LIBANAN VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN
233 SCRA 163
Petitioner: Marcelino Libanan
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN and Agustin B. Docena
Ponente: J. Vitug

FACTS:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections.

He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified
replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body.

In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety
(90) days.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall
affront the petitioner’s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar
as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist.

Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent
Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged
might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.

The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a
public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner
invokes.

Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN’s decision is affirmed.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed
a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532
by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The

1
permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the
enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an
appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The
police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of
the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with
the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and
their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese charactersfrom being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more familiar with Spanish and
maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and
impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal
property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All,
without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious
objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although,

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an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of
the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly
issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights ofperson or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation
of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied,
with costs against the appellants.

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

7 June 1926 | Taft | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands

Facts

Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties for its
violation), also known as the “Chinese Bookkeeping Act,” was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in
1921. It provides:

• Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with
existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
• Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber business in Chinese, as he cannot read,
write nor understand English, Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and his
books were seized.

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on behalf of all other Chinese
merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the presiding
judge.

Arguments

• By the petitioner
• Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his books in English or Spanish, he would
have no means of verifying the correctness of the books. If he would employ a translator or interpreter, he might
be at the mercy of his employees if they might cheat and defraud him. According to the Act, he is prohibited from
even keeping a duplicate set of accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to remain in total ignorance
of the status of his business.

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• The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese merchants out of business (They do 60%
of the business in the country).
• The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese merchants of their liberty and property
without due process of law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws.
• Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners are entitled to the same rights,
privileges, and immunities as the citizens and subjects of Great Britain and Spain.
• By the respondent
• The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of proper legislative power. Due to the
inability of internal revenue officials to check the books of the Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of
money corresponding to taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court

• A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account books in
languages other than those listed
• Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may keep his account books in Chinese,
but he has to keep another set of books in the prescribed languages
• A third construction is that the law only intended to require the keeping of such books to facilitate
governmental inspection of the same for tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds of books
shall be kept.
• The Act is not unconstitutional under the Court’s construction of the law. A literal interpretation would
render it unconstitutional, so the Court made a reasonable construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Philippine Supreme Court’s decision
denying an original petition for prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972, on
the ground of its invalidity.

Issues

• WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

• WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

Issue # 1

WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be
reached to bring it within the fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the
law from conflict with constitutional limitation.

What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of great indefiniteness to conform to
what the court assumes was, or ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change
would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained construction, in order to make a law conform
to a constitutional limitation, cannot be sustained.

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“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This
would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government.” (US v. Reese)

Issue # 2

WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due process of law,
and denies them the equal protection of the laws.

Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14 th Amendment were extended to
the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when
Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)

PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of their transactions.
However, it is NOT within the police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a set
of books in Chinese.

To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the public require such
interference and 2) the means are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon
individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the legislature’s police power is subject to
the courts’ supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)

We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the doing
of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning violates due process of law.

Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the carrying on of their business, and
is obviously intended to affect them (as distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.

JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.

Layno vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985
Facts:Layno was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. was then
arraigned on October 3, 1983, and was suspended pendente lite, by respondent Sandiganbayan on October 26,
1983.

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The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, suspending from office any
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under such statute, is assailed in
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on the ground that it is violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Issue: Whether or not the provision is violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Held: Yes.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the
services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be
established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold
office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only
victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man
they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of
this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension
should be lifted.

DELOSO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 86899-903

Facts :

The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971.
While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan
accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the
award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to
1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement
as to the payment of rentals. The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was
dismissed. As regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30,
1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan.

The complaint alleged that Amor Deloso taking advantage of his public and official position, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest partiality and
evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor purchased by the Municipality
of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost,
without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue
injury to the Municipality of Botolan. Deloso was suspended indefinitely pending the hearing of the complaint.
Thus, the instant petition.

Issue :

Whether or not there was violation of the right to due process when Deloso was suspended indefinitely.

Held :

The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the
rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility

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considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground
that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial
office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case
possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth,
murder, malversation of public finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be
brought to the Supreme Court prevents the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.

The court ruled that a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act
3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service
Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petition is GRANTED.

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the
elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said
decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and
in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

Issues:
1. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the respondent
missing.

