People vs. Abelita, GR No.

96318, June 26, 1992

Ponente: Medialdea, J.
Nature of the Case: An appeal to SC from the decision of the RTC for the finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic Act (RA) No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment….

RA 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)

Section 4, Article II (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs)

Under RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)

Section 5, Article II (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals)

FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution:
 On February 16, 1990 (at about 12:15am), Sgt. Wilfredo Mendoza (Sgt. Mendoza – lone witness) and
his co-policemen were patrolling the fishport compound at Northbay Boulevard, Navotas.
 They were approached by a man (informant) who told them that a certain ‘Toto’ (Reynaldo Abelita y
Luquias-accused-appellant) was selling marijuana at Gilmar Beerhouse inside the fishport
 Sgt. Mendoza then planned to have ‘Toto’ arrested and asked the informant if he could buy marijuana
from Toto.
 The informant agreed to the suggestion and Mendoza gave the former a P10.00 bill on which he
placed his initial.
 Then, the policemen and the informant proceeded to Gilmar Beerhouse.
 The informant entered inside while the policemen positioned themselves outside where they could see
the interior of the beerhouse through the open spaces on the wall of said beerhouse.
 The policemen saw the informant approach Toto, who was occupying a table at a distance of 4 arms’
length from where they were positioned.
 The informant gave the money to ‘Toto’ who, in turn, handed to the informant a small white package.
 The policemen then entered the beerhouse and met the informant, who handed the package to Sgt.
Mendoza.
o The small white package handed by the informant to Sgt. Mendoza contained three (3) sticks
of marijuana.
 Police officer Castil (one of the policemen who was with Sgt. Mendoza) recovered from ‘Toto’ a blue
can of Bonna milk which, when opened, was found to contain the following:
o Thirty seven (37) sticks of marijuana; and
o The P10.00 marked bill
 ‘Toto’ was thereafter brought to the Navotas Police Station for investigation.
 The forty (40) sticks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory
examination, which gave positive result for marijuana.

Version of the Defense:

 The accused denied the charge particularly that of ownership of the marijuana found inside the
‘Bonna’ milk can.
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  He claimed that at about midnight of February 16, 1990, while he and his friend Jun were drinking
inside Gilmar Beerhouse, three policemen arrived and arrested them allegedly for owning the
marijuana placed in a can of milk being held by one of the policemen.
 He and Jun were brought to the Navotas Police Station where they were asked to admit ownership of
the marijuana which they denied.

The lower court did not give credit to the version of the defense.

 Upon arraignment, the accused, as duly assisted by a counsel de oficio, entered a plea of “not guilty.”
 Also, accused filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence contending, among others,
that the failure of the prosecution to present the informant who allegedly bought the three (3) sticks of
marijuana from him is fatal.
 On August 23, 1990, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
 Also, during the pre-trial conference, the accused made admissions as to the due execution and
genuineness of the evidence submitted by the prosecution witness.
 And upon issuance of the pre-trial order, no objections were interposed by the accused, if any.
 The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 4, Article II, RA 6425
and sentenced to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and the costs of his suit.
 Hence, this appeal from the RTC’s decision.

Defenses raised by the accused:

 That the failure of the prosecution to present the forensic expert who prepared the NBI report of its
findings that the confiscated materials are indeed marijuana is fatal to its cause.
o In the absence of a clear and conclusive evidence that such materials were prohibited drugs,
the accused stands to be acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
 The accused also stressed that the fact that the prosecution did not present the confidential informer
as witness casts serious doubt on appellant’s guilt because without the testimony of the poseur-buyer,
there is no convincing evidence to show that appellant sold marijuana.

ISSUE 1:
Is the failure of the prosecution to present the forensic expert who prepared the NBI report to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime fatal to the prosecution’s case?

RULING 1:
 No. The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic expert who prepared the NBI report to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime is not fatal.
 The pre-trial stipulation that items are marijuana as embodied in Chemistry Report correctly dispenses
with testimony of NBI Chemist.
 In this case, the records show that during the pre-trial conference, the accused and his counsel
admitted the due execution and genuineness of the evidence submitted by the prosecution witness,
Forensic Chemist Felicisima M. Francisco.
 Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order dated April 11, 1990 which embodied the manifestation of
the prosecution that since the accused and his counsel admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the forensic chemist report, it is dispensing with the testimony of the forensic expert.

