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HANDBOOK
MISSIONS
AND OPERATIONS
edited by
Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume
with forewords by
H. E. Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and Vice-President of the Commission
and
H. E. Gerald Klug
Federal Minister of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria
Disclaimer:
Imprint:
Publication of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria
Published by: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria
Rossauer Lände 1, 1090 Vienna/Austria
Photo credits for the front page: European Union/EUTM Somalia, European Union/EUCAP Nestor, European Union/
EUPM, European Union/EUNAVFOR Somalia, European Union/EUFOR Althea, Sonia Khoudja
Printed and bound by: Printed according to the Austrian Ecolabel for printed matter,
Armed Forces Printing Centre, Vienna/Austria, 2015 Austrian Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports/
BMLVS 15-9999 Armed Forces Printing Centre, UW-Nr. 943
ISBN: 978-3-902275-42-4
2
Contents
1 BACKGROUND
1.1. The rationale for CSDP.......................................................................................................... 12
1.1.1. Development of CFSP/CSDP (Jochen Rehrl).............................................................. 12
1.1.2. Je parle donc je suis? The raison d’être of the CSDP (Sven Biscop)............................... 18
3
2.2.2. Human rights and rule of law (Richard Winkelhofer)................................................. 116
2.2.3. Strategic Communication – Crisis Response Information
Activities (CRIA) (Vicente Diaz de Villegas)............................................................... 120
2.2.4. Law of armed conflict and rules of engagement (Michael Pesendorfer)....................... 126
2.2.5. International criminal law and transitional justice
(Sari Kouvo and Christian Behrmann) ...................................................................... 133
2.2.6. Protection of civilians (Vincenzo de Benedictis).......................................................... 137
2.2.7. Anti-corruption (Raluca Stefanuc)............................................................................. 141
2.2.8. Public diplomacy (Victor Reuter)............................................................................... 148
2.2.9. Gender and the UNSCR 1325
Women, peace and security agenda (Sari Kouvo)....................................................... 153
2.2.10. Conflict sensitivity – Why and how do I need to engage
differently in a situation of conflict and fragility?...................................................... 158
4
3 Capabilities
3.1. Capability Development ..................................................................................................... 236
3.1.1. Military capability development (Paul van der Heijden)............................................ 236
3.1.2. Civilian capability development (Nina Antolovic Tovornik)........................................ 241
4.3. The EU’s unique strength in preventing conflicts and managing crises (Gabor Iklódy)....... 272
4.4. The challenges of CSDP Command and Control (Wolfgang Wosolsobe)............................... 276
ANNEXES
Authors.................................................................................................................................. 284
List of abbreviations............................................................................................................... 295
5
Foreword
6
Foreword
7
Foreword by the editors
The European Security Strategy of 2003 states In mid-2014, when we launched the process
that that culminated in the publication of this hand-
book, we were able to call upon a wide range of
“Our task is to promote a ring of well governed able and willing contributors from the EU institu-
countries to the East of the European Union and tions and academia. Over time, we increased the
on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom number of articles and authors so as to provide
we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.” an even more comprehensive and up-to-date over-
view and, as a result, we have ended up with 57
In the light of the current circumstances – the contributions from 54 different experts (33 male
aftermath of the Arab Spring, in particular the and 21 female). Owing to their different profes-
difficult situation in Libya, the Syrian crisis and sional backgrounds, we were able to cover topics
the rise of ISIL/ISIS, the Ukrainian conflict and such as counter-terrorism, hybrid warfare, stra-
the resulting frictions with Russia – do we now tegic communications and maritime security, all
have to admit that we have failed in our efforts to issues which are currently on the agendas of high-
achieve our strategic objectives? level meetings.
The present handbook was put together at a Specific emphasis has been placed on operational
time of geopolitical tsunamis in Europe and on its aspects of the Common Security and Defence
doorstep, including the ongoing terrorist threat, Policy, which will ensure added value for our col-
financial austerity in the EU Member States and leagues working in theatre. Such work would not
global health crises (e.g. Ebola). Each generation be possible without the help and assistance of many
faces its own challenges, and we can only confront individuals and departments working behind the
those challenges by keeping our feet firmly on the scenes: We are therefore delighted to be able to
ground, accepting cultural differences, following a publicly thank the following for their support:
step-by-step approach, and strongly engaging with • the English editing service of the General Secre
each other in a spirit of “solidarity”. The CSDP tariat of the Council for providing us with edi-
and the other EU crisis management instruments torial suggestions and for carrying out a final
have a crucial role to play in tackling crises and linguistic check on the text, in particular Shauna
conflicts; together they can provide the key, in Doherty, Serena Dyer-Meenenga, Sophie Etse,
the context of the EU’s long-term endeavour to Andy Flower, Roger Greenwood, Maurice
promote peace, stability and security, to finding Hannon, Michael Harris, Laura Hayes, Jane
solutions in a way that is collaborative, fitted to Keates, Tim Nicolas, Úna O’Connor, Melanie
the circumstances and comprehensive. Saville, and William Spurgeon;
8
• the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports • all other colleagues who, through their advice
of the Republic of Austria, in particular the and support, made this project possible – both
Directorate for Security Policy headed by from the field and at headquarters, especially
Brigadier Dr. Johann Frank; Oliver Rentschler, Bert Versmessen, Laura Di
• the Austrian Armed Forces Printing Centre for Rosa, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, Thomas Fronek,
its continued support in relation to layout and Walter Matyas, Alin Bodescu, Mercedes Gar-
administration, especially Mr Axel Scala and cia-Perez, Birgit Loeser, Gilles Janvier and
Ms Eva Kutika; Kęstutis Jankauskas;
• our colleagues at the European Security and • finally our families, in particular Bernadeta,
Defence College, in particular Charlotta Ahl- Julia and Maximilian.
mark, Pavlina Gorenc, Mario Marmo, Valen- We hope that this handbook will help spread the
tina Reynoso, Petteri Taitto, Symeon Zambas, word about the Common Security and Defence
Hans-Bernhard Weisserth (outgoing Head of Policy of the European Union and thereby con-
the ESDC) and Dirk Dubois (incoming Head tribute to deepening our common European se-
of the ESDC); curity culture.
Photo: Harald Minich/Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports
9
1 BACKGROUND
11
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
To write about history is always difficult, par- In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) codi-
ticularly when it comes to finding the right entry fied European Political Cooperation. That cooper-
and exit points. One must, of course, mention ation was the forerunner of the European Union’s
important politicians, thinkers and visionaries Common Foreign and Security Policy, which
such as Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan entered into force through the Treaty of Maas-
Willem Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De tricht on 1 November 1993. With this treaty, the
Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean goal proclaimed in 1957 of an “ever closer Union”
Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak and was achieved, although not entirely as envisaged
Altiero Spinelli. One of their visions was an “ever by the founding fathers, whose model of Euro-
closer Union”, which would include security and pean Integration was more supranational.
defence aspects. This idea was manifested in the With the Treaty of Maastricht, both the “Com-
plan to establish a “European Defence Commu- mon Foreign and Security Policy” and “Justice and
nity” (EDC), which failed in 1954. Home Affairs” remained intergovernmental, hence
Nevertheless, the development of an economic, led by the Member States. In the foreign and security
financial, political and security community in policy, reality on the ground – in this case the process
Europe was driven by of Yugoslavia’s disintegration – was the driving force
• a step-by-step approach, taking into account that deepened cooperation. In 1997, the so-called
national sensitivities; “Petersberg tasks”, an exemplary list of possible mis-
• a process of continuous enlargement; sion scenarios, were incorporated in the Amsterdam
• the geopolitical environment with its obstacles, Treaty. But at that time, the underlying idea was still
challenges and windows of opportunity; to rely on the Western European Union (WEU)
• the political will of the EU Member States. to further develop a common security and defence
Another milestone in the development of a com- policy. Mutual assistance was to be “granted” via the
mon foreign and security policy was the so-called obligation resulting from the NATO Treaty.
Davignon report of the late 60s. The report, Amsterdam also created a very important and
which was written by a council chaired by Étienne forward-looking position, which would be instru-
Davignon of the Belgian Foreign Office, included mental in the development of security and defence
proposals on political cooperation between the policy: The High Representative for the Common
Member States. The recommendations stated that Foreign and Security Policy. Javier Solana, former
the Member States should “try to speak with a sin- Spanish minister for Foreign Affairs and former
gle voice on international problems”. Nowadays this Secretary General of NATO, held this post from
paradigm has slightly shifted and the focus is on 18 October 1999 until 1 December 2009 (when
“delivering one message”. the Lisbon Treaty entered into force).
12
1 BACKGROUND
In October 1998 at the informal European Council in Pörtschach/Austria, the then new UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair made a first official statement favoring a European Security and Defence Policy
In the picture, 1st row: Antonio Guterres (PT), Tony Blair (UK), Jacques Santer (EU), Martti Ahtisaari (FI),
Viktor Klima (AT), Jacques Chirac (FR), Gerhard Schröder (DE), Paavo Lipponen (FI), Lionel Jospin (FR);
2nd row: Jean-Claude Juncker (LU), Bertie Ahern (IE), Constantine Simitis (GR), José Maria Aznar (ES),
Göran Persson (SE), Jean-Luc Dehaene (BE), Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (DK), Massimo D’Alema (IT), Wim Kok (NL)
After the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1998 position on this subject, which was summarised in
(Kosovo crisis) and facilitated by a political change a press conference after the meeting as follows:
in the United Kingdom, the EU Member States “…in respect of common foreign and security pol-
decided to establish an independent “Common icy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK
European Security and Defence Policy” (known obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger for-
at the time by the acronym ESDP, which changed eign policy and security role. This will arise partic-
to CSDP with the Lisbon Treaty). At a NATO ularly because we are going to be appointing two
summit in 1998, the then US Secretary of State, people to common foreign and security positions in
Ms Madeleine Albright, contributed to the dis- the European Union in the next few months so it
cussion about an autonomous European security is something that is very much on our minds but
and defence policy with her famous “three D’s”: we are all agreed it was important that Europe
no diminution of NATO, no discrimination and should be able to play a better, more unified part
no duplication; the latter was understood by the in foreign and security policy decisions … A com-
Europeans as no “unnecessary” duplication, as mon foreign and security policy for the European
clearly stated in the Helsinki Conclusions of 1999. Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and
Nevertheless, during the Austrian EU Presidency it is high time we got on with trying to engage
in the second half of 1998, the informal European with formulating it and I think that people were
Council in Pörtschach, Southern Austria, on 24 pleased that Britain came to this with an open
and 25 October gave the former UK Prime Minis- mind and was willing to participate in the debate
ter Tony Blair the possibility to state Britain’s new and I think it is important that we do that.”
13
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Only one week later, on 3 and 4 November, the • comprehensive: “military and non-military crisis
defence ministers of the European Union con- management capability”;
vened for an informal meeting in Vienna. Both • based on the principles of the United Na-
events paved the way for the bilateral meeting of tions Charter and recognising the primary
France and Britain in Saint Malo, which is seen by responsibility of the United Nations Security
many scholars as the birth of the European Secu- Council;
rity and Defence Policy. • autonomous capacity to take decisions and to
Various European Council meetings after the launch and conduct EU-led military opera-
turbulent second half of 1998 started to establish tions in response to international crises.
the Common European Security and Defence The latter was modified from a reactive measure
Policy. The first meeting with clear guidance on (“in response”) to a preventive tool through the
ESDP was held on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne. European Security Strategy in 2003. The magic
In the Council conclusions, emphasis was given sentence for describing the relationship between
to the “the Union’s and Member States’ non-military EU’s autonomous military capabilities and
crisis response tools” besides the military aspects. NATO’s crisis management ambitions concluded
On 10 and 11 December 1999, the European “where NATO as a whole is not engaged”. But to
Council in Helsinki underlined the – still valid – date, cooperation between the CSDP and NATO
basic principles underpinning the European structures has been limited – although not so
understanding of an autonomous security and much between their respective staff, but more on
defence policy for the EU: a political level.
14
1 BACKGROUND
The European Council in Helsinki also stated a a level of ambition for the civilian side of crisis
level of ambition for the military aspects, namely management, focussing on police capabilities: by
“to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 2003, the EU Member States should be able
1 year military forces of up to 50 000-60 000 per- “to provide up to 5 000 police officers for interna-
sons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks”. tional missions across the range of conflict preven-
These capabilities should be ready to use by 2003. tion and crisis management operations [… and]
The European Council further agreed that to be able to identify and deploy up to 1 000
“new political and military bodies and structures police officers within 30 days”.
will be established within the Council”. The Nice Treaty of 2000 legitimised the newly
And finally, new emphasis was given to the non- established crisis management structures within
military crisis management in order the Council, in particular the Political and Secu-
“to coordinate and make more effective the various rity Committee, the EU Military Committee and
civilian means and resources […] at the disposal the EU Military Staff. Additionally, the former
of the Union and the Member States”. WEU agencies were transformed via Council Joint
On 19 and 20 June 2000, the European Coun- Actions in 2001 into EU agencies: EU Institute for
cil in Feira set four priority areas for the civilian Security Studies in Paris and EU Satellite Centre in
aspects of the EU’s crisis management: (1) Police, Torrejon. In 2004, the European Defence Agency
(2) Rule of Law, (3) Civil Administration and (4) in Brussels was created in order to facilitate the
Civil Protection. Later, these four areas were sup- process of developing military capability. This com-
plemented by (5) Monitoring and (6) Support to pleted the structure of agencies currently in place to
EU Special Representatives. Feira also formulated support the Common Security and Defence Policy.
15
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
NATO Photo
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (left) and Dr. Javier Solana, European Union High Represen
tative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, announcing the Berlin plus arrangement in late 2002
During the Laeken Summit from 14 to between the EU Member States, Javier Solana
15 December 2001, the Heads of State or Gov- took the initiative to reunite the European coun-
ernment declared that tries by providing a European Security Strategy.
“the Union is now capable of conducting some The ESS was first presented and discussed at the
crisis-management operations.” Council meeting in Thessaloniki during Greece’s
However, the launch of the first ESDP mission EU presidency. In December 2003, the document
(EU Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) was agreed by all EU Member States. In 2008, a
took another year and the military had to wait “Report on the Implementation of the European
until the Berlin plus arrangement with NATO Security Strategy” with the subtitle “Providing
was finalised on 17 March 2003. Security in a Changing World” updated the ESS
In the same year, the US administration, spe- to a certain extent, but did not replace or revise it.
cifically the then Secretary of Defence Donald The report mentioned new threats such as piracy
Rumsfeld, tried to separate the Europeans by and cybercrime, complementing the strategic
dividing them into a new and an old Europe. basis for the EU’s activities.
The trigger was the dispute over the invasion During the disputes in 2003, four EU Mem-
of Iraq, which was not UN-mandated and was ber States (Germany, France, Belgium and Lux-
disapproved of in particular by Germany and embourg) met and discussed options to further
France. In the US’ view, the old Europe was rep- improve the functioning of the European Union.
resented by the countries against the war and the One famous outcome was the discussion on an
new Europe constituted by the supporters of the “EU military Headquarters” in Tervuren, Bel-
US intervention. gium. This plan was immediately rejected by the
Faced with what was a severe strategic dispute United Kingdom and a few other countries. Nev-
16
1 BACKGROUND
Photo: European Communities, 2009/ Georges Boulougouris
ertheless, as a compromise, an operations centre flag, but also genuinely effective in managing cri-
was created within the EU Military Staff, which ses. Several new headline goals, an improved capa-
could grow into a fully fledged OHQ if agreed bility development plan for both the military and
unanimously among EU Member States. Another the civilian side, the creation of a civilian head-
point for consideration was the establishment of quarters (CPCC) in August 2007 and the estab-
a European Security and Defence College, which lishment of a Crisis Management and Planning
actually happened in July 2005. Directorate (CMPD) in 2009 showed that inno-
In 2004, the work on a “Treaty establishing vation and speed can – to a certain extent – over-
a Constitution for Europe” was finalised and come a political deadlock.
the EU Member States signed the document With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
on 29 October 2004 in Rome. This document on 1 December 2009, the ten-year-era of Javier
brought with it some important new elements Solana ended and the five-year-era of Catherine
for CFSP/CSDP, including a “Union Minister Ashton started. She was the first High Represent-
for Foreign Affairs” and a “mutual assistance ative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
clause”. rity Policy and at the same time Vice-President
However, the Treaty was rejected by France of the Commission. With the European External
and the Netherlands; hence, it was never ratified Action Service, she had a valuable and compe-
and never entered into force. The “mutual assis- tent tool at her disposal to significantly enhance
tance clause” survived unchanged the following the coherence and consistency of the EU’s for-
debates, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” eign affairs and security policy work.
was renamed “High Representative of the Union To date, the European Union counts around
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. 140 EU Delegations, around 35 terminated or
The failure to ratify the “Treaty establishing a ongoing CSDP missions and operations, work-
Constitution for Europe” was followed by a long ing structures, good policy frameworks (e.g. the
period of reflection, which only came to an end in comprehensive approach), various partnerships
2009. During this time, there was little movement and useful intra- und inter-institutional com-
on the foreign and security policy. But thanks to munication with some room for improvement.
the personal engagement of the High Representa- Federica Mogherini took office in 2014 as the
tive, the security and defence policy became a new High Representative and Vice President.
priority area within the second pillar. Several suc- With a new head, a good staff and functioning
cessful missions around the world proved that the structures, new and positive developments in the
EU’s crisis management was not only able to show area of CFSP and CSDP lie ahead of us.
17
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Does anyone remember the original reason end, the European Council defined the Headline
why the European, now Common Security and Goal: the ambition to deploy up to a corps-size
Defence Policy (first ESDP, now CSDP) was cre- formation (50 000 to 60 000 troops), within one
ated? or two months, and to sustain it for at least one
It was certainly not so that the European Union year. However, the Headline Goal was last heard
(EU) could have just one or two battlegroups on of during the 2008 French EU Presidency and
stand-by. Ever since the battlegroup scheme was has been completely overshadowed by the battle-
launched, it has been a dominant theme in the groups. But even if the battlegroup scheme worked
deliberations on the CSDP. And it risks remaining as desired, would that really greatly increase the
so for a long time, for it presents a problem that EU’s capacity to act? In which of the crises going
cannot be solved. No matter how much the EU on at the time of writing (Ukraine, Syria, Iraq,
tries to perfect the scheme, the actual deployment Libya, Mali …) would deploying a battalion-size
of a battlegroup will always be a matter of coin- battlegroup make a difference?
cidence: when a crisis occurs, does it fit the inter- Clearly, the original raison d’être of the CSDP
ests and political will of the Member States whose needs to be brought back to the attention of
forces happen to be on stand-by? Unless com- today’s political, diplomatic and military deci-
mand authority over the battlegroups on stand-by sion-makers.
is transferred to the Council, which could then Unfortunately, ambiguity about the raison
decide on deployment by a majority vote, this is d’être was precisely the mechanism that made
an insoluble conundrum. And thus the debate can the CSDP possible in the first place. The CSDP
go on and on – the perfect excuse not to have to is a Franco-British creation (something which the
talk about the actual objective of the CSDP. latter need to be reminded of more than the for-
At the inception of the CSDP, Member States mer). In 1998, at their annual bilateral meeting,
were much more ambitious. “To develop an held that year in Saint-Malo, the UK and France
autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where agreed to try and stimulate capability develop-
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and ment by launching a European scheme. For Brit-
conduct EU-led military operations in response to ain, the primary framework in which strategy
international crises”: this was the purpose agreed would be set and decisions made on when and
upon by the European Council in Helsinki in where to use those capabilities, remained NATO.
1999. The definition of the “Petersberg Tasks” in France believed that European capability develop-
the Treaty on European Union made clear that ment should also lead to autonomous European
this included peace enforcement, i.e. war, along- operations, outside the framework of NATO.
side classic peacekeeping, military assistance, Rather than eventually resolving itself, that
evacuation, and humanitarian support. To this fundamental ambiguity has continued to handi-
18
1 BACKGROUND
cap the CSDP, which has never enjoyed the full be needed to translate excellent intelligence and
support of all Member States. The end result is awareness into policy options for the full range
that it has never reached its full potential in either of EU external action, civilian and military. The
dimension: capability development or operations. result is a decision-making structure that certainly
An elaborate process was conceived to fulfil works for operations planned long in advance and
the Headline Goal, and the European Defence even, if Member States want it to, for rapid reac-
Agency (EDA) was set up to urge Member States tion. But that structure’s lack of planning capacity
to invest in collective solutions for the prior- means that it is not in itself systematically proac-
ity shortfalls. But by depriving the EDA of the tive enough to make the EU the platform of choice
budget to initiate projects itself, capitals have for addressing urgent security crises. Indeed, when
ensured that capability development remains force has to be used, Member States, even those
an almost entirely bottom-up process, nearly who regularly stress that the CSDP covers the full
completely reliant on national initiative and spectrum of military operations, rarely choose to
hence protective of national industrial interests. deploy under the EU flag, but systematically opt
Even so, the CSDP remains the most promis- for NATO or coalitions of the willing when fight-
ing avenue for collective European capability ing is expected.
development. The European Commission can In the end, it boils down again to the issue of
be increasingly involved, certainly in research the raison d’être: What do the nations of Europe
but even in actual (dual-use) projects. Today really want to be able to do in security and
though that is evident more because nations’ defence? And how much of that do they want to
performance in other frameworks is even more do through the CSDP?
meagre than because of the CSDP’s own achieve- While Europeans themselves may remain
ments. Collective capability development has undecided, the United States does not. Seen from
never been NATO’s forte. Instead, the NATO Washington, there is only one potential strategic
Defence Planning Process (NDPP) generates competitor for the US: China. Hence the “pivot”
national targets, while the organisation’s Smart of American strategy. That pivot hinges on Europe:
Defence initiative never really took off. Pooling the more Europeans can take care of their own
and Sharing between Member States in regional business, the more confidently the US can focus
clusters complements but cannot replace the on Asia. And there is no want of business, as both
EDA’s efforts, for no cluster can achieve the criti- Europe’s eastern and southern neighbourhood are
cal mass required to develop strategic enablers. in turmoil. Therefore the US does not only want
EDA projects have started (on air-to-air refuel- Europeans to contribute to conventional deter-
ling, satellite communication, drones and cyber rence under NATO’s Article 5 and to American-
defence), but for these to produce new platforms led crisis management operations. In non-Article
and more capability, many more Member States 5 scenarios around Europe, Washington expects
will have to invest a lot more money – and these Europeans themselves to initiate and lead crisis
are just some of the priority shortfalls. management in their periphery, preferably at an
Elaborate institutions were also established to early stage, when a crisis has not yet escalated and
allow the EU to launch military operations and can still be contained without relying too heavily
civilian missions – but not an operational head- on American assets. In other words, those Mem-
quarters, hence command and control of the ber States that are still seeking to please the US
military operations has to be outsourced to either by curbing the development of the CSDP would
NATO or a Member State. Nor has the EU been be well advised to note that Washington is now
endowed with even sufficient planning capacity actively promoting European strategic autonomy,
for the permanent prudent planning that would i.e. crisis management without the US. Under
19
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
which flag they do it, the US doesn’t care, as long and to forge the coalition that can do it. When
as they do it. So whether it be NATO, the CSDP military action is decided upon, more often than
or an ad hoc coalition that takes charge, it will not the NATO command structure will then be
increasingly have to be Europeans who take the called for to conduct the operation.
initiative. The military capabilities which these responsi-
The strategic situation thus ought to compel bilities for non-Article 5 scenarios require should
Europeans to revive their original ambition for also be defined by the EU. The CSDP mecha-
autonomy and to reassess the role of the various nisms are more than fit for that purpose. At the
foundations of the European security architecture: very least, Europeans ought to be able to achieve
the EU and its CSDP, NATO, and the nations. the Headline Goal autonomously within their
Ultimately there is only one security architecture neighbourhood, i.e. to be able to deploy up to a
and the issue is not which part of it does what, corps relying on European enablers only. Incor-
but whether what has to be done gets done, with porating this European level of ambition into the
maximum effectiveness and efficiency. NDPP will allow the European Allies and part-
The EU is best placed to answer the big strate- ners/EU Member States to design a capability
gic question: which responsibilities does Europe mix that enables them to meet both their collec-
want to assume as a security actor outside its tive defence obligations and their expeditionary
borders? For that is a function of overall foreign requirements. These capabilities can be developed
policy, including trade, development and diplo- and acquired through collective European projects
macy as well as defence, which only the EU’s under the aegis of the EDA (certainly for the stra-
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in tegic enablers, which will in turn enable a viable
close coordination with the Commission, covers European defence industry) in combination with
in a comprehensive manner. This much is certain: radical pooling of assets in regional clusters so as
Europeans must take the lead in stabilising their to eliminate all redundancies. Ensuring operabil-
own broad neighbourhood, stretching out into ity among Europeans and between European and
the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and even the other Allies and partners through manoeuvres is
Gulf, and into the Caucasus and perhaps Central again a task for NATO.
Asia – for if they don’t, nobody else is likely to do Finally, NATO’s collective defence of course
it for them. That includes their maritime borders, remains the ultimate guarantee of Europe’s secu-
but as a global trading power Europe must also rity. But it should be seen as such: an ultimate
contribute to global maritime security, notably guarantee. Before considering what reassurance
in Asia. And as a defender of rules-based interna- they can seek from the US, Europeans ought first
tional order, it must contribute when the United to think of what contribution they can make to
Nations decide to act if the rules are broken. For global security. All of this will require a profound
the same reason – the comprehensiveness of its strategic debate among Europeans. But the world
external action – the EU ought to be the default will not stop while they deliberate. Ultimately, the
platform for crisis management in an actual con- raison d’être of the European security architecture
tingency: to assess what is happening, to decide and of the CSDP in particular is not its ability to
how important it is, to settle what has to be done, talk about security, but to deliver security.
20
1 BACKGROUND
Since the European Union was declared oper- The crisis management structures of the EU
ational at the Laeken Council in 2001, crisis rely on both:
management structures in support of the Com- • bodies composed of representatives from the
mon Security and Defence policy (CSDP) have EU Member States, and
developed significantly. The increasing recourse • CSDP structures and other entities within the
to CSDP missions and operations – 34 were EU organisation.
launched since 2003 – demanded further institu-
tional development, to support the planning and
conduct of missions and operations, but also to Bodies composed of
support decision-making at the political and stra- representatives from EU
tegic level. The structures initially provided at the Member States
outset of CSDP (namely the Political and Secu-
rity Committee, the EU Military Staff and the EU The European Council consists of the Heads
Military Committee – but also the Committee for of State or Government of the EU Member States
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management) were com- and defines the general political direction and
plemented by the establishment of advisory bod- priorities of the European Union. It is chaired
ies and Council working groups, integrated stra- by a president who is elected for 2.5 years. Mr
tegic planning, and further command and control Donald Tusk, former prime minister of Poland,
options – including a permanent headquarters for currently holds the post, having succeeded Mr
civilian CSDP missions. The establishment of the Herman Van Rompuy, former prime minister of
European External Action Service in 2011 gave Belgium.
greater coherence to the EU’s external action, In December 2013, the European Coun-
both by bringing together these structures and cil met to discuss specifically on security and
by linking them to EU external policies – nota- defence issues and a follow up is envisaged for
bly through the thematic and geographic man- June 2015.
aging directorates. One key feature is that when Legally, there is only one Council. Neverthe-
it comes to CSDP missions and operations, the less, there are ten different Council configurations
final word rests with Member States. They define depending on the subject to be discussed. These
the general orientations of the Common Foreign are referred to as the Council of the European
and Security Policy (CFSP), and exercise political Union and are where the Member States’ govern-
control and set the strategic direction of CSDP ment representatives sit (in general at ministerial
missions and operations. level).
21
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
EU Heads of State and Government meet at the European Council on 12 January 2015, in Brussels.
The main topics are the conflict in Ukraine, counter terrorism and the economic situation
The “Foreign Affairs Council” (FAC) is specif- Coreper divides the ministerial agenda into
ically relevant for CFSP and CSDP. This Coun- three categories:
cil configuration has two distinguishing features • “I” points which are for information and no
compared to the other nine: a) The High Rep- ministerial decision is needed;
resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and • “A” points, where the decision can be made
Security Policy chairs it; and b) Only the FAC and without debate;
the General Affairs Council are explicitly men- • “B” points where debate is needed and the de-
tioned in the Treaty of Lisbon. cision may not be known in advance.
The Foreign Affairs Council can meet in the for- Council Decisions related to CSDP missions and
mat of ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and/or operations are – in general – categorised as “A”
Development. These ministers attend meetings to points.
discuss foreign policy, trade, security, defence and The Political and Security Committee (PSC),
development matters, meeting on a monthly basis which usually meets twice a week at ambassado-
and as the international situation demands. rial level, is the highest Council body to prepare
Nevertheless, due to the fact that the Council is decisions on CFSP/CSDP.
a single EU institution, all Council configurations The Committee monitors the international situ-
can decide on all issues. For example, in 2003 ation in the areas covered by CFSP and contributes
the military CSDP operation ARTEMIS was for- to the definition of policies by delivering opinions
mally decided (adopted as a Joint Action) by the to the Council. It also monitors the implementa-
ministers of justice in their Council configuration tion of agreed policies, without prejudice to the
“Justice and Home Affairs” (Council Joint Action powers of the High Representative. It exercises
2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003). political control and strategic direction of the EU’s
In preparation for Council meetings, Member crisis management operations, under the responsi-
States’ ambassadors meet in the Permanent Rep- bility of the Council and of the High Representa-
resentatives Committee (or Coreper, for Comité tive. The PSC plays a key role for CSDP by adopt-
des représentants permanents), which convenes in ing relevant conclusions, recommendations and
two formats. The one relevant for the Common decisions1. Missions and operations are discussed
Security and Defence Policy is Coreper II. in particular when their six-monthly reports are
22
1 BACKGROUND
issued, when their strategic reviews are conducted, provide advice and recommendations on all mili-
and when the Head of Mission/Operation Com- tary matters within the EU. The EUMC moni-
mander is to be appointed. The PSC also plays a tors the proper execution of the military mis-
key role in preparing a coherent EU response to sions/operations.
crises and prompting discussion with the relevant The Chairperson of the EUMC acts as the
EEAS crisis management bodies, when deemed primary point of contact with the EU Missions/
necessary or the situation so demands. The PSC is Operations Commander.
chaired by an EEAS representative. The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is a civil-
Three advisory bodies are responsible for giving ian/military meeting format that prepares and sup-
advice and recommendations to the ambassadors ports the work of the PSC. It covers the political
in the PSC, particularly in relation to CSDP mis- aspects of EU military and civil-military issues, pre-
sions and operations: pares Council conclusions, provides recommenda-
The European Union Military Committee tions for the PSC, contributes to the development
(EUMC) is the highest military body within the of (horizontal) policy and facilitates exchanges of
Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence information. The PMG is chaired by an EEAS rep-
of the Member States, who are represented by resentative.
their permanent military representatives. They
1 According to Article 38 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “the Council may authorise the PSC,
for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation, as determined by the Council, to take the relevant
decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation”.
23
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
On the civilian side, the Committee for Civil- It prepares the Council Decisions and related
ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) financial instruments allowing the deployment
takes responsibility for formulating recommen- of CSDP engagements before submitting them
dations and giving advice on civilian aspects of to the Council for adoption. This is done in close
crisis management to the PSC. In particular, it cooperation with the Foreign Policy Instrument
exercises its role with regards to civilian CSDP (FPI) – the Commission service implementing
missions’ planning and periodic reports as well the CFSP budget working under the authority
as the development of concepts for civilian cri- of the High Representative. RELEX is chaired
sis management. The Committee helps ensure a by a representative of the rotating presidency of
high degree of coherence in the civilian aspects of the Council.
EU crisis management, and promotes improve-
ments in the crisis response capabilities of the
EU. The CIVCOM is chaired by an EEAS rep- Entities within the EU
resentative. structures
In addition, the Working Party of Foreign
Relations Counsellors (RELEX) is responsi- The European External Action Service
ble for discussing the legal and financial aspects (EEAS) was created with the Treaty of Lisbon.
of CFSP and all of its instruments, including One of the key tasks of the EEAS is to ensure that
CSDP. As part of this work, it considers the all the different activities and policies that the EU
institutional, legal, logistical and budgetary conducts abroad – the EU’s external action – are
dimensions of CSDP missions and operations. consistent and effective. This is particularly impor-
24
1 BACKGROUND
tant because while there is one external action, decision to refocus, extend or terminate a given
many of the EU’s external policies are organised mandate. The CMPD is also in charge of devel-
across the EEAS and different divisions of the oping partnerships, policies, concepts, capabilities
European Commission. Since late 2014, Federica and training for both civilian and military missions
Mogherini has headed the European External and operations. It works under the political control
Action Service. She succeeded Catherine Ashton, and strategic direction of the Member States in the
who was the first High Representative and Vice PSC, acting under the responsibility of the Council
President of the European Commission after the of the EU and of the High Representative.
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Within her The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is the source
service, there are specific entities responsible for of collective military expertise within the EEAS. It
crisis management, called “Security Policy and works under the direction of the Chair of EUMC
CSDP structures”. The European Parliament has and under the authority of the High Representa-
the right to scrutinise the CSDP and to take the tive. The EUMS coordinates the military instru-
initiative of addressing the HR/VP and the Coun- ment as part of the EU comprehensive approach,
cil on it, in addition to exercising authority over with a particular focus on military missions and
the CFSP budget2. operations, as well as the creation of military capa-
bilities. Its enabling activity includes early warn-
Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
ing, situation assessment, strategic planning, com-
(CMPD)
munications and information systems, concept
development, training and education, and sup-
Director port to partnerships through military-to-military
relationships.
2 Twice a year, the European Parliament holds debates on progress in implementing the CFSP and the CSDP, and adopts
reports: one on the CFSP, drafted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and including elements relating to the CSDP
where necessary; and one on the CSDP, drafted by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Members of the European
Parliament also play an external role by conducting visits and fact finding missions, and in relation to election observation
missions.
25
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
26
1 BACKGROUND
by Jochen Rehrl
27
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
28
1 BACKGROUND
ticipation in EU-led crisis management missions/ Staff, directed and approved by the EUMC, will
operations”, arrangements for their participation provide an “Initiating Military Directive”, which
will be defined in a participation agreement. gives the Operation Commander clear guide-
This decision is also the starting point for the lines concerning the conduct of the operation.
strategic-operational planning, in which the crisis The operation plan, which describes in detail the
management structures within the EEAS may draft intent, conduct, strength and organisation of the
option papers. These papers illustrate the various mission or operation, is approved by the Council
military, civilian or police options, how best the (the RoE and RUoF are thereby authorised), and
mission can be accomplished. At that stage, the mil- the decision to launch the mission/operation is
itary Operation Commander should be appointed taken by the Council. Between these two Coun-
and integrated into the planning process. cil Decisions, a “core team” or “initial mission
Due to the permanent function of the CPCC capacity” may be sent to the theatre to prepare the
as the operational headquarters for all civilian ground for the deployment of the full mission/
missions, no specific appointment needs to take operation.
place. The CPCC director is the Civilian Opera-
tions Commander.
