Collective Action and Network Structure

Author(s): Roger V. Gould

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 182-196
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095965
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 COLLECTIVEACTION AND NETWORK STRUCTURE*

ROGER V. GOULD
University
of Chicago

I developand analyzea mathematicalmodeldescribingthe relationshipbetweenindi-

vidualcontributionsto a collectivegood and the networkof social relationsthatmakes
these contributionsinterdependent. Startingfrom the assumptionthatactors respondto
the contributionsof othersbecauseof efficacyconcernsand normsoffairness, I derive
predictionsabout the impactof networkstructureon total contributions.Networkden-
sity and size influencecollective action outcomesin dramaticallydifferentways, de-
pendingon thestructuralpositionof thosewhomakeunconditionalcontributions.More-
over,these effectsare highlynonlinear,suggestingthatthe impactof social ties on col-
lectiveactionmaybe quitesensitiveto mobilizationcontexts.

M ost studentsof collectiveactionagree contributionmore likely), the total benefit re-

thatsocialtiesoccupya centralplacein
explanations of howgroupsovercomethefree-
riderproblem.Takinga cue fromthe theoreti-
cal workof Oberschall (1973)andTilly(1978),
empiricalstudiesof social movementspoint
increasinglyto the role of networksof social
relations in recruitmentand mobilization
(Snow, Zurcher,and Ekland-Olson1980;
McAdam1986;Fernandez andMcAdam1988;
Gould 1990). Theoreticalworkby Marwell,
Oliver,and theircolleagueshas shown that
payingattentionto networkdensityandcen-
tralizationprovidesconsiderableleveragein
makingpredictionsaboutmobilizationout-
comes (Oliver,Marwell,and Teixeira1985;
Marwell,Oliver,andPrahl1988;Oliverand
Marwell1988).
Underlying thisfocuson networksis therec-
ognitionthatsocialties makeindividuals'de-
cisionsaboutparticipating in collectiveaction
interdependent. A basictenetof Olson's(1965)
formulation of the free-rider
problemis thata
rationalactorwill abstainfromcontributing to
a publicgood if his or hercontribution has a
negligibleimpacton the total amountof the
goodproduced(andconsequently a negligible
impacton hisorherconsumption of thegood).
But if thesedecisionsare not independent (if
one actor'scontribution makesanotheractor's
sulting from an individual's decision to con-
tributemay be considerablygreaterthanhis or
her cost of contributing.1
Recent discussions of this issue (Marwellet
al. 1988; Macy 1991a, 1991b; Gamson 1990)
highlightthe role thatinterdependentdecisions
play in motivatingindividualsto participatein
collective action in the absence of selective in-
centives. Opp (1989) suggested that commit-
ted actors revise their perceptionsof efficacy
upwardbecause of cognitive dissonance when
they realize that others may abstainfrom col-
lective action if they think their contributions
will have little impact. Marwell et al. (1988)
arguedthat,if individualactorsignorethe pos-
sibility that others will provide a collective
good for them, they will contributeto the good
as long as total contributionsare large enough
to ensurethattheirshareof the returnsexceeds
the cost. In a similar spirit, but slightly differ-
ent vein, Macy (1991b) arguedthat actors do
not act to maximize net rewards, but simply
respond to positive and negative reinforce-
ments measured in terms of changes in their
share of the collective good (or bad). When
collective outcomes are beneficial, shirkers
raise their "thresholds"(Granovetter 1978),
makingfutureshirkingeven more likely, while
cooperatorslower theirthresholdsand thus be-

