R. Doc. 120-4 - MIS Motion For Summary Judgment Against

Case 2:17-cv-02797-NJB-DMD Document 120-4 Filed 02/06/20 Page 1 of 30
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
__________________________________________
RODNEY GRANT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Case No. 17-cv-2797-NJB-DMD
)
MARLIN GUSMAN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Against Defendant James LeBlanc
The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DOC”) is “legally bound” to
release inmates on time; even Defendant James LeBlanc, secretary of the DOC, agrees that this
is so.1 But on-time release is neither policy nor practice in Louisiana.
Instead, a “lot of human beings [have been] held past the point where their sentence was
complete.”2 In 2012, Secretary LeBlanc learned “that thousands of people in the custody of the
Department of Corrections for whatever reason were being held past their release date.”3 That
year, an internal investigation conducted by the DOC revealed that 2,252 inmates were
overdetained every year, with an average of 71.69 “overdue days” per inmate.4 (According to the
DOC, “Overdue days” means “days past when their proper release date was.”5) Despite the clear
evidence of chronic unlawful overdetention—which he called a “big problem”6—Secretary
LeBlanc failed to fix the problem.7 (“Overdetention” is defined as a people being held in prison
1
Ex. H at 15 (Dep. of Secretary LeBlanc) (“Q. And the department is -- of corrections is legally bound to release
inmates on their release date, correct? . . . A. Yes.”)
2
Ex. B (Dep. of DOC 30(b)(6) Representative) at 33. (“Q. A lot of human beings were held in prison past the point
where their sentence was complete, correct? A. Correct.”)
3
Ex. H at 48 (“Q. But you learned that thousands of people in the custody of the Department of Corrections for
whatever reason were being held past their release date, correct? A. I did.”)
4
Ex. I (Dep. of DOC 30(b)(6) Representative) at 20 (“Q. So in 2012, the DOC’s Six Sigma investigation found an
average of 2,252 cases of immediate release per year with an average of 71.7 overdue days per case; is that right? A.
Yes. Q. This is inmates being held past their legal release date, correct? A. Yes.”)
5
Id.; Ex. B at 20 (“Q. It says there was an average of 71.7 overdue days per case, right? A. Correct. Q. That's an
average of 71.7 days past when their proper release date was, right? A. Correct.”)
6
Ex. H at 48-49.
7
Id. at 36-37 (“Q. Why was the goal to get it down to just 450 [overdetained persons] per year rather than zero? A.
Honestly, I don’t know.”)
1
past their legal release date.8)
Unsurprisingly, the pattern and practice of unlawful overdetention continued unabated. In
2017, a DOC internal investigation reported that it had “an average of 200 inmates per month
held an average of 49 days past the end of their sentence.”9 That year, it cost the state $239,022
per month to hold “people who should be out.”10 And according to a third internal investigation,
this time in 2019, the DOC held 231 individuals in a single month an average of 44 extra days
after a court ordered them free.11 It is, as the DOC concedes, “a lot of overdetention.”12
Plaintiff Rodney Grant, like thousands of others, is a victim of the DOC’s unlawful
exercise of sentencing authority that rightfully belongs to the judiciary.13 In 2016, the DOC
imprisoned Mr. Grant for 27 days after the expiration of his court-ordered sentence. When Mr.
Grant was not timely released, Judge Buras of the Orleans Criminal District Court vacated his
sentence and awarded him simply “credit for time served.” When that did not result in his release
either, Judge Buras called and emailed the DOC to explain that Mr. Grant was supposed to have
been. Even that did not result in his immediate release – it took the DOC a few more days.
And according to the DOC, everything that happened to Rodney Grant “flowed from the
DOC policies approved by Secretary LeBlanc.”14
There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact in this case. Accordingly, and for the
reasons that follow, Mr. Grant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Defendant
Secretary LeBlanc in his personal and official capacities.
8
See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiff's claim falls into a category of claims
which unfortunately have become so common that they have acquired their own term of art: ‘overdetention,’ ” i.e.,
when “the plaintiff has been imprisoned by the defendant for longer than legally authorized, whether because the
plaintiff's incarcerative sentence has expired or otherwise.”)
9
Ex. I at 38 (“Q. So it's a true statement that the DOC found that in 2017 it had an average of 200 inmates per month
held an average of 49 days past the end of their sentence, correct? A. Yes.”).
10
Ex. E at 4 (“immediate releases are costing the state $239,022 per month”) Ex. H at 58-59 (“Q. The next sentence
says, ‘immediate releases are costing the state $239,022 per month,’ right? A. Yes. Q. So that suggests that these are
people who should be out, correct? A. Correct.”)
11
Ex. P at RFA 76 (“It is admitted that in February of 2019, 231 people were found to be held past the release date,
with an average of 44 days waiting for release.”)
12
Ex. B at 33 (“Q. This Six Sigma investigation found a lot of overdetention as a baseline, right? A. Correct.”)
13
Ex. N (Deposition of DOC 30(b)(6) Representative) at 36-39 (“Q. So to the DOC, someone's sentence continues
until you do time comp and release him? Is that what you're saying? A. It does”)
2
I. Background
A. Factual Background
1. The DOC is “legally bound” to release inmates at the end of their sentence. But to
the DOC, an inmate’s sentence does not end when a judge says it should – it ends
whenever the DOC decides to do the inmate’s time computation.
It is a jailer’s “obligation is to see that the sentence imposed is the sentence served.”15
And the jailer therefore “has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from prison.”16
Thus, “[n]o privilege enables a jailer to detain a prisoner beyond the period of his lawful
sentence.”17 The DOC agrees it is “legally bound to release inmates on their release date.”18
The DOC also agrees that if a person meets three criteria, their legal release date will be
the date of their sentencing. Those criteria are: (1) they spent time in custody before sentencing;
(2) they are given a sentence with credit for time served; and (3) their sentence is less than or
equal to their period of custody before sentencing.19 (E.g., a person who spent time in jail
awaiting sentencing, and then is given a sentence of less than that with credit for time served.)
Under Louisiana law, it “is well settled that the determination of the sentence a defendant
is to serve, and what, if any, conditions are to be imposed on that sentence, is made by the trial
judge, not the defendant's custodian.”20
The DOC, however, has a different perspective. According to the DOC, an inmate’s
sentence does not end when a judge says it should. It ends whenever the DOC conducts that
inmate’s time computation:
Q. What date do you think Rodney Grant's sentence was complete?
A. To DOC, it was the date we processed his time comp.
14
Ex. N (DOC 30(b)(6) witness) at 114..
15
State ex rel. Pierre v. Maggio, 445 So.2d 425, 426 (La.1984); State v. Criminal Dist. Court Parish of Orleans, 433
So. 2d 712 (La. 1983).
16
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011); Whirl, supra, 407 F. 2d at 792 (A jailor’s functions “include
not only the duty to protect a prisoner, but also the duty to effect his timely release.”)
17
Whirl, supra, 407 F.2d at 791.
18
Ex. H at 15 (Dep. of Secretary LeBlanc) (“Q. And the department is -- of corrections is legally bound to release
inmates on their release date, correct? . . . A. Yes.”)
19
Ex. J at 30-31 (“Q. So if they meet all three of these criteria, their legal release date is going to be the date of their
sentencing, right? A. Right.”)
20
Boddye v. La. Dept. of Corrections, 175 So. 3d 437, 441 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2015).
3
...
Q. So standing here today . . . can you say what day Rodney Grant's sentence was
complete?
A. The date we calculated it, found out everything was -- he would not be a parole
violator, when his crime was actually committed. We found that out. That would
not violate him. We calculated his time and released him on that date. That's the
date he was completed.
...
Q. Understood, right, but independent of when someone should be released and

