to August 5, 1994 while those in Branch 32 were for September 30, 1994 to
January 3, 1997. Complainant also alleged that Judge Liwag granted plaintiffs' false
motion without ascertaining the veracity of the allegations therein; and that
complainant was not furnished a copy of the said motion to withdraw nor was the same
set for hearing.
Complainant alleged that the purported motion and Order of Judge Liwag do not
appear in the records of Civil Case No. 90-55003, as such, respondent Dela Cruz-
Buendia, who was then the Assistant Clerk of Court, is guilty of negligence and
connivance with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003 for allowing and facilitating
the release of the deposits without verifying the authenticity of the motion and Order.
Complainant also claimed that respondent Esponilla is guilty of gross negligence for
failing to safeguard vital case records and conniving with the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 90-55003.
Respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia denied the charges against her. She maintained that
her function as a clerk of court is purely ministerial in nature. She does not exercise
any discretion except to follow orders of the court; neither is she bound to determine
the propriety or impropriety of the orders of the court.
Respondent Esponilla alleged that he was not the Officer-In-Charge of Branch 54 when
the purported Order granting the ex-parte motion to withdraw rental deposits was
allegedly issued on November 11, 1994 by Judge Liwag as he was only designated as
such in March 1995. He thus prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed.5
On November 9, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the instant
complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
On February 1, 2006, Executive Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. submitted his Report
and Recommendation,6 the pertinent portions of which read:
Respondent Edgar Esponilla cannot be faulted for any of the acts complained of as he
was appointed officer-in-charge of Branch 54 only in March 1995 and the questioned
order was issued by Pairing Judge Hermogenes Liwag on November 11, 1994. Nor did
he have a hand in the preparation and release of the check to the plaintiffs on
November 14, 1994 or sometime thereafter. x x x
As to respondent Clerk of Court, we likewise find her explanations meritorious. In the
instant case, the duty of the Clerk of Court and/or respondent Buendia xxx is
ministerial.
Upon receipt of an order from a court, the Clerk of Court's duty is to make sure that
the order is complied with. xxx For a Clerk of Court to question a ruling or order of a
judge is an invitation for contempt. x x x
The pivotal issue that should be addressed is why Atty. Walfredo Bayhon filed the
motion in the first place and why then Pairing Judge Hermogenes Liwag favorably acted
on it without looking into the truth of the allegation of "duplicity and superfluity." x x
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the administrative complaint filed against
respondents Edgar Esponilla and Jennifer de la Cruz-Buendia be dismissed for lack of
merit.
It is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be asked to explain the
circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the Supreme
Court with a true copy of the motion.7
On June 5, 2006, the OCA submitted its Evaluation Report,8 adopting the findings
and recommendation of Judge Eugenio, thus:
In view of the foregoing discussions, it is respectfully submitted that the administrative
complaint filed against respondents Edgar Esponilla and Atty. Jennifer Dela Cruz-
Buendia be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, it is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be asked to
EXPLAIN the circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the
Court with a true copy of the motion.9
Indeed, clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt
and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and
administrative orders, processes and concerns. They perform delicate function as
designated custodians of the court's funds, revenues, records, properties and premises.
As such they are generally also treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant
manager thereof. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of
such funds and property.10
The duties of Clerks of Court as defined in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court
are as follows:
Adjudicative Support Functions:
A. Prepares and signs summonses, subpoenas and notices, writs of execution,
remittances, and releases of prisoners;
b. Certifies true copies of decisions, orders, and other processes, letters of
administration and guardianship; transmittals of appealed cases, indorsements and
communications; andcralawlibrary
l. Performs other duties that may be assigned to him.
As may be gleaned above, the functions of a Clerk of Court do not involve the use of
mental processes in the determination of law or fact nor do they involve discretion on
the use of judicial powers. The functions are generally administrative in nature.11
(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In the instant case, while it is true that the duty of respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia is
purely ministerial, ordinary prudence calls for her to at least verify the authenticity
and origin of the alleged Order of Judge Liwag because from the copies on record,12
we note that the same does not bear the seal of the Court nor the standard certification
by the branch clerk of court. She should have been vigilant considering that the Order
dealt with withdrawal of deposits.

c. Prepares and signs monthly reports of cases. We therefore find respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia guilty of simple negligence, for which
she should pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with a warning that a
Non-Adjudicative Functions: repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

