ARISTOTLE: POLITICS

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(1) Forms of society and the origin of the state
(2) Slavery
(3) Good and bad “Art of getting wealth”

(1) Forms of Society and the Origin of the State

Preface (Pol. 1.1)

• The end of a community is the good (in fact, everything aims at Pol. 1.1.1252a1–6,
a good). (1.1.1252a1–2) McKeon, 1127
– The state aims at a higher good than other communities (1.1.1252a4–6)
• The state (πόλις) does not only differ from other forms of society because of the num-
ber of subjects, but it differs in kind—for even states (forms of government) differ in
kind.
• The goal (at least of books 1–4) is to see how different kinds of rule differ. (For this,
lower forms of society must be considered.)

Forms of Society (Pol. 1.2)

Consists of . . .
Family • male and female (1.2.1252a27,
1.3.1253b6)
• natural ruler (= master) and subject
(= slave) (1.2.1252a31, 1.3.1253b6)
• father and children (1.3.1253b6)
Village • several families (1.2.1252b15)
State • several villages (1.2.1252b27)
Its end . . .
• supply of man’s everyday needs,
(1.2.1252b12)
• more than supply of man’s everyday
needs (1.2.1252b15–16)
• supply of man’s needs of life
• the good life (1.2.1252b28–29)

The state is . . . 1.2.1252b27–1253a4

• is natural
• is the end of the earlier forms of society (1.2.1252b30–31)

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⇒ (1) The state is a creation of nature;
(2) man is by nature a political animal (1.2.1253a2–4)

What does “by nature” mean?

• It is not from a deliberate purpose (1.2.1252a29)
• It is not by mere accident (1.2.1253a2)
• It is not by law (1.3.1253b22)

Why are we “political animals” (unlike gregarious animals like

bees)?

Nature has given man speech (and nature does nothing in vain). 1.2.1253a8.
What is the end of the power of speech?
• Set out the expedient and inexpedient
• as well as the just and unjust;
• ⇒ make it possible that there be such societies as families and states (1.2.1253a18); justice
is the bond of men in states (1.2.1253a37).

In which sense is the state prior to the family and to an individual?

• The whole is prior to the part (if the body dies, there is no longer a foot or a hand)
(1.2.1253a19–22)
• The individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing, and therefore he is like a part in rela-
tion to the whole. (1.2.1253a27)

The Household (Pol. 1.3)

Aristotle wants to consider what each of these three constituents “is and ought to be”, plus
one additional element:
• Relation of master and servant
• Marriage relation
• Procreative relation
• The art of getting wealth
Notice that the slave is “built into” Aristotle’s basic family.
An important problem is introduced: is the distinction between slave and freeman by law
[i.e., by convention, 1.6.1255a5] or by nature? (Cf. 1.3.1253b21–22)—This relates to the
question: is there such a thing as “natural slavery”?

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(2) Slavery

The Slave, a Living Instrument (Pol. 1.4)

Why do slaves belong to the household, according to Aristotle?

Because they are the “living instruments” (as opposed to “lifeless instruments”) for acquiring
property, and without property one cannot live well or indeed live at all. (1.4.1253b23–27)
Example: the pilot of a ship uses the rudder and the look-out man (1.4.1253b28)

Is what Aristotle has in mind all that different from modern

societies that have certain streamlined low-paid jobs?

The more technological the society, the less there is a need for slaves.1 (1.4.1253b37–38)

Slavery: a Natural Institution or a Violation of Nature? (Pol. 1.5)

Lead Question
“But is there any one thus
[1] intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right
[this is what Aristotle intends to show here!], or rather is not all slavery a
[2] violation of nature?” (1.5.1254a18–20 = first sentence of the chapter)
Aristotle establishes [1] “on grounds both of reason and of fact” (1.5.1254a20).
The duality of ruler and ruled “originates in the constitution of the universe” (1.5.1254a32).

Analogies of Master – Slave in Nature

Nature provides examples of the expediency of the rule of the supe- 1.5.1254b2–21

rior over the inferior:

• Soul and body / intellect and appetites (1.5.1254b2–9).2
– Soul → body: despotic rule
[As soon as we want to move our limbs, they move]
– Intellect → appetites: constitutional and royal rule
[Even though we might want our anger to calm, or to be in control of our desires, our passions do
not swiftly obey, but only after habituation]

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“. . . if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to
guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.”
2
The idea to compare the relation between ruling and ruled parts of a human being with the political
order seems to derive from Plato, Republic 4.

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 In both cases, such rule of the superior is natural and expedient (whereas equality or the
rule of the inferior would be hurtful).
• Men and animals: tame animals are better off when ruled by men, for they are better
preserved. (1.5.1254b9–11)
• Male and female (1.5.1254b12)
⇒ Where there is a difference among men that is like that between soul and body, or be-
tween men and animals (such as people who can only do bodily work), then the lower sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them to be under the rule of a master. (1254b15–19)

What view of slavery emerges here? How does it compare to

modern types of slavery (such as that in the New World until the
19th century)?

Slavery by Nature vs. by Law (i.e., Convention/Enslavement) (Pol. 1.6)

Aristotle clarifies a few criteria.
• As to the master: “the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master.” (1.6.1255a20)
• As to the slave: no one can be [by nature] a slave who is unworthy to be a slave, such as
those who are taken captive and sold. (1.6.1255a25–28)
So there are two kinds of slavery (1.6.1255a5–6):
• one is by nature;
• the other by law (i.e., by convention, meaning, taken in war by the victors).
Where the relation is natural (rather than originating in forceful enslavement), master and
slave are friends (!), because they have a common interest. (1.6.1255b12–15)3

Is there in modern societies an analogon to slavery as depicted by

Aristotle?

Consider the difference between employed and employer, or better, between a boss and his
subordinates. Some people need instructions about how to work; others “invent” their own
work. (Example: some people who loose their jobs may have some entrepreneur spirit and
start a small company; others may be unable to work if not as an employee.)