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2. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of July
23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?
Held:
1. No.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and
the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms
that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government.
The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There
are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2. No.
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all
matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc
only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the
grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

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GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his
head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman)
was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined
in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the
evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassinationwas the product of a military conspiracy,
not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also
granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent
Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to
lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for
such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due

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process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring
them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents
committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of
the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

Held: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which
should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no longer around)
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices
and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang
wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First
Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First
Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take
the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres.
Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos
expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

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The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacañang
Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and
that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final
outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
Pres. Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his
military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same
time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation in theassassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently
acquitted, they mayclaim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses
two weeks after Ninoy'sassassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because
they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that
the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran
himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The
monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be
acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases.
"This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment
of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by
Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The

11
courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no
rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should
not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this
Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill
the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor
minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

MARCOS V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 126995 – 247 SCRA 127 – Political Law – Due Process

Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while
they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1 st Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate
justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence.
Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional
members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of
Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who
further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division

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and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation
granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imelda’s guilt. The
SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’
manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its
“•decision”• convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view
of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to
be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who
may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice
Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot
deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice
del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant
but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied
the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special
Division.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995)
Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving
for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts punishable
under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without permission required by
CSC. Rivera allegedly toldPerez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan if he would
be given 10% commission. Riverawas further charged having served and acted, without prior authority required by
CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao andconsultant in various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held
Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and actsprejudicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment
from a client of the bank. The penalty of forcedresignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.

Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis
of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions

Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit
herself totally from any participation in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a
fundamentalaspect of due process.CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution,
sans the participation of CSCCommissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus
appealed

El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca

G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law,
or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that
while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such.

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* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning
again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-
resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the
order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the
authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and
thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may
grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its
authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized
and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found

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in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage
of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential
jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate
the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by
which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to
certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the action
becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with
reference to the principles governing actions in rem.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR - GR No. 46496, February 27, 1940

G.R. NO. L-46496 FEBRUARY 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
69 Phil. 635 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process in Administrative Bodies

Facts:

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to
alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor
Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members
of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims
that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court
agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:

Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to
their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise
of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible
but already existing).

The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must
also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can
be complied with by observing the following:

• The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
• Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
• While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
• Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
• The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
• The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

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CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE
LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive
Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-
making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt
contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively
to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however,
insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a
temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar
the NTC didn’t scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

Ateneo vs Court of Appeals GR 56180 16 October 1986

Facts: Juan Ramon Guanzon was a student-boarder at Cervini hall who hurled abuses and laid hand to the cafeteria
server. This was witnessed by several boarders. The university investigated the slapping incident and decided to
expel Guanzon. He opted instead to apply for honourable dismissal which was granted. Upon learning of the
incident, his parents lodged a complaint for damages with CFI on the ground of unfair trial. The university denied
this and justified that such behaviour of the student is subject to be sanctioned by the school and that the
university has the sole prerogative and authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be

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undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and discipline. Lower court decided in favour of the
Guanzon. CA initially reversed the LC decision. Upon motion for reconsideration of the Guanzons, CA reversed it’s
own decision. Ateneo was compelled to ask for review of the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not Guanzon was denied due process on the ground of unfair trial?
Decision: Petition granted. Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He admitted the slapping
incident. He was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to present his side; the investigating board
acted fairly and objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were met. The court does not share
the view that there was no due process because the parents of Guanzon was not given any notice of the
proceedings. He, who at the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student, intelligent and mature
enough to know his responsibilities. He is assumed to have reported this serious matter to his parents. The fact
that he chose to remain silent and did not inform them about his case, not even when he went home to Bacolod
City for his Christmas vacation, was not the fault of the petitioner university.

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon City Branch
ET AL, respondents
May 2, 1988

FACTS:

In 1986, some PSBA students, herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the premises of the school.
In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was entered into among others the regulations for the
conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous
and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors,
causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions
upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration. The students and the intervening professors were
sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and of due
process of law of the students who have been barred from re-enrollment.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already
recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation
of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given three
(3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against
them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, the
respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors during and when the
investigation was going on.

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The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due process
were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression
and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.

