and conditional nature of the said agreement (making the novation conditional) is acknowledged by

MWSS. Its failure to pay within the stipulated period removed the very cause for the agreement,
rendering the same ineffective and, therefore, the parties were remitted to their original rights under
the judgment award. (b) resolutory conditions — (also called conditions subsequent) — here, rights
already acquired are lost once the condition is fulfi lled. Example: 1) I’ll give you my car now but should
you pass the bar, the donation will not be effective. If you pass the bar, you must return the car to me.

Parks v. Prov. of Tarlac 49 Phil. 142

FACTS: Concepcion Cirir and James Hill donated land to the province of Tarlac on condition that the
latter would build upon the land a schoolhouse and a park, the work to begin within 6 months from the
date the parties ratify the donation. The province accepted the donation, and the land was registered in
the name of the donee. Several years later, noticing that the province had not performed the conditions,
the donors sold the land to Mr. Parks. Now Parks sued to recover the land from the province. HELD:
Parks has no right to get the land. It is true that the donation was revocable because of breach of the
conditions. But until the donation was revoked, it remained valid, and hence, Cirir and Hill had no right
to sell the land to Parks. One cannot give what he does not have (nemo dat quod non habet). What the
donors should have done fi rst was to have the donation annulled. And after that was done, they could
validly have disposed of the land in favor of Parks. But there is one more point to be answered. The
donors contend that the condition set forth — the

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CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

194

construction — was in the nature of a suspensive condition (condition precedent), that is, since the
condition never happened, there really was no donation, and if there was no donation, there is no
donation to be annulled. Hence, the donors insist on their right to sell the property to Parks. Are the
donors correct here? HELD: No. The condition imposed was not a condition precedent. It is not true
that the schoolhouse and the park had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is,
before the province could become the owner of the land; otherwise, it would be invading the property
rights of the donors. Hence, the donation had to become valid even before the fulfi llment of the
condition. Hence, the condition is a resolutory one. Inasmuch as although revocable, the donation had
not yet been revoked, it follows that in the meantime, it is valid and, therefore, the sale by the donors to
Parks is not valid. Hence, Parks has no right to recover the property. [Author’s Note: It is submitted that
it is not correct to say that one has to be fi rst the owner of the land before he can be allowed to build
on it. One can very well do so upon the owner’s permission, and it is evident that in this case, the
owners (the donors) were already granting permission.]

(2) Conditional Perfection of a Contract If the perfection of a contract depends upon the fulfi llment of a
condition, non-fulfi llment thereof means the non-perfection of the contract since the suspensive
condition should have been fi rst fulfi lled. (Ruperto v. Kosca, 26 Phil. 227).

(3) Some Cases and Doctrines

Panganiban v. Batangas Trans. Co. (C.A.) 46 O.G. 3167 FACTS: The Batangas Transportation Company
bound itself to furnish a certain number of trucks provided they were