Delay in Delivery of Detained Persons Art 125 – Lino v. Fugoso – GR L-1159, 01/30/47 – Moran, C.J.

Facts: This petition is for habeas corpus for 12 persons alleged to be unlawfully detained by Valeriano Fugoso, Laberto
Javalera, and, John Doe; in their capacity as mayor, chief of police, and officer in charge of the municipal jail of
Manila respectively. They arrested and detained the 12 persons with charges for inciting to sedition.

The 10 who were detained were released by Fugosa et al due to no sufficient evidence found to warrant their
prosecution. The case of the 10 prisoners has become academic due to their release; thus, SC dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus for them.

The 2 other prisoners are still in custody for unjust vexation and disobedience to public officers. The prisoners,
Pascual Montaniel was arrested on 11/08/46 by police officers without warrant for inciting to sedition. Pacifico
Deoduco was arrested on 11/07/46 for resisting arrest and disobedience to police orders.

The current petition was filed in 11/11/46 thus, Pascual was detained for 3 days while Pacifico was detained for 4
days without warrants nor charges formally filed in court. The papers of their cases weren’t transmitted to the
city fiscal until late in the afternoon of 11/11/46.

Upon investigation, the fiscal didn’t find sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution, but they remained in
custody for informations filed charging Pascual with unjust vexation and Pacifico with disobedience to an agent
of a person in authority under Art 151(2) RPC.

Issue: Is the detention of Pascual and Pacifico illegal?

Held: Yes. Their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration 6 hours without being delivered to the proper
judicial authorities as per Art 125 RPC as amended by Act 3940. Even if they were legally arrested without warrant,
the 6-hour time limit was ignored and allowed to expire.

The late filing of their cases on Nov 11 doesn’t cure the illegality of their detention since no warrants of arrest or
orders of commitment were issued by the municipal court.

Pascual and Pacifico’s remaining criminal informations are both light offenses under Arts 151(2) and 287(2)
respectively. Rule 108 Sec 10 of the (old) Rules of Court operates its general rule where if the offense charged is
light, the accused shouldn’t be arrested; except in particular instances when the court expressly orders it in its
discretion.

In this case, the municipal court hasn’t acted on the 2 informations nor exercised its discretion but the Pascual
and Pacifico were detained, nonetheless.

The prisoners should’ve been released long before the informations were filed in the municipal court asp er Rule
108 Sec 10 (old) Rules of Court.

Art 125 RPC: This was an old version of the provision

Act 3940 amendment:

Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who
shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
 Search Warrants – People v. Salanguit – GR 133254-55, 04/19/01 – Mendoza, J.

Facts: Roberto Salanguit was convicted for violating §16 RA 6425 and was sentenced to 6 months arresto mayor as
minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as maximum. He was also guilty of violating §8 and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of Php700k. The 2 informations consisted of him possessing 11.14g of
shabu and 1254g of marijuana on 12/26/95.

On 12/26/95, Senior Inspector Aguilar procured a search warrant after presenting his witness, SPO1 Badua,
testifying a purchase of 2.12g of shabu from Salanguit in his house. The warrant was issued by Judge Dolores
Espanol. The police went to Salanguit’s house to serve the warrant and requested entry, but nobody answered.
The police heard panicked movements in the house then broke into the house.

The police searched the house and found 12 sachets of shabu and 2 bricks of marijuana. They prepared a receipt
of the items seized but Salanguit refused to sign it. The evidence was taken to the lab and was confirmed to be
illegal drugs.

Salanguit claimed that on that night, he was about to leave the house then saw 20 armed men in civilian outfits
climb over his gate and entered the house via roof. He demanded to see a search warrant and was shown a piece
of paper inside a folder waved in front of him. He couldn’t see without his glasses and wasn’t able to read the
paper as the police put it away. He saw the police take his .45 pistol, a bag with money, jewelry, and canned food.
His mother corroborated with his testimony.

Salanguit contested his conviction on 3 grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu seized on the ground of using
a search warrant was invalid; the validity of the warrant was challenged for lack of probable cause, pertaining to
more than 1 specific offense, and, that the place to be searched wasn’t described with sufficient particularity. 2nd,
the admissibility of the marijuana seized pursuant to the “plain-view” doctrine was invalid. 3rd was the use of
unnecessary force by the police in executing the warrant.

Issue: (1) Was the search warrant valid?

(2) Was the seizure of marijuana in “plain-view”?

(3) Did the officers employ unnecessary force to execute the search warrant?

Held: (1) Yes, the warrant authorized the seizure of an undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. But the
fact that there’s no probable cause to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia doesn’t void the warrant. This
would only be so if the paraphernalia was in fact seized; but no paraphernalia was taken. The warrant is void
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia but is valid regarding the seizure of shabu due to
probable cause of its existence.

