2010

Report of the
Auditor General
of Canada
to the House of Commons

DECEMBER The Public Sector Integrity

Commissioner of Canada

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

The Report is available on our Web site at www.oag-bvg.gc.ca.

For copies of the Report or other Office of the Auditor General publications, contact

Office of the Auditor General of Canada

240 Sparks Street, Stop 10-1
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0G6

Telephone: 613-952-0213, ext. 5000, or 1-888-761-5953

Fax: 613-943-5485
Hearing impaired only TTY: 613-954-8042
Email: distribution@oag-bvg.gc.ca

Ce document est également publié en français.

© Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2010

Cat. No. FA3-66/2010E-PDF
ISBN 978-1-100-17430-3
 Auditor General of Canada
Vérificatrice générale du Canada

To the Honourable Speaker of the House of Commons:

I have the honour to transmit herewith my special report on the Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner of Canada, which is to be laid before the House in accordance with
the provisions of subsection 8(2) of the Auditor General Act.

Yours sincerely,

Sheila Fraser, FCA

OTTAWA, 9 December 2010
The Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner of Canada
Table of Contents

Foreword 1

Introduction 3

Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada 3

Complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada 3

Observations 5

Conduct and interactions with PSIC staff 5

The Commissioner engaged in inappropriate conduct 5

The Commissioner engaged in retaliatory actions 7

Performance of mandated functions 9

Operational guidance was not finalized or implemented 9

There are concerns about a reluctance to investigate 9
Decisions were not always supported 10

Conclusion 13

Subsequent Event 13

About the Audit 14

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 iii

 The Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner of Canada

Foreword
This report presents the results of our audit of the allegations related
to the conduct of the former Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of
Canada as a deputy head. The Office of the Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner of Canada (PSIC)was created in April 2007 to provide a
means for federal public servants and members of the public to disclose
potential wrongdoing in the federal public sector. Under the Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA or the Act), if a federal public
servant or member of the public wishes to make a disclosure of
wrongdoing that concerns PSIC, the disclosure may be made to the
Auditor General of Canada. In investigating that disclosure, the Auditor
General has the same powers and duties as the Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner (the Commissioner). I recently exercised some of these
powers and duties as a result of disclosures that I received under the Act.

In light of the statutory requirement for an independent review of the

PSDPA in April 2012, I wish to bring to the attention of Parliament
two matters related to the Act that we identified in the course of our
work. The first is the inability to pursue information outside the public
sector during an investigation under the Act. The second is the lack of
an independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within
PSIC. We did not look at all of the provisions of the Act.

During an investigation into wrongdoing under the PSDPA, the

Commissioner can only obtain information from within the public
sector. If the investigation involves obtaining information from outside
the public sector, the Act requires the Commissioner to cease that part
of the investigation and refer it to a competent authority. This prevents
the Commissioner from obtaining information relevant to certain
investigations—from former public servants, for example. In the case
of the disclosures that I received under the Act, we determined that
our work would require information from outside the public sector.
In ceasing an investigation under the PSDPA and transferring it to
another authority, however, none of the individuals who cooperate in
the new process receive the same protection from reprisals as they
would have under the PSDPA.

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 1

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

In addition, while the Auditor General can receive disclosures of

wrongdoing concerning PSIC under the PSDPA, there is no
independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within
PSIC. Reprisal complaints under the Act can only be filed with the
Commissioner, and the Commissioner has the sole authority to
determine whether an investigation will be conducted. The
Commissioner also has the sole authority to determine whether a
reprisal complaint will be referred to the Public Servants Disclosure
Protection Tribunal for a determination of whether the complainant
has been subject to reprisals. In this case, it was the Commissioner
herself that was alleged to have engaged in reprisal actions.
As a result of these two limitations of the PSDPA, the Office of the
Auditor General of Canada ceased its investigations and converted
them into a performance audit under the Auditor General Act.
I hope that these observations on my Office’s experience with
the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act will be of assistance to
Parliament when it considers the review of the operation of the Act.