when they should not be released, I'm just asking, when was the end of his
sentence?
A. For DOC, it was the date we time comped and released him.
Q. So to the DOC, someone's sentence continues until you do time comp and release
him? Is that what you're saying?
A. It does -- -- it continues to the case that we release him on, that case, on that
docket, until we get clarification what kind of credit he gets, what is going to
apply, if he is going to owe more time.21
2. The DOC admits to a pattern and practice of illegal overdetention.
a. In 2012, the DOC found it was overdetaining thousands of inmates per year.
Louisiana has historically ranked as the state with the highest incarceration rate.22 The
DOC manages approximately 33,000 persons in its custody.23
In 2012, the DOC had a team of a dozen of its staff perform a “Lean Six Sigma”24 review
of its inmate time calculation processes.25 Secretary LeBlanc was a “champion” of the project.26
The Lean Six Sigma review found a widespread pattern of people being held past their
legal release date. Specifically, it found that when the DOC calculated the release date of
21
Ex. N (Deposition of DOC 30(b)(6) Representative) at 36-39. The witness here was Angela Griffin, the “top
person” in the PreClass department. Id. at 21. She oversees the managers of that department. Id. at 20. PreClass is
the department that “receives documents as inmates are sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections,
processes them, calculates their time, and distributes them around the Department of Corrections system.” Id.
22
Ex. E (DOC Grant Application) at 1.
23
Id.
24
“Lean Six Sigma is a team-focused managerial approach that seeks to improve performance by eliminating waste
and defects.” Will Kenton, Lean Six Sigma, Investopedia.com (Feb. 5, 2018).
25
Ex. A (DOC’s Six Sigma Report).
26
Id. at 3.
4
inmates, 83% were eligible for “immediate release . . . due to an earlier release date.”27 By the
DOC’s own admission, this 83% of inmates were all being “overdetained”:
Q. I use the word “overdetention” to describe someone who should have been
released in the past but wasn't. Will you understand me if I use that term?
A. Yes.
Q. So these people who were found to have an earlier release date, they were
being overdetained, right?
A. By your definition of overdetention, yes.
Q. So this investigation found that 83.44 percent of these cases, once their time
was computed, were found to have been overdetained, correct?
A. By your definition, yes.28
Some of the delay came from the time it took to receive documents from the clerks’ and
sheriffs’ offices. But it was primarily because the DOC was taking approximately seventy-nine
days to calculate an inmate’s sentence after receiving their documents.29
This created a major problem for all those people who were “eligible for release
immediately upon sentencing because of credit for time served.”30 For these people, or for
people sentenced to fewer than seventy-nine days, the long wait meant that they necessarily
would be held past their release date.31
How widespread was this problem? The DOC Six Sigma review found that it was
overdetaining 2,252 inmates per year, with an average of 71.69 “Overdue days” per inmate.32
27
Ex. A at 4
28
Ex. B (DOC 30(b)(6) Deposition) at 17-18.
29
Id. at 33 (“Q. So this approximately 79-day number represents the DOC's, to the best of its knowledge in 2012,
about how long it was taking for documents to wait at the DOC to be calculated? A. Correct.”) See also Ex. F (DOC
Frequently Asked Questions) (“If a person has recently been sentenced to DOC custody, it can take up to 12 weeks
to calculate a date as the Department has to receive official paperwork from the sentencing court in order to
calculate the offender’s release date.”)
30
Ex. I at 14.
31
Ex. J at 32 (“Q. So for all of these people whose legal release date was the date of their sentencing, if it takes a
week for everything to happen, such that the DOC calculates the time and releases them, they've been held past their
legal release date by a week, right? A. From their sentence date, correct. Q. If it take a month before the DOC
calculates their sentence, they've been held past the end of their sentence for a month, right? A. Correct.”)
32
Ex. A at 18, 20; see also Ex. P at RFA 69 (“It is admitted that the 2012 Lean Six Sigma found an average of 71.70
‘overdue days’ for inmates found to be eligible for immediate release upon time calculation.”), RFA 70 (“It is
5
The DOC concedes that these inmates were being held past their “legal release date”:
33
Thus, in 2012, the DOC found out that they were holding inmates past their “legal release
date” for a total of 161,446 days per year.34 This was, as the DOC concedes, “a lot of
overdetention.”35
Fig. 1: The DOC’s Knowledge of its Pattern of Overdetention.36
DOC investigates and DOC investigates and DOC investigates and

finds an average of finds an average of finds 231 people held
2,252 people per year 200 people per month an average of 44 days
held an average of 71.7 held an average of 49 past release date.
days past release date. days past release date.
Rodney Grant is held

