The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy

Author(s): Bobo Lo
Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 80, No. 2,
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Mar., 2004), pp. 295-309
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
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 The long sunsetof strategicpartnership:
Russia'sevolvingChina policy

BOBOLO

In the 1997 'Joint declaration on a multipolar world and the formation of a new
international order', then Russian president Boris Yeltsin and his Chinese
counterpart Jiang Zemin announced their commitment to develop a 'part-
nership ... for the purpose of strategic interaction in the twenty-first century'.I
The statement was widely seen not only as a challenge to American 'hege-
monism', but also as confirmation of the qualitatively new relationship that had
emerged between Moscow and Beijing after the end of the Cold War.2 The
negative legacy of historical irredentism, civilizational prejudices and strategic
suspicions appeared to be giving way to a new era of constructive engagement
and positive-sum cooperation, based on shared political, security and economic
interests.
Some seven years later, it is time to assess how far the Yeltsin-Jiang vision of
enhanced strategic interaction has been realized, and to consider the likely
evolution of a relationship that continues to be characterized by profound
contradictions and uncertainties. As Vladimir Putin prepares to enter his second
presidential term, what does the future hold for Moscow and Beijing: a lasting,
if imperfect, partnership on the basis of convergent perceptions and priorities;
or a gradual but inexorable slide into strategic enmity? The outcome has enor-
mous importance, not only in defining the relationship between two of the
world's major powers, but also in shaping a Russian foreign policy struggling to
come to terms with changing global realities and seismic strategic shifts.
This article has three main aims. The first is to review the strengths and
weaknesses in the strategic partnership between Russia and China as it has
developed in the decade or so since the fall of the Soviet Union. The second is
to examine the influence of Moscow's larger strategic calculus after 9/I on
Russian policy and attitudes towards China. Finally, the article looks ahead to
the future of the bilateral relationship, seen through the prism of three critical

Rossiiskie vesti, 25 April 1997, p. 2.

2
ShermanW. Gamett, 'Limitedpartnership',in ShermanW. Garnett,ed., Rapprochementorrivalry?
Russia-Chinarelations
in a changing
Asia (WashingtonDC: CarnegieEndowment for InternationalPeace,
2000), p. I.

International Affairs 80, 2 (2004) 295-309

Bobo Lo

issues: the routeing of the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline, crisis management

on the Korean peninsula, and strategic involvement in Central Asia.

A success story
The development of the relationship with China is arguablythe greatest Russian
foreign policy success of the post-Soviet period. During the presidency of Boris
Yeltsin, when Russia's international status and influence were in decline on
nearly all fronts, the 'strategic partnership' with Beijing represented a notable
exception to the rule.3 Under Vladimir Putin the gains of the I99os have been
consolidated, and there is genuine substance to the official claim that relations
are at an all-time high,4 particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Good-
Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001.s
The positives are evident across the board. First, the two countries have
near-identical views regarding the desired structure of the post-Cold War inter-
national order. Both emphasize the primacy of the UN in global decision-
making and the precedence of national sovereignty over western conceptions of
'humanitarian intervention' and 'limited sovereignty'. They aspire to a 'multi-
polar' world in which a few great powers-the United States, Russia, western
Europe, China, India, Japan-make the big decisions. This elitist vision is the
modern-day successor of the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth
century, and diametrically opposed to the unipolar order associated with a
hegemonic America.
Moscow and Beijing also share many security interests and threat percep-
tions, from an attachment to geopolitical concepts such as spheres of influence
and the balance of power to a common view of the post-9/I I international
security agenda.6 They have adopted similar positions on the war against terror,
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and international
conflict management, most recently in the context of Iraq.7 They are suppor-
tive of each other's direct security concerns. Beijing has publicly backed Putin
over his handling of the Chechen conflict, while Moscow has reciprocated on
Chinese efforts to suppress separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet and has given its
unequivocal support to the 'One China' policy towards Taiwan. Both have a
major stake in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
The record of achievement is even more impressive in respect of the bilateral
agenda. Somewhat remarkably, given the historical record, there are currently
no serious disagreements. Formerly contentious issues such as demarcation of
the 4,300okmcommon border and Chinese 'illegal migration' into the Russian

3 Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putinandtheevolutionof Russianforeignpolicy(Londonand Oxford:Royal Instituteof

InternationalAffairs/Blackwell,2003), p. 26.
4 VladimirPutin, cited in 'China-Russia"closerthan ever"',BBC news report,27 May 2003, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/29386i8.stm.
5 Joint declarationof Putin and Hu Jintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.rmid.ru/brp_4.nsf.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.