ISSUE 2:
Is the failure to ask for correction of pre-trial order fatal?
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RULING 2:
 Yes. The failure to ask for correction of pre-trial order, if any, is fatal.
 The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s position that if the matters taken up and
embodied in the pre-trial order were not in accordance with what was really stipulated upon, then
accused-appellant should have interposed his objections earlier or as soon as the pre-trial order was
issued.
 Hence, it is clear that upon the accused-appellant’s failure to interpose objections, the facts stipulated
during a pre-trial conference and embodied in a pre-trial order bind the parties.

Other issues

ISSUE 3:
Is the non-presentation of an informant fatal to the prosecution’s case?

RULING 3:
 No. The non-presentation of an informant is not fatal.
 The Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would
be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution’s case.

ISSUE 4:
Is a credible testimony of a lone witness suffices to convict in drug cases?

RULING 4:
 Yes. The lone testimony, if credible, suffices to convict in drug cases.
 In this case, the testimony of the lone prosecution witness is positive and sufficiently clear to show that
the accused-appellant committed the offense charged.
 The prosecution witness was not actuated by improper motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a
very serious offense against the accused-appellant.
 His knowledge was acquired in the performance of his official duty and there being no showing that he
is prejudiced against the accused-appellant, his testimony deserves full credit.

Disposition: The judgment of the trial court (RTC) in convicting the accused is affirmed.

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Garayblas vs Ong

Nature: Petition for holding counsels of the accused liable for their non-appearance in the scheduled pre-
trial conferences

Facts:
 Atty. Garayblas and Atty. Dela Cruz, as petitioners, are counsels for Gen. Ramiscal who is facing
charges for falsification of public documents and violation of RA 3019 before several divisions of
the Sandiganbayan (SB)
 Accused was arraigned and the SB 4th Division set the pre-trial for April 6, 2006 in Davao City
 On Feb. 28, 2006, the Clerk of Court sent a Notice of Hearing to all the parties, informing the
cancellation of the April 6, 2006 pre-trial hearing and the resetting to April 27, 2006
 Atty. Garayblas opposed the resetting to April 27 and filed a Motion to Reset
 SB 4th Division denied the motion stating that Atty. Garayblas and Associates must adjust their
schedule to suit all the other accused and their counsels, who are available for that date
 Petitioners failed to appear for pre-trial on April 27, 2006, hence the SB 4th Div. ordered them to
explain why they should not be held in contempt
 Atty. Garayblas reasoned that:
o The day before the pre-trial, she was having severe headache, body weakness, and
sluggishness
o Her blood sugar count was 420 and her blood pressure was 170/140
o Thus, she opted to stay home and follow instructions by her doctor, Dr. Garayblas-Gonzaga
o She was requested to administer insulin every 6 hrs
o Her condition did not disappear til the day of the pre-trial, thus, she was not able to attend
it
 Atty. Dela Cruz reasoned that:
o He did not attend the pre-trial because he had to appear before the SB 2nd Div. in another
criminal case involving the same accused, attaching a certificate of appearance from the 2nd
Div. as proof
 The SB 4th Div issued the first assailed Order stating that:
o The Court does not find their excuse satisfactory
o That they belongs to the same law office, therefore, one or the other should have appeared
or made the necessary arrangement to let one of their associates appear in the pre-trial
conference
o Atty. Dela Cruz should have been more prudent in the scheduling of his cases in order to
avoid conflict of schedule, and should have given more priority to the out-of-town schedule
considering the expenses for out of town hearings
o With the modern means of communication, Atty. Garayblas should have made
arrangements with her co-counsel or other members of her law office, while noting the
absence of a medical certificate
o Thus, they were held liable for their non-appearance which caused the cancellation of the
pre-trial conference
o They were ordered to pay P10,000 each as penalty and to partially answer the traveling
and other expenses of the Court
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration:
o Atty. Garayblas reasoned, among other things, her illness, that records show that except for
her non-appearance at the pre-trial, she had never been absent in all the proceedings of the
4th Division, and that there were no other lawyers from their office who could attend the
pre-trial in Davao
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 o Atty. Dela Cruz reiterated that in their agreement, Atty. Garayblas would be assigned for
the Davao pre-trial, and that he was assigned to appear before the SB 2nd Division
 The SB 4th Div denied their motion, hence the present case for certiorari

Issue:
Should Atty. Garayblas and Atty. Dela Cruz be held liable for their non-appearances in the scheduled pre-
trial conference?