In this regard, the civilian side has a compara- Decision to launch
tive advantage vis-à-vis the military side, because a mission/operation
civilian missions have their permanent com-
mand and control structures within the CPCC As soon as the mission/operation is launched,
(although with a limited number of planners the deployment can start. Ideally well in
needed at the operational stage of planning). On advance, the force generation (same expres-
the military side, this task is somehow more dif- sion for both civilian and military) process will
ficult as the EU has various leadership options; have been conducted. In this process, Member
they can make use of the five available national States and partner countries are involved in
headquarters from France, Germany, Greece, filling personnel and capability gaps/require-
the United Kingdom or Italy. Under the Berlin+ ments. On the military side, one or more force
arrangements, the EU bodies can also make use of generation conferences will be held by the
the permanent NATO headquarters in Mons/Bel- Operation Headquarters selected. The process
gium. Another two options include the activation of filling the posts in the headquarters is called
of the Operation Centre within the EUMS or the “force manning”. On the civilian side, the force
merger of Operation HQ with the Force HQ to generation is conducted via “calls for contribu-
a Mission HQ, as happened with both training tions”. This mechanism was created for adver-
missions in Mali and Somalia. tising and requesting applications for mission
The Operation Commander establishes the posts from EU Member States and partner
concept of operations (CONOPS) and develops countries.
an operation plan (OPlan), keeping the Head Under the responsibility of the Council and of
of Mission/Force Commander closely involved. the High Representative, the Political and Secu-
The military operation plan will also include the rity Committee exercises political control and
request for defined “rules of engagements” (RoE). strategic direction of the CSDP mission/opera-
The same procedure applies to the civilian mission- tion. The comprehensive approach is imple-
specific rules on the use of force (RUoF), if need mented via regular contacts and cooperation. On
be, which will be an integral part of the OPLAN. the military side, the Chairman of the EUMC
In order to facilitate the process for the devel- acts as the primary point of contact with the EU
opment of an operation plan, the EU Military Mission/Operation Commander.
29
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Decision to refocus or
terminate a mission/operation
The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate plays a
crucial role in drafting the crisis management concept Any change in the mission mandate requires a
(in the picture: HR/VP Federica Mogherini and Director
new Council Decision. A mission can be termi-
CMPD, Gabor Iklódy)
nated through a Council Decision or when the
mandate expires and is not extended.
This political decision is taken on the basis of
the strategic review and bearing in mind possible
transition strategies.
PFCA ✓ ✓
CMC ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
MSOD
CSOD ✓ ✓
IMD ✓ ✓ ✓
Graphic: European External Action Service
CONOPS ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
OPLAN/
ROE-RUoF ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3 weeks 9 months 5 months 6 months 10 months
Planning in Reality
30
1 BACKGROUND
31
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Member States in the Political and Security Since 2007, the Civilian Planning and Con-
Committee (PSC) exercise the political control duct Capability (CPCC) has been the perma-
and strategic direction of both civilian and mili- nent headquarters for civilian CSDP missions.
tary crisis management missions and operations, The CPCC comprises about 70 staff, mostly EU
under the responsibility of the Council and of the civil servants and Seconded National Experts
High Representative. They are on top of the chain from EU Member States. The CPCC director is
of command. the CivOpsCdr, and is therefore mandated by the
The chain of command is the structure through Council to exercise command and control at stra-
which command instructions flow down from the tegic level for the operational planning (Concept
political to the strategic, operational and tactical of Operations and Operation Plan) and conduct
levels, and through which control is exercised by of all civilian CSDP missions, under the politi-
specified procedures and feedback. In particular, cal control and strategic direction of the PSC and
command and control (C2) structures define the the overall authority of the High Representative.
authority, responsibilities and activities of Heads Assisted by the Chief of Staff, who is also dep-
of Mission/Military Commanders in the direc- uty CivOpsCdr for the purposes of maintaining
tion and coordination of personnel/forces and in continuity of command and control, he/she is
the execution of their respective mandates. the overall commander of all civilian Heads of
Although the EU has developed several options Mission and has a duty of care to the personnel
for command and control of CSDP missions and deployed in the field.
operations, each has a single and identifiable chain As the permanent Operations Headquarters
of command for its safe and efficient conduct. (OHQ), the CPCC plays a crucial role in carry-
In the field, the Force/Mission Commander ing out operational planning to conceive and set
(for military operations/missions) and the Head up civilian CSDP missions up to initial operational
of Mission (for civilian missions) exercise com- capability. It later provides continued support and
mand and control at theatre level. The Head of follows up on mandate delivery, including by car-
Mission (HoM) is directly responsible to the rying out assessments and making any readjust-
Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr). ments required at mission level. In practice, desk
The HoM assumes responsibility and leadership officers in the Conduct of Operations Division are
of the mission, which he/she represents, in thea- the first point of contact for the ongoing missions
tre; they exercise command and control over per- and the first recipients of their reporting products;
sonnel, teams and units from contributing States they act as a focal point for the mission in Brussels
as assigned by the CivOpsCdr. They also have and assist and advise the CivOpsCdr in the over-
administrative and logistical responsibility for sight of the day-to-day conduct of civilian CSDP
the assets, resources and information put at the missions. The CPCC Mission Support Division
disposal of the mission. For military operations/ ensures the missions are provided with appropriate
missions, the Chairman of the EU Military Com- support in their human resources, procurement,
mittee acts as the primary point of contact. financial, legal and logistics aspects; the CPCC pre-
32
1 BACKGROUND
33
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The military OHQ is chosen by a PSC deci- on the ground. Each of the five military OHQ
sion: Member States in the PSC identify both have been activated to date: Potsdam (EUFOR
the future military OHQ and the Operation RDC), Mont Valerien (EUFOR Tchad-RCA),
Commander. The OHQ directs the Force Head- Rome (EUFOR Libya1), Northwood (EUNAV-
quarters (FHQ, operational level) provided by a FOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta) and Larissa
Member State, which carries out the operation (EUFOR RCA).
EU Special Representatives (if appointed) and
Heads of EU Delegations are not in the chain
of command of CSDP missions and operations;
however, HoMs can receive from them – with-
out prejudice to the chain of command – local
political guidance, especially for the matters in
which EUSRs have a particular or stated role.
The Head of EU Delegation represents the EU
in country, and promotes overall EU political
Photo: European Union
34
1 BACKGROUND
The EWS
► puts early, upstream conflict prevention on the EU political agenda
► strengthens overall EU coherence on conflict prevention actions
► contributes to strategic planning & programming across the EU
► provides an evidence-base for EU-wide external action in “at risk” countries
► facilitates risk management for EU in conflict affected countries
► stimulates creative thinking on potential EU preventive actions
► promotes relations between EU staff working in and on the countries
1 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/201409_factsheet_conflict_earth_warning_en.pdf
35
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
36
1 BACKGROUND
Step 1 Step 2
Global Conflict Risk Scan Identifying
(quantitative & qualitative) “at risk” countries
EU-wide awareness of
conflict risks and potential
for EU preventive actions
Step 4 Step 3
Reporting on Analysis
Early Preventive Action for Early Preventive Action
Through the Instrument contributing to Stabil- flict analysis and the development of response
ity and Peace (IcSP), the EU is supporting early- strategies; nurturing collaborative relationships
warning capabilities of civil society actors around among in-country actors engaged in early warn-
the world. ing; promoting the generation and use of early
warning information by in-country actors; and
‘Strengthening Early Warning and Mobilis- by disseminating lessons learnt on early warning
ing Early Action’ – International Crisis Group capacity and processes.
in partnership with the European Peacebuilding
Liaison Office
This project aims to strengthen the links “The costs of not preventing war are
between early warning, conflict analysis and enormous. The human costs of war in-
early response with a view to contributing to bet- cludes not only the visible and immedi-
ter conflict analysis and early warning combined ate – death, injury, destruction, displace-
with creative but practical recommendations and ment – but also the distant and indirect
a more coherent and systematic use of informa- repercussions for families, communities,
tion. local and national institutions and econ-
omies, and neighbouring countries.”
‘Capacities for Peace’ – Saferworld in partner-
ship with Conciliation Resources Kofi A. Annan
This project aims to enhance in-country actors’ Prevention of Armed Conflict
capacity and opportunity to engage effectively in Report of the Secretary-General
the whole ‘chain’ of early warning. In particular, February 2002, United Nations
by strengthening in-country actors’ skills in con-
37
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Since 2007, the EU has cooperated with regional partners on the development of crisis response
and early warning as part of EU external action. For example, in 2007, cooperation began with
the African Union to enhance the Continental Early Warning System based in Addis Ababa, fol-
lowed in 2010 by cooperation with the League of the Arab States (LAS) on developing a Regional
Crisis Response Centre in Cairo, which was inaugurated by High Representative/Vice-President
Catherine Ashton in November 2012.
Support has also been provided to the Organisation of American States (OAS), ASEAN, and will
soon be extended to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These activities have been financed
under the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.
38
1 BACKGROUND
39
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
40
1 BACKGROUND
Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instuments-agencies/eu-military-staff/images/
bring together the EEAS intelligence analysis
capacity into a single functional arrangement (see
graphic). EU INTCEN is the most recent name
for an entity that was created in 2002 as the EU
Joint Situation Centre. It monitors events in order
to provide intelligence analysis, early warning and
situational awareness to the High Representative/
Vice-President. It focuses particularly on sensi-
tive geographical areas, terrorism, proliferation
impetus_springsummer_14.pdf
of weapons of mass destruction and other global
threats.
EU INTCEN is currently composed of two
divisions. The Analysis Division – divided into
sections – provides strategic analysis based on General EU Intelligence Landscape
input from the security and intelligence services
of the EU Member States. The General and Exter-
nal Relations Division deals with legal, adminis- The above-mentioned HR/VP Decision defines
trative and Information Technology (IT) issues “intelligence” as information that has been col-
and provides open-source support. lected, processed and disseminated for use by
decision-makers and other customers and ISA as
structures, processes and activities related to intel-
EEAS Intelligence Support ligence. It aims to optimise the intelligence func-
Architecture tion within the EEAS and encourages close coop-
eration and coordination across EU institutions
In parallel with the establishment of the EEAS and between intelligence stakeholders.
and against the existing environment, EU intelli- The ISA includes two central structures – the
gence elements have initiated the development of Intelligence Steering Board (ISB) and Intelligence
guidelines for intelligence support for the EEAS. Working Group (IWG). The Secretariat function
The idea was to take into account all relevant for both ISB and IWG is provided jointly by EU
developments and design an intelligence support INTCEN and EUMS INT. The ISB defines intel-
package: ligence requirements and priorities at the strategic
• to define responsibilities; level and endorses structural, organisational and
• to provide direction and guidance; policy measures required to improve the Architec-
• to create provisions for effective production ture. It also provides guidance to address deficien-
and fast, secure and reliable dissemination of cies in the field of security. The Board is chaired
intelligence products. by the HR/VP or the EEAS Executive Secretary-
The outcome of this whole process was the HR/ General (ESG).
VP Decision from 2012 establishing the organi- The IWG further defines, specifies and adjusts
sation and functioning of the EEAS Intelligence EEAS intelligence requirements and priorities. In
Support Architecture (ISA). The ISA also includes particular, it proposes the strategic intelligence
provisions on coordination and liaison with the direction and Prioritised Intelligence Require-
MS intelligence organisations, the European ments (PIR) for the intelligence. The IWG syn-
Commission and international organisations. chronises the tasking of the Single Intelligence
41
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Analysis Capacity (SIAC), defines SIAC product However, since the end of 2010 and the transfer
range, and develops and monitors a feedback of EU SITCEN and EUMS to EEAS, production
mechanism. The IWG is co-chaired by the has grown by about 40 % annually. This can be
Director EU INTCEN and Director EUMS attributed to an increase in the number of intel-
INT. ligence customers and a continued increase in the
demand for intelligence products.
42
1 BACKGROUND
For decades the European Union and Member ades ago, is a glaring example of today’s crises. The
States have been working together on solutions for EU is still actively supporting the new federal gov-
major crises over the world. The EU is the largest ernment on the road to recovery, after several wars
economy on earth and a area where people have and crises. The events in Ukraine in 2014 also
been living in peace for 70 years. But it is also the reminded the EU how a fragile situation can rap-
largest donor of development aid, actively engaged in idly turn into violent conflict, right on its borders.
supporting countries in trouble. EU external action, One year later, Europe is still engaged in difficult
based on the vision of 28 nations, encompasses a mediation to reach an agreement between the par-
wide range of activities in the area of diplomacy, ties. Nevertheless, the wounds left by the conflict
humanitarian aid, cooperation and security and will have serious consequences and deserve special
defence. attention in the future.
Despite Europe’s significant resources and Nowadays there is remote contamination
extensive experience, supporting fragile states between fragile countries, as crises are spread-
remains a very tough challenge. Poverty, crimi- ing fast through media and social networks. The
nality, corruption, famine and violence, amongst expansion of Da’esh in Iraq has invigorated sup-
many other factors, are often interlaced in modern porters of radical Islam elsewhere, and has also
crises. It is increasingly difficult to address each stimulated other extremist organisations in the
problem separately, and the EU is gradually try- Horn of Africa or in the Sahel. This spill-over
ing to synchronise all civilian and military instru- has a concrete impact on societies. External and
ments in a single inclusive approach. internal factors of instability are now dynamically
This combined effort, also called the compre- connected through the internet, causing or nour-
hensive approach, aims to increase the efficiency ishing new crises. Today’s threats are much more
of our response to the complexity of crises. The diffuse, unpredictable and difficult to contain
concept is continuously being improved and now than in the past.
promotes a better integration of local capacities Therefore a continuous analysis of crises and
and the early involvement of regional actors in the conflicts is essential to understand the problems
pursuit of solutions. and identify options for action. The comprehensive
approach addresses four essential questions: What
precisely is this crisis? What should we do? Do we
Explosive crises need long-term have the response capacity? How can we do it suc-
therapies cessfully? Of course, any answer has to be realis-
tic, meaning that the EU and its partners should
Crises come fast, but they may last a long time. have sufficient resources and the ability to ensure
The conflict in Somalia, which began three dec- implementation.
43
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
the fUll range of eU structures, and the first missions and operations
instrUments were launched in 2003. The entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 was also a
Over years, the EU has adopted essential tools decisive step. It established the External Action
to support fragile states and tackle conflicts and Service (EEAS) and gave greater resources and
crises around the world. The European Devel- coherence to CSDP through a new institutional
opment Fund (EDF) was established under the framework. The EU now acts as a global political
Treaty of Rome in 1957, and has continuously player to maintain international security through
improved so that the EU is today the world’s larg- diplomatic, political, economic, civilian and
est donor of development aid. European devel- military operational actions with an across-the-
opment policy has also undergone important board approach to crises. Since 2003, CSDP has
reforms since 2000 to more effectively reduce deployed 35 missions and operations all over the
poverty worldwide. world; 17 are currently active in Africa, the Mid-
The EU is also widely engaged in emergency dle East, Asia and Eastern Europe.
assistance through its Humanitarian Aid and Civil EU external action is not limited to develop-
Protection department (DG ECHO) established ment, humanitarian aid and security. The Euro-
in 1992. Funding from the office reaches over pean Commission and the various European
120 million people in 90 countries. ECHO spends agencies are also engaged in international coop-
EUR 800 million a year of its initial budget on eration in various domains such as environment,
humanitarian projects through over 200 partners trade, migration, justice, fishery, or research. All
such as the Red Cross, NGOs or UN agencies. these external activities receive the active support
The Common Security and Defence Policy of European diplomacy through the EEAS direc-
(CSDP) is another very important element of torates, the EU Special Representatives in priority
EU external action. In 2000, the EU officially regions and a remarkable network of 140 Delega-
created civilian and military crisis management tions all over the world.
■ Environment protection
■ Health
■ Rule of law
■ Private Sector Development
■ Countering terrorism
■ Development
■ EC Flight
■ Security Sector Development
■ Recovery
■ Education
■ Governance, security and support to civil society
■ Water, sanitation and energy
■ Maritime security
■ Infrastructure
■ Support to civil society
■ Rural development and food security
Graphic: Jean-Philippe Scherer
44
1 BACKGROUND
Today, the EU is probably the most inclu- their actions. One of the priorities is to maximise
sive organisation in terms of instruments and civilian-military synergies. In the field of infor-
capacity, so it is comprehensive by nature. As an mation, the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity
example, it is currently funding over 150 differ- (SIAC) combines civilian intelligence (EU INT-
ent activities in the Horn of Africa, covering all CEN) and military intelligence (EUMS Intelli-
identified areas of fragility. gence Directorate) and has been producing joint
The EU is continuously improving its instru- assessments since 2007. In 2012, Member States
ments to meet the challenge of fast-moving cri- also activated the EU Operations Centre in the
ses. In the last few years the EEAS has created Horn of Africa to support CSDP missions and to
several early warning and response systems to facilitate better interaction with the Commission.
better anticipate and manage the risks, while the Its mandate has been extended to the Sahel region
European Commission has developed sophisti- and two liaison officers are currently deployed in
cated tools to better assess and evaluate the pro- DG DEVCO to enhance the exchange of infor-
gress of beneficiaries. mation and establish synchronisation mecha-
The comprehensive approach also means that nisms between CSDP and development activities.
there is no discontinuity in the proposed solu- The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs
tions, and most EU structures are combining and Security Policy and Vice-President of the
both geographic and thematic branches to cover European Commission (HR/VP) has affirmed the
both the specific elements and the horizon- intention to reduce the gap between short- and
tal issues of a crisis. Ultimately, the full range long-term instruments, including CSDP and
of instruments provides the EU with a unique development or humanitarian aid, through more
external capacity, but of course these numerous effective cooperation between services.
lines of development and the players involved A second priority for the EU is to integrate
need permanent coordination. its action in the local, regional and international
efforts. This hard work applies mainly to the EU
diplomacy efforts through the different contact
We do better in concert groups, meetings, and conferences. Mobilising
international partners and empowering regional
Like in an orchestra, each EU instrument has or local actors is paramount to engendering effec-
its own operation and technique. As the score tive third parties’ commitment to work in concert
drives the music, strategy and plans usually pro- with the EU’s initiatives. The EU is already work-
vide consistency to the EU approach. But this is ing closely in this direction with partners such
not enough, and coordination between the differ- as the UN, NATO or the African Union – and
ent players is necessary to achieve a rounded per- national civil societies.
formance. Both internal and external coordination efforts
Typically, there are four levels of internal need to be actively supported by a joint communi-
coordination (tactical, operational, strategic and cation plan, with the objective of explaining the role
political) and three levels of external coordination of each actor in the comprehensive approach. Imple-
(local, regional and international). The number of menting organisations work better when their con-
EU actors and partners in a theatre can be very tribution is clearly defined and acknowledged by
large, so it is always extremely complex to syn- others. Communication is also essential in order to
chronise all the activities of all stakeholders at all convince all EU actors and their partners that the
levels. collective result critically depends on all individual
The EU measures the challenge daily through efforts, and that each instrument plays a key role in
operating many instruments and coordinating the overall crisis resolution process.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
EU Commissioners
International cooperation, EUSR Horn of Africa
Transport, Development EU Delegations:
& Humanitarian aid, Maritime affairs, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia, Tanzania,
Trade, Research … Ethiopia, Eritrea, Seychelles,
Political & Security Committee Comoros, Mauritius, Uganda …
PMG, CIVCOM and EUMC
EEAS Directorates
MD II Africa, CROC, K, CCT … DIPLOMACY
POLICY
STRATEGY
ACTIVITIES
Managing priorities is the key cooperation can hardly address these two prob-
lems before the violence is reduced to a certain
A paradox of the comprehensive approach, level. In contrast, military action cannot stabilise
and probably one of the major challenges, is to a situation for long if the root causes of a conflict
be inclusive and selective at the same time. The or a crisis have not been addressed.
multiplicity of instruments inevitably raises the In other words, all instruments are interde-
sensitive question of priorities. Each crisis has a pendent. They must be implemented simultane-
specific profile and requires a well-planned and ously but in harmonised plans of action.
tailored response over time. Violent phases typi- Short- and long-term activities are also inter-
cally require short-term actions in the form of active because they operate in the same environ-
CSDP missions/operations or humanitarian aid, ment at the same time. However their duration
while periods of relative calm usually present the and start and end dates are not identical, so syn-
best opportunities to develop long-term activities chronisation and transition between activities is
such as cooperation or education. essential for the coherence and efficiency of the
However, the reality is usually more complex, EU’s external action.
because the combination of instruments can The continuity of actions ensures consistency
create an induced effect, and there are always and is a key factor for success. The course of events
many possible dosages of efforts throughout a should not totally jeopardise the EU’s strategy, but
crisis. ignoring some changes can challenge its activities.
Tailored solutions are never easy to implement The real difficulty is to maintain a balance between
and require a solid plan. Although the origin of a the reaction to events and a coherent plan. Crisis
crisis is often related to poverty and corruption, management structures are perfectly aware of this
46
1 BACKGROUND
Crisis
Level
Total E
U Effort
Humanit
arian Aid
Security &
Defence
Diplomacy
Cooperation & D
Peace evelopment
and breaking news will inevitably generate new durable solutions. This is why both short- and
pressures. long-term instruments are necessary and the EU
A possible response to fast-changing situations must implement them simultaneously through-
is to secure key activities but also to adjust priori- out the spectrum of a crisis. Patience, pugnacity
ties and budget allocations more frequently. In any and adaptability are usually the three fundamental
case, strategic and operational planners must keep factors in crisis management.
in mind that modern crises are usually lengthy,
and sacrificing long-term activities to short-term
reaction will usually degrade the final result. learning and improving
Today the EU is considered to use soft power,
as it usually favours long-term effort. Some may The EU is facing a changing international
consider this approach to show a lack of reac- environment and has to adapt its instruments
tion, but they should also recognise the EU’s per- on a continual basis. Financial and management
severance and stability of commitment in tough optimisation is always sought, and each structure
situations. The EU has made notable progress in is regularly required to do better with less. This
adapting its procedures, inter alia by transferring exercise is necessary but it also has some limits,
funds from cooperation to humanitarian aid in and carried to excess it could degrade the effi-
the event of emergencies, for example in the Sahel ciency of EU as a whole. An alternative is to
region in response to the dramatic impact of Boko optimise the coordination between structures in
Haram. order to identify and use synergies. This princi-
A rapid response is sometimes necessary in the ple is not new and is applied every day in team
face of an explosive situation, but it rarely offers sports such as football or rugby.
47
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
It is not easy to apply it to large organisations and operations are sensibly benefiting economic
for many reasons. The number of EU actors is cooperation and development programmes. As an
much higher than in a sports team, the objective example, piracy has been dramatically reduced in
is not as simple as to score a goal and there is the Indian Ocean thanks to the combined efforts
not a unique coach or captain to drive the play- of civilian and military commitment including the
ers. The more complex EU decision mechanisms operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the civilian
become and leadership is diluted, the more inter- CSDP mission EUCAP Nestor. But in order to
nal coordination will be essential. address the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the
The EU still has significant room for improve- EU is investigating how to secure positive results
ment in many directions. The first area of pro- by promoting the fishing economy and eradicating
gress concerns shared analysis, common strate- poverty along the Somali coast.
gic vision and joint planning. These factors have The EU is currently making significant pro-
been seriously improved in recent years and the gress on synergies and synchronisation across
effort is ongoing and accelerating. Today the EU its external action instruments. The increasing
institutions are using common strategic frame- number of initiatives between the EEAS and
works for their external actions. During plan- the European Commission agencies, but also
ning phases, consultation between EU services between the EU and its Member States, is a
has become the rule to foster common under- positive sign. Wide consultations, comprehen-
standing (of the crisis, of the course of action sive platforms and workshops, common key
proposed) from the starting phase of a crisis or leader engagement at regional level, coordina-
in view of preventing it. New crisis management tion meetings in Delegations, and the appoint-
procedures in 2013 have supported this process, ment of coordinators or liaison officers – joint
with for instance the introduction of the ‘Politi- programming efforts are positive elements con-
cal Framework for Crisis Approach’ – an inter- tributing to the improvement and optimisation
service endeavour contributing to the enhance- of EU efforts to tackle crises and conflicts world-
ment of shared analysis. Planning documents wide. This effort will undeniably continue in the
integrate more detailed provisions about coordi- future with a common information strategy and
nation and mutual support. more cross-fertilisation between EU actors. In
One of the most important challenges for the the same logic, the EU has recently defined the
comprehensive approach today is probably to plan “Train & Equip” concept, with the aim of better
and to manage the transition between short-term synchronising the training and capacity-building
and long-term instruments, but here, too, progress efforts of CSDP missions with Commission-
is ongoing. Transition strategies for CSDP missions sponsored projects and the equipment provided
48
1 BACKGROUND
Conclusion
The EU comprehensive approach is a way of flict situations. However it does not dictate any
understanding the requirements of fragile coun- particular approach for specific areas or regions,
tries, crises and conflicts, proposing realistic solu- and respects the methodology and imperatives of
tions and coordinating actions for better results. the different actors.
The large number of European instruments and The EU instruments have been improving over
actors make this synchronisation a complex exer- the years with just one objective: doing more,
cise, but it is also a fantastic opportunity for the doing it right, and doing it better. In practice this
development of synergies and innovative solu- effort is reflected in greater information-sharing,
tions. a joint consultation before planning and increas-
In terms of policy, the basic principles of the ingly, a culture of coordination. The ongoing
comprehensive approach remain clear – it is about work on the operationalisation of the comprehen-
working better together, and enhancing the coher- sive approach will further support the optimisation
ence, effectiveness and impact of the EU’s policy of the EU’s – and Member States’ – engagements
and external action, in particular in crisis and con- in favour of peace and security worldwide.
In December 2013, the High Representative and the European Commission presented a
new policy paper on the EU comprehensive approach in the form of a Joint Communication:
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU’s comprehen-
sive approach to external conflict and crises, 11.12.2013 JOIN(2013).
In the spring of 2014, these policies and priorities were discussed with EU Member States,
following consultations with a broad spectrum of Council stakeholders from the political,
development, military and humanitarian domains.
In May 2014, the Foreign Affairs Council gave its full support to this concept and agreed a
set of ambitious Council conclusions on the subject matter, including on the way forward.
See the Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach, Foreign Affairs Council
meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
50
1 BACKGROUND
51
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
ment procedures for CSDP crisis management nal and internal security. The document provides
operations to the PSC: a good explanation of the EU’s policy and gives
“CSDP advance planning by CMPD, supported valuable guidelines for future action:
by CPCC and EUMS, will engage with other “(…)The interdependence between internal and
Services, such as Geographic, Conflict Preven- external security is constantly growing and the
tion/Peace-building/Mediation, EEAS Security, renewed EU’s Internal Security Strategy should
Human Rights and Democracy, EU Delega- take into account the external security dimension,
tions, the Commission (FPI, ECHO, DEVCO, and vice versa, the Union’s external and develop-
HOME, ELARG), EU Agencies (EUROPOL, ment policies should take into account the relevant
FRONTEX, EUROJUST), Member States principles of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy.
embassies, and NGOs as required. Where appro- a) Internal security should be more systemati-
priate the EEAS will consult with international cally addressed as part of the EU external rela-
organisations (UN, AU, NATO etc.), and third tions policies, and strong coherence should be
states that may have a role/interest in the resolu- ensured in any foreign policy with regard to
tion of the crisis.” security-related issues. Migration and refugee
Communication of the Commission “An open policies and cooperation with third countries
and secure Europe: making it happen” also indicates in tackling criminal phenomena, including
close links between external and internal security facilitating illegal immigration and trafficking
aspects. It states the following: in human beings, should be seen as an integral
“In an ever increasingly interdependent world, part of the Union’s external and development
Home Affairs issues need to be embedded in the policies. Special attention should be placed on
EU’s overall external policy, allowing for rein- establishing an effective common return policy
forced dialogue and cooperation with third coun- and enforcing readmission obligations in agree-
tries. Consistency and coherence with the external ments with third countries.
policy will help in anticipating challenges, better b) Relations with third countries should enhance
reaching the EU’s objectives (…).” cooperation, including operational coopera-
Moreover, in a subchapter entitled “Building inter- tion, on the EU policy cycle’s current and future
nal security in a global context” it states that priorities as well as cooperation on addressing
“European internal security also means acting radicalisation, and recruitment to terrorism
beyond EU borders and in cooperation with third and foreign fighters and returnees phenomena.
country partners. Radicalisation, fight against (…) The European External Action Service is
trafficking of human beings and fight against drug invited to play a strong role in ensuring links
trafficking for example require such cooperation”. between EU internal and external security are
The European Council in its conclusions of 26/27 recognised and acted upon.
June 2014 stated the following: c) When developing external relations strategies,
“The answer to many of the challenges in the area due consideration should be given to the princi-
of freedom, security and justice lies in relations with ples of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy.
third countries, which calls for improving the link d) The cooperation between all actors involved in
between the EU’s internal and external policies.” internal and external security in combating the
The Justice and Home Affairs Council in its Con- challenges identified above calls for stronger coor-
clusions on the development of a renewed Euro- dination on security issues, in particular between
pean Union Internal Security Strategy adopted on EU Delegations and Member States’ embassies.
4 December 2014 builds on the above-mentioned Particular emphasis should be given to the better
guidelines of the European Council and empha- use of and interconnection between EU agen-
sises the need to forge a proper link between exter- cies, and with regard to their role in external
52
1 BACKGROUND
53
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
54
1 BACKGROUND
In 2010, the EU established a multi-annual policy cycle. Its aim is to ensure that the fight
against serious international and organised crime is coherent and properly coordinated.
The Council selects priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime based on
Europol’s EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA).
The following priorities were chosen for the period between 2014 and 2017:
• To disrupt organised crime groups (OCGs) involved in the facilitation of illegal immigra-
tion and operating in the source countries at the main entry points to the EU on the
main routes and, where evidence-based, on alternative routes. To reduce OCGs’ abuse
of legal channels for migration, including the use of fraudulent documents as a means
of facilitating illegal immigration.
• To disrupt OCGs involved in intra-EU human trafficking and human trafficking from the
most prevalent external source countries for the purposes of labour exploitation and
sexual exploitation; this includes those groups using legal business structures to facili-
tate or disguise their criminal activities.
• To disrupt OCGs involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit goods violat-
ing health, safety and food regulations and those producing sub-standard goods.
• To disrupt the capacity of OCGs and specialists involved in excise fraud and Missing
Trader Intra Community (MTIC) fraud.
• To reduce the production of synthetic drugs in the EU and to disrupt the OCGs involved
in synthetic drugs trafficking.
• To reduce cocaine and heroin trafficking to the EU and to disrupt the OCGs facilitating
the distribution in the EU.
• To combat cybercrimes committed by OCGs which generate substantial criminal prof-
its, e.g. online and payment card fraud, cybercrimes which cause serious harm to their
victims such as online child sexual exploitation, and cyber-attacks which affect critical
infrastructure and information systems in the EU.
• To reduce the risk posed by firearms to the public, including combating illicit trafficking
in firearms.
• To combat organised property crime committed by mobile organised crime groups.
Member States are also encouraged to take into account, among other factors, regional
dimensions such as the Western Balkans and West Africa, money laundering and asset
recovery.
It is important to underline that these are EU priorities: they are not restricted merely to
home affairs. Thus, they should be taken into account in other policy areas too.
The EEAS is a relevant actor in a number of priority areas, in particular illegal migration,
counterfeit goods, trafficking in human beings (THB), synthetic drugs, cocaine and heroin
and firearms. The service participated in the drafting of certain operational action plans
that translate strategic priorities into concrete actions.
The EEAS is considered to have unique expertise and resources that can be shared and uti-
lised, for example in the fight against THB. EEAS’ active contribution would also be sought
in cases that require engagement with key third states. The above-mentioned priorities
should also be considered when planning and designing CSDP missions so that they ad-
dress key criminal threats faced by the EU.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The European Union (EU) engages with over conflict, such as trade, investment, global eco-
50 countries affected by conflict and fragility. nomic governance and financial regulation, en-
• The EU has Delegations in the 50 or so coun- ergy, the environment and regional integration.
tries that can be considered in situations of • In 2012, the EU’s development cooperation
conflict or fragility. Beyond the Delegations, with countries in situations of conflict and fra-
there are 12 EU Special Representatives (as of gility represented EUR 4.9 billion (a budget
January 2014). Nearly all Special Representa- managed by the Directorate-General for De-
tives work in fragile and conflict-affected coun- velopment and Cooperation), or 59 % of total
tries or regions, or on fragility-related themes. EU assistance. This makes EU institutions the
• The EU’s engagement in situations of conflict second-largest provider of assistance in situa-
and fragility spans a wide range of interventions tions of conflict and fragility – after the United
(see graphic). The engagement also involves States and before the World Bank. The top
other issues that can directly affect fragility and three recipients of such assistance in 2012 were
Prevention of
Capacity building recurrence of violence
Shuttle diplomacy/
mediation Development Long-term
Political dialogue/
Conditionality/ Crisis intervention mediation peace
sanctions (e.g. CSDP mission) State building and stability
Election
Humanitarian assistance observation Security sector reform
Source: Adapted from J.P. Lederach, as cited in EEAS and EC (no date).
LRRD
Institutional reform
1 European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series.
Reference Document No 17. December 2014. To be found on http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/docu-
ment/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook
56
1 BACKGROUND
Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and of violent conflict, affecting more than 131 mil-
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking a longer view, lion people.
over 2000-2012, the top three recipients were Fragility and conflict can also affect territories
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghani- beyond national borders – for example, the belt of
stan and Ethiopia. instability that stretches from the Horn of Africa
• The EU is also engaged in situations of con- to the Sahel, due to al-Qaeda, al-Shabab and
flict and fragility through electoral observation related groups.
missions and Common Security and Defence Situations of conflict and fragility are influ-
Policy (CSDP) missions. There were 16 CSDP enced by local, national and global factors. Local
missions in July 2014, civilian and military, factors of conflict and fragility include weak or
representing over 7 000 personnel. exclusionary local governance, limited or unequal
There are distinguishable types of situations of access to land and water, etc. National factors
conflict and fragility, each calling for a different include tense social relations, unequal access to
set of responses. There are many ways to distin- jobs and services; and weak rule of law, etc. Global
guish between such types of situation, but one of factors include the following:
the most useful is the security-capacity-legitimacy • international trade (e.g. barriers to exports and
model proposed by Charles Call (2010), which vulnerability to shocks);
classifies country fragility according to deficien- • transnational organised crime and illicit trade;
cies or gaps involving three sets of issues. • the existence of a global and poorly regulated
• Security issues. The state has a good degree of market for private security services;
capacity and legitimacy, but has limited reach • economic and financial liberalisation processes;
and suffers from illegal trafficking and/or • migration to and from fragile states and the
chronic violence; spread of radicalism through new technolo-
• Capacity issues. The state has legitimacy (e.g. gies;
through regular elections), but low capacity to • internationally networked non-state armed
deliver services; groups;
• Legitimacy issues. The state has some capacity • climate change.
to deliver services but suffers from weak legiti- These global factors are often ignored in political
macy, resulting from, for example, the violation economy analysis, yet globalisation makes them a
of agreed rules, poor public service delivery, central set of forces to take account of – especially
beliefs shaped by tradition and religion, or in- in contexts of weak institutions, high poverty,
ternational action undermining national sover- high levels of violence and structural exclusion.
eignty. Additionally, local, national and global factors
Countries can have gaps in one, two or all of these interact, as the spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria
areas. and the explosion of drug-related violence in sev-
Besides countries, sub-national and transna- eral Central American countries illustrate.
tional areas can be in fragile or conflict-affected The EU has a track record of contributing to
situations. Some countries that are not usually conflict mitigation, stabilisation, reconstruction
thought of as being fragile contain large swaths and rehabilitation. For example, it has made ‘sig-
of territory that exhibit all the attributes of fragil- nificant contributions to development, peace and
ity; examples include Northern Uganda, Khyber stability’ in Ethiopia (2012); it has ‘succeeded
Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, Mindanao in the Phil- in implementing the support to the Palestin-
ippines, North-East Nigeria and Southern Thai- ian Authority in difficult circumstances’ (2013);
land. In Asia, sub-national conflict is considered and in the East and South Neighbourhood Policy
the most deadly, widespread and enduring form Regions, ‘EU support stimulated regional policy
57
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
C A P A C I T Y G A P : weak states
Zimbabwe LEGIMACY GAP:
58
1 BACKGROUND
Effectiveness of EU support
59
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
dently? What level of operational coordination EU’s comparative advantages enable it to add
is required? value to the efforts of others by drawing on its:
While in some cases, the costs of operational coor- • credibility as an intergovernmental entity, with
dination can outweigh its benefits (for example if a negligible political profile and no ties to na-
it slows down the response to an emergency situa- tional interests;
tion), coordination at the planning stage is essen- • reliability, in terms of its continued presence
tial to effectiveness. and capacity to establish long-term partner-
ships;
• representation of a critical mass of financial
Efficiency of EU support support;
• wide array of policies and instruments, includ-
EU support is most efficient when it builds on ing its position as a major trading partner with
pro-activity, creativity and coordination. Evalu- many fragile states;
ations generally rate the efficiency of EU support • in-depth thematic experience in a range of
in situations of conflict and fragility as low, with fields that are pertinent to fragility and conflict-
much room for improvement. Improving support related issues.
efficiency requires first and foremost a recogni- The EU can add considerable value by empha-
tion that each situation is different. Also, creativ- sising these strengths, notably by playing a greater
ity is needed in seeking solutions. A good starting role than currently as a convener or co-convener
point is for staff to put coordination arrangements in liaising with Member States to engage with one
in place that bridge the fragmented responsibilities voice in political and policy dialogue with govern-
among donors – and even within EU institutions – ment, setting the policy agenda and/or coordinat-
in responding to fragility and conflict. Situations of ing priority sectors.
conflict and fragility also demand thinking ‘outside
of the box’; in this regard, good practices among
EU Delegations note the following. ISSN 1830 - 8198
Source: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook
support (e.g. political and policy dialogue; techni-
cal assistance) can be valuable.