296
The long sunsetof strategicpartnership

Far East (RFE) have been largely defused.8 The two countries have also reached
a tacit understanding over their respective roles in Central Asia. With Beijing
effectively conceding Russia's leading position,9 the threat of a renewed Great
Game in the region has been deferred.
Economic ties, too-once the weakest dimension of the strategic partnership
-have expanded in recent years. Two-way official trade has nearly tripled during
Putin's first presidential term, from US$5.7 billion in I999 to US$I 5.7 billion in
2003.I? And this is before factoring in 'unregistered trade', estimated at around
US$io billion." Moreover, a commercial relationship once dependent on arms
transfersand shuttle commerce has shown signs of diversifying.12 In addition to
cooperation in civilian nuclear energy and space technology, there is growing
interest in trans-Asianinfrastructuraland especially energy (oil and gas) projects.'3
Such achievements are matched by the proliferationof institutionallinks. High-
level bilateralmeetings have become much more frequent, acquiring some of the
routine character of Russia's regular summits with the United States and Euro-
pean Union. There is considerable interaction between respective ministries,
militaries and economic entities. The institutional framework is furtherbuttressed
by both countries'participationin regional multilateralorganizations-the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) grouping, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This layer of
multilateralism has helped consolidate gains in the bilateral relationship, particu-
larly in the area of confidence-building measures (CBMs) along the former Sino-
Soviet border,14 while offering useful insulation in the event of future tensions.
8
Today's figures for the number of Chinese in the RFE are relatively modest, particularly compared to
estimates in the I99os, some of which went as high as 2 million. 'Based on all the available data, the
Chinese population in the Far Eastern district cannot exceed Ioo,ooo people ... One could not find any
villages or settlements in the region with a predominant Chinese population'. See Vilya Gelbras, 'Chinese
migration to the Russian Far East: a view from Moscow', in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., Humanflows across
bordersin northeastAsia, proceedings of a seminar held at United Nations University, Tokyo, 20-21 Nov.
2002 (Monterey Institute of International Studies, http://www.miis.edu/rcenters-ceas-pub-html), p. I43.
9 Robert Legvold, 'Great power stakes in Central Asia', in Robert
Legvold, ed., Thinking strategically:the
majorpowers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian nexus (Cambridge, MA and London: American Academy
of Arts and Sciences/MIT Press, 2003), p. 34.
IO Russian foreign ministry press releases, 'O Rossiisko-kitaiskom torgovo-ekonomicheskim
sotrudnichestve', 22 Nov. 2002, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf; 'O razvitii rossiisko-kitaiskogo
torgovo-ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva', 30 Jan. 2004, http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf.
" Joint press conference of Vladimir Putin and HuJintao in Moscow, 27
May 2003, http://www.ln/mid.ru/bl.nsf
I2 The bulk of'unregistered trade' comprises transactions by shuttle traders (chelnoki),so called because they
criss-cross the border to sell their wares. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable secrecy regarding the level
of Russian arms transfers, although most estimates put this at around US$I-I.5 billion per annum a
relatively modest proportion of total bilateral trade.
I3 In 2002, for example, Russia exported 3 million tonnes of oil to China: Putin's comments at joint press
conference with Hujintao, Moscow, 27 May 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf. In addition to the
Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline project, there are also reasonable prospects of natural gas development in
the Kovykta field near Lake Baikal: see 'RUSIA petroleum, CNPC and KOGAS complete Kovykta
international feasibility study', Insight TNK-BP, Dec. 2003, p. 6.
14 As a result of two
agreements reached in I996-7, the five countries adjoining the former Sino-Soviet
border-Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-undertook not to carry out threatening
military activity against one another. The agreements imposed ceilings on the number of ground troops
and certain types of military equipment permitted in a Iookm-wide frontier zone. For a useful summary
of the agreements see Jennifer Anderson, The limits of Sino-Russian strategicpartnership,Adelphi Paper 315
(London: Oxford University Press/International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997), pp. 40-2.

297
Bobo Lo

An imperfectrelationship
Nevertheless, for all its successes, the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has
become the target of increasingly negative comment and speculation. Some of
this is linked to Moscow's changing strategic calculus in the post-9/I I world, a
subject that will be discussed below. But there are also critical weaknesses in the
bilateral dynamic itself, which the progress of the past decade has masked, but
not eliminated. While relations may have reached a high point, it is clear that
'there is still a long way to go to the "peak".'I5 This climate of uncertainty is, if
anything, heightened by the pre-eminent position of China in Moscow's 'Asian
view'. Just as the overall western focus of Russian foreign policy does not imply
a pro-western outlook, so Moscow's Sinocentrism in Asia does not necessarily
signify a favourable disposition towards China. China is Russia's principal
'partner'and its main gateway to the Asia-Pacific region, yet also major strategic
competitor and potential security threat. In short, Russia's China policy reflects
larger contradictions and paradoxes in Moscow's approach to international affairs.
A number of issues will require careful handling if the two countries are to
safeguard the gains of recent times, let alone make good on the Yeltsin-Jiang
vision of 'strategic interaction' for the twenty-first century. The oldest and most
fundamental problem is historical baggage dating back to the Mongol invasion
of Muscovy in the thirteenth century. Although the connection between the medi-
eval Mongols and today's Han Chinese is tenuous at best, this past trauma lies at
the heart of the anti-Chinese attitudes of many Russians. The image of a 'yellow
peril' sweeping into the Russian Far East and further west remains a powerful
one, both across the elite and among the general population.'6 Such atavistic
prejudices have been fuelled by fears of Chinese irredentism regarding territories
lost under the 'unequal treaties' of the nineteenth century,17 and by the steady
depopulation of the RFE, whose population has declined to less than 7 million. I8
In fact, these insecurities are not the result of Chinese actions and policies,
but a reflection of internal Russian problems. Putin's concerns that Chinese
could become the lingua franca of the RFE are directed at the failure of the
Russian authorities-central and local-to regenerate the region.19 Possible
remedies, such as incentives to encourage migration from European Russia and
from ethnic Russians in the Baltic states and Central Asia,20 have not been