2 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010


Office of the Public Sector
Integrity Commissioner of Canada
Complaints received by
the Office of the Auditor
General of Canada
Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010
THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
Introduction
1. The Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of
Canada (PSIC) was established under the Public Servants Disclosure
Protection Act (PSDPA), which came into force on 15 April 2007.
The PSDPA and PSIC exist to provide a means for federal public
servants and members of the public to disclose potential wrongdoing in
the federal public sector. The PSDPA also protects public servants who
make a disclosure, or public servants who cooperate in an investigation,
against reprisal.
2. The Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada
(the Commissioner) is the head of PSIC and has the rank and powers
of a department deputy head. The Commissioner is an independent
Agent of Parliament appointed by the Governor in Council after
consultation with the leader of every recognized party in the Senate and
House of Commons, and following the approval of the appointment by
resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. The first Public
Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada, Christiane Ouimet, began
her seven-year term at PSIC on 6 August 2007. On average, PSIC has
employed about 20 full-time equivalents since its inception.
3. If a federal public servant or member of the public wishes to
make a disclosure (or complaint) of wrongdoing that concerns PSIC,
section 14 of the PSDPA allows them to make the disclosure to the
Auditor General of Canada who has, in relation to that disclosure, the
powers, duties and protections of the Public Sector Integrity
Commissioner under this Act.
4. On 28 November 2008, 30 April 2009, and 17 July 2009, the
Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) received complaints
from three individuals against Public Sector Integrity Commissioner
Christiane Ouimet. Details on the specific allegations against the
Commissioner were obtained in meetings with each of the complainants.
Allegations of wrongdoing made against the Commissioner were related
to her conduct as a deputy head and interactions with PSIC staff, reprisal
(or retaliatory) actions taken by the Commissioner against former
employees, performance pay decisions, and the performance of her
mandated functions.
5. The OAG commenced investigations into the first two disclosures.
On 11 May 2009, the OAG ceased its investigations and converted
them into a performance audit under the Auditor General Act. This was
done for two reasons. First, the investigative work would involve
3
THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

obtaining information that was outside the public sector, which is not
permitted under the PSDPA. Second, the PSDPA does not identify an
independent mechanism for addressing allegations of reprisal within
PSIC. While the Auditor General can receive disclosures of wrongdoing
concerning PSIC under the PSDPA, reprisal complaints can only be filed
with the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner who, in this case, was
alleged to have engaged in the reprisal actions.
6. In the course of our audit, we met with 34 current and former
PSIC employees, as well as with senior government officials and third
parties. We reviewed documentation and communications at PSIC,
and documentation at PSIC’s service providers—the Canadian Human
Rights Commission for financial administration services, and Status of
Women Canada for human resource services. Finally, we interviewed the
Commissioner on 2 December 2009 and on 13 and 14 September 2010
to obtain her representations regarding the allegations made against her
by the complainants and the information that we collected in the course
of our audit.
7. We have organized the allegations against the Commissioner into
the following categories, which we discuss in the observations section
of this report:
• Conduct and interactions with PSIC staff

• Retaliatory actions

• Performance of mandated functions

8. On the allegations dealing with performance pay decisions, we

have reported separately to the Chief Human Resources Officer at the
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, and to PSIC Management.
9. The period covered by our audit was 15 April 2007 to
31 July 2009. More details concerning the audit, including the audit
objective and criteria, can be found in About the Audit at the end
of this report.

4 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

Observations

Conduct and interactions 10. The complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General
with PSIC staff of Canada included allegations about inappropriate conduct by the
Commissioner, including in her interactions with PSIC staff. These
allegations included statements to the effect that the Commissioner
yelled, swore, and also berated, marginalized, and intimidated certain
PSIC employees, and that she engaged in reprisal actions. We sought to
determine whether allegations made by the complainants concerning the
Commissioner’s conduct were founded. Specifically, we looked at whether
• human resource decisions and management practices of the
Commissioner reflected the highest standards of ethical conduct
as required by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service;
• human resource management practices of PSIC and of
the Commissioner fostered a respectful workplace for all
PSIC employees;
• actions of the Commissioner raised reasonable grounds for
believing that a reprisal was taken against a complainant.