NON V. JUDGE DAMES - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

FACTS:

Petitioners (Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome
Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres), students
in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic
year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.
They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their re-admission or re-
enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that
they waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed,
and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89.

In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and
regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled."

Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON there was a violation of the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly.

HELD:

YES. The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and
regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on
the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still,
institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic
freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.

The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a
violation of their right to equal protection.

Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue.

However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic
standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities.
Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related
to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic
tenets of fair play.

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Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither
can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to an insufficiency of
information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the
mass actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and
it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph
145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools).

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and
academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively
excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that,
according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings
would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and
the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of
Appeals and before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24,
1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of
petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel
Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they
have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.

Goldberg v. Kelly

Citation. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 1970 U.S. LEXIS 80 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970)

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees were financial aid recipients whose benefits were terminated without being
afforded a pre-termination hearing, which they challenged as a denial of due process.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded is influenced by the extent
to which he may be “condemned to suffer grievous loss.” Due process required a pre-termination hearing prior to
termination of welfare benefits.

Facts. This case was brought by residents of New York City who received financial aid under the federally assisted
program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or under New York State’s Home Relief Program. Their
complaint alleged that City officials administering these programs terminated such aid without prior notice and
hearing, denying them due process of law. After the suit was filed, the City adopted procedures for notice and
hearing, which the plaintiff-appellees then challenged as constitutionally inadequate. The procedure allowed the
recipient to challenge the proposed termination of benefits within seven days and submit a written statement for
the reviewing official to make a final determination. Appellees’ challenged the procedures’ lack of an opportunity
to personally appear before the reviewing officer for oral testimony and cross-examination of adverse witnesses.
The procedure did allow for a post-termination “fair hearing,” however. The District Court held that only a pre-
termination hearing would satisfy the constitutional due process requirement.

Issue. Does a State that terminates public assistance benefits to a particular recipient without affording him an
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination deny the recipient due process of law?

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Held. Yes. Affirmed. Where welfare is concerned, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient
with procedural due process. For qualified recipients, welfare provides the only means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing and medical care. The crucial factor is that the termination of aid pending resolution of a
controversy might deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Dissent. No
provision in the Constitution should paralyze the government’s efforts to protect itself against making payments to
people who are not entitled to them. There are large numbers of undeserving welfare recipients, and States should
be able to fight back against them. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. The interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, coupled with the
State’s interest that payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh the State’s competing interest to
prevent administrative and fiscal burdens. The pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or
quasi- judicial trial, as the “fair hearing” will afford full administrative review later on. It need only produce an
initial determination that the welfare’s grounds for termination of benefits are valid.

Bell v. Burson

Citation. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 41 (U.S. May 24, 1971)

Brief Fact Summary. A clergyman in Georgia was involved in an accident when a child rode her bike into the side of
his car. He challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Act), which
prevented him from submitting evidence regarding his lack of fault prior to the suspension of his driver’s license.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Once licenses are issued, they cannot be revoked without procedural due process
required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Facts. The Act provided that the registration and license of an uninsured motorist involved in an accident should
be suspended unless he posted a security to cover the damages claimed in the accident reports. The administrative
hearing to be conducted prior to the suspension excluded any evidence of fault or liability for the accident.
Petitioner was a clergyman who was involved in an accident when a five-year-old child rode her bike into the side
of his car. In the administrative hearing, Petitioner was not permitted to present any evidence that he was not at
fault for the accident, or that his ministry would be severely handicapped if he lost his license. Petitioner appealed
to Superior Court, which found him free from fault for the accident and ordered that his license not be suspended.
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting Petitioner’s contention that the State’s statutory scheme denied
him due process of law.

Issue. Did the revocation of Petitioner’s license without affording him an opportunity to contest liability violate
due process?

Held. Yes. Reversed. Once issued, licenses may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood, as in the Petitioner’s
case. Suspension of issued licenses involves state action that adjudicates important interests of licensees, and due
process is required. The procedure set forth by the Act violated due process. Dissent. None. Concurrence. None.

Discussion. It is fundamental that, except for in emergency situations, States afford notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of a case before terminating an interest. This case did not involve an emergency
situation, and due process was violated.

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