*
Direct correspondenceto Roger V. Gould, De- i For instance, it may be rationalto cooperate in
partmentof Sociology, Universityof Chicago, 1126 IteratedPrisoner's Dilemma games because when
East 59th St., Chicago, IL 60637. I thank Charles players use some variationof the "tit for tat"strat-
E. Bidwell, James S. Coleman, Pamela E. Oliver, egy, the decision to cooperate or defect affects the
Joel M. Podolny, Kazuo Yamaguchi, and the ASR other player's decision in later-iterations(Axelrod
editorand reviewersfor theircomments. 1984; Macy 1991a).
 ACTIONANDNETWORK
COLLECTIVE STRUCTURE
come more willing to cooperate;when collec-
tive outcomes are harmful, actors alter their
thresholdsin the opposite direction.
According to all three perspectives, contri-
butions hinge on a crucial element of naivete.
For Opp, actorsconvince themselves thatthey
can make a difference because it would be
costly (in cognitive terms) to go on making
contributionsin the face of a contrarybelief.
In Macy's (1991b) account, actors simply do
more of whateverappearedto work last time
(or less of what did not work), regardlessof
whetherthere is any plausible causal connec-
tion between their own actions and the out-
come. Thereis such a connectionin the model,
because thresholdsmake everyone's participa-
tion contingenton the overall rateof participa-
tion; but this causal link is invisible to each ac-
tor because his or her impact on the participa-
tion rate is small.2 In the model describedby
Marwellet al. (1988), actorsclose their minds
to the temptingoption of shirkingwhile others
contribute.
In this article,I proposea formulationof the
link between individualparticipationand col-
lective efficacy that is predicatedon different
assumptions.When contributionsfall short of
the collective optimum,I argue,it is not neces-
sarily because people are rewardedfor free-
riding.Conversely,when people do contribute,
it is not necessarilybecause they have not con-
sideredthe possibility of free-riding.Instead,I
assumepotentialcontributorskeep all theirop-
tions in mind, choosing amongthem on the ba-
sis of two simple concerns: norms of fairness
thatencourageindividualsto matchthe contri-
butionsof others, and the desire to avoid mak-
ing contributionsthatwill be wasted.Both con-
cerns push actors to attend to the behaviorof
otherswhen makingdecisions abouttheirown
contributions.
Following a brief theoretical discussion, I
develop a model relating individualdecisions
about participationin collective action to net-
worksof social ties thatinformactorsaboutthe
behaviorof others.Solving the model for equi-
libriumoutcomes leads to the predictionthat
2 Macy (1991b) noted that actors' initial thresh- tioning mechanisms(Heckathorn1988, 1990),
olds may reflect attachmentto a norm of fairness
- a willingness to contributeonly if a sufficient sofar as they also predictsuboptimaloutcomes
numberof others are contributing.But changes in in a varietyof situations.
actors' thresholds are modeled exclusively as a
function of positive and negative reinforcements.
183
alternativenetworkstructuresexert profoundly
differentand occasionally counterintuitiveef-
fects on collective action, depending on the
structuralposition of "volunteers." Specifi-
cally, when volunteers are centrally located,
dense networksoffer far dimmerprospectsfor
mobilizationthansparsenetworks.In addition,
group size may affect mobilizationpositively,
negatively,or not at all, dependingon density.
Finally, tendencies toward intransitivity en-
hance mobilizationby contributingto connect-
edness in relatively sparse networks. All of
these effects, and the complex interactions
among them, show that an actor's impact on
the behavior of others depends not only on
overall networkstructure,but also on his or her
position within that structure.
THEORY
Suppose the residents of Maple Street gener-
ally agree that they would like it to be cleaner
than the city keeps it. Olson's (1965) logic of
collective action predicts that suboptimallev-
els of this "good" (cleanliness) will be pro-
duced unless there is at least one individual
who values it sufficientlyto bearthe cost alone,
or unless selective incentives are providedthat
make individual contributions worthwhile.
Worse yet, even if there are people who value
clean streets enough to benefit by doing the
work themselves, they may still prefer to do
nothing in the hope that someone else will do
it first. This is the essence of "Volunteer'sDi-
lemma":As worthwhile as it might be to do
the work, it would be even nicer to have some-
one else do it (Diekmann 1985).
Few social scientists believe that individuals
arepurerationalegoists, particularlysince col-
lective action occurs more frequentlythan the
rationalchoice frameworkwould predict.This
is why models like those of Macy (1991 a,
1991b), Oliver and Marwell (1988), and Mar-
well et al. (1988) relax the rational-choiceas-
sumptions underlying economists' work on
public goods. The advantageof such models is
that they can explain the productionof collec-
tive goods even in the absence of formal sanc-
but they do not errin the opposite directionin-
For instance, in the hypothetical case just
described,Macy's (1991) model would predict
184
that some residentsmight end up participating
in a cleanupeffort if chance producedenough
simultaneouscontributionsto have a noticeable
effect. If the benefit were sufficiently large,
these contributorscould eventually lower their
thresholdsenough to "lock in" a sustainedef-
fort, even as shirkers,reassuredby the success
of theirfree-riding,settled furtherinto idleness
by increasingtheir thresholds.(Some of these
shirkersmight, in fact, have had initially low
thresholds;their startdown the roadto chronic
shirkingbegins with positive reinforcementin-
curredduringa randomlyproducedmomentof
nonparticipation.)
The model I propose retainsthe assumption
that individuals are not pure utility maximiz-
ers, in particularbecause I argue that fairness
norms play a central part in the productionof
collective goods (Elster 1989). At the same
time, however, I assume thatdecisions to con-
tribute are informed by expectations of indi-
vidual efficacy. People may be perfectly will-
ing to contribute something to a collective
good, but unless they are reasonablysure their
contributionswill not be wasted,they will wait
to see what others do. That is, even if they are
not tempted to free-ride, individuals may be
reluctantto invest in a collective good unless it
seems likely that enough others will also in-
vest to producepositive results.
Imagine, then, that none of Maple Street's
inhabitantshas so far done anythingto improve
the street'sappearance.Most thinkit would be
unfairif they had to shoulderthe burdenalone;
moreover,if the task of cleaning is large, the
total benefit of one person's efforts will be
small. But as long as there is at least one per-
son for whom some small effort is worthwhile
(perhapsbecause he or she values clean streets
more), the decision framework for everyone
else changes. Suppose, for example, thatBetty
decides to spend an hour picking up refuse.
This initial effort increasesthe value of further
efforts: Others will now be more enthusiastic
about sweeping, planting ivy, or just picking
up trash(becausea single discardedobject now
representsa greaterpercentageof the total re-
maining). Stated more formally,Betty's effort
has increasedthe marginalreturnsto the group