The Commissioner engaged in inappropriate conduct

11. We met with current and former PSIC employees and reviewed
documentation and communications at PSIC. Many of the current
and former PSIC employees that we met with expressed concerns
about the Commissioner communicating with PSIC employees in a
disrespectful and unprofessional manner, including yelling, swearing,
and also berating PSIC employees, at times in front of co-workers.
Several instances of disrespectful and unprofessional communication on
the part of the Commissioner were corroborated by multiple witnesses
and, in some cases, by email communications, electronic documents on
PSIC’s shared drive, and contemporaneous notes. The Commissioner
denied these allegations and stated that the information provided by
the complainants and the witnesses was exaggerated. The
Commissioner stated that she did not treat her employees in a
disrespectful or unprofessional manner.
12. A large number of the current and former PSIC employees
that we met with also expressed concerns about the Commissioner
marginalizing or intimidating certain PSIC employees. Examples of
allegations with regard to the treatment of these employees included
• removing employees from decision-making processes and
communication networks;

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 5

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

• overloading or removing employees’ workload and duties; and

• ignoring employees.

Some of the current and former employees that we spoke with also
told us that the Commissioner had indicated to them that she
wanted to push certain employees to leave PSIC. Again, several
allegations of marginalization or intimidation were corroborated by
multiple individuals and, in some cases, by email communications. The
Commissioner denied these allegations and advised us that, in some
cases, duties were removed from individuals at their request or because
the duties were no longer necessary after PSIC had completed its
transition from the former Public Sector Integrity Office.

13. We found a high level of turnover at PSIC in the first

two years of its operation. Between 5 August 2007 and 31 July 2009,
24 employees left the Office, which amounted to an average turnover
rate of over 50 percent per year. This included the departure of
the majority of staff in senior positions who reported directly to the
Commissioner. The Commissioner told us that the level of turnover
within PSIC was normal for a small entity.

14. We met with 18 of the 24 people that left PSIC during the period
covered by our audit, and with 5 more people who left PSIC after
31 July 2009 but who were employed by PSIC during the period covered
by our audit. Many of these former PSIC employees told us that they
left as a result of the Commissioner’s conduct and the resulting work
environment. Some of these former employees also told us that they
experienced health problems as a result of their interactions with the
Commissioner. Some very negative terms were used by both current and
former employees to describe the work environment at PSIC.

15. In our interview with the Commissioner on 13 and

14 September 2010, we asked her to respond to some of the specific
alleged events that were brought to our attention. The Commissioner
denied the allegations against her concerning her conduct and
interactions with PSIC staff. She told us that she acted in good faith
and within the boundaries of government policies at all times. The
Commissioner stated that some of the current and former employees
who had made allegations against her did so because they were angry
that they were not given the promotions they were promised by
previous managers. The Commissioner also suggested that many of the
current and former employees who made allegations were incompetent
or not productive during their tenure at PSIC. The Commissioner

6 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

acknowledged that PSIC has faced some challenges as a new

organization, but that it is exactly where it should be after three years
of operation.

16. In our view, the allegations against the Commissioner concerning

her inappropriate conduct and interactions with PSIC staff are
founded. In arriving at this conclusion, we considered information
gathered from multiple sources throughout our audit. This included
interviews with current and former PSIC employees, the corroboration
in email communications, electronic documents on PSIC’s shared
drive, contemporaneous notes, the corroborating testimony of
witnesses, and our interviews with the Commissioner.

The Commissioner engaged in retaliatory actions

17. A former PSIC senior executive alleged on 17 July 2009,

in the third complaint received by the Office of the Auditor General
of Canada, that the Commissioner undertook a series of retaliatory
actions against him because she believed that he had complained
about her to the Auditor General and that he had cooperated in our
audit. The former PSIC employee (the complainant) alleged that
the Commissioner
• provided information of a personal nature to his previous
employer, to senior officials in government, and to a private
sector security consultant;
• sought to obtain confidential information from his personnel
files in the possession of his previous employer;
• prepared and circulated a large volume of information concerning
his character, health, and performance during his tenure at PSIC,
following his departure from the Office.

The complainant further alleged that these actions taken by the

Commissioner could adversely affect his current and/or future
employment or working conditions, or his ability to obtain future
contracts with the federal public service.

18. We met with senior officials in government, including with

the complainant’s previous employer, with the private sector security
consultant, and with certain current and former PSIC employees. We
also reviewed relevant email communications and documentation at
PSIC. We interviewed the Commissioner on 2 December 2009 to
obtain her representations regarding the allegations that she
undertook retaliatory actions against the complainant.