'5 Mikhail Margelov,'Russian-Chinese

relations:at theirpeak?',InternationalAffairs(Moscow),49: 6, 2003, p. 91.
I6 Dmitri Trenin, Russia'sChinaproblem(WashingtonDC: CarnegieEndowmentfor InternationalPeace,
I999), P. 9.
I7 As a resultof the 'unequaltreaties'of Aigun (I858) and Peking (I86o), China ceded about 1.5 million sq
km of territory,includingthe present-dayregionsof Primorye,Khabarovsk,Amur and Birobidzhan.
i8 Accordingto Yurii Obriadin,Deputy PresidentialPlenipotentiaryfor the FarEasternFederalDistrict,
the populationof the RFE hasfallenfrom 8 million to 6.7 million duringthe pastdecade. See
'Populationin FarEastdroppingfast',Pravda.ruwebsite, I3 Nov. 2003, http://newsfromrussia.com/
main/2003 / I / 3/51197.html.
I9 Putin'scomments,cited in Rouben Azizian, 'The optimistshave the lead, for now: Russia'sChina
debate',specialassessment(Honolulu:Asia-PacificCenter for SecurityStudies,Dec. 2003), p. 6.
20 Dmitri Trenin, The endof Eurasia: Russiaon theborder between
geopoliticsandglobalization
(Moscow:
Carnegie Moscow Center, 200I), p. 218.

298
The long sunset of strategicpartnership

seriously attempted. In the meantime, local inhabitants are leaving in droves in

response to living conditions miserable even by Russian standards. Unfortun-
ately, in the absence of any early prospect of improvement (let alone a lasting
solution), the Chinese serve as convenient scapegoat and bogeyman.
At a more generalized level, there exists a cultural divide that frequently
obscures and undermines commonalities of interest. Many Russians, even
advocates of strategic partnership, subscribe to the image of Russia as a 'civiliza-
tional barrier' against the barbarian 'East'.2' Although these days the principal
danger is seen as Islamic radicalism emanating from the south, the very concept
of Russia as a guardian of 'western' values inhibits rapprochement with China. It
fosters a superiority complex that many Chinese find unwarranted in a state
they view as economically backward, militarily crippled and of diminishing
international influence.22
The combination of historical fears and political/civilizational stereotyping
has reinforced an extant West-centrism in both Russia and China. As a con-
sequence, the strategic partnership carries the whiff of second class. This is
especially true in Moscow, where relations with America, western Europe and
the former Soviet Union (FSU) absorb considerably more attention and
resources. Such relativism detracts from the bilateral relationship in two ways.
In the first place, it sometimes translates into a careless attitude towards the
strategic concerns of the other. For example, the Putin administration has made
significant commitments in its external relations-notably endorsement of the
American military presence in Central Asia post-9/I I and strategic arms agree-
ments with Washington-after only minimal consultation with Beijing.23
Second, Russia and China have to some extent become competitors for western
favour, whether in the form of foreign investment, political approbation or
advantageous security arrangements.24
This sense of competition is rendered more acute by perceptions of the
rapidly changing balance between the two states. The startling pace of China's
modernization raises the spectre of an increasingly ambitious Beijing, intent not
only on maximizing its influence in areas, such as Central Asia, that have tradi-
tionally fallen within Moscow's pale, but also one day reviving its territorial
claims on the RFE.25 In this connection, there has been an upsurge in concerns
within Russia about Chinese rearmament and the contribution of Russian

2I As one western commentatorhas put it, 'Russiananalysisoften treatsChina as a strategicpartner,but

rarelyas a politicalor culturalequal':E. Wayne Merry, 'Moscow'sretreatand Beijing'srise as regional
greatpower', Problems of Post-Communism 50: 3, May/June2003, p. 22.
22
This was a common refrainof Chinese diplomatsandjournalistswhen the authorworked at the
Australianembassyin Moscow duringthe late I990s.
23
Merrycomments that Putin'ssupportfor the US post-9/I I 'causedgenuine consternationin Beijing':
see Merry, 'Moscow's retreat',p. 29. The Chinese are also known to have been unhappywith thefait
accompliof the Russia-US StrategicOffensiveReductions Treaty (SORT) in May 2002, as well as with
Moscow's relaxedattitudetowardsAmericanabrogationof the 1972 Anti-BallisticMissile(ABM)Treaty.
24
Rajan Menon and CharlesE. Ziegler, 'The balanceof power and US foreignpolicy interestsin the
RussianFarEast',in Judith Thornton and CharlesE. Ziegler, eds, Russia'sFarEast:a regionat risk
(Seattleand London:National Bureauof AsianResearch/Universityof WashingtonPress,2002), p. 39.
25
Trenin, The endof Eurasia,p. 220.

299
Bobo Lo

weapons and weapons technologies to this build-up.26 The 'China threat',

which had appeared to be more notional and long-term than direct, is now seen
as looming more rapidly than anyone had anticipated.
In this complex ideational and psychological climate, there is ample scope for
dormant differences to flare up again. Settlement of the common border, Chinese
'migration' into the RFE, strategic and economic involvement in Central Asia,
and Russian arms transfers are all issues on which an apparently stable accom-
modation could unravel, especially given the intrusion of other elements into
the mix. In China, political instability arising from internal power struggles or
economic recession could stimulate a nationalist revanche, provoke widespread
disorder and lead to unregulated large-scale population movements in the
border regions.27 In Russia, economic stagnation and the revival of nationalism
and feelings of derzhavnost(sense of 'great power' status) might engender more
assertive,less flexible attitudestowards China. The last twelve months have already
witnessed a noticeably more vigorous Russian approach to defending 'zones of
special interest' in the FSU.28 In the end, it should be remembered that many
bilateraldifferences between Russia and China have not been settled definitively,
but only neutralized for the time being. Their quiescence is a function of the
positive atmosphere and momentum in the relationship, rather than proof that
the current state of affairsis necessarily viewed as satisfactoryby either side.