past his release date.
2012 2016 2017 2019
admitted that the 2012 Lean Six Sigma project found that approximately 2252 inmates per year were eligible for
immediate release upon time calculation.”)
33
Ex. I at 20; see also Ex. J at 32 (“Q. If it take a month before the DOC calculates their sentence, they've been held
past the end of their sentence for a month, right? A. Correct.”)
34
2,252 inmates per year multiplied by 71.69 days per inmate.
35
Ex. B at 20.
36
Ex. I at 20, 34, 38; Ex. P at RFA 76.
6
b. After learning it has a “lot of overdetention,” the DOC did not fix the problem – or
even set a goal of fixing the problem. As a result, “a lot of human beings were held in
prison past the point where their sentence was complete.”
The DOC did not fix the overdetention problem. It did not even set for itself a goal of
fixing the problem. The goal the DOC set for itself was to overdetain only 450 persons per year
by an average of 31 days per person.37 The team estimated that if it could hit that self-set goal, it
would save the state $3.7 million dollars per year.38 So the DOC implemented interventions that
“modestly improved”, but did not eliminate the problem:
39
After the DOC Six Sigma team’s interventions, the number of these overdetained persons
was reduced from 2,252 per year to 1,612, and the average number of overdue days was reduced
37
Ex. A at 5; Ex. B at 18. That would be 38 years of overdetention per year (450*31/365).
38
Id. at 19.
39
Ex. B at 33.
7
from 71.7 to 60.52 days – still a major constitutional violation.40
The DOC did take some steps to try to improve things after that. They centralized their
PreClass department, and made “some adjustment and updates to the Uniform Commitment
Order.”41 In 2015 the “department did attempt an offender [electronic records] management
system, which was not a success. It never went into full production. It was tested for a bit and
then found to be inoperable.”42 As a result, the “functional processes” around the transmission of
documents “remain as antiquated as they were in 1996.”43 The “DOC today is using the same
technology for managing inmates that they used in '96” – twenty-four years ago.44
Instead of continuing to try to find a solution, the DOC the DOC accepted and
institutionalized the problem into its public-facing identity. On its website, the DOC posted a
statement: “If a person has recently been sentenced to DOC custody, it can take up to 12 weeks
to calculate a date as the Department has to receive official paperwork from the sentencing court
in order to calculate the offender’s release date.”45 The DOC put on its voicemail an audio
statement that it “takes at least 90 days after sentencing” for the department to calculate how
much time a person must serve.46 The DOC posted these statements online and on voicemail to
reduce the number of calls asking about why a family member was still being held in prison past
their release date.47
As a result, the overdetention problem continued, year after year. Each year, thousands of
people were held in DOC custody longer than their court-ordered sentences. The DOC did not
even provide a training program for DOC time computation staff. “[P]rior to 2017, there was no
40
Ex. A at 18.
41
Ex. I at 22.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 29.
44
Id. at 30. See also Ex. H (Dep. of Sec. LeBlanc) at 75 (“the CAJUN System is obviously antiquated” and “some
documents are driven by van from the sheriffs to the Department of Corrections”).
45
Ex. F at 3. Secretary LeBlanc testified that this “12 weeks is ridiculous” and “just absurd.” Ex. H at 90.
46
Ex. I (DOC 30(b)(6) Deposition) at 12-13
47
Id. at 18 (“Q. [The purpose was to] tell people's families, to tell inmates' families, hey, it may take months for an
inmate's time to get computed after their sentence, so you don't need to call us about it, right? A. Giving them
parameters of how long it may take, yes.”)
8
formal training program for time computation. It was ad hoc people working with their
supervisors and learning as they go.”48
c. In 2017, the DOC finds that “an average of 200 inmates per month [are] held an
average of 49 days past the end of their sentence.” The DOC declines an offer
from the Clerks of Court to begin sending documents via email.
In October 2017, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor released a report detailing an audit it
had conducted into the DOC, entitled “Management of Offender Data: Processes for Ensuring
Accuracy.” The Legislative Auditor found a number of problems, including basic data errors at a
rate of 26 errors per 100 inmates.49 Compounding this, the Auditor found that the “DOC’s
process for calculating offender release dates is inconsistent, which can result in errors.”50 As a
result, the Auditor found that “an offender could be held too long if the release date was
miscalculated and not caught until shortly before release.”51 For example, the Auditor “asked
two DOC staff to calculate release dates on the same offender, and each staff used a different
method to calculate the release date. The two results differed by 186 days.”52
That same year, 2017, the DOC did its own internal investigation and confirmed that the
pattern of overdetention it learned about in 2012 was ongoing. In a grant application to the U.S.
Department of Justice, the Louisiana DOC disclosed that in 2017, it “had an average of 200
cases per month considered an 'immediate release' due to these deficiencies.”53 According to the
DOC, these people were held an “average of 49 days past the end of their sentences.”54 The DOC
concluded that this pattern of overdetention was costing the state “$2.8M per year in housing
costs alone.”55 According to the DOC, this is “taxpayer money” that the “DOC should not have
48
Ex. J (Dep. of DOC 30b6 Representative) at 21; Ex. H (Sec. LeBlanc) at 69 (in 2017, “DOC plans to provide a
basic Pre-Class and Time Computation training program to all new hires.”)
49
Ex. D at 10.
50
Id. at 7.
51
Id. at 13.
52
Id. at 13.
53
Ex. E at 4 (emphasis added); Ex. I at 31-32 (testifying that it is true that in “2017, DPS&C had an average of 200
cases per month considered an 'immediate release' due to these deficiencies.”)
54
Ex. I at 34, 38 (“Q. So it's a true statement that the DOC found that in 2017 it had an average of 200 inmates per
month held an average of 49 days past the end of their sentence, correct? A. Yes.”)
55
Ex. I at 35.
9
to spend.”56
On March 8, 2018, Defendants’ counsel, Attorney General Jeff Landry, made a public
statement corroborating the pattern of overdetention, stating that:
Underneath all of that is a layer of incompetence so deep that the