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 7

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

19. We found that the Commissioner

• disclosed personal information about the complainant to his

previous employer, to senior officials in government, and to the
private sector security consultant;

• requested access to the complainant’s personnel file from his

previous employer in order to use this information in a security
investigation that targeted the complainant and three other
former PSIC employees;

• prepared and circulated information about the complainant within

PSIC, which included leading the preparation of four binders
comprising 96 documents and totalling more than 375 pages of
information about him, circulating at least 50 emails about him,
and involving at least 6 of her staff in these activities; and

• did not meet her obligations under the Treasury Board’s Policy on
Privacy Protection and under the Privacy Act, in responding to the
requests made by the complainant to access his personal
information in PSIC’s possession.

20. In addition, we found that the Commissioner took the above

actions against the former PSIC employee at a time when he had not
yet made a complaint to the Auditor General, and more than six to
eight months after he had resigned from public service. In our opinion,
the Commissioner also breached the Privacy Act in undertaking these
actions. As a direct result of the Commissioner’s actions against the
complainant, senior government officials in three government
organizations, individuals at a private sector security company, and a
number of PSIC employees were provided information concerning the
Commissioner’s opinions about the complainant’s character, health,
and performance.

21. The Commissioner told us that she acted in good faith at all times
and intended no prejudice toward anyone. The Commissioner told us
that she had acted to protect the reputation of her Office and on the
advice that she received from PSIC’s Departmental Audit Committee.

22. We concluded that the allegations made by the former PSIC

employee that the Commissioner undertook a series of retaliatory
actions against him because she believed that he had complained about
her to the Auditor General and that he had cooperated in our audit are
founded. Again, we considered information gathered from multiple
sources in the course of our audit in arriving at this conclusion.

8 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

Performance of mandated 23. The complaints received by the Office of the Auditor General of
functions Canada included allegations that the Commissioner was not properly
performing her mandated functions. These allegations included
statements to the effect that the Commissioner did not want to
conduct investigations or refer complaints of reprisal to the Public
Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal), and that she
did not establish policies and procedures within PSIC for dealing with
disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal. We sought to
determine whether these allegations were founded. Specifically, we
looked at whether
• PSIC had established, implemented, and monitored effective
procedures and practices to receive, record, review, investigate,
and otherwise deal with disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints
made with respect to reprisals;
• investigations into allegations of wrongdoing or reprisal received
by PSIC were conducted in accordance with the Public Servants
Disclosure Protection Act.

Operational guidance was not finalized or implemented

24. We spoke to members of PSIC investigative and legal staff and
reviewed documents provided to us. We found that, for the period
covered by our audit, draft internal guidance for handling disclosures
of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal under the PSDPA existed.
This included discussion papers concerning the legal framework of the
PSDPA and certain key concepts under the Act. However, procedures
for conducting investigations had not yet been finalized or implemented.
25. During the interview on 13 and 14 September 2010, the
Commissioner told us that many policies and procedures have been
developed by PSIC, and she subsequently provided us with copies of
12 different internal policies. We reviewed the documents provided by
the Commissioner and found that none of them set out procedures for
handling disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal received
under the PSDPA.

There are concerns about a reluctance to investigate

26. According to its 2007–08 and 2008–09 annual reports, PSIC
received a total of 114 disclosures of wrongdoing and 42 complaints
of reprisal in the first two years of its operation. During this period,
out of the 156 files, three formal investigations were conducted.
No disclosures of wrongdoing were determined to be founded and no
reprisal complaints were referred to the Tribunal. Following the period

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 9

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

covered by our audit, PSIC released its annual report for 2009–10. For
its third year in operation, PSIC reported having received an
additional 56 disclosures of wrongdoing and 16 complaints of reprisal.
Out of these 72 additional files, two disclosures of wrongdoing were
reported as having been closed after formal investigation, neither of
which resulted in a finding of wrongdoing. Two reprisal files were
reported as being under formal investigation.

27. Many current and former PSIC employees we met with as part
of our audit expressed concerns that the Commissioner was reluctant
to investigate disclosures of wrongdoing and to refer complaints of
reprisal to the Tribunal. Additionally, some of these current and former
employees raised concerns about the Commissioner’s objectivity and
impartiality in her decisions and her involvement in operational files.
Most of the individuals who expressed these concerns were members of
PSIC’s investigative or legal teams and were directly involved in the
operational files.

