obligation to Parkway.
On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima agreed to
DIVISION
[ GR No. 136492, Feb 13, 2004 ]
MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT v. PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION +
DECISION
467 Phil. 190
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 9, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866[1]which affirmed in
toto the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No.
5697[2] dismissing petitioner's appeal for having been filed out of time.
The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and located along
Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by
Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who in
turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real Estate
Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16, 1989.[3]
Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management
and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and
sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million
Pesos.[4] It was further agreed that failure to pay any of the installments on
their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of
liquidated damages.[5]
Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted
several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance
of P1,820,000.00.[6]
Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a
Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor
of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name
and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its
transfer title to the condominium unit directly in Maxima's name subject to the
condition that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00,
representing transfer fee, utility expenses, association dues and miscellaneous
charges.[7]
On June 5, 1990, RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maxima's
P1,820,000.00 loan subject to the submission of, among others, the
Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the
Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.[8]
Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and
charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to
Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled
its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima.[9]
On May 2, 1991, Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal
Affairs of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a
complaint[10] for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell
Unit #702.
On December 17, 1992, the HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the
Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of
P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium
certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon payment by the
latter of the registration fees. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
1. declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between
complainant Maxima and Parkway;
2. ordering respondent Parkway to refund to complainant Maxima the
amount of One Million One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P1,180,000.00);
3. ordering respondent Segovia to issue the certificate of title in favor of
Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.[11]
Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the
HLURB (Board).[12] During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay
the balance of P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then
ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of manager's check to
Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to
Maxima.[13] The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled
Parkway to file a Manifestation[14] that the appeal be resolved.[15]

On March 14, 1994, the Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the
HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid
by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The decretal portion of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office of Appeals Adjudication and Legal
affairs (OAALA) dated December 17, 1992 is hereby affirmed with respect to
the following:
1) Declaring the nullification of the Deed of Assignment between
complainant and Parkway;
2) Ordering Respondent Segovia to immediately issue the certificate of title
in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of only the registration
expenses. This order for delivery of title in the name of Parkway is now final
and immediately executory.
and is modified as follows:
3) Declaring the forfeiture of 50% of the total payments made by the
complainant to Parkway by way of damages and penalty, and for Parkway to
refund the remaining balance of the said payments to the complainant within
thirty (30) days from finality of this decision with legal interest thereon
thereafter, for each day said amount remain unpaid; and
4) Ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
On May 10, 1994, Maxima appealed[17] to the Office of the President which
dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time.[18]
Undaunted, Maxima filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On
October 1, 1998, Segovia filed its Comment that as the original owner-
developer of Unit #702, it had already consummated the sale and transferred
title of said property to Parkway.[19]
On December 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Office of the President.
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of: Was petitioner's appeal before
the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period?
In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President[20] it was settled that the
period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of
HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15[21] of Presidential Decree No. 957
(otherwise known as the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protection
Decree) and Section 2[22] of Presidential Decree No. 1344.[23] The Court ruled
that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from
decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of
Procedure,[24] is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy
of appeal to the Office of the President, such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and
Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure.
Thus:
…[W]e find petitioner's contention bereft of merit, because of its reliance on a
literal reading of cited rules without correlating them to current laws as well as
presidential decrees on the matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President. Any party may, upon notice to
the Board and the other party, appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative
Order No. 18, of the Office of the President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of
the President shall be final subject only to review by the Supreme Court on
certiorari or on questions of law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, issued by public
respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of
the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed
from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the aforecited administrative order allows
[the] aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such
thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory
periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases
which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall
prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This
is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or
regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the
provisions of the enabling law.
We note that indeed there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of
fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First,
Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second,
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National
Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen
(15) days from the date of its receipt. The latter decree provides that the
decisions of NHA is appealable only to the Office of the President. Further, we
note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land
development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission, now known as HLURB [by virtue of E.O. No. 684 (7 February
1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)]. Thus, said presidential issuances
providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in this case.
Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in Section 27 of
HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with
the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees. For it is axiomatic that
administrative rules derive their validity from the statute that they are
intended to implement. Any rule which is not consistent with [the] statute itself
is null and void.