A. Plans, directs, supervises and coordinates the activities of all Regarding respondent Esponilla, we find that he cannot be faulted for the missing
divisions/sections/units in the Office of the Clerk of Court; documents in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003 as he was not the Officer-In-Charge
when the said papers were allegedly with Branch 54. Further, there is no proof that he
b. Controls and manages all court records, exhibits, documents, properties and participated in the preparation and release of the check to the plaintiffs on November
supplies. 14, 1994 or sometime thereafter.
c. Acts on applications for leave of absence and signs daily time records; We are not convinced that either respondent connived with the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 90-55003 or with one another to perpetuate fraud against the complainant in the
d. Determines the docket fees to be paid by the parties-litigants as provided in the
instant case. No evidence was presented to prove this allegation. We have ruled many
Rules of Court;
times in the past that the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial
e. Issues clearances in appropriate cases; evidence, the averments of his/her administrative complaint.13 This Court has always
been punctilious over and over again that it will never tolerate or condone any conduct,
f. Provides information services to the public and private agencies including bar act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
associations; people's faith in the judiciary. However, when administrative charges against court
personnel hold no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to
g. Prepares cases for raffle;
protect the innocent court employees against any groundless accusation that trifles
h. Safekeeps and maintains a judgment book and execution book; with judicial process.14

i. Studies and recommends to the Executive Judge ways and means to improve both
adjudicative and support functions;
j. Performs special functions as ex-officio municipal sheriff;
k. Implements all orders and policies of the court in connection with the speedy
administration of justice;
Regarding the missing documents in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003, the
Evaluation Report of the OCA stated that as per the investigation15 of Judge Enrico A.
Lanzanas, the purported Order of Judge Liwag was actually prepared in Branch 55 by
one Baby Manalastas. This finding does not fully explain why the said Order or the
plaintiffs' motion were not filed in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003. Thus, the OCA
is directed to conduct an investigation against the then clerks of court of Branches 54
and 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, during the period material to this case,
to explain the circumstances behind their improper management of court records and
documents.
We likewise agree with the observation of the OCA that there is a necessity for Atty.
Walfredo Bayhon to submit an explanation on why he filed the Ex-Parte Motion and to
submit a copy of the same to the Court within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision, in order to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
November 11, 1994 Order and the release of the rental deposits.
WHEREFORE, the administrative case against respondent EDGAR ESPONILLA, Legal
Researcher and Officer-In-Charge of the RegionalTrial Court of Manila, Branch 54is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent JENNIFER DELA CRUZ-BUENDIA, Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila isfound GUILTY of simple negligence in the performance of her duties, for which
she should pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. ATTY.
WALFREDO BAYHON is ORDERED to explain within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Decision the circumstances behind the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the
Court with a true copy of the motion. The OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR
is DIRECTED to conduct an investigation regarding the improper management of court
records and documents by the then clerks of court of Branches 54 and 55 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila during the period material to this case.
SO ORDERED.
Toledo vs. Abalos [A.C. No. 5141. September 29, 1999]
Ponente: MELO, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within
six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of
said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note. After the lapse of six months,
and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation. Afraid that she
will not recover her money, Ms. Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.
[T]he Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-
complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the
complaint. Investigating Commissioner issued an order setting the case for hearing
Despite due notices, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant was
allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case was considered
submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown by the registry
return. However, she again did not do anything about it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Abalos may be disciplined by the IB
HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for one (1) month.
RATIO: According to the Supreme Court, the general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. It was,
however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission
in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of
its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the
practice of law is warranted.
Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Attys. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia
[A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010]
FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel
E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with
gross immorality.
Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.
Sometime in 1987, one of their children confided that an unknown caller talked with
her claiming that the former is a child of Atty Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May
Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido strolling at a mall together with a woman
and a child who was later identified as Atty. Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively.
Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among
others that the said child is the daughter of Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia. In 1993,
Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since
he left the conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still failing to give Maelotisea the
needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling
because of financial constraints.
By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he
was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea.
He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. As he and
Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty.
Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties.
Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his
second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in
private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a
special secondary course.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death
of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born
before he became a lawyer.
On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia.
In the course of the hearings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea
filed a motion for the dismissal of her complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.
ISSUES:
Should the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido be dismissed because the alleged
immoral acts were committed before he was admitted to the Philippine Bar?
Whether the desistance of Maelotisea merits the dismissal of the case.
Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred for gross immoral conduct.
Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense that the marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea is void tenable.
RULING:
Prescription of offenses by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a
lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. Admission to the practice
of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public.
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint
is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of
the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained
of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. The
possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar.
B. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings.
We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented
her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to
note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely because of compassion (and, impliedly, out of
concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido).
C. The undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment.
His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women.
He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for
leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was
already married to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to
lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal
liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not “valid.”
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited
and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded
wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical
rules of the profession.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense
of decency. We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising
from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all
of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”;
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, “a lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.”
D. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was
null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him
six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children.
Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario
smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal
profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must
lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty.
Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and
after she became a member of the legal profession.

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.
To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being
good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in
the place where she is known. The requirement of good moral character has four
general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other.

The Fallo:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.