There is value in engaging at different geo- Tools and Methods Series
graphical levels of intervention (local, national, Reference Document No 17
regional) – sometimes, the best entry points are
not necessarily within the central government.
Engaging with both state and non-state actors,
preferably together, can provide opportunities for
change.
Situations of conflict and fragility require addi- Operating in situations of
tional resources and continuous development of
more appropriate tools for support. The EU at
conflict and fragility
An EU staff handbook
Headquarters is investing in knowledge manage- December 2014
60
1 BACKGROUND
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty and the 2011 Agenda engagement in situations of conflict and fragility,
for Change (EC, 2011) sharpened the EU’s focus the key elements of which are summarised here:
on situations of conflict and fragility. The Lisbon • Coordinate and cooperate broadly and appro-
Treaty directs the EU to ‘preserve peace, prevent priately to ensure a comprehensive response.
conflicts and strengthen international security’. • Enhance resilience.
The Agenda for Change charges it to ‘allocate • Use the right mix of financial instruments and
more funds than in the past to the countries most tools.
in need, including fragile states’. And a 2013 com- • Develop, safeguard and support human re-
munication sets out the case for a comprehensive sources.
approach to external conflict and crisis (EC and • Ensure consistent, integrated Headquarters
High Representative, 2013). In response to this support.
guidance, and based on the lessons learnt, the EU • Make best use of EU comparative advantag-
has fashioned a successful and cogent approach to es.
61
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
military CSDP operations (CMPD) Works alongside EEAS C: Sustainable Growth and
● Civilian CSDP crisis manage- Operations management Development
ment operations (CPCC)
● Handles financial management D: East and Southern Africa ACP
Coordination & implementation of operational Coordination
budgets for CFSP, IcSP & Election E: West and Central Africa
MD VI and MD II
Observation Mission
● EEAS contact point for develop- F: Neighbourhood
● Implements sanctions and
ment policy matters G: Latin America and Caribbean
Kimberley Process
● JAES strategic political objectives H: Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/
Gulf and Pacific
62
1 BACKGROUND
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The strong transatlantic relationship remains dynamics, fostering further complementary and
of fundamental importance to Europe. The prac- mutually reinforcing actions, for example on mili-
tical cooperation between the EU and NATO tary capability development. Both the EU and
has expanded significantly in the past few years, NATO share the assessment that the crisis in the
within the agreed framework of their strategic Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods signifi-
partnership and respecting the decision-making cantly altered the security reality for Europe and
autonomy of each organisation. Apart from the the broader transatlantic community. Since the
already on-going operational cooperation and beginning of the Ukrainian crisis the good coop-
coordination (e.g. in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, eration and coordination with NATO and the
Afghanistan), there is potential for strengthened OSCE has proved invaluable.
interaction on maritime security, defence and Following the establishment of the African
security capacity building and cyber security. Union and the prospect of the African Peace
The “intertwining summits” – from December and Security Architecture (APSA), the EU estab-
2013 (European Council discussion on CSDP), lished the African Peace Facility in 2004 in order
through the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, to financially support (logistics, transportation,
the June 2015 European Council up to the 2016 medical, communication and personnel costs)
NATO Summit in Warsaw – bring additional the deployment of African-led peace support
operations (e.g. AMIS, AMISOM, MISCA,
AFISMA). The EU also supports APSA in terms
of logistics, planning, and operational training
(e.g. the AMANI Africa training cycle for the
operationalisation of the African Standby Force).
This relationship was put on a new strategic foot-
ing with the signing in 2007 of the Joint Africa-
EU Strategy which made peace and security a
priority among the eight thematic partnerships
that the EU and Africa should develop in a
comprehensive manner. In parallel, at the UN’s
request, the EU started deploying its own crisis
management operations under CSDP in Africa.
Of the 31 completed or still ongoing CSDP mis-
sions and operations since 2003, 16 have been
deployed on the African continent.
The current EU Chairmanship of the Con-
tact Group on Piracy off the Somali coast pro-
vides ample opportunities for global engagement.
The EU took over this role from the US in 2014
and will continue in 2015 until a new Chair has
been selected. It involves coordinating the work
of more than 80 stakeholders: sovereign States,
international organisations, the private sector and
Photo: European Union
64
1 BACKGROUND
Art. 21: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third coun-
tries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the [same] principles.
It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework
of the United Nations.”
“The Union remains fully committed to working in close collaboration with its global, trans-
atlantic and regional partners. Such collaboration should be further developed in a spirit
of mutual reinforcement and complementarity.”
The Council “stresses the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN,
NATO, OSCE, and African Union, as well as strategic partners and partner countries in
its neighbourhood, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision-making
autonomy of the EU.”
In November 2013, the European Council Iceland, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova,
adopted a comprehensive set of conclusions on New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea,
CSDP partnerships in which it fostered “contrib- Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. Non-EU
uting partners support to CSDP, with a focus on NATO allies and candidate countries are amongst
non-EU NATO Allies, strategic partners, partner the most active contributors to CSDP activities,
countries in the neighbourhood, notably the Medi- and were the first to develop close cooperation
terranean and Eastern partners (…) and other indi- with the EU in this respect.
vidual partner countries”. The Council also noted The Union regularly invites third countries to
that “priority should be given to cooperation with participate in specific missions and operations.
partners who share with the EU common values and To give a practical example – recently launched
principles and are able and willing to support EU CSDP missions and operations enjoyed wide
crisis management efforts”. political and practical support from several part-
The EU concludes Framework Participation ners. In 2014 Georgia joined EUFOR RCA with
Agreements with selected partner countries to a light infantry company as the second largest
facilitate their participation in CSDP missions contributor; Turkey and Serbia also contributed
and operations and foster long-term cooperation. to this mission; Montenegro, the Republic of
Until now 16 such legally binding international Moldova, Switzerland and Serbia participate in
agreements have been signed, notably with: Alba- EUTM Mali; Australia joined EUCAP Nestor
nia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Former Yugo- (for the first time participating in a CSDP mis-
slav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, sion); Ukraine supported EUNAVFOR Atalanta
65
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
with a frigate (the largest Ukrainian contribution experience with Canada’s financing of a project
ever) and New Zealand contributed a reconnais- run by EUTM Mali. Beyond US participation
sance aircraft. All this was in addition to continued in CSDP missions in Kosovo and DRC, flexible
participation in other CSDP missions and opera- informal cooperation with the US continues in
tions. Altogether in 2014, fifteen partner coun- the Horn of Africa/Somalia, and at the military-
tries (Australia, Albania, Canada, Chile, FYROM, to-military level with EUCOM and AFRICOM.
Georgia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, the Some partners are also joining the Battlegroups
Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, (FYROM, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine) and
Ukraine and the US) contributed to ten CSDP train with the EU (China and Japan held naval
missions and operations, accounting for approxi- exercises with Atalanta).
mately 8 % of the total personnel deployed. In 2013-2014, network of CSDP partnerships
In parallel, the EU explores innovative ways of further expanded to Asia and Latin America with
cooperation that do not require a legally binding the signature of Framework Agreements on par-
agreement. For example: support from China in ticipation in EU-led crisis management operations
the escort of World Food Programme vessels off with Chile and Colombia (the first partners in
the Somali coast, sharing the burden with the EU Latin America) and the Republic of Korea (the first
naval operation Atalanta; financial support from in Asia, and the second in Asia-Pacific after New
Japan for specific projects in Niger, in line with Zealand). Entry into force of those agreements will
EUCAP Sahel Niger objectives. It is now regularly open new avenues for dialogue and concrete opera-
possible for new CSDP missions and operations tional cooperation. The EU’s willingness to step up
to establish project cells in order to gather paral- cooperation with its Asian partners also translates
lel support from potential donors among Member into multilateral activities, for example within the
States and partner countries, following excellent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): from autumn
66
1 BACKGROUND
2013 until spring 2014 the EU co-chaired with In the South the EU remains forthcoming,
Myanmar the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group inter alia in CSDP contacts with Morocco, Jordan
on Confidence Building Measures and Preven- and the League of Arab States.
tive Diplomacy and the related Defence Officials The EU has developed regular dialogues in the
Dialogue. The EU also regularly participates in field of CSDP with several countries and organi-
ARF-driven exercises in Humanitarian Assistance sations. As “one size does not fit all”, their level,
and Disaster relief and workshops on issues such as frequency, topics and format are adapted to EU’s
Maritime Security and Mediation. and partners’ respective expectations and interests.
In the East, the CSDP Partnership with East- Beyond dialogue and operational cooperation,
ern Partners dates back several years – to 2004 it is worth underlining the role of the European
with Ukraine and to 2012–2013 with, increas- Security and Defence College in highly appreci-
ingly, Georgia, Moldova and other Eastern Part- ated training provided to and undertaken with
ners. Georgia and Ukraine are both contributors partner countries.
to CSDP operational activities, while at the same Security challenges have to be tackled by those
time hosting EU missions (EUMM Georgia and and with those most affected, in a spirit of part-
EUAM Ukraine respectively). The multilateral nership. The EU is therefore increasingly engaged
cooperation under the Eastern Partnership CSDP in building capacities of partner countries and
Panel, launched in 2013, complements bilateral organisations in volatile regions. The long-term
relations and allows the involvement of all six East- objective is to enable them to take responsibility
ern Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor- for their own security so that they can increasingly
gia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine) in numer- prevent and manage crises by themselves. It is in
ous workshops, seminars, field visits and training that context that the flagship initiative of ‘Train
activities through this multilateral platform. and equip’ was initiated.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Whilst the clear focus at the operational level size of development budgets compared to CSDP:
will be delivery of effect in-theatre, it is impor- for the time period 2014–2020 the Common For-
tant to keep in mind how you will eventually eign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, including
transition away from the Common Security and the civilian CSDP budget, is EUR 2 338 million,
Defence Policy (CSDP). This chapter will cover compared to the International Cooperation and
the concept of how this is done in Headquarters, Development DG DEVCO (EuropeAid) budget
how the Head of Mission contributes, and the of EUR 74 217 million1.
options that can be considered for transition. In particular, when launching CSDP in a cri-
The European Union uses the term “transi- sis management situation, the EU is dealing with
tion strategy” rather than “exit strategy” as the complex environments, and fragile states are usu-
end of CSDP action will not be the end of the ally wicked problems2. The 28 EU Member States
EU’s involvement in the host country. By using will launch a mission to deal with a problem that
“exit strategies” the EU can inadvertently give the may not be well understood, with incomplete
impression to the host country that the Union is information, and with a clear need for multi-
ending its support. Clearly that will not be the dimensional cooperation. Common experiences
case; ending CSDP engagement is not the same as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – going far beyond
ending EU involvement. EU action – highlight the challenges of bringing
Transition strategies are important when consid- together different actors in the planning process,
ering that CSDP is not designed to be a long-term particularly in situations which are highly politi-
instrument; it is a crisis management tool that can cal. Synchronisation of CSDP planning with the
be fundamental in providing short- to medium- programming of development and other coopera-
term activity in order to assist in stabilising a situ- tion instruments is difficult, given that they usu-
ation. Development, particularly in fragile states, ally pursue different primary objectives and are
is a generational endeavour; this allows time for subject to different approval mechanisms. This
specialisation and focus, and it allows for longer also relates to both EU institutions and EU Mem-
interventions, with less variance and more adap- ber State development processes. Timing and
tation, monitoring and feedback. Development early engagement/agreement of all relevant actors
instruments are also funded to allow for long-term is key for any option to transition from/to CSDP
interventions. This is clearly demonstrated by the activity.
1 DG DEVCO budget is broken down into: Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) of EUR 19 662 million, Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) of EUR 15 433 million, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)
of EUR 7 058 million, European Development Fund (EDF) of EUR 30 506 million, EU Instrument for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR) of EUR 1 333 million, and the instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSC) of
EUR 225 million. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/programmes/
2 Conklin, Jeff; Wicked Problems & Social Complexity, Chapter 1 of Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding
of Wicked Problems, Wiley, November 2005.
68
1 BACKGROUND
Once launched, the regular review of CSDP A good example of this is Niger, where the Com-
missions through the Strategic Review process mission-funded national programme of Counter
will allow a reflection on whether we are doing Terrorism-Sahel ceased, and elements of that pro-
the right things and whether those things are gramme were “taken over” by the CSDP mission
being done well. This not only gives the oppor- EUCAP Sahel. Adaptability must be both ways in
tunity to refocus a CSDP mission, but also pro- order to achieve a “win-win” situation.
vides an indication of when transition could be Transition from CFSP/CSDP to support from
considered likely. The Head of Mission, inputting Development or other EU cooperation instru-
through the Civilian Operations Commander, ments also requires a fundamental change in
has an important role to play. Their assessment of mind-set, notably as we will be moving from a
how they are delivering against their mandate, an primarily foreign and security policy objective
indication of time likely to be required to com- (e.g. crisis management) towards a developmental
plete the mandated tasks, and their opinion as to or other EU cooperation objective (e.g. long-term
what the future of the mission is likely to be, are institution building). It must be clear that one EU
all fundamental to the review process. instrument cannot “replace” another; each instru-
While other EU instruments may not need to ment has its own clearly-defined purpose, but an
“take over” the task of a CSDP mission or opera- instrument could be used to sustain elements of
tion in the classical sense of “transition”, CSDP success achieved by another. In particular, the
activity can very well be an enabler for future transition from a military CSDP operation to
work under other instruments. Similarly, CSDP non-military instruments can, however, be espe-
tasks can benefit and help reinforce ongoing cially problematic. It has to be recognised that
activities managed under other EU instruments. political control, strategic direction, and the deci-
69
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
sion-making process must also transition from sudden drawdown or closure; adaption of the
CSDP to another internal EU-lead so that there is mission in its final stages could be considered.
no ‘impingement’ on CFSP competences, or vice b. Transition to host country. The ideal, and de-
versa, as mandated by Article 40 TEU. sired, transition where possible. This is current-
Transition strategies have to consider, in addi- ly (early 2015) being considered for EUTM
tion: Mali, where the host country is foreseen as be-
• the full, inclusive and transparent participa- ing able to conduct the majority of tasks that
tion of all actors (EU institutions and Member are being undertaken by the mission. This is
States) on the ground and in Brussels, with par- also partly anticipated in the cases of EUSEC
ticular emphasis on the need for a strong role and EUPOL RDC. As there may be concerns
for the EU Delegation; that the host country is not ready to sustain
• the existence of coordination mechanisms the progress made by the CSDP mission, im-
aligned with the strategic vision and objectives; pact assessments and evaluations should sup-
• the ownership of the partner country, under- port this option. DG DEVCO’s experience
pinned by the political and policy dialogue; with aid effectiveness principles (including the
• output, performance and impact indicators and New Deal for working in fragile and conflict-
the necessary processes to measure the progress affected states) and how national capacity can
on mandate delivery, in order to better guide be supported and built in order to support such
the transition. a transition can be very useful with this option.
Last but not least, transition must be understood c. Transition to a third party (the United Nations,
as a two sided process, and not a “translation” or African Union, etc.). This is where CSDP ac-
linear succession of CSDP to other instrument. tivity is designed as a “bridging” capability and
The process of the Strategic Review is a key step partners are prepared or preparing to sustain
when adjustments may need to be made to allow the CSDP role. Two examples are EUFOR
better synergies and coordination with other Tchad/RCA and, more recently, the Central
instruments. African Republic, where it is envisaged that the
operation will transition to the UN. Transition
to the UN (UNIOGBIS) was also explored for
Options for Transition from the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission.
CSDP d. Transition to Member States’ bilateral activ-
ity or to another EU instrument. Transition to
a. No transition is required or possible. There are Member States’ bilateral activity was an avenue
circumstances, especially related to confidence explored for the transition of EUAVSEC South
building, where there is no requirement or pos- Sudan and EUPOL and EUSEC RDC. It re-
sibility to transition to other means. Examples mains a critical area for development, includ-
could include EUMM Georgia and EUBAM ing with third parties. Transition to another
Rafah. For EUMM Georgia, the monitoring EU instrument has historically been the most
of a ceasefire agreement is specifically a CSDP common transition strategy, and examples in-
task (Art. 43(1)). For EUBAM Rafah, if the clude Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and DRC.
mission is unable to monitor the border cross- A range of options is available, principally de-
ing point at Rafah (as agreed in the Agree- velopment programmes, but this could also
ment on Movement and Access of 2005) due include other forms of CFSP support, possi-
to broader political constraints, then it will bly used under Article 28 (including through
be likely that no other instrument would be Member States funding), dedicated teams
able to do that. However, this may not mean a within the EU Special Representative (EUSR)
70
1 BACKGROUND
Photo: EEAS
HRVP Federica Mogherini with Prime Ministers Aleksandar Vučić and Isa Mustafa on 10 February 2015
in Brussels, finalising the agreement on justice. Facilitated by the EU since October 2012, this high-level
dialogue aims at normalising relations and promoting cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina
office, and/or strengthening either the local is an option to significantly drawn down the
Delegation or EUSR with relevant expertise. mission in the country and retain a small cell to
Agreement has to be reached with the other EU assess/monitor the situation and surge capac-
instrument that they will take on the transition ity into the country if required. The funding
activity, and a clear coherent strategy from the for this would come from the CSDP budget as
outset can be instrumental in this. Understand- the mission would either not close or it would
ing, and agreement, as regards likely CFSP be reconstituted as a small CSDP monitoring
timelines and objectives must be provided, not- mission.
ing that this may impinge on Member States’ b. Short-term bridging capability. If, as hap-
desire to have very broad objectives and short, pened with DRC, the planning assumption
politically driven, timelines. The failure of tran- for transition changes due to events on the
sition in EUAVSEC South Sudan has provided ground, then Article 28 could be considered
a clear lesson in this regard. so as to guarantee sustainment whilst develop-
In practice, there are a number ways to facilitate ment programmes are finalised and put into
transition, and in reality CSDP transition strate- place. The practical difficulty of ensuring that
gies will often include elements of more than one the transition starts while development activi-
of these options. ty may not be fully planned is recognised, and
a. A mix of short-term extension and progressive using Article 28 (in this case as both short-
reduction of CSDP activity. If the CSDP mis- term and clearly focussed) could prove useful
sion is close to transition but there remains a if the political decision to close the mission
concern about closing the mission fully, there has been taken.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Steps have been taken to improve our collec- justment of their future planning to the new
tive planning methodology, and these should have situation created by the CSDP effort. This
ensured that the Crisis Management Concept could relate to new activities in parallel to
(CMC) – the bedrock of further planning – has the CSDP action still ongoing (to support
transition strategies articulated very early in the or complement or take advantage of it) and
planning process: activities foreseen after closure of the mis-
• A coherent strategy, such as using a Politi- sion/operation. Such timelines can then be
cal Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA), incorporated in CSDP planning and review
agreed through a consultative process between processes.
the Commission, the External Action Service, • Collaborative planning should have continued
and Member States, enhances understanding at the CMC stage, in particular between the
and collaboration between different EU actors. Crisis Management and Planning Directorate,
Overarching EU strategy documents, such as the EEAS geographical desks, and relevant ac-
Joint Framework Documents or regional strat- tors in the European Commission as it may
egies, can greatly assist in providing a common provide a better understanding of what, how
vision for EU action. Shared conflict analysis and when CSDP will deliver, and more realistic
helps enhance such understanding and collabo- mandate durations required for CSDP activity,
ration; if we seek to transition to development means.
• Collaborative planning before CSDP mission Planners/programmers will also require an un-
launch between EEAS and relevant Commis- derstanding of Member States’ bilateral activ-
sion services is instrumental as it may provide ity (active and planned) to make this coherent.
better understanding of the (collective) tasks This will also be key during operational plan-
to be achieved. To make this fully effective, an ning by the Civil or Military Operation Com-
agreement on the EU’s objectives and instru- manders;
ments should be in place in the PFCA, so that • At the Strategic Review stage, and as we get
CSDP planners and development program- closer to understanding when CSDP objectives
mers already have senior-level agreement on are likely to be achieved, then a Transition Road
likely tasking and could start parallel plan- Map prepared in coordination with all relevant
ning. In concrete terms this results in the fol- actors can be a useful tool for joint planning
lowing: and programming. A dedicated Task Force
1. for CSDP: a planning process that attempts might usefully be established for that purpose.
to link the CSDP effort to what is already This was utilised for DRC and EULEX Kosovo
planned and/or ongoing by EU or other and proved to be of great value.
partners. This should also allow “tighter”
and clearly focussed objectives for CSDP; Thus, we have in place the conceptual and
2. for EU actors managing other instruments: planning methodology to allow early and broad
to agree as part of the CSDP planning pro- discussion on transition. This will remain a live
cess how they may adjust implementation of topic throughout the life cycle of a mission; and
ongoing work in view of the CSDP action the operational level has both the ability and the
and what the timelines are for possible ad- mechanisms to input.
72
1 BACKGROUND
First of all, the fundamental distinction between likely to be part of a wider tapestry of crisis man-
foreign policy and diplomacy is worth noting. agement tools (civilian and military).
Foreign policy is the political process of deciding Diplomatic engagement is therefore an integral
upon priorities and interests and, as such, is dis- part of any crisis prevention/management process
tinct from diplomacy, which concerns itself with where the primary objective is to bring a peace-
implementing foreign and security policy. The ful end to a dispute with the aim of contribut-
two are obviously related in the sense that foreign ing to longer-term stabilisation. Different forms
policy decisions will lay out the parameters and of diplomatic engagement are likely to be pre-
mandates for any diplomatic engagement. Beyond sent throughout the crisis cycle, with some stages
this, the actors involved in the making of foreign (mediation or the negotiation of agreements)
policy and its implementation are often different. being more intensive than others. In addition to
The former aspects are addressed elsewhere in this these more obvious aspects, diplomatic engage-
volume, while the latter are of primary concern ment will also involve extensive coordination
here. efforts with the local actors (including EU mem-
The EU’s diplomatic engagement is not pre- bers), regional actors (like the AU or OSCE) and
scriptive. The actual tools employed depend very often international organisations such as the UN.
much upon the specifics of any given crisis sce- Given the scenario-dependent nature of the EU’s
nario. The range of diplomatic tools that can be diplomatic engagement, the sections that follow
employed is extensive. On the crisis prevention aim to give a broad overview of the mix of actors
side (which has been a ‘fixed priority’ for the EU and the types of activity that could be involved in
since 2001) this might involve exchanges with the support of the Union’s foreign and security policy
pertinent interlocutors, either for fact-finding or goals, which provide the parameters for any diplo-
aimed at mediation and/or crisis resolution. Vari- matic engagement.
ous incentives can also be brought to bear in sup-
port of such diplomatic efforts, more often than
not in the form of economic ‘carrots’ that may be
tied to development aid and assistance or trade
preferences, or even both. Persuasion can also take
Graphic: Wikimedia Commons
73
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Analysis and task forces ment, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Manage-
ment).
Any diplomatic overtures will initially be based The principal role of the HR/VP is therefore
on the available analysis of information derived that of coordination and ensuring the consistency
from multiple sources, such as the analysis of of the EU’s external policies. She may, however,
intelligence derived from civilian and military choose to involve herself directly in the negotia-
sources. As a supplement to the available analysis tions (as in the case of Kosovo, Serbia and Iran) as
the EU may also dispatch a task force in order the key EU diplomatic actor. If the HR/VP is not
to provide on-the-ground reporting. This stage involved directly, she will certainly remain abreast
therefore belongs more in the realm of foreign of all developments and will steer accordingly.
policy, although it may involve key diplomatic
actors, such as personnel from the proximate EU
Delegation, the Special Representative, the local Special Representatives
diplomatic representation of EU Member States,
experts from the relevant parts of the EU head- The EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) sup-
quarters and other EU institutions, in particular port the work of the HR/VP. They are appointed
the European Commission, where many of the with a specific mandate relating to a crisis-prone
relevant funding instruments are to be found. or post-crisis country or region (in places as
This stage will also give those involved in any diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
foreseeable diplomatic engagement the chance to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean).
study their potential interlocutors. There are ten at the time of writing. Their indi-
vidual mandates will differ according to the spe-
cific country or regional dynamics, but they share
The HR/VP the common tasks of being a key coordination
point for the EU representatives on the ground,
The HR/VP is at the pyramid of any diplo- as well as other international partners. Many for-
matic response. She will be thoroughly briefed mer SRs were senior national diplomats, while
on developments and, in turn, will ensure that the tendency more recently has been to appoint
the national foreign ministers are also briefed senior EEAS staff. The role of the EUSRs as the
via the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The HR/ ‘face and voice’ of the EU obviously has to be
VP will also chair the Crisis Platform, an ad hoc exercised sensitively, especially with regard to the
body created specifically in response to an exter- EU’s Delegations and other EU staff present on
nal crisis. The Crisis Platform draws together all the ground.
those involved in the crisis response cycle, includ- The SRs may also play an important role in
ing non-EU countries where relevant. Although mediation and negotiation, supported by the
relatively new, the Platform has an important applicable EU Delegation and with a detailed
role bearing in mind the HR/VP’s obligation to mandate provided via the headquarters. This
ensure ‘the consistency of the Union’s external often demands considerable diplomatic tact and
action’. Under the Juncker Commission, the discretion from the SR, as well as support from
HR/VP (in her latter capacity) is also responsible the applicable Delegation, the headquarters and
for coordinating and steering the project team other interested third parties. The question of the
‘Europe in the World’ (including, but not lim- longer-term utility of the SRs remains open, espe-
ited to, the Commissioners for European Neigh- cially since Heads of Delegation and Delegation
bourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, staff could potentially assume many of the tasks
Trade, International Cooperation and Develop- currently performed by SRs.
74
1 BACKGROUND
The EEAS and the Delegations tiple dialogues spread across all policy sectors)
as well as other important local actors (such as
The headquarters plays a significant role in civil society organisations). The Delegations are
assisting the HR/VP as well as the other principal also the source of information about the EU’s
EU actors. The Service also includes many of the positions for the host country or region – this
relevant crisis management response bodies (civil- information is provided in regular ‘lines-to-take’
ian and military) as well as the Crisis Platform (see briefings sent from Brussels on a daily basis. The
above). The EU’s 140 Selegations, which are part overall emphasis is on offering a coordinated and
of the EEAS, are at the forefront of the EU’s dip- ‘comprehensive’ approach to any given crisis.
lomatic engagement. They are often best placed
to assess the local conditions and they also share
information with the diplomatic representations of The Member States
the EU Member States. The number of Delegation
staff varies considerably from country to country The Member States have already been men-
but may swell considerably in crisis-torn countries, tioned on a number of occasions, thus already
especially those hosting crisis management mis- indicating their important role. Much of their
sions (for example the Democratic Republic of the diplomatic engagement occurs at the initial stages
Congo, South Sudan and Tanzania). of the crisis response cycle, with intensive engage-
The transition from Commission Delegations ment within and between the national capitals
(pre-Lisbon) to EU Delegations (post-Lisbon) in order to ensure the necessary consensus on a
has put far more emphasis on diplomatic engage- course of action at EU level.
ment for a wide variety of foreign and security Most effective crisis responses, especially in a
issues. One of the early challenges for the new- crisis management context, rely on Member State
style Delegations involved the general quality support (in order to secure the necessary agree-
of the political reporting to support the early ment to legitimise crisis intervention) and, more
warning role, although national diplomats tem- often than not, the necessary resources and man-
porarily assigned to the Delegations have greatly power. Hence, it is vital that Member State ‘buy
boosted the quality, as have the growing confi- in’ is present from the very earliest stages. Under
dence and experience of the Delegation staff in the treaties, the Union and the Member States
foreign and security policy matters. A further must observe the ‘principle of sincere coopera-
challenge was the frequent absence of special- tion’ – this includes refraining from any action
ist security knowledge in Delegations to bolster which could jeopardise the attainment of the
diplomatic efforts on the ground. In many cases Union’s objectives.
this has been resolved by the temporary place- The Member States are involved at multiple
ment of EU Military Staff personnel in Delega- levels. The analytical and fact-finding stages have
tions where there is a demand for specific skills already been mentioned. The relevant working
and advice (often those in the early stages of a groups in Brussels will also be actively involved
CSDP mission or those with one underway) or and much of the drafting for any crisis manage-
regional security advisers. The need for security ment mission will be done in this context. There
specialists in Delegations is now widely recog- will be strong coordination with the national cap-
nised, but has to be balanced against practical itals via the European Correspondents, who will
considerations, such as the available budget and also liaise with the PSC, the working groups and
human resources. other EU institutions such as the Commission. A
The Delegations are at the forefront of dialogue dedicated group of External Relations (RELEX)
with the host government (there are often mul- advisers will prepare the legal, institutional and
75
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
financial aspects of decisions to be made in the What does this mean in diplomatic terms? The
CFSP/CSDP area. At the ambassadorial level, implications are twofold. First, any diplomatic
both the PSC and the Committee of Permanent engagement should consider the full spectrum of
Representatives, based in the various permanent tools and resources available for the crisis response
representations in Brussels, will also be involved. cycle, with the objective of addressing the root
Formal decisions on any CSDP mission are made causes of conflict. Second, successful coordination
at the level of foreign ministers. and streamlining at all stages of the crisis response
It is also worth noting that the Member States cycle must underpin any diplomatic engagement.
are heavily involved in the work of the EU’s Del- If resources or expertise are not available when
egations, with around 45 % of the administra- required, the legitimacy of any diplomatic engage-
tive-level officials comprising national diplomats ment may be undermined.
on temporary assignment. Their diplomatic expe-
rience (many of the political advisers are national
diplomats) is of particular relevance for crisis Stocktaking and prospects
response.
The EU has acquired considerable experience
in various facets of crisis prevention and man-
The European Commission agement over the last few decades. As we look to
the future and to ways of enhancing the Union’s
The European Commission is an essential diplomatic engagement, it is evident that clearer
actor when it comes to wider conflict prevention strategic guidance is needed in order to ascer-
or post-conflict stabilisation. Very few crises are tain more clearly when and whether to intervene
unidimensional and many will require the use and how any intervention would serve the EU’s
of multiple tools and instruments over a period broader values and interests, especially with finite
of time to address the crisis. This often involves resources. The EU is often criticised, with some
thinking through the links between the crisis justification, for being cacophonous and slow.
management aspects and the development-ori- Diplomatic efforts may be complicated by the
ented ones (although progress has been made, the inability to bring some financial instruments to
security-development nexus remains one of the bear in a timely manner, and by internal coordi-
most challenging in terms of linking together the nation issues within and between the EU’s institu-
different aspects, ensuring there are smooth hand- tions. The recent emphasis on the ‘comprehensive
over mechanisms and the fundamental goals are approach’ has the benefit of focusing attention on
understood and observed consistently). The Horn how to join up the three Ds (diplomacy, devel-
of Africa and the Sahel are often quoted as exam- opment and defence) more effectively. Finally,
ples of early application of the comprehensive introspection can also be helpful for diplomats
approach. and others alike. In this regard there is a need
Generally speaking, CFSP/CSDP measures to ensure that the ‘lessons learned’ at the end of
are often aimed at shorter-term crisis avoidance any EU crisis involvement are properly extracted
or stabilisation, while the Commission’s expertise and assimilated into a modified or refined crisis
and instruments are employed for longer-term response cycle. Although these suggestions would
stability. This may involve measures such as Secu- benefit the EU’s crisis response capacities more
rity Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobili- effectively in general, they would also strengthen
sation and Reintegration. its diplomatic engagement.
76
1 BACKGROUND
Conflict prevention – by facilitating the reso- Within the EEAS, the Division for Conflict
lution of underlying tensions and disputes – can Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instru-
save lives, reduce suffering, and avoid the destruc- ments (within the Directorate for Security Policy
tion of infrastructure and the economy. Peace- and Conflict Prevention) supports the geographi-
building – itself a core tenet of Common Security cal services and Delegations, crisis response/
and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions – provides management services, as well as EEAS senior
an important foundation to enable fragile and management, in taking real-time decisions in the
conflict-affected countries to progress towards pursuit of peace and in anticipation of crises and
wider development goals. Mediation and dialogue prevention of conflict. The division increasingly
facilitation can be an effective and cost-efficient supports CSDP missions and operations, for
means of preventing, transforming or resolving example through conflict analysis, as a basis for
violent conflict. the development of a Political Framework for Cri-
The importance of these aspects, therefore, sis Approach. Close cooperation with the Euro-
is enshrined in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty pean Commission on these issues is also ensured
which – for the first time at Treaty level – includes (notably, with the DEVCO Unit on Fragility and
the goal ‘to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and Crisis Management and the Stability Instrument
strengthen international security’ among the objec- Operations Unit in the Service for Foreign Policy
tives of the EU’s external action. The general refer- Instruments).
ences in Article 21 were further developed in the Specific tools of relevance for CSDP missions
2011 Council conclusions on conflict prevention. and operations are introduced below:
In addition, the 2009 EU Concept on Media- • Early Warning System,
tion and Dialogue Capacities advocates the use of • Conflict Analysis and
mediation as a tool of first response to emerging • Justice and Security Sector Reform Support.
or on-going crisis.