In this case, petitioner received a copy of the decision of HLURB on October 23,
1995. Considering that the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen days,
petitioner has only until November 7, 1995, to file its appeal. Unfortunately,
petitioner filed its appeal with public respondent only on November 20, 1995
or twenty-eight days from receipt of the appealed decision, which is obviously
filed out of time.[25]
In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt
of the decision of the Board on April 19, 1994,[26] to appeal to the Office of the
President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the
reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 9, 1998 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41866 which sustained the June 2, 1998
Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 5697 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

OPLE v. TORRES
Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought
to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O.
No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Issue: Petitioner contends:
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE
ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION
OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS
FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.
Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a
National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires
a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates
no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.
His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its
fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification
(ID) card.
In view of the need for Legislative Act
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject
that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An
administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O.
No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and
more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the
lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the
demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the
power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of
power and cannot be allowed.
In view of right to privacy
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy
is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two
considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce,
if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which
if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present
danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology"
and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our
antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of
data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In
fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification
Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used
solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of
A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN .
His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded —
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax
returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance
of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government
purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access
to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of
information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can
make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of
assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people
will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down
his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave
the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when
we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed
on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten
the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that
the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual report disclosing his
assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on
the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in
public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions.
G.R. No. 159692
BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., and BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY
JABAN, Petitioners,v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR
ALVIN GARCIA, SANGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF CITY OF CEBU, HON.
RENATO V. OSME, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNSOD and CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF,
CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, and LITO
GILBUENA,Respondents.
BERSAMIN,J.:
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize
any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in
the Traffic Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato
V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No.
1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being
contrary to law, and damages.
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked
his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain
records and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had
found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for
three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay
P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car
but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due
process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00
for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court hearing and
final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM
operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the
release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a
court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the
City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity
of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a
portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way
for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was
towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and
Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The
appeals were consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates
the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).
InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village
Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed
that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power.
The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national
lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the
City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the
legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done
through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual
rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of

law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict
scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and
constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution
and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular
traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise,
the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE
HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in
his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE
SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO,
APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA,
JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO,
FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and
MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of the
Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas and
Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of
Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No.
9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act
Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was
filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third
reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was
sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed
by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that
instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the
latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second
reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section 11 were
introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by
Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings
as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House
of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was
a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to
it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies
were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the
Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way
of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act
No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate
reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law
by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the
Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding
officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he
considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect.
A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification
that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that
the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by
the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had
signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in
view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature
on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the
previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public
policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued
circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to
recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor,
Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7,
1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor
of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service,
the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members
of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act
4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never
became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then
going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining order,
without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly
conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic
Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any
other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded
by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and
Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici
curiae, and have filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on
the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities,
principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts, have
been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine
or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A
similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing
opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5,
1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case
applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the
question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a
binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of
Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935) Constitution to be
appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights
provision) had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives" pursuant
to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in
by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros,
held that the case involved a political question which was not within
the province of the judiciary in view of the principle of separation of
powers in our government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon
merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds the
judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law
or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of
that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice
Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to resolve the
question presented, and affirming categorically that "the enrolled copy
of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,"
specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No.
2210. This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the
"enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by
the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof,
or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their
order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved
by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding
officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill.2 It has
been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication,3 to
signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses.
Even where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution
authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are
mandatory such that their absence would render the statute
invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving
the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary6 There is less reason to make the attestation a
requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even
provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill before it is
submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required
the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed
mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under
the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not
required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The
authorities in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case
of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval,
and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal
and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the
respect due to coequal and independent departments," which requires
the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in
other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the
logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they
are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due
enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify
to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its
proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may in its judgment require
secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall,
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House
unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in
its final form furnished its Members at least three
calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill
no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the
Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is
said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill
is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the
validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage.
In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of
the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable
step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof
that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but
argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it
to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence,
it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding.
This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence
upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case
the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is
not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this
and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is
a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the
President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate
and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by
disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the
so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN
AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE,
AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF
THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated
April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Title: ASTORGA vs VILLEGAS
GR No. 23475, April 30, 1974
Facts:
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to
the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city
government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard
the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to
the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police
force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga
presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted
against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for
"Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to
compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal
board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act
Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose
Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four
Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law
was considered to have never been enacted. When the this
said “law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB
9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments
were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate
floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then
sent back to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the
HOR. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it
became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the
copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the HOR for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the
wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no
amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by
Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this
fact, the Senate president and the President of the
Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that
they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA
is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute.
Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's
due enactment.
Issue:
Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to
determine if the said law was validly enacted.
Decision:
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is
true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to
the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be
looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to inquire
whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
President was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and
lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note
however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that
the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the
Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures
therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it
is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate
that error by disregarding such rectification and holding
that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
ARROYO v. De Venecia
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation
is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passedin
violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given
to a ruleaffects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity
is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of
the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is
not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated,
as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of
quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
 Enrique Morales vs Abelardo Subido
26 SCRA 150 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journals vs
Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city
for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree.
Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position.
Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated
acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila.
Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the
designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for
“failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other
persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
 Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police
department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high
school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed
Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has
served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office.
Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated
upon, the approved version was actually the following:
 No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National
Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city
and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein
for at least three years or any high school graduate who
has served the police department of a city or who has
served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually
approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference
committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of
the phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of
certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him
was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill,
thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of
the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is
in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the
Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what
the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on
the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act
may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently
being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now
decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly
required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.
.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the
Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying
a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its
Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic
Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and
veneer by plywood and hardwood producers — bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are
the main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In
May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and
paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of
P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of
said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon
after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee
vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank
refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground
that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with
the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for
review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the
provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in
this provision should be construed as "urea andformaldehyde"
(emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General
and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In
this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology decree.
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
resin formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and
extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is

patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"
between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in
support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the
view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54
Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games
& Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is
well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake
in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot
speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system —
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA
G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO,
RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON.
GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his
Capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards
and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no
valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system
should not apply to officials and employees of all other government
agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power
to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard
on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR
and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation
in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issues:
Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue
targets to the President.
Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated
in the creation of a congressional oversight committee.
Discussions:
The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, which states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is
not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the State.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is
not palpably arbitrary. “
To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the
following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test.
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is
clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.
Rulings:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the
incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain
to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the
BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of
generating revenues for the national government through the collection
of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its
great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law.
Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.
R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience
and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved
the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function
of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
G.R. No. L-20740 June 30, 1964
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, CHRONICLE BROADCASTING
NETWORK, INC., and
MONSERRAT BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDO VALENCIA, Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications and
ROBERT SAN ANDRES of the Radio Control Division, respondents.
V. J. Francisco, A. Almeda and San Juan, Africa Benedicto for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Enrique Fernando as amicus curiae.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with
preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners
and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against
respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief
of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator
of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in
this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install
and operate a television station in Manila.
From the various pleadings presented by the parties including their written
memoranda as well as the oral arguments adduced during the hearing of this
case, the issues presented to the Court for resolution are: (1) whether the
investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners'
applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis; (2)
whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3) whether or
not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is
entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations
thereof. 1äwphï1.ñët
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and
duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly
Commerce And Communications), provides:
SEC. 3.
(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or
operator license; Provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing.
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents allegedly are now
conducting the investigation in connection with the petitions for renewal.
The notices of hearing, sent by respondents to petitioners, in connection with
the applications involved herein, are uniformly worded, thus:
(Name of station operator)
____________________
(Address)
____________________
____________________
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your application for renewal of your radio station license
No. ____________ authorizing you to operate (Name of station), a (broadcast or TV)
station, which expired on (Expiration date of previous license.)
It is noted that said application was received in this Office on (Date of receipt of
application) or (length of period delay) month after said license has expired
which is a clear violation of Section 12 and 14 of Department Order No. 11,
which is hereunder quoted:
"SEC. 12. — License Required for Operation of Transmitter,
Transceiver, or Station. — No radio transmitter or radio
station shall be operated without first obtaining from the
Secretary of Public Works & Communications a radio station
license.
"SEC. 14. — When to Apply for Renewal. — If renewal of a
station license is desired, the licensee shall submit an
application to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications two (2) months before the expiration date
of the license to be renewed. Application should be made on
prescribed forms furnished for the purpose."
Please take notice that on January 28, 1963, at 9:00 a.m., the matter will be
heard before the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, at the Conference Room, Office of the Secretary,
Third Floor, Post Office Building, Plaza Lawton, Manila (Commonwealth Act No.
3846, Sec. 3. subsection h). Your failure to appear at the said hearing will be
construed as a waiver on your part to be heard and this Office shall forthwith
act on said application in accordance with existing Radio Laws, Rules and
Regulations.