28. During the interview on 13 and 14 September 2010, the

Commissioner told us that the statistics reported in her annual reports
are normal for a new organization such as PSIC, especially one with a
complex mandate. She also told us that the PSDPA gives her a large
amount of discretion in deciding whether to conduct formal
investigations into disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of
reprisal, and whether such investigations are in the public interest.
The Commissioner informed us that she is not reluctant to commence
investigations, and that a number of investigations have been initiated
and are well under way.

Decisions were not always supported

29. We reviewed 86 PSIC closed operational files as part of our audit.

In many cases, we found that decisions by PSIC to refuse to formally
investigate, or to dismiss, disclosures of wrongdoing and complaints of
reprisal were not supported by the nature of work performed, the
documentation on file, or both. In our view, a more thorough approach
to these files was warranted before decisions to refuse to investigate, or
to dismiss, these disclosures and complaints could be reached.

30. In one case of disclosure of wrongdoing, the complainant alleged

that he was directed by his manager to accept a late bid on a
procurement contract contrary to the Treasury Board Contracting Policy
and applicable law. The manager who allegedly issued the direction also
allegedly had an interest in the organization that submitted the late bid.
Although PSIC recognized that the alleged actions by the manager

10 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

would constitute a wrongdoing, it refused to investigate the disclosure

because the contract was never awarded, and because PSIC was satisfied
that the situation had been properly dealt with by the Senior Officer of
the government organization. We did not find any evidence on file to
demonstrate that the government organization had addressed the
alleged conflict of interest and direction by the manager to accept the
late bid. The complainant also filed a complaint of reprisal in relation
to this disclosure based on other events that took place. PSIC refused
to investigate the reprisal complaint on the basis that management’s
actions were within its privilege in the course of managing an office.
Again, we did not find any evidence on file in support of this conclusion.
We asked the Commissioner for her position regarding PSIC’s
conclusions on this file. The Commissioner told us that she was satisfied
by the recommendations of her staff. PSIC subsequently informed us
that it recently conducted a review of a number of its files, and that the
case described in this paragraph has been re-opened.

31. In a second case of disclosure of wrongdoing, the complainant

alleged that a public servant was being permitted to pursue studies on a
full-time basis while at the same time collecting a full salary for duties
not being performed. PSIC refused to investigate the disclosure of
wrongdoing based on its conclusion that an agreement was in place
between the government organization and the employee in question,
allowing for the situation described in the disclosure. As part of the
work that PSIC performed in this file, PSIC contacted officials within
the government organization in which the wrongdoing was allegedly
occurring. According to documents on file, department officials
confirmed that the studies were not a requirement of the position held
and that related costs were not reimbursable. Department officials also
contended that an agreement with the employee in question was in
place, but no such document was on file at PSIC. PSIC’s decision to
not investigate the disclosure of wrongdoing is not supported by the
documents in the file, and PSIC did not conduct a probing analysis
into the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement. We asked
the Commissioner for her position regarding PSIC’s decision on this
file. The Commissioner responded that she did not wish to discuss the
merit of PSIC’s decision; that the letter of decision was not signed by
her; but that she was satisfied the investigation had followed PSIC
procedures. PSIC subsequently informed us that the case described in
this paragraph has also been re-opened.

32. In the case of a complaint of reprisal, PSIC refused to investigate the

complaint based on its conclusion that the alleged measures taken against
the complainant were not the result of a protected disclosure under the