Ruling:
 NO.
 The court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the ff concur:
1. Counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference; AND
2. Counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse
 For Atty. Garablas, the SB 4th Div already said it believed her claim. Symptoms of hypertension
include confusion, ear noise or buzzing, fatigue, headache, irregular heartbeat, and vision
changes. As for hyperglycemia, it includes headaches, increased thirst, difficulty concentrating,
blurred vision, frequent urinating, and fatigue, among others.
 Verily, the Court can understand that a person suffering from confusion, difficulty in
concentrating, blurred vision, fatigue, and others, would be hard put to attend a hearing, much less
have the clarity of mind to think or worry about finding another lawyer to substitute for her.
Indeed it would not be reasonable to expect her to have been able to make necessary
arrangements for another lawyer to attend in her stead.
 Consider, further, the importance of having counsel who is the most well-versed on the facts of the
case, to be the one attending a pre-trial conference. It is not quite prudent to send in a new lawyer,
who has not had ample time to fully familiarize himself with the facts and issues involved in the
case, to attend a pre-trial conference
 Moreover, she had never been absent for a hearing before the SB 4th Div. This circumstance should
be taken in her favor, as it shows she is not in the habit of feigning illness
 However, Atty. Garayblas should have at least sent word to the SB 4th Division and to her co-
counsel, Atty. Dela Cruz, when she began feeling the symptoms, that she would be unable to attend
said pre-trial conference. This would have been the courteous thing to do.
 With regard to Atty. Dela Cruz, his non-appearance was also excusable. There were hearings for
their client’s case in 2 separate division of the SB on the very same date in 2 distant locations. To
ensure representation for their client at the hearings in both divisions of the SB, petitioners agreed
that Atty. Dela Cruz would attend the one before the 2nd Div., while Atty. Garayblas would attend
the one before the SB 4th Div in Davao. It appears that Atty. Dela Cruz was not fully apprised of the
fact that his co-counsel would not be able to attend the pre-trial conference. It is understandable
why Atty. Dela Cruz could not have abandoned the hearing before the 2nd Div so he could attend
the pre-trial in Davao. It was already too late in the day for Atty. Dela Cruz to change plans and to
notify the 2nd Div that he would be absent so he could attend the pre-trial in Davao

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Bayas vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 143689-91
November 12, 2002
Panganiban, J:
Nature of the case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for the
setting aside of the April 28, 2000 and the May 26, 2000 Orders of the Sandiganbayan (SBN) in Criminal Case
Nos. 25280-82. The first Order denied petitioners Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents, while the second denied reconsideration.
Facts:
 On May 6, 1999, three Informations were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T.
Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with:
 violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended;
 and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in
relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code.
 They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the
Municipality of Kabayan, Province of Benguet.

 During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled not guilty.
 The pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999,
because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared.
 On November 5, 1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty. Molintas, who
was allegedly suffering from the flu.
 Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of
facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero.
o They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they
could expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved.
 On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had
been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero.
 On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty.
Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for February 14, 2000.
o However, on February 7, 2000, he moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion
was granted by the anti-graft court in an Order dated February 14, 2000.
o In the same Order, the pretrial was rescheduled for March 31, 2000, to give the accused ample
time to employ a new counsel.
 On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M. Cinco, moved to
withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents.
 they sought to withdraw:
o Stipulation 1(b) which states that Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount
of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00;
o and second, Exhibits 1 to 8-a. They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty.
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Issue:
Whether or not pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel be unilaterally withdrawn
before the commencement of the trial?
Ruling:
 No. Pretrial stipulations signed by the accused and their counsel cannot be unilaterally withdrawn
before commencement of trial.
 Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases.
 The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and
evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a
faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the
same time, help unclog court dockets.
 Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause.
 They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and
sound public policy.
 When made before the court, they are conclusive.
 the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress,
fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on
such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a
stipulation validly made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse,
will not be disturbed on appeal.
 While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that these
were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud.
 On the contrary, they do not dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake
vitiated their and their counsels consent to the signing of these stipulations.
 They even admitted, in answer to its query, that they had freely given their consent.
 Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the blame on the alleged
incompetence of their former counsel. They claim that, in agreeing to the Joint Stipulation, he failed to
consider their legal interests.
 To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact -- not, as in this case, a
mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it.
 Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their
counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case
are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed
by the counsel.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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San Juan vs Sandiganbayan
GR No. 173956
August 6, 2008
Ponente: Ynares-santiago, J