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See also 1.13.1260b5–7: the master should converse with slaves, rather than only commanding them.

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(3) Good and bad “Art of getting wealth”

The Art of Getting Wealth; ch. 8: 1st Kind (by Nature); ch. 9: 2nd Kind (by Art)
Aristotle distinguishes a “good” (i.e., necessary) kind and a “bad” (i.e., unnecessary) kind of
the art of getting wealth.
• Necessary [i.e., good] art of getting wealth: 1.9.1258a14–18, McKeon,
– part of managing the household 1140, last ¶ of ch.
– concerned with the provision of food; i.e., limited in kind
– [“the art of getting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural (1.10.1258a37)”]
• Unnecessary [i.e., bad] art of getting wealth:
– this is retail trade, not part of household managing
– it is unlimited (i.e., one can pursue it in a boundless way).
– [this is unnatural (1.10.1258b1)]
– [the worst and most unnatural sort is usury, “which makes a gain out of money itself,
and not from the natural object of it” (b3–9)]

Aristotle is critical about the “unnecessary art of getting wealth”—

why?

Aristotle critiques the conception of life of those who want to ac- 1.9.1257b34–1258a14

crue wealth without limit.

• They are intent upon “living” only, not upon “living well” (= living virtuously)
• Their desires are unlimited; this is why they seek the means without limit to gratify them.
• Thus their enjoyment is in excess
• They end up using the arts contrary to nature. Yet the end of “arts” and virtues is not
wealth:
– Courage is for the sake of inspiring confidence (not money)
– A general’s end is victory (not money)
– A physician’s end is health (not money) [My comment: likewise, a university’s end is
education and not money. ⇒ It is wrong to set up a university like a business.]
The key is the distinction between “proper” and “improper” (or secondary) use, 1157a7–8.
Comment: thus Aristotle distinguishes between ends and purposes.

The Rules over Wife and Children (Pol. 1.12)

The rules over wife and children are free, yet they are ruled by the husband/father:
• Husband → wife:

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 – Constitutional rule4
• Father → children:
– Royal rule: by virtue of love and respect of age

The Virtues in the Ruled (Pol. 1.13)

Do slave, wives, and children have virtue? (1.13.1259b21–31)
That is, do the natural ruler and the natural subject have the same or different virtues?
(1.13.1259b32–33)
Moral virtue belongs to the subjects, but the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a
woman in obeying (1.13.1260a23–24).
The slave is actually more virtuous than the artisan (i.e., craftsman), because he participates
in the master’s virtue. (1.13.1260a36–b5)

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(1) Definition of the citizen, state (Pol. 3.1), constitution (Pol. 3.6)
(2) The forms of constitution (Pol. 3.7–8); to whom the supreme power? (Pol. 3.10);
advantages of democracy (Pol. 3.11)
(3) The rule of law (Pol. 3.15)
(4) Critique of communism (Pol. 2)

Introduction

What might be criteria for a good constitution?

Pol. 2.1: The constitution has a bearing on the capacity for realizing the good (ideal) life.
(2.1.1260b28–29)

Why does Aristotle study the topic?

In part because he considers all existing theoretical accounts or practical realizations of
constitutions are faulty. (2.1.1260b35–36)

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Puzzle: in constitutional rules, the nature of the citizens are equal (1.12.1259b7); yet the inequality be-
tween husband and wife is permanent (b9–10)—hence why does Aristotle call this rule “constitutional”?

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The Tasks of the Political Theorist (Pol. 4.1)
The goal of political science is not only to find what is theoretically the best government, but
also what is realistically possible. The (theoretically) best form is often unattainable
(4.1.1288b25).
The legislator and statesmen needs to know (1288b25–39):
1. that which is best in the abstract (in theory)
2. that which is best relatively to the circumstances
3. how a state can be constituted under any given conditions
4. the form of government which is best suited to states in general and which is easily attain-
able by all.
The statesman must “find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions” (1288b42–
1289a7).
For this, he needs to know how many forms of government there are (1289a8–10).
Thus he will be able to know which laws are the best: for the laws are relative to the constitu-
tion, not vice versa. (1289a12–15)

(1) Citizen, State, and Constitution

“What is a state?” (3.1.1274b33)

Strategy: since a state is a composite, we must first ask: “Who is the citizen, and what is the
meaning of the term?” (3.1.1275a1–2)

Definition of Citizen
Negative method: who is not (necessarily) a citizen?
• He who lives in a certain place (1275a8)
• He who has no legal right, except for suing and being sued (1275a9)
• Not those too young, nor old men who have been relieved from state duties (1275a15–
16)
• Deprived citizens and exiles (1275a22)
Citizens in the strictest sense are those that share in the administration of justice and in of-
fices, either dicast (i.e., judge) or ecclesiaste (i.e., representative). (1275a22–34)
The definition of citizen differs under each form of government; the above definition ap-
plies best to a democracy. (1275b3–6)

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In sum, definition of citizen and state: “He who has the power to 3.1.1275b18 – 3.2.
take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is 1275b24, McKeon 1177,
last 2 lines – 1178 top
said by us to be a citizens of that state; and, speaking generally, a
state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life. But in practice a citizen is defined
to be one of whom both the parents are citizens.”

Are the Mechanics and Laborers Citizens? (Pol. 3.5—was not part of assigned reading)
Mechanics (βάναυσος τεχνίτης) are not to be deemed citizens:
• They cannot have the virtue of ruling and obeying (3.5.1277b37)
• Excluding the mechanics is not any more absurd than excluding slaves and freedmen
(1278a2–3)
• We cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the
state: e.g., children are not citizens (1278a3–5)
“The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our
definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as
such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services.” (1278a8–10)
Why? “no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer.”5
(1278a20–21)
In any event, an aristocracy does not admit them to citizenship, although an oligarchy may
well do so, for many mechanics (but not laborers) are rich. (1278a15–25)

Excursus: The Baseness of Manual Work

The meanest arts are those “in which the body is most deteriorated, the most servile in which
there is the greatest use of the body, and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of
excellence.” (1.11.1258b36–38)
The slave has a share in virtue by means of sharing in his master’s life; the artisan only be-
comes virtuous to the extent he becomes a slave (cf. 1.13.1260a39–b2)
“. . . the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of
inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will
cease to be a distinction between master and slave.” (3.4.1277b3–6; cf. 8.2.1337b15)
See also the significance of leisure for the life of a citizen.