More generally, further strengthening of the
EU’s comprehensive approach to conflicts and The EU Conflict
crises in third countries is increasingly high on the Early Warning System
political agenda. Conflict prevention and mitiga-
tion efforts (notably, robust and perceptive early The EU’s Conflict Early Warning System is
warning systems; sound and systematic conflict part of a shift in emphasis away from reacting to
analysis; flexible mediation support capacities; crises towards conflict prevention. The aim is to
and identifying EU early responses) constitute the preserve lives and livelihoods that might other-
bed-rock of such a broad approach – which in fact wise be destroyed when violent conflict erupts.
comprises a wide range of mechanisms and tools As well as the severe human costs of violent con-
(including CSDP missions, as one among other flict, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development
diplomatic, political dialogue, trade, and external Report showed that civil wars destroy decades of
assistance measures). gross domestic product (GDP) growth on aver-
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
age and it takes countries years to get back onto a an interest and ability to take additional action,
sustainable growth path. and
In order to prevent the emergence, re-emer- 2. the EU early response = the development of
gence or escalation of violent conflict, early warn- concrete early action proposals and subsequent
ing is indispensable. It is about systematically monitoring of the various EU actions taken
providing the right information to the right peo- forward for implementation.
ple at the right time – connecting the dots across
relevant actors in the field and at headquarters. It
encompasses the systematic collection and analy- Conflict Analysis and the
sis of information from a variety of sources, development of response
1. in order to identify and understand the risks for options
violent conflict in a country, and
2. in order to develop strategic responses to miti- Past evaluations of EU assistance, as well as
gate those risks. lessons learnt from CSDP missions, have shown
that the EU has been investing heavily in conflict
In the EU’s approach to early warning for con- contexts. Yet with insufficient conflict analysis to
flict prevention the goal is not ‘prediction’. It will inform its strategy development and program-
always be difficult to pinpoint the exact trigger for ming, the EU’s impact on addressing the causes
the eruption of violence in the future. What we do and consequences of conflict has been limited.
know is that there are certain factors and indica- Conflicts (and not only violent conflicts) are
tors that frequently correlate with the emergence often complex and multifaceted, involving local
of violent conflict. If we can bring together infor- populations, warring factions, state armies, rebel
mation and analysis to better identify and assess movements, and regional and international play-
these structural, underlying risks for violent con- ers. This constantly changing, complex web of
flict, we can more easily pursue early preventive causes and actors, their interests, agendas, and
actions before situations escalate into crises. This actions can make it difficult for decision makers
is upstream conflict prevention in essence. More- and implementers to understand how, where and
over, country risk assessments enable decision- when to intervene.
makers to take decisions on prevention (and crisis To address this challenge, the EU has devel-
response) based on evidence and a deeper under- oped a systematic approach to conflict analysis.
standing of the underlying causes and dynamics It can be used by decision makers, practitioners
of violence in countries and regions. and diplomats to make strategic and operational
The Early Warning System is a consultative decisions. It is in line with the comprehensive
process that in Brussels involves the EEAS, includ- approach, which calls for a ‘common methodol-
ing CSDP actors, relevant services of the Com- ogy to conflict and crisis analysis.’
mission and Member States through the Political Conflict analysis is not only a product but also
and Security Committee and geographical work- a process. This is important as it needs to be car-
ing groups. At country level, EU Delegations, ried out, and shared, by those who need to apply
CSDP missions and operations, EUSR teams and the results in their own work. The EU’s compre-
Member State embassies are involved. The process hensive approach sets this out clearly: ‘A shared
broadly consists of two parts: analysis should set out the EU’s understanding about
1. the EU ‘early warning’ = a scan of conflict risk the causes of a potential conflict or crisis, identify the
around the world, leading to an EU prioritisa- key people and groups involved, review the dynam-
tion of countries/regions where there is a sig- ics of the situation and assess the potential risks of
nificant risk of escalation and where the EU has action, or non-action.’
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1 BACKGROUND
Drivers of peace
What helps resilience against
violence and escalation?
Institutions promoting peace.
Causes Stakeholders
What structural and proximate Who are the Stakeholders act-
factors cause conflict? ing or affected by the conflict?
(political, economic, Interests, goals, positions,
social, security or other) capacities and relationships.
Conflict dynamics
What is driving conflicts and
violence?
Patterns and triggers for violence.
What is the impact?
Scenarios Options
What are possible What are possible strategies?
future developments? What are the options to
realise them?
Responses
What has the EU done/is doing?
And others?
Assessment.
Conflict analysis is a structured approach, right mix of people, combining the necessary
addressing different elements of a conflict in turn. knowledge with those that need to ‘own’ the
This is needed to complement the daily monitor- analysis when they take it forward in their own
ing of events and political developments and gain work. Relevant outside experts may provide exter-
a deeper understanding of underlying issues and nal perspectives and help avoid ‘group-think’. This
dynamics. latter approach, called ‘light touch’ conflict analy-
The diagram above shows the different ele- sis has proven to be very useful for responsive and
ments of conflict analysis. It shows that in the flexible use within the EU (and where necessary
EU approach, analysis goes beyond understand- followed up by deeper/continued analysis). Such
ing what is going on and why, also assessing what conflict analysis workshops are particularly per-
could happen (scenario building) and what has tinent in conflict-affected settings characterised
been and is being done to help prevent or resolve by rapidly-moving developments, and they have
the conflict (responses). On this basis, the analysis already been organised in a number of conflict
process concludes by identifying specific objec- situations (Mali, DRC, Libya, Lebanon, Syria,
tives or strategies to address key drivers of conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nigeria). They result
and specific options for how the EU could con- in short and structured conflict analysis reports
tribute to these objectives. which combine analysis with a set of options to
In concrete terms, conflict analysis can take address the core conflict issues that were identi-
many forms, ranging from an in-depth field fied. As such, the results can serve as a common
assessment or conflict-sensitive political economy point of departure to explore options to use the
analysis to a two-day workshop that gathers the wide range of EU tools available in an effective
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
way – thereby ensuring a solid basis for a com- than 100 countries. Moreover, CSDP missions are
prehensive approach. The EEAS Conflict Preven- currently supporting justice and security institu-
tion, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments tions in countries such as Bosnia and Herzego-
Division, often in partnership with DEVCO’s vina, Afghanistan, DRC, Mali and Somalia.
Fragility and Crisis Management Unit can help An integrated EU approach to programming,
organise and facilitate these events upon request. designing and implementing JSSR programmes
will be crucial to cope with these challenges and
the growing need for support. An EU Informal
Justice and Security Sector Inter-service Group on Security Sector Reform –
Reform (JSSR) managed by the Conflict Prevention, Peace-build-
ing and Mediation Instruments Division, in close
The Arab Spring up risings – as well as recent association with relevant geographical and crisis
events in a number of African countries – have management services from the EEAS and the
underlined the continuing challenge faced by Commission (DG DEVCO) – aims to facilitate
many countries regarding the provision of effec- such an approach.
tive, legitimate and accountable justice and secu- This forum primarily aims to exchange infor-
rity services. The EU has long supported JSSR mation between CSDP missions, crisis response
programmes, through a wide range of diplomatic, actions and governance/development pro-
crisis response, development and security mecha- grammes, on planned JSSR interventions from
nisms. The EU, over the period 2001-2009, dis- the early stages onwards. It also promotes joint
bursed approximately EUR 1 billion in funds for analysis as a basis for effective response and imple-
development cooperation, targeting JSSR in more mentation.
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1 BACKGROUND
1 From 2007 to 2013, the geographic distribution of funds allocated under the IfS Crisis Response envelope (Art. 3) was
34 % to Africa, 34 % to Middle East and North Africa, 17 % to Asia and Pacific, 9 % to Latin America and the Carib-
bean, 5 % to Central Asia and South Caucasus, and 1 % to Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
operations. Cooperation between the latter and Crisis Response under the IcSP
the IcSP has included hands-on cooperation in (Art. 3)
the field, such as the IcSP running reconciliation
projects between communities in the very sectors Under Article 3 the IcSP can provide assis-
of Bangui where the EUFOR mission in CAR tance in response to situations of crisis or emerg-
was maintaining order. It has also included pro- ing crisis to prevent conflicts on a wide range of
vision of non-military equipment to beneficiaries issues such as: support for mediation, confidence
of CSDP operations (‘train and equip’) – but of building, interim administrations, security sec-
course not to CSDP operations themselves. tor reform and strengthening the rule of law,
The IcSP was established by Regulation (EU) measures to combat the illicit use of and access
No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and to firearms, small arms and light weapons, demi-
the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an ning, reintegration measures for former com-
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. It batants, threats to public health linked to pan-
has a budget of EUR 2.3 billion, which amounts demics, transitional justice or the role of natural
to 2.5 % of the EU’s entire external action portfo- resources in conflict.
lio (Heading IV of the EU budget) for the period Even though crisis response measures account
2014-2020. This financial envelope is at the same for 70 % of all IcSP funding, Article 3 is still a
level as that available for CSDP and marks a consid- relatively small but rapidly accessible and targeted
erable increase from the EUR 1.6 billion allocated envelope that is mobilised when other EU instru-
to its predecessor, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), ments cannot be deployed for reasons of timing or
which was in force from 2007 until the end of 2013. the nature of the crisis. Crisis response measures
82
1 BACKGROUND
CASE STUDY
IcSP Crisis Response Measure
in support of Police Reform in Myanmar
Implementation of the project has largely been successful so far, with strong buy-in from
government authorities, the main opposition party in Parliament and civil society. More
than 4 300 police officers have already been trained in best international practice in crowd
management and an equal number of personal protective equipment sets have been de-
livered, which has led to observable partial change in the behaviour of the MPF in public
order situations. In parallel more than 750 officers have been trained in community polic-
ing with a strong focus on ‘train-the-trainers‘ and, due to its success, an extension of the
community policing pilot to three additional areas. Progress on drafting a new police vision
and guidance manual has also been made. Despite profound initial reluctance on all sides,
the first joint MPF-civil society and MPF-media workshops have been successfully imple-
mented, helping to nurture a fragile trust-building process. In order to ensure the continu-
ity of the EU engagement, a longer-term police reform support project is being developed
under the geographic programme of the Development Cooperation Instrument.
usually act as a catalyst to prepare the ground for The key advantage of IcSP crisis response
more sustained, long-term assistance and develop- measures is their speed and flexibility. As Arti-
ment programmes of the EU, its Member States cle 3 is non-programmable, crisis response meas-
or other donors. In the context of the EU’s com- ures do not require formal approval via standard
prehensive approach, the IcSP therefore comple- EU ‘comitology’ procedures. Instead they are
ments but does not replace humanitarian aid or presented for information to the Political and
longer-term instruments. Security Committee of the Council, principally
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
84
1 BACKGROUND
CASE STUDY
The IcSP’s Peace-building Partnership
in support of International Crisis Management Missions – ENTRi and EUPST
Europe’s New Training Initiative (ENTRi) is an innovative programme to build the capacities
of civilian experts to participate in civilian stabilisation missions of the EU, the UN and oth-
er international organisations. With a budg-
et of EUR 3.3 million its current cycle runs
from 2013 to 2016 and it is implemented by
a consortium of 15 European Training Pro-
viders. ENTRi offers pre-deployment cours-
es for specific country contexts, in-country
training for local staff of international mis-
sions as well as specialised courses on a
wide area of subjects such as human rights,
gender, rule of law or mission administra-
tion. In addition, ENTRi certifies EU civilian
crisis management courses, has produced a
handbook for civilian experts working in mis-
sions, and is currently developing e-learning
possibilities.
The European Union’s Police Services Training Programme (EUPST) is currently entering
its third phase, which will run from 2015 to 2018 with an overall budget of EUR 6.25 mil-
lion. It is again planned to be implemented by the EUPST consortium, which is made up
of police and gendarmerie services of several EU Member States. Like its predecessors,
EUPST aims to build up the capacity of police officers from the EU, non-EU countries con-
tributing to CSDP missions, as well as African Union countries taking part in international
crisis management missions and projects with a police component. In line with the evolv-
ing mission reality on the ground, EUPST will aim to include more strengthening elements
in both training and practical exercises.
EUPST added value is threefold:
i) an international learning context and the possibility to integrate operational and com-
mand-post elements into operational training and comprehensive live exercises, close-
ly shadowing mission and project reality;
ii) a focus on inter-operability, best practices and harmonisation of training approaches
and the formulation of the resulting lessons learned, in close cooperation with the Eu-
ropean Police College; and
iii) stimulation of international linkages and exchange of best practices in international
policing with partners outside the EU.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
1 EU Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Norway.
86
1 BACKGROUND
2 http://www.gdacs.org
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31996R1257
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Pro- The statements that EU humanitarian aid is
tection department (ECHO) has organised much needed life- independent of political, military or economic
saving humanitarian cargo from Europe to Bangui, the capi-
objectives of the Union and that it is not a cri-
tal of Central African Republic
sis management tool often cause consternation
among other EU actors that engage in external
The Commission does not implement the EU’s action. Is it not naïve in a 21st century world with
humanitarian aid itself but through pre-selected complex international relations to make such
implementing partners: around 200 organisations, claims? Is it not hypocritical? What does it mean
ranging from humanitarian NGOs to the Red for EU foreign policy?
Cross/Red Crescent and the UN system, along The principled approach is derived from the
with a number of Member States’ specialised Geneva conventions and is enshrined in the EU
agencies, such as the German Federal Agency for Treaty as well as in the above-mentioned Euro-
Technical Relief (THW). However, ECHO is also pean Consensus. It is also grounded in operational
directly engaged in the field, thanks to its global necessity and logic, particularly in complex emergen-
network of technical field experts. This field net- cies. In such situations, especially in conflicts, access to
work provides ECHO with real time situational the most vulnerable people depends on there not being
awareness and humanitarian needs assessments an association of EU humanitarian aid with military
and it also monitors closely the implementation or political interests on the ground, not taking sides in
of ECHO-funded projects. In addition, ECHO a conflict and helping all those in need, irrespective
has developed sound humanitarian sector policies of their political views, religious beliefs or other per-
(e.g. food security, nutrition, water and sanita- suasion. This independence and neutrality are also
tion, gender) that allow it to influence and often crucial for the safety and security of ECHO’s own staff
lead the international humanitarian system. and implementing partners. In other words, human-
According to the European Consensus on itarian assistance in areas controlled by a party to
Humanitarian Aid, to which all Member States the conflict would not be possible if the EU logo
and EU institutions have subscribed, EU assis- coming with it were associated with another party
tance is given on the basis of needs, in line with in the conflict, or even merely with vested interests.
the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers
impartiality and independence. It is therefore not a were assaulted in a record number of attacks (see
crisis management tool. Needs are assessed through graphic) and more than a third (155) were killed.
an evidence-based, rigorous methodology, which For these reasons the humanitarian community
also enables ECHO to compare needs with funding has to take care to avoid misperceptions and
from other sources and establish a list of “forgotten strengthen its independent, neutral and impartial
88
1 BACKGROUND
and the perception that its actions are principled. 100 107
Graphic: Fink-Hooijer/scala
In short, the principled approach encompassed 63 63
75
50
in humanitarian aid makes possible an EU pres-
ence in cases where other relations are impossible. 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Yet ECHO does not operate in a vacuum, but is
In 2013, 454 humanitarian relief workers were assaulted in
part of a broader EU structure. ECHO therefore
a record number of 247 attacks and more than a third (155)
works closely with other Commission services were killed
(e.g. with DG DEVCO on resilience and linking
relief, rehabilitation and development and solu- in internationally accepted guidelines4 and Host
tions to protracted displacement) as well as the Nation Support agreements. Specific internal EU
EEAS and other CFSP actors. documents approved by the PSC5 and further elab-
As to information sharing, ECHO does provide orated between the EU Military Staff and ECHO
selected information to help shape other policies, apply when ECHO draws on military support in
but in such a way as to ensure it does not com- civil protection operations, which remain civilian in
promise operational security and access of ECHO nature irrespective of the means deployed.
staff and partners. For instance, regular situation In short, ECHO is “in but out” of the EU com-
updates in the Council working groups bring prehensive approach. It is in to assess situations
Member States up to speed on assessments from and ring alarm bells; to help formulate key mes-
the field. An ECHO presence at the Crisis Plat- sages on issues like IHL; to help mobilise politi-
form ensures that EU deliberations on EU foreign cal, development or military action when needed.
policy are given a humanitarian reality check. There is also cooperation between civil protection
Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) and military assets when needed. But it is also
and CSDP planning documents also benefit from out, as humanitarian aid cannot be put under any
relevant ECHO input. Conversely, ECHO also political, military or economic objective or com-
informs CFSP colleagues of situations that require mand. It needs to retain neutrality, impartiality
stronger political or military attention – such as and independence to be able to operate in conflict
compliance with International Humanitarian situations. The careful judgement call as to how
Law (IHL) and protection of civilians – and may best to apply the “in-but-out” approach in each
also plead for action as need be. crisis is the role of civil-military relations within
For similar reasons, in the vast majority of cases, ECHO. ECHO therefore maintains close links
civil protection as a form of governmental assistance with the crisis management structures within the
is provided in non-conflict environments. The rules EEAS to allow ECHO to be “in” as much as pos-
for the deployment of civil protection are laid down sible without compromising its independence.
4 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – “Oslo Guidelines” - Rev. 1.1
(November 2007).
5 General Framework for the use of Member States’ military or military chartered Transportation Assets and ESDP Coordi-
nation tools in Support of EU Disaster Response; Military support to EU disaster response: Identification and coordina-
tion of available assets and capabilities.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
In
But Out
the comprehensive approach in guidelines are drawn up which describe the rela-
practice tionship between armed counterparts, including
EU CSDP operations, and humanitarians: does the
Taking into account the prevailing param- security situation warrant the use of armed escorts
eters in a given emergency or crisis situation and from UN or EU military forces? If so, how does
through an appropriate coordination mechanism that affect humanitarian access in areas controlled
and smart, context-dependent actions, the EU’s by the other forces? What is the division of labour
humanitarian and civil protection actions make in protecting the population (humanitarian protec-
an important contribution to the EU’s successful tion/protection of civilians)? Can military forces
comprehensive external action. attend humanitarian protection cluster meetings?
In the field, this translates into context-dependent There is no general yes-or-no answer to these ques-
relations between EU humanitarian aid and EU tions, as the situation will be different in each crisis,
CSDP operations and missions, if present. With the and humanitarians have to take into consideration
help of UN OCHA, the humanitarian community longer-term implications for how they are per-
carefully assesses the potential influence that closer ceived and accepted. The extent of “in” and “out”
relations with armed actors would have on its per- will therefore vary with each CSDP mission and
ceived independence. Frequently, country-specific operation.
90
1 BACKGROUND
Election Observation Missions (EOM) are a ing sustain able peace and stability. Elections
key tool at the service of a fundamental objec- provide groups of citizens with an opportunity
tive of the EU’s external action: the promotion of to express their political voice in competition
democratisation processes and respect for human with their opponents without resorting to vio-
rights across the world. The immediate goal is to lence, and thus enable the peaceful transfer of
strengthen transparency, and hence confidence political power. In this regard, election observa-
in the elections, deter fraud, and provide an tion activities conducted by the EU can comple-
informed and factual assessment of the election ment and enhance other EU crisis management
process that can also contribute to shaping the EU and peace-building initiatives in partner coun-
political reaction to the process. The long-term tries. EU election observation activities can thus
objective, however, is to improve the overall elec- contribute towards conflict prevention or resolu-
tion framework via the recommendations issued tion.
by the EOMs which must be followed up by both In some cases EU election observation activities
EU and domestic actors, hence promoting their will be taking place in the partner country where
ownership of the process. CSDP Missions or Operations are also deployed
The EU deploys every year on average ten at the same time, as was most recently the case in
EOMs across the world, with the exception of the Mali, Kosovo and Afghanistan (see box). While
OSCE region where the OSCE/ODIHR remains each EU instrument has its own distinct objec-
responsible for deploying EOMs. The EU has tive, they are all deployed in the spirit of the EU’s
become one of the main players in election obser- comprehensive approach, allowing for synergies
vation and enjoys high credibility. of effort as they often impact the wider good gov-
EU EOMs can, under certain circumstances, ernance and rule of law areas.
also assist partner countries in overcoming crisis EOMs are not CSDP actions but rather a joint
situations and facilitate democratic and/or endeavour of EU institutions and Member States,
post-conflict transitions. A genuine and demo- acting under the High Representative’s (HR)
cratic election process can contribute to ensur- political guidance and in line with the political
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
92
1 BACKGROUND
• Election Expert Mission (EEM) is the less • Following the creation of the EEAS, Member
costly option (maximum EUR 300 000), and States no longer participate in Exploratory
is deployed in countries that are not regarded Missions;
as among the main election priorities or when • The HR alone takes the decision, following the
security conditions allow only a very limited Exploratory Mission, on whether or not to de-
deployment. Consisting of two or more experts ploy an EOM;
they have very limited visibility and issue no • The HR decides on the appointment of the
public statement. The report is shared with the Chief Observer without consulting Member
authorities and sometimes published on a case- States, whilst the EP, following the Declaration
by-case basis. The EU deploys several EEM a of Political Accountability, has increased its
year, such as recently in Thailand and Algeria prerogatives and is now consulted on the selec-
(2014). tion of the Chief Observer.
A decision to deploy an EAT or an EEM does not Nevertheless, Member States are closely associated
automatically represent a negative judgment on with the various phases of the EOMs. The Politi-
the pre-election situation, and they are therefore cal and Security Committee is consulted twice
politically neutral. a year on the identification of election priorities
The system has also evolved following the and it is often briefed by Chief Observer for the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty with a countries that regularly feature on its agenda. The
stronger role of the HR. The main post-Lisbon views of Heads of Missions (HoMs) are an inte-
innovations are: gral part of the Exploratory Mission report and
• The HR has more leeway in setting the election once an EOM is decided on, the Council Work-
priorities, while consulting Member States and ing Parties and HoMs on the ground are regularly
the European Parliament; briefed. EOMs produce internal interim reports
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/pdf/compendium-of-int-standards-for-elections_en.pdf
recommendations to improve the election frame-
work before the next election cycle. To ensure a
lasting impact on democratisation it is essential
that the EU Delegations, the EEAS, the Euro-
pean Commission, the EP and Member States
follow up systematically on those recommenda-
tions through political dialogue and financial
assistance and promote local ownership in their Second Edition
EuropeAid
Second Edition
94
1 BACKGROUND
Mediation efforts are an inescapable feature print, the EU has displayed this practice in its role
of contemporary peacemaking. Since the end of as a third-party mediator. This is evident in the
the Cold War, the use of mediation as a way to EU’s recent high-level mediation work in Kosovo-
reach peace settlements between warring parties Serbia, Mali, South Sudan and Georgia, to name a
has become a standard tool for the international few cases. The EU has also engaged in supporting
community. Recognising the EU’s ambition and mediation and dialogue work at different levels,
capacity in this area, the EU Concept for Strength- including grassroots, in the Philippines, Colom-
ening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, bia, Syria and Libya, for example. Currently,
adopted by the Council in November 2009, states the EU is actively engaged in either conducting
that mediation is to be established “as a tool of or supporting mediation and dialogue in most
first response to emerging or ongoing crisis situa- regions of the world.3
tions”.1 It constitutes the policy basis for the EU’s
involvement in international peace mediation.
The post-Lisbon EU institutional set-up has What are mediation and
given further visibility to the EU’s role as an inter- dialogue?
national mediator. In particular, the creation of
the position of High Representative of the Euro- In the 2009 Concept, mediation is defined in
pean Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Pol- a broad sense, reflecting the great variety of ways
icy/Vice-President of the European Commission in which the EU uses this tool at different levels
(HR/VP) and, within the EEAS, the creation of and through different activities, including directly
the Mediation Support Team (MST) in the Con- mediating and facilitating; funding or providing
flict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation political and financial leverage; providing tech-
Instruments Division have enhanced the EU’s nical support; and promoting the wider use of
capability to conduct and support mediation and mediation and dialogue by national and interna-
dialogue. However, the extent to which the EU is tional actors.
engaged in mediation is not yet fully recognised, In practical terms, mediation is only one aspect4
even within the EU institutions.2 of conflict prevention, management, resolution
As a peace project itself, the EU has mediation, or transformation, where the parties to a conflict
dialogue and negotiation as an integral part of its request the assistance of, or accept an offer of
internal makeup: it has a long history and rich help from, a third party (an individual, organisa-
experience of mediation and dialogue within its tion, group, or state), to help them find a mutu-
own borders. As part of its foreign policy foot- ally acceptable solution to their conflict, without
1 Council of the European Union (2009), Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities, 15779/09.
2 Sherriff, A., Hauck, V. (2012), Glass Half Full: Study on EU Lessons Learnt in Mediation and Dialogue, ECDPM.
3 Ibid.
4 Mediation is only one tool for conflict resolution. Mediation is best seen as one part (albeit a very important part) of a
larger peace process that starts before and continues after the signing of a peace agreement.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
resorting to violence or physical force or invoking In most contexts where CSDP missions are
the authority of law. The third party (mediator) deployed, mediated peace processes will either be
should be impartial and accepted by the parties to ongoing, or just concluded, or the CSDP mission
lead them through a fair and impartial process of will form a part of efforts to lay the ground for
dialogue. The role of the mediator is to bring ideas, peaceful settlement, or may even directly oversee
knowledge, resources and authority, and ideally to or implement parts of a peace agreement. Either
orchestrate the multitude of actors, interests and way, these dynamics form a critical part of the
interventions involved in a peace process.5 context in which a CSDP mission is designed and
Mediation is an appealing conflict resolution planned and in which it operates. Mediation and
mechanism because it is voluntary, which makes it dialogue skills are also seen as critical by CSDP
less threatening for parties to a conflict than other mission staff in their day-to-day work. Many mis-
possible options, such as arbitration or the use of sions engage in informal dialogue and sometimes
force. Mediation ultimately leaves the final decisions dispute resolution at the working level.7 When
of any outcomes to the conflicting parties them- engaged in mediation, the EU uses a range of
selves. Furthermore, peace mediation has nowadays strategies that derive from the examples below:
largely moved away from negotiating fairly limited Communication facilitation strategies allow
ceasefire agreements, offering scope for more com- the mediator to adopt a fairly passive role, chan-
plex, multi-issue, multi-stakeholder, long-term tran- nelling information to the parties and facilitating
sition processes.6 Mediation today has the ambition cooperation, where she/he does not have control
to address the root causes of conflicts and reduce the over the more formal process or substance of
chances of any relapse into violence in the long run. mediation. This role can be effective in conflicts
where the parties do not have direct channels of
communication. An example is Aceh, where the
The conduct of mediation EU gave financial support to the facilitation of the
peace process by a Finnish NGO that had little
Who mediates in the EU? What relevance leverage over the parties or the outcome.8
for CSDP missions? Procedural strategies enable the mediator to
structure the mediation process and bring the par-
The principal and most visible EU mediator ties together in a neutral environment, where the
is the HR/VP, who in turn appoints EU Special mediator exerts some control over the mediation
Representatives (EUSRs) and Special Envoys, process. The mediator may exercise control over
who are empowered to mediate on the HR/VP’s timing, issues on the agenda, meeting place, fre-
behalf in specific conflicts. Due to the nature of quency, media relations, and the formality or flex-
their work, Heads of Delegations (HoDs) and ibility of the meetings. This is significant for parties
Heads of Missions (HoMs) frequently find them- to a conflict who may not have had an opportunity
selves mediating in the course of their daily work, to interact constructively. Former HR/VP Cath-
playing different formal and informal roles in the erine Ashton’s conduct of the Serbia-Kosovo Dia-
course of a wider peace process. logue is a classic example of this way of working.
5 Lanz, D. and Gasser, R. (2013), A Crowded Field: competition and coordination in international peace mediation, Cen-
tre for Mediation in Africa, Mediation Arguments, no. 2.
6 Papagianni (2014), National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion
Paper No.3, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office.
7 Gourlay, C. (2010), Mediation and Dialogue as Tools for EU CSDP Missions, Initiative for Peacebuilding.
8 Herrberg, A. (2008), ‘The Brussels Backstage to the Aceh Peace Process’, in Aguswandi and Large, J. (eds.), Reconfiguring
Politics: The Indonesia Aceh Peace Process Accord Series, Conciliation Resources.
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1 BACKGROUND
Directive strategies are the most intrusive former government representatives, acting in a
form of intervention. The mediator actively personal capacity.
shapes the content and nature of the final out- The outcomes of the various dialogues on the
come by offering the parties incentives, promises different tracks are non-binding. However, they
of support, threats of diplomatic or economic are channels used to explore options and build
sanctions or even the use of force by outside par- networks. Coherence between the different tracks
ties. The mediator confronts the parties with new (and particularly linking them all to the track 1
resources or the prospect of losing resources, if level) is crucial to their effectiveness.
certain agreements are not made or actions are Working with the multi-track systems by default
not taken. The idea is that this may change their ensures that the mediation process is inclusive and
incentive structure, and induce them to reach a works with multiple stakeholders. It also allows
resolution. In the strictest sense, directive strate- the process to address the root causes of conflict,
gies leave the remit of mediation, and go more which is consistent with the EU’s comprehen-
in the direction of power diplomacy. Yet they are sive approach. Nevertheless, special efforts must
often utilised in the context of peace processes as be made to bring in specific stakeholders usually
part of the ‘mediation repertoire’, especially when marginalised in conflict contexts, such as women
conflicts are highly escalated, and directly threaten and youth. Other inclusive mechanisms include
the interests of outside third parties, including the National Dialogue processes that try to engage the
mediator(s).9 country as a whole in a more informal but recon-
ciliatory process. For instance, the EU supported
the National Dialogue in Yemen between 2013
An inclusive and comprehensive and 2014, inter alia by playing an important role in
approach advocating and supporting the inclusion of youth,
women, and groups from outside the capital.
The 2009 Concept explicitly builds ‘multi-
track’ approaches into the EU’s understanding
of mediation, exemplifying the idea that peace EU institutional support for
processes cannot be limited to top-level leaders, dialogue and mediation
but need to reach deep and wide into the fabric
of a society affected by violent conflict. In an effort to optimise the effectiveness and
Track One refers to the official government professionalisation of mediation10, mediation
decision-making bodies or elite. Track Two support aims to improve mediation practice and
refers to mid-level elites who are influential and policy more widely, through various activities that
linked to decision-makers; these include civil include training, research, policy development
society organisations, think-tanks, religious and networking.
leaders, etc. Track three refers to grassroots/ The hub for EU mediation support is the EEAS
community based stakeholders. There is also the Mediation Support Team (MST), which provides
increasing distinction of a Track One-and-a- ongoing and real-time technical advice to EUSRs,
half, which focuses primarily on dialogue with Special Envoys, EU Delegations and Brussels-based
influential individuals, including current and EU staff, as well as to third parties outside the EU.
9 The strategies discussed above derive from Bercovitch’s work on intractable conflicts. See Bercovitch, J. (2004), ‘Interna-
tional Mediation and Intractable Conflict’, in Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Infor-
mation Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder.
10 See Lehman Larsen, S. (2014), Effectively Supporting Mediation: Developments, Challenges and Requirements, Oslo
Forum Paper, HD Centre.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Support is provided on specific and relevant the- specific topics. These are available to the general
matic topics and through deployment to the field, public via the EEAS website.
including scoping missions. Complementary sup-
port is provided by colleagues across the institu- Partnerships: The EEAS has built close and
tions, including the geographical Desks, Foreign constructive partnerships with key international
Policy Instrument11, DEVCO and the Delegations. organisations – including the UN, the AU,
The activities of the MST are as follows: ASEAN, the OSCE – dealing with mediation and
dialogue, in order to create synergies and foster
Operational support: The EU provides support cooperation. Outreach to Member States also
for ongoing operations by deploying both internal forms part of this work.
and external technical experts to support media-
tion processes around the world. Experts are
deployed to help design and run processes, advise Conclusions
the conflicting parties and mediators on a range
of thematic topics such as constitutional reform, International peace mediation is an evolving
ceasefire arrangements, power-sharing, human field. Most conflicts today are internal/civil wars,
rights and gender issues. The EEAS has access, with multiple conflicting parties, which make
through framework agreements, to two consortia them more complex, with a greater need to recon-
which include ten of the most prominent media- cile the parties and affected populations that will
tion and dialogue organisations in Europe and need to continue to co-exist side by side after the
beyond. The MST can deploy experts to the field violence ends. This has brought about a greater
at relatively short notice, even within two days. realisation that international third parties may be
best placed to support – but never replace – the
Mediation training and coaching: Training in critical, long-term peace work of local and national
mediation and dialogue is available to all EU staff, individuals and groups. Furthermore, this chang-
as well as external mediators and parties to con- ing landscape means that a reliance on mono con-
flicts. The MST provides two types of training flict resolution strategies, including classical diplo-
for mediators: personal one-to-one peer coaching macy, is seldom the only answer. Instead, multiple
for senior members of staff engaged in mediation efforts, with better links between a range of stake-
and dialogue (EUSRs, Special Envoys, HoDs and holders on multiple tracks – crucially also non-
HoMs). This is conducted by external experts state actors – are required to tackle contemporary
who are often experienced mediators themselves crisis and conflicts. Given these trends and needs,
in confidential sessions. The second type of train- mediation is gaining more visibility and traction
ing is an interactive workshop based methodol- as a key conflict resolution mechanism, involving
ogy, where mediation and negotiation skills are more funding, actors and tools than a decade ago.
taught, through role plays and scenarios. The EU’s commitment to conflict prevention, as
well as to the professionalisation and systematisa-
Knowledge management: In an effort to improve tion of its own, and others’, mediation work, gives
and professionalise the practice of mediation, the it a growing capacity and confidence in mediating
MST captures lessons learnt from peace efforts conflicts. This positive trend can be expected to
by debriefing EU mediators, commissions studies continue as the EU mainstreams its comprehen-
and produces fact-sheets and guidance notes on sive approach to crises and conflict.
11 The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace works with the MST technical experts to provide mediation support
through its European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) programme.
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1 BACKGROUND
1.4.7. Sanctions
by Kees Smit Sibinga
Sanctions, also referred to as restrictive meas- not responsible for such policies and actions, in
ures, against third countries, individuals or enti- particular the local civilian population, or regard-
ties are an essential foreign policy tool of the EU ing legitimate activities in or with the country
for pursuing its objectives in accordance with the concerned. The political objectives and criteria of
principles of the Common Foreign and Secu- the restrictive measures should be clearly defined
rity Policy. Certain EU measures are imposed in the legal acts. The types of measure will vary
in implementation of Resolutions by the UN depending on their objectives and their expected
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN effectiveness in achieving these objectives under
Charter. The EU may however decide to apply the particular circumstances, reflecting the EU’s
autonomous measures that are more restrictive in targeted and differentiated approach.
addition to the UN’s measures or, when adoption Restrictive measures must respect human rights
in the framework of the UN is not possible, adopt and fundamental freedoms, in particular due pro-
restrictive measures autonomously. cess and the right to an effective remedy in full
In general terms, the EU’s restrictive meas- conformity with the case-law of the EU Courts.
ures are imposed to bring about a change in The measures imposed must be proportionate to
policy or activity by the targeted country, part their objectives.
of a country, government, entities or individuals. The uniform and consistent interpretation and
They are a preventive, non-punitive, instrument effective implementation of the restrictive meas-
which should allow the EU to respond swiftly to ures is essential to ensure their effectiveness in
political challenges and developments. Sanctions achieving the desired political objective.
should be used as part of an integrated and com-
prehensive policy approach, in the framework of
the European Union’s overall foreign policy strate- How are measures adopted?
gies, involving political dialogue, complementary
efforts and other instruments. The EU and its Sanctions measures can for example include
Member States should actively and systematically export and import restrictions, including on arms
communicate on EU sanctions, including with (‘arms embargo’), oil and gas and other goods and
the targeted country and its population. items, restrictions on support for trade, measures
The measures should target the policies or concerning the financial sector, measures regard-
actions that have prompted the EU’s decision ing the transport sector and listings (for listings,
to impose sanctions and the means to conduct see below). Proposals for restrictive measures,
them and those identified as responsible for including proposals for listings or de-listings, in
these policies or actions. Such targeted measures respect of country-specific EU autonomous sanc-
should minimise adverse consequences for those tions should be submitted by the Member States
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1 BACKGROUND
Subjecting certain targeted persons and enti- The EU attaches much importance to ensur-
ties responsible for the policies or actions that ing that the listing of targeted persons and enti-
prompted the EU decision to impose sanctions to ties respects fundamental rights. In particular,
a travel ban and asset freeze (‘listing’) is an instru- due process rights must be guaranteed in full con-
ment often used in sanctions. Proposals for auton- formity with the case-law of the Court of Justice,
omous listings should be clear and unequivocal. including with regard to the rights of the defence
In particular, they must aim to include sufficient and the principle of effective judicial protection.
details (identifiers) so that the listing decision, To this end, proper notification of the deci-
once it has entered into effect, can be effectively sion and of the reasons justifying the listing must
implemented by economic operators and national be ensured. This is achieved by means of a letter,
authorities (e.g. banks, consulates). Identifying where appropriate, or through the publication of a
information is also crucial to ensure that restric- notice in the Official Journal (C series) on the same
tive measures do not affect non-targeted persons day as the publication of the legal act in question
and entities. indicating that the Council will communicate the
Proposals for autonomous listings should fur- reasons for listing on request. The notification will
thermore include individual and specific reasons for inform the persons, groups and entities concerned
each listing. The purpose of the reasons is to state, of their right to present observations and to request
as concretely as possible, why the Council consid- a review of the decision taken by the Council, as
ers, in the exercise of its discretion, that the person, well as of their right to challenge the Council’s deci-
group or entity concerned falls under the designa- sion before the General Court in accordance with
tion criteria defined by the relevant legal act, taking the relevant provisions in the EU treaties.
into consideration the objectives of the measures as
expressed in its introductory paragraphs.
