MAURO GANZON v. COURT OF APPEALS and GELACIO E.

TUMAMBING
G.R. No. L-48757
May 30, 1988
Sarmiento, J.

Facts:

Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron.
Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron, when about half of the scrap iron was loaded Mayor Jose
Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter
resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun
and fired at Gelacio Tumambing.

After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting
Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to
dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating
that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron.

Issue:

Whether the order by the local government in taking in custody the scrap iron was due to
fortuitous event?

Held:

No before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he was
ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor
Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under
legal process of authority. The appellee failed to establish this.

The intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render
impossible the fulfilment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the
illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the
issuance of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower
the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere difficulty in the fulfilment of the obligation is not
considered force majeure.
 EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR
AND EDILBERTO MONTESIANO
G.R. No. 89880
February 6, 1991
Medialdea, J.

Facts:
A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck. Due to the impact, several passengers of
the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained. During the incident, the
cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the
passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant
Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado,
under a franchise, which Novelo sold to and which the latter transferred to Cerrado

After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case, the trial court reached the conclusion
"that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing
the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons”

Issue:

Whether the respondent court has properly applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the
present case?

Held:
No, the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance
as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles.

The doctrine, provides that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
negligence. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

The Court citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil.
1073) ruled that the principle of "last clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce
its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."