thatwould accruefrom furthercontributions.
Note that, if everyone else were a rational
egoist, these increasingmarginalreturnswould
make no difference. The contributionalready
made would only furtherpersuadeshirkersthat
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
the best thing to do is wait aroundfor someone
else to do the (now more valuable) work. But
Betty's effort has anothereffect as well: In the
presence of a norm of fairness, everyone now
has a reasonto matchher contribution.For the
same reasonthatpeople dislike being exploited
(i.e., they believe exploitation is unfair), they
do not want to be perceived, and potentially
ostracized, as exploitative. Stated more posi-
tively, seeing otherscontributeshouldmotivate
actors to contributetheir share. Thus, in gen-
eral, if contributionsare visible, then noncon-
tributorsmay be subject to normative social
pressures to alter their behavior.3That this is
far from a trivial concern was clearly demon-
stratedby the emotional reactions of subjects
in Dawes, McTavish,and Shaklee's (1977) ex-
perimenton communicationandcooperationin
social dilemmas. Cooperators often reacted
with considerable anger to the defection of
other subjects, either shouting at them or re-
fusing to speak with them afterwards. Even
when the identities of defectors were not an-
nounced, cooperators were visibly upset by
what they consideredto be treachery.For their
part,defectors waited until others had left be-
fore leaving the experimentsite.
In short, if at least one actor has already
madea contribution,otheractorshave two rea-
sons - one normativeandone instrumental-
to make contributions of their own. Neither
reason accomplishes much by itself: Norma-
tive pressure to contribute should have little
impact if elicited contributionswill be com-
pletely wasted, while increasing marginal re-
turns will only reinforce the waiting game in
the absence of fairnessnorms.
Nonexperimentalresearchsuggests thatcon-
siderationsof this kindoften enterinto people's
decisions to participatein collective action. For
instance, McAdam's (1986) study of partici-
pants in the Mississippi Freedom Summer
projectfound thatpairsor groupsof friendsof-
3 This could create a second-order free rider
problem insofar as people might be unwilling to
expend the effort to pressureothers (Oliver 1980).
But it seems doubtfulthatindividualswould neces-
sarily perceive this "effort" as costly: Pressuring
others to contributeto a collective good may actu-
ally be rewardingin itself because it permits con-
tributorsto representthemselves as praiseworthy,
conscientious citizens. Fairnessnorms make social
influence both possible and efficacious as a weapon
against free-riding.
COLLECTIVEACTIONAND NETWORKSTRUCTURE
ten decidedto participateafteran I'l go if you
go" discussion. Applicants to the project felt
that (1) participationwould be more effica-
cious if others also participated, and (2) it
would be embarrassingto withdrawfrom the
project if one's friends had the courage and
commitment to stay with it. Gould (1990)
found that participantsin the Paris Commune
of 1871 routinely reportedthat pressurefrom
neighborsin the Paris National Guardmade it
difficult to avoid serving in the neighborhood-
based insurgent militia organization. Hirsch
(1990) suggested that participantsin an anti-
apartheid divestiture movement understood
theirown participationas a responseto the ap-
parentlyaltruisticparticipationof othersand to
the change in their expectations of success
based on this observation.
BoundaryConditions
The argumentsI have advancedare clearly not
applicableto all social dilemmasituations.The
most salient boundary condition is efficacy:
Althoughit is not necessaryto assume thatac-
tors can precisely estimate the group's mar-
ginal returnsto contributing,they must at least
perceive a differencein the potentialimpactof
theirown efforts based on the effortsof others.
In addition to scenarios like the Maple Street
example, it is reasonableto expect such a per-
ception in any situation in which there is no
explicit benefit function but where results de-
pend on an indispensablefirst step. Signing a
petition, for instance, is not only pointless but tors may have no reasonto thinkof themselves
impossible unless someone has already in-
vested the time in writingone. Similarly,large
protestdemonstrationsalmost inevitablybegin
(at least in Westernsocieties) with an applica-
tion for an official permit,followed by adver-
tisementand recruitmentefforts,and finally by
directparticipation.At each step in the process, sumably have no qualms about not contribut-
new contributionsare efficacious only to the
extent that previous efforts have alreadybeen
made. The increasing importance of profes-
sionalized social movement organizationsde-
rives from the same principle, which explains
why direct-mailsolicitations focus so heavily
on the value of small contributionsgiven that
movementactivities are alreadyorganizedand
producingresults.
The theory I propose, then, would not pre- the same prediction;no one expects large contribu-
dict contributions in situations in which the tions to collective goods that have little perceived
volunteeredeffortsof a small numberof people chance of being provided.
185
are insufficient to make the contributions of
others seem worthwhile. This does not imply
that the argument is incorrect in such situa-
tions, but rather that the model based on it
leads to a predictionof low total contributions
when initial contributionsleave marginal re-
turns unchanged.Here, normativepressure to
contributeis simply outweighed by futility.4
A second boundarycondition is that initial
contributionsmust represent sunk costs, i.e.,
the model developed below assumes that vol-
unteers will not or cannot retracttheir contri-
butions if responses are not forthcoming.Oth-
erwise, uncertaintyabout whether the volun-
teeredcontributionhas been made in good faith
may vitiate its impact;in response, the volun-
teer might reducehis or her investment,result-
ing in a self-fulfilling prophecyof failure.This
means that instances of collective action in
which mobilization attempts are backed up
with promised contributions(ratherthan vis-
ible investmentsthat have alreadybeen made)
are less likely to exhibit the influence process
hypothesized here. For instance, a pledge to
spend one hour cleaning up Maple Street will
do less to motivateothers than an hour already
invested.
The final boundarycondition is that in order
for fairnessnormsto influencebehavior,actors
must perceive themselves as members of an
identifiablecollectivity - even if this collec-
tivity is defined merely as the total numberof
potential beneficiaries of the collective good.
In the absence of such a collective identity,ac-
as bound by a norm of fairness (or a norm
againstexploitation),at least with respectto the
specific collective good in question (for recent
discussions of the role of collective identities
in social movements, see Gamson 1990;
Melucci 1985). Residents of Oak Street pre-
ing to the clean-up effort on Maple Street. On
the otherhand,collective identitiesneed not be
restrictedin scope or impact to small, face-to-
face groups. Finkel, Muller, and Opp (1989)
found that the "duty to participate"played a
significant role in decisions to join in anti-
nuclearprotests,despite the fact that duty was
4 Most theoretical discussions, of course, make
186 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW

construed in terms of national citizenship how his or her hypothetical contribution

ratherthan membershipin a local community. (which might be nothing) compares with the
And recent debates on nationalismare predi- averagecontributionfrom everyone else.
cated on the observationthat membershipin Assume, then, that Betty (whom I denote
abstractly defined "imagined communities" formallywith the subscript1) is willing to con-
(Anderson 1983) powerfully influences indi- tributeone hourof work to cleaning the street,
vidual behavior (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm even if everyone else contributeszero, while
1990). In sum, the influence of norms of fair- everyone else is unwilling to contributeany-
ness presupposesthe existence of a collective thing if no one else does. (Formally,xl = 1, and
identity,butthis stipulationdoes not restrictthe xi = 0 for i > 1.) Since Betty has nonetheless
model to small or close-knit groups. contributedsomething,everyoneelse has to re-
consider his or her contributionlevel because
the conditionsunderwhich each actor'scontri-
THE MODEL
bution will be just xi are not met. The central
I begin by assumingthat actors are influenced contention of my theoretical model is that, if
by a set of exogenous factors that determines individualsare exposed to each other's behav-
the level at which they will makeunconditional ior, they will adjusttheir contributionsto take
contributions to a specific collective action, accountof the fact thatone person is willing to
i.e., contributions they are willing to make contributeone hour even if no one else con-
even if everyone else contributesnothing. For tributes.In this case, if everyone has contact
an actor, i, this initial expected contributionis with everyone else, each noncontributorwill
denotedby xi. Althoughone interpretationof xi observe one person (Betty) who has contrib-
is that it representsthe level at which actor i utedone hourandN - 2 personswho have con-
finds it rationalto contribute(in terms of the tributednothing, where N is the total number
individualbenefit the contributionwould con- of actors.
fer) in the absence of contributionsfrom oth- Given thatcontributionstotal one hourfor N
ers, this is not the only possible interpretation, actors, how do the others decide how much to
nor is it necessary to the logic of the model. contributein response?A reasonableconcep-
For instance,xi might representthe amountac- tion of a "fairshare"would requirean actor's
tor i is willing to contributethroughsimple al- contributionto be proportionalto the total con-
truism, independentof the actual benefits the tributionssummed across all other actors, di-
contributionmight lead to.5 In the analyses of vided by the total numberof such actors, i.e.,
the model presentedbelow, xi is set to 0 for all the averagecontributioneach person observes
actorsexcept one (the "volunteer"). fromeveryoneelse.6 In the scenarioundercon-
The second key assumptionis thatactorsal- sideration, then, actors will initially modify
ter their levels of contribution,denoted by ci, theircontributionsin the following way:
based on the levels of contributionthey ob- N
serve among other actors. Knowing what oth- x
ci(t)= N l cj(t-l), if j, (I)
ers are likely to contributetells a potentialcon- N-1i1
tributortwo things: (1) how likely it is that a
furthercontributionwill have an effect, and (2) whereci is the total amountactori has contrib-
uted at time t, X is a "discounting"parameter
5
Contributionsby urbanprofessionalsto organi- ranging between 0 and 1, and N is the total
zations that protect wildlife, for example, are more number of potential contributors. (At t = 0,
reasonablyinterpretedas altruisticthan as attempts Betty has contributed1 hour,so cl(0) = x= 1.)
to invest in future rewards. It seems unlikely that When X is close to 1, actors matchthe average
Americansliving in the northeasternUnited States contributionalmost completely;thus X reflects
actually expect to derive some future benefit by the strength of the influence actors exert on
contributingmoney to protect spotted owls in the each other.For example, if X is .9 and N is 20,
Pacific Northwest. The furtherargumentcould be
madethatcontributorsderive psychic benefits from
the feeling thatthey are helping to solve a problem, 6 A more complex formulationwould make each
but such an intepretationwould stretch the notion actor's fair shareproportionalto his or her resource
of rational cost-benefit calculation to the point of endowment. I restrictmy attentionhere to the case
tautology. in which actors' resourcesare roughly equal.
COLLECTIVE
ACTIONANDNETWORK
STRUCTURE
then the hour Betty contributesat time 0 (in
conjunctionwith the observednoncontribution
of everyoneelse) will persuadeevery otherac-
tor to contribute.9/19 = .047 hours at time 1.
When X < 1, actorsonly partiallymatchthe av-
erageof otheractors;the influenceactorsexert
on each other by virtueof their own contribu-
tions is systematically"discounted."This dis-
counting is to be expected inasmuch as indi-
viduals tend to overestimatetheir own contri-
butionsto collective efforts relativeto the con-
tributionsof others (see the researchon "ego-
centric bias" reported by Ross and Sicoly
1979).
While everyone respondsto Betty at time 1,
she will not (at this time point) be persuadedto
supplement her initial one-hour contribution
because contributions from everyone else at
time 0 totaled 0. That is, she has no reason to
expect thatfurthercontributionswill be effica-
cious unless she observesotherswho have con-
tributed. (By hypothesis, the hour Betty ini-
tially plans to contribute is the amount she
thinksis worthwhileto invest in the absenceof
contributionsby others.) In any case, unless
otherscatch up with her initialhour,Betty will
not in general be subjectto normativepressure
to make furthercontributions.She may, how-
ever, contributemore time because of efficacy
considerations or because of the enthusiasm
sparkedby the responses of others. I assume,
therefore, that anyone who makes uncondi-
tional contributionsmay respondmore slowly
to subsequentcontributionsby nonvolunteers.
As a result, Betty's subsequentcontributions
are subjectto a furtherdiscounting,denotedby
the parameterv.
Overall, then, the supplementalcontribution
each actor is willing to make at time t is the
averageexpected contributionof everyoneelse
at time t - 1, weighted by X. For Betty, how-
ever, this averageis weighted by vX,wherev is
assumedto be less thanor equal to unity.
The fact that individualschange the amount
they contributein response to Betty's contri-
butionproducesa feedback loop: The changes
in ci at time t requireeach actorat time t + 1 to
revise his or her perceptionof what a fair share
is. In addition,seeing that othersbesides Betty
have madecontributionschangeseach person's
expectationabout the efficacy of contributing
further.This in turn results in a revision of ci
for each actor (now including Betty), which
again changes everyone's expectations.Thus,
187
the hour Betty contributesat time 0 persuades
everyone to contribute something at time 1;
actorsrespondto this influenceprocess at time
2 by influencingeach otherfurther,and so on.
When 0 < X < 1, each of these successive
adjustmentsto ci is smallerthanthe last.7Con-
sequently,the influenceprocess leads actors to
convergeon a set of equilibriumcontributions,
ci, which is given by
X N N
Ci= Xi+ N 1 Acj(1) + Acj(2)
N
+.. +
XAcjio
N-1,
oo
= Xi+ I Aci(t), (2)
t=o
whereAci(t)= ci(t) - ci(t- 1). BecauseAc (oo)
=0, I can also express each actor'sequilibrium
contributionas follows:
x N
Ci =Xi+ _I c (3)
N-1 i
except for Betty, whose equilibriumcontribu-
tion is
* VX N
C1-=X
N I Ci(4
In other words, each actor's contribution at
equilibriumis equal to his or her initial contri-
bution added to the average equilibriumcon-
tributionfor everyoneelse.8 Given an initial set
of volunteeredcontributions(the values of xr,),
the model predicts that actors will influence
each other's expected contributionsuntil they
arriveat a stable set of actualcontributionsthat
satisfies equations3 and 4.
7 This is true even when X = 1, as long as v < 1.
Otherwise, contributionswill continue to increase
until new efforts are redundant.
8 If total contributionsare already large, actors
can be expected to believe thatfurthercontributions
will make no difference.That is, if the benefit func-
tion is S-shaped (Elster 1989; Macy 1991b), the
marginal return to contributions will be small at
high levels of provision. Equilibriumwill therefore
obtain either when the flat region of the benefit
function is reached, or when contributionssatisfy
equations3 and 4, dependingon which occurs first.
188 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW

Calculationof this equilibriumcontribution,

given the xi, is straightforward.In the hypo- -1 + _ (N-1+vX)X
thetical example being considered,xi = 1 for (N-1)-X(N+vX-2)'
Betty (actor 1) and 0 for everyoneelse. Conse-
which, aftersome algebra,gives
quently,following equation3,

Cl =v(C7)+1, (5) (=1-X)+(1 v) (10)

(1-X) + N+vX-1
where c is the equilibriumcontributionfor
everyone but actor 1. (Note that everyone butSo, to extend the above example, if N = 20, X
Betty has the same equilibriumcontribution, = .9, and v = .5 (i.e., if every hour contributed
because each has xi = 0 and each faces identi-
by the "average"alter leads ego to contribute
cal influences beginningwith Betty's expected54 minutes,but people like Betty respondhalf
one-hourcontribution.As a result, c. is equalas quickly), Betty's initial hour will result in a
to the average contribution Betty observes total equilibriumcontributionacross all 20 ac-
among the otherN - 1 actors.) tors of 1/[(1 - .9) + (.45/19.45)] = 8.31 hours.
For everyone else, Specifically, Betty will contribute 1.17 hours,
while each of the other 19 actors will contrib-
ute .376 hours. Note that, as v approaches
* * ( Cl * N-2)* l(6 unity, i.e., when Betty responds to others at
nearlythe same ratethatothersrespondto her),
or as N becomes large, equation 10 simplifies
which averages Betty's equilibriumcontribu- to the following:
tion with the equilibriumcontributionsof the
otherN - 2 actors.Substitutingequation5 into X 1
ctot=1+ = (II)
equation6 gives

This reveals that, at least in the scenario in

C.$= X CI (N C)C. (7) which everyone responds to everyone else's
contribution equally, the influence process
modeled here follows a simple multiplierpat-
Rearrangingto solve for c gives tern: Betty's initial, exogenously determined
hourresults in potentiallylarge total contribu-
tions as actors iterativelyreact to each other's
reactions. In addition, this total equilibrium
c* = I (8a)
contributionis, in the limit, independentof N,
1- X- (N+vX-2) althoughindividualcontributionsare not. The
N-i
reason is that a kind of dilution occurs as the
which can also be writtenas numberof actors increases:With more actors,
the initial volunteered contribution of any
* X single actor is worth less because there are
c = (N-1)-X(N+vX-2) (8b) morepeople initiallyvolunteeringnothing,and
this bringsdown the average.This is shown by
The expression for the total equilibriumcon- the presence of N in the denominatorof equa-
tributionacross all actors,ctot,then, is tion 8b. But because thereare also more actors
subjectto the influence process, the total equi-
=
*+(N-1)c librium contributionis unchanged:Everyone
Ctot C,+(-lC. contributesless, but thereare morepeople con-
= vXc+ 1 +(N -1)c. (9) tributing.
If X = 1, on the other hand, total contribu-
= tions at equilibriumincrease linearly with N
(N-1+vX)c. *+1. and exponentiallywith v (keeping in mind that
v is constrainedto vary between 0 and 1). That
Substitutingfrom equation8b gives is, for X = 1,
COLLECTIVE
ACTIONANDNETWORK
STRUCTURE 189