Corrections Department doesn’t know where a prisoner is on any given
day of the week or when he should actually be released from prison.57
Similarly, DOC spokesperson Ken Pastorick said of the overdetention problem: “We
know that there is an issue here and we want to solve it.”58
But despite “want[ing] to solve it,” the DOC has declined help when offered. The
executive director of the Louisiana Clerks of Court Association, Debbie Hudnall, had a series of
meetings with the DOC and Secretary LeBlanc.59 Ms. Hudnall offered that to speed things up,
the Clerks of Court could begin emailing documents to the DOC.60 The DOC declined, claiming
that they “don't have the capability of receiving that.”61
d. The overdetention problem continues. According to the most recent data, 231
people per month wait an “average 44 days to be released after a judge ordered
them free.”
The problem still has not been solved. The most recent large-scale data the DOC has
released is from February 2019. In that month, according general counsel for the Department of
Corrections, “231 people across the state were affected. Those people waited an average 44 days
to be released after a judge ordered them free.”62 Despite all this, there has not been a single
example of “discipline or adverse employment activity for DOC employees who have incorrectly
56
Id.
57
Ex. K at 2(emphasis added).
58
Ex. L at 2, Emily Lane and Richard Webster, Edwards, prison officials pledge fix to stop people being detained
past their release date. Times-Picayune (March 28, 2019).
59
Ex. H at 25 (Dep. of Secretary LeBlanc) (“I've met with Debbie Hudnall.”)
60
Testimony of Debbie Hudnall, Louisiana House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, Jan. 15, 2020, at
1:03:35. Available online at
http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer.aspx?v=house/2019/dec/1212_19_JU
61
Id.
62
Ex. L at 5. See also Ex. P at RFA 76 (“It is admitted that in February of 2019, 231 people were found to be held
past the release date, with an average of 44 days waiting for release.”) The list of 231 inmates is attached here as
Exhibit G, with names redacted.
10
computed sentences or release dates, from 2000 to the present.”63
Aside from these specific investigations in 2012, 2017, and 2019, the DOC does not even
keep a record of the problem. According to the DOC’s 30(b)(6) witness:
64
As a result of all of the above, it is routine in Louisiana for the DOC to hold people like
Rodney Grant past their release date. In fact, the DOC testified that it is “rare” for them to be
released on time.65 Indeed, the head of the DOC’s Pre-Class department testified that she “can't
say positively” if she has ever seen it happen. In her deposition, she discussed those people, like
Rodney Grant, who meet three criteria: they have (1) spent time in cusstody pretrial; (2) are
given a sentence with credit for time served; and (3) have a sentence that is less than or equal to
their period of pretrial custody.66 Regarding these persons, she explained:
63
Ex. X at Int. 17; see also Ex. H at 48-49 (no employee was fired, demoted, docked pay, or reprimanded as a result
of the discovery that ‘thousands of people . . . were being held past their release date.”)
64
Ex. J (Dep. of 30(b)(6) Witness) at 29.
65
Id. at 30-31.
66
Id. at 30.
11
67
It is worth noting that nothing about this pattern is outside the State’s capability. For its
employee retirement benefit system, the State has to “has to keep careful track of how long DOC
employees have worked, what their salary was, and other factors so that the state can calculate
what sort of benefits they're eligible for upon retirement.”68 And in that context, to the DOC’s
knowledge, there are no complaints.69 That is because “the State is capable of keeping track of a
lot of people's questions about their time, applying formulas, doing it in an accurate and orderly
67
Id. at 30-31.
68
Ex. I at 42.
69
Id.
12
fashion.”70
3. Secretary LeBlanc Personally Knew of the “Big Problem” of Overdetention.
Defendant James LeBlanc has been Secretary of the Department of Public Safety &
Corrections since 2008.71 As Secretary, he is “responsible for the inmates sentenced to the
custody of the DOC,” whether or not they are in “a state-run facility, a parish-run facility, or
private-facility.”72
Prior to 2012, Secretary LeBlanc testifies that he did not know about a problem of
overdetention.73 Then, in 2012, he was one of the three “champions” of the 2012 Lean Six Sigma
project.74 It was “through that Six Sigma Process that [Secretary LeBlanc] learned there was a
problem with people being held past their release dates.”75
76
Secretary LeBlanc also learned that the period “from when a person got sentenced or
convicted to when their time was calculated by the Department of Corrections was an average of
110 days.”77 And even after the Six Sigma interventions, he understood that the DOC still had
“people being held an average of about two months past their release date.”78 Secretary LeBlanc
agrees this was “a big problem.”79 But he did not fire anyone. He did not demote anyone. He did
70
Ex. I at 42-43.
71
Ex. H (Dep. of James LeBlanc) at 91-92.
72
Id. at 13.
73
Id. at 29.
74
Ex. A at 3. Sec. LeBlanc received a “yellow belt or a green belt” for being a champion of the project. Id. at 34.
75
Ex. H at 33.
76
Id. at 48.
77
Ex. H at 50; see also Ex. P at RFA 67 (“It is admitted that the 2012 Lean Six Sigma project found an average time
in May of 2012 from conviction to completion of time calculation of 110 days”).
78
Ex. H at 45; see also id. at 27 (“Q. Right, and the problem with immediate releases is that people are being held
past the end of their sentence, correct? A. Correct.”)
79
Ex. H at 41.
13
not dock anyone’s pay. He did not even reprimand anyone.80
So the problem continued, and Secretary LeBlanc was periodically reminded of it by
judges and state legislators. On January 20, 2015, Judge Doggett of the 9th JDC wrote an email
that was forwarded to Secretary LeBlanc. Judge Doggett complained that an inmate had been
held past his release date by nearly two months, “in spite of several phone calls from Judge
Randow for his release.”81
On January 28, 2016, a state legislator’s office reached out to Secretary LeBlanc about an
inmate who had obtained “an order of immediate release” more than two weeks prior, and was
“still being detained and has been given no explanation of the delay.”82
On February 21, 2019, Secretary LeBlanc was forwarded an email from Judge Edwards
of the 15th JDC. Judge Edwards had attached three articles about overdetention in Louisiana and
information about a specific overdetained person. The Judge added that “defense attorneys in
Lafayette are also complaining about the failure to timely release inmates from LPCC.” LeBlanc
responded that he had read at least one of the articles.83
Secretary LeBlanc admits that five years after the Six Sigma project, overdetention was
still “a problem.”84 He testified that in 2017, it was “costing the state $239,022 per month” to
hold “people who should be out.”85 Also in 2017, Secretary LeBlanc was personally involved in
the “the back-and-forth with the auditor” which led to the Louisiana Legislative Auditor’s
report.86 As of 2019, Secretary LeBlanc testified that there was still a problem.87
He acknowledges that even now, “once the DOC gets the documents, it takes an average
of ten days to process the release.”88 And he agrees that for a person whose sentence is less than
80
Ex. H at 48-49.
81
Ex. M at 3-4.
82
Id. at 10.
83
Id. at 1-2.
84
Ex. H (Dep. of Secretary LeBlanc) at 58.
85
Id. at 58-59, 60.
86
Id. at 61.
87
Id. at 77.
88
Id. at 81.
14
their credit for time served, if “it takes ten days [to calculate their time], they've been held ten
days past when they were eligible for immediate release.”89 Thus, they would be “overdue on the
day of their sentencing.”90
Secretary LeBlanc does not know of “any other state that has the magnitude of an issue
with people being held past their release dates that Louisiana has.”91 He has not, however, talked
to the heads of other states’ department of corrections about how they prevent overdetention,
aside from looking at what software they use.92
Finally, Secretary LeBlanc testified that the DOC has tried some things to improve the
problem. And he did identify one concrete thing the DOC could do “to mitigate the problem of
people being held past their release date.”93 That would be for the DOC to “actually go out and
get the paperwork,” rather than waiting for sheriffs and clerks to bring it to them.94
But under Secretary LeBlanc, the DOC has never tried that.95
3. The DOC Illegally Overdetained Rodney Grant as Part of its Pattern and Practice.
On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff Rodney Grant was arrested on a fifteen-year-old-warrant.96
On June 30, 2016, Mr. Grant plead guilty in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. Judge
Camille Buras sentenced him to a one-year DOC sentence, with “credit for time served from 9-
14-08 to 2015.”97 From 2008 to 2015, Mr. Grant had been incarcerated for approximately seven
years,98 and the judge gave him credit for that time.99 According to Judge Buras, the “clear
intention of all parties when the defendant plead guilty was to have this credit for time served
89
Ex. H (Dep. of Secretary LeBlanc) at 86.
90
Id. at 86.
91
Id. at 104.
92
Id. at 103-104.
93
Id. at 100-101.
94
Id. at 80.
95
Id. at 80.
96
Ex. Q (capias warrant issued November 29, 2000. Rodney Grant arrested June 27, 2016.)
97
Ex. O at RFA 3; Ex. Q at 1 (minutes of court); Ex. N (Dep. of DOC 30(b)(6) witness) at 28-29.
98
Id. at RFA 1; Ex. N at 29-30 (“Q. Would you agree that he spent multiple years in DOC custody between 2009
and 2015? A. Yes. Q. Definitely more than one year? A. Correct.”)
99
Ex. R (Sentencing Transcript) at 8-9.
15
sentence result in a release.”100 Accordingly, Mr. Grant should have been released from custody
immediately. But he was not released. Instead, he was transported back to the Orleans jail.
Fig. 2. Timeline of Mr. Grant’s Overdetention
Outer constitutional limit of Judge emails DOC to ask