Russia'sevolving strategiccalculus29
At a time when both countries, and global affairsmore generally, are in profound
transition, the strategic partnership is a dynamic rather than a static pheno-
menon, not founded in eternal 'truths' and principles, but flexible in response to
events and emerging international trends. As the Kremlin's reaction to 9/I I and
its aftermath showed, Russian strategic calculus is susceptible to rapid and signi-
ficant adjustments. The tensions and ambiguities in Russian-Chinese relations
cannot therefore be understood in an isolated bilateral context, but need to be
considered against the setting of Putin's overall management of foreign policy in
an unstable international environment.
Since coming to power in January 2000 Putin has pursued a 'multivectored'
foreign policy, based on the premise that Russia can be 'friends'with all countries.

26
See Andrew C. Kuchins,'Limitsof the Sino-Russianstrategicpartnership',in Andrew C. Kuchins,ed.,
Russiaafterthefall (WashingtonDC: CarnegieEndowmentfor InternationalPeace, 2002), pp. 212-13.
27
Trenin, Russia'sChinaproblem, p. 33. See also Viktor N. Pavliatenko,'Russiansecurityin the Asia-
Pacificregion:the dangersof isolation',in GilbertRozman, MikhailG. Nosov and Koji Watanabe,eds,
RussiaandEastAsia:the21st centurysecurity environment (Armonk,NY and London:EastWestInstitute
and M. E. Sharpe, I999), p. 28.
28 In 2003 Moscow undertooka numberof concrete stepsto reassertits presencein formerSoviet Central
Asia,includingthe formalizationof the Collective SecurityTreatyOrganization(CSTO) and the
establishmentof a militarybase in Kant,Kyrgyzstan.
29 The term 'strategiccalculus'does not imply here a logical or even rationalizedprocess,but rather
signifiesthe basketof predispositionalinfluences-rational and irrational,logical and atavistic-that shape
Russia'sapproachto geostrategicand political-militaryquestions.

300
The long sunsetof strategicpartnership

In practice, he has been very successful in realizing this ambitious design.

Compared to the Yeltsin years, Moscow today has functional relations with
Washington and the major west European capitals; it has built on its strategic
partnerships with Beijing and New Delhi; it is much more effective in pro-
jecting Russian influence in the FSU; and its ties with the Islamic world have
survived the brutal conduct of the Chechen war and participation in the
American-led coalition against international terrorism.30
However, over the past i 8 months this multifaceted approach has come under
some strain. Belying the rhetoric about a universal civilization confronting
common threats, the post-9/ ii world is anything but united, with even the
concept of a unitary West under attack. Despite agreement in principle about
the menace posed by international terrorism and WMD proliferation, and the
importance of cooperation in conflict management, these priorities mean very
different things to different countries. Thus, for Russia international terrorism is
about Chechnya rather than Al-Qaeda, a commitment to non-proliferation
does not preclude nuclear exports to Iran, and conflict management is above all
the responsibility of the major powers-rather than one 'hyperpower'-
operating through the structuresand mechanisms of the United Nations.
In a shifting international system, Putin finds himself under increasing
pressure to make critical choices; and one of the most difficult of these concerns
China. In theory, a cosy relationship with Beijing is not incompatible with the
West-centric focus of contemporary Russian foreign policy. With its public
commitment to 'multivectoralism', Moscow can (and does) claim to assign equal
importance to East and West. And it has even imparted some substance to this
assertion, for example timing summits with the non-western powers immedi-
ately before or after meetings with George Bush and other western leaders.31
But Putin's room for manoeuvre is contracting. China's apparently inevitable
ascent as the next superpower, the continuing global primacy of the United
States, and Russian strategic sensitivities on many fronts are combining to create
an environment in which he may no longer be able successfully to portray Russia
as all things to all people in a rosy, positive-sum conception of international
affairs.
In this context, China assumes an importance that extends well beyond the
bilateral, highlighting a larger dilemma in Russia's relationship to the outside
world. In a very real sense, contrasting attitudes towards the partnership with
Beijing reflect a continuing struggle for Russia's foreign policy soul: integration
(albeit highly qualified) with the West against an ambivalent approach charac-
terized by alternating cooperation and competition, particularlywith the United

30 Putin'sdepiction of Russianforeign policy as multivectoredhasbeen much aidedby his flexible use of

civilizationallabellingaccordingto time and place. Thus Russiais Europeanin dealingswith Europe,
Asianin Asia, transatlanticstrategicpartnerwith the United States,and a Muslim nation when
participatingat the summit of the Organizationof IslamicConference.
3I For example, the summit of the ShanghaiCooperationOrganizationfollowed the Russia-US and
Russia-NATO summitsin May-June2002. One year later,Hu Jintao'ssix-dayvisit to Russia preceded
Putin'sSt Petersburgmeetingswith George Bush, Tony Blairand EU leaders.