On the specificity of offense, Salanguit’s contention is untenable. The warrant was issued for a violation of RA
6425 without specifying specific provisions. RA 6425 is a special law which defines offenses of the same class; thus
1 warrant may be validly issued. The same situation was present in People v. Dichoso but SC still upheld the validity
of the search warrant for the same reason.

Salanguit also can’t contest that the warrant failed to sufficiently and particularly indicate the place to be
searched. In Prudente v. Dayrit, the rule is that a description of the place is sufficient if the officer can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched.

Overall, the search warrant was validly issued.

(2) No. The police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found. It’s presumed that the search conducted
after seizing the shabu was invalid. Regardless if the marijuana was found in Salanguit’s person or in an area within
his immediate control.
 Search Warrants – People v. Salanguit – GR 133254-55, 04/19/01 – Mendoza, J.

On prior justification and discovery by inadvertence: the location of the shabu was indicated and known to the
police. It’s reasonable to assume the police found the shabu first. After the valid portion of the warrant has been
served, the plain view doctrine can’t provide any basis for admitting other items subsequently found as per
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.

On apparent illegality: The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newpaper; there’s no apparent illegality to it. In
People v. Musa, the marijuana seized were inadmissible because it was contained in a plastic bag which gave no
clear indication that the plastic bag contained weed. No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer
in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. The
contents of the newspaper wrapping weren’t transparent and could’ve have been apparently perceived to be
marijuana. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to prove that the marijuana seizure was without warrant and was
conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.

(3) No. As per §7 Rule 126 Rules on CrimPro, the police validly broke in the house. Salanguit refused to allow the
police to enter despite repeated knocks on the door. The police also saw suspicious movements in the house.
These circumstances justify the police’s forced entry as it was founded on apprehension that the execution of
their search would be frustrated unless they break in.

Wherefore, Salanguit is guilty for violating §16 RA 6425.

RA 6425: Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

Sec 8 - Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.

Sec 16 - Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription, subject to the provisions of section 20 hereof. (As amended by Sec 16, RA No. 7659).

Plain View Doctrine: Requisites:

- Prior justification
- Inadvertent discovery of the evidence
- Immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police

§4 Rule 126 CrimPro: On search warrants – Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

In issuing search warrants, judges must strictly comply with its requirements and no presumption
of regularity may be invoked to justify its issuance.

§7 Rule 126 CrimPro: Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place
of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant
or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
 Search Warrants – Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff – GR 64261, 12/26/84 – Escolin, J.

Facts: On 12/07/82, Judge Ernani of CFI Rizal issued 2 search warrants to the addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers to seize subversive materials. The buildings were searched, and the police seized
office/printing machines, equipment, vehicles, other articles for printing, publication and distribution of
newspapers, along with papers, documents, books, and literature all belonging to Jose Burgos Jr, the publisher-
editor of the We Forum newspaper.

Burgos impleaded the respondents to return the seized items and enjoin them from using the articles as evidence
in a criminal case against him and the other petitioners for publishing subversive material. He also assailed the
validity of the search warrants issued.

The judge and other respondents sought to dismiss the petition on the ground that Burgos didn’t move to quash
the search warrants before the judge in the criminal case. Additionally, the moved to dismiss on the ground of
laches; arguing that the warrants were issued on 12/07/82 and the current case assailing the warrants were filed
on 06/16/83, 6 months after the issuance of the warrants.

Issue: (1) Are the search warrants invalid for only indicating 1 place?

(2) Are the search warrants invalid for lack of probable cause?

Held: (1) No, the defect in the warrants was a typo. 2 warrants were applied for and issued. It’s absurd/illogical for the
judge to knowingly issue 2 warrants intended for 1 place. The actual addresses can also be found in the search
warrant applications presented.

The place to be searched is deemed sufficiently and particularly indicated. The executing officers’ prior knowledge
of the place to be searched is relevant. This is found to be so in this case. The officers knew where to conduct the
searches when they applied for a search warrant.

(2) Yes, the affidavits used to apply for the warrants for seizing items related to publication of subversive material
is too general. The affidavits must specify the particular subversive material; mere generalization won’t suffice.

The affidavit by Col. Abadilla states that Burgos is “in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other
paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD 885”

A mere conclusion of law doesn’t satisfy the requirements of probable cause. The affidavits lacked particularity
that would’ve justified the finding of existence of a probable cause. Issuing the warrants was a grave error on the
part of the judge. Under §3 Art 4 1973 Const, personal knowledge by the complainant or their witnesses is required
to justify the issuance of a search warrant.

Gutierrez’s and Tango’s affidavit states "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that
the premises abovementioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being
used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the
Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."

In Alvarez v. CFI, the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses and not the individual who made the affidavit. Gutierrez and Tango’s affidavit doesn’t
meet the test of sufficiency set regarding the oath.

Wherefore, the warrants are declared void.

 Search Warrants – Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff – GR 64261, 12/26/84 – Escolin, J.
Probable Cause: Probable cause for a search is defind as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.

§3 Art 4 ’73 Const: …and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."