It is primarily the responsibility of those submit- Review of the measures
ting the proposal to provide such reasons. Other
Delegations should contribute to this process. The review of EU autonomous sanctions or EU
Input from the HoMs located in the country(ies) additions to UN sanctions should take place at
concerned will be requested, where appropriate. regular intervals and in accordance with the provi-
The reasons for listings will be finalised by the sions of the relevant legal acts. Regular assessments
RELEX working party on the basis of the ele- of sanctions regimes by the relevant working party
ments discussed in the regional working party. If and RELEX, assisted by the EEAS, the Commis-
needed, RELEX may request additional informa- sion and HoMs, should permit the adjustment of
tion from the regional working party in order to the measures, as needed, depending on develop-
ensure that listings are legally sound and properly ments with regard to the stated objectives and the
substantiated. effectiveness of the measures in that respect.
As the legal act adopting the designations will
be published in the Official Journal, it should be
possible to make these reasons public. In excep-
tional cases, where it is considered that the rea-
sons for the listing are not suitable for publication
because of privacy and security considerations,
the reasons will need to be addressed separately to
the person, group or entity concerned.
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Implementation and application by the EU. In addition, the issue of uniform and
of measures consistent interpretation and effective implemen-
tation of UN sanctions regimes should regularly
The uniform and consistent interpretation and be included in consultations with key partners.
effective implementation of the restrictive meas- EU Delegations should be fully involved in this
ures is an essential element ensures their effective- process.
ness in achieving the desired political objectives. The EU and its Member States should actively
Member States must inform each other of the and systematically communicate on EU sanc-
measures taken under the relevant legal acts and tions, in order to give them visibility and avoid
supply each other with any other relevant infor- any misconceptions, in particular on the part of
mation at their disposal in connection with these the local civilian population. Such communica-
acts, in particular information in respect of vio- tion will also ensure that the measures have maxi-
lation and enforcement problems and judgments mum political impact. Common messages should
of national courts. With regard to the measures be discussed in the relevant geographical working
within the remit of the Community, the Com- party in consultation with the RELEX working
mission oversees the implementation of the meas- party with regard to the legal, technical and hori-
ures by the Member States. At the EU level, the zontal consequences of the measures.
Commission is also responsible for contacts with
the private sector on issues of proper implementa-
tion of sanctions. Enforcement of the sanctions is
entirely the responsibility of the Member States.
By their very nature, sanctions are designed to
have political effects in third countries. Neverthe-
less, EU restrictive measures only apply within the
jurisdiction of the EU.
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1 BACKGROUND
Annex
The list of restrictive measures in force includes both measures applied in implementation of
UN Security Council Resolutions and measures applied by the EU autonomously.
AL-QAEDA ERITREA
restrictive measures against members of the al- restrictive measures against Eritrea
Qaeda organisation and other individuals, groups,
undertakings and entities associated with them REPUBLIC OF GUINEA (CONAKRY)
restrictive measures against the Republic of Guinea
BELARUS
restrictive measures against Belarus GUINEA-BISSAU
restrictive measures directed at certain persons,
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA entities and bodies threatening the peace, security
restrictive measures in view of the situation in or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau
Bosnia and Herzegovina
HAITI
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC prohibition to satisfy certain claims in accord-
restrictive measures against the Central African ance with UN Security Council Resolution
Republic No 917(1994)
CHINA IRAN
Madrid European Council Declaration, restrictive measures against Iran
27.6.1989
IRAN
CRIMEA AND SEVASTOPOL restrictive measures directed against certain persons
restrictive measures in response to the illegal and entities in view of the situation in Iran
annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol
IRAQ
DEMOCRACTIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO restrictive measures on Iraq
restrictive measures against the Democratic
Republic of the Congo DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA (NORTH KOREA)
COTE D’IVOIRE restrictive measures against the Democratic
restrictive measures against Côte d’Ivoire People’s Republic of Korea
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
LEBANON SUDAN
prohibition on the sale or supply of arms and restrictive measures in view of the situation in
related material and on the provision of related Sudan
services to entities or individuals in Lebanon in
accordance with UNSC Resolution 1701 SYRIA
(2006) restrictive measures against Syria
MOLDOVA UKRAINE
restrictive measures against the leadership of the restrictive measures directed against certain
Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova persons, entities and bodies in view of the
situation in Ukraine
MYANMAR (BURMA)
restrictive measures against Myanmar/Burma USA (extraterritoriality)
measures protecting against the effects of the
RUSSIAN FEDERATION extra-territorial application of legislation adopted
restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions by a third country, and actions based thereon or
destabilising the situation in Ukraine resulting therefrom
SOMALIA YEMEN
restrictive measures against Somalia restrictive measures in view of the situation in
Yemen
SOUTH SUDAN
restrictive measures in view of the situation in ZIMBABWE
South Sudan restrictive measures against Zimbabwe
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2 CSDP Missions
and Operations
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
by Arnold Kammel
At the summit of Saint-Malo in 1998, France fight against terrorism, including by supporting
and the United Kingdom insisted that the EU third countries in combating terrorism in their
“must have the capacity for autonomous action, territories”.
backed up by credible military forces, the means The first CSDP mission, EUPM Bosnia and Her-
to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in zegovina, was deployed in 2003. Since then the EU
order to respond to international crises”. has so far launched 35 civilian missions and mili-
At that time the focus was on military crisis tary operations. Despite the tendency of military
management, but the argument has since been operations to attract more attention, the major-
applied to both the military and the civilian ity of CSDP interventions are civilian missions.
dimensions of CSDP. In December 2001, the From a geographical perspective three regions can
European Council of Laeken declared the Euro- be identified as main theatres for CSDP action:
pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, nowa- Europe and Eurasia, Africa and the Middle East/
days CSDP) operational, with some nuances in Asia.
the various language versions
(“the Union is now capable of conducting some
crisis-management operations” versus “l’Union est Europe and Eurasia
désormais capable de conduire des opérations de
gestion de crise”). The Western Balkans and Eurasia have been
Pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Treaty on Euro- focal points of EU external activities for different
pean Union (TEU), reasons: geographical proximity, historical links
“[T]he common security and defence policy […] and the perspective of European integration for
shall provide the Union with an operational the states in the region as well as the self-interest
capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. of having stability in its neighbourhood.
The Union may use them on missions outside the
Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security in accordance Ongoing missions/operations
with the principles of the United Nations Char- in Europe and Eurasia
ter”.
The missions are defined in Article 43 TEU in a Launched in 2008, the European Union Rule
non-exhaustive list. The CSDP task catalogue of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) has been the
“shall include joint disarmament operations, largest ever EU civilian rule of law mission that
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice trains police, judges, customs officials, and civil
and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and administrators in Kosovo.
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis EUFOR Althea is a post-conflict stabilisation
management, including peace-making and post- operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was
conflict stabilisation” and may “contribute to the launched in December 2004 and conducted under
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Photo: EEAS
EUTM Somalia’s Security Support Element, 28 September 2014
the Berlin Plus agreement. Althea took over respon- Completed missions/operations
sibility for stabilisation in BiH when NATO con- in Europe and Eurasia
cluded the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) operation.
Following the Russian-Georgian conflict in The first-ever CSDP mission was a civilian police
2008, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina that
launched and from 2009 it became the only inter- was launched in 2003 and focused on training and
national monitoring presence in Georgia. This Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA).
civilian mission is tasked with monitoring the EUPM concluded at the end of June 2012.
parties’ compliance with the ceasefire agreement The EU conducted three CSDP missions in
and its implementing measures, to contribute to FYROM. The EU’s first military mission, Con-
stability, normalisation, and confidence-building cordia, was a military support and peacekeeping
through facilitating communication between par- operation under Berlin Plus, conducted in 2003
ties on the ground. after the EU took over responsibility from the
In 2005, the EU launched EUBAM1, which NATO mission Allied Harmony (2001-2003).
aims to provide technical assistance and advice to Concordia was succeeded by a police training
improve security and customs operations along mission (EUPOL Proxima) from 2003 to 2005,
the Ukraine-Moldova border, thereby facilitating followed by a police advisory team (EUPAT)
the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. operation in 2005 and 2006.
The latest mission launched in the Eurasian In 2004-2005, the EU carried out a rule of
region is EUAM Ukraine to assist the country in law mission in Georgia, EUJUST Themis, at the
the reform of the civilian security sector, including request of the Georgian government. The EU’s
police and the rule of law, established in July 2014. first ever rule of law mission supported the Geor-
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
gian authorities with a view to reforming Geor- a military training mission (EUTM Mali) in the
gia’s criminal legislation and justice process. context of a French military operation fighting
Islamist rebel groups in northern Mali. The objec-
tive of the EUTM mission is to train and advise
Africa Malian armed forces in order to help restore
nationwide law and order under constitutional,
Half of CSDP missions and operations have democratic authorities. EUCAP is advising on
so far taken place in Africa. The EU’s interest is internal security aspects.
mainly linked to humanitarian aspects, geograph- In 2014, the EU decided to deploy a military
ical proximity and the potential spill-over effects operation to contribute to a secure environment in
of regional instability as well as the historical links the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA). The
between Europe and Africa. aim was to provide temporary support in achiev-
ing a safe and secure environment in the Bangui
area by contributing to the international efforts to
Ongoing missions/operations in protect the populations most at risk and also creat-
Africa ing the conditions necessary to enable the provision
of humanitarian aid. The operation was to be suc-
Established in April 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali ceeded by a UN peacekeeping operation.
is an operational EU contribution to supporting Another CSDP mission was established in
stability, institutional reform and the full restora- February 2015 in the country, the EU Military
tion of state authority throughout the country. Advisory Mission in the Central African Repub-
In February 2013, the EU had already launched lic, EUMAM RCA.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Further Information
111
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The peaceful resolution of conflicts constitutes capacities, including CSDP. Finally, the EU´s
a fundamental principle underlying the Common strategic guidelines, whether general or focused
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – but also on specific geographical regions, emphasise the
represents the focal point of the EU´s overall com- link between the EU´s values, which include
mitment to peace and security. human rights, democracy and the rule of law, on
Brussels has made operational contributions the one hand, and the prevention and resolution
to this end through various CSDP missions of conflicts, by means including regional integra-
and operations over the past decade. The varied tion, on the other.
nature of these contributions in terms of their The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS)
tasks but also their civilian and military nature identifies regional conflict and state failure as key
reflects the fact that the means of peaceful resolu- threats that both lead to and magnify the threat
tion of conflicts are inherently multifaceted – but posed by extremism and organised crime. This
also that operational contributions have evolved makes conflict intervention and contributing to
in response to a changing international security effective and long-term conflict resolution both a
environment. Thus, CSDP missions and opera- strategic and an operational objective. The 2008
tions provide assistance in the implementation report on the implementation of the ESS also
of conflict settlements and deterrence of renewed highlights the need to engage in conflict reso-
violence, but also engage in capacity-building and lution. Given the increasing urgency – due not
training of security forces in weak state settings only to the increasing geographical proximity of
where regional conflict and non-state actors pose conflict but also the ongoing occurrence of state
challenges for government capacities to provide fragility, as well as the root causes of these phe-
security to citizens. The latter in particular reflects nomena – the report also focuses on the security/
current trends in international security that call for development nexus and the need for a coherent
European action in settings as diverse as Ukraine, and comprehensive approach to tackling conflict.
the Levant and sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the 2011 regional strategy for security
and development in the Sahel mentions conflict
resolution as a specific challenge for the region,
An evolving strategic and its implementation roadmap includes specific
framework lines of action in pursuit of conflict resolution,
including mitigating internal tensions. The strat-
The EU´s commitment to the peaceful resolu- egy also outlines the EU´s contribution, namely
tion of conflicts is underpinned by a number of encouragement and support for internal politi-
strategic documents. These reflect an adjustment cal dialogue in order to make possible sustainable
to a changing global security environment but home-grown solutions to remaining social, politi-
also the EU´s changing institutional set-up and cal and ethnic tensions; a focus on transparent
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
and locally accountable governance, the promo- By contrast, the contributions to conflict reso-
tion of institutional capacity; and efforts to re- lution of civilian CSDP include police, rule of law
establish and/or reinforce the administrative pres- and civilian administration – all designed to com-
ence of the state, particularly in the north of Niger plement a focus on physical (military) security
and Mali. While focusing on a specific region, the with long-term state capacities to provide law and
2011 Sahel strategy does reflect the increasingly order so as to make conflict resolution sustainable.
diffuse nature of contemporary security threats, In practice, CSDP missions have supported
the inextricable linkages between security, devel- police, judiciary and customs reforms and engaged
opment and fragility and the merging of internal in capacity-building. In more immediate connec-
and external security. tion to conflict resolution, CSDP missions have
also ensured compliance with peace agreements
and have helped stabilise conflict and/or fragile
Operational tasks in a changing environments, in efforts to ensure the security of
institutional framework civilians.
In addition to these specific tasks, CSDP
When it comes to operational contributions, also lends visibility to the contributions of EU
the principles of EU engagement through the mil- Member States. This signals both EU ownership
itary aspect of CSDP are enshrined in the ‘Peters- of operational contributions and their link to
berg tasks’, which both contribute to the peaceful the EU´s collective political and developmental
resolution of conflicts and help avoid their re- engagements. The entry into force of the Lisbon
emergence. This applies in particular to conflict Treaty and the establishment of the European
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, joint disar- External Action Service (EEAS) has adjusted the
mament operations, military advice and assistance role of CSDP in the broader institutional archi-
tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. tecture and placed a renewed focus on the coher-
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
in this setting enabled the EU to take up this but it also has a role in the reform of the judici-
particular task. On the other hand, EU engage- ary and in war crime investigations.
ment in FYROM in 2003 through Operation But the EU has also engaged in comprehensive
Concordia was made not only possible but also conflict resolution through its CSDP operations in
necessary by the evolving enlargement prospects conjunction with broader political approaches.
of the countries of the western Balkans. The EU In the Western Balkans, present and former
operation, through its mandate to contribute to CSDP operations are and have been deployed
a stable, secure environment in which to imple- with a view to the eventual accession of indi-
ment the Ohrid Framework Agreement, thus vidual countries. That said, deterrence and the
made possible a transition from military to civil- provision of a secure environment, and training
ian assistance – and the eventual termination of activities, are also still aspects of the EU´s policy
CSDP engagement in favour of economic and, towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, through Oper-
more importantly, accession instruments. ation EUFOR Althea, which two decades after
CSDP operations intervening in active con- Dayton remains mired in a post-conflict setting.
flict or settings of insecurity have contributed to
achieving a safe and secure environment, the pro-
tection of refugees and UN personnel with the aim Back to first principles
of handing over to other institutional partners –
be they the African Union (AU) or the United The peaceful resolution of conflicts remains
Nations (UN), as in the case of EUFOR RCA in part and parcel of the EU´s engagement in inter-
Central African Republic since 2014 and follow- national security, including through its CSDP.
ing 2003’s operation Artemis. These operations In institutional terms, the creation of the EEAS
can help lay the groundwork, or contribute to and, particularly, the upgrading of EU Delega-
such groundwork, for further efforts in conflict tions in the field have given the EU a stronger
resolution undertaken by the EU or its partners. framework in terms of concurrent political and
The EU is further engaged in training, advis- development commitments. As Brussels moves,
ing and mentoring of police and military forces in together with Member States capitals, to con-
some post-conflict settings, and also in some set- solidate its CSDP and comprehensive approach,
tings where conflict is still ongoing or where con- revisits its strategic orientation and reformulates
ditions of regional fragility obtain. This includes its strategic priorities, the peaceful resolution of
EUTM Somalia and EUTM Mali, where CSDP conflicts stands to remain at the centre of CSDP
missions contribute to assisting governments activities. But a changing global security envi-
in extending their reach (and presumably also ronment – which is more diffuse, while inse-
services to their populations, including the curity and instability are moving ever closer to
provision of security) throughout their territo- the EU´s Eastern and Southern borders – makes
ries. As to civilian efforts, EUPOL Afghanistan the persistence of this particular basic principle
as part of a broader international stabilisation not a luxury nor an option, but a fundamental
effort focuses on the professionalisation of the requirement.
police force, police-justice links and advising on
reforms of the Mol. Similarly, the EU´s engage-
ment through EULEX Kosovo, although with
an executive mandate and an overall EU political
lead in the region, forms an approach to conflict
resolution through its contribution to multi-eth-
nic institutions and anti-corruption initiatives;
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“The European Union is founded on the values strikes at home. Or, in the words of the European
of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, Security Strategy (ESS):
equality, the rule of law and respect for human “The best protection for our security is a world
rights (…). The Union’s aim is to promote peace, of well-governed democratic states. Spreading
its values and the well-being of its peoples (…). In good governance, supporting social and politi-
its relations with the wider world, the Union shall cal reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of
uphold and promote its values (…). It shall con- power, establishing the rule of law and protecting
tribute to peace, security (…) (and) the protection human rights are the best means of strengthening
of human rights (…). The Union’s action on the international order.”
international scene shall be guided by the prin-
ciples which have inspired its own creation (…)
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: Human rights
democracy, the rule of law, (and) the universal-
ity and indivisibility of human rights (…). The Human rights are the basic rights and freedoms
Union shall define and pursue common policies to which all people everywhere are considered to be
and actions, and shall work for (…) cooperation entitled, protecting them from severe political, legal
in all fields of international relations, in order to and social abuses. They commonly include civil and
(…) support democracy, the rule of law, (and) political rights (such as the right to life, the prohibi-
human rights (…).” 1 tion of torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of
thought and expression, and the rights of women,
Respect for human rights and upholding the rule minorities and groups to be free from discrimina-
of law have a twofold effect on the EU: As founda- tion), economic, environmental, social and cultural
tional and common values (internal dimension), rights. Human rights norms are mainly enshrined
and as guiding principles for international action in a number of international treaties and conven-
(external dimension). These dimensions are, how tions2, and in customary international law. A good
ever, inseparably intertwined: this is becoming many of them are reaffirmed by the binding provi-
most obvious in the nexus between internal and sions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as
external security, with the most worrying exam- annexed to the EU treaties, specifically addressing
ple being that of armed conflicts outside Europe the EU’s and – when implementing EU law – its
setting the scene for radicalisation and terrorist Member States’ actions, including external actions.
1 Articles 2, 3 (1) and (5), and 21 (1) and (2) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (TEU)
(emphasis added).
2 Amongst them the rights conferred by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, established within the framework of the Council of Europe, which “shall constitute general principles of the
Union’s law” (Art 6 [3] TEU).
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3 Inter alia, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into ESDP – Compilation of relevant documents’ ([Council of the
EU; further quotations also referring to Council documents] 11359/07), ‘Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and
other policies’ (10076/06), ‘Mainstreaming of Human Rights into ESDP’ (11936/4/06), ‘Human Rights and Democracy:
EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan’ (11855/12), and instruments relating to the implementation of UNSCR 1325
on women, peace and security (11932/2/05, 12068/06, 15671/1/08, 7109/12).
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being above the law), with the aim that all vio-
lators of the law be held accountable, even the
state itself. It is deeply linked to the principle
of justice, involving an ideal of accountability
and fairness in the protection and vindication
of rights and the prevention and punishment of
wrongs.
Against the backdrop of the link between the
4 See the ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Framework)’ 18173/10, adopting this definition
of the rule of law as set out by the UN Secretary-General in his report ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict
and post-conflict societies’ (2004).
5 This was done by the EU, too, with the early ‘Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in cri
sis management, including annexes’ (14315/02 and 9792/03), actually addressing justice missions (only). This concept’s
revised and reviewed version was then named ‘EU Concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law Frame-
work)’ (18173/10). Likewise, at the Feira European Council 2000 ‘Rule of Law’ was identified as one of four priority areas
for civilian crisis management (alongside police, civilian administration, and civil protection), effectively equalling ‘justice
(reform)’ in recent terminology.
6 See also the Council conclusions on fundamental rights and rule of law 10168/13, and on Ensuring Respect for the Rule
of Law 16682/14: “(…) respecting the rule of law is a prerequisite for the protection of fundamental rights”.
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the European Court of Justice and the European ent and impartial justice system, with unhindered
Court on Human Rights. access to, capable of dealing – without impunity –
As to the relationship between human rights with the legacies of the past and the needs of the
and the rule of law, while human rights have to present, in coexistence with informal or alterna-
do with the substance of rights and freedoms, the tive dispute-resolution mechanisms.
rule of law has to do with their just and effective Missions must pursue a tailored, systemic and
protection and promotion. Or, as stated in the comprehensive approach under local ownership,
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human and with a shared vision, in coordination with
Rights of 1948, “human rights should be protected EU institutions and actors, and with the interna-
by the rule of law.” 6 tional community, in particular the UN, OSCE,
AU and NATO, subject to regular reporting,
measuring, assessment and adjustment proce-
EU principles and concepts dures, with a proactive communication strategy
relating to the rule of law in vis-à-vis civil society in the host countries, and a
CSDP missions clearly defined end-state and transition strategy.
These imperatives apply equally to the two
EU concepts for CSDP missions cover diverse generic types of CSDP missions in the area of
state functions and policy fields in the broader rule of law: strengthening missions, supporting
rule of law area, such as police and justice, civil- host countries by means of monitoring, mentor-
ian administration, customs, border manage- ing, advising and training activities, and execu-
ment, anti-corruption, human rights and gender. tive/substitution missions, delivering public
The ‘core concepts’, to be read in conjunction services to (temporarily) replace dysfunctional
with each other, comprise the above-mentioned local structures. Depending on their man-
concept relating to CSDP justice missions, dates, missions may take on a combination of
the ‘Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police these generic types, and may address a variety
Strengthening Missions (Interface with Broader of the state functions and policy fields outlined
Rule of Law)’, the ‘Comprehensive Concept above. Under the current concepts, executive/
for Police Substitution Missions – Revised Ver- substitution missions would never stand alone,
sion’, and the ‘EU Concept for ESDP Support but always be complemented by strengthening
to Security Sector Reform (SSR)’.7 activities – see the example of EULEX Kosovo,
Amongst the main imperatives for the design, the only current CSDP mission whose mandate
planning and conduct of CSDP missions, as laid includes executive functions.
down in these concepts are: ensuring sustainable, Promoting respect for human rights and the
transparent, effective and accountable institu- rule of law in implementing their mandates, these
tions in the host countries, set up in a democratic missions are at the heart of the EU’s contribution
fashion, being free from corruption, upholding to restoring and maintaining international order
human rights, in particular the rights of women, beyond its borders, in ever closer coordination
children and other vulnerable groups, operating with the UN as its principal partner. As the ESS
within a coherent legal framework, developed via says: “(…) establishing the rule of law and protect-
due legislative process, and in line with interna- ing human rights are the best means of strengthen-
tional norms and standards. ing international order”. The EU stands ready to
These institutions should include an independ- play a vital part.
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The EU comprehensive approach to crisis man- According to one of the United States of
agement intends to foster a culture of coordina- America’s official definitions:
tion amongst EU actors to ensure overall coher- “Strategic Communication2 is the synchroniza-
ence in the EU’s response. It also emphasises the tion of our words and deeds as well as deliberate
need to work closely with partners. In modern efforts to communicate and engage with intended
information societies, the factor ‘information’ audiences.”
has evolved to become a decisive element for any
security-related activity. Each and every action According to the Multinational Experiment 63,
may affect the information environment. Strategic Communication consists of
“focused [coalition] efforts to understand and
engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or
What is Strategic preserve conditions favourable for the advance-
Communication? ment of [coalition] interests, policies, and
objectives through the use of coordinated pro-
There are many and varied definitions of what grams, plans, themes, messages, and products
Strategic Communication is; the following are synchronized with the actions of all [coalition
just some definitions: partner].”
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Economic
Crisis Response Information Activities (CRIA)
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cations derives from the inclusion of those Infor- avoid and to emphasise, audiences of concern and
mation Strategies in an overarching strategy. the means available to influence or bring about
The particular case of the Horn of Africa (HoA) change. Only then, i.e. after that conceptual pro-
is a clear example of the need for a comprehensive cess, can master messages be drafted with a clear
strategy. Such a complex theatre, with military aim.
operations, civilian missions, development pro-
jects and EU Delegations working side by side,
in addition to the existing conflicts in the area, Social media
demands synchronisation of communication to
internal and external audiences and of engage- Of the different possible scenarios, hybrid
ment with other stakeholders. Currently, there warfare6 is one in which social media have
are separate Information Strategies in place for an enormous impact. It is therefore essential to
EUTM SOMALIA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA focus on effects, audiences and influence in order
and EUCAP NESTOR. to select the most appropriate and effective social
The EU Special Representative (EUSR) channel.
requested an overall and comprehensive Infor- As observed in several crises, notably in Ukraine
mation Strategy to harmonise all efforts in the and Syria/Iraq, news of any developments,
area. Accordingly, in a report of 4 May 2012 on whether accurate or inaccurate, will often spread
key actions for the HoA, the importance of hav- more rapidly by social media and micro blogging
ing a clear and comprehensive EU communica- (e.g. ‘Facebook’ or ‘Twitter’) than by traditional
tion and outreach strategy for the HoA region news outlets.
was agreed and the EUSR was invited, in coordi- The EU has long noticed the growing impact
nation with the EEAS and Commission, to take of these communication channels. Conse-
this forward. quently, efforts are continuously being made
A Crisis Information Strategy should not be to adapt CSDP structures to this new dimen-
initiated as a compilation of master messages, but sion: from Brussels level down to the staff and
should consider the EU’s broader engagement in resources allocated to social media in operations
the region, the information objectives, themes to and missions.
6 Hybrid warfare: where coordinated, overt and covert use of a broad range of instruments, military and civilian, conven-
tional and unconventional are employed ambiguously.
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Initial drafting by
Core group
(Info Strategy Team)
Information
Internal Strategy
EEAS and
staffing
Initial Master
Messages
Political approval
by MS and
distribution
Military operations affect the information envi- and in front of the cameras” are subject to local,
ronment, and by doing so they influence the local regional and worldwide scrutiny. Therefore, there
population’s perception and have an impact on is an exponential importance attached to shaping
whether the conduct of an operation is deemed a the information environment, initially to influ-
success or a failure. As described by General Kru- ence first impressions and manage expectations
lak in the “Three Block War”, tactical incidents and later to achieve the EU information objec-
can also have strategic effects7. tives.
In the case of the EU, having united various With respect to EU CRIA in the military
information and communication disciplines domain, the Crisis Information Strategy is imple-
under the roof of Crisis Response Information mented through Military Public Information/
Activities (CRIA) in line with the comprehensive Public Relations8 (Mil PI/PR) and Military Info
approach (CA), it is necessary to render seamless Ops9 (Mil Info Ops).
cross-echelon support to the mission objectives Mil PR/PI and EU Mil Info Ops are separate
by actively shaping the information environment but related functions that must remain closely
on operations. Operations “within the population coordinated.
7 As described with the requested leadership of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ in isolated situations and the effects of his decisions
in the upper levels.
8 EU Mil PI/PR supports the information objectives drawn from the Crisis Information Strategy at each level of the mili-
tary chain of command, by reporting facts and assessing events in the most appropriate way.
9 EU military Info Ops is a military function that provides advice and coordination of military activities affecting informa-
tion and information systems in order to create desired effects in support of the mission-specific Crisis Information Strat-
egy and of the EU’s political and military objectives.
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In CSDP military training missions (EUTM) This group of expert planners meet routinely to
and military advisiory (EUMAM) type of mis- draft and review information strategies and mas-
sions, information activities play an important ter messages and should be in a position to repre-
role. The advisory, mentoring and training pil- sent their own areas of expertise.
lars provide a great opportunity to support, in
daily interaction, the nucleus of the future secu- EUMS
rity forces in defining their future role, associated Within the EUMS, the Crisis Response Infor-
capabilities and doctrine and policies. mation Activities are divided into two areas:
Military Public Information/Public Relations and
Military Info Ops11.
Organisational structures
EU Member States
Regional and international organisations, such Inside the EU, Member States such as Ger-
as NATO10 and the UN, place a lot of emphasis many (Operative Kommunikation der Bun-
on the growing domain of STRATCOM. deswehr) and Italy (Comunicazione Operativa)
Examples of this can be found in the docu- are supporting efforts in the area of information
ments in which these two organisations define activities through investigation, experimenta-
their approach to crisis management. tion and further development of capabilities. The
Within the EU there are different organisations United Kingdom is one of the main providers of
in charge of information activities at EU insti- the foundations on this domain12, particularly
tutional level (European External Action Service when it comes to social media, and France also
[EEAS] and EU Military Staff [EUMS]), at Mem- makes valuable contributions in this field. Other
ber States’ level, and finally, at OHQ level: Member States are also developing capabilities
in this area. In all cases, and as the EUMS does,
EEAS: Information Strategy Team (IST) Member States differentiate between Public Infor-
To draft an Information Strategy, a comprehen- mation/Public Relations activities and Informa-
sive team (IST) is established. Strategic Communi- tion Operations activities.
cations must be the business not only of a specific
EEAS division but of all EEAS bodies involved. OHQ
To assist here, relevant expert personnel from OHQs from the United Kingdom, Italy,
each EEAS body (i.e. Regional Desks and Cri- Greece and Germany have a permanent part of
sis Management Structures) and from other EU their nucleus structure dedicated to effects, par-
instruments (e. g. ECHO, DEVCO) are recog- ticularly those related to information and influ-
nised and selected to create the pillars of an “EU ence.
Information Strategy Team”.
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High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission
Vice-President Federica Mogherini makes a press statement at the 51st Security Conference in Munich,
8 February 2015
Summary
The fundamental challenge when it comes to Only then, i.e. after that conceptual process, can
invigorating EEAS Strategic Communications master messages be drafted with a clear aim.
is for the EU to think strategically in the way it The challenge for the EU is to find the right
communicates. Each crisis situation requires a way to convey its messages to the local audiences
tailored-made Information Strategy – a real plan at the different theatres. All civilian missions and
from the conceptual stage. military operations are dependent on the ability to
Coordination among actors within the EEAS engage in culturally attuned communication with
is essential to achieving a real comprehensive critical communities in theatre, besides our tradi-
approach between the political and military/oper- tional domestic audiences. This requires capacity
ational spheres and convergence between the dif- to carry out conceptual planning in advance.
ferent levels of decision and action. The exponential growth of social media cannot
A Crisis Information Strategy should not be ini- be ignored. Member States are using it as a sensor,
tiated as a compilation of master messages but must but it is necessary to analyse its role as an effector.
consider the information objectives, themes to Lessons from the Ukraine crisis and ISIL/Da’esh
avoid and emphasise, audiences of concern and the must be analysed and ways to properly engage
means available to influence or bring about change. with the social media arena must be found.
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Introduction
The Common Security and Defence Policy conflict. The brigades crossing into Iraq were not
provides the EU with an operational capacity in the least concerned about passports, visas and
drawing on civilian and military assets to be used customs procedures. But when these brigades pre-
on missions outside the EU for peace-keeping, pared themselves on other territories on their way
conflict prevention and strengthening interna- to Iraq, these legal issues were key considerations.
tional security in accordance with the principles All EU crisis management operations since
of the United Nations Charter. Multinational 2003 have differed from war in that the law and
military crisis management operations (CMO) jurisdiction of the host nations have not been dis-
across virtually the entire spectrum specified in placed. In the absence of an agreement with the
Article 42(1) of the Treaty on European Union host nation, the EU-led force and other EU per-
(TEU) are playing an increasingly prominent role sonnel are basically subject to the laws and juris-
in international security policy. diction, both criminal and civil, of the host nation
However, the success of a multinational and its courts. Political settlement, not victory on
operation depends to a great extent on the abil- the battlefield, is the ultimate measure of success
ity of its members to work together effectively. in EU-led military crisis management operations.
In line with this aim, legal support is necessary Experience of recent EU-led operations and
to meet any future challenge and ensure opera- operations conducted by other international
tions are conducted lawfully under the umbrella organisations has highlighted the increasing num-
of the EU as a “cooperative security provider”. ber of situations in which legal support is a key
The legal paradigm framing the envisaged joint factor to ensure that the military action taken
disarmament operations, humanitarian and res- complies with the law. EU policymakers and mili-
cue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, tary commanders alike need to understand the
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, and legal basis for the mission, the scope of author-
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, ity for accomplishing the mission and the use
including peace-making1 and post-conflict stabi- of force. They also need to be aware of status of
lisation, is significantly different from that which forces agreements, the role of the International
applies in war. Criminal Court, the applicability of international
The 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United humanitarian law and how human rights are to be
States marked the start of a protracted armed safeguarded under the given circumstances.
1 The existing UN definition of peacemaking, as presented in UNSG’s Agenda for Peace, suggests that only diplomatic
efforts, such as mediation and negotiation, be undertaken. It is submitted that at the time of Petersberg Declaration the
interpretation of ‘peacemaking’ was closer to what relevant EU and WEU documents call ‘peace enforcement’ in this
context. The term ‘peace enforcement’ describes the use of force to restore international peace and security in situations of
coercive military action.
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Legal Basis for EU-led Crisis statements and ensure their conduct is in keep-
Management Operations ing with the CFSP. It affects the operation’s pur-
pose, scope, timing, use of force, the status of
The legal basis for CMO ultimately begins personnel, and the command’s relationships with
with the TEU. The TEU provides a framework, military and non-military organisations. The EU
resources and procedures for implementing the Operation Commander (OpCdr) must have been
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). granted specific authority for each action he or
Further guidance is provided by the conclusions she takes in the course of executing his/her mis-
published after European Council meetings. sion. Unless there is a specific prohibition on tak-
CFSP decisions are generally taken unani- ing an action, a commander may take the action
mously. This means that one Member State can under his own authority. The OpCdr’s national or
block the adoption of a text. The Treaty, however, cultural background and his branch of military
includes a number of measures intended to over- service are important factors that influence how
come this obstacle. he or she approaches the mission. However, the
Nevertheless, the United Nations Charter is the approach of an OpCdr is certainly influenced by
overarching international legal authority for both factors such as rules of engagement, geographic
the use of force and crisis management operations. limitations on the operation, obligations toward
A fundamental tenet of international law, codi- refugees and displaced persons, and appropriate
fied in the UN Charter, is the prohibition against relationships with NGOs, international organisa-
intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states. tions, and contributing third states’ contingents.
