PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.

, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on
its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary
civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried
in one single decision that has become final and executory.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March
29, 20002 and the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
59390. Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal
is ordered DISMISSED."4

The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as
follows:

‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
his death, plus the sum of ₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income
for one year at ₱2,500.00 a month, ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of
Renato Torres, and the further sum of ₱300,000.00 as moral damages;

‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of ₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for
three years at ₱45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
 ‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of ₱22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of ₱20,544.94 as medical
expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at ₱1,000.00 per month, and the further
sum of ₱100,000.00 for moral damages;

‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as hospital expenses,

doctor’s fees of ₱170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the
[n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to cover future
correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.00;

‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical expenses, ₱2,000.00 as

loss of income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;

‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47 as medical expenses,

₱800.00 for loss of income, and ₱25,000.00 as moral damages;

‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as medical expenses, ₱4,600.00

as actual damages and her loss earnings of ₱1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of ₱10,000.00;

‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as hospital expenses,

₱14,530.00 as doctor’s fees, ₱1,000.00 for medicines and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages;

‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for medical expenses, ₱87.00
for medicines, ₱1,710.00 as actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;

‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for hospital bills, ₱500.00
for medicine, ₱2,100.00 as actual damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income and
₱5,000.00 as moral damages;

‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace
Van, the amount of ₱250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally
wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of ₱22,698.38 as actual
damages;’

"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall
be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused
had become final and executory.

"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant
jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed
a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice
of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
 "Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On
December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s]
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents’] brief
on the ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on
appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2,
1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations
omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee,
the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
becomes conclusive and enforceable.

The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed
by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and
executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issues

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay
v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality.
The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had
jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-
employee.

We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases

Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:

"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed
in double jeopardy."

Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may
do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.10 On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to
their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the
offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to
them.11

Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or
motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal."12

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their
right to seek judicial relief.13

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also
to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle
in this wise:

"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial,
but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him
and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be
dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against them.15 While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.16

Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused
has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become final and executory.17

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:

"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given
them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper’s employees."

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which
reads:

"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge
of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

"x x x xxx x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by
execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.19

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and 217623 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and
independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in
the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.24

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime
or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control
of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.25

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right
to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.

In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se
cases, the accused’s employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any
single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is
not possible.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. 28 Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim that
the trial court’s finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."31

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The
latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or
unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a
sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the
judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.34

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open
to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the
trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his
consent.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right
to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his
right against double jeopardy.

Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the
court below final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to
have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in
People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:

"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x."37

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the
reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.38 Such conduct is
intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.39

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the
proper authorities becomes final and executory.40

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment
in the criminal case against him is now final.

Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay
v. Adil43 do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Court’s directive to the
employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating
in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings
laid down in these leading cases.

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track
of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employer’s liability in a finding of guilt
against its accused-employee is subsidiary.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency.44 The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.45 Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.46 In effect and
implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.48 By the same token, to
allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.
The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.49

Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former
are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.50

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise purpose,
with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employee’s
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.

According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could
be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should
not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for
its accused-employee.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of
absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability
of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by
reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process

As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to
be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employee’s criminal
negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal
wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his
criminal negligence.52

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.53 It
is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the legal
requirements must be strictly complied with.55

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57
In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be
followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.58

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings
before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might
have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it can be said that by
jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced.
It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof
is clear from the admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from
Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner’s driver,
Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."61 Neither does petitioner
dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge
of his duties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. and FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners
vs.
ANTONIO SAN ANDRES, Respondent

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed at
anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same act or omission.

The Case

Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz hereby assail the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November 24, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco
City dismissing their counterclaim on the ground that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount
to double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not prosecuted in the criminal action
against the respondent's driver.2

Antecedents

The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA thusly:

On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger
bus, Mabel Tours Bus with body number 1896-C and plate Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648
(new), owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along Maharlika Highway in Barangay
Malabanban Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. While traversing
Maharlika Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel
Tours Bus immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus
owned and registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and
driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of the strong
impact of the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour
Bus continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that was parked on the side of the road
which later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.

Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as the other two (2)
vehicles were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police
Station.

[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have
it repaired. The cost of repair was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand
and Five Hundred Pesos (Phpl44,500.00).
On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was instituted by
[respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus
and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in
the amount of ₱144,500.00 and ₱150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of
₱30,000.00, appearance fee of ₱l,000.00, litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00 and cost of the suit
were also lodged in the complaint.

xxxx

Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged among others that
plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the
reckless imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus
recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of
the accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a
registered plate.

By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered
damages in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00 and another ₱l00,000.00 for the medical
expenses of its employees and passengers. The unwarranted filing of the case forced them to secure
the services of a counsel for ₱50,000.00 plus appearance fee of ₱5,000.00 and litigation expenses
in the amount of ₱3,000.00 including traveling expenses.

xxxx

After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference wherein the parties,
in an effort to amicably settle the case, referred the case to conciliation. The parties, however,
failed to hammer out an amicable settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.

[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support their claims and contentions.
[Respondent] presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who later became a hostile witness. On the
part of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix Ruz, SPOl Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for Operations of
[petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.