Nature of the Case: This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the February 6, 2006
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27808 granting the prosecutions Manifestation with
Motion for Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits and the June 21, 2006 Resolution denying the motions
for reconsideration separately filed by petitioner and his co-accused.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Frisco F. San Juan, in his capacity as Chairman of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), together
with 26 other accued, composed of PEA Board of Directors, PEA Officers, Officers of the Commission on
Audit and the contractor of Central Boulevard Project (now the President Diosdado Macapagal
Boulevard), Jesusito D. Legaspi, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
o They were conspiring and confederating with accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI, a private
contractor doing business under the name of J.D. Legaspi Construction
o Criminally give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused JESUSITO D.
LEGASPI, through the commission of numerous illegal related acts all pertaining to the
President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project
 Such as (but not limited to) the bidding out of the said project and illegally awarding the
same to accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPIs J.D. Legaspi Construction
 Approving the award of the project to, as well as the Construction Agreement with, J.D.
Legaspi Construction despite the lack of compliance with the mandatory requirements
and procedure for bidding, even if no funds are yet available to finance the project,
without the requisite certificate of availability of funds and without complying with the
mandatory conditions imposed by the Office of the President of the approval thereof,
per Memorandum dated 29 January 2000 from the Office of the Executive Secretary,
Malacaang
 Approving/allowing several improper variation/change orders and overruns to be
implemented without the requisite presidential approval and the appropriate funds,
recognizing, affirming and causing the implementation of the just-mentioned void
contract
 Allowing and paying or causing the allowance and payment of several claims of accused
JESUSITO D. LEGASPI for initial contract price, contract price adjustment, variation
orders, overruns and other claims even when the same were clearly improper, illegal
and without the requisite presidential approval
o Thereby paving the way for accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI to claim and receive undue payments
from the Government totaling millions of pesos in improper overprice, thereby causing undue
injury and grave damage to the government in the aggregate amount of at least FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY AND
39/100 PESOS (P532,926,420.39), more or less, constituting the total illegal overprice paid to
accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI for the subject Project.

8
  The People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed its pre-trial brief with
proposed Exhibits A to HHHH dated March 16, 2005. Petitioner filed his pre-trial brief on June 23, 2005.
 At the scheduled hearing on January 24, 2006, instead of proceeding with the presentation of its
evidence, the OSP filed a manifestation with motion for additional marking of documentary exhibits
 Petitioner filed an Opposition alleging that the motion fails to comply with the three (3) day notice
rule, thus, it is fatally defective which must be dismissed outright; that the prosecutions attempt to
introduce additional evidence after Pre-Trial has been completed, without petitioner having been
confronted by such evidence, violates petitioners fundamental rights under the Constitution; that
petitioners right to due process has been violated by the presentation of the prosecutions additional
evidence when such pieces of evidence ought to have been presented during the pre-trial of the case;
that the prosecution failed to show good cause in order for the additional evidence to be accepted,
since only those pieces of evidence which are identified and marked are allowed by the court.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it granted OSPs motion for
additional marking of exhibits. (or pde pd “Whether additional evidence may be introduced after the pre-trial
has been completed/terminated” , wa lang koy sure)
2.) Whether the admission of the additional evidence constitutes a violation of petitioners constitutional right
to due process. (ibutang ra kay basung mu ask c judge, pde ra dagay ni ma disregard sa recit.)

RULING:
1st Issue:
 NO. While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not
be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, however, this Court has likewise
held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Besides, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, the court may disregard procedural lapses, so that a case may be resolved on its merits
based on the evidence presented by the parties. Moreover, under the above-cited Rule, the Court is
granted the authority to set the hearing on shorter notice upon showing of good cause.
o In the instant case, petitioner was served with the Manifestation with Motion for Additional
Marking of Documentary Exhibits on January 24, 2006, or two days prior to the scheduled
hearing date on January 26, 2006. Although the three-day notice rule was not complied with,
the Sandiganbayan allowed the motion based on good cause, i.e., that the markings of the
additional documentary evidence at this period was due to the sheer volume of the supporting
documents to the disbursement vouchers and the fact that such supporting documents were
only recently completed and secured.