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 11

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

PSDPA (and therefore outside of PSIC’s jurisdiction) and, further, that the
matter was a workplace conflict. We found that PSIC reached these
conclusions despite evidence on file that the complainant had in fact
made a protected disclosure (and therefore it was within PSIC’s
jurisdiction), and without any evidence that PSIC had investigated the
workplace to determine if there was indeed a workplace conflict. We asked
the Commissioner for her position regarding PSIC’s decision on this file.
The Commissioner referred us back to the analysis contained in the file
and stated that she was not aware of any additional information
supporting the conclusion. We reviewed the file once again, and
concluded that the reasons provided for the refusal to investigate this
reprisal complaint are not supported by the documents on file.
33. Under the PSDPA, in considering whether to make an
application to the Tribunal for a determination of whether a reprisal
was taken against a complainant, the Commissioner must consider
whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that a reprisal was
taken. In the only complaint of reprisal formally investigated by PSIC
during the period covered by our audit, we found that the
Commissioner stated in her decision letter that she was dismissing the
complaint on the basis that she could not conclude an act of reprisal
had occurred. The rationale set out in the Commissioner’s decision
letter to the complainant was that PSIC could not identify a “clear
nexus” (or clear link) between the alleged reprisal action and the
disclosure of wrongdoing. In our view, such a determination extends
beyond the Commissioner’s responsibilities under the PSDPA because
it goes further than assessing whether there are “reasonable grounds”
for believing that a reprisal was taken. In our interview with the
Commissioner, she stated that, for all cases of alleged reprisal, a clear
nexus between the disclosure of wrongdoing and the alleged reprisal
actions is the minimum criterion that must be met in order to proceed
with the complaint. PSIC subsequently informed us that it does not
agree with our finding that the Commissioner’s determination in this
file extended beyond her responsibilities.
34. During the interview on 13 and 14 September 2010, the
Commissioner acknowledged that she is accountable for, and stands
behind, all of the decisions made by PSIC, and that these decisions
were based on the advice received from experts, including her staff.
She also told us that the PSDPA gives her a large amount of discretion
in deciding whether to conduct formal investigations into disclosures
of wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal, and whether such
investigations are in the public interest.

12 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

35. In our view, the allegations against the Commissioner concerning

the improper performance of her mandated functions are founded.
During the period covered by our audit, procedures for conducting
investigations were not finalized or implemented. We also found that, in
many cases, decisions to refuse to investigate, or to dismiss disclosures of
wrongdoing and complaints of reprisal were not supported by either the
nature of work performed, the documentation on file, or both. It is also
our view that decisions by the Commissioner to refuse to investigate
certain complaints of reprisal on the basis that she could not conclude
that an act of reprisal had occurred extended beyond her responsibilities
under the PSDPA. Again, we considered information gathered from
multiple sources in the course of our audit in arriving at this conclusion.

Conclusion
36. In our view, the allegations made by the complainants
concerning the Commissioner’s inappropriate conduct and
interactions with PSIC staff, retaliatory actions by the Commissioner,
and the failure by the Commissioner to properly perform her mandated
functions, are founded. As previously noted, we have reported
separately to the Chief Human Resources Officer at the Treasury
Board of Canada Secretariat and to PSIC management on the
allegations related to performance pay decisions.
37. We are of the view that the Commissioner’s conduct and
actions were inconsistent with the spirit of the Public Servants
Disclosure Protection Act, the same Act from which she obtains her
mandate. Further, the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service
states that “Public servants shall act at all times in a manner that will
bear the closest public scrutiny; an obligation that is not fully
discharged by simply acting within the law.” In our view, the
Commissioner’s behaviour and actions do not pass the test of public
scrutiny and are inappropriate and unacceptable for a public servant—
most notably for the Agent of Parliament specifically charged with the
responsibility of upholding integrity in the public sector and of
protecting public servants from reprisal.

Subsequent Event
38. On 20 October 2010, PSIC announced that Christiane Ouimet
retired from public service, effective 18 October 2010. We provided
Ms. Ouimet with the opportunity to comment on a draft of our report,
but we did not receive a response from her.

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 13

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

About the Audit

All of the audit work in this report was conducted in accordance with the standards for assurance
engagements set by The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. While the Office adopts these
standards as the minimum requirement for our audits, we also draw upon the standards and practices of
other disciplines.

Objective
The objective of the audit was to investigate and assess the allegations pertaining to the conduct of the
Commissioner as a deputy head—including her conduct and interactions with PSIC staff and the
performance of her mandated functions—and to determine if her conduct and other actions are consistent
with applicable legislation, government policies and public sector values and ethics.