Very truly yours,
s/ Jose L. Lachica
t/ JOSE L. LACHICA
Acting Undersecretary
Also, passing upon petitioners' motion for dismissal of the aforementioned
investigation conducted by respondents it was ruled, thus:
The present hearing, as the notices quoted above show, is precisely
the hearing required by Section 3 (1) of Act 3846, as amended. It is an
indispensable step in the processing of application of licenses when and
if summary approval for one reason or another, real or fancied, could
not be given as in the instant case. Certainly, the respondents
(movants) themselves would be the first ones to raise their voice of
protest if their application for renewal were to be summarily
disapproved, without benefit of any hearing. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground
to disapprove the applications for renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the ground for the
disapproval of the applications, is the alleged late, filing of the petitions for
renewal. The notices to petitioners (which in effect take the place of complaint
in civil or administrative cases or an information in a criminal action) alleged
only one supposed violation which would justify, disapproval. But petitioners
claim that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July
24, 1962, which in its pertinent part, reads:
CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS,
MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO TRAINING
SCHOOLS
It has come to the attention of this Office that a great number of radio station
operators have been conducting their operations resorting to practices which
are in violation of existing radio laws and regulations, such as:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Late submission of applications for new and renewal licenses.
It is no the intention of this Office to correct whatever laxity which in the put
has encouraged this illegal practices, to strictly others the radio regulations and
to take drastic action against violators of these regulations.
You are, therefore, requested to examine closely your operating practices,
permits and licenses and take remedial measures as soon as possible but not
later than August 10, 1962.
(SGD.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES
Radio Regulation Chief
APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. Feliciano
Undersecretary
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that
the previous non-observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations
of the Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among
others, was condoned if the necessary steps were taken to correct their records
and practices before August 10, 1962. It is not denied that herein subject
applications for renewal were all made before said date, or even before the
issuance of the circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason given for the
investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no
longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is
no reason nor need for the present investigation. The raison d'etre for it has
disappeared. Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation of
the law authorizing investigations in connection with applications for renewal
of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon violations
of the radio control regulations cannot be upheld. Firstly, by specific provision
of law,1 the respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion either to
"bring criminal action against violators of the radio laws or the regulations and
confiscate the radio apparatus in case of illegal or simply suspend or revoke the
offender's station or operator licenses or refuse to renew such licenses; or just
reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited circular specifically approved by
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications (who has not been
shown to have acted beyond his powers as such in representation of the
Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act authorized under
the law. Secondly, the circular having been issued by respondents themselves,
the latter can not now claim its illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by
petitioner CBN of its right to operate on Channel 9. It is admitted that there was
no express agreement to this effect. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10
assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer
television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to
petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement
between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10. As explained by
petitioner, it was made to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in
connection with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be effective
upon the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to avoid
interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force Base station in
Pampanga, which is operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would
be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate. When
the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean
abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9
in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks appearing in the construction
permit No. 793, issued to the Philippine Broadcasting Service that "construction
of this station shall be begun after DZXL-TV (Channel 9) Manila of Chronicle
broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved." It is claimed that upon
the approval of the request to transfer, the petitioner was deemed to have
renounced or abandoned on Channel 9. This statement cannot bind petitioner.
In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause "Chronicle
broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved" was merely played by
respondent's personnel after erasing the original words written therein. And, it
does not appear what were really written there before the erasure. In the
second place, CBN had no participating in the preparation of said permit.
Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an inter alios acta which can not bind it.
And, finally, the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed transfer, is proof
that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the
approval of its petition to transfer. There being no proof that petitioner had
really waived or renounced its right to operate on Channel 9, respondents
committed error in refusing to grant or approve petitioner's application for
renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state
that it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said
intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right belonging to
said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give up its present
operation of Channel 9. However, it may also be added that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines, was provided as follows:
PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,
including promotion, programming, operations and general
administration; Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for
the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where
there are television stations. ... P300,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
VI — SPECIAL PROVISIONS
1. ...
xxx xxx xxx
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations. (Emphasis supplied).
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President
included the following in his veto message:
(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
IV — SPECIAL PURPOSE
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, ...:
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation
of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are
television stations.
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations.