In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez before the Court in Candelaria, Quezon.
The case is now terminated and the accused was convicted because of his admission of the crime
charged. In the said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal
to reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their counterclaim in the present civil
action filed by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any compensation for the civil
aspect of the criminal case, and although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did not
claim for any reimbursement in connection with the subject incident.3

Judgment of the RTC

On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the respondent's complaint as well
as the petitioners' counterclaim,4 decreeing:

From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed
for having failed to prove liability on the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by
the defendants hereof is also dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.

SO ORDERED.5

The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability;6 and that the
petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,7 whose pertinent portions the RTC quoted in its judgment as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institute the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

xxxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.8

The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
precluded their right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim.9

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE COUNTERCLAIM.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO

RESERVATION WAS MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED AGAINST
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.10

Decision of the CA
In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,11 the CA dismissed the petitioners'
appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper because
their recourse was limited to the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code;12 that "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to
double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules;"13 and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their
right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal
action.14

The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the resolution promulgated on
January 26, 2012.15

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was correctly
denied by the RTC.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the
CA despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they
had brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not they could recover damages
upon their counterclaim presents a different story, as they should first show that they will not
recover damages twice for the same incident.

1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation

As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be limited to the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's
driver the criminal complaint for criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
The CA was seemingly of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was
limited to recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary liability under and pursuant
to Article 10316 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the petitioners'
failure to reserve the civil aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a separate
civil action based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case they have filed.
Without so doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on
the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover
liability from appellee based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be limited to the
recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x17

The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners' cause of action as
presented in their counterclaim.

We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners' counterclaim to determine the correct
nature of their cause of action.18 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern the suit
are to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief,
but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.19

The counterclaim relevantly reads:

xxxx

5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
plaintiffs driver, one ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in
violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without
regards (sic) to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction
resulting to head on collision (sic) on the lane of defendant's SUPREME bus;

6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject Mabel Tour bus outside his
franchise, hence, in violation of his franchise and allied rules and regulations; operated the same
without registered plate and using the route of another franchise holder; and

COUNTERCLAIM

7. Defendants replead the proceedings (sic) paragraphs as they may be relevant;

8. That as a result of plaintiffs violation of his franchise and gross negligence of his driver, the
defendant's SUPREME bus suffered damage in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00; medical
expenses for its employee and passengers in the amount of ₱100,000.00;20

xxxx

Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-
delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article 2184,21 in relation
to Article 218022 and Article 2176,23 all of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the
RTC itself acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as its ratiocination bears
out, to wit:

The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may
nonetheless bring an action for damages against the plaintiff under the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned task, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised
Penal Code.

However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action
under the above quoted provisions of the New Civil Code may be brought separately from the
criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved.24

Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was founded on the obsolete
version of the Rules of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24,
2008, the revised relevant rule of procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect,25 and
it had specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil
actions, as follows:

Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary dan1ages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (la)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the
filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.1awp++i1

The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that the
omission of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not
only to the obligation ex delicto,26 but also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on
the common element of negligence. Article 217727 of the Civil Code and Section 3,28 Rule 111
of the Rules of Court allow the injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions
simultaneously. As clarified in Casupanan v. Laroya:29

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is
only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted,"
and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right
to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the
criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy by
which to enforce their claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because
Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the same act or
omission. As ruled in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco:30

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., ( 1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article
2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.

As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule III, unlike the predecessor, no longer includes the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code as requiring prior
reservation to be made in a previously instituted criminal action. Had it been cautious and
circumspect, the RTC could have avoided the error.

2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.

Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by the petitioners
in their counterclaim.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages arising
from the same act or omission. The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages
from the respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against the respondent's
driver had already been concluded. It remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate that the RTC
as the trial court did not award civil damages in the criminal case. Consequently, Civil Case No.
T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the petitioners
the opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition against double
recovery of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011; and REMANDS Civil Case No. T-2240 to the Regional Trial
Court in Tabaco City for further proceedings to allow the petitioners to present evidence on their
counterclaim, subject to the foregoing clarifications.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

FIRST PRODUCERS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
LUIS CO, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A criminal proceeding, as a rule, may be suspended upon a showing that a prejudicial question
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the very issue to be decided in a civil case
pending in another tribunal. However, such suspension cannot be allowed if it is apparent that the
civil action was filed as an afterthought for the purpose of delaying the ongoing criminal action.
This exception applies especially in cases in which the trial court trying the criminal action has
authority to decide such issue, and the civil action was instituted merely to delay the criminal
proceeding and thereby multiply suits and vex the court system with unnecessary cases. Procedural
rules should be construed to promote substantial justice, not to frustrate or delay its delivery.