301
Bobo Lo

States, and the pursuit of closer ties with the major non-western powers-
China, India and the Muslim world.32
What might otherwise be an abstractdiscourse is transformedinto the concrete
by the presence of several critical catalysts. The most important is the emerging
strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Although forecasts that
the gulf in military capabilities between the two will be bridged some time
around 202033 are scarcely credible, the pace of China's economic development
may in time generate a more aggressive foreign policy posture in Beijing-not
only in connection with Taiwan but also throughout the Asia-Pacific and
beyond.34 Even if such predictions prove unfounded or exaggerated, American
concerns about China's enhanced military capacities may still push Washington
into an increasingly tough policy of containment. In such a scenario, the Kremlin
would have to balance the strategic partnership with China against the need to
avoid collateral damage from being on the 'wrong' side-as, for example,
occurred during the Iraq war.35 As in the aftermath of 9/I I, when George Bush
first outlined his Manichaean vision of the world, Russia's place and influence
in the world may depend on making the right choice.
A second major factor is Russia's growing emphasis on strategic diversity in
Asia, specifically reducing its dependence on China to promote its interests in the
region. Although in the past Beijing's cooperation has been vital in facilitating
Russian membership of organizations such as APEC and the ARF, there is a
belief that China often acts in ways that effectively, if discreetly, work against
Russian interests.36 Accordingly, the case for strategic diversity has become
more urgent than ever-not in the classical sense of balancing East and West,
but in the sense of shifting towards a less Sinocentric approach in Asia.
The idea of such diversity is not new; it was implicit, for example, in
Yeltsin's attempts during the 199os to reach an accommodation with Japan over
the Southern Kuriles/Northern Territories. There was talk that Russia might
become the 'swing' power in north-east Asia between China and Japan and,
more fancifully, between China and the United States.37Today, however, such
notions have given ground to a more practical, economically based vision of
strategic diversity, as illustratedby the debate over whether to build the Angarsk
oil pipeline to Daqing in northern China or favour a longer route extending to
the Russian port city of Nakhodka. In important respects, the Daqing route is

32 It should be emphasized that Putin's interpretation of'integration' is highly selective. There is a basic
unwillingnessto acceptthe loss of sovereigntyand freedomof manoeuvreentailedin subordinating
nationalidentityto a largerpersona.See Lo, Vladimir of Russian
Putinandtheevolution foreignpolicy,p. 60.
33 Margelov, 'Russian-Chinese relations', pp. 80, 85.
34 See Denny Roy, 'China'sreactionto American predominance', Survival
45: 3, Autumn 2003, p. 74.
35 In fact, Putin emergedrelativelyunscathedfrom the Iraqcrisis.He was fortunate-or skilfulenough-
that the Russianposition appearedalmostinvariablyto be more accommodatingthan that of the French
and the Germans.
36 Trenin, Russia'sChina probleni,
p. 28.
37 See GeorgiiBovt and AlexanderChudodeev, 'Obeshschannogotri goda zhdut', Segodnya, 4 Nov. I997,
p. 4; also RajanMenon, 'Russo-Japaneserelations:implicationsfor NortheastAsiansecurity',in Stephen
rolein Asia (Durham,NC and
decline:Russia'schanging
J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein,eds, Imperial
London: Duke University Press, 1997), p. 142.

302
The long sunset of strategicpartnership

economically more viable: as well as being cheaper and logistically easier, its
planned capacity is better suited to the estimated volume of oil to be carried
from the east Siberian oilfields.38 But such considerations are counterbalanced
by concern that Russia could be held hostage by a China exploiting its position
as monopoly customer-as Turkey did over Blue Stream gas.39The Nakhodka
option, by contrast, opens up the entire Asia-Pacific market to Russian oil
exports-not only China, but also Japan, South Korea and the South-East Asian
'tigers'.40 In this schema, the development of transnational energy (and infra-
structural)projects would become the main conduit through which Russia could
establish itself as an influential player in the region, rather than as a mere raw
materialsappendage.4'
The importance of strategic diversity has been accentuated by the changing
balance of power between Russia and China, alluded to earlier. The threat is
not that Beijing will attempt to exploit this to regain its former lands in the RFE
or challenge Moscow's leading role in Central Asia. For the time being, China's
focus will remain firmly centred on other priorities-internal modernization,
Taiwan, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea.42The advantagesof the
'rear-to-rear'arrangement,43whereby stabilityalong the Russian-Chinese border
frees both to concentrate on more pressing concerns elsewhere, still hold good.
But Chinese resurgence does present Moscow with a dilemma regarding the
long-term future of the strategic partnership. Does Russia accept the 'inevit-
able', namely, that the changing balance of power will lead to a reversal in roles
and its demotion to junior status within the partnership? Or does it move
instead to embrace the West, including its Asian members (Japan,South Korea),
in order to mitigate China's growing strength-a shift that would involve
downgrading 'partnership' relations with Beijing? The implications of this
choice are not merely bilateral and regional. They go to the heart of what role
and place Russia envisages for itself in the strategic map of the twenty-first
century. If the answer is, as Putin has often suggested, that its destiny is as a
global power-as opposed to an essentially regional player with some global
interests-then the comfort of a multivectored foreign policy could give way to
overt competitive tensions between two aspiring world powers.

38John Helmer,
'Japanmisdirectslobbying for Russianoil', RussiaJournal,8 July 2003, http://
www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml.
39
SergeiPletnev, 'U Putinaest shansprevzoitiKhu Tsintaov vostochnoi diplomatii',26 May 2003, http://
www.strana.ru/print/i8i997.html.Under the Blue Streamproject,Moscow and Ankaraagreedto
transportRussiannaturalgas to Turkey via the Black Sea. Although it was originallyenvisaged(in 1997)
that the pipeline would eventuallydeliver I6 billion cubic metresper annum, the Turkishgovernment
subsequentlyused its position as sole customerto pressurethe Russiansto agreeto considerablyreduced
levels.
40 See
Margelov,'Russian-Chineserelations',p. 87.
4I
Ibid., p. 90.
42 Menon and
Ziegler, 'The balanceof power', p. 49.
43 Alexei D. Voskressenski,'Russia'sevolving grandstrategytowardChina', in Garnett,ed., Rapprochement
or rivalry?,p. 13 1.