time to process and release why Mr. Grant hasn’t been
Mr. Grant is arrested on Mr. Grant. released.
a fifteen year old, Judge vacates Mr.
expired warrant. Grant’s sentence, gives
him simply “credit for
Judge Buras sentences DOC learns Mr. Grant’s time served.”
Mr. Grant to one year, conviction not a violation
credit for time served of parole. Mr. Grant is
between 2008 and 2015. released.
DOC receives Mr. Grant
Mr. Grant’s brought to DOC.
documents.
June 27 June 30 July 2 July 7 July 8 July 12 July 18 July 25 July 27
On July 7, 2016, the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office drove Mr. Grant’s paperwork to the
DOC.101 The next day, DOC employee Janille Townsel reviewed Mr. Grant’s paperwork.102
According to the DOC, the first thing that had to be done was to determine whether Mr.
Grant’s conviction was a violation of his parole. Once they figured out that, the DOC would then
“have everything it needed to do his time computation.”103
So Ms. Townsel emailed Michael Reese, the Probation & Parole Supervisor of the New
Orleans District to find out if the conviction was a violation of Mr. Grant’s parole. 104 (Probation
& Parole is a division of the Department of Public Safety & Corrections.105). Approximately an
hour later, Supervisor Reese informed Ms. Townsel that Mr. Grant’s conviction was “not a
100
Ex. S at 2; Ex. O at 27.
101
Ex. N (Dep. of 30(b)(6) Witness) at 44.
102
Id. at 44.
103
Id. at 47.
104
Id. at 61, 63 (“Q. So with Mr. Grant, the DOC was waiting to receive the Bill of Information before beginning the
time computation, correct? A. Correct.”)
105
Ex. N at 58.
16
violation of the subject’s current term of supervision. The date of offense is from 2000 which
predates his date of release.”106
But at that point, the DOC did not compute Mr. Grant’s time. Nor did they release Mr.
Grant. Instead, the DOC waited to receive his Bill of Information. The DOC said it needed that
document to “know if he is a parole violator or not,” 107 even though Probation & Parole had
already said he was not a parole violator.108 The DOC said it would not even start Mr. Grant’s
time computation before receiving the Bill of Information.109 So Mr. Grant remained in jail.
On July 12, 2016, at the DOC’s request, the Orleans sheriff drove Mr. Grant to the Elayn
Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana to be processed.110 But the DOC did not
release Mr. Grant then, either. Instead of releasing him, DOC Defendants transferred Mr. Grant
to Madison Parish Correctional Center in Tallulah, Louisiana.111
Mr. Grant’s friend Alfred Marshall became concerned. On or around July 15, 2016, Mr.
Marshall spoke with Judge Buras and let her know that Mr. Grant was still in custody.
On July 18, 2016, Judge Buras held a hearing about Rodney Grant. The first thing she
said was:
106
Ex. O at RFA 16; Ex. T (Email from Probation & Parole). See also Ex. N at 51 (“Q. So Probation & Parole is
telling PreClass Rodney Grant is not violating his parole, correct? A. Correct.”) and 47 (“Q. So it was not a violation
of his parole? A. Correct.”)
107
Ex. N at 54, 59.
108
The DOC also had in its possession a different document, a criminal history record, that showed that Docket
Number 417717 was an “old case from 2000.” (Ex. N. 55) The DOC also could have also seen it was an older case
by looking it up online on Docketmaster. Ex. N at 119.
109
Ex. N at 61, 63 (“Q. So with Mr. Grant, the DOC was waiting to receive the Bill of Information before beginning
the time computation, correct? A. Correct.”)
110
Ex. O at RFA 21.
111
Ex. N at 48.
17
112
Judge Buras explained that Mr. Grant’s sentence was “supposed to be a credit for time
served sentence.”113 So to further expedite things, she vacated the one-year sentence, and
resentenced Rodney Grant to simply “CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.”114 She did this so he
“could be immediately released.”115
At that point, according to the DOC, Rodney Grant was “no longer a DOC offender as of
the 18th. . . . As far as 7/18, we're not even the custodial [sic] over him anymore.”116 According
to the DOC, after that hearing, “[t]here is no sentence anymore.”117 They did not, however,
release Mr. Grant. He continued to wait in prison.
On July 25, 2016, Judge Buras contacted DOC employee Irma Ray.118 The judge then
emailed DOC employee Kanedra Burton. The judge wrote, “Please advise as to what might be
the issue with this case as the clear intention of all parties when the defendant pled guilty was to
have this credit for time served sentence result in a release.”119 The DOC responded that “When
we initially received his paperwork, there was nothing to indicate that this was an older case.”120
112
Ex. U at 2.
113
Id. at 3.
114
Ex. O at RFA 22.
115
Ex. S at 2l; Ex. O at RFA 26.
116
Ex. N (Dep. of 30(b)(6) Witness) at 65-66
117
Id. at 68 (emphasis added)
118
Ex. S at 2
119
Ex. S, Ex. N at 71.
120
Ex. S, Ex. N at 71.
18
(This was false – Probation & Parole had emailed two and a half weeks earlier that this is “not a
violation” of parole because the “date of offense is from 2000.”121)
The DOC still did not release Rodney Grant. According to the DOC, even having both a
Probation & Parole supervisor and a judge telling them that it was an old case was not sufficient:
122
Even after being told by Probation & Parole that it was an older case, and even after
being told by the judge it was an older case, the DOC still waited to receive the documents
before even beginning Mr. Grant’s time computation. They waited passively to receive the
documents even though the DOC acknowledges it should not do so:
123
(According to the DOC, when it reaches out and tries to get a Bill of Information, it can do so
same-day via fax or email.124)
121
Ex. N (Dep. of 30(b)(6) Witness) at 51
122
Id. at 78.
19
On July 26, 2016, at 10:52 a.m., Judge Buras personally emailed the Bill of Information
to the DOC.125 The DOC then calculated Mr. Grant’s release date.126 Once it calculated his time,
it determined that he must serve negative 2,329 days,127 because his “his jail credit is thousands
of days longer than his sentence.”128 And thus, it saw he was “eligible for immediate
release.”129
Despite having everything they needed by 10:52 a.m. on July 26, 2016, the DOC took
another full day before releasing Rodney Grant. He was finally released on July 27, 2016,130
twenty-seven days after his legal release date.
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Grant filed his complaint on April 2, 2017.131 On April 10, 2018, he filed the
currently-operative Second Amended Complaint.132 Mr. Grant alleges that the DOC and
Secretary LeBlanc committed the torts of false imprisonment and negligence, and violated his
state and federal due process rights by imprisoning him beyond his court-ordered sentence.133 He
also alleges that Secretary LeBlanc caused the torts and constitutional violations via the failure to
adopt proper policies and conduct proper training of employees,134 and is liable pursuant to
Monell for the constitutional violations and respondeat superior for the state torts.135 He also
pleads claims against the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office.
On April 24, 2018, DOC Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.136 On August 14, 2018,
the Court granted the motion in part as to “Plaintiff’s federal law claims against Warden
123
Ex. N (Dep. of 30(b)(6) Witness) at 80.
124
Id. at 82.
125
Id. at 80, 83; Ex. V (email from J. Buras).
126
Id. at 82.
127
Ex. W.
128
Ex. N at 87 (emphasis added).
129
Id. at 83.
130
Ex. O at 34.
131
Rec. Doc. 1.
132
Rec. Doc. 48.
133
Rec. Doc. 48 at ¶¶ 88 to 125.
134
Rec. Doc. 48 at ¶¶ 101 to 117.
135
Rec. Doc. 48 at ¶¶ 135-143.
136
Rec. Doc. 49.
20
Hooper,” but denied the motion as to Secretary LeBlanc. 137 The Court further ruled that
“Plaintiff has met his burden in demonstrating that Secretary LeBlanc is not entitled to qualified
immunity in this case.”138 From January 7, 2019 to June 4, 2019, the case was stayed due to
DOC counsel’s military service.139
II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery, and any affidavits
show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”140 When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists,
the court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.”141 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the
nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory
facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for summary
judgment.”142 If the record, as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party,” then no genuine issue of fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.143
“[A] nonmoving party is not entitled to rest on his pleadings, but must carry his burden of
providing evidence of a genuine issue of material fact.”144 “That burden can be met by
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file and affidavits.”145 The Fifth