Statement of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking a reversal of the May 10, 1999 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 49701. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Orders dated February 27, 1998 and October 9, 1998
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED TO
SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 97-734 to await the outcome of Civil Case No.
97-2663."4

The February 27, 1998 Order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was set aside by the CA
disposed as follows:

"The MOTION TO SUSPEND on grounds of prejudicial question and to reset arraignment is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit."6

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On March 13, 1997, x x x Armand M. Luna filed a criminal complaint for estafa and perjury
against [herein respondent] Luis L. Co in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, docketed as
I.S. No. 97-10892. Pertinent portion of the complaint is hereby quoted as follows:

‘2.....On November 25, 1997, in the regular meeting of the Board of Directors of the Producers
Bank of the Philippines held at Manhattan Bldg. Nueva Street, Manila, a resolution was adopted
authorizing the corporation to purchase three (3) proprietary shares of Manila Polo Club to be
placed in the names of Messrs. Co Bun Chun, Henry Co and Luis Co to be held by them on behalf
of the corporation which is evidenced by the attached ANNEX 'C':

‘3. In accordance with said resolution, the corporation purchased said proprietary shares in the
name of the nominees, one of which was placed in the name of Mr. Luis L. Co as evidenced by
Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 203 dated July 2, 1979, hereto attached as ANNEX D;

‘4. On March 17, 1994, after the separation from the service of Mr. Luis L. Co, Ms. Amelita F.
Bautista demanded from him the transfer of the subject certificate in the name of the corporation
as evidenced by a letter dated March 16, 1994 attached hereto as ANNEX 'E';

‘5. Despite his duty to assign the certificate back to the corporation and the subject demand, Mr.
LUIS L. CO, on April 26, 1994, instead registered the loss of the said proprietary share with Manila
Polo Club Inc. by executing a false Affidavit of Loss and subsequently, he was able to secure a
replacement certificate No. 4454 in his name after allegedly complying with the legal requirements
for the replacement of lost certificates. This is evidenced by the letter dated September 5, 1996
signed by Ramon B. Salazar, General Manager of Manila Polo Club, Inc., hereto attached as
ANNEX 'F';

‘6. In so doing, Mr. Luis L. Co misrepresented himself to be the legitimate owner of subject share
and by executing a false affidavit, he made it appear that Certificate No. 203 was lost despite the
fact that said certificate is existing and remains in possession of the corporation;

‘7. That on February 06, 1997, another demand was made upon Mr. Luis L. Co to deliver to us the
newly issued Manila Polo Club Certificate No. 4454 and to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor
of a new nominee. Said demand is evidenced by the attached letter dated February 6, 1997 signed
by Atty. Pedro M. Malabanan, ANNEX 'G' hereof;

‘8. That the value of said certificate is FIVE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,650,000.00) as of April 1996 as evidenced by a certification dated Oct. 03, 1996 hereto
attached as ANNEX 'H';

‘9. Despite subject demand, Mr. Luis L. Co failed and [has] continuously fail[ed] to deliver the
subject certificate to the corporation and to execute a Deed of Assignment in favor of the nominee
of the corporation to the damage and prejudice of the latter;

’10. That said act of Mr. Luis Co constitutes misappropriation or conversion of something given
to him in trust to the prejudice of the bank;’

"After the filing of [Co’s] counter affidavit and after consideration of necessary pleadings
appended thereto, [the] City Prosecutor recommended the filing of estafa and perjury against
[him]. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed [an] information for estafa against [him] in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-734 and another information
for perjury was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.
"Unsatisfied, [Co] appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice but
was dismissed by the latter in a[n] order dated October 2, 1997.

"On November 16, 1997, during the pendency of the criminal case, [Co] filed an action for
damages against Armand Luna and First Producers Holdings (complainant in the criminal case
filed) with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2663. In
the said complaint, [he] claimed ownership over questioned Manila Polo Club Proprietary Share
No. 203.

"On December 10, 1997, [Co] filed a motion for suspension of the case and his arraignment thereon
but was denied by [the trial court] in an order dated February 27, 1998."7

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals explained that "a prejudicial question is a question which arise[s] in a case,
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal."8 And based on the above definition, it ruled that the
requisites for the existence of a prejudicial question were present in the case at bar. Should the
ownership of the share in question be decided in favor of Luis Co, there would be no basis for the
charge of estafa against him. The CA added that respondent’s belated filing of the civil case did
not detract from the correctness of his cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
based on the pendency of a prejudicial action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests.

Hence, this Petition.9

Issues

Petitioner attributes to the CA the following errors:

"A.....The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in finding that a prejudicial
question exists with respondent’s filing of Civil Case No. 97-2663.

B.....The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in directing the suspension of
Criminal Case No. 97-734 pending resolution of Civil Case No. 97-2663."10

In the main, the Court will resolve the propriety of the suspension of the criminal proceedings
based on the alleged prejudicial question.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Existence of a Prejudicial Question

Echoing the appellate court’s position, respondent maintains that the issue of ownership of the
Manila Polo Club share, which was raised in the civil action, constitutes a prejudicial question
warranting the suspension of the criminal case for estafa. He argues that his guilt or innocence may
be determined only after the issue of ownership has been resolved. He further contends that the
prejudicial question was seasonably raised because the Rules provide that it may be made "at any
time before the prosecution rests."

Prejudicial questions are regulated by Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

"SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. -- The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed."

"SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. -- A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests."

True, the Motion to Suspend the criminal case on the ground that a prejudicial question existed
was raised "before the prosecution rest[ed]."11 However, the peculiar circumstances of this case
clearly show that it was merely a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal case and vex the
already overloaded court system with an unnecessary case.