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οà γÏρ οἷόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τÏ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίον βάναυσον ¢ θητικόν.

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Democracies made of craftsmen of the mechanical crafts, traders, and laborers are inferior
to those made of farmers or shepherds, for the former are unable of virtue. (6.4.1319a25–
28)
In the best state, the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such life is
ignoble and inimical to virtue. (7.9.1328b39–40)
Aristotle distinguishes between liberal and illiberal occupations; the latter are vulgarizing,
the former seem to include leisure. (8.2.1337b5–14)

The State (3.6 and 3.9)

What Makes a State a State? (3.9.1280b12–35; cf. 1280a33–11)

1. cities become contiguous
2. intermarriage
3. exchanges and laws
4. alliances
All of this would not yet make of a state a state.

What is the essential characteristic of a state?

Aristotle seems to say that it is “the power to make the citizens good and just” (3.9.1280b11).
Mere alliances or treaties fail to do so: they merely see to it that those under the treaty do
not do injustice to one another; whereas good governments take into consideration virtue
and vice in states. (1280b3–10).
In conclusion: a state ≠ a society. A state is “a community of families 3.9.1280b30–1281a2,
McKeon, 1188, 3rd line
and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect
from bottom – 1189
and self-sufficing life.” It is sustained by friendship.

The End of a State

What is the end of a state? 3.6.1278b15–29,

McKeon, 1184
• The chief end = well-being (as opposed to mere life)
• A further end is mere life
• But even when they do not require one another’s help, men desire to live together.

The Common Good (or Common Interest)

Analogy with household management (3.6.1278b30–40)
• the rule over a slave is exercised

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 – primarily with a view to the interest of the master;
– only accidentally of the slave;
• the rule over wife and children is exercised
– primarily for the good of the governed
– but also for the common good of both
Likewise, governments that regard (1279a17–21)
• the common interest are in accord with principles of justice (= community of freemen)
• the private interest of the rulers are defective and perverted forms, for they are despotic.

The Definition of Constitution and the End of a State

3.6.1278b10–14,
Definition of “Constitution” McKeon, 1184
“A constitution (πολιτεῖα) is the arrangement of magistracies
(ἀρχῶν) in a state (πόλις), especially of the highest of all. The government (πολίτευμα) is
everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government.6 For exam-
ple, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we
say that these two forms of government also are different: and so in other cases.”

(2) Forms of Constitution

The True and Perverse Forms of Government/Constitution (Pol. 3.7; cf. EN 8.10)

Common interest Private interest . . . . . . of the

(= true forms) (= perversions)

One kingship/royalty tyranny monarch only

A few aristocracy oligarchy7 wealthy

The many constitution/polity democracy7 needy

According to Aristotle, each of these basic kinds of government has numerous sub-
categories (Pol. 3.14–4.16). What could give rise to the differences internal to each kind?

6
Cf. 3.7.1279a25: “The words constitution and government have the same meaning.”
7
Aristotle does not entirely condemn oligarchies and democracies: “Oligarchy or democracy, although
a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good enough government. . . .” (5.9.1309b31–33).

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According to Aristotle: “There must therefore be as many forms of government as there are
modes of arranging the offices, according to the superiorities and differences of the parts of
the state.” (4.3.1290a11–13)

Does the above scheme correspond to reality?

According to Aristotle, although the scheme of 3.7 does not exhaust the theoretical possibili-
ties, it represents in fact the true state of affairs. Here are theoretical possibilities
(3.8.1279b20–27):
• Democracy = government of the many—What if the many are wealthy?
• Oligarchy = government of the few—What if the few are poor, yet stronger than the
wealthy?
For Aristotle (3.8.1279b40–1280a6), what is essential to
• democracy is not a great number of rulers but poverty;8
• oligarchy is not a small number of rulers but wealth.
“But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many” (1280a3)

How does wealth contribute to the success of a constitution?

My comment: accordingly, it matters for a constitution how wealth is distributed. Notice that
in modern industrial nations, there tends to be a large relatively wealthy middle class. This
seems to contribute to the success of a constitution like the one of the United States of
America.

Supreme Power in the State – Overview (Pol. 3.10)

Who should rule the state:
1. the multitude (= the poor)?
– They will divide up among themselves the property of the rich ⇒ injustice and the
ruin of the state
2. the wealthy (= the few)?
– They will rob and plunder the poor
3. the good?
– This would dishonor those excluded from power
4. one best man?
– Thus even more people would be dishonored
5. the tyrant?

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Notice that for Aristotle, poverty implies lack of education (that is, lack of both theoretical education
and moral education).

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 – [not discussed]
6. the law?
– This only shifts the problem: is the law democratical or oligarchical?

Advantages of Democracy (Pol. 3.11)

That the multitude should rule “seems to contain an element of truth” (3.11.1281a40–41).
This may not apply to every democracy, but of some it might be true (1281b15–21)
• Each individual has a share of virtue and prudence;9 when they come together they be-
come as it were one man (1281b3–5)
• The many are better judges than a single man (1281b7–15); each individual, left to him-
self, forms an imperfect judgment (1281b37)
• Though it is dangerous to give them great offices of state (danger of error and crime), it
is also a danger in excluding them from offices, because they would become enemies of
the state (1281b26–31) ⇒ give them some deliberative and judicial functions (1281b31–
32).
• Analogies in favor of this solution:
– Impure food, when mixed with pure food can make the entire food more wholesome
than a small quantity of pure food would be (1281b36–38)
– The user of a house will judge better the worth of a house than its builder (1282a20–
22)
Yet there are problems with this theory—Who has good judgment about political affairs?
– Men ought to be called to account by their peers, just like the physician ought to be
called to account by physicians (1282a2–3). [In other words (it seems), the magis-
trates are not to be called to account by the uneducated, “the many.”]
– Those who know geometry will choose a geometrician rightly (1282a8–10)
In response to these difficulties, Aristotle reiterates that the multitude would combine their
competence.
Above all, these aporiae show the necessity to have good laws!
“. . . laws, when good, should be supreme; . . . the magistrates should 3.11.1282b1–14

regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to
the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars.” (1282b2–6).