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Bobo Lo

Resilienceand continuity
Notwithstanding the impact of a larger strategic calculus on the bilateral
relationship, eventual confrontation between Moscow and Beijing is far from
certain. There may be some sharpening of individual policy differences and
even a deterioration in the overall atmosphere. But there are also countervailing
considerations that suggest the partnership may prove surprisingly resilient in
the face of conventional strategic logic.
The most crucial of these is that the relationship is clearly established on the
basis of common interests rather than 'shared values' or ideological stereotypes.
Neither Moscow nor Beijing is dewy-eyed about the quality of their coopera-
tion, and both are careful to distinguish today's partnership from the so-called
'unbreakable friendship' of the Stalin-Mao era. Despite the occasionally flowery
rhetoric, this is a realist (and even cynical) union of interests, not a love-in. Its
limitations are well understood and expectations correspondingly well managed.
Second, although Putin's choices may be narrowing, he will attempt to
sustain his positive-sum approach to international relations for as long as he can.
In the event of further Russia-US rapprochement and heightened Sino-American
tensions, Putin will nonetheless maintain close ties with China. In this context, his
stubborn resistance to American pressure over nuclear energy cooperation with
Iran offers an instructive precedent, demonstrating that Moscow will not give
ground easily, even when a western 'rational actor' perspective might suggest
otherwise.
Third, China remains the most promising political, economic and security
partner for Russia in Asia. There are few real alternatives. The Japan 'option',
touted by some, continues to be more theoretical than real. Moscow and
Tokyo are no nearer to clearing the road-block of the territorial dispute;
bilateral trade is less than a fifth of the turnover between Russia and China;44
there are significant differences on a number of issues, including Asian theatre
missile defence and post-conflict management in Iraq; Tokyo is viewed as
Washington's staunchest ally in the region; and Moscow fears that an econo-
mically resurgent Japan could become ever more aggressive in pursuing its
foreign policy interests.45
Fourth, notwithstanding Russian unease about China's ascent, the strategic
and security implications of this phenomenon are poorly defined and understood.
For example, the prospect of China's bridging the gap in military capabilities
remains a distant one. There is an underlying assumption-albeit less confident
than before-that Russia will retain a significantnuclear and conventional military

44 In a three-year decline in Russian-Japanese trade was reversed, with turnover back to nearly US$5
2003
billion (up from US$4.2 billion in 2002): 'Rossiisko-yaponskie otnosheniya', 28 Jan. 2004, http://
www.ln.mid.ru/ns-rasia.nsf. However, this improvement is unimpressive when compared to the
burgeoning commercial ties between Russia and China, which, taking into account unregistered trade,
are now worth over US$25 billion.
45 Merry, 'Moscow's retreat', p. 29.

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The long sunset of strategicpartnership

superiority for some time.46 Meanwhile, the economic (and political) benefits
of large arms sales continue to outweigh the hypothetical possibility that China
may, one day, use these same weapons and their technologies against Russia.47
Fifth, even accepting that China represents the principal long-term threat to
Russia's security, it is a huge leap to conclude from this that the optimal response
is a policy of confrontation or containment, with or without other powers.
Despite occasionally grandiose claims of influence, Russian policy-makers
recognize their country's limited strategic weight, especially in the Asia-Pacific
region. Dabbling in balance-of-power games of 'triangularism' could rebound
dangerously, fomenting anti-Russian sentiment in Beijing without obtaining
any adequate quid pro quo from the United States (let alone Japan).48 It is
worth recalling in this connection that many in Moscow are bitter about
Washington's perceived ingratitude in return for Putin's support-his 'strategic
choice'49-in the aftermath of 9/II. With no particular reason to trust in
American good intentions, the natural course is to tread warily, avoiding com-
mitments unless absolutely necessary.
Indeed, there is a compelling argument that the best way of neutralizing the
'China threat' is to tie Beijing more closely into trans-Asian energy and infra-
structural projects, facilitating the transformation of the RFE into a commer-
cially lucrative region in whose stability all parties have a stake. The accelerated
development of local infrastructure that might result from such collaboration
could attract Russian people and investment into sparsely populated regions,
thereby defusing a seemingly intractable security problem. On a broader macro-
economic level, the proliferation of bilateral commercial links-not just in oil
and gas, but also in space cooperation, atomic energy and civil aviation-gives
Russia a strong security as well as economic interest in maintaining good relations.
Finally, although some observers have identified the impact of generational
change as a potentially negative factor in Russian-Chinese relations,50 the