Civil Case Clearly Dilatory

The criminal action for estafa had been lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor on March
13, 1997. Yet, respondent filed the civil case only eight months later, on November 18, 1997.
Indeed, as early as 1994, a written demand had already been served on him to return the said
share.12 He did not contest petitioner’s claim; in fact, he filed the present civil action several
months after the institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that the civil action was
instituted only as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal case.

The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact that he could have
raised the issue of ownership in the criminal case. He himself admits that the issue of ownership
may be raised in the estafa case.

Yet, he resorts to subterfuge, arguing:

"x x x. The resolution of the issue of ownership in Criminal Case No. 97-734 would only be for
the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the respondent. The said issue may not be
resolved with finality in the same criminal proceedings, since the court a quo would be bound by
what appears on the face of the Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership Certificate No. 203.
Considering that the subject Membership Certificate clearly shows that the same is registered in
the name of the respondent, the same is conclusive evidence of his ownership."13
This argument is bereft of merit. We find no sufficient reason why the trial court hearing the
criminal case cannot resolve the question of ownership. Significantly, the civil action for recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action.14 Hence, respondent
may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. In fact, there is no
law or rule prohibiting him from airing exhaustively the question of ownership. After all, the trial
court has jurisdiction to hear the said defense. The rules of evidence and procedure for the recovery
of civil liabilities are the same in both criminal and civil cases.15

Equally unmeritorious is respondent’s theory that the trial court trying the criminal case would be
bound by the Membership Certificate, which was registered in his name and would thus be
"conclusive evidence of his ownership."16

If the trial court would indeed consider the Certificate as conclusive proof of his ownership, then
such ruling would in fact be favorable to him and give him no reason to file the civil suit. It would
be up to petitioner, then, to disprove during the criminal proceedings his alleged ownership.

Ownership Is Not Necessarily An Element of Estafa

In any event, the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of estafa, as held by the Court in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:

"Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa x x x. In estafa, the person prejudiced
or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of the goods. Thus, Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that ‘Any person who shall defraud another (it does not say ‘owner’)
by any means mentioned is that the loss should have fallen on someone other than the perpetrators
of the crime. x x x"17

Furthermore, to allow respondent’s stance is to open the floodgates, as it were, to similar dilatory
tactics.1âwphi1 In this light, we reiterate hereunder our earlier pronouncement:

"Were we to sanction the theory advanced by the respondents x x x, there would hardly be a case
for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the
proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an independent civil action against the complainant,
raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been
misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be interposed by the party
charged in the criminal proceedings."18

The foregoing principle applies with equal force in this case. Indeed, the rules of procedure,
including the rule on prejudicial questions, were conceived to afford parties an expeditious and
just disposition of cases. This Court will not countenance their misuse and abuse to frustrate or
delay the delivery of justice.19 In this light, the civil action may in fact give rise to the evils of
forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to proceed with the
trial of Criminal Case No. 97-734 with all deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,

vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-
affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon
City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated
December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is
no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative
of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related
to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not
the latter action may proceed.6 Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in
the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the
indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second
marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to
determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void
for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity
at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage
and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the
material time of the first marriage.9

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that
the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As
succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage
is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage,
they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and
we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to
state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."12 [] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their
marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or
patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That
is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render.
Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in
such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.15 This ruling applies here
by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked
as an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized
by the Revised Penal Code.17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is
presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when
he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own
disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a
matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable.
It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or
delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.19
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against this legal
backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance
to defeat the criminal action against him.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is
ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of
Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No.
261782 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September
14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other
regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her.3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted
a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she
learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy
was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He
alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective
engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage,
petitioner was already married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent
added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella
that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism
and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990
which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently
established a prima facie case against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to
inhibit for lack of legal basis.10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting
antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due
process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before
the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for
judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
23971.11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend
the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to
private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC
of Quezon City.12 When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,13
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board
gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is
prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the
continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right
against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-
sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation
and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before
the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the
same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the
consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to
petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.15 The Court of Appeals
likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure
to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to
adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of
prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action
sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case.17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied.18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND

THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN

ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF.19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for
bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss
the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules.20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which
would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity
of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal
proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would
necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24
and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found
in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage
to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.26 In Landicho vs.
Relova,27 we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of
marriage exists.28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial
question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it
shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in
another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as
in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the
case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or
quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are
not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella.
Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without
the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the
proceedings before the PRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not
presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the
requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the
marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said
contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage
ceremony participated in by him ever took place.31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion
of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion.32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the
prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has
been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the
prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima
facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his
demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was
already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits
but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or
not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.35 The RTC’s observation that there
was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient
evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless
petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.36 Said declaration
by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely
because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present
evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by
both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-
14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in
several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration
of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was
dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed.
Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was
not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case
and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the
same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s
hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant
of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did
not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the
rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit
himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which
he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case,
for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s
motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether
petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a
fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s
counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which
rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s
counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified
delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO R. MANALO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and PAIC SAVINGS AND
MORTGAGE BANK, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks the review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP. No. 50341 promulgated December 23, 1999, which affirmed an Order issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 9011 dated December 9, 1998.