Circuit has “repeatedly held that self-serving affidavits, without more, will not defeat a motion
137
Rec. Doc. 66.
138
Id. at 23.
139
Rec. Docs. 89-90.
140
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp.,
37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
141
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
142
Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
143
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
144
King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.
1991)); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
145
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
21
for summary judgment.”146 However, a nonmovant’s deposition testimony is often considered by
a court in recognizing that a genuine issue of material fact exists, which precludes summary
judgment.147 The party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.148 Thereafter, the
nonmoving party should “identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate” precisely how
that evidence supports his claims.149 To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must show that there is a genuine issue for trial by presenting evidence of
specific facts.150 The nonmovant’s burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact is
not satisfied merely by creating “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” “by
conclusory allegations,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.”151
Rather, a factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment only if the evidence is sufficient
to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Hearsay evidence and
unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence at
trial do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.152
III. Argument
A. The DOC Committed the Tort of False Imprisonment When It Held Rodney Grant
Past the End of his Sentence.
The tort of false imprisonment occurs when one “restrains another against his will without
a warrant or other statutory authority. Simply stated, it is restraint without color of legal
146
Tyler v. Cedar Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 426 Fed.Appx. 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing
DirectTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 2005); United State v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir.
2001)).
147
See, e.g., Vetter v. Frosch, 599 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., King, 974 F.2d at 656 (5th Cir.
1992).
148
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
149
Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
150
Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248–49 (1996)).
151
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
152
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987)
22
authority.”153 In Louisiana, false imprisonment is not an intentional tort.154 As a result, “[m]alice
is not a necessary element of the tort of false imprisonment and is immaterial except as it may
affect the question of damages.”155 Thus, the elements of false imprisonment under Louisiana
law are: (1) proof of imprisonment, and (2) lack of legal authority.156 There “is no requirement of
proving that the confinement be intentional.”157 Nor is there any requirement that the jailer know
the prisoner is being held unlawfully:
The fact that the jailer is without personal knowledge that the prisoner is held
unlawfully does not constitute a defense to an action for false imprisonment. . . . .
In such circumstance, as in the one before us, ignorance of the law is no excuse.”158
The lack of an intent requirement arises from the fact that the jailer’s “obligation is to see
that the sentence imposed is the sentence served.”159 Thus, “[n]o privilege enables a jailer to
detain a prisoner beyond the period of his lawful sentence.”160 And because there is no intent
requirement, a jailor is on constructive notice of court proceedings.161
And so the Fifth Circuit has instructed that if is undisputed that a person was held past
their legal release date, a district court should issue a “directed verdict as to liability, and [leave]
for the jury only the issue of damages.”162
Here, there is no genuine dispute of material fact with respect to either element of the false
153
Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 971 (La., 1977); see also Miller v. Desoto Regional Health Sys., 128
So.3d 649, 655-56 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2013).
154
McMasters v. Dep't of Police, 172 So.3d 105 (La. App., 2015) (“We have, moreover, on prior occasion indicated
that civil false imprisonment is not an intentional tort.”)
155
Fontenot v. Lavergne, 365 So.2d 1168, 1170 (La.App. 3d Cir.1978); Tabora v. City of Kenner, 650 So. 2d 319,
322 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995); see also, Edmond v. Hairford, 539 So.2d 815 (La. App., 1989);
156
See Prisk v. Palazzo, 668 So.2d 415, 417 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96).
157
Id.
158
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
159
See State ex rel. Pierre v. Maggio, 445 So.2d 425, 426 (La.1984); State v. Criminal Dist. Court Parish of
Orleans, 433 So. 2d 712 (La. 1983).
160
Whirl, supra, 407 F.2d at 791 (“[N]on-malicious restraint is no sweeter than restraint evilly motivated, and we
cannot sanction chains without legal justification even if they be forged by the hand of an angel. . . . Sheriff Kern
had an unyielding duty to know his prisoner's sentence time, and this duty was not discharged.”) See also Porter v.
Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A] jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates are timely released from
prison.”).
161
Whirl, supra, 407 F.2d at 793 (“We find on the record before us that Sheriff Kern was chargeable with
constructive notice of the termination of all proceedings against Whirl, or alternatively, that absence of such notice
was not a legal justification for Whirl's continued imprisonment.”)
23
imprisonment test. First, Defendants do not dispute that Mr. Grant was sentenced to DOC
custody on June 30, 2016.163 There is similarly no dispute that Mr. Grant was released from
DOC custody on July 27, 2016.164 Accordingly, there is no dispute as to proof of
imprisonment.165
Second, there is no dispute that Mr. Grant’s lawful sentence was complete on the day of his
sentencing. The DOC concedes that an inmate’s legal release date is going to be the date of their
sentencing if the inmate: (1) spent time in custody before sentencing; (2) is given a sentence with
credit for time served; and (3) is given a sentence that is less than or equal to his or her period of
custody before sentencing.166
Here, Mr. Grant met all each criteria. First, he spent seven years in custody between 2008
and 2015. Second, he was given a one-year sentence with credit for time served between 2008
and 2015. Third, his sentence (of one year) is less than his period of pretrial custody (seven
years). Therefore, Mr. Grant’s legal release date was June 30, 2016 — the date of his sentencing.
But instead of releasing him, the DOC unlawfully imprisoned Mr. Grant for 27 more days.
(Indeed, once they subtracted his credit-for-time-served from his one-year sentence, the DOC
calculated that he “must serve” negative 2,329 days.167)
After the DOC failed to carry out the judge’s order, the judge made it even clearer. She
vacated Rodney Grant’s one-year sentence, and sentenced him simply to “credit for time
served.” At that point, according to the DOC, Rodney Grant was “no longer a DOC offender as
162
Whirl, supra, 407 F.2d at 793 (“We find on the record before us that Sheriff Kern was chargeable with
constructive notice of the termination of all proceedings against Whirl, or alternatively, that absence of such notice
was not a legal justification for Whirl's continued imprisonment.”)
163
Ex. O at RFA 3.
164
Ex. O at RFA 34.
165
Nor is there any dispute that Mr. Grant was held against his will. See Ex. Z (Grievance by Mr. Grant that “Im
being held on a 16yr. old warrant i was arrested 6/27/16 i need to be placed on the court docket ive got a job im
trying to keep i cant afford to wait 30 days to be placed on the court docket.Thank You.”)
166
Ex. J at 30 (“So if they meet all three of these criteria, their legal release date is going to be the date of their
sentencing, right? A. Right.”)
167
Ex. W.
24
of the 18th”168 and “[t]here is no sentence anymore.”169 But even though there was no sentence
anymore at all, the DOC still failed to release him for another nine days.
Accordingly, it is undisputed that both elements of false imprisonment have been met:
Rodney Grant was (1) imprisoned (2) beyond the time of legal authority. And thus, just as in
Whirl, this court should grant Plaintiff’s motion as to the tort of false imprisonment and leave
“for the jury only the issue of damages.”170
B. Secretary LeBlanc was Deliberately Indifferent to Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment

Rights by Failing to Adopt a Policy That Would Fix the Pattern of Thousands of
Inmates Per Year Held Past Their Release Date.
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. For that reason, the “due
process clause is implicated in cases of continued incarceration . . . beyond the term of a court-
ordered sentence[].”171 The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that
“there is a clearly established right to timely release from prison.”172 Thus, “over detention, or
detention absent (or beyond the expiration of) legal process, violates an incarcerated person’s
right to due process.”173
Once a court has issued a sentence, the person has a constitutional right to not be held
beyond that sentence.”174 That does not mean, however, that a jailor is “instantly liable.”175
Instead, the jailor is allowed a reasonable time to effect the release.176
168
Ex. N at 65-66
169
Ex. N at 68 (emphasis added)
170
Whirl, supra, 407 F. 2d at 793.
171
Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2010),
172
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Rec. Doc. 66 (denying qualified immunity to
Secretary LeBlanc).
173
Traweek v. Gusman, 19-cv-01384-MLCF-JVM, 2019 WL 5430590, *6 (E.D. La., Oct. 23, 2019), citing Jauch v.
Choctaw County, 874 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2017), Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2010), and Whirl
("There is no privilege in a jailer to keep a prisoner in jail beyond the period of his lawful sentence.")
174
Terry v. Hubert, supra; see also Douthit, Whirl, supra; Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (States may
“create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Shorts v. Batholomew, 255 Fed Appx 46,
*52 (6th Cir. 2007) (inmate’s 14th Amendment due process rights violated when he was held past the term of his
credit-for-time-served sentence).
175
Traweek v. Gusman, 2019 WL 5430590 (E.D. La., Oct. 23, 2019) (one day period of over detention – failing to
effect release “until the afternoon of the following day” – states claim and is sufficient to defeat qualified immunity).
25
But this “reasonable time” is very short – on the order of thirty minutes to a few hours,
and in some circumstances a day or two.177 Thus, courts have held that overdetention beyond two
days is presumptively unreasonable, but within forty-eight hours, reasonableness is a jury
question.178 (For example, the Seventh Circuit declined to presume that a pattern of detention up
to 48 hours was reasonable, because “Evidence in the record indicates that the average time
period to effect such a release is 2–4 hours in counties in general, and up to 6 hours if problems
are encountered, but even if we doubled those times, release still would be accomplished within
12 hours.”179)
This Court previously pointed to Baker as suggesting that perhaps more than a few days
might be reasonable. But as this Court pointed out, Baker was about a person “stopped for a
routine traffic violation and arrested on a facially valid warrant.”180 Thus, Baker was not a case
of overdetention at all – it was instead a case about law enforcement’s “failure to institute
adequate identification procedures.”181 (Because Baker is not an overdetention case, the court in
Douthit v. Jones182 cited Baker only for the purpose of distinguishing its facts from Baker. The
176
Rec. Doc. 46 at 21 (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss), quoting Whirl, supra, 407 F.2d at 792 (a jailer’s “duty to
his prisoner is not breached until the expiration of a reasonable time for the proper ascertainment of the authority
upon which his prisoner is detained.”)
177
See Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir.1988) (“We recognize that the administrative tasks incident
to a release of a prisoner from custody may require some time to accomplish — in this case perhaps a number of
hours.”); Arline v. City of Jacksonville, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1300 at 8 (M.D.Fla. 2005) (two and a half hour detention
following acquittal presented jury question).
178
See Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011) (“courts appear to agree that the
maximum permissible administrative delay in the overdetention context likely falls well short of the 48-hour horizon
set out in McLaughlin. . . . [E]ven a thirty-minute detention after being ordered released could work a violation of a
prisoner's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730 (8th
Cir. 2001) (jury verdict for plaintiff for half-hour overdetention at court holding cell and two and a half hours at jail
after release order ); Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (whether 11 hours was reasonable was a
question of fact for jury); Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp.2d 903 (C.D.Cal.2004) (12 ½ hour delay not reasonable as a
matter of law; summary judgment denied); Jones v. Cochran, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20625 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (3
hours); Parilla v. Eslinger, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34747 (D. Fla. 2005) (approximately 5 hours after court ordered
released and 14 hours after family paid bond); Muick v. Jasso, No. 3:02-CV-1089-L, 2003 WL 22054226, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2003) (labeling plaintiff's claim for fifty-minute overdetention as nonfrivolous).
179
Driver v. Marion County Sheriff, 859 F.3d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 2017) (granting class certification for inmates
whose release was delayed for periods ranging up to 72 hours.)
180
Rec. Doc. 47 at 23.
181
443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
182
619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1980), reh’g denied 641 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
26
case is not cited at all in Fifth Circuit overdetention cases like Porter v. Epps183, Terry v.
Hubert184, Jones v. Lopez185, etc.)
Thus, Baker does not disturb the general pattern that a constitutional violation occurs
after a reasonable period of overdetention, not to exceed 48 hours. As one court found in a wide-
ranging survey:
The Court has been unable to find any case, whether within or outside of the
Eleventh Circuit, in which the detainment of a properly identified individual
for days beyond his scheduled release date was held constitutionally
permissible. . . . Accordingly, based on the arguments and record currently
before the Court, dismissal of Plaintiffs' over-detention claims on qualified
immunity grounds would be improper.186
To prove a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must show a defendant acted
with deliberate indifference to the potential deprivation of constitutional rights.187 “Deliberate
indifference requires that the official have subjective knowledge of the risk of harm.”188 And a
“failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent when it is obvious that the likely
consequences of not adopting a policy will be a deprivation of constitutional rights.”189
This can be shown through either “actual or constructive notice.”190 A jailor is
“chargeable with constructive notice of the termination of all proceedings” against an inmate.191
And so, even under a deliberate indifference framework, subjective “good faith” is no excuse. As
the Fifth Circuit explained in Whirl,
We do not find any cases nor are we referred to any by counsel which provide that
"good faith" is a defense to an imprisonment that is not only without valid
process, but contrary to it. Nor do we believe as a matter of federal policy that
such a defense should be available to a jailer in circumstances like those before
183
659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
184
Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757 (5th. Cir., 2010).
185
262 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Tex. 2001).
186
Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (emphasis added); see also Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011) (“courts appear to agree that the maximum permissible administrative
delay in the overdetention context likely falls well short of the 48-hour horizon set out in McLaughlin.”)
187
Porter v. Epps, 659 F. 3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011).
188
Blank v. Eavenson, 530 F. App’x 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal
Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).
189
Porter, supra, at 446 (5th Cir. 2011).
190
Id. at 447 (5th Cir. 2011), quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011).
191
Whirl, supra, 407 F. 2d at 793.
27
us. The responsibility for a failure of communication between the courts and the
jailhouse cannot justifiably be placed on the head of a man immured in a lockup
when the action of the court has become a matter of public record. Ignorance and
alibis by a jailer should not vitiate the rights of a man entitled to his freedom. A
jailer, unlike a policeman, acts at his leisure. He is not subject to the stresses and
split second decisions of an arresting officer, and his acts in discharging a prisoner
are purely ministerial. Moreover, unlike his prisoner, the jailer has the means, the
freedom, and the duty to make necessary inquiries. While not a surety for the
legal correctness of a prisoner's commitment, he is most certainly under an
obligation, often statutory, to carry out the functions of his office. Those functions
include not only the duty to protect a prisoner, but also the duty to effect his
timely release.192
Here, Secretary LeBlanc agrees that the DOC is “legally bound to release inmates on
their release date.”193 And if the “Department of Corrections has a legal duty to do something
with regards to an inmate,” he agrees that it is his “job as Secretary to make sure that
happens.”194 Furthermore, according to Secretary LeBlanc, there is “no question” that it is a
problem for even “one inmate to be held past their release date.”195
And yet, he learned in 2012 that “thousands of people in the custody of the Department
of Corrections” were being “held past their release date.”196 He testified that this was “a big
problem.”197 But he did not fire anyone. He did not demote anyone. He did not dock anyone’s
pay. He did not even reprimand anyone.198
Secretary LeBlanc agreed that one solution “to mitigate the problem of people being held
past their release date,”199 the DOC could “actually go out and get the paperwork,” rather than
waiting for sheriffs and clerks to bring it to them.200 But under Secretary LeBlanc, the DOC has
never tried that.201 Thus, it was obvious that continued overdetention was the “likely
consequence” of Secretary LeBlanc’s actions.
192
Id. at 792.
193
Ex. H (Dep. of Sec. LeBlanc) at 15.
194
Id. at 13.
195
Id. at 36.
196
Id. at 48.
197
Id. at 41.
198
Id. at 48-49.
199
Id. at 100-101.
200
Id. at 80.
201
Id.
28
And so the pattern of overdetention continued, year after year. It predictably led to Mr.
Grant being held past his release date. According to the DOC, everything that happened to Mr.
Grant happened according to the rules laid out by Secretary LeBlanc:
202
If Secretary LeBlanc had implemented, anytime between 2012 and 2016, a policy in
which the DOC chose to “actually go out and get the paperwork,” Rodney Grant would not have
been overdetained. Or if Secretary LeBlanc had implemented, anytime between 2012 and 2016, a
policy in which the DOC quickly obtained documents through other parties, Rodney Grant
would not have been overdetained. Or if Secretary LeBlanc had implemented, anytime between
2012 and 2016, a training program for time computation staff that required them to reach out and
obtain any documents they think they need, Rodney Grant would not have been overdetained.203
That this is deliberate indifference is not a hard question.204 The DOC here usurps the
role assigned to judges. It rejects the black-letter law that a judge decides the length of an
inmate’s sentence. It has decided, under Secretary LeBlanc, that an inmate’s sentence continues
until the DOC gets around to performing his time computation.205
And the fact that the DOC has many inmates to calculate time for is no excuse. As the
202
Ex. N (DOC 30(b)(6) witness) at 114.
203
Ex. J (Dep. of DOC 30b6 Representative) at 21 (“[P]rior to 2017, there was no formal training program for time
computation. It was ad hoc people working with their supervisors and learning as they go.”)
204
Ex. Y (Transcript of Sept. 18, 2018 hearing in Crittindon v. Gusman, E.D. La. 17-512) at 23. (Judge Dick:
“These people were detained past their release date, end of story. Liberty interest, end of story. Fourteenth
29
Fifth Circuit observed, “[t]he large number of incarcerated persons about whom [the jailer] must
make decisions, while increasing his administrative burden, does not affect the scope of his
narrow discretion to hold or release the individuals in his custody.”206 Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit issued this succinct directive:
[W]e must never forget that we are dealing with a man's liberty, and a game of
who has the paper and who saw the paper is not constitutionally playable.207
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment on two claims – the tort of false imprisonment and a 14th Amendment
constitutional violation – against Defendant Secretary LeBlanc in his personal and official
capacities.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ William Most__________