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How does that cohere with EN 6.12–13?

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The Importance of the Middle Class (Pol. 4.11–12)
Because of the antagonism of the rich and the poor, the middle class is crucial and should
be taken into account, whether the laws are oligarchical or democratical. With the middle
class as an ally, the government will be stable. (1296b35–1297a13)
More advantages of the middle class (4.11.1295b2ff.):
• The middle class will neither shrink from rule, nor be over-ambitious for it (1295b 12–14)
• The luxurious cannot obey and can only rule despotically; the very poor do not know
how to command and must be ruled like slaves (1295b 14–25)
⇒ not a city of freemen, but of masters and slaves
⇒ the rich despise the poor, the poor envy the rich
⇒ no friendship and no good fellowship in such states
• The middle class citizens’ life is most secure (they do not covet their neighbors’ goods,
nor do others covet theirs) (1295b 29–34)
• Where people lack sufficient property, there may arise extreme democracy; where there
is too much, there may arise oligarchy, and tyranny may develop from either extreme
(1295b40–1296a5)
Yet the middle form of government [i.e., with a great middle class] has rarely existed.
(1296a36–37)

(3) The Rule of Law (part of Pol. 3.15)

Is it more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or the best

laws? (1286a8–9)10

Contra rule of law:

• The laws speak only in general terms and cannot provide for circumstances (1286a10–11)
• An individual can better deliberate in particular cases (1286a20–21)
Pro rule of law:
• Law is passionless (1286a19)
When the law cannot determine a point (cf. EN 5.10: equity), who should decide: one best
man or all? (1286a25)
Answer:
• a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual (1286a30)

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This issue is taken up again in 3.16.1287a19–

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• the many are more incorruptible than the few. They are more difficultly all overcome by
passion (anger) than a single individual. (1286a31–37)
• in any event, if not the multitude is able of virtue, then a few good citizens are still better
than a single man ⇒ aristocracy is better than royalty. (1286a38–b8)

(4) Difficulties in Communism and Equality

• Unity is not created by making them equal, but by the principle of compensation, that is,
by justice. (2.2.1261a24–31) (against Plato’s premise: “the greater unity of the state, the
better.”)
• “that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it,” for
“everybody is more inclined to neglect duties which he expects another to fulfil” – includ-
ing the care of the sons! (2.3.1261b33–1262a2)
• Complaints arise is when the farmers do not share equally in enjoyments and toils.
(2.5.1263a12)
• If everything is held in common, two virtues disappear (2.5.1263b8–14):
– temperance: it is honorable to abstain from another’s wife for temperance’s sake
– liberality

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Preservation and Destruction of States:
(1) How the rulers fool the ruled (Pol. 4.13)
(2) The importance of justice (Pol. 3.9 and 5.1)
(3) Causes of Revolution
(4) Causes of Preservation of States

Introduction

Notice that what book 5 is above about all what to keep in mind in order to make a good
constitution.
The study of the causes of revolution should help to organize a state in such a way that
revolutions are less likely to take place. (5.1.1301a19–24)
The modes of revolution (change of government) are different (1301b4–26):
• Changing the form of the constitution (e.g., from democracy to oligarchy)
• Trying to get the administration into one’s hand [without changing the constitution]

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• Changing the degree to which a constitution is oligarchical etc.
• Changing a particular institution of the constitution (e.g., a particular office)

The Safety (or Stability) of a Constitution

Which of the imperfect constitutions lasts the longest (1302a9–16)?
• oligarchy: double danger:
– discord among the oligarchs
– discord between oligarchs and the people
• democracy: only one form of danger:
– quarrel with the oligarchs.
The middle class contributes to the safety of the imperfect forms of government [i.e., de-
mocracy or oligarchy]; a government composed of the middle class approximates democ-
racy more than oligarchy. (1302a13–16)

(1) How the Rulers Deceive the Ruled (Pol. 4.13)

Do we live in a democracy or in an oligarchy?

“The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people . . . relate to 4.13.1297a14–34 (McK
1223, 4.13 beginning of
(1) the assembly;
chapter)
(2) the magistracies;
(3) the courts of law;
(4) the use of arms;
(5) gymnastic exercises” (4.13.1297a14–16)
In all these points, with selective fines (either only the rich are fined, or they are fined much
higher than the poor), it is made sure that the rich take care to attend. Concerning the law
courts, one is free to register, but there are heavy fines if after registration one fails to at-
tend; thus through fear of fines the poor may avoid to register themselves. (1297a16–35)
Analogously, democracies pay the poor for attending, but inflict no penalty on the rich for
non-attendance. (1297a35–37)
If they duly mixed the two principles [like in a polity11 ], they would pay the poor to attend
and fine the rich if they do not attend, so that all will take part. (1297a37–b1)

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Cf. 4.9.1294a36–b2, on how a polity comes about by combining the laws of democracies and oligar-
chies.