The use of military forces in ‘peace support opera-
tions’ derives from the Security Council’s desire to
facilitate the adjustment or settlement of interna- Command and Control
tional disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace. Command and control is one of the most
Following up the principles of the UN Charter legally important and politically charged issues in
and of the OSCE Charter for European Security, CMO. In CMO the military’s role, while essen-
as well as the objectives of the EU, as outlined in tial, is most likely a supporting one. EU Opera-
the TEU, the EU is active in stability promotion, tion Commanders and Force Commanders are
early warning and conflict prevention. It cooper- supported by staff including political and legal
ates with the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Coun- advisors who advise them on how to conduct a
cil of Europe and other international organisa- joint operation in full compliance with the appli-
tions in a mutually reinforcing manner. cable provisions of international law, the EU legal
Legal authorisation of any EU-led military cri- framework and the host nation’s law.
sis management operation derives from a decision Coordination, interaction and liaison need
of the Council of the European Union. Estab- always to be established between the EU-led
lished political and military bodies and structures military force and its contacts in international
within the Council enable the Union to ensure organisations, civilian authorities, NGOs and the
the CMO is given the necessary political guidance civilian population to make use of synergies to
and strategic direction, while respecting the single promote the mission.
institutional framework. The point in time when operational control
A clear understanding of the legal basis pro- shifts from a state to the commander of the EU
motes the legitimacy of the operation, enabling led force is a critical juncture for the status of the
commanders and crisis management structures forces, financial issues, logistics issues, and rules
to better plan their missions, structure public of engagement.
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Generally, the military uses force in two situ- RoE are influenced by three considerations:
ations: for self-defence and for mission accom- law, policy, and mission. The rationale for any
plishment. During a CMO, when tactical given rule will be influenced by one or more of
actions of a single soldier can have ‘strategic con- these considerations, but RoE are not used to
sequences’, a proper understanding and applica- assign tasks or give tactical instructions.
tion of the rules of engagement (RoE) are vital. RoE may further define the intensity or nature
This implies that the success or failure of a CMO of the force to be used. Depending on the opera-
may hinge on how well the use of force policy tion and the mission profile this instrument gives
and the RoE are conceived, articulated, under- the OpCdr maximum flexibility to tailor the
stood and implemented. Application of the rules potential use of force to his mission.
of engagement is probably the most visible mil- RoE cannot be viewed separately from the
itary-legal issue facing both the commander and operational planning process. They form a prod-
soldiers in a CMO. uct of that process, which has identified all relevant
All use of force – in self-defence and under the aspects of the mandate, the mission, the OpCdr’s
RoE – in any CMO must always be in conformity intent and the means at his disposal. Hence, while
with international standards, especially interna- the development of generic RoE in the context of
tional law as defined in applicable international contingency planning may be appropriate, each
agreements, customary international law and the operation will need tailor-made RoE.
guiding principles of the EU, and limited to what RoE are used to ensure that military forces oper-
is necessary. ate in accordance with the political goals set. They
The authorisation of use of force is an essential provide the OpCdr with the required guidance on
part of the political guidance and strategic direc- behalf of the competent authorities. RoE should
tion for any CMO. take into account the political goals to be achieved,
Although use of force is generally understood reflect military, political and other relevant capabil-
to encompass armed force only, limitations in ities, and conform to the national and international
international and national law affect all forms of legal requirements applicable to the operation.
measures taken by military forces that encroach During international armed conflict, an adver-
upon the freedoms of individuals. In addition to sary will be declared hostile. Elements of that
the use of armed force, measures such as identity adversary’s forces may be engaged upon identifica-
checks, searches, detention or retention need to tion, without first having to commit a hostile act
be addressed in comprehensive guidance on the or demonstrate hostile intent. In CMO, groups
use of force provided by the OpCdr. Such meas- are rarely declared hostile. Soldiers may, however,
ures should respect human dignity and, as far use force in self-defence.
as possible, local customs. These measures may Self-defence is a universally recognised inherent
limit the exercise of individual freedoms guar- right of individuals to defend themselves using
anteed under fundamental human rights. They necessary and proportional force against attack or
therefore need an appropriate legal basis in order imminent attack. The law in Member States with
to be legitimate. regard to the use of force in self-defence varies in
scope and in nature. However, the general prin-
ciples that any force used must be necessary and
proportional are common to all Member States’
legal systems. Usually terminology is a critical
issue in RoE development in multinational crisis
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
management operations. Therefore all participat- gees and displaced persons is likely to be involved
ing national military contingents must share the in the civilian part of a CMO. However, com-
same understanding of RoE terms. manders will need to know what exactly the mili-
However, the various national contingents have tary’s obligation is toward refugees and displaced
to reflect these provisions in accordance with their persons, whether the military will be expected to
national legal limitations in the RoE cards (“sol- assist in return and resettlement, and if the mili-
dier cards”) which they provide to their individual tary is expected to provide protection and other
soldiers. humanitarian assistance to support in the return
The classification of the RoE for a CMO will and resettlement process.
be determined by the prevailing political and As long as the Rule of Law (RoL) is not work-
operational circumstances. Every soldier from ing in an area of operations, the military could
each national contingent must have access to and be asked to contribute to the functional spectrum
understand the rules. Ideally, this would happen of policing, management and oversight of public
sufficiently early in the CMO to allow the rules safety and security, thus providing for and main-
to be distributed and training on their use to be taining a safe and secure environment. This might
provided. The declassification of the RoE shows require new technologies and the use of less-than-
openness to the population in the mission area but lethal means of crowd control or self-defence.
could enable those seeking to frustrate the CMO There are new developments in technology that
to place the military at a severe disadvantage. may be very useful in peace operations to control
Past experience has proved that it is often diffi- a volatile situation without resorting to deadly
cult for military forces to withdraw from a complex force or riot control agents like tear gas.
peace support operation before the political and Finally, the use of information technologies
civilian aspects of the mission are well under way in CMOs raises such issues as whether a “cyber-
and succeeding. As a result, EU CMO scenarios attack” (non-kinetic attack) constitutes a “use
allow for coordination and cooperation between of force” within the meaning of the UN Char-
EU military and civilian components, possibly ter and whether the use of cyber-technology as a
supported by other international organisations, weapon constitutes a hostile act. Another category
agencies or non-governmental organisations, to of issues is the use of force against information
meet the challenge of restoring law and order in sources within the operational area. The ‘EU use
the crisis region. This may have an impact on the of force concept’, with its generic compendium
RoE because the military is involved in support- of RoE, provides answers adapted to all scenarios.
ing the civilian aspects of the operation, possibly
through the use of force. The issue to be decided
is this: against whom and to what extent will the Protection of Cultural
military be authorised to use force to uphold law Property
and order in an ostensibly sovereign state? Press-
ing law enforcement and force protection matters The growing number of interreligious and
typically include interaction with civilian police interethnic conflicts has implied not only attacks
and civilian police checkpoints, freedom of move- against civilians but also, in many cases, the
ment, prevention of crimes by civilians, and the destruction of civilian objects, in particular cul-
detention of civilians. tural property. Acts of vandalism directed against
The overarching aim is always to protect such objects or their destruction are particularly
civilians and ensure unimpeded access to humani- common in such conflicts, as cultural property
tarian aid, not necessarily only in situations of can be considered to symbolise the cultural iden-
armed conflict. Return and resettlement of refu- tity and history of the adverse party.
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2 The words ‘traditional peacekeeping’ refer to strict Chapter VI-style peacekeeping where there is a high degree of consent
among the parties, a ceasefire agreement is in place, the force is small and lightly armed, the use of force is authorised only
in self-defence, and there are no enforcement powers.
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131
HanDBooK on CSDP MiSSionS anD oPerationS
The term Rules of Engagement (RoE) used within which personnel and units deployed
by the military derives from ‘engagement in with a mission may use force in accordance
combat’, clearly originating from a war-like with the principles and purposes of the Char-
scenario and thus legally bound by the law of ter of the United Nations, Human Rights,
armed conflicts. the mandate assigned by the relevant Council
On the other hand, civilian CSDP uses the Decision and all related principles of Interna-
term Rules for the Use of Force (RUoF) and tional Law.
refers to other scenarios: collective self-defence/ RUoF have to take into account the political
mission protection and Rule of Law (RoL)/Law goals to be achieved, reflect the civilian, politi-
Enforcement. For this reason, the legal frame- cal and other relevant capabilities and com-
work of RUoF consists of the more restrictive ply with the national and international legal
provision for the protection of human rights requirements of the mission. They provide the
and related international standards for law Head of Mission (HoM) and mission person-
enforcement. nel with the necessary guidance.
For security reasons or to perform an execu- Competent authorities at international,
tive mandate, civilian CSDP missions may also regional and national level must ensure that
be armed. In broad terms, RUoF correspond the UoF policy and the mission-specific RUoF
to the ‘Confirmatory RoE’ for the part related do not jeopardise the execution of the man-
to collective self-defence/mission protection. date or put lives at risk unnecessarily. On the
Nonetheless, they may also include authorisa- other hand, the RUoF help to assist the HoM,
tion to use force as ‘second responders’ – tem- as appropriate, when pursuing the mission’s
porarily assuming an executive role – in sup- objectives in accordance with the assigned
port of local police to ensure the maintenance mandate.
of public order. Finally, when the mission is Luigi Bruno
invested with executive powers, its armed per-
sonnel will be bound by the relevant,
locally applicable penal legislation
(provided that this complies with
the principle of respect for human
rights). Also in the latter case, Policy
Capabilities
the immunities from local juris- considerations
diction of the Status Of Mission
Agreement (SOMA) apply. ruof
When civilian CSDP missions
are to be armed, specific provisions
will accordingly be included in the SOMA
and the mission-specific RUoF annex will Legal
be an integral part of the Operation Plan considerations
(OPLAN) approved by the Council.
Graphic: Bruno/Scala
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The establishment of the International Criminal emphasised the importance of combining justice
Court (ICC) through the adoption of the Rome and reconciliation efforts with “other public inter-
Statute in 2000 strengthened the international law est objectives, such as the consolidation of peace and
commitment so that there can be no amnesty for democracy and the need for economic development
gross human rights violations and war crimes. The and public security”. That is, the concept note
Rome Statute confirmed the increasing political clearly puts accountability, transitional justice and
consensus that amnesty for those responsible for reconciliation at the heart of what has become
the worst violations during conflict is not condu- CSDP and the EU’s comprehensive approach to
cive to sustainable peace. However, accountability managing external crisis and conflict.
is not the only way of dealing with legacies of con- In practice, very few CSDP missions and oper-
flict-related violations. Contemporary transitional ations have dealt directly with ICC- and transi-
justice mechanisms also include documentation tional-justice-related issues. However, through
and truth-seeking, vetting and institutional reform, their engagement with security provision in crisis
reparations and symbolic measures, such as memo- and conflict situations or security sector reform
rials. It is also important to mention that Addi- in post-conflict situations, CSDP missions do
tional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, in often find themselves balancing interests of peace
its guidance to authorities after non-international and interests of justice: they may find themselves
armed conflicts, encourages the broadest possible dealing with the challenges of joint patrols with
amnesties. The Additional Protocol II reference to security forces with very different levels of edu-
amnesties cannot include grave breaches of inter- cation, mentoring security-sector personnel with
national humanitarian law, but it is an important records of human rights abuses and violations or
reminder that re-establishing normal relations in training military and police personnel who have
life and institutions after conflict also demands gone through Disarmament, Demobilisation and
reconciliation. Ultimately, the aim of all these Reintegration (DDR) processes with very limited
measures is to strengthen society’s ability to move focus on accountability or on vetting in human
forward after conflict or other transitions, through rights terms.
bringing those responsible for the worst crimes to
justice, acknowledging the suffering of victims and
building institutional resilience. The EU and the ICC
The European Union is a strong supporter of
the ICC and of transitional justice. The 2006 The ICC, for the purpose of preventing and
concept note on transitional justice and ESDP curbing the commission of the serious crimes fall-
(10674/06) defined transitional justice as a ing within its jurisdiction, is an essential means
“framework for confronting past abuse as a com- of promoting respect for international humani-
ponent of a major political transformation – from tarian law and human rights. Based on the Rome
war to peace or from authoritarian rule to democ- Statute, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide,
racy”. Recognising that political will was often a crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime
challenge to transitional justice, the concept note of aggression (Arts. 5-8). The ICC is established
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
on the basis of the principle of complementarity. cooperation with the Court and support the imple-
The primary responsibility for bringing offenders mentation of the principle of complementarity.
to justice lies with states themselves in conformity In accordance with the Council Decision, a
with the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. revised Action Plan was adopted on 12 July 2011.
The successful implementation of this ‘comple- It consists of five sections: (i) coordination of the
mentarity principle’ requires both political will Union’s activities to implement the objectives of
and capacity. the Decision; (ii) universality and integrity of the
The EU provides strong support – politically Rome Statute; (iii) independence of the Court
and diplomatically, and logistically and finan- and its effective and efficient functioning; (iv)
cially – to the ICC and other criminal tribunals, cooperation with the Court, and (v) implementa-
for instance the ad-hoc international tribunals for tion of the principle of complementarity.
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Moreover, according to the ‘EU Action Plan
Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Cham- to follow up on the Decision on the International
bers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Criminal Court of 12 July 2011(12080/11)’
Tribunal for Lebanon. The entry into force of the endorsed by the EU Political and Security Com-
Lisbon Treaty has contributed to steadier action in mittee, the “EU and its Member States will under-
this area through its emphasis on strict observance take consistent action to encourage full cooperation of
and development of international law (Articles 2 States with the ICC, including the prompt execution
and 3 of the Treaty on European Union). of arrest warrants. The EU and its Member States
The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 should avoid non-essential contacts with individu-
states that one of the strategic objectives of the als subject to an arrest warrant issued by the ICC.
EU is an international order based on effective They will monitor and address developments that
multilateralism. Support for the ICC is high- may hamper the ICC’s work.” The EU’s response
lighted as an example of the EU’s commitment to to non-cooperation with the ICC by third states
a rule-of-law-based international order. In order focuses particularly on how the EU and its Mem-
to enable Europe to contribute to a more effec- ber States can respond to impending instances of
tive multilateral order around the world, the 2008 non-cooperation, to persistent or repeated cases of
Report on the Implementation of the ESS states non-cooperation, and when to avoid non-essential
that the ICC should grow further in effectiveness, contacts with individuals subject to arrest warrants
alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen inter- issued by the ICC.
national justice and human rights. All EU Mem- Given states’ primary duty to investigate
ber States have ratified the Rome Statute and the grave international crimes, the EU is particu-
Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the larly engaged in promoting and contributing to
International Criminal Court (APIC). strengthening the capacity of national judicial
As pledged at the Kampala Review Conference systems to investigate and prosecute these crimes.
(2010), the EU updated its Common Position The European Commission and the European
2003/444/CFSP by Council Decision 2011/168/ External Action Service have developed a Joint
CFSP, adopted on 21 March 2011 (this Deci- Working Document on Advancing the Princi-
sion repealed and replaced Common Position ple of Complementarity. This Complementarity
2003/444/CFSP). The objective of the Council Toolkit aims to provide operational guidance for
Decision is to advance universal support for the bridging the gap between international justice
Rome Statute by promoting the widest possible and national justice systems, as effective and effi-
participation in it, to preserve the integrity of the cient interaction between national justice systems
Statute, support the independence of the Court and the ICC is pivotal to giving full effect to the
and its effective and efficient functioning, support Rome Statute.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
needs of each specific context. The understand- be part of CSDP missions’ core mandates, but it
ing that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach is important that CSDP missions, in their security
to transitional justice is also at the heart of the provision and justice and security sector reform
EEAS’s and the European Commission’s under- efforts, be aware of and where relevant support
standing of conflict analysis, which should be other EU efforts that contribute to account-
context-specific and victim-centred.1 ability and justice. This is particularly important
when providing strategic advice on security sector
reform and when supporting security sector vet-
CSDP, ICC and transitional ting initiatives. For these reasons it will be impor-
justice tant to continue operationalising guidance on the
ICC and transitional justice with a specific focus
As noted above, apart from the adoption of the on CSDP. This was already foreseen in the 2006
ESDP concept on transitional justice in 2006, ESDP concept note.
there has so far been limited overlap between the Important elements for CSDP are furthering
EU’s use of its CSDP tool and its commitment to knowledge about not only the EU’s commitment
the ICC and transitional justice. This may seem to the ICC, but also the Rome Statute obligation
surprising, as CSDP missions and operations are that states parties cooperate with the ICC (Art.
deployed in several contexts where the ICC has 86 Rome Statute). This applies to various types
initiated preliminary examinations or even formal of cooperation with the Court, including the
investigations, including Afghanistan, the Central execution of arrest warrants. Non-cooperation by
African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Repub- a Rome Statute state party not only undermines
lic of Congo (DRC) and Libya, and that most of the Court but also constitutes a breach of a legal
the countries where CSDP missions are deployed obligation and should be treated as such. Inte-
grapple with legacies of past violations and war gral to – but also broader than – accountability
crimes. The EULEX Kosovo mission is one of the issues are the EU’s commitment to ending sexual
few missions which directly engages with these violence in conflicts. Gender-based and sexual
issues. In the case of EULEX Kosovo, the mission violence in conflict are Rome Statute crimes, but
itself draws upon an executive mandate within addressing legacies of gender-based and sexual
the Kosovo justice sector, while prosecuting war violence after a conflict also needs victim-centred
crimes (related to the Kosovo conflict in 1999) is and institutional responses. These are issues that
at the core of its efforts. These efforts are comple- CSDP missions and operations supporting justice
mented by the mission’s role in the establishment and security sectors are already tackling in several
of a Specialist Court, which will deal with spe- contexts and will need to continue engaging with.
cific allegations made in a Council of Europe Par- Also integral to CSDP missions’ engagement in
liamentary Assembly Report of 7 January 2011 security and justice sector reform is support for
against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. vetting processes that are non-discriminatory and
However, even when CSDP missions are not that also take account of legacies of human rights
directly involved in supporting the ICC or tran- violations and war crimes. Civil society consulta-
sitional justice, they can contribute as part of the tion is another obvious area for consulting about
EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict legacies of conflict and their impact on post-
and crisis. Support for the ICC or more broadly conflict SSR and justice reform or institutional
for transitional justice does not necessarily need to reform more broadly.
1 EEAS and EU Guidance Note on the Use of Conflict Analysis in Support of EU External Action.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
In this century, civilians continue to suffer as insurgency, etc. Some of the groups have politi-
a result of armed groups – state and non-state – cal, strategic, ethnic, religious or ideological
failing to abide by national and international law, aims; others seek new soldiers (often children)
as we can observe in places such as the Central and forced labour (often women) or are organ-
African Republic, Mali, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. ised criminal groups exploiting the lack of state
In contemporary conflicts, civilians have increas- governance. Sometimes they may be proxies of
ingly become the victims of the struggle for the host government, third-country governments
power over populations, resources and territory or signatories to a peace agreement. The groups
by competing armed groups. Terrorising civilians often present a combination of these characteris-
through such means as sexual and gender-based tics, adjusting their behaviour and alliances to the
violence, the threat of violence and/or killing, har- evolving conditions.
assment, enslavement or inflicting serious injuries Targeted individuals and groups include refu-
has become a frequently employed tactic in order gees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees,
to achieve political goals. migrant workers, journalists, healthcare person-
Multiple groups of perpetrators have been nel, human rights activists, missionaries (religious
targeting civilians in many recent and ongo- or lay), humanitarian aid workers and volunteers,
ing armed conflicts, as demonstrated by cases of women, children and ethnic and religious minori-
genocide, ethnic cleansing, post-conflict revenge, ties. Today the situation is of concern in many
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HanDBooK on CSDP MiSSionS anD oPerationS
Protection
from imminent Access to Enjoyment of Enabling
threats of basic necessities human rights conditions
physical violence
Graphic: Benedictis/Scala
countries where civilians (especially women and Protection of civilians is broadly understood
children) continue to be subject to various forms of as all efforts to reduce the effects of war or vio-
extreme violence, often causing grave humanitarian lence on civilian life. There are several ‘layers’
crises including forced migration. of protection of civilians: physical protection
States have the responsibility to protect their from imminent violence, access to basic necessi-
own citizens; lack of political will, capacity or ties (e.g. food, water, medical assistance), enjoy-
governance mechanisms sometimes render them ment of human rights (e.g. freedom of speech)
unable or unwilling to act. Sometimes atrocities and enabling the conditions for the above. The
may even be state-sponsored. ‘protection onion’ above, which illustrates these
layers, also explains the different conceptual
understandings of what protection may entail.
iMportanCE and sCopE of poC It distinguishes between different aspects of the
protection agenda that fall under the responsibil-
For the above reasons, protection of civilians ity of different protection organisations, which
(POC), in particular the protection of women include but are not limited to the following
and children and the fight against sexual violence (both civilians and military) in a given area of
in armed conflict, has become increasingly impor- operation: the UN, the EU, the ICRC, other
tant specifically in the margins of UN peacekeep- international organisations, humanitarian and
ing operations or CSDP missions and operations. human rights organisations, multinational coali-
There is no common definition of POC, but there tion forces (with a clear POC mandate), the host
is a general understanding that the entire spectrum country, and governmental and non-governmen-
of those involved in conflict and post-conflict envi- tal organisations.
ronments, both military and civilian, has an impor- In 2010 the UN produced an operational con-
tant role to play in protecting civilians. Neverthe- cept on POC for peacekeeping operations, which
less, the local or host government and its security represents a critical contribution to developing a
institutions maintain the primary responsibility. common understanding of POC. The Concept
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
2.2.7. Anti-corruption
by Raluca Stefanuc
Over the past two decades, considerable efforts fore goes beyond the criminal law angle, touching
have been made worldwide to raise awareness as upon a wide range of areas and measures which
to the pervasive effects of corruption on economic impact on corruption risks and on the capacity to
development and growth, social justice and rule of control corruption.
law. Anti-corruption policies were placed higher
on the political agenda by various leaders and
organisations and all-encompassing international EU anti-corruption policies
anti-corruption instruments such as the compre-
hensive United Nations Convention against Cor- General remarks
ruption were adopted. Yet the road from declared
intentions to actual reality still appears to be Whatever general remarks one may have on
a long one. In many countries confronted with corruption, they also apply within the EU as well.
endemic corruption affecting the very core of the Without a doubt, corruption is a complex phe-
rule of law and democratic institutions, corrup- nomenon and against many of its trans-national
tion remains, in spite of massive legislative and aspects action taken only at national level is not
institutional changes, a very profitable business enough. Corruption is distorting the inner struc-
and tangible results are not yet in evidence. ture of licit economies, by facilitating tax evasion,
While a treasure trove of wisdom has already lowering investments levels, reducing competi-
evolved regarding what worked and what did not tion and increasing the costs of doing business.
work when promoting anti-corruption policies, For these reasons, corruption has received close
there are very few examples of countries suffering attention from the EU for over a decade now, as
from systemic corruption where anti-corruption reflected throughout the main instruments at its
policies could be considered even relatively suc- disposal: legislation, policies and support pro-
cessful. Therefore, the question of what does it grammes/agreements.
really take to make anti-corruption policies deliver
appears to be still valid.
This article presents a brief overview of the Legislative framework
main efforts undertaken by the EU to strengthen
anti-corruption policies and the instruments at its Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
disposal to achieve this objective. It also reflects on the European Union (TFEU) provides that the
a number of key issues that can indicate whether Union “shall endeavour to ensure a high level of
an anti-corruption policy is sufficiently solid to security, including through measures to prevent and
bring about convincing results. combat crime”. Pursuant to Article 83 TFEU, cor-
Mention should be made that in the context of ruption is one of the particularly serious crimes
EU policies, corruption is defined in a broad sense, with a cross-border dimension for which mini-
as any ‘abuse of power for private gain’. It there- mum rules on the definition of criminal offences
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
and sanctions may be established. The EU has recently been adopted at EU level, such as: the
therefore been vested with the general right to act reformed Public Procurement Directives5 which
in the field of anti-corruption within the limits contain strengthened anti-corruption safeguards,
established by the Treaties. including specific provisions on conflict of inter-
In terms of legal instruments, although the est; the Directive on the freezing and confiscation
pieces of EU legislation primarily targeting cor- of proceeds of crime in the EU6; the revised Direc-
ruption are rather scarce, the EU has taken some tive on disclosure of non-financial and diversity
very important steps at an early stage in defining information by certain large companies7, whereby
active and passive corruption and in requiring the companies concerned have to disclose infor-
EU Member States to ensure an effective, pro- mation on policies, risks and outcomes as regards,
portionate and dissuasive criminal penalties sys- inter alia, anti-corruption matters.
tem for certain corruption offences, as well as to A new Accounting Directive was adopted in
introduce the liability of legal persons for certain June 2013, introducing a new obligation for
categories of corruption-related offences. These large extractive and logging companies to report
were reflected in the Protocols to the Convention the payments they make to governments (coun-
on the protection of the European Communities’ try-by-country reporting-CBCR).8 Reporting
financial interests1, the Convention of 26 May would also be carried out on a project basis,
1997 on the fight against corruption involving where payments have been attributed to specific
officials of the European Communities or officials projects. The Accounting Directive regulates the
of Member States of the European Union2, and information provided in the financial statements
the Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of all limited liability companies which are reg-
on combating corruption in the private sector3. istered in the European Economic Area (EEA).
In 2008, as an important step towards a In order to ensure a level playing field between
stronger EU stance against corruption, the EU companies, the same disclosure requirements
joined the most comprehensive international anti- were incorporated in the revised Transparency
corruption legal instrument: the United Nations Directive9. This includes all companies which are
Convention against Corruption.4 listed on EU regulated markets even if they are
Some other important pieces of legislation not registered in the EEA and incorporated in a
with relevance for anti-corruption policies have third country.
1 First Protocol of 27 September 1996 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’
financial interests (OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, p. 2). Second Protocol of 19 June 1997 to the Convention of 26 July 1995 on
the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ C 221, 19.7.1997, p. 12).
2 OJ C 195, 25.6.1997, p. 2.
3 OJ L 192, 31.7.2003, p. 54.
4 Council Decision 2008/201/EC of 25 September 2008 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Community, of the
United Nations Convention against Corruption [Official Journal L 287 of 29.10.2008].
5 Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94/65,
28.03.2014); Directive 2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy,
transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (OJ L 94/243, 28.03.2014) and Directive
2014/23/EU of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts (OJ L 94/1, 28.03.2014).
6 Directive 2014/42/EU of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the
European Union (OJ L 127/39, 29.04.2014).
7 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and
diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups (OJ L 330/1, 15.11.2014).
8 Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related
reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC (OJ L 182/19, 29.06.2013).
9 Directive 2013/50/EU of 22 October 2013 amending mending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The Commission has also recently put forward tain central registers listing information on the
a number of legislative proposals currently going ultimate beneficial owners of corporate and other
through the adoption process with the Council legal entities, as well as trusts. This measure can
and/or European Parliament and which are also also serve as an efficient anti-corruption tool.
relevant in the context of anti-corruption policies,
notably in relation to criminal law aspects. These
concern: the proposal for a Directive on the fight Policy initiatives
against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by
means of criminal law10 and the proposal for a In terms of anti-corruption policy initiatives,
Council Regulation on the establishment of the the first Commission Communication in this
European Public Prosecutor’s Office11. field14 was issued in 1997 and was aiming at set-
Mention should also be made of the upcoming ting the framework for a number of relevant meas-
new Directive on the prevention of the use of the ures against corruption that would define an EU
financial system for the purpose of money laun- strategy line. In 2003, the Commission adopted
dering and terrorist financing (i.e. fourth Anti- a second far-reaching Communication on a com-
Money Laundering Directive) and the Regulation prehensive EU policy against corruption15, call-
on information accompanying transfers of funds. ing on the European Council to fully endorse the
In February 2013, the Commission submitted conclusions and recommendations formulated
a proposal for the fourth Anti-Money Launder- therein in a number of EU policy areas.
ing Directive12 and a proposal for a Regulation In June 2011 the Commission adopted an anti-
on information accompanying transfers of funds13. corruption package bringing a new approach to
On 10 February 2015 the Council approved an addressing corruption at EU level. The anti-cor-
agreement with the European Parliament on this ruption package of June 2011 consisted of a Com-
package. This approval paves the way for adoption mission Communication on Fighting Corruption
of the directive and regulation at second reading. in the EU16, an internal Commission Decision
The package implements the recommendations of establishing an EU anti-corruption reporting
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), but also mechanism for periodic assessment (‘EU Anti-
provides in some areas additional safeguards and Corruption Report’)17, a Report on modalities of
higher standards as compared to FATF’s require- participation of the European Union in the Coun-
ments. Among other things, the new rules will for cil of Europe Group of States against Corruption
the first time oblige EU Member States to main- (GRECO)18 and a second implementation Report
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and Com-
mission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive
2004/109/EC (OJ L 294/13, 6.11.2013).
10 COM (2012) 0363 final.
11 COM (2013) 534 final.
12 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money
laundering and terrorist financing, COM(2013) 45 final.
13 Proposal of 5 February 2013 for a Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds; COM (2013) 44 final.
14 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Union policy against corrup-
tion, adopted by the Commission on 21 May 1997 COM(97) 192 final.
15 COM(2003) 317 final.
16 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, and the European Economic and Social
Committee on Fighting Corruption in the EU of 6 June 2011 (COM(2011) 308 final).
17 C(2011) 3673 final.
18 Report from the Commission to the Council on the modalities of the European Union participation in the Council of
Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (COM(2011) 307 final).
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
of Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA pool of information available from a wide range
on combating corruption in the private sector19. of sources, including existing monitoring mecha-
The main novelty of the anti-corruption package nisms such as GRECO, OECD or UNCAC,
consisted of the setting up of an EU anti-corrup- as well as civil society, researchers, experts, spe-
tion reporting mechanism to assess on a periodic cialised networks, associations, bodies, agencies
basis EU Member States’ efforts against corrup- and other stakeholders. It also aims to assess the
tion. achievements, weaknesses and vulnerabilities of
The 2011 Commission Communication on the EU Member States’ anti-corruption policies,
Fighting Corruption in the EU also calls for a identify EU trends, stimulate peer learning and
stronger focus on corruption in a range of relevant exchange of good practices and ultimately help
external EU policies. Thus, it emphasised a rein- to frame and implement more effective policies
forced focus on anti-corruption and the rule of law against corruption at EU and national level. The
in the EU enlargement process, a strengthening of key concept underlining the EU Anti-Corruption
the efforts to reinforce the capacity of neighbour- Report is ‘political will’ as it is intended to become
hood countries to fight corruption, continuous a tool that can: be useful to all layers of society in
support for strengthening good governance and the EU Member States, offer an overview of both
democratisation in the context of cooperation and cross-cutting and country-specific corruption-
development policies, as well as the promotion of related issues, look into possible solutions and
specific anti-corruption or transparency-related focus on impacts of both corruption and anti-
provisions in free trade agreements.20 The Com- corruption measures.
mission support for global frameworks aimed at The first EU Anti-Corruption Report was
setting up transparent systems for extracting and aimed at giving a frank assessment of how each
trading natural resources and raw materials, such EU Member State tackled corruption, how exist-
as the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and ing laws and policies work in practice, and it sug-
Trade and the Extractive Industries Transparency gests how each EU Member States can step up the
Initiative, is also mentioned in the 2011 Com- work against corruption. The first report included:
mission Communication. These have been com- (1) a general part on overall corruption-related
plemented by the legislative measures mentioned trends across the EU (based on the findings of the
above as regards the Accounting and the Transpar- individual country assessments and a presentation
ency Directives. of the results of the most recent Eurobarometer
surveys on corruption); (2) a thematic part on
selected cross-cutting issues of particular relevance
Reporting mechanisms at EU level (in the case of this first Report: cor-
ruption in public procurement); (3) 28 country-
On 3 February 2014, the Commission adopted specific chapters focusing on outstanding issues
its first EU Anti-Corruption Report21. Subsequent specific to each EU Member State (not limited to
reports will follow every two years. The EU anti- the matters covered by the thematic part). Good
corruption reporting mechanism does not aim to practices were also presented all throughout the
reinvent the wheel, but rather to streamline the report.
19 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council based on Article 9 of Council Framework
Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector (COM(2011) 309 final).
20 COM(2011) 308 final, pages 15-17.
21 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – the EU Anti-Corruption Report of 3 Febru-
ary 2014; COM (2014) 38 final.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Photo: IACA
The International Anti-Corruption Academy’s mission is to deliver and facilitate anti-corruption education and training
for practitioners from all sectors of society and provide technical support and assistance to a wide variety of stakeholders
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
cal context where real power to change or reform 3. A tailor-made and problem-oriented approach
is present. This would entail, inter alia: stability, that takes account of the specificities of each
peace, unity in decision-making, awareness/rec- country, region, sector and context (i.e. no one-
ognition of corruption problems at political level, size-fits-all)
prioritising of resources to enforce anti-corruption
policies, high-level tangible commitments, etc. Anti-corruption policies should consider the
Other prerequisites are: political accountabil- realities of each country, region, sector, and cir-
ity (i.e. clear checks and balances and account- cumstances. Solutions that worked well in one
ability for actions and decisions taken by those place or context may not work as well in another
in positions of power) and the tone taken at the place or context. This is because corruption is
top (i.e. leaders committed to fighting corrup- interwoven with a wide spectrum of economic,
tion should promote integrity through their own legal, historical and social aspects which vary
actions and lead by example). greatly from one context to the other, both in
An important part of political accountability is place and in time.
related to the level of transparency and integrity
of the interface between business and politics,
including transparency, effective supervision and 4. Joint coordinated efforts and effective checks
follow-up of wrongdoing concerning financing and balances in all policy areas (i.e. no isolated
of political parties and electoral campaigns, con- measures)
nections between public contracts and political
financing, illegal lobbying, revolving doors, etc. As mentioned above, corruption is closely
Political parties’ discipline may also contribute related to a wide range of factors, from economic
considerably to ensuring political accountability. to social. This entails that an effective anti-cor-
In this respect, integrity and anti-corruption ruption policy must reflect an all-encompassing
should constitute influential elements in the approach and be linked to a range of cross-
decisions taken within the political parties. cutting measures and sector-specific reforms
which have a wider scope than anti-corruption.
For example, an anti-corruption strategy target-
2. The right people appointed on their merits to ing the healthcare sector cannot work in isola-
the right positions tion from or independent of a wider healthcare
reform context which exceeds the mere purpose
People matter most when starting or imple- of preventing and combating corruption. Also,
menting a reform process. The legislative and insti- within anti-corruption policies themselves, a
tutional settings are important and indispensable, very effective preventive response by a strength-
but with these in place and the wrong people at the ened criminal justice system cannot on its own
top little if any progress can be made. It is therefore address deeply-rooted corruption problems
worth investing a lot in finding the most capable if not complemented by effective prevention
people with the drive, profile and capability to policies, as well as internal and external control
carry out top assignments and lead key institutions mechanisms across the board (including external
that can propagate a wave of reforms. audit bodies and oversights).