WILLIAM MOST, La. Bar No. 36914
201 St. Charles Ave., Ste. 114, # 101
New Orleans, LA 70170
T: (504) 509-5023
Email: williammost@gmail.com
Amendment, constitutional violation. I don’t know how in the world you argue that’s not a constitutional
violation.”)
205
Ex. N at 36-39.
206
Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 535(5th 1980).
207
Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781, 798 (5th Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
30

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Case 2:17-cv-02797-NJB-DMD Document 120-4 Filed 02/06/20 Page 1 of 30

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is so.1 But on-time release is neither policy nor practice in Louisiana.

evidence of chronic unlawful overdetention—which he called a “big problem”6—Secretary

past their legal release date.8)

Unsurprisingly, the pattern and practice of unlawful overdetention continued unabated. In

DOC policies approved by Secretary LeBlanc.”14

Secretary LeBlanc in his personal and official capacities.

judge, not the defendant's custodian.”20

inmate’s time computation:

Q. What date do you think Rodney Grant's sentence was complete?

A. To DOC, it was the date we processed his time comp.

Q. Understood, right, but independent of when someone should be released and

2. The DOC admits to a pattern and practice of illegal overdetention.

DOC manages approximately 33,000 persons in its custody.23

A. By your definition of overdetention, yes.

A. By your definition, yes.28

days to calculate an inmate’s sentence after receiving their documents.29

would be held past their release date.31

Fig. 1: The DOC’s Knowledge of its Pattern of Overdetention.36

DOC investigates and DOC investigates and DOC investigates and

Rodney Grant is held

2012 2016 2017 2019

“modestly improved”, but did not eliminate the problem:

from 71.7 to 60.52 days – still a major constitutional violation.40

their release date.47

supervisors and learning as they go.”48

statement corroborating the pattern of overdetention, stating that:

Underneath all of that is a layer of incompetence so deep that the

know that there is an issue here and we want to solve it.”58

that they “don't have the capability of receiving that.”61

computed sentences or release dates, from 2000 to the present.”63

keep a record of the problem. According to the DOC’s 30(b)(6) witness:

their period of pretrial custody.66 Regarding these persons, she explained:

3. Secretary LeBlanc Personally Knew of the “Big Problem” of Overdetention.

problem with people being held past their release dates.”75

not dock anyone’s pay. He did not even reprimand anyone.80

So the problem continued, and Secretary LeBlanc was periodically reminded of it by

Randow for his release.”81

responded that he had read at least one of the articles.83

day of their sentencing.”90

aside from looking at what software they use.92

On June 27, 2016, Plaintiff Rodney Grant was arrested on a fifteen-year-old-warrant.96

Fig. 2. Timeline of Mr. Grant’s Overdetention

Outer constitutional limit of Judge emails DOC to ask

June 27 June 30 July 2 July 7 July 8 July 12 July 18 July 25 July 27

“have everything it needed to do his time computation.”103

predates his date of release.”106

to Madison Parish Correctional Center in Tallulah, Louisiana.111

“could be immediately released.”115

release Mr. Grant. He continued to wait in prison.

violation” of parole because the “date of offense is from 2000.”121)

documents even though the DOC acknowledges it should not do so:

same-day via fax or email.124)

twenty-seven days after his legal release date.

pleads claims against the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office.

DOC counsel’s military service.139

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

for summary judgment.”146 However, a nonmovant’s deposition testimony is often considered by

conclusory allegations,” by “unsubstantiated assertions,” or “by only a scintilla of evidence.”151

trial do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.152

authority.”153 In Louisiana, false imprisonment is not an intentional tort.154 As a result, “[m]alice