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(2) The Importance of Justice, and Rival (or Partial) Conceptions of Justice

Revolutions arise from a dispute about justice: 5.1.1301a25 – b2, McK.,

1233, 1st ¶
• Democracies: “those who are equal in one respect (freedom)
are equal in all respects”
• Oligarchies: “those who are unequal in one respect (property) are unequal in all re-
spects”
• (whereas freedom and wealth are common, good birth and virtue are rare ⇒ democracy
and oligarchy are the principal forms of government, 1301b39–1302a1)
So there are different ideas of what justice is. Distributive justice is:
• equality for equals
• inequality for unequals (3.9.1280a11–13).
The criterion is the person’s deserts.
⇒ “[T]his is the origin of quarrels and complaints …” EN 5.3.1131a23–29,
McK., 1006, end of 2nd ¶
These complaints are due to two reasons:
• They agree about equality of things, but disagree concerning equality of [the deserts of]
the person, because everyone is a bad judge of their own affairs
• [T]hey are speaking of a limited and partial justice12 , but imagine themselves to be speak-
ing of absolute justice” (3.9.1280a19–23).
Example: Pol. 3.9.1280a23–32,
McK., 1187, bottom:
• one party [i.e., “the oligarchs”] considers itself unequal (i.e.,
“For the one party …”
more deserving) on account of its wealth;
• another party [i.e., “the democrats”] considers itself equal on account of free birth.
According to Aristotle, both miss the point. The state exists for the sake of good life
(1280a32).
The goal of a political society is to foster noble actions ⇒ The crite- 3.9, 1281a3–10, McK.,
1189
rion for sharing in the government is not wealth, but political virtue.
Revolutions arise when their participation in the government does not correspond to their
preconceived idea of which share in the government they deserve.
There are two kinds of equality; if a state is based upon a single kind of equality, it does not
last; instead, both kinds should be taken into account.13 Equality can be (1301b29–1302a13):
• numerical: sameness in number or size: 3–2 = 2–1
12
They have a (just) claim in a certain sense, but not an absolute claim, Pol. 3.12.1283a29–30.
13
Democratic justice is the application of numerical, not proportional equality, 6.2.1317b4.

16
• proportional: equality of rations: 4:2 = 2:1

(3) The Causes of Revolution

The Causes of Revolutions in Outline (Pol. 5.2)

[Chapter 5.2. is not as neatly ordered as may appear;14 more details are explained in 5.3–4]
Three causes of revolutions and dissensions :
• Which attitudes (πῶς τε ἔχοντες)?
– Desire of equality (of the underprivileged)
– Desire of inequality and superiority (of those who think of themselves as superior)
• Which motives (τίνων ἕνεκεν)?
– Love of gain and honor
– Fear of loss and dishonor
• Which origin (τίνες ἀρχαί)?
– Insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in
some part of the state
– Election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements

The Causes of Revolutions in More Detail (Pol. 5.3)

Aristotle now discusses the causes mentioned in 5.2. in a little more detail and gives historical
examples.
• Insolence and avarice → magistrates conspire against one another and against the consti-
tution
• Honor → the dishonored who see others obtaining honor rise in rebellion
• Superiority → a too great power by one or by a few is too much for the state to control
⇒ monarchies or family oligarchies, or ostracism (cf. Pol. 3.13) to prevent this to happen
• Fear → those who expect to be punished or to suffer wrong anticipate their enemies
• Contempt → in oligarchies, the [poor] majority revolts; in democracies, the rich [minor-
ity] revolts
• Disproportionate increase in any part of the state (e.g., by military losses) → when the
number of the poor increases ⇒ democracy; when the number of the rich increases ⇒
oligarchy
14
Aristotle starts by listing three causes: feelings, motives, origins (1302a19–22)—but how do they dif-
fer? Then he mentions that there are seven causes and reasons of revolutions, but from a different perspec-
tive more than seven (1302a37–38)—but what are these two different perspectives and how does he number
them?

17
• Unfair election of magistrates → election contests; replacement of electors by election by
lot
• Carelessness → disloyal persons find their way into the highest offices
• Neglect of slightness of the change15 → a great change may slip into the constitution
through neglect of a small matter
• Difference of races16 , that is, reception of strangers → they may drive out of power the
native citizens.
• Inability to preserve the unity of the state, that is, disagreement between inhabitants of
different locations within the state.17

(4) The Means for Preserving Constitutions

The Means for Preserving Constitutions (5.8)

• Foster the spirit of obedience to the law (1307b31)
• Guard against the beginning of change (1307b39–40)
• Never wrong the citizens (1308a8–11):
– The ambitious in a matter of honor
– The common people in a matter of money
• Restrict the tenure of offices (1308a16–24); thus
– oligarchies and aristocracies do not fall into the hands of families
– long tenure begets tyranny
• Invent terrors, so that the citizens may be on their guard (1308a25–30)
• Control the contentions and quarrels of the notables (1308a30–31)
• The laws should provide to raise or lower the property qualification in proportion to the
increase or decrease of money (1308a35–b9)
• Do not allow the disproportionate increase of any citizen (1308b10–30):
– Give moderate honor for a long time rather than great honor for a short time
– The laws should provide against anyone having too much power
– Watch over the appropriate life-style of individuals
– Carefully watch an increase of prosperity in any part of the state. The instruments for
this are these:
• Give the management of affairs and offices to opposite elements:
15
Seems to be distinct from “neglect about trifles” (5.2.1302b4); see 5.4.1303b28–1304a17 for the lat-
ter.—Does “neglect of trifles” comprise “smallness of change” like a the species of a genus? In 5.7.1307a40–
b6, this is insinuated.
16
Cf. 5.2.1302b4: “dissimilarity of elements.”
17
Not mentioned in 5.2.