Supporting or investing in institutions which A high level of transparency of public spend-
appear to have the right legal and administra- ing, including public procurement and imple-
tive setting, but instead have a weak or incapable mentation of public contracts, as well as of deci-
leadership, would likely achieve little in the way sions taken by public institutions, including
of results. state-owned, state-controlled and state-regu-
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
lated companies, is also a key factor in ensuring Finally, mention should be made that, nota-
proper accountability levels of those in power, bly in the context of EU external action, includ-
as well as effectiveness of checks and balances ing the EU accession processes, and also in rela-
in relation to areas or activities most exposed to tion to post-accession monitoring of certain EU
corruption. Member States, external oversight and leverage,
also through specific anti-corruption condition-
alities linked to various financial, legal or policy
5. Public pressure from all sides of society (no instruments, often proved to be beneficial in driv-
actual social tolerance for corrupt practices), in- ing reforms forward. This was particularly valid at
cluding access to information, transparency and times when various reform processes were put at
good quality education risk, for example through actions of political lead-
ers threatening rule of law fundamentals or undue
In the long run, this may produce the most tan- pressure threatening the existence and functioning
gible results: i.e. a society that reacts to wrongdo- of key institutions or legislative measures putting
ing, abuse of power or ineffective decision-making the anti-corruption framework at risk, etc. In such
by leaders and which also has sufficient leverage instances, the external leverage acted as an enabler
to make those in power and public services care for exerting political will or at least for mitigating
about their reaction. To arrive at this situation, damage. There were also situations where leaders
one needs to ensure proper access to education whose genuine political will to implement anti-cor-
and proper quality of education; high levels of ruption reforms was questionable have nevertheless
transparency from decision-makers, including pursued such reforms given a certain political con-
through the opening up of databases containing text or the incentive of instruments or processes
public interest information in a user-friendly for- with an external dimension. Nevertheless, external
mat; ensuring adequate and timely access to infor- leverage cannot work on its own; in order to ensure
mation, including through well-informed and sustainability of reforms, it must be balanced with
easily accessible media (internet access has also an responsibility for and ownership of reforms at
important role to play in this context). national level. This could also be achieved through
A well-informed and powerful society would supporting the real national anti-corruption cham-
be the ultimate guarantee of sustainability of pions and civil society who have the necessary drive
anti-corruption reforms. Any coherent sustained and commitment and who can ensure that internal
efforts in this regard would be rewarded in the checks and balances are in place and guarantee con-
longer term. tinuity of reforms from within.
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Over the years the European Union has evolved local counterparts share that need and are likely to
into a key player on the international security and be grateful for any support in meeting it. This new
defence scene. Since the creation in March 2003 reality results in new tasks for the Press and Public
of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Information Officer.
and Herzegovina by a Council Joint Action, some Since no two scenarios are alike, a “one size fits
30 civilian and military missions and operations all” approach is not realistic, although the CSDP
have been launched under the Common Security has its own philosophy and style that set it apart.
and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU is constantly Nevertheless, the strategies themselves vary from
improving its crisis management capabilities, both one mission or operation to another.
civilian and military.
The CSDP engagement usually takes place in
high visibility areas, creating a need for account- Phraseology
ability, transparency and trust. This need can be
met only if the mission or operation has a well A succinct version of the Commission’s under-
thought-out and thoroughly planned communi- standing of public diplomacy was provided as part
cation strategy and policy. An increasing number of a booklet produced for the EU’s 50th anniver-
of communication officers are therefore being sary celebrations in 2007:
deployed in support of all our missions and opera-
tions. “Public diplomacy deals with the influence of
In addition to the general public’s ever-growing public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests
desire to communicate, new risk prevention meas- by understanding, informing and influencing. It
ures must be taken into consideration. This leads means clearly explaining the EU’s goals, policies
to new tasks for the communication specialists. and activities and fostering understanding of these
The new communication technologies have not goals through dialogue with individual citizens,
only increased the speed, scale, interactivity and groups, institutions and the media.”1
global reach of information flows, but have also
opened the door wide to speculation and manipu- The tasking related to this very general descrip-
lation. This means that public information analy- tion is found in a mission’s organigram as its Press
sis has to be considered in a completely new light. and Public Information Office (PPIO). An analy-
In terms of the information-driven process, the sis of the existing missions’ structures shows that
operational level of a mission relies on a constant the set-up of the individual communication units
supply of verified and accurate information to differs from almost every mission to every other,
ensure the efficiency of its action. The mission’s depending on the mandate and environment.
1 European Commission, A glance at EU public diplomacy at work, The EU’s 50th anniversary celebrations around the world
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), p.12.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Photo: EU2015.LV
Press statement of HR/VP Mogherini in the margins of the ‘Gymnich’ meeting in Riga/Latvia, March 2015
The PPIO inside the mission The PPIO coordinates with and takes guidance
structure: a service provider from the High Representative’s Brussels-based
strategic communication unit within the EEAS.
Usually the communication unit is adminis- In the mission area, close coordination with all
tratively subordinate to the Chief of Staff and, as EU actors – particularly with the local EU Del-
such, is part of the Chief of Staff’s Office. How- egation – is mandatory.
ever, in its daily business it reports directly to the
Head of Mission and, in any case, it supports the
entire mission staff. Early deployment
Operationally, the PPIO has a number of inter-
nal points of contact that it deals with on a daily When designing a mission it is highly recom-
basis, particularly the political department and the mended to consider all possible communication
key operational actors. Information exchange and issues right from scratch, i.e. during the fact find-
public information analysis delivery are among its ing stage, and to deploy an embryo of the future
daily tasks. unit at the start of the planning phase or with the
The support provided to mission staff in gen- Crisis Response Team, as appropriate. The mis-
eral boils down to daily analysis/media monitor- sion’s arrival on site usually generates major inter-
ing, fact sheets, press lines, logistic support, train- est, commentaries, questions and very early media
ing etc. requests. It is important to shape the mission’s
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
image right from the beginning. When it comes initial information material (e.g. fact sheets,
to winning hearts and minds, the first impression CVs) have to be developed. Basic working tools
matters. (e.g. camera, voice recorder, TV set, flags) have
Building a communication structure takes to be provided.
time. Once deployed, the press and public infor- • In terms of planning, the PPIO is involved in
mation officer faces a long list of logistical, tech- drafting the concept of operations (CONOPS),
nical and human resources challenges. The early the operation plan (OPLAN) and the Mission
deployment period is the ideal time to compile Implementation Plan (MIP). At this point the
the PPIO notebook and make important contacts communication policy and the communication
that will be of inestimable value once the mission strategy have to be finalised, the communica-
is up and running, especially if it becomes neces- tion budget has to be established and the first
sary to resort to crisis communication at a given procurement procedures for equipment and
moment. visibility support have to be launched. Dur-
As all other mission departments, the PPIO ing this very intensive period the HR strategic
works in close cooperation first with the Plan- communication unit and the CPCC expect as
ning and Methodology Section and later on with much feedback as available.
the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability • Finally, the PPIO dedicates a great deal of
(CPCC). Their joint efforts will notably result in time to the first major public event, the of-
the definition of initial master messages and an ficial mission launch, which is accompanied
information strategy to be submitted to Member by the declaration of initial operational capa-
States in Brussels. bility.
As for all other mission components, staffing lev-
els are low in the early days. Recruitment will take
The start-up phase place much later. Be aware that at that point the
staff selection procedures will take a lot of your
The start-up of a mission is a critical stage for time. It is, however, crucial from the outset to
shaping the future communicative action, as that have sufficient support from a minimum of trust-
is when the basis is established for the final struc- worthy staff who are native speakers of the local
tures, resources, procedures and tools. It is not language and are familiar with the environment
only about putting up the flag and creating first and customs in the mission area. This will also
awareness for the mission. A number of tasks that facilitate ‘local ownership’.
will ensure the sustainability of communication
have to be performed:
• Exploring the local public information scene Policy and guidance
(media, social media, public opinion, consumer
habits, communication equipment landscape, The CSDP communication policy looks pretty
technological issues and market prospection), much the same for every single mission. Basi-
and identifying local stakeholders and opinion cally all missions have a positive, fully transparent
leaders. relationship with the media and all other public
• Contacting any existing EU presences and in- communication actors. Nevertheless, certain pro-
ternational community partners, who are reli- cedural rules must be followed:
able sources and generally a great support. • Public information is organised under the con-
• Giving some thought to the corporate identity trol of the PPIO, which is to be informed about
of the mission. Visuals (logo and letterhead), any public information contact or request ad-
the website, the social media presence and the dressed to a mission member. It is up to the
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
PPIO to assess the communication opportu- media (TV, radio, print and web press) which
nity and to check up on the reliability of the implicitly involve social gate keepers/journal-
requester. ists. Both, however, need to be used. A profound
• General press lines and lines to take in response knowledge of the local stakeholders and the habits
to general, non-specific information requests of information consumers is needed to make the
are to be made available to every mission mem- right choices.
ber. In all other cases the PPIO has to be con- The same approach can be followed for the
tacted and involved directly. choice of target audiences, although there is also
• Conversely, the PPIO depends on information some common ground here among all missions in
that every staff member can provide, particular- terms of the EU recipients (mainly the Member
ly in relation to sensitive issues likely to arouse States and the institutions). Each mission needs
public interest. to identify the civil society organisations, opinion
• Finally, every mission must be able to regulate leaders, minority groups or other demographic
its own and its staff’s social media behaviour. groups it wishes to communicate with. The same
The mission’s social media user guide addresses applies to international communities, depending
all procedures for professional and private use, on the nations and organisations (for example
establishes sanctions and rules, and provides think tanks and non-governmental organisations)
advice. operating in the mission area.
The choice of communication tools is also
dependent on the technological environment
The public information strategy and consumption patterns in the theatre of oper-
ations. It has to be a mix of relevant press ele-
The strategic approach varies from mission to ments (e. g. press releases, audio-visual materials,
mission, although there are general communica- press conferences, interviews, background briefs,
tion rules and principles that apply to all opera- op-eds, press visits) and PR/social media activi-
tions in their everyday communication and, to ties (campaigns, delocalised events, road shows,
some extent, crisis communication: billboards, brochures, promo items, advertising,
• Ensuring accuracy, availability, pro-activity, civil society and social events, twitter, Facebook,
bottom-up and one-channel communication, YouTube, website). Keep in mind that the use
and having pre-selected talking heads are meas- of PR elements, in particular, is costly, labour-
ures that can help avoid major trouble. intensive and requires considerable procurement
• The communication action must be coherent effort.
and coordinated with all players within and
outside the mission.
• The response has to be quick, but not hasty. Crisis communication
• Language and wording play a crucial role in
getting a clear message across. Crisis perception varies greatly from mission to
• Do not forget the impact of audio-visual ele- mission, depending on the mandate, the physical
ments, which have become central to consumer and psychological environment and the image of
habits. the mission. All the above-listed strategic com-
In addition to these general principles, every mis- munication principles apply. However, a crisis
sion PPIO will have to configure its strategy to fit situation breaks with the normal communication
the local circumstances. Choices have to be made workflow:
on the balance between direct communication • The pressure is much more intense over a pro-
(social media and public relations) and traditional longed space of time.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The European Union (EU) currently deploys tal norms of equality and non-discrimination
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
missions in fifteen crisis and conflict situations. Union and in the EU Charter of Fundamental
Most of the missions and operations are engaged Rights. It also draws on the EU’s commitment
in security and justice sector reform efforts or to integrating UN Security Council Resolution
directly in security provision through monitoring 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security and
or deploying European military forces. Although several policy frameworks, including the EU’s
not a dominant component in CSDP missions, Crisis Management Procedures.
all missions in some way engage with issues of The EU, like other organisations engaging in
women’s participation or with gender issues. The reform efforts in crisis, conflict and post-conflict
focus on women’s participation and on integrat- situations, has had to realise that there is no one-
ing a gender perspective draws on the fundamen- size-fits-all approach or silver bullet for success-
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
ful and sustainable reform. This is also true for employment and having proper and properly
gender mainstreaming and efforts to implement implemented codes of conduct and disciplines.
the women, peace and security agenda. Crisis An important element for the internal dimen-
situations and transitions can provide opportu- sion is codes of behaviour that forbid discrimi-
nities for renegotiating gender roles, but they nation, harassment and exploitation. In 2005
can also result in new challenges such as a rise the EU had already adopted Generic Standards
in domestic violence, a rise in corruption and of Behaviour for ESDP Operations (8373/1/05)
organised crimes, including sexual exploitation covering both civilian and military missions and
and trafficking in women and children. The seeking to ensure that personnel in CSDP mis-
influx of international organisations can itself sions and operations hold themselves to the high-
be a poisoned gift for women, as the politically est possible standards. In addition, all CSDP mis-
and culturally attuned approaches of local actors sions have mission-specific codes of conduct and
are exchanged for sometimes too standardised behaviour and procedures for dealing with com-
international approaches on gender and women’s plaints. As called for in the EU Action Plan for
issues. Human Rights and Democracy 2012–2014, the
The EU – and its CSDP missions – have over EU is currently revising its code of conduct and
the years developed comprehensive policy frame- discipline for civilian missions.
works that seek to guide and support practical The external dimension involves ensuring that
approaches promoting equality and women’s CSDP missions and operations in their program-
rights. Lessons from CSDP missions provide ming and activities also promote equal rights
important guidance for continued work. This between women and men. This is done through
article seeks to reflect both policy and practical an emphasis on integrating a gender perspective
developments. (gender mainstreaming) and through seeking to
implement UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women,
peace and security. These concepts and policy
Key conceptual and policy frameworks will be addressed below.
frameworks
Equality and non-discrimination are funda- The notion of gender refers to the different
mental principles of international human rights social roles of women and men, which often dic-
law. They are also fundamental values of the Euro- tate what possibilities and constraints women
pean Union, enshrined in its normative frame- and men have in a given society. By analysing
work (Article 2 Treaty on European Union and gender roles in a society or an institution, it is
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). The EU possible to identify women’s and men’s different
should also seek to uphold and promote its val- access to power, influence and resources. That
ues and interests through its foreign policy (Arti- is, to identify the underlying causes of inequali-
cle 5(3) TEU). ties and discrimination. Gender mainstreaming
Equality and non-discrimination have internal seeks to ensure that this analysis – and the strate-
and external dimensions. EU institutions, includ- gies adopted to counter inequalities and promote
ing the CSDP structures, should ensure that they non-discrimination – are integrated into all pro-
have relevant procedures in place to promote gramming and parts of an institution. In the EU
equality and provide remedies for discrimination. and in CSDP missions and operations, gender
This includes promoting equal opportunities in advisers or focal points ensure that the institution
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
has relevant knowledge and understanding about with mission management; and that CSDP
women’s rights, equality and non-discrimination human rights and gender advisers should be
issues and, for example, gender-based and sexual strategically placed within the mission, so that
violence. Mainstreaming seeks to ensure that the they can provide timely input to mission man-
whole institution benefits from this knowledge agement. Expertise should also be integrated
and promotes equality. Key policy frameworks for into the operational aspects of the mission;
gender mainstreaming include: human rights and gender elements should
• Mainstreaming Gender and Human Rights into also be reflected in the EU’s comprehensive
ESDP (11936/4/2006). This policy document approach to crisis management, including co-
provides guidance for mainstreaming at the ordination and cooperation between all EU
mission level. actors on the ground;
• Lessons and Best Practices of Mainstream- • Crisis Management Procedures for CSDP Crisis
ing Human Rights and Gender into CSDP Management Operations (7660/2/2013) inte-
Military Operations and Civilian Missions grated some of these lessons, inter alia by em-
(17138/1/2010) follows on the 2006 policy phasising the importance of mainstreaming hu-
document. Key lessons include: that human man rights and gender and by including special
rights and gender elements should be reflect- headings for human rights in crisis management
ed throughout the planning, implementation, templates. The human rights headings ensure
reporting and review cycle; that the ultimate that human rights information is reflected in all
responsibility for mainstreaming needs to lie planning documents for CSDP missions.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, women to gender-based and sexual violence, rec-
peace and security ognising that although most victims of, especially,
sexual violence are women and girls, sexual vio-
The EU has been a strong promoter of the lence also affects men and boys. The UK-spon-
UN Security Council’s thematic resolutions on sored Global Campaign for Ending Sexual Vio-
women, peace and security. It has also sought to lence in Conflict (2014) has also resulted in new
integrate especially UNSCR 1325 (2000) and EU initiatives to tackle sexual violence in con-
1820 (2008) on women, peace and security into flict, including its consequences for post-conflict
its crisis management. The women, peace and peacebuilding and reforms.
security agenda developed through the seven the- The EU’s approach to combating gender-based
matic Security Council resolutions emphasises and sexual violence in conflict aims to be com-
women’s participation, empowerment and pro- prehensive, i.e., it engages all EU institutions,
tection. They also include a thematic focus on including CSDP. It is also based on an under-
gender-based and sexual violence and establish a standing that conflict-related sexual violence and
framework for implementation. Important policy its effects do not end when the conflict ends, but
documents for implementing the women, peace that it is important to address issues of sexual vio-
and security agenda within CSDP include: lence when engaging in justice and security sector
• Comprehensive Approach to the EU Implemen- reform and with civil society. Key policy docu-
tation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on women, ments include:
peace and security (15671/1/2008), which em- • EU Guidelines on Violence against Women and
phasises women’s participation in CSDP mis- Girls and Combating all forms of Discrimination
sions, that CSDP missions when planning their against them (16173/1/2008)
activities must consult with local women’s or- • Non-Paper on Ending Sexual Violence in Con-
ganisations and ensure that missions include a flict – a Guide to Practical Actions at EU Levels
focus on human rights violations against wom- (155/2014)
en, especially conflict-related sexual violence.
The EU has also adopted 17 indicators that
help monitor the progress made in integrating Women’s participation and
the women, peace and security agenda; five of gender mainstreaming in CSDP
the indicators focus specifically on CSDP. The missions and operations
indicators are being revised in 2015.
• Implementation of UNSCRs on women, peace As noted above, the EU does have a very well-
and security into CSDP mission and operations developed policy toolbox for gender mainstream-
(7109/2012) provides further guidance for in- ing and integration of UNSCR 1325. How are
tegration of the 1325 agenda into CSDP. these policy frameworks implemented in CSDP
missions?
An important element in all equality work –
Elimination of gender-based and whether internal or external – is women’s par-
sexual violence in conflict ticipation. Within CSDP missions a critical mass
of women is important for ensuring a positive
Since the early 1990s, the elimination of vio- working environment for women. In many cri-
lence against women has developed into an sis and conflict situations where the EU is pre-
important sub-theme within the field of equality, sent through its CSDP missions and operations,
non-discrimination and women’s rights. Over the the presence of women is a necessity in order to
years, the focus has shifted from violence against gain legitimacy from local populations and reach
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
out to women. Women’s participation in CSDP basic principles of humanitarian law and on the
missions and operations has, however, grown only protection of civilians, with components about
slowly over the years. By January 2015, there had sexual and gender-based violence as war crimes.
been only two female heads of civilian CSDP mis- In the Central African Republic, the EU has
sions, and the percentage of female staff in mis- been deploying an executive military force to
sions has remained at around 20-25 %. There are ensure some stability and security in the area of
no regular statistics on women’s participation in the capital. Here the EU force has had to grapple
military operations, but levels are considerably with protection issues, including how to ensure
lower. that women’s organisations providing basic ser-
All current CSDP missions and operations vices to women and children can continue to
have human rights and/or gender advisers or focal operate.
points. The term ‘adviser’ tends to be used for
staff whose full-time occupation it is to deal with
human rights and/or gender issues and who have Forward-looking strategies
expertise/prior experience of dealing with these
issues. The term ‘focal point’ tends to be used for Through the CSDP tool, the EU has been able
staff who have been assigned to deal with human to engage in crisis and conflict situations and
rights and/or gender issues in addition to their also to ensure that gender issues are integrated
other tasks and who are not necessarily expected in the post-conflict justice and security sector
to have specialised knowledge. The advisers and reforms. The EU by now has strong policies
focal points tend to be responsible either for for gender mainstreaming and for integrating
mainstreaming gender into the overall work of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security,
the mission or for undertaking specific gender- and has gained practical experience through the
centred projects. These projects most often focus CSDP missions. The key task henceforth will be
on women’s participation or on supporting insti- to ensure that the EU’s policies and knowledge
tutional structures that seek to ensure women’s are turned into operational guidelines, so that
empowerment or protection. gender and women, peace and security issues are
Some examples of gender-centred activities fol- reflected systematically in the planning, imple-
low. mentation and reviewing of CSDP missions, and
The police mission in Afghanistan has been so that CSDP staff are helped in their everyday
seeking to encourage women to join the Afghan work with gender and women, peace and secu-
police force. The mission has also, very impor- rity issues.
tantly, sought to establish safe and appropriate The commitment of mission management to
working conditions in a context where violence gender and women’s rights issues is also impor-
against women is rampant and where women tant, as is gender advisers’ and focal points’
who are working are still viewed with suspicion knowledge of the political and cultural context
by much of society. The police mission in the in which they are working. Contemporary cri-
Palestinian Territories has been supporting the sis management and post-conflict work is also
adoption of a law prohibiting domestic violence about cooperation and the ability to coordinate
and supporting the establishment of family with both international and national actors. An
response units. important tenet of the UNSCR 1325 women,
In Mali, where the EU has two missions, the peace and security framework is that women
focus of the EU Training Mission has been on need to be represented and that their opinions
supporting the rebuilding of the Malian armed need to be taken into account in all aspects of
forces. Military training includes training on this cooperation and coordination.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Sensitivity to context is required in all frag- security. While it may be tempting to think that
ile situations, not just crisis situations. The case only governance and security colleagues need to
of Rwanda, where the international community worry about doing no harm and addressing fragil-
was claiming progress in economic and develop- ity, roads, food security and agriculture, education
ment terms just months before the 1994 geno- and energy programmes also have a direct bearing
cide was unleashed, is evidence of the need for on fragility and conflict and thus must be pro-
greater awareness of the political forces, social grammed with a conflict lens.
dynamics and fundamental beliefs and values that Sensitivity to context may require adapting
exist in society. As the study on lessons learned some of the principles of aid effectiveness, nota-
from CSDP missions and operations states: ‘Post- bly ownership and alignment, as recognised in
conflict settings require political savvy.’ Ethnic-, the Accra Agenda for Action. As stated in the
clan- or regional-based exclusion; gender-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
violence and discrimination; and youth exclusion Development’s (OECD) Principles for Good
are often acute in situations of conflict and fragil- International Engagement in Fragile States and
ity and require special attention. Situations, endorsed by the EU:
Although it is easier to infer causal relations in “Where governments demonstrate political will
hindsight than to detect them as events unfold, to foster development, but lack capacity, interna-
all programming in a fragile or conflict-affected tional actors should seek to align assistance behind
situation needs to be informed by context analy- government strategies. Where capacity is lim-
sis and anticipation of what might be the impact ited, he use of alternative aid instruments – such
– intended and unintended – of the programme as international compacts or multi-donor trust
and its components. This analysis is often read- funds – can facilitate shared priorities and respon-
ily available in well-documented contexts such as sibility for execution between national and inter-
Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the national institutions. Where alignment behind
Congo. When such documentation is not avail- government-led strategies is not possible due to
able, various tools exist for rapid ‘light’ analysis. particularly weak governance or violent conflict,
Sensitivity to context is required in all pro- international actors should consult with a range of
grammes, not just those involving governance and national stakeholders in the partner country, and
1 European Commission: Operating in situations of conflict and fragility. An EU staff handbook. Tools and Methods Series.
Reference Document No 17. December 2014. pp 9-12. To be found on http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/public-fragility/
document/operating-situations-conflict-and-fragility-eu-staff-handbook
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
pacity to political and security risks; leading to and fragility can be managed by being more
(ii) programmatic risks (failure to achieve pro- pro-active than in more stable contexts. If
gramme goals and the risk of doing harm) and there is a high fiduciary risk, it might be both
ultimately to (iii) fiduciary and reputational safer and have more of an impact to invest
risks for the institution providing support. in strengthening the financial management
• Calculating risk. Situations of conflict and fra- of receiving partners than to state conditions
gility are usually higher risk than more stable that will probably not be met. To cite another
contexts, but taking a zero-risk or low-risk ap- example, “combating corruption ought to be
proach could lead to strategic failure (zero im- done within the framework of broader sup-
pact). Rather, the calculation should (i) weigh port to strengthen good governance and de-
the risk of action vis-à-vis the risk of inaction and mocratisation processes” (Commission of the
the potential benefits of engaging, and (ii) com- European Communities, 2003).
pare the risks involved with several courses of Risks in situations of conflict and fragility can
action. In calculating risk, there is a need for also be managed though multi-donor efforts,
greater realism (most recent evaluations identify including pooled funding; and/or by using spe-
overly optimistic objectives and/or timelines for cial instruments, such as the EU Instrument con-
EU support in situations of conflict and fragil- tributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP; formerly
ity) and greater honesty about risk exposure be- the Instrument for Stability, IfS), for which there
tween donors and receiving partners, and with- is higher tolerance (within agreed limits) than for
in donor administrations between programme regular instruments if innovation and untested
managers and financial controllers. approaches are not fruitful.
• Managing risk. Risk in situations of conflict
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1 Civil protection has not been implemented under CSDP; the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the
Commission ensures cooperation and coordination across national civil protection agencies among EU Member States
and partners (since 2010).
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
sought to establish sustainable policing arrange- the benefit of all citizens, be it in Ukraine, in
ments under BiH ownership, the scope of man- Africa or in the Balkans, is envisaged as a partic-
dates has become wider. The support to civilian ular, critical contribution to national dialogues
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and to other struc- and regional stability, among the wider efforts of
tures in the realm of Rule of Law (RoL), such as the international community. Building on the
the judiciary, has increasingly formed part of mis- added value of the EU’s expertise and standing,
sion tasks. In Iraq, the CSDP contribution to the missions of very various sizes add to wider peace
country’s transition focused on the criminal justice efforts.
system. Through integrated training activities and
the promotion of a culture of respect for human
rights, it aimed at a consolidation of security by Support to State institutions:
underpinning the system of RoL. More compre- top-down and bottom-up
hensive from the outset (2008), EULEX Kosovo
has enjoyed a far-reaching mandate, initially cov- Missions initially focusing on training and
ering the police, justice and customs sectors with MMA have also adapted, over time, to further
a view to assisting and supporting the Kosovo their assistance to partners willing to tackle over-
authorities in the establishment of a sustainable, arching policies and inter-institutional coopera-
accountable and multi-ethnic RoL system. tion. The support to the Palestinian Civil Police
Recent missions have seen their lines of opera- carried out by EUPOL Copps has shifted, over
tions specifically designed to have an impact at eight years, from training activities towards advice
strategic level. EUAM, the EU advisory mission on institutional sets-ups and legislation in the field
in Ukraine, provides strategic advice on civil- of security and justice. Current efforts range from
ian SSR in support of the Ukrainian authorities the basic Law on Police to delineation of responsi-
who have embarked on the path of reform. The bilities in the Ministries of Justice and the Interior.
development of accountability mechanisms for Another example of such refocusing is EUPOL
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
2 In the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel regions, the Council has adopted global frameworks or strategies to guide the vari-
ous dimensions of its external action, in partnership with the regions and key international organisations.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
and other types of basic equipment). To address authority of its director, the Civilian Operations
this gap and more generally to improve support Commander (CivOpsCdr). The permanent civil-
to partners in the field of capacity-building, fol- ian operations headquarters since 2007, CPCC
lowing up on the December 2013 European monitors how missions deliver and ensures that
Council and Foreign Affairs Council conclusions the missions’ activities and organisational set-ups
of 17-18 November 2014, a joint exercise involv- are best suited to fulfilling mandated tasks. This
ing the Commission, EEAS and Member States oversight and support to operational planning
was launched in 2014; in this context several mis- require a constant dialogue with the Council and
sions and operations were tasked with mapping the Political and Security Committee, through
the equipment needs of the host country in their which Member States exercise the political con-
mandate area. This work is expected to result in trol and strategic direction of CSDP missions
a joint policy approach in relation to Train and and operations. Annual or bi-annual strategic
Equip. From a CSDP point of view, this pilot reviews under the aegis of the Crisis Management
initiative should help mitigating a recurring chal- and Planning Directorate (CMPD) also play an
lenge to mandate implementation: the provision important role in refocusing mandates, missions’
of equipment, which CSDP missions cannot fully objectives and tasks – within the realm of EU
address, is marked by procedural constraints (dif- external action and in the wider context.
ferent programming cycles and timeframes for CPCC is the first point in the Heads of Mis-
development and assistance programming versus sions’ reporting line to Brussels. The CivOpsCdr,
limited lifetime of missions) and limits in terms who is the Commander at strategic level, issues
of what can be funded through the the European regular instructions and advice to the missions
Development Fund (under current Official Devel- in theatre. Concepts and thematic operational
opment Assistance, military or dual-use equip- guidance also contribute to enhancing mission’s
ment can hardly be funded). This ongoing work3 efficiency – building on mission expertise and
will contribute to a comprehensive approach to lessons learnt. Mission reporting is instrumental
capacity-building in practice, in order to optimise in informing the development of best practices
EU efforts dedicated at enabling partners to pre- which, in turn, act as enablers for mandate imple-
vent and manage crises by themselves. mentation.
The planning phase of EUBAM Libya has
prompted debates, at HQ level and among Mem-
A catalyst for horizontal ber States, about integrated border management
debates (IBM) – inter alia resulting in a EU Concept on
CSDP support to IBM in 2013. Maritime secu-
These examples show how reporting is critical rity is another example, with EUCAP Nestor. The
to planning – both at operational and at policy work carried out by EULEX Kosovo to tackle
level. Civilian CSPD missions constantly have to organised crime also contributed to increasing
adapt to changing – or at times protracted – polit- cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and
ical contexts and operational environments. On EU agencies in the area of Freedom, Security and
a daily basis, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Justice. When deployed in new areas of security/
Capability (CPCC) in Brussels supervises the con- intervention, missions often function as a catalyst
duct of civilian CSDP missions and ensures ade- for ‘horizontal’ debates (i.e. on issues pertain-
quate support, as well as a duty of care, under the ing to missions overall), by putting them on the
3 A joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council will provide policy options in this respect, consider-
ing both the security and development policy areas.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Since the inception of Common Security and approach” to enable an effective EU response. The
Defence Policy1 (CSDP) interventions in 2003, European Union comprehensive approach is both a
the European Union has become increasingly general working method and a set of specific meas-
active abroad and has undertaken ever more cri- ures and processes to improve how the EU can
sis management operations. The EU has progres- deliver more coherent and effective policies and
sively become a global political actor and a secu- actions, drawing on a wide array of existing tools
rity provider. and instruments. The regional strategies developed
EU operations are undertaken on the basis of a to date for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel have
UN mandate, which the EU would normally seek been valuable in framing the EU’s comprehensive
in enforcement situations. On the other hand, response to new political developments and chal-
EU missions, which are non-executive, are carried lenges. Policy coherence has also proven highly
out in a non-coercive framework. Over the last beneficial for the sustainability of EU engagement
year, five missions and operations involving mili- transitioning from CSDP operations to other
tary instruments have been ongoing in two conti- forms of commitment. Perhaps the most remark-
nents– four of them in Africa, one in Europe. In able characteristic of the CSDP planning system
addition, at the time of writing, the Council of the is that it constitutes a process for planning civilian
EU established the EU Military Advisory Mission as well as military operations. As a matter of fact,
in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA). on the political-strategic level – at the start of the
The new mission will follow on from the EU mili- planning cycle – the Crisis Management Concept
tary operation EUFOR RCA, which contributed (CMC) is a jointly drafted ‘civ-mil’ document.
to security in the capital Bangui and ended on Under CSDP, the EU conducts military mis-
15 March 2015. EUMAM RCA is meant to sup- sions worldwide. These missions perform a vari-
port the Central African authorities in preparing ety of tasks and complement military operations,
a reform of the security sector with respect to the taking into account confrontational politics and
management of CAR armed forces. complex development; they are valuable opera-
tional instruments within the EU’s comprehensive
approach. The EU’s concept of crisis management
Military contribution to the has evolved and it has demonstrated its ability to
comprehensive approach engage in a new type of missions, involving military
training and an advisory role. But a precondition
Conflicts or crises, as multifaceted problems, for such commitments is that these missions must
require a strategically coherent use of the EU’s vari- be launched in countries where hostilities have
ous instruments and policies to effectively address ceased and where some functioning governance is
their root causes. They require a “comprehensive in place. Over the past ten years, the military have
1 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions and operations became Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP) missions and operations through the Lisbon Treaty.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
also become a tool contributing to capacity-build- Many missions with an SSR dimension take
ing and state-building in host countries. place in Africa in support of the African secu-
In this light, the EU’s crisis management oper- rity architecture, alongside the EU’s cooperation
ations have seen the extension of their mandate and engagement with the AU and other African
to feature new tasks, and training missions have regional organisations. This is because the EU
morphed to have a new focus on Security Sec- endorses the principle of African ownership of
tor Reform; they envisage programmes that take solutions to the continent’s problems. Therefore,
more time to implement. rather than expanding its military presence there,
For example, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH was the EU seeks to empower local and regional actors
revised in 2005 and increasingly the operation has to cope with crisis management and conflict pre-
carried out tasks related to capacity building or vention themselves. Training assistance, security
an advisory role related to Security Sector Reform sector reform and capacity-building are the cor-
programmes. nerstones of this endeavour – they can be con-
Another illustration of CSDP evolutions is the ceived as preventive measures, with a view to the
succession of EU military missions and opera- long-term stability of the affected region.
tions in CAR. Assigned with a mandate to protect Given the EU’s commitment to multilateralism
civilians and establish security in a limited area and support for the UN and regional organisa-
of operation (restricted to the airport in the capi- tions like the AU, the EU aims to raise its profile
tal of Bangui, as well as two districts in the city), through, inter alia, inter-organisational coopera-
the EUFOR RCA is intended to serve a bridge tion. Such cooperation is viewed as a means of
function, later handing over military control to constructively amplifying the EU’s impact.
the UN peacekeeping operation. Chapter VII of
the UN Charter authorises the mission to deploy
all necessary means to maintain security. Indeed, Partnerships
amid the precarious security situation in Bangui,
EU troops have been required to use force to Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty sets the scene
protect civilians. Following a request by the UN for the EU’s cooperation with partner countries
Secretariat and CAR’s interim president, Cath- and international organisations in crisis manage-
erine Samba-Panza, Member States extended the ment. The EU commitment to multilateral coop-
EU operation until MINUSCA is expected to be eration is based on its history and values. In the
fully operational. The EUMAM, which is a (now framework of military CSDP, this occurs through
typical) advisory mission, will be the successor of cooperation with host countries, regional organi-
EUFOR RCA, representing a new phase of the sations and the United Nations. Partnerships are
EU’s engagement in CAR under CSDP. an important component of CSDP, as shown by
Furthermore, to support the approach adopted cooperation with third countries and regional
in the Sahel and the decisions taken by EU Defence organisations, but also by CSDP cooperation
Ministers at a meeting in Luxembourg, which were with the UN in the field of international crisis
part of international efforts to stabilise Mali and management – where the EU supports UN peace-
extend the state’s authority there, the EU recently keeping efforts through ‘bridging operations’ and
agreed to extend by two years a mission to train ‘stand-by operations’.
the army (EUTM) while sending civilian advisers Recalling the Conclusions from the European
to train and advise Mali’s internal security forces Council of December 2013, the EU is ensur-
(EUCAP Sahel Mali). EU experts will give advice ing the greatest possible coherence between the
and training to the three internal security forces in Union’s and Member States’ actions to support
Mali: the police, Gendarmerie and National Guard. partner countries and regional organisations,
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
including in the context of security sector reform, approach. The engagement of the EU in wider
by providing training, advice, equipment and peacekeeping efforts is demonstrated by the devel-
resources where appropriate. opment of its Common Security and Defence
The participation of different international, Policy (CSDP), in which Africa remains a centre
regional, and non-governmental organisations of gravity, with 10 missions and operations con-
towards one peace objective or mission has become ducted on the continent to date.
a significant feature of contemporary international
relations. Pioneering new ways to work together
with the US, the UN, and the AU is perhaps the EU military Operations
most tangible achievement of EUTM. An effec-
tive division of labour has emerged between the EUFOR ALTHEA
EU, the AU, and the US, if we refer to EUTM
Somalia, for example. More generally, EU train- The military operation European Union
ing missions have become well known for their Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia and Herzego-
ability to establish enduring cooperation with key vina was launched in December 2004. As part
stakeholders in the regions where they operate, of the EU’s comprehensive approach in Bosnia
providing a multilateral dimension to global gov- and Herzegovina (BiH), Operation Althea pro-
ernance. vides a military presence to contribute to a safe
The EU focuses on policy frameworks, conti- and secure environment, prevent conditions for
nental and regional structures, tools and mech- a resumption of violence and manage any resid-
anisms to anticipate, prevent, manage, and ual aspects of the General Framework Agree-
resolve crises, in line with its own comprehensive ment for Peace in BiH (the 1995 Dayton/Paris
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
EUFOR RCA
2 See paragraph 7 of ‘EU-UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the
EU-UN Joint Declaration’, adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004).