These two provisions if approved will render inoperative the television stations
currently operated by the Philippine Broadcasting Service which started last
September, 1961, in Manila.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item
or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot
veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items
to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the
amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service
was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended
for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing
commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the
President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in
the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research
on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide action on the
matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was already declared that
such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's
veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.3 If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever,4 and
the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any
expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or
operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television
stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the
release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult
to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said
intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ prayed for by
petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by this Court is made permanent. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-20740 June 30, 1964
BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, CHRONICLE BROADCASTING
NETWORK, INC., and
MONSERRAT BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., petitioners,
vs.
BRIGIDO VALENCIA, Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications and
ROBERT SAN ANDRES of the Radio Control Division, respondents.
V. J. Francisco, A. Almeda and San Juan, Africa Benedicto for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Enrique Fernando as amicus curiae.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with
preliminary injunction filed by the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle
Broadcasting Network, Inc., and Monserrat Broadcasting System, Inc., owners
and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein, against
respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief
of the Radio Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator
of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in
this case, said intervenor having been granted a construction permit to install
and operate a television station in Manila.
From the various pleadings presented by the parties including their written
memoranda as well as the oral arguments adduced during the hearing of this
case, the issues presented to the Court for resolution are: (1) whether the
investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners'
applications for renewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis; (2)
whether or not there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle
Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS; and (3) whether or
not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is
entitled to damages, for CBN's refusal to give up operations
thereof. 1äwphï1.ñët
Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by Republic Act 584, on the powers and
duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications (formerly
Commerce And Communications), provides:
SEC. 3.
(1) He may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station or
operator license; Provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be
disapproved without giving the licensee a hearing.
It is in the exercise of this power that the respondents allegedly are now
conducting the investigation in connection with the petitions for renewal.
The notices of hearing, sent by respondents to petitioners, in connection with
the applications involved herein, are uniformly
This has reference to your application for renewal of your radio station license
No. ____________ authorizing you to operate (Name of station), a (broadcast or TV)
station, which expired on (Expiration date of previous license.)
It is noted that said application was received in this Office on (Date of receipt of
application) or (length of period delay) month after said license has expired
which is a clear violation of Section 12 and 14 of Department Order No. 11,
which is hereunder quoted:
"SEC. 12. — License Required for Operation of Transmitter,
Transceiver, or Station. — No radio transmitter or radio
station shall be operated without first obtaining from the
Secretary of Public Works & Communications a radio station
license.
"SEC. 14. — When to Apply for Renewal. — If renewal of a
station license is desired, the licensee shall submit an
application to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications two (2) months before the expiration date
of the license to be renewed. Application should be made on
prescribed forms furnished for the purpose."
Please take notice that on January 28, 1963, at 9:00 a.m., the matter will be
heard before the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, at the Conference Room, Office of the Secretary,
Third Floor, Post Office Building, Plaza Lawton, Manila (Commonwealth Act No.
3846, Sec. 3. subsection h). Your failure to appear at the said hearing will be
construed as a waiver on your part to be heard and this Office shall forthwith
act on said application in accordance with existing Radio Laws, Rules and
Regulations.
Very truly yours,
s/ Jose L. Lachica
t/ JOSE L. LACHICA
Acting Undersecretary
Also, passing upon petitioners' motion for dismissal of the aforementioned
investigation conducted by respondents it was ruled, thus:
The present hearing, as the notices quoted above show, is precisely
the hearing required by Section 3 (1) of Act 3846, as amended. It is an
indispensable step in the processing of application of licenses when and
if summary approval for one reason or another, real or fancied, could
not be given as in the instant case. Certainly, the respondents
(movants) themselves would be the first ones to raise their voice of
protest if their application for renewal were to be summarily
disapproved, without benefit of any hearing. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the intention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground
to disapprove the applications for renewal.
But the only reason relied upon by the respondents to be the ground for the
disapproval of the applications, is the alleged late, filing of the petitions for
renewal. The notices to petitioners (which in effect take the place of complaint
in civil or administrative cases or an information in a criminal action) alleged
only one supposed violation which would justify, disapproval. But petitioners
claim that this violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July
24, 1962, which in its pertinent part, reads:
CIRCULAR TO:
ALL RADIO STATIONS, RADIO DEALERS,
MANUFACTURERS AND RADIO TRAINING
SCHOOLS
It has come to the attention of this Office that a great number of radio station
operators have been conducting their operations resorting to practices which
are in violation of existing radio laws and regulations, such as:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Late submission of applications for new and renewal licenses.