46 The vast disparityin nuclearweaponspotentialis reflectedin the fact that Russiais committedby the
May 2002 SORT agreement to reducing its strategic weapons stocks to 1,700-2,200 warheads; all this
while China has an estimated20-25 strategicwarheads.As for conventionalwarfarecapabilities,few
analystsbelieve that China could launcha successfulamphibiousoperationagainstTaiwan today, even if
the US militarywere to standaside.
47 China'spurchaseof Russianarmsmakesit dependenton Moscow for sparepartsand ammunition,while
variouscommentatorshave also suggestedthat Russia tends to sell a better classof weaponryto India.
Although the transferof Russianmilitarytechnologiesto the PLA (People'sLiberationArmy)meansthat
China will, eventually,be able to make its own weapons, Moscow would still retainsubstantialinside
knowledge, certainlymore than would be the case if China were to buy from other sources.See Azizian,
'The optimistshave the lead', pp. 6-7.
48 Ideasof strategic'triangularism'were especiallycurrentduringthe Soviet period. They referrednot only
to the dynamicbetween the United States,the Soviet Union and China, but also includedat various
times the Chinese-Soviet-Japanese,Chinese-Soviet-Indian,Chinese-Soviet-North Koreanand
Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamesetriangles:see Robert Legvold, 'Russiaand the strategicquadrangle',in
Michael Mandelbaum,ed., Thestrategic quadrangle:Russia,China,Japan,andthe UnitedStatesin EastAsia
(WashingtonDC: Council on ForeignRelations Press, I995), pp. 21-2.
49 Dmitri Trenin, "'Osenniimarafon"VladimiraPutinai rozhdenieRossiiskoi
vneshnepoliticheskoi
strategii',briefingpaper,CarnegieMoscow Center, I5 Nov. 2001, p. 6.
50 See e.g. Robert H. DonaldsonandJohn A. Donaldson, 'The armstradein Russian-Chineserelations:
identity, domesticpolitics, and geopoliticalpositioning',International
StudiesQuarterly
47, 2003, p. 722.

305
Bobo Lo

opposite could turn out to be true. The retirement of the old Soviet-educated
cohort of Chinese leaders and their succession by a more business-oriented,
western-influenced generation may encourage the development of relations on
a more practical basis. A leader like current Chinese President Hu Jintao is, in
many respects, a better fit for Vladimir Putin than Hu's predecessor, Jiang
Zemin.51 More generally, there may be scope for a measure of normative con-
vergence between two statist, yet market-oriented models of government.

Litmustests
In the post-Soviet period the trend of Russian-Chinese relations has been
consistently positive, moving from a barely civil interaction into one fully
meriting the often devalued title, 'strategic partnership'. Despite criticisms from
some quarters, the goal of a stable and cooperative relationship with Beijing has
found broad acceptance within the Russian political establishment, a choice
born of the pragmatic realization that the alternative is far worse.
Over the next decade, there are unlikely to be radical changes to this think-
ing. The ambiguities in the strategic partnership will remain: on the plus side, a
confluence of views on many international issues, common threat perceptions,
expanding economic ties; in the minus column, the burden of historical and
civilizational prejudices, an increasingly dominant West-centrism in Moscow and
Beijing, and Russian anxieties regarding China's rise as the next superpower.
This duality suggests that the relationship is set to move into an ambivalent,
essentially transitional phase in which many of the assumptions of partnership
are challenged by new realities, but in which, too, the advantages of functional,
cooperative relations continue to be appreciated. The tension and interplay be-
tween larger strategic considerations, on the one hand, and resilient perceptions
of common bilateral interests, on the other, will shape the evolution of Russia's
China policy well into the new century.
Within this overall dynamic, three issue areaswill bear particularscrutiny: (i)
developments over the Angarsk-Nakhodka oil pipeline; (2) security manage-
ment on the Korean peninsula; and (3) strategic projection in former Soviet
Central Asia. Responses to these contrasting sets of problems will provide
crucial pointers as to the condition of the strategic partnership.

TheAngarsk-Nakhodka
pipeline
Few issues highlight the dual nature of the Russian-Chinese dynamic so
vividly as the pipeline debate. On the one hand, collaboration on this project
reflects the determination of both countries to take their relationship up to the
next level. Formerly stuck in a near-default mode, whereby the primary
rationale of 'partnership'-'counterbalancing' the United States-was essentially
5' Although Hu is some ten years older than Putin, they
enjoy a similar reputation for professionalism and
dynamism.

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The long sunset of strategicpartnership

derivative,52 these days Moscow and Beijing focus much more on relations for
their own sake. In a further break from the Yeltsin years, they are also looking
to change the centre of gravity in the partnership from principally political and
security-based issues (what Rajan Menon terms 'strategic convergence'53) to
economic cooperation.
However, this symbolism is double-edged, and has raised the stakes all
round, for ill as well as for good. Large-scale energy and infrastructuralprojects
represent the 'future', the most promising avenue for diversifying and enriching
the bilateral relationship;yet they also enhance the potential for serious disagree-
ments. Differences arising from concrete decisions will not be issue-specific, but
will be extrapolated to highlight the limitations and structuralweaknesses of the
strategic partnership as a whole.
In the event that Putin opts for the Nakhodka route, as many believe he
will,54 there will be political as well as economic ramifications.Beijing would not
only take grave offence at the cancellation of prior intergovernmental under-
takings,55 but might also interpret the decision as signalling a fundamental
reorientation in Putin's foreign policy-away from the geographical 'balance' of
multivectoralism towards a clear strategic commitment to the West. The Chinese
have already indicated that they will not readily accept Russian economic
arguments regarding customer diversification, despite their logic, and Moscow
will need to handle the announcement and implementation of this decision
very carefully in order to limit the wider fall-out.56

The Korean peninsula

Moscow's interest in the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline route is motivated, it will
be recalled, not only by economic considerations, but also the desire to play a
larger, more independent role in the Asia-Pacific region. The corollary of such
an agenda is the need to restrain China-discreetly-from occupying too
dominant a position in north-east Asian affairs, in the first instance on the
Korean peninsula. To some extent, Russia sees China regionally as the analogue
of the United States globally, that is, as a country with an overtly hegemonic
agenda.57 Consequently, just as Moscow seeks common cause with others to
dilute the exercise of American power worldwide, it may increasingly be
disposed to work with the other powers in East Asia-the United States
included-to restrain Beijing's strategic ambitions there.