 This Court allows a liberal construction of this rule where the interest of substantial justice will be
served and where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court, as in the instant case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly held that:
o Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the pre-trial has effectively been terminated,
the Court gave both the prosecution and the accused the opportunity to submit comments to
the Pre-Trial Order or to modify their submissions or in some instances, even to withdraw the

9
 stipulations they made during the pre-trial. The Courts position is consistent with the exercise
of its discretion to decide how best to dispense justice in accordance with the circumstances of
the proceedings before it. The decision to grant the prosecutions motion for additional
marking of documentary exhibits is another exercise of this judicial prerogative, which
prerogative was made known to the parties in the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005,
when the Court stated that such was subject to modification in order to prevent manifest
injustice.

2nd Issue: No.

 There is likewise no merit to petitioners contention that his right to due process was violated when the
OSPs motion was granted. In its Resolution of February 6, 2006, the Sandiganbayan declared, thus:
o [T]he Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion but only insofar as to allow
additional marking of documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently described in the said
motion, over the objection of the defense, in order to give the Prosecution the opportunity to
fully present its case, and considering that the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the
parties. The defense may register their objections to the documentary exhibits at the time that
the same are introduced in evidence.
 In its Resolution dated June 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan also held that:
o While it is true that pre-trial has already been terminated, records show that, before the Pre-
Trial Order dated November 7, 2005 was issued, the Court made clear to all the parties,
considering the numerous documentary evidence sought to be marked and presented by the
parties, that the said Order was without prejudice to the comment [on the Pre-Trial Order] of
the prosecution and the accused; that is, the Court may still accept any modification of the said
Order from both the prosecution and the accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave
the prosecution and the accused a period of time to file a formal manifestation with respect to
some changes they would like to propose in the Pre-Trial Order notwithstanding the
commencement of the trial.
 Thus, petitioner can still file his objections to the documentary evidence during trial on the merits of
the case.
Notes:
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

Disposition: The Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The February 6, 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27808 granting OSPs Manifestation with Motion for Additional Marking of Documentary
Exhibits, and the June 21, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
10
People vs Tac-an, GR No. 148000, Feb. 27, 2003

Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

Nature of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner for the nullification of the Order dated August 2002 and subsequent Order
denying the motion for reconsideration issued by the RTC in People vs Mario Austria.

FACTS:
 An Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Batangas against Mario Austria for
falsification of public documents.
 Eleven witnesses were listed in the Information for the People of the Philippines.
 The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial on Aug. 1, 2000. Out of the
eleven witnesses listed, only the first three witnesses were notified of the said arraignment and pre-
trial.
 When the case was called for pre-trial, the trial court discovered that none of the three witnesses who
were allegedly earlier notified by the court was in attendance.
 On motion of the accused and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial court issued an
order dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to appear before it.
 The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial court
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply because three of its witnesses who
were notified failed to appear at the initial pre-trial.
 Asserted that only three out of eleven witnesses were subpoenaed by the trial court.
 Urged that the dismissal of the case was not authorized under RA No. 8493 (AN ACT TO
ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RTC, MTC,
AND MCT)
 The trial court denied the motion. It posits that under RA No. 8493, pre-trial is mandatory and the
presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise required during the trial for the parties to participate
in the plea-bargaining and stipulation of facts during the proceeding.
 Argued that if the complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose of pre-trial cannot
be achieved.
 Argued that it was incumbent on the public prosecutor to procure the attendance of its
witnesses which he failed to do.
 Stated that there were instances in the past that when the public prosecutor manifested to the
trial court that it had no witnesses for pre-trial and moved for dismissal of criminal case.
 Contended that if the dismissal of the case was precipitate, it was the fault of the public
prosecutor and not the trial court.
 The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA under Rule 65 for the nullification of the orders of the trial court.
 Alleged that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the dismissal of the case and denying its
motion for reconsideration.
 The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the errors committed by the trial court were mere
errors of judgment which are not correctible by a writ of certiorari.
 Also stated that a reinstatement of the case will place the private respondent in double
jeopardy.
 Petitioner filed the present petition for the reversal of the decision of the CA.