It is no the intention of this Office to correct whatever laxity which in the put
has encouraged this illegal practices, to strictly others the radio regulations and
to take drastic action against violators of these regulations.
You are, therefore, requested to examine closely your operating practices,
permits and licenses and take remedial measures as soon as possible but not
later than August 10, 1962.
(SGD.) ROBERTO M. SAN ANDRES
Radio Regulation Chief
APPROVED:
(Sgd.) M. V. Feliciano
Undersecretary
It seems clear that the foregoing circular sustains petitioners' contention that
the previous non-observance by station operators of radio laws and regulations
of the Radio Control Office regarding filing of petitions for renewal, among
others, was condoned if the necessary steps were taken to correct their records
and practices before August 10, 1962. It is not denied that herein subject
applications for renewal were all made before said date, or even before the
issuance of the circular itself on July 24, 1962. The lone reason given for the
investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no
longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is
no reason nor need for the present investigation. The raison d'etre for it has
disappeared. Its continuation will serve no useful purpose in contemplation of
the law authorizing investigations in connection with applications for renewal
of permit.
Respondents' claim that they have no authority to condone or pardon violations
of the radio control regulations cannot be upheld. Firstly, by specific provision
of law,1 the respondent Department Secretary is given the discretion either to
"bring criminal action against violators of the radio laws or the regulations and
confiscate the radio apparatus in case of illegal or simply suspend or revoke the
offender's station or operator licenses or refuse to renew such licenses; or just
reprimand and warn the offenders." The cited circular specifically approved by
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications (who has not been
shown to have acted beyond his powers as such in representation of the
Secretary of the Department) warning the offenders, is an act authorized under
the law. Secondly, the circular having been issued by respondents themselves,
the latter can not now claim its illegality to evade the effect of its enforcement.
The next issue is whether there was abandonment or renunciation by
petitioner CBN of its right to operate on Channel 9. It is admitted that there was
no express agreement to this effect. The only basis of the contention of the
respondents that there was such renunciation is the statement "Channel 10
assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer
television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to Baguio City, issued to
petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement
between the radio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or
change of operations of CBN from Channel 9 to Channel 10. As explained by
petitioner, it was made to understand that the assignment of Channel 10, in
connection with the planned transfer of its station to Baguio, was to be effective
upon the final transfer of the said station. This was necessary to avoid
interference of its broadcast with that of the Clark Air Force Base station in
Pampanga, which is operating on Channel 8. In other words, Channel 10 would
be assigned to petitioner only when the Baguio station starts to operate. When
the plan to transfer DZXL-TV to Baguio had to be abandoned, it did not mean
abandonment by the station of its right to operate and broadcast on Channel 9
in Quezon City.
Respondents also made reference to the remarks appearing in the construction
permit No. 793, issued to the Philippine Broadcasting Service that "construction
of this station shall be begun after DZXL-TV (Channel 9) Manila of Chronicle
broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved." It is claimed that upon
the approval of the request to transfer, the petitioner was deemed to have
renounced or abandoned on Channel 9. This statement cannot bind petitioner.
In the first place, as admitted by respondents, the clause "Chronicle
broadcasting Network's permit to transfer is approved" was merely played by
respondent's personnel after erasing the original words written therein. And, it
does not appear what were really written there before the erasure. In the
second place, CBN had no participating in the preparation of said permit.
Insofar as petitioner is concerned, it is an inter alios acta which can not bind it.
And, finally, the fact that CBN was allowed to continue and did continue
operating on Channel 9 even after the approval of its proposed transfer, is proof
that there was no renunciation or abandonment of that channel upon the
approval of its petition to transfer. There being no proof that petitioner had
really waived or renounced its right to operate on Channel 9, respondents
committed error in refusing to grant or approve petitioner's application for
renewal of the license for station DZXL-TV Channel 9.
As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to state
that it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said
intervenor on the exchange of use of Channel 9 and 10, no right belonging to
said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal to give up its present
operation of Channel 9. However, it may also be added that as the records
show, the appropriation to operate Philippine Broadcasting Service as
approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the
Republic of the Philippines, was provided as follows:
PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
GENERAL FUND
PART ONE CURRENT GENERAL EXPENSES
IV. SPECIAL PURPOSES
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,
including promotion, programming, operations and general
administration; Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for
the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where
there are television stations. ... P300,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
VI — SPECIAL PROVISIONS
1. ...
xxx xxx xxx
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations. (Emphasis supplied).