On July 19, 1983, S. Villanueva Enterprises, represented by its president, Therese Villanueva
Vargas, obtained a loan of three million pesos (P3,000,000.00) and one million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from the respondent PAIC Savings and Mortgage Bank and the Philippine
American Investments Corporation (PAIC), respectively. To secure payment of both debts, Vargas
executed in favor of the respondent and PAIC a Joint First Mortgage1 over two parcels of land
registered under her name. One of the lots, located in Pasay City with an area of nine hundred
nineteen square meters (919 sq. m.) and covered by TCT No. 6076, is the subject of the present
case. Section 2 of the mortgage contract states that "the properties mortgaged therein shall include
all buildings and improvements existing on the mortgaged property at the time of the execution of
the mortgage contract and thereafter."2

S. Villanueva Enterprises defaulted in paying the amortizations due. Despite repeated demands
from the respondent, it failed to settle its loan obligation. Accordingly, respondent instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged lots. On August 22, 1984, the Pasay City
property was sold at a public auction to the respondent itself, after tendering the highest bid. The
respondent then caused the annotation of the corresponding Sheriff's Certificate of Sale3 on the
title of the land on December 4, 1984. After the lapse of one year, or the statutory period extended
by law to a mortgagor to exercise his/her right of redemption, title was consolidated in respondent's
name for failure of Vargas to redeem.

On October 29, 1986, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a Petition4 for assistance in the
liquidation of the respondent with the Regional Trial Court. The petition was given due course in
an Order5 dated May 19, 1987.

It appears that from the years 1986 to 1991, Vargas negotiated with the respondent (through its
then liquidator, the Central Bank) for the repurchase of the foreclosed property. The negotiations,
however, fizzled out as Vargas cannot afford the repurchase price fixed by the respondent based
on the appraised value of the land at that time. On October 4, 1991, Vargas filed a case for
annulment of mortgage and extrajudicial foreclosure sale before Branch 116 of the Pasay City
Regional Trial Court. On July 22, 1993, the court rendered a decision6 dismissing the complaint
and upholding the validity of the mortgage and foreclosure sale. On appeal, the appellate court
upheld the assailed judgment and declared the said mortgage and foreclosure proceedings to be in
accord with law.7 This decision of the Court of Appeals subsequently became final and executory
when we summarily dismissed Vargas' Petition for Review on Certiorari for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period.8
In the meantime, on June 22, 1992, respondent petitioned the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
of Pasay City, herein court a quo, for the issuance of a writ of possession for the subject property
in Civil Case No. 9011. This is in view of the consolidation of its ownership over the same as
mentioned earlier. Vargas and S. Villanueva Enterprises, Inc. filed their opposition thereto. After
which, trial ensued.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 9011 (for the issuance of a writ of possession), Vargas, on
December 23, 1992, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale9 selling, transferring, and conveying
ownership of the disputed lot in favor of a certain Armando Angsico. Notwithstanding this sale,
Vargas, still representing herself to be the lawful owner of the property, leased the same to
petitioner Domingo R. Manalo on August 25, 1994. Pertinent provisions of the lease agreement10
state:

"3. (a) The lease is for a period of ten year lease (sic), involving 450 square meters, a portion of
the above 919 square meter property.

x x x (d) The LESSEE has to introduce into the said 450 square meter premises improvements
thereon (sic) consisting of one story building to house a Karaoke Music Restaurant Business,
which improvements constructed thereof (sic), upon the termination of the lease contract, by said
LESSEE be surrendered in favor of the LESSOR (sic).''11

Later, on June 29, 1997, Armando Angsico, as buyer of the property, assigned his rights therein to
petitioner.12

On April 21, 1998, the court a quo granted the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Possession.13
The writ was subsequently issued on April 24, 1998, the pertinent portion of which reads:14

"NOW THEREFORE you are hereby commanded that you cause oppositors THERESE
VILLANUEVA VARGAS and S. VILLANUEVA ENTERPRISES, INC. and any and all persons
claiming rights or title under them, to forthwith vacate and surrender the possession of subject
premises in question known as that parcel of land and improvements covered by TCT No. 6076 of
the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City; you are hereby further ordered to take possession and deliver
to the petitioner PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK the subject parcel of land and
improvements."

Shortly, on May 8, 1998, S. Villanueva Enterprises and Vargas moved for its quashal.15 Thereafter
on June 25, 1998, petitioner, on the strength of the lease contract and Deed of Assignment made
in his favor, submitted a Permission to File an Ex-parte Motion to Intervene.16 It bears mentioning,
however, that before petitioner sought intervention in the present case, he had separately instituted
a Complaint for Mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0868 before another branch17 of the
Pasay City RTC to compel PAIC Bank to allow him to repurchase the subject property.

On October 7, 1998, the court a quo denied the Motion to Quash and Motion to Intervene filed
respectively by Vargas and petitioner.18 A Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration were filed by the petitioner which, however, were similarly denied on
December 9, 1998.
Petitioner then sought relief with the Court of Appeals, filing therein a Petition for Certiorari.
While this was awaiting resolution, he entered into another lease agreement,19 this time with the
respondent, represented by its liquidator, over the same 450 sq. m. portion of the lot. The contract
fixed a period of one month beginning January 28, 1999, renewable for another month at the
exclusive option of the lessor, respondent PAIC Bank.