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  Alleges that the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case
simply because three witnesses of its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-trial of
the case.
 That RA 8493 does not contain any provision which mandates a trial court to dismiss a criminal
case for failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre-trial.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not the absence of witness/witnesses for the prosecution during pre-trial a valid ground
for the dismissal of a criminal case.

RULING: No.
 Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the
Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a
valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in
criminal cases, the presence of the private complainant or the complaining witness is however not
required. Even the presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court. It is
enough that the accused is represented by his counsel.
 Indeed, even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial,
the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public
prosecutor is vested with authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.
 The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of the
witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. The State, like the accused is also
entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case
deprived the State of its right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of
jurisdiction, and is of no effect.
 Said witnesses may be cited by the trial court in contempt of court if their absence was unjustified.
Undue delay in the prosecution of the case should not also be condoned. But the right of the State to
prosecute the case and prove the criminal liability of the private respondent for the crime charged
should not be derailed and stymied by a precipitate and capricious dismissal of the case at the initial
pre-trial stage.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal case will place the private respondent in double
jeopardy.

Ruling: No.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

Disposition: Petition is granted. The assailed decision of the CA and the orders of RTC are set aside. RTC is
ordered to reinstate People vs Mario Austria.
NOTES:
 In Dimatulac vs. Villon: The judge, on the other hand, “should always be imbued with a high sense of
duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice.”
He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus,
exerting the same devotion as a priest “in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious
liturgy,” the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and
12
 confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his
exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised
within reasonable confines. The judge’s action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused,
nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. Indeed, for justice to prevail, the
scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and
the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice;
for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the
other.

 Elements of DJ:
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).

 By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result
thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double jeopardy attaches.
(Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 [1997])

13
ESTIPONA vs. LOBRIGO
G.R. No. 226679
August 15, 2017
PERALTA, J.
NATURE: Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the constitutionality of Section 23 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
FACTS:
 Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs).
o The information alleged that on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, the
accused had in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white
crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
 On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation
of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
 He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates:
o the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
o the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and
o the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government
 In its Comment or Opposition dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion
for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress'
prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
 It manifested in a Comment or Opposition dated June 29, 2016 that it "is open to the Motion of the
accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3,
Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165
prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."
 On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion.
o Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional
because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it
allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
o The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law,
R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible
in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia
with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December
2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of
the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.

14
 o Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the
declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional
power of the Supreme Court.
o While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever
warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the
Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare
Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration
might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.
 Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order dated July 26, 2016.
 Hence, this petition
ISSUE 1:
 Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
RULING 1: YES
 The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and
no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-
making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
o x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in
the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that
popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for
it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
 The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re:
Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding
admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.
o The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the
1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
15
 inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
 Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary
by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
 The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court.
 The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the .first time was given the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was
also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. x x x.
 APPLICATION: The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court. 25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative
if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court. 26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on
the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to
wit:
o 1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an
administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770.
o 2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. -The
Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules.
o 3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees;
Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-
Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket
Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. -Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141
of the Rules.
o 4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division/3 -The first paragraph of Section 14 of
R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
 Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional independence.
ISSUE 2:
 Did Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, violates the Constitutional
right to equal protection of the law?
16
RULING 2: QUALIFY, the issue remains unresolved.
 At this point, We (Court) shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary
to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion
by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
o Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified
version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining
on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
 DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

__________________________________________________________________
Discussion on Plea Bargaining as a rule of Procedure
 The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
o "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions.”
 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural
in nature.
o In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether
the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.
 In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For
example, in People v. Lacson, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish
the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
 Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which
provides that an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall
lose the remedies available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely
provides the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
 By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important,"
"essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.

17
 In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There
is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system -speed, economy, and finality -
can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
o Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create
a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing
right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
o The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
guilty plea be offered and accepted.
o In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious
and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet
the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.
 Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under
the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.
 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his
duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the
evidence on hand can sustain.
 If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the
prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
o The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in
the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on
record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all
the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
interests of justice and of the public will be served.
o The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
o Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.

18