Disallowing some of the items in the said Appropriations Act, the President
included the following in his veto message:
(e) PHILIPPINE BROADCASTING SERVICE
IV — SPECIAL PURPOSE
1. For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service, ...:
Provided, That no portion of this appropriation shall be used for the operation
of television stations in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are
television stations.
5. No amount appropriated for televisions under Special Fund and General
Fund shall be used for the operation of television stations in Luzon or any part
of the Philippines where there are television stations.
These two provisions if approved will render inoperative the television stations
currently operated by the Philippine Broadcasting Service which started last
September, 1961, in Manila.
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item
or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an
appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot
veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items
to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)
It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the
amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service
was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended
for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing
commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the
President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in
the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research
on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide action on the
matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was already declared that
such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executive's
veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases.3 If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever,4 and
the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any
expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or
operating a television station in Manila, where there are already television
stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the
release of the appropriation and, consequently, null and void. It is not difficult
to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said
intervenor would not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ prayed for by

petitioners is hereby granted. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by this Court is made permanent. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P.
ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig,
Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the
Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the
MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF
THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in
behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted
by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and
circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures
and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time.
Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon
this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration
Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as
sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its
motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption
of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and
the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly
shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected
and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution
providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2)
to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it
reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide
postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other
postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full recognition of
their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and
understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange of postal
matters between nations;
 c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to
different users and changing needs, including but not limited to,
philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the
industry to finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of
postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion
and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive
orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a
statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute
on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the
repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not
the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to
be briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces
only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it
or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule
would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed,

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265,
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No.
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included
35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under
in the title of the said law.
such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or
unauthorized use thereof.
II
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged
act violates the Constitution. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26
was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2 (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring
be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its
never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph
execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject
could not have been validly added as an amendment.
as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have
These argument are unacceptable. bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this III
question. Its broader function is described thus:
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter clause.
or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the
two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions
and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
offices and officers.10
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81). The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a
valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking
privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons.11
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless
upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process
old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults.
7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking
privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or
to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is
it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the
privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all
for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was
carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted.
There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its
repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to
the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used
for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and
Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the
government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no
question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is
the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the
respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this
basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service
Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails
amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor,
the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759.
Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming
from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents'
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the
franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking
privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the
widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of
justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not
really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between
those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we
may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a
similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like
former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as
the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the
public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange
for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys
under its charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of
mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion
pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial
revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys.
It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the
Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of
justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this
serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents
themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for
communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary
has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and
Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties
of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the
discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents
a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary,
we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its
title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However,
we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution
providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to

provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be
accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own
favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life
in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with
our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to
be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws
the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail
Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its
Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The
temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision
dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are
10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support the case of
Murdock v. Pennsylvania.
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies
transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that
taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive
system of taxation”.
Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that legislature was to
adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would therefore be to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever
waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption,
the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have
long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not
discriminate against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional." The Court was speaking in that
case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly
for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior
restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax.
It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed
on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of
services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to
its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.
Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though
such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person
and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and
release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its
true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such
transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally
essential. The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which
are essential goods and services was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1)
of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that
R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions, while subjecting those of
petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform
and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless,
equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of
the same class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons,
forms and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does
not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive.
What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . .
. to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." The
mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system.
As regards the contention of CUP, it is worth noting that its theory amounts to saying that
under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt from taxation. Such theory is contrary to
the Constitution under which only the following are exempt from taxation: charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, §28 (3), and non-stock, non-
profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, §4 (3).
With all the foregoing ratiocinations, it is clear that the subject law bears no
constitutional infirmities and is thus upheld.
o. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the
ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM
regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30,
2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013
to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule
under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national
and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which
the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional
Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and
for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording
and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-
days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the
EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the
President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our
Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order
to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to
last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of
the incumbent ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-
year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant
for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot
be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress
cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the
new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover –
whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not
have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to
remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing
this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of
Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own,
has no authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of
Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August
2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing,
Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision
and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an
act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen –
a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision
of the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153
and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-
synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure
that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for any
attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations
on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the
constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions.
RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM
(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact
only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different
from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the
assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in
the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it
was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.