1 1 N+v-1 xi = 0 for all i > 1, thenthe first columnof the N

x N matrix (I - XW)-' gives the equilibrium
Ctot=I + I V 1-V contributionsof each actor,i.e., c, is given by
N+v-1 the ith elementin the firstcolumnof (I-XW)-I
= (12) (This is because multiplying (I - XW)-1by a
1-v column vector with 1 in the first row and 0 in
all otherrowsyields a columnvectorthatequals
In general, the set of equilibriumcontribu- the first column of (I -XW)-'.) The sum of the
tions given a range of values for xi across N elements in the first column of (I - XW)-,
actorscan be calculatedby solving the set of N therefore,gives ct~twhen actor I initially vol-
simultaneousequationscorrespondingto equa- unteersone hour and everyone else volunteers
tion 3. Using matrix notation, this system of nothing.
equationscan be rewrittenas follows: But the most useful propertyof this model is
thatthe elementsof W are not requiredto equal
c* = x + A'WC*, (13) I/(N - 1). That is, equation 14 can be used to
calculate equilibriumcontributionseven if ac-
where c* and x are N x 1 vectors of equilib- tors assign unequalweights to the behaviorof
rium and initial contributions,respectively; X others when deciding how to alter their own
is a matrixin which the diagonalelements are behavior. As long as the rows of W sum to
actor-specificdiscounting parametersand the unity,i.e., as long as the N x I vector Wc* ex-
off-diagonalelements are equal to 0; and W is presses some form of actor-specific weighted
an N x N matrix in which the diagonal ele- average of contributions,c* can be calculated
ments are 0 and the off-diagonalelements are from equation 14. If social ties are structured
equal to 1I(N- 1).9Wc* is thus an N x 1 vec- so that actors are not exposed to the behavior
tor in which the ith element gives the average of everyone else, but only to a subset of rel-
equilibriumcontributionfor all N - 1 actors evant others, the influence process changes
otherthan i. Solving for c* gives dramatically.The next section examines these
changes in detail.
c* = (I - %W)-lx, ( 14)
EFFECTSOF NETWORKSTRUCTURE
where I is an N x N identity matrix.Equation
14 thus succinctly describes the equilibrium I assume that social ties are binary and sym-
contributionfor each actor,given the values of metrical,i.e., i is either tied to j or not, and i is
x andX.IONotice,for example,thatif xl = 1 and tied to i if and only if j is also tied to i. The
9Equilibriumsolutions are easily calculatedeven assumptionof symmetry makes considerable
when each actor has a different value for X. In the sense given the substantivefocus of the model:
examples investigatedhere, however, I assume that If i interactswith j and consequently is aware
X is equal for all actors except the volunteer. This of what is contributingto the collective good,
permitsthe derivationof tractableclosed-form so- it is reasonableto assume thatj will likewise
lutions for equilibriumoutcomes; moreover, these know what i is willing to contribute.The as-
solutions representthe central tendencies for sce- sumption that ties are binary is not essential,
nariosin which the values of X arepermittedto vary but it simplifies some of the calculationswith-
arounda specified mean.
"O Note the similaritybetween this formalismand
out undulyalteringthe substantiveimplications
FriedkinandJohnsen's (1990) specification of "so- of the model. In the analysis that follows, the
cial influence theory."In both cases, some outcome binaryadjacencymatrixthatrepresentsthe pat-
variable (y) is a function of a set of actor-specific ternof symmetricties is normalizedso thatthe
startingvalues and the values of the outcome vari- rows of W sum to unity.
able for other actors in the system. The centraldif- Even with these assumptions,the numberof
ference is that Friedkinand Johnsenuse this model possible network structuresis extraordinarily
to predict the emergence of consensus, whereas I large except for very small networks, making
model contributionsto a collective good. The out-
come of interest in their research is uniformity in
generalizationsaboutstructuredifficult. (For a
the equilibriumvalues of y, whereas in the present set of N orderednodes, the numberof distinct
context the centralissue is total contributions,i.e., symmetric and binary networks is 2N(N1)/2*
the sum of the equilibriumvalues of y. However,the numberof distinctnetworkstruc-
190
60
00
0 i
IX 40
02
C
00
10-V . =
0
0 .1 2 3 A 5
Actor's Discounting Level (X)
Figure1. DifferenceBetweenStarNetworksandFullyConnectedNetworksin TotalContributions
countingLevel(A)
tures is somewhatsmallerbecausetwodistinct
networksmaybe structurally isomorphic.)My
purposehereis to derivea few generalstate-
mentsabouttheeffectsof structured socialties
in networksof arbitrary size.
Thebestplaceto startis by derivingct.0for
certainarchetypical networkstructures. Theo-
reticaldiscussionsof collectiveactionoften
takefor grantedthat,whensocialnetworksin
a grouparedense(whendensityis definedas
theratioof existingtiesto possibleties),people
in the groupwill contributeheavilyto collec-
tive goods. Discussingworkersin two hypo-
thetical communities,Alpha and Beta, of
whichtheformeris close-knitandthelatterat-
omized,Marwellet al. (1988, p. 505) stated
that"wewouldfind virtualunanimityamong
sociologistsin predictingthattheemployeesin
Alphaaremorelikelythanthosein Betato act
collectively."However,Marwellet al. called
attention to thecompetinginfluenceof network
centralization, while Macy(1991a)suggested
thatsparsenetworksmayprovidebetteroppor-
tunitiesfor cooperativebehaviorby reducing
the likelihood that randomdefections will
spreadthroughthegroup.Similarly,themodel
outlinedhereindicatesthatthe networkcon-
sideredin the previoussection- a network
with maximumdensitybecauseeveryoneis
tiedto everyoneelse - yields,atleastin some
situations,a distinctlymediocrelevel of col-
lectivegoodproduction. Ontheotherhand,the
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
v = .8
.2
.6 .7 X .9 1.0
by Actor'sDis-
model shows thatthis effect may dependon the
structurallocation of the volunteer.
Considerthe case of the polaroppositeof the
completely connected network: a minimally
dense network,i.e., a network with the mini-
mum numberof ties necessary for every node
to be "reachable"by some path from every
other node. For a network with N actors, this
minimumnumberof ties is N - 1; N nodes are
mutuallyreachableif they are linked by N - 1
ties into a "chain"or a "star."
For all possible networksof size N in which
only actor 1 offers a one-hourinitial contribu-
tion, and for any value of X or v, the network
that results in the maximumequilibriumcon-
tributionis a "star"with actor 1 at its center.
The reasonis simple. First,the influenceof ac-
tor l's initial contribution on any actor i is
greaterfor shorternetworkpaths between ac-
tor I and actor i; this results from the fact that
X < 1, which attenuatesthe impactof actor l's
volunteered contribution at each step in the
chain of influence. Second, the impact of the
volunteeredcontributionon actor i is greater
the fewer the ties i has to other actors (recall
the "dilution"effect discussed earlier).A star-
graph links every actor to actor 1 through a
pathof length 1, the shortestpossible path.Be-
cause no actor is tied to anyone other than ac-
tor 1, the effect of actor 1's volunteeredcontri-
bution is unmitigatedby links to others who
have not volunteered.
 ACTIONANDNETWORK
COLLECTIVE STRUCTURE
0
z
'g 10 / /N 1
01
.0
C
0
a
CT2
o2
0 .1 2 3 A 5
Network Density
Figure 2. Total Contributionsby Network Density: Networks With RandomActor VolunteeringOne Hour
Solving equation 14 for a star-shapednet-
work in which the centralactorinitially volun-
teers to contributeone hour gives a total equi-
libriumcontributionof
(N-l+l5)
So, if X = .9, N = 20, and v = .5, then ct~t=
[19(.9) + 1]/.595 = 30.42. This total contribu-
tion, which (by definitionof a "star"of size 20)
occurs in a networkwith density .1 (density is
the number of existing ties divided by
N[N - 1]/2), is four times greaterthanthe equi-
libriumcontributionbasedon a fully connected
network,which by definition has a density of
1. Figure 1 plots the difference in total contri-
butions yielded by these two network struc-
turesagainstvalues of X for threedifferentlev-
els of volunteer responsiveness (v). For low
values of X, the advantageaccruingto central-
ization is more or less independentof whether
or not the single volunteerechoes the reactions
of othersby addingto his or her unconditional
contribution.But for X > .5, the differences
start to increase sharply for the scenario in
which enthusiasm at the collective effort in-
duces the volunteerto raise the stakes still fur-
ther.As X approachesunity,however,the large
advantageof the starnetworkbegins to evapo-
rate.Indeed,when X = 1, equation 15 gives the
same level of total contributionsas equation
10; for both networkstructures,total contribu-
tions simplify to N/(1 - v).
191
.6 .7 8 .9 1.0
These findings clearly indicate that, when
actors peg their contributionsto the contribu-
tions they observe among theirsocial contacts,
network density can be deleterious to collec-
tive action to varyingdegrees - dependingon
the rate at which normativepressure and en-
thusiasm about the prospects for success
prompt actors to emulate the contributionsof
others. Moreover, the size of this effect de-
pendson the degreeto which volunteersin turn
respondto nonvolunteers.But this leads to two
furtherquestions.First,are these effects of net-
work structurecontingenton the networkposi-
tion of volunteers,as the sensitivity of cto0to v
suggests? Second, do these effects hold for
"messier" network structures? Figures 2
through 4 show the overall relationship be-
tween networkdensity and total contributions
for situationsin which one actor volunteersan
initial one-hourcontribution.For each density
level between 0 and 1 at intervalsof .01, 500
networks were sampled from the universe of
possible networksand equation 14 was calcu-
lated in each case to give the total contribution
for each sampled network. The graphs show
the average total equilibriumcontributionby
density for these sampled networks for three
volunteerscenarios:The volunteeris randomly
selected (Figure2); the volunteeris always the
most centralactorin termsof the total number
of ties to other actors (Figures 3a and 3b); the
volunteeris always the least centralactorin the
network (Figure 4). Figures 2, 3a, and 3b
present results for networks of varying sizes
 192 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW

16 N =20

0
0
14
z
c 12
10

C
0

EN
~,6

CT~ 4
LU

12

0 .1 2 .3 4 .5 .6 .7 8 .9 1.0
Network Density
Figure 3a. Total EquilibriumContributionby Network Density: Networks With Most Central Actor Volunteering
One Hour (X = .9, v = .8)

25
N =50
0
z
%
20
.0

15
C
0
0
E
10
.0~~~~~

0 .1 2 3 A .5 .6 .7 X .9 1.0
Network Density
Figure 3b. Total EquilibriumContributionby Network Density: Networks With Most Central Actor Volunteering
One Hour (X= .9, v = 1)

(results for the last scenario are more or less
independentof networksize). In all figuresex-
cept 3b, X = .9 and v = .8; Figure 3b depicts
results for v = 1. In the scenarios represented
in Figures 2 and 4, low values of the two pa-
rametersproduce low total contributions,but
the patternsare the same. Even when v = 0,
i.e., when volunteershold steady at theirinitial
contribution levels, the effects of network
structureare still noticeable.
Clearly,density has a radicallydifferentef-
fect on total contributionsdepending on the
structuralposition of the actor who makes the
initial unconditionalcontribution.If the volun-
teer is simply a randomlyselected actor (Fig-
ure 2), total contributions increase steadily
with density, but level off at a little under 10
hoursonce densityreaches.5, or in otherwords
when half of the possible pairs of actors are
tied. In this scenario, then, additionalties are
useful up to a point, but then make no differ-
ence; if the volunteeris an "average"actor in
terms of the numberof others to whom he or
she is tied, then total contributions are no
greater in extremely dense networks than in
moderatelydense ones.
 ACTIONANDNETWORK
COLLECTIVE STRUCTURE
10
0
z 8
C
26
C
.2
0
0
E
4
.0
X 2
I-I
0
0 .1 2 3 A 5
Network Density
Figure 4. Total EquilibriumContributionby Network Density: Networks with Least CentralActor VolunteeringOne
Hour
On the otherhand,when the initial contribu-
tion is made by the actor with the most ties
(Figures 3a and 3b), more ties mean lower to-
tal contributionsexcept when networksare so
sparsethatsome actorsarecompletelyisolated.
That is, once there are enough ties to ensure
thatmost actorsare tied to someone, additional
ties serve only to dilute the effect of the central
actor's volunteered contribution. Conse-
quently, sparse networks provide the highest
level of contributionsin situationsin which the
most central actor is the volunteer.Moreover,
Figure 3a shows that this effect is even stron-
ger for large networks:With more actors,total
contributionsare largerand the point at which
new ties starthinderingratherthanaidingcon-
tributionsoccurs at lower densities. When v =
1 (Figure3b), networksize actuallyhas a nega-
tive effect on contributionsat high densities.
However, the near convergence of the three
lines in Figure 3a at the highest density levels,
and their actual convergence in Figure 3b,
show that the effect of size disappearsas net-
work density approaches 1. The explanation
for these findings again rests on the notion of
dilution:For dense networks, the presence of
more actors means that everyone is tied to
more people who do not volunteer anything,
reducingthe impactof the one actor who vol-
unteersan hour.In sparse networks,the pres-
ence of more people does not on averagehave
this effect becauseof the greaterlikelihoodthat
193
.6 .7 X .9 1.0
additional actors are tied only to the central
volunteer. Consequently, more actors means
there are more people subject to the influence
of the volunteerratherthanmore people bring-
ing down the average expected contribution.
This advantage disappears, of course, when
high density guaranteesthateveryone is tied to
nearlyeveryone else.
When the least centralactor is the volunteer
(Figure 4), density has a monotonicallyposi-
tive effect on total contributions.In this case,
addingties helps because, even in networksin
which every actoris mutuallyreachableby ev-
ery other, the least central actor will on aver-
age be linked to other actors by longer paths.
This means that the impact of that actor's vol-
unteeredhour will be reduced not only by the
presence of nonvolunteers, but also by the
greaternumberof steps it takes to reachevery-
one else. If, to expand the cast of characters,
Betty is the least central actor because she is
tied only to Frank,then every other actor will
be influencedonly by the effect of Betty's con-
tributionon Frank.Since X is less than unity,
the added step requiredfor the influence pro-
cess to reach the other N - 2 actors has a cost
in terms of the discounting reflected in the
value of X.And because new ties will, on aver-
age, reduce the length of paths to Betty, they
will increase the influence of her volunteered
contribution until everyone is directly con-
nected to everyone else.
194 AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW

Finally,in all threescenarios,networkswith are they the result of operantconditioning. In

a highdegreeof intransitivity
(i.e.,networksin this sense, my theory does not "explain"
whichani-j tie andaj-k tie implythatthereis prosocialbehaviorby reducingit to some other
no tie betweeni andk) will be conduciveto mechanism,as the idea of a normto some ex-
greatertotalcontributions, thoughthis effect tent presupposes prosocial behavior. Rather,
will be smallerfor densernetworks.In groups my purposehas been to explore the impact of
in whichties are sparse,a tendencytoward network structureon collective action, taking
intransitivitywillproduceconnectednetworks, for granted that individuals are guided by a
whereastransitivitywill dividenetworksinto normof fairness.
cliquesthatareisolatedfromeachother(Davis Several of the predictionsgenerated by the
1967).As a result,intransitivitywill expose model concur with those of other theoretical
moreactors(eitherdirectlyorindirectly)to the models, even thoughthe logic underlyingthem
influenceof one actor'svolunteered contribu- is different.Above all, the connection between
tion,generating higherlevelsof contribution
at network centralization and collective action
equilibrium.This effect, too, will vanishin highlightedby Marwell et al. (1988), and the
dense networks,as the increasingnumberof negative effect of "cliquishness"described by
tiesguarantees thateveryonewill be connected Macy (1991b), are echoed here. Network cen-
by somepathto everyoneelse. tralizationaffects totalcontributionsbecauseof
the competing influences of volunteers and
DISCUSSION shirkerson actors trying to match the average
contributionof theirpeers:When the volunteer
I have attemptedto derivepredictionsabout is a centrallylocated actor,high centralization
contributionsto collectivegoods usinga for- means that most actors perceive a high aver-
malmodelthatsharesseveralfeatureswiththe age level of contributionbecause they are tied
recentworkof Marwellet al. (1988), Oliver to relativelyfew shirkers.
and Marwell (1988), and Macy (1991a, At the same time, my model suggests that
1991b).A key elementof thesemodelsis the these network effects are contingent on the
assumptionthatactorsmakedecisionsabout structuralposition of actors who contribute
contributingto collective goods interdepen- voluntarily.For an actor who is centrally lo-
dently.Moreover,it is assumedthatnetworks cated in terms of "closeness,"i.e., short paths
of social relations provide the apparatus to others(Freeman1979; Bonacich 1987), vol-
throughwhich actorsinfluenceeach other's unteeringwill have far greatereffects when the
behavior.I havetriedto improveon thispast network is sparse because the impact of the
workby proposinga formalismthatyieldspre- volunteeredcontributionwill not be vitiatedby
dictionsthroughanalysisratherthancomputer social exposureto nonvolunteers.But for mar-
simulation.Given a networkstructureand a ginal actors, volunteeringwill have little im-
rangeof valuesfor volunteered contributions, pact on the contributionsof others unless net-
my modelpermitsexactcalculationsof equi- worksare dense and centralizationis commen-
libriumlevelsof contribution.
Thisproperty of suratelylower. Earliermodels have not called
the modelhelps to identifyrelationshipsbe- attentionto this contingency.
tweenmodelparameters andcollectiveaction A second, metatheoretical consideration
outcomeswith greaterprecisionthanis pos- leads to divergentpredictionsfrom models that
siblewithsimulationresults;in particular,
ana- explain cooperativebehaviorin terms of cog-
lytic solutionsensure that arbitrarilysmall nitive dissonance (Opp 1989), learningtheory
changesin parametervalueswill not lead to (Macy 199Ia, 1991b), or boundedutility maxi-
unknownchangesin predictedoutcomes. mization(Marwellet al. 1988). Any model that
On a substantive front, the behavioral assumes that the process leading to collective
mechanismI use differsfromthoseof previ- action occurs behind actors' backs, i.e., that
ous authorsin that it explicitlyincorporates actors' understandingof how collective action
botha pragmatic anda normativecomponent: works is less accuratethan the modeler's un-
Actorsaremotivatedby a concernforefficacy derstanding,leads to predictionsof instability
and by a fairnessnorm.In my model,there- if actorsarepermittedto reflect on the process.
fore, decisionsaboutcontributing are not de- That is, if such a model is initially correctand
terminedsolely by utilitymaximization,nor actorslearnthat it is correct(by readingsocial
 ACTIONANDNETWORK
COLLECTIVE STRUCTURE 195
sciencejournals,or simplyby thinkingabout location, network density and size are pre-
the problem),then the collectiveactionpre- dicted to exhibit strikingly nonlinearrelation-
dictedby themodelmaycollapse.Forinstance, ships with contributions to collective goods.
if actorslearnthattheirindividualcontribu- Both predictions indicate that it is risky to
tions are not reallythe causeof positiveout- make generalizationsabout the impact of net-
comes, or, in otherwords,thattheirpast re- work structurein the absence of detailed infor-
sponses to positive and negativereinforce- mation about collective action settings. The
ments were - on the individuallevel - mis- model outlined here, therefore,helps to make
guided,they mayrevertto standardfree-rider sense of the elusive characterof collective ac-
logic.In contrast,actorswho"learn"thattheir tion, and of the difficulty theoristshave in ex-
pastcontributions havebeenguidedjointlyby plaining why individualsend up doing appar-
normsandby efficacyconsiderations haveno ently irrationalthings with collectively ration-
reasonto changetheirbehavior- the degree al results.The solution to the puzzle lies, I ar-
to whicha normis bindingon an actoris not gue, in the influence process I have described
diminishedby his or her awarenessof it. In- formally - the mechanism by which indi-
deed,norm-oriented actorscanbe expectedto vidual agency (in this case, volunteering) is
resistthe temptationto free-rideeven if they routed throughnorms, efficacy concerns, and
aretoldthatfree-ridingis rational,or thattheir social structuresto produce macro-outcomes
pastcontributionshavebeenmotivatedby op- that neitherthe actors involved nor the social
erantconditioning.I scientists who study them are likely to have
This suggeststhata simpletest of whether predicted.
obedienceto fairnessnormsin collectiveac-
tion is reducibleto some other behavioral ROGERV. GouLDis Assistant Professor of Sociol-
mechanismcouldbe constructed usingan ex- ogy at the Universityof Chicago. His researchfo-
cuses on social networks and social movements.
perimental or quasi-experimental designcom- Recentpublicationsincludean article in the Ameri-
paring"knowledgeable" with "naive"actors. can Journalof Sociologyon artisanal activism in
To theextentthatactorsareguidedby norms, the Paris Commune.
decisions to contributeto collective goods
shouldbe unaffectedby insightinto the pro-
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