Scope and approach

On 28 November 2008, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) received a disclosure under
section 14 of the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA). The disclosure alleged wrongdoing on
the part of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada, Christiane Ouimet (the Commissioner).
The allegations pertained to the Commissioner’s behaviour as a deputy head, including her interactions
with staff from the Office of the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of Canada (PSIC), turnover of PSIC
employees, performance pay decisions, and performance of her mandated functions.
On 30 April 2009, the OAG received a second disclosure under the PSDPA in relation to the
Commissioner. This disclosure also alleged wrongdoing by the Commissioner relating to her conduct and
to the performance of her mandated functions.
On 11 May 2009, the OAG ceased its investigations into the two disclosures and converted them into a
performance audit under the Auditor General Act. This was done pursuant to sections 24 and 34 of the
PSDPA. Specifically, the Auditor General was of the opinion that the investigations would involve
obtaining information that was outside of the public sector. Section 34 of the PSDPA instructs that, in
such situations, that part of the investigation must be ceased and referred to an authority that she
considers competent to deal with it. The Auditor General was of the opinion that the subject matter of the
disclosures (including the allegations of reprisal relating to the Commissioner’s actions) could more
appropriately be dealt with through a performance audit under sections 5 and 7 of the Auditor General Act.
In the course of the audit, on 17 July 2009, the Auditor General received another complaint pertaining to
the conduct of the Commissioner as a deputy head. This complaint raised allegations of retaliatory action
(an allegation of reprisal can only be made under the PSDPA) taken by the Commissioner against the
complainant in response to her belief that he was the, or one of the, original complainant(s), and that he
had participated in our investigations and audit. The OAG included examination of this complaint in its
ongoing performance audit.

14 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010

 THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

The Commissioner was provided with a full opportunity to respond to the allegations against her. She was
also given a full opportunity to provide us with additional information that she considered to be relevant
to our audit. On 18 September 2009, we provided the Commissioner with documentation that we had
collected in relation to the third complaint. We interviewed the Commissioner on 2 December 2009 to
obtain her representations regarding these allegations. On 11 June 2010, we provided the Commissioner
with documentation that we had collected in relation to the remainder of our performance audit. We
interviewed the Commissioner on 13 and 14 September 2010 to obtain her representations regarding all
allegations made against her by the complainants and others who had provided information to the OAG.
The periods between each of the disclosures of evidence and the subsequent interviews were to provide
the Commissioner with enough time to review the materials that the OAG provided to her in preparation
for the interviews.
In the course of our audit, we met with 34 current and former PSIC employees, as well as with senior
government officials and third parties. We reviewed documentation and communications on site at PSIC,
and documentation at its service providers, the Canadian Human Rights Commission for financial
administration services, and the Status of Women Canada for human resource services.

Period covered by the audit

The period covered by our audit was from 15 April 2007 to 31 July 2009. This period was chosen based on
the allegations made in the three complaints. Audit work for this report was substantially completed on
8 October 2010.

Criteria

To investigate and assess the allegations pertaining to the conduct of the Commissioner as a deputy head—including her conduct and interactions with
PSIC staff and the performance of her mandated functions—and to determine if her conduct and other actions are consistent with applicable legislation,
government policies, and public sector values and ethics, we used the following criteria:

Criteria Sources

Human resource decisions and management practices of the
Commissioner reflect the highest standards of ethical conduct as
required by the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service.
Human resource management practices of PSIC and of the
Commissioner foster a respectful workplace for all PSIC
employees.
Actions of the Commissioner raised reasonable grounds for
believing that a reprisal was taken against a complainant.
• Public Service Employment Act
• Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service, Treasury Board
• Ethical Guidelines for Public Office Holders, Privy
Council Office
• Terms and Conditions of Employment for Full-Time Governor in
Council Appointees, Privy Council Office
• Public Service Employment Act
• Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service, Treasury Board
• Policy on Prevention and Resolution of Harassment in the
Workplace, Treasury Board
• Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act
• Privacy Act

Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010 15

THE PUBLIC SECTOR INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA

Criteria Sources

PSIC has established, implemented, and monitored effective • Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act
procedures and practices to receive, record, review, investigate,
• Financial Administration Act, section 16.4
and otherwise deal with disclosures of wrongdoing and
complaints made with respect to reprisals.
Investigations into allegations of wrongdoing or reprisal received • Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act
by PSIC were conducted in accordance with the Public Servants
• Financial Administration Act, section 16.4
Disclosure Protection Act.
Performance management and compensation decisions conform • Financial Administration Act, section 12
to legislation and applicable government policies and are
• Policy on the Management of Executives, Treasury Board
conducted in a fair, open, and transparent manner.
• Directive on the Performance Management Program (PMP)
for Executives, Treasury Board

PSIC management was provided with the opportunity to review and comment on the suitability of the
criteria used in the audit. No response was received.

Audit team management

Deputy Auditor General: John Wiersema
Principal: Linda Drainville
Director: Mathieu Lefèvre
For information, please contact Communications at 613-995-3708 or 1-888-761-5953 (toll-free).

16 Report of the Auditor General of Canada—December 2010