On December 23, 1999, the appellate court rendered the impugned Decision, dismissing the
petition, thus:

"All told, WE find the Order, subject of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, to be
not without rational bases and we observe that the court a quo, in issuing its questioned Order,
committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
December 9, 1998 Order is AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED."20

Hence, this appeal, where petitioner raises and argues the following legal issues:

"I. Whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and/or was
patently in error when it affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention, despite the fact
that he has a legal interest, being a lessee and an assignee of the property subject matter of this
case.

II. Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that
what are required to be instituted before the liquidation court are those claims against the insolvent
banks only considering that the private respondent bank is legally dead due to insolvency and
considering further that there is already a liquidation court (Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
57, docketed as Spec. Pro. No. M-1280) which is exclusively vested with jurisdiction to hear all
matters and incidents on liquidation pursuant to Section 29, Republic Act No. 265, otherwise
known as The Central Bank Act, as amended.

III. Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or was patently
in error in affirming the ruling of the trial court, totally disregarding the arguments raised in
petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration only through a minute order and without
taking into consideration the fact that there is a pending action in another court (RTC, Pasay City,
Branch 231 ) which presents a prejudicial question to the case at bar.

IV. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning private respondent's ownership
when it entered into a contract of lease involving the property in question."21

We will first resolve the jurisdictional and procedural questions raised by the petitioner.

I.
Petitioner postulates that the lower court should have dismissed respondent's "Ex-Parte Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Possession" in Civil Case No. P-9011 for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim. The power to hear the same, he insists, exclusively vests with the
Liquidation Court pursuant to Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The
Central Bank Act.22 He then cites our decision in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals,23 where we held
that "if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be
filed in the liquidation proceeding." For going to another court, the respondent, he accuses, is guilty
of forum shopping.

These contentions can not pass judicial muster. The pertinent portion of Section 29 states:

"x x x The liquidator designated as hereunder provided shall, by the Solicitor General, file a
petition in the Regional Trial Court reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction
in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of disputed claims against the bank or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and the enforcement of individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution
and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board, x x x"24 (emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioner apparently failed to appreciate the correct meaning and import of the above-quoted law.
The legal provision only finds operation in cases where there are claims against an insolvent bank.
In fine, the exclusive jurisdiction of the liquidation court pertains only to the adjudication of claims
against the bank. It does not cover the reverse situation where it is the bank which files a claim
against another person or legal entity.

This interpretation of Section 29 becomes more obvious in the light of its intent. The requirement
that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central Bank
is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish
due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations
and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness.25 The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience,
only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the
liquidation court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations.26

It then ought to follow that petitioner's reliance on Section 29 and the Valenzuela case is misplaced.
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession in Civil Case No. 9011 is not in the nature of
a disputed claim against the bank. On the contrary, it is an action instituted by the respondent bank
itself for the preservation of its asset and protection of its property. It was filed upon the instance
of the respondent's liquidator in order to take possession of a tract of land over which it has
ownership claims.

To be sure, the liquidator took the proper course of action when it applied for a writ in the Pasay
City RTC. Act 3135,27 entitled An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers
Inserted In or Annexed To Real Estate Mortgages, mandates that jurisdiction over a Petition for
Writ of Possession lies with the court of the province, city, or municipality where the property
subject thereof is situated. This is sanctioned by Section 7 of the said Act, thus:
"SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated,
to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case
it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act x x x"28 (emphasis supplied)

Since the land subject of this controversy is located in Pasay City, then the city's RTC should
rightly take cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of other courts.

Anent petitioner's auxiliary contention that respondent should be held guilty of forum shopping
for not filing the case in the liquidation court, suffice it to state here that the doctrine only ponders
situations where two (or more) cases are pending before different tribunals.29 Well to point, we
have laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping
as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.30 Inasmuch as the case at bar is the only one filed by the
respondent for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject property, there is no occasion
for the doctrine to apply.

Petitioner next casts doubt on the capacity of the respondent to continue litigating the petition for
the issuance of the writ. He asserts that, being under liquidation, respondent bank is already a
"dead" corporation that cannot maintain the suit in the RTC. Hence, no writ may be issued in its
favor.

The argument is devoid of merit. A bank which had been ordered closed by the monetary board
retains its juridical personality which can sue and be sued through its liquidator. The only limitation
being that the prosecution or defense of the action must be done through the liquidator. 31
Otherwise, no suit for or against an insolvent entity would prosper. In such situation, banks in
liquidation would lose what justly belongs to them through a mere technicality.32

That the law allows a bank under liquidation to participate in an action can be clearly inferred from
the third paragraph of the same Section 29 of The Central Bank Act earlier quoted, which
authorizes or empowers a liquidator to institute actions, thus: "x x x and he (liquidator) may in the
name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and with
the assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution or defend any action
filed against the institution."33 (emphasis supplied.)

It is therefore beyond dispute that respondent was legally capacitated to petition the court a quo
for the issuance of the writ.

II.

Petitioner likewise proffers one other procedural obstacle, which is the pendency of Civil Case No.
98-0868 in Branch 231 of Pasay City RTC. The said action is the complaint he filed against the
respondent for the latter to receive and accept the redemption price of eighteen million pesos for
the subject property. He argues that the primary issue therein constitutes a prejudicial question in
relation to the present case in that if the Court therein will grant petitioner's prayer, then this will
necessarily negate the possessory writ issued by the court a quo.

Again, we are not persuaded. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal.34 It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.35

Here, aside from the fact that Civil Case No. 98-0868 and the present one are both civil in nature
and therefore no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the two actions,36 it is apparent
that the former action was instituted merely to frustrate the Court's ruling in the case at bar granting
the respondent the right to possess the subject property. It is but a canny and preemptive maneuver
on the part of the petitioner to delay, if not prevent, the execution of a judgment adverse to his
interests. It bears stressing that the complaint for mandamus was filed only on May 7, 1998, sixteen
days after the lower court granted respondent's petition and thirteen days after it issued the writ. It
cannot then possibly prejudice a decided case.

At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be
considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to
have the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagor's successor-in-interest (petitioner): while
that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired.
The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction
independent of each other.

III.

Having disposed of the jurisdictional and procedural issues, we now come to the merits of the case.
Petitioner seeks intervention in this case by virtue of the lease agreement and the deed of
assignment executed in his favor by the mortgagor (Vargas) and an alleged buyer (Angsico) of the
land, respectively. He posits that as a lessee and assignee in possession of the foreclosed real estate,
he automatically acquires interest over the subject matter of the litigation. This interest is coupled
with the fact that he introduced improvements thereon, consisting of a one-storey building which
houses a karaoke-music restaurant, allegedly to the tune of fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000.00).
Enforcing the writ, he adds, without hearing his side would be an injustice to him.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceeding,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceeding.37 The pertinent provision is stated in Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
"SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding."38

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutory
conditions for the right to intervene is shown.39 Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion
to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.40 In determining the propriety of
letting a party intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a person
(1) has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of either of the parties; (3)
or an interest against both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof."41 Just as
important, as we have stated in Big Country Ranch Corporation v. Court of Appeals,42 is the
function to consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected
in a separate proceeding.

The period within which a person may intervene is also restricted. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure requires:

"SECTION 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before the
rendition of judgment by the trial court, x x x"

After the lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore. This is because, basically,
intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing
litigation.43

Taking into account these fundamental precepts, we rule that the petitioner may not properly
intervene in the case at bar. His insistence to participate in the proceeding is an unfortunate case
of too little, too late.

In the first place, petitioner's Ex-parte Permission to File a Motion to Intervene was submitted to
the RTC only on June 25, 1998. At that stage, the lower court had already granted respondent's
petition for the writ in an Order dated April 21, 1998. It had issued the Writ of Possession on April
24, 1998. Petitioner's motion then was clearly out of time, having been filed only at the execution
stage. For that reason alone, it must meet the consequence of denial. While it is true that on May
8, 1998, Vargas and S. Villanueva Enterprises moved to quash the writ, that did not in any way
affect the nature of the RTC's Order as an adjudication on the merits. The issuance of the Order is
in essence a rendition of judgment within the purview of Section 2, Rule 19.

Allowing petitioner to intervene, furthermore, will serve no other purpose but to unduly delay the
execution of the writ, to the prejudice of the respondent. This cannot be countenanced considering
that after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right.44 Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.45 As such, the court neither exercises its official
discretion nor judgment.46 If only to stress the writ's ministerial character, we have, in previous
cases, disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance,47 just as we have held that issuance of the
same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.48

Even if he anchors his intervention on the purported interest he has over the land and the
improvements thereon, petitioner, still, should not be allowed to do so. He admits that he is a mere
lessee and assignee. Whatever possessory rights he holds only emanate from that of Vargas, from
whom he leased the lot, and from whom his assignor/predecessor-in-interest bought it. Therein lies
the precariousness of his title. Petitioner cannot validly predicate his supposed interest over the
property in litigation on that of Vargas, for the simple reason that as early as December 4, 1985,
the latter has already been stripped of all her rights over the land when she, as mortgagor, failed to
redeem it. A mortgagor has only one year within which to redeem her foreclosed real estate. 49
After that period, she loses all her interests over it. This is in consonance with Section 78 of the
General Banking Act, 50 viz.:

"x x x In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real
estate which is security for any loan granted before the passage of this Act or the provisions of this
Act, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold at public auction, judicially or
extrajudicially, for the full or partial payment of an obligation to any bank, banking or credit
institution, within the purview of this Act shall have the right, within one year after the sale of the
real estate mortgage as a result of the foreclosure of the respective mortgage, to redeem the
property by paying the amount fixed by the court in the order or execution x x x"51 (emphasis
supplied.)

Being herself bereft of valid title and rights, Vargas can not legitimately convey any to some other
person. She could not have lawfully sold the land to Angsico nor leased it to petitioner for her own
account. It is axiomatic that one can not transmit what one does not have.52 It ought to follow that
petitioner could not have acquired any right or interest from Vargas.

Withal, all is not lost for the petitioner. He can still fully protect his rights in Civil Case No. 98-
0868 or the complaint for mandamus he filed before Branch 231 of the Pasay City RTC. There, he
can ventilate his side to a fuller extent as that would be the more appropriate venue for elucidating
whatever legal basis he alleges in compelling the respondent to sell to him the currently disputed
land.

IV.

This brings us to petitioner's final point. He briefly asserts that his act of entering into a lease
contract with the respondent should not affect his right to redeem the subject property.

The possible legal implication of the lease on the petitioner's act of trying to redeem the disputed
lot is a question which, in our opinion, can best be resolved in the mandamus complaint. Whether
the agreement must be construed as a waiver on his part of exercising his purported right of
redemption is an issue best left for the court therein to decide. Whether by acknowledging the
legality of the respondent's claim and title over the land at the time of the execution of the contract,
he likewise perpetually barred himself from redeeming the same is a matter which can be addressed
most aptly in that pending action. Hence, there is presently no need for us to squarely rule on this
ultimate point.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to disturb the assailed Decision, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May
31, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set
aside the January 23, 2001 order 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondent's motion for deferment of arraignment.

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz, 4 represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443
square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599
in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was
previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the
representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.

In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the
subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to
respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is
not on file with the Register of Deeds.

In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and
Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return
the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an
action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc,
Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John
Does. 5 Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various
transactions involving TCT No. 687599.

On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for "Damages and
Attachment," docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. 6 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency
of Civil Case No. SCA 1759. 7

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed
against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite. 8

On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial
question, i. e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381. 9 On January 27, 2000,
the trial court denied respondent's motion.

A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001. 10

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the
arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case. 11 The Court of Appeals granted
respondent's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March
19, 2001. 12

On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the, trial
court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal
case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been
finally decided.

Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition
seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA
1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial
question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 13

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. 14

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An
agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even
if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow
that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated
differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price
plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his
guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other. 15 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may
the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People, 16 the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor
of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a
civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted
of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid
and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in
abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was
necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of
the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the
trial court and ruled that:
. . . the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action
based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor
of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial
No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability
of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of
the Revised Penal Code . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question
is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the
criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both
the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the
new Civil Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore,
the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made
with "grave abuse of discretion."

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial in
Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

SO ORDERED.

KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66
of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 20072 and July 14, 20083 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007
Orders4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was
no prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions against petitioner.

The following facts are established:

Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioner’s late
father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate
of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of Pasig City.5 Petitioner initially opposed6
Rosemary’s petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a
compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for approval.7 In a Decision8 dated
November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine
Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment
Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.9 Peter and Catherine
claimed that they are also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the
settlement of the latter’s estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise
claimed to be a biological child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her,
filed a petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgment.10

Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions
pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate. Rosemary, their elder sister, promised to take care
of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided
by law. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get
a disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached
and as far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate. They were
not aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that
a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had
falsely averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of
Bella. In petitioner’s opposition, it was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the
only heirs of Bella. The subsequent compromise agreement contained similar averments, and it
was not disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only sometime
in June 2004 that they came to know of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City
RTC.

Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers11 to the petition for annulment of judgment and the
petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew, the three (3) were literally purchased from third
persons who represented to Bella and the latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they
were abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as
their own. This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and
Fannie in order to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children.
However, Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the
rights of legitimate children.

While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed
a complaint12 for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that
petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the
RTC of Pasig City that the late Bella had only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner
and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the ground
of a pending prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals.13 They argued that the issue of
whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was
pending before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and
found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of falsification of
public documents.14 The prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity
of the compromise agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the
liability of petitioner and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false
statements in the opposition to the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent
compromise agreement filed before the RTC of Pasig City.

On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations15 against petitioner and Rosemary were thus filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.

Petitioner filed a petition for review16 with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer
proceedings17 before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also,
petitioner and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the
ground of prejudicial question.18 However, petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,19 while
her motions before the MeTC were denied by the said court.20 The MeTC agreed with the
prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is
the validity of the compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for
falsification of public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.21

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition22 with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 66. In an Order23 dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on the ground
that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial
question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the
quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration24 was also denied by the RTC in its Order25 dated March
9, 2007.1avvphi1

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC’s orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution,26 the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner’s
counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in
the July 14, 2008 Resolution27 of the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner alleges that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-
FORUM SHOPPING WAS SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF SEC.
3, RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1 RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE

ASSAILED ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON THE
GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.28

The petition is meritorious.

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions
for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.29
The primary question that has to be resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance.30

Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping

does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.31 A certification of the
plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who
is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition.32 A
certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent
to non-compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the
petition.33

However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality,
especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the
rule clearly unjustified.34

In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,35 while we said that, strictly, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed
by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of
the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the
same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.36

In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,37 we categorically stated that while the petition was flawed as the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, such
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.38 Finally, the Court has
also on occasion held that the party need not sign the verification; a party’s representative, lawyer
or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the
verification.39

Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel.
Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-compliance
with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification
and certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule.40 We deem this to be sufficient
compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered as a special
circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard consequence of the
procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.41

On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s prayer
for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner.

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may
be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that
said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.42 The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.43

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the criminal case," the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.44 Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.45

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a
prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case
are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the
civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222
pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the
compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter,
Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella
and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve
the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing
pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of
Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the petitioner
in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the
claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally
adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently
not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal
cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before
the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and
Fannie having been judicially settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 and July 14,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The criminal proceedings against petitioner Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case
Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are hereby
ordered SUSPENDED until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.