52
Vassily Mikheev, 'The strategy of "stability" (on the results of the i6th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China)', IAIR Policy Papers I: 3, Nov. 2002, Institute for Applied International
Research, Moscow, p. I2.
53 Rajan Menon, 'The strategic convergence between Russia and China', Survival39: 2, Summer I997, p. 101.
54 Author's interviews in Moscow in October
2003.
55 As related to the author by a senior Chinese government official.
56 Alexander Lomanov, 'Russia's Chinese policy', presentation to a conference, 'Russia in the New World
Order', Lessius Hogeschool, Antwerp, 27 Nov. 2003.
57 Bobo Lo, 'Rossiiskaya politika v Vostochnoi Azii: evolyutsiya i preemstvennost', YadernyKontrol
(Moscow), no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 2002, p. 40.

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Bobo Lo

However, Moscow will need to preserve a delicate balance between pur-

suing this ambitious objective, carving out a meaningful role for itself in multi-
lateral negotiations on the Koreas, and ensuring that it is not seen to obstruct,
much less challenge, the Chinese agenda. Paradoxically, Russia's position as the
least influential of all the parties involved in the Korean question is to its
advantage, since its weakness enables it, more or less plausibly, to put itself
forward as the (relatively) disinterested facilitator of the peace process.58

CentralAsia
If north-east Asia highlights the prophylactic dimension of Russia's geopolitical
ambitions, then in Central Asia Moscow is engaged in a much more activist
project: re-establishing itself in a traditional sphere of influence. Here, Russia
sees itself as the regional hegemon, a position it is extremely reluctant to cede.59
Despite backing the Washington-led coalition againstinternational terronrismand
endorsing the American military presence in Central Asia post-9/I I, it remains
acutely uncomfortable with the involvement of outside powers in the region,
and will do what it can to contain this.
In relation to the United States, this means exercising 'strategic patience',
waiting for Washington to lose interest-a not unreasonable hope in the light of
historical experience.60 However, China's geographical proximity to Central
Asia and considerable security and economic interests there mean that it will not
simply 'go away'. For the moment this is not an issue, given Beijing's willing-
ness to accept a secondary role and the existence of a Russian-Chinese security
consensus against the threat of Islamic radicalism. But there is no guarantee that
this commonality of interest will remain the dominant reality. As Russia seeks
to reassert its presence and influence in the region, and China attempts to
maximize its economic stake, Central Asia looms as perhaps the most likely
theatre for renewed bilateral tensions.

58Moscow's unassumingposition on participationin the Koreantalkswas exemplifiedby ForeignMinister

Igor Ivanov'scomment that Russiawould be happyto take a more active partin the negotiations,'in
whateverform required':pressconferencein St Petersburgon I June 2003, http://www.ln.mid.ru/
brp_4.nsf.
59As StephenBlankhas noted, 'the perceptionsof waning power are difficultfor Russianleadersto accept
and translateinto policy. Russiais disinclinedto acceptlimits on its capabilityto achieveits perceived
vital interests':StephenJ. Blank, 'The United Statesand CentralAsia',in Roy Allisonand LenaJonson,
eds, CentralAsiansecurity: thenewinternationalcontext(Londonand WashingtonDC: Royal Instituteof
InternationalAffairs/BrookingsInstitution,200I), p. 144.
60 RajanMenon observesthat 'the Americanpublic'ssupportfor protractedembroilmentin the tumultof
greaterCentralAsia statesis liable to be thin-and without that support,it will be hardto sustainany
policy that involves expenditures,setbacks,frustrationand the loss of Americanlives.' Nevertheless,he
argues,the strongAmericanemphasispost-9/I I on the war againstterror'is likely to be durableand to
dictateengagement':'The new GreatGame in CentralAsia', Survival45: 2, Summer2003, p. 201.

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The long sunset of strategicpartnership

Conclusion
Many of the concerns in Russian-Chinese relations are more potential than
actual. Currently, the strengths of the strategic partnership far outweigh its
weaknesses and, for a while at least, relations should be resilient enough to
absorb differences over the Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline, the fate of the Korean
peninsula and Central Asia. In spite of the many reservations about China, few
in Moscow advocate a confrontational stance towards Beijing. Not only would
this jeopardize vital national interests, but a still convalescent Russia is scarcely
capable of sustaining such a committal and resource-intensive approach.
However, the underlying problems in the partnership are serious and the
broader international context farfrom immutable. The changing balance between
the two countries, the growth of Chinese military power as a factor in inter-
national affairs,increased strategic and economic competition: all could exacer-
bate the numerous actual and potential stresses in a relationship that lacks the
foundation of shared values to sustain it through periods of crisis. As the process
of China's transformation from predominantly regional actor into global player
gathers momentum, the divide in perceptions and priorities is likely to widen.
In the ensuing climate of apprehension, Russian fears about China would find
new life and be increasingly reflected in concrete policy.
Such change would not be rapid or linear, and there is no prospect of an early
return to the adversarialrelationship of the 196os.6I Both countries will strive-
with some success-to maintain substantive, mutually beneficial ties. Neverthe-
less, despite the appearance of calm and productive cooperation, new realities
are intruding to highlight its limitations and weaknesses. At a time when
Russian-Chinese relations are at their zenith, the ultimate paradox is that we
may be witnessing the beginnings of a transformation from strategic partnership
into strategic divergence.

6I The nadir of Sino-Soviet relations was reached with a series of bloody border clashes on Damansky island
on the Ussuri river in March I969.

309