172
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
EUNAVFOR ATALANTA
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
174
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
One of the increasingly common examples of SSR should, first and foremost, be a locally-
how CSDP missions and operations are assist- owned process. This means that the support
ing countries in improving the safety and security provided by missions and operations should
of their populations is support to Security Sector be developed and implemented in partnership
Reform (SSR). Security and justice actors in a frag- with the host authorities, be culturally and con-
ile, post-conflict or transitional country are often textually appropriate, and support their vision
more a source of insecurity than a means to make and strategies for security and justice. Such an
the population feel safe: examples include extra-judi- approach allows missions and operations to help
cial killings by the police, demands for bribes to pass build up national capacity in the skills required
through border crossing points, inhumane custodial to develop plans for reform. This means factoring
conditions, dysfunctional courts, or mob justice. the time and resources needed to build the strate-
Stemming from the now-established under- gic approach with local partners in the planning
standing that ‘security’ needs to be understood in process, notably in the Operation Plan, Mission
terms of human security, whereby the security of Implementation Plan and other planning docu-
the individual rather than just the state is placed ments.
at the centre of decision-making, SSR refers to the Local ownership does not mean just support-
process through which a country seeks to review ing the political elite, and therefore efforts can be
and enhance the effectiveness and accountability made to support consultation processes to capture
of its security and justice providers towards its cit- and feed in the views of wider sectors of society
izens. This may involve a wide range of state and into the development of policies and their imple-
non-state security and justice providers and gov- mentation. Participatory and community-based
ernance institutions, examples of which are illus- approaches for information capture and analysis
trated on p. 176. The services they deliver should are critical. Women are usually not represented
meet the needs of all sectors of the population (in at political decision-making levels, and the same
particular the most vulnerable), whilst operating is true of minorities and people with disabilities.
within a framework of good governance, rule of Deliberate effort needs to be invested in reaching
law and respect for human rights. out to them.
The EU’s policy framework on SSR1, developed Another challenge is that local demands can
in 2005-2006, outlines a number of core princi- often focus on unsustainable equipment and
ples. These have been further enhanced by lessons infrastructure projects, rather than focusing on
from EU CSDP missions and operations, support institution building. Support carried out by
provided by other EU instruments and reflection EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories,
and analysis from further afield. shown in Box 1, illustrates one approach taken
1 EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform. Council of the European Union, Brussels, 13 October 2005,
12566/4/05 REV 4.
A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform. Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 24 May 2006, COM(2006) 153 final.
Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform. 2736th General Affairs Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, 12 June 2006.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Service Providers
Governance Institutes
The European Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) has been
mentoring and advising a small team from the Strategy, Development and Planning Unit
(SDPU) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), helping the MoI to develop a series of robust pro-
cesses to implement the security sector strategy. Part of this involved developing a system
to evaluate project proposals from the security services. Higher scores were to be given to
projects that could demonstrate relevance, alignment and impact to the nationally-owned
security sector strategy, as well as projects that considered sustainability and demonstrat-
ed a strong commitment from the agencies’ leadership to oversee the project. Projects
that targeted specific priority issues such as institutional development, accountability and
oversight, human rights and gender were given a relatively higher score. EUPOL COPPS
support involved coaching and mentoring the SDPU to apply the criteria, and a series of
workshops by the MoI with each of the security services to explain its evaluation of the
proposed projects. The entire process was completely led by the MoI and endorsed by the
Ministry’s leadership, and led to a locally-owned list of 140 projects, ranked according to
their relevance to the strategic plan’s priorities, and shared with donors in line with their
funding interests.
176
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
to help the Ministry of Interior to take greater human rights. Moreover, many of the challenges
ownership of the development of the Palestinian in reforming security and justice providers and
security sector. Ensuring local ownership remains setting up functioning democratic mechanisms
a challenging issue. to control them are invariably related to power,
In order to deliver good quality security and relationships and other political questions. This
justice services to the population, actors in the means that CSDP missions and operations need
security sector need to be both effective and to engage in political dialogue and understand
accountable. If efforts are made solely to build the political ramifications of any technical sup-
their technical capabilities, there is a risk that port they are providing. EUAM Ukraine (Box
the result will be, for example, an army that is 3) provides a good snapshot of the importance
more adept at oppressing citizens. If, conversely, of the issue. Coordination with the EU Del-
all the support provided focuses on accountabil- egation in country and the wider international
ity, the resulting institution is unlikely to be able community is vital to ensure common, coherent
to deliver the services needed by the population. messaging, in line with the EU’s comprehensive
However, whilst support is often concentrated approach.
on technical training and equipment, improving SSR is a process that involves many different
the accountability of security and justice actors is actors and institutions. Even if the mandate for a
frequently overlooked, in part because it is more mission or operation focuses closely on a partic-
difficult to measure results, harder to find entry ular security or justice provider it is nonetheless
points and more likely to meet with resistance vital to understand the interconnected nature
amongst the elite. The EUSEC mission in the of the different components within the security
DRC, shown in Box 2, is a notable example of and justice sector. As an example, improving the
the potential impact of focusing on issues of gov- capacity of the police to make arrests without
ernance and the value of a balanced approach to also improving the ability of the courts to process
SSR that looks at both accountability and capac- cases, or the accountability of detention facilities,
ity building. can result in an overall increase in human rights
SSR is an inherently political process. It violations. The graphic on p. 178 illustrates the
touches on the state’s sovereignty, monopoly holistic nature of SSR, highlighting in addition
on the use of force, its institutional architecture to the individual sectors the importance of the
and societal values such as freedom, security and security and justice needs of the people as the
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Established in July 2014, the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform
Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) is currently fully engaged in the planning phase for supporting
the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms.
One of the biggest challenges is identifying how to trigger the organisational cultural and
behavioural change needed for the Ukrainian security providers to deliver better services,
as well as the systems and frameworks to enable that change. This means that the mis-
sion needs to work very much through a political lens: analysing and understanding the
underlying interests, relationships of power and drivers of behaviour, and engaging with
multiple stakeholders. This is evident in the work the Mission is doing to help establish a
coordinating centre, in a context where the division of constitutional powers between the
President and government is still uncertain, and the concept of human security is still new.
The Mission is also working to engage stakeholders at multiple levels by supporting mid-
level reform amongst the traffic and patrol police in the Kyiv region, as well as legislative
change to develop a more independent and more accountable judiciary.
STATE
SSR-related processes
Private security companies
parliamentary oversight
Executive, judicial and
Human rights
DDR
Prosecutors
Intelligence
Defence
Others
Courts
Police
SALW control
Public oversight
Gender
Mine action
Financial management
Transitional justice
Other Elections
Other
PEOPLE
foundation for all reform. States would ideally framework that is financially realistic, sensitisa-
have a national security strategy that captures tion and communication processes, and develop-
these needs and provides a policy framework for ing mechanisms for enabling successful imple-
the individual institutional reform programmes. mentation (including monitoring).
Support in this area is very important, involv- SSR is a technically complex process, requir-
ing assisting a range of activities, such as under- ing a wide array of skills. Substantive knowledge
taking broad consultations, creating a strategic and experience is core: deployed experts need to
178
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
2 Civilian Operations Commander’s Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP missions,
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 7 November 2014, 15272/14.
179
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Recent years have seen renewed interest in the ations. This would advance not only the theory
potential role of the EU as a security provider. A but also the practice of such endeavours.
recurring theme in this debate is whether the EU
can play a meaningful part in conflict manage-
ment beyond its borders. Since the Union estab- State of the art
lished the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP – now CSDP) in 1999, its endeavours in Conceptual discussions of success in EU schol-
military conflict management have developed rap- arship are limited at best. We tend to assume that
idly. At the time of writing, the EU has launched success is obvious. One knows it when one sees
military operations to help manage conflicts in it. Consequently, success in EU military conflict
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bos- management operations has been evaluated on an
nia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of ad-hoc basis rather than systematically examined
Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic.1 according to sound criteria. This article suggests
As operations have been undertaken in the field, that one evaluation framework for success in EU
corresponding case studies have examined their military conflict management operations should
achievements. Despite this interest, a theoretically be applied consistently.
grounded understanding of how to define and In order to accurately evaluate, explain and pre-
evaluate success in this kind of operation has all dict success in EU military conflict management,
too often been missing. This contribution posits, what is meant by the term success must first be
however, that it is important, because in order to clearly defined. Generally speaking, success means
achieve success, it is crucial to know what it is. reaching a desirable outcome. The question is:
Moreover, to accurately evaluate and explain suc- desirable according to whom or what? This issue is
cess in past operations and to predict success in at the heart of EU military conflict management,
future operations a sound understanding of what yet it is hardly ever discussed. On the contrary,
constitutes such a success is required. The purpose definitions of success, which are often implicit
of this article is to encourage rigour concerning rather than explicit, vary considerably. The notion
the notion of success in CSDP missions and oper- of success itself has not been subject to much
1 This list includes neither the Union’s civilian missions nor its maritime or military support, training and assistance opera-
tions, which serve different purposes than military conflict management.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
consideration. This article suggests that existing success criteria are decided upon by the EU alone.
knowledge from the study of international peace- On the one hand, it is important not to automati-
keeping, conflict management, military interven- cally equate self-defined interest with self-interest,
tion and foreign policy may be helpful in this but on the other, it is important to recognise that
regard,2 as the problem of which perspective to internal success criteria reflect self-selected goals.
adopt when defining success is not confined to the This notion of success, as defined by the intervener
evaluation of EU military conflict management. itself, can be referred to as internal success. Accord-
For example, Pushkina and Baldwin have high- ing to this definition, whether an operation is a suc-
lighted ongoing disputes concerning whether to cess is ultimately assessed according to whether it
evaluate success from the perspective of the pol- has reached its stated objectives. This logic suggests
icy actor, the target or according to theoretically that the EU should be judged on its own merits
defined standards in international peacekeeping alone and that whether a CSDP military conflict
or foreign policy analysis, respectively.3 management operation is a success depends simply
on whether it fulfils its mandate.
Internal success is an important part of an
Internal success overall success. However, as a stand-alone defini-
tion internal success is problematic for three key
In practice, a narrow definition of success reasons. Firstly, it suggests that an operation is
reflecting the interests and intentions of the pol- successful when its outcome is compatible with
icy actor – in our case the EU – is often applied. the intentions and interests of the intervener,
In the military, operational success is understood disregarding the fact that these do not necessar-
as mandate fulfilment.4 This perspective is shared ily reflect the needs of the target or indeed the
across the board when evaluating military opera- overall purpose of this kind of operation. Sec-
tions and has to some extent been adopted by the ondly, assessing the operation solely according to
EU, which evaluates success in these operations whether it has met its stated objectives is risky,
according to its own aims and objectives. In effect, as this logic suggests that success can be ensured
EU representatives can claim that all the operations by a vague mandate aiming to achieve very lit-
to date have been successful – even if they leave no tle. On its own, this definition of success would
more than a mere pinprick in the conflict coun- mean that an EU military conflict management
try.5 Although a mandate may include considera- operation could be declared successful, even if
tions on behalf of the target, this understanding of the conflict situation it left behind was less secure
success is internally defined, in the sense that the than when the operation was launched, as long as
2 See for example Diehl, Paul F. & Druckman, Daniel (2010). Evaluating peace operations. London: Lynne Rienner; Freed-
man, Lawrence (2006). Interventionist strategies and the changing use of force, In: Croker, Chester, A., Osler Hampson,
Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict. Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 309-321; Haas, Richard, N. (2006). Using force: Lessons and choices In: Croker, Ches-
ter, A., Osler Hampson, Fen & Aall, Pamela, eds. Turbulent peace: The challenges of managing international conflict. Wash-
ington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, pp. 295-307; Howard, Lise Morje (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil
wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh (2011). Contem-
porary conflict resolution. Cambridge: Polity; Ross, Mark Howard and Rothman, Jay (1999). Theory and practice in ethnic
conflict management: Theorising success and failure. Basingstoke: Palgrave; Seybolt, Taylor B. (2008). Humanitarian military
intervention: The conditions for success and failure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3 Baldwin, David A. (2000). Success and failure in foreign policy, Annual Review of Political Science, 3, pp. 167-182;
Pushkina, Darya (2006). A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission.
International Peacekeeping, 13(2). pp. 133-149.
4 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). International peacekeeping. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61.
5 Solana, Javier (2009). Ten years of European Security and Defence Policy. ESDP newsletter. 9. pp. 8-11; Syren, Haakon
(2009). ESDP 2009 – The military dimension. Interparliamentary conference on ESDP. Stockholm, 9th of November.
182
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
6 Guthrie, Charles & Quinlan, Michael, 2007. Just war: The just war tradition: Ethics in modern warfare.
London: Bloomsbury, pp.20-21 and p.31.
7 Druckman, Daniel et al (1997). Evaluating peacekeeping missions. Mershon International Studies Review, 31(1),
pp. 151-165.
8 Diehl, Paul F. (1994). International peacekeeping. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 33-61.
9 Howard, Lise Morje (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7.
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OVERALL
SUCCESS
Evaluating success
The conceptual problem of defining success One should expect an EU military conflict
causes further problems in the evaluation of suc- management operation to have a positive impact
cess. Depending on which definition one applies, on the management of a conflict. However, one
the level of success varies significantly. Where the should not expect EU soldiers to resolve the
internal definition arguably asks too little for an underlying root causes of that conflict. This is
operation to succeed, the external perspective normatively unfair, analytically unsound and
often evaluates success according to an ideal state practically unproductive. The definition of suc-
of peace, practically impossible for soldiers to cess must reflect the purpose of military conflict
achieve. Both definitions reflect misconceptions management; namely, to militarily manage the
about the purpose of military conflict manage- violent aspect of a conflict. Conflict management
ment operations. This causes observers to allocate must not be confused with conflict resolution.
the forces too much or too little credit – credit- The resolution of a conflict is dependent on the
ing or blaming the intervener for developments in actions of domestic, regional and international
which it is neither the only nor, often, the decisive actors engaged in the conflict and its resolution,
actor. The internal success criteria often set the bar not simply the presence of an EU force.10 This
too low, whereas many external criteria for suc- article, therefore, also rejects definitions of success
cess make it all but impossible for an operation soley based on extensive external criteria. Neither
to succeed. This problem is mirrored in the EU internal nor external success alone constitutes
scholarship. overall success in EU military conflict manage-
10 Johansen, Robert, C. (1994). UN peacekeeping: How should we measure success? Mershon International Stud-
ies Review, 38(2), pp. 307-310.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
ment operations. The understanding of success which incorporates internal and external goal
must incorporate both internal and external per- attainment as well as the appropriate implemen-
spectives on success so as to reflect the interests of tation thereof. This is particularly important if
the intervener (the EU), the target (the conflict) one seeks to compare the success of several oper-
and the purpose of this type of operation (conflict ations or to draw lessons from completed opera-
management). tions to future operations and to the practice of
military conflict management more generally.
Failure to address these issues appropriately may
Conclusion lead to analytical misunderstanding, misguided
policy prescription and, in the worst case, to less
Violent conflict and military conflict man- than successful operations. The EU has an inter-
agement are both complex phenomena. Success est in succeeding in these operations, but it is
in military conflict management operations is important to recall that failure in military con-
a complex issue to define, let alone to evaluate, flict management has serious implications for
explain and predict. Because of that complexity, the soldiers who implement the operations and
this article proposes that the notion of success in for those who live and all too often die in the
military conflict management operations must conflicts they seek to manage. This is why sys-
be based on a theoretically grounded under- tematic scrutiny of success in EU military con-
standing of success and a sound analytical frame- flict management operations is important – not
work for its evaluation (illustrated in Figure 1), only in theory, but in practice.
Systematic scrutiny of success in EU military conflict management operations is important – not only in
theory, but in practice (in the picture: Medal parade for EUFOR RCA)
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Benchmarking was formally introduced into The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
civilian CSDP mission planning and conduct (CPCC) accordingly undertook extensive research
in 2011. However, its main elements were not and in-depth analysis of existing approaches to
new; in fact, since the very first mission in 2003, the topic, studying other EU, international and
all mission concepts of operations (CONOPS) research best practice. Benchmarking for the pur-
defined concrete objectives and mission tasks; poses of civilian CSDP was eventually described as
they also contained definitions of ‘end states’ and
‘criteria for success’ based on analysis of risks and „a methodology designed to contribute to measur-
opportunities for mission accomplishment; and ing progress and outcome by comparing a situa-
missions were asked to report regularly and com- tion (an initial baseline) against its evolution at
prehensively on mission progress. given points in time using pre-defined indicators.
However, prompted inter alia by the financial The information obtained from this process is then
crisis, and in the light of a number of civilian SSR- fed back into the mission chain of command,
related missions being prolonged time and again, facilitating tactical, operational and strategic pol-
notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo, icy adjustments as required” 1.
Member States requested that the approach to
benchmarking and delivery/impact be tightened More specifically, the benchmarking methodol-
up. ogy agreed in 2011 provides the following:
In this context, the basic consideration was As benchmarking serves as a tool for measuring
that one of the key objectives of civilian CSDP change, the starting point is a conflict and situa-
missions is to facilitate the changes or processes tion analysis and assessment of needs that leads to
necessary to foster stability in crisis situations. the definition of a ‘baseline’. This work is normally
With this goal in mind, a monitoring and report- done at the stage of Crisis Management Concept
ing mechanism designed to provide objective and (CMC) drafting, later refined and detailed during
timely feedback on progress made was considered operational planning with input from the ground.
essential, among other things to help verify the Whilst the CMC sets out the aims and political-
impact of missions on the ground. strategic objectives of the envisaged CSDP mission
It has to be kept in mind that civilian CSDP mis- as well as its basic parameters, the further opera-
sions are but one of the instruments at the disposal tional planning translates these into mission ‘tasks’
of the EU in conflict prevention or post-conflict and ‘benchmarks’. The concept of operations thus
scenarios, where the EU is not the only actor. In identifies lines of operations suited to achieving
general, they are conceived and designed to oper- those aims and objectives. Political intent becomes
ate in a short- to medium-term perspective, focus- direction and guidance. ‘Decisive points’ and
ing on specific aspects of the situation and meant ‘desired outcomes’ are defined in this process.
to help in advancing towards a political end-state The subsequently developed OPLAN further
which the EU is pursuing in the longer term. elaborates the operational details necessary for
1 Cf. Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011.
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What is a ‘lesson learnt’? This is worth explain- lessons systems, formal or informal, to take into
ing as there are different understandings of the account what works and what does not work
term. In normal speech, a ‘lesson learnt’ is often and to improve their performance. What can-
used as a synonym for ‘experience’ and does not not be solved at the level of a mission or opera-
necessarily imply that any action has been taken tion should be reported to HQ as part of regular
as a consequence. In daily life, one can note some- reporting. Good feedback on lessons from the
thing as a ‘lesson learnt’ and that can be the end field is extremely valuable.
of the story. Each of the three CSDP structures at EU HQ
Lessons specialists, particularly in the military (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) now has its own
domain, are more precise. They define a ‘lesson’ as internal lessons system for recording, analysing
any occurrence or finding that has an impact on and implementing lessons. CMPD collects les-
operational output, which requires further devel- sons from political-strategic planning of CSDP
opment or monitoring. After proper analysis and missions and operations and from the related
validation, a simple ‘lesson observed’ becomes a strategic reviews. CPCC collects lessons from
‘lesson identified’. At this point remedial action operational planning, conduct and support of
should be taken, which may, for example, con- civilian CSDP missions. EUMS collects lessons
sist of modifying concepts, planning documents, from advance planning and support to military
training documents, guidelines or standard oper- HQ and from reports from missions and opera-
ating procedures in order to reflect the lesson. tions. As far as possible, lessons are also collected
After remedial action has been taken, a lesson through visits by officials from Brussels HQ to
identified becomes a ‘lesson learnt’. Therefore, a CSDP missions and operations and through
‘lesson learnt’ is a lesson that has been not only interviews with mission and operation staff and
observed and identified but also acted on. other stakeholders.
‘Best practice’ is a successful practice that Certain lessons identified by CMPD, CPCC or
should be replicated. It can be classified as a posi- EUMS cannot be implemented by any of those
tive lesson, and in this context replication takes structures on their own. Since 2013, these lessons
the place of remedial action. are discussed in a two-level CSDP Lessons Man-
Learning lessons is essential for organisational agement Group/Lessons Working Group, which
improvement in any environment. This also includes not only CMPD, CPCC and EUMS
applies to the planning and conduct of CSDP but also all other CSDP stakeholders: INTCEN,
missions and operations, and considerable efforts Security Policy and Conflict Prevention, MD
have been made to improve the CSDP lessons sys- CR&OC, CivCom, EUMC and PMG chairs,
tem over the last few years. An exhaustive report relevant geographic and thematic departments, as
on CSDP lessons from security sector reform was well as the Commission’s DG DEVCO, ECHO
issued in 2012 and the CSDP lessons system in and FPI. An effective lessons system needs the
Brussels was overhauled in 2013. Missions and involvement of the highest level of management,
operations should, of course, also have their own and the CSDP Lessons Management Group
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
is composed by the heads of these bodies and sons system itself.1 They were accompanied by
chaired by a member of the Corporate Board of nineteen specific recommendations for remedial
the EEAS. The CSDP Lessons Working Group action or replication of good practice. The PSC
has the same composition at expert level and is endorsed these key lessons and recommendations
chaired by an official appointed by the Chair of in line with the advice from the relevant Council
the Lessons Management Group. It discusses working groups.
in detail the lessons raised by its members and The CSDP Lessons Working Group monitors
attempts to produce a shared analysis and joint the implementation of the key lessons and recom-
recommendations. mendations. In 2014, it found that good progress
Every year, the CSDP Lessons Management had been made in all five areas identified in the
Group identifies up to five broad, overarching 2013 Report, although further work was needed,
issues or key lessons and submits them to the Polit- particularly on certain aspects of the comprehen-
ical and Security Committee (PSC) for endorse- sive approach and on pre-deployment training.
ment in an Annual CSDP Lessons Report. This The lessons work will continue this year and in
report also includes the input from EU Delega- the years ahead, which should help, in practice,
tions in countries where missions and operations constantly to improve the functioning of the
are deployed. The key lessons of the 2013 Report CSDP. Of course lessons are only useful if they
concerned the implementation of the compre- are duly recorded, carefully analysed and actually
hensive approach, pre-deployment training, local implemented, which requires the commitment
ownership, preparatory measures and the les- and active involvement of all concerned.
Lesson observed
1 • Action: proper analysis and validation
Lesson identified
• Action: remedial action such as modifying concepts or standard
2 operating procedures
Lesson learnt
3 • Lesson implemented
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Concepts are an important tool in EU crisis ment and EUMS involvement in civil-military
management.1 Military and civilian concepts set concept development at EU level. The biannual
out fundamental principles for crisis management programme comprises over 30 concepts, both
missions and operations. Ideally, concepts estab- updates of already existing concepts and the devel-
lish basic parameters and definitions and ensure a opment of new ones. In addition to operational
common understanding with a view to the plan- requirements, the work is driven by the Capability
ning and execution of missions and operations, Development Plan (CDP) and the work of Euro-
both in the civilian and military fields. They also pean Defence Agency, EU presidencies and Mem-
contribute to standardisation where required and ber States’ initiatives, the work of the Headline
applicable. When 28 Member States and the dif- Goal Task Force as well as analysis of lessons from
ferent EU institutions work together, many fun- operations, missions and exercises, both civil and
damental issues need to be clearly defined. Precise military, and input from international organisa-
definitions of operational standards, policing, rule tions.
of law, force generation, planning procedures, etc.
play an essential role in making CSDP missions
and operations as efficient as possible. Civilian concepts
Concepts are important for internal reasons,
i.e. ensuring that all EU actors have a joint under- The Crisis Management and Planning Direc-
standing of the issues involved. They are also useful torate (CMPD) is responsible for keeping the
for training purposes and for third States partici- overview of CSDP and CSDP-related concepts
pating in CSDP operations and missions as well and conceptual documents, and for developing
as for international organisations with which the concepts. The Civilian Planning and Conduct
EU cooperates, in particular the United Nations. Capability (CPCC) is active in producing guide-
lines on various aspects of civilian crisis manage-
ment. The CMPD has concentrated on develop-
Military concepts ing broad overarching concepts, establishing the
foundation for some of the tasks set out by the
Military concepts are developed by the EUMS European Council in Feira in 2000 such as polic-
(the Concepts & Capability Directorate). The ing and the rule of law. CMPD has also put con-
EUMS follows biannual work plans set out in siderable emphasis on the link between internal
the EU Military Concept Development Imple- and external security, an important item for EU
mentation Programme (CDIP). The CDIP is crisis management. Recently, CMPD addressed
revised annually and provides a projection for the the issue of border management in CSDP mis-
next two years of EU military concept develop- sions at the conceptual level with a view to ensur-
1 For the purpose of the article, ‘concepts’ refer both to concepts as such and to guidelines, handbooks and other guidance
notes that aim to facilitate the planning and conduct of missions and operations.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
2.5. Challenges
2.5.1. Cyber security and defence
by Wolfgang Röhrig
192
Photo: Austrian Armed Forces 2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The success of conventional military operations in the other domains is enabled by, and dependent on,
the assured availability of, and access to, cyberspace
• Ubiquitous, anybody can buy anonymously al- were affected by a – technically quite simple –
most everything – attack kits or services at the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack.
online black market; The tools for such attacks are nowadays avail-
• Extremely rapid, the reaction time counts in able in any basic hacker kit. That the military
seconds. and a society can be paralysed through cyber
attacks was demonstrated during the Georgia
conflict one year later in 2008.
However, what has this virtual world and its 2. Crises or disasters in the physical domains (e.g.
threats got to do with CSDP crisis management? power outages) can regionally affect the avail-
ability of cyber space. The regional or even
1. Crisis can be initiated or exacerbated through widespread unavailability of cyber space can
cyber space. The three-week-long cyber-attack cause tremendous negative economic and soci-
campaign on Estonia in 2007 almost turned etal effects which might exacerbate a crisis or a
into a national crisis, as governmental and vital disaster. For example, one aspect addressed by
services for the functioning of Estonian society Finland in its cyber security strategy is the psy-
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
chological resilience of its citizens in the face of • Consider cyber threats as intentional or ac-
a major cyber crisis. cidental from the beginning of planning,
3. Vital and critical crisis management assets can throughout the mission and until the end of
be affected through cyber attacks. Today ef- redeployment of all personnel and assets;
fective crisis management relies on modern • Consider the effects of activities or disasters in
information and communication systems or the physical domains on cyber space in crisis
services, and equipment with many embedded management;
technology and processors, which often use cy- • Establish a dynamic risk management approach
ber space. in order to improve the resilience of vital and
In the military cyber space is nowadays widely critical systems and to minimise their vulner-
recognized as the 5th operational domain besides ability to attacks.
land, sea, air and space. The success of conven-
tional military operations in the other domains Since the EU published its “Cyber Security
is enabled by, and dependent on, the assured Strategy – An open, Safe and Secure Cyber-
availability of, and access to, cyber space. Simi- space” on 7 February 2013 the Strategy has
lar enabling conditions and dependencies can taken, like other national cyber security strate-
be assumed for civilian CSDP missions. The EU gies, a comprehensive approach. It addresses,
rightly prides itself on its ability to deploy civil- within the remit of EU’s responsibilities, the civil
ian and military responses to global crises. All the aspects of cyber security as well as Cyber Defence
same, it is important that the EU adopts a com- for CSDP. In December 2013 at the EU Coun-
mon civilian and military approach to self-protec- cil on defence matters, the EU heads of state
tion in cyber space. Own vulnerabilities are cen- and government recognised cyber defence as a
tral in the context of the cyber domain. Hostile priority for capability development. An action
actors may exploit these at critical times or during plan for CSDP was agreed with the EU Cyber
decisive phases of an operation or mission. Thus, Defence Policy Framework in November 2014
the threat landscape must be seen in the context and plenty of work is in progress for its imple-
of the following crisis management implications: mentation with the aim of making missions and
• Crisis management activities in the physical do- operations more cyber resilient.
mains rely on guaranteed access to cyber space;
• Crisis management is increasingly dependent
on civil (critical) infrastructures – both home Practical Tips
base and in the deployment area;
• As crisis management becomes increasingly As a new domain, there is still little under-
interconnected, using internet technologies, standing of the cyber planning techniques nec-
internet vulnerabilities get closer to deployed essary to adequately consider cyber space dur-
personnel and their assets. ing planning for crisis management operations
and missions and their execution. However, it is
The impact of cyber attacks can range from sim- essential that civil and military senior decision-
ple inconvenience, reputational damage, loss/ makers and their support staffs, including spe-
compromise of information, right up to physical cialised staff like Legal Advisers or Political Advis-
damage and/or loss of life. ers, fully understand the environment in which
In consequence, today’s crisis management, be it they will operate; that includes the cyber domain
in a civil mission or on military operations, has to: and the understanding of the dependency of
• Establish and maintain Cyber Situational activities in the traditional domains of land, air,
Awareness; sea and space on the cyber space domain. With
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Network and
Information Law enforcement Defence
Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf
security
• Commission/ENISA
• CERT-EU • EC3/Europol • EEAS
EU • Network of • CEPOL • European Defence
competent authorities • Eurojust Agency
• EP3R
Academia
Industry
• National CERTs • National Cybercrime • National defence
NATIONAL • NIS competent Units and security
authorities authorities
To address cybersecurity in a comprehensive fashion, activities should span across three key pillars –
Network and Information Security (NIS), law enforcement and defence – which also operate within dif-
ferent legal frameworks
• Which cyber defence considerations should be Military Operations” was agreed in December
de-conflicted and coordinated with other con- 2012 and is the EU’s military guideline for opera-
siderations; tional commanders to create and maintain cyber
• Which cyber security/defence activities should situational awareness. The Concept outlines the
be synchronised with activities in other do- need to adopt a risk-based threat assessment meth-
mains; odology and to create coordinating structures to
• Who are the relevant internal and external ensure that national cyber defence capabilities work
partners that can give support in the case of coherently to protect the Force. An update of the
large-scale incidents (e.g. CERT-EU, national concept is scheduled for 2015. Member States aug-
CERTs, contracted service provider); mented the concept in March 2013 with the ‘EU
• Who should have the authority to release cyber Cyber Defence Capability Requirements State-
defence/security related information to exter- ment’. Through the participation of the EU in the
nal partners; US-led Multinational Capability Development
• What are the best mechanisms for optimal Campaign since late 2014 additional supporting
cyber information-sharing with external part- documents for cyber defence planning for CSDP
ners; have become available, with a handbook and guide-
• How should own cyber defence be organised lines for integrating cyber into operational planning
(structure, manning, processes, disposition, and a guide and specifications for the analysis of the
equipment)? cyber domain. These documents can be obtained
During the execution phase of the operation or either through the EUMS or through the EDA.
mission Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) For civilian missions, pilot projects have been
for Cyber incident response, business continuity launched in order to increase cyber security
and disaster recovery should be established and capabilities and as a basis for further implemen-
frequently exercised and tested. tation and instructions across all civilian CSDP
In terms of practical support to military opera- missions. The above documents can serve as ini-
tions, over the last year an initial set of operational tial guidelines for civilian missions until specific
concepts and references has been developed. The guidance covering both missions and operations
“EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led is developed.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The public perception is often that cyber pro- As in the other domains, the success of cyber
tection primarily is a technological rather than a security/defence in CSDP operations and mis-
human issue. Nowadays, all personnel at all levels sions will depend on a balanced combination of
require an increasingly sophisticated understand- competent personnel, connected through well-
ing of cyber space and how to operate effectively developed processes and procedures, and apply-
in cyber space. Competencies and skills have to ing state-of-the-art technology. However, human
be developed and maintained. Cyber Security/ beings are, and will continue to be, our most
Defence is not limited to Cyber Security/Defence precious cyber security/defence asset. For the
specialists. ICT users, today that is almost eve- time being, humans are the first (users) and the
rybody, have a role to play in Cyber Security/ last (cyber security/defence specialists) lines of
Defence. They must have up-to-date knowledge defence. The competence and expertise of all per-
and awareness of the threat environment and how sonnel is a fundamental requirement for success-
to react in the event of incidents. This awareness ful cyber security/defence in CSDP operations
should be frequently updated and tested as appro- and missions.
priate. Decision-makers must understand the
cyber options and the impact of cyber operations
when making decisions.
Cyber modules in general courses and specific
cyber security courses are in the inventory of the
ESDC and more specific cyber security/defence
courses are under development and will be avail-
able soon to increase the competencies and skills
of the different stakeholder groups. Cyber aware-
ness seminars for staff and deployed personnel
have been developed, notably by the EDA, and
may be applied for if required. The EDA has also
developed a framework of necessary competen-
cies and skills for the different stakeholder groups
with respect to cyber defence. Besides the value
of the framework for the development of new
course curricula, it can serve to augment different
job descriptions as necessary with required cyber
security/defence competencies.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Source: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/evolving-threat-environment/enisa-thematic-landscapes/threat-landscape-of-the-internet-infrastructure/iitl
2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Campaign/
Year of Attack
Malware Target Objective Description
Discovery Vector
Name
The Cyber Caliphate, a hacker group claiming
Propaganda
Cyber association with terrorist group ISIS seized control
2015 USCentCom and reputati- Defacement
Caliphate of the @CENTCOM Twitter and YouTube accounts
onal loss
representing U.S. central military command.
Energy and Energetic Bear Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
manufactu- Spear campaign appears to be a long-term operation
Energetic
ring sector, phishing and which has targeted companies in several coun-
Bear/ 2014 unknown
research Watering tries.
DragonFly
organisations, Hole attacks 20 000 victim IP addresses. Gathers information
public sector about connected industrial control systems.
This significant vulnerability was undetected for
Day 1 exploit some time. The buggy code is at least 19 years
Any Internet
Unicorn Bug 2014 Multiple using drive- old and has been remotely exploitable for the past
Explorer user
by attacks 18 years. The problem has been present since the
original release code of Windows 95.
Surgical strikes against targeted guests at luxury
hotels in Asia and the US infecting victims via
Top managers Compromised spear phishing attacks: e.g. the victim got a pop-
Dark
2014 and senior Espionage Wifi infra- up alerting him to a new Adobe software update;
Hotel
officials structure when he clicked to accept the download, he got a
malicious executable instead. It is assumed that
attackers were active for at least 7 years.
Local Area A virus used to attack computer systems that run
Middle East
Flame 2012 Espionage Network or on Microsoft Windows as their operating system.
countries
USB stick
Organisations An ongoing series of cyber attacks that started
worldwide incl. in mid-2006. The operation was derived from the
the Internati- common security industry acronym for Remote
onal Olympic Access Tool (RAT) and was behind the cyber attack
Operation
2011 Committee, the Espionage on the 2008 Summer