18
 – e.g., virtuous and the many
– the rich and the poor
• Combine the poor and the rich in one body
• Increase the middle class
• Magistrates are not to make any money (1308b31–1309a10)
– Thus the people are not irritated, thinking the magistrates are stealing their money
– Also, then the poor, though able, are not interested in holding office (thus aristoc-
racy and democracy are combined)18
• Honors should be given by law to magistrates who have the reputation of being incor-
ruptible (1309a13–15)
• In democracies, the rich should be spared and their property not divided (1309a15–17)
• In an oligarchy, great care should be taken of the poor, and lucrative offices should go
to them19 (1309a19–21)
• Properties should be equalized by means of inheritance laws (1309a24–26)
• Assign to those who have less share in the government (i.e., the rich in democracies, the
poor in an oligarchy) a proportionate participation in the offices, except for the princi-
pal ones (1309a27–31)

Further Means to Preserve a Constitution (5.9)

Three qualifications for those who fill the highest offices (5.9.1309a33–36):
• “loyalty to the established constitution;
• the greatest administrative capacity;
• virtue and justice of the kind proper to each form of government”
What should we do when these three qualities are not found in the same person?—Look at
which qualities are rare. Examples:
• In the choice of a general, look for skill rather than virtue
• In an office of trust, look for outstanding virtue (1309b3–8)
Why is virtue necessary, in addition to loyalty and political ability?—If someone cannot look
after his own interests (because, say, he lacks self-control), will he not also be negligent of the
interests of the public? (1309b9–14)

18
Like in the U.S., as Tocqueville noted.
19
How does this fit with the point just made before that the magistrates should make no money so that
the poor are not interested in the offices (1308b38–1309b10)?

19
Further Means to Preserve the State
• Have care that the loyal citizens should be stronger than the disloyal. (1309b17–18) ⇒ do
not push the principles of either oligarchy or democracy to the extreme (1309b33–34)
• Democrats should profess to maintain the cause of the rich; oligarchs should profess to
maintain the cause of the poor (by taking an oath: “I will do no wrong to the people”)
(1310a3–12)
• The most important thing is the adaptation of education to the form of government:
train the young by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution; otherwise, the
best laws are useless. (1310a13–17) ⇒ Two corrections are necessary (1310a19–36):
– The sons of the oligarchs should not live in luxury while the sons of the poor are
hardened by toil
– The general idea that freedom means doing what a man likes is wrong; rather, “men
should not think it slavery to live according to the rule of the constitution; for it is
their salvation.” (1310a35–36)

The Destruction of a Monarchy (Pol. 5.10)

Comparison between royalty and tyranny (i.e., the two forms of monarchy)

Royalty Tyranny

Kinship to other forms Aristocracy; it is based upon: Compound of oligarchy . . .

of government • Merit • Aims at wealth
(5.10.1310b2–7) • Benefits conferred • Mistrusts the people
• Power added to both • Injures the people
(1310b33–34) . . . and democracy:
• War against the notables
(1311a8–23)

Origin of the rulers Selected from the noble class • Most have been demagogues
(1310b7–32): against the people • Some came from the leading
class in oligarchies
• Some were previously kings.

Aims of the rulers • Public interest: • Private ends

(1310b40–1311a5) – Secure justice for the rich • Pleasure and Riches
– Avoid abuse of the poor
• Honor

Guards (1311a6–7) Citizens Mercenaries

20
The Destruction of Tyrannies
The cause of conspiracies in monarchies is similar as in other forms of government
(1311a23–30). The main motives are (mostly illustrated by historical examples) (1311a28–
1312a39):
• Love of gain
• Insult
• Fear
• Contempt (see also 1312b20)
• Ambition
• Hatred (1312b20)
• Anger (1312b25)
Tyrannies (like all other governments) are also overturned
• from without by an opposite and more powerful form of government (1312a40–b1)
• from within, when the reigning family is divided (1312b9–10).
The same causes which bring to fall the most unmixed form of oligarchy and the most ex-
treme form of democracy affect also tyranny; both extreme forms are in fact tyrannies dis-
tributed among several persons. (1312b34–38)

The Destruction of Royalties

They are usually destroyed from within, not from without—in two ways (1312b39–1313a3):
• Quarrels within the royal family
• Tyrannical style of government, that is, contrary to the law
Since kings rule over voluntary subjects, their rule ends when the subjects do not want him;
whereas tyrants last also against their subjects’ wills. (1313a5–16)

The Preservation of a Monarchy (Pol. 5.11)

Monarchies are preserved by the opposite causes.
Royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers ⇒ less envy ⇒ more lasting (5.11.1313a17–
33)
Tyranny is preserved in two ways:
• The traditional tyrannical method: cut off those who are too high, that is, three things
(1314a13–29)
– Humiliation of the subjects
– Creation of mistrust

21
 – Take away their power.
This is accomplished concretely by these means (1313a34–1314a1)
– Put to death men of spirit
– Do not allow for common meals, clubs, education
– Guard against things that inspire courage and confidence
– Prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion
– Prevent people from knowing one another
– Make them appear in public so that the tyrant knows what they are doing
– Try to know what the subjects think and say ⇒ employ spies
– Sow quarrel among the citizens
– Impoverish the subjects
– Multiply taxes
– Make war so that
• People have something to do
• They need a leader
– Distrust the friends
– Give power to woman and slaves, so that they inform against their husbands or betray
their masters
• They are also preserved by the opposite ways, that is: make tyranny more like the rule of a
king (1314a30–40); show himself to his subjects like a steward and king (1315a41–42:
– act or appear to act in the character of a king;
– meanwhile keep power enough to rule over the subjects
Concretely (1314a34–1315b10)
– pretend care of public revenues—give an account of the revenues and spending
– collect taxes only for state purposes
– dignified appearance
– no sexual offenses
– moderate indulgence of pleasures—in any event, not parade his vices to the world
– adorn and improve the city
– appearance of earnest service to the gods to make believe that the gods are fighting
at his side—yet his religion must not be thought foolish
– honor men of merit—honors should be conferred by himself, while punishments in-
flicted by officers and courts
– do not make one person great
– if someone needs to be deprived of power, this is to be done gradually
– abstain from all outrage, personal violence, and arbitrary conduct towards the young
– be careful towards men who are lovers of honor
22
 – if correction needs to be made, then make it appear as fatherly correction
– special care towards those who think of themselves as insulted
– make believe that he guarantees that of two classes in the city (i.e., rich and poor), he
prevents one from harming the other
– give the more powerful class a share in the government
– do not confiscate what belongs to others
– win the notables by companionship, and the multitude by flattery
– have a virtuous (or at least a half-virtuous) disposition; not be wicket, but half-wicked
only.

Examples of Durations of Tyrannies; Critique of Plato’s Republic (5.12)

Epilogue on Changes of the Duration of Tyrannies (5.12.1315b12–1316a1)

Oligarchies and tyrannies are the most short-lived forms of government. (1315b13–14)
Aristotle gives historical examples of tyrannies that had a long duration (up to a 100 years);
the examples confirm some of the points of 5.11. about the preservation of tyrannies.
Furthermore, this displays Aristotle’s empirical rather than theoretical method.

Critique of Socrates’ Theory in Plato’s Republic (1316a2–b29)

• Aristotle acknowledges Socrates’ point that some bad men do not submit to education.
Aristotle admits that “there may well be some men who cannot be educated and made
virtuous.”
• Contrary to Socrates’ view, there is no rule according to which one type of government
changes into another; e.g., a tyranny can change into another tyranny, into oligarchy,
democracy, or aristocracy.
• A government changes into an oligarchy not merely because the ruling class are lovers
and makers of money, as Socrates supposes
• Socrates only mentions one cause of change—that citizens become poor through dissi-
pation and debt—although there are many of them, e.g. insults
• Socrates fails to realize that there are many forms of oligarchy or democracy, not just
one of each.

4
(1) Happiness of the state: virtue
(2) Moral education and music

23
(1) Happiness of the State

Happiness Lies in Virtue (Pol. 7.1)

st
“He who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought 7.1.1323a14–21, 1 ¶ of
ch., McKeon, 1277
first to determine which is the most eligible life”—there is an im-
mensely important connection between ethics and politics
• Those who are governed in the best way may be expected to lead the best life
• There seems to be a connection between the best for the individual and the best for the
state

Happiness is proportional to virtue

The Lowest Common Denominator concerning ethics (common 7.1.1323a21–36, 2nd ¶ of
ch., p. 1277
opinion)—the partition of goods:
• External goods (wealth, property, power, reputation, 1323a39)
• Goods of the body
• Goods of the soul
– Courage
– Temperance
– Justice
– Prudence
“Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue
and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action.” (1323b21–22) Aristotle makes this point after
having argued that external goods contribute little to happiness.
(Cf. God, who is blessed by reason of his own nature, not by reason of external goods.
1323b23–25)

The Happy State is a Virtuous State

• A happy state is that which is best and which acts rightly, thanks 1323b30–36, McKeon,
1278, “In like manner …”
to virtue and wisdom.
• The virtues of the state have the same form and nature as the virtuous of the individual
[cf. Plato, Republic 4]

24
Individual and Political Happiness—Questions Raised (Pol. 7.2)
Everyone agrees that happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state. Their views
concerning what happiness of the state consists in depend on what they think happiness of
the individual consists in (7.2.1324a5–14):
Highest individual good is. . . . ⇒ the happiest city is. . . .
• wealth • the wealthiest city
• the life of tyrant • a city which rules over the greatest number
• virtue • the most virtuous city

What Does Happiness of the Individual Consist In?

“Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can
act best and live happily.” (7.2.1324a24–25)
But those who are most keen in the pursuit of virtue prefer one of two kinds of life—which
one is best? (Pol. 7.2.1324a25–b2; cf. EN 1.5 and EN 10.7–8)
• The life of business and politics ⇒ the true life of man is practical and political
• The contemplative life ⇒ involvement in a constitutional rule seems an impediment to
the ruler’s own well-being
(Aristotle addresses this issue in Pol. 7.3)
Others think that happiness consists in tyrannical rule ⇒ the laws are framed so as to main-
tain the rulers in power ⇒ importance of military power ⇒ emphasis of military training and
warlike virtues (awards are given for having slain enemies). (1324b2–23)
Aristotle rejects of course tyrannical rule and the practice and ideas it implies:
• Despotic governments are irrational: the despot demands justice for himself but is not
concerned with justice toward the others. “How can that which is not even lawful be the
business of the statesman or the legislator?” (1324b23–41)
• Warlike pursuits are only a means, not an end (1325a5–7)—cf. 7.14.1333a36: war is for
the sake of peace
• The lawgiver should inquire how states, peoples, and communities can participate in the
good life and in happiness (1325a7–10)

Conclusion: Life of Virtuous Activity is the Best

Since happiness is virtuous activity, the active life is the best. “Activ- 7.3.1325b14–23,
McKeon, 1282
ity” concerns above all thoughts and contemplation. (Even with re-
spect to external actions, the directing mind is most truly said to act.)

25
Becoming Virtuous (Pol. 7.13)
Since a city can only be virtuous if the citizens are virtuous, Aristotle inquires again into vir-
tue (7.13.1332a33–36)

Good Ends and Means

Generally well-being consists in a good end and good means.
One can fail in either one or in both. Example: “physicians do not always understand the
nature of health, and also the means which they use may not effect the desired end.”

Happiness and Virtue

It is not granted to everyone to attain happiness, for the good life requires external goods
(1331b40–1332a1)
Happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue (1332a9–10). Virtue is of two
kinds:
• Absolute (which is good in itself): actions which aim at honor → the foundation and
creation of good
• Conditional (indispensible, but not a good in itself), e.g. just punishments → the lesser
evil (1332a10–17)
Three things must be in harmony in a good man:
• Nature
• Habit
• Rational principle
These do not necessarily agree: men do many things against habit and nature, if the rational
principle persuades them to do so. (1332a39–b8)
⇒ need of education → by installing good habits and by instruction. (1332b9–10)

(2) Education

Education should provide the harmony of nature, habit, and rational principle. The order
of childhood education is: first care of the body, then training of the appetitive part, for the
sake of reason. (7.15.1334b7–28)
General consideration: “the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill
up.” (Pol. 7.17.1337a2–3)

26
Excursus: Relation of Rulers and Subjects (Pol. 7.14)
How to set up the education of the subjects depends on this question: Should the relation
between rulers and subjects change or be permanent?—On the answer to this question de-
pends the education of the citizens. (7.14.1332b12–16)
Since no class of people excels by far the other classes (like heroes and gods excel mankind
in general), it is not the case that one class should rule and another class should serve.
Rather, all citizens should take their turn in governing and being governed ⇒ equality /
justice ⇒ no revolution.
At the same time, governors should excel their subjects.

How can this be achieved?

When you are young, you are governed; when you are old, you gov- 1332b36–40: “Nature
herself …”
ern.
What does this mean for education?—He who wants to learn to command well must first
learn to obey. (1332b43–1333a2)
The legislator has to see to it that citizens become good men, for 1333a11–16: “But since
we say …”
the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good
man.
⇒ Laws and education must be given the people with a view to all the virtues (cf. 1333b9)

Marriage (7.16)
Since the legislator is concerned with the upbringing of children, he should fix some laws
concerning marriage.
• Age of marriage
– Not too late
• for then the parents will be too old to derive pleasure from their affection
(1334b40)
• old men produce children who are defective in body and mind (1335b29–31)
– not too soon
• the children would lack respect (1335a3)
• the children would be small and ill-developed, and would predominantly female
(1335a12–13)
• it is conducive to temperance not to marry too soon (1335a21)
– Women should be about eighteen; men about 37 years old
• Then they are in the prime of life

27
 • The decline of generative powers will coincide (1335a28–30)
• Season of the year for marriage
– The winter (no reason given) (1335a36–39)
• Constitution of parents: not athletic, not too feeble; capable of all actions of a freeman
(1335b5–11)
• Women with child
– should exercise (⇒ a law prescribing daily visits to a temple to worship gods who pre-
side over birth)
– have a nourishing diet. (1335b12–17)
• Deformed children shall not live (1335b21)
• For the sake of population control,
– Children are not to be exposed,
– But abortion should be practiced before sense and life have begun: “what may or
may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensa-
tion.” (1335b22–26)
• Adultery is to be held disgraceful and is to be punished. (1335b39–1336a2)

Education as Task of the State (Pol. 8.1)

“No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention 8.1.1337a11–17, McKeon,
1305, beginning of ch.
above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education
does harm to the constitution. The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government
under which he lives. . . .”
Education should be public and the same education for all, for the whole city has one end.
(1337a21–22)
No citizen belongs to himself, but they all belong to the state, and are each a part of the
state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole (1337a27–30)

Usefulness and Leisure as the Ends of Education (Pol. 8.3)

The customary branches of education and their relation to usefulness:
• Reading and writing → useful for various purposes in life (8.3.1337b25–26); many other
sorts of knowledge are acquired through them (1338a39–40)
• Gymnastic exercises → infuse courage (1337b27)
• Music → it is for enjoyment in leisure, not for some usefulness (1338a21 and 8.3 passim)
• Drawing → makes one judges of the beauty of the human form (1338b1–2)

28
The consideration of the non-instrumental character of education in music gives Aristotle
the occasion to discuss to what extent education aims at leisure rather than usefulness.
Premise: “the first principle of all action is leisure.” Occupation is for the sake of leisure.
(1337b32–33)
What ought we to do when at leisure? (1337b34–35)—Aristotle does not give a positive re-
sponse; he only excludes amusement:
• If amusement were what we should do at leisure, then it would be the end of life
(1337b35–36)
• Amusement should be our medicines; it is for the sake of relaxation and rest; it is to be
done only at suitable times. (1337b28–42)
In this context, Aristotle makes a fundamental point about leisure 1338a1–14, McK., 1307:
“But leisure … or utility”
and happiness.
& a21: “There
• “But leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment remains … enjoyment in
of life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those leisure.”

who have leisure.” (1338a1–3)

• What pleasure? “[T]he pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest
sources.” (1338a8–9)
• “It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study
merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for
their own sake” (1338a9–12)
• This is why music is part of the educational curriculum, that is not for the sake of neces-
sity or utility (1338a14), but for “intellectual enjoyment in leisure.” (1338a21–22)
In accordance with his highest esteem of leisure, Aristotle has a non-instrumentalist view of
education [unlike John Dewey]:
“It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents 8.3.1338a30–32, McKeon,
1308
should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because
it is liberal or noble.”
“To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and 1338b3–4, McKeon, 1308

exalted souls.”
Why learn music? “music has a power of forming the character, and should therefore be
introduced into the education of the young.” (8.5.1340b12–14)

29
In your experience, what is the value of music?

Further Conditions of the Ideal or Perfect State (Pol. 7.4–12)

Aristotle offers fairly detailed considerations concerning:
• The Size of the State (Pol. 7.4)
– It must be able to fulfill its work (1326a14)
– The size is in a mean (1326b2–5)
• Too few citizens ⇒ the city is not self-sufficing
• Too many citizens ⇒ the city is incapable of a constitutional government.
• The Territory of the State (Pol. 7.5): “In size and extent it should be such as may enable
the inhabitants to live at once temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure.”
(7.5.1326b30–32)—Optimal conditions:
– Self-sufficing, all-producing territory
– Militarily optimal
• See ports are mostly beneficial (Pol. 7.6)
• The Character of the Citizens (Pol. 7.7)
– The ideal character is that of the Greek: high-spirited and intelligent. It is a mean be-
tween
– Europeans from a cold climate: spirited, but deficient in intelligence and skill
– Asians: intelligent and inventive, but deficient in spirit (7.7.1327b24–30)
• The Indispensable Professions (Pol. 7.8)
– Indispensible:
• Farmers
• Craftsmen
– Part of the State:
• Soldiers → maintain authority against internal and external assailants
• Wealthy → public revenue
• Priests
• Judges
• Who Should Perform Which Function? (Pol. 7.9)
• The Distribution of Land (Pol. 7.10)
• The Location and Plan of the City (Pol. 7.11)
• Buildings and Agoras (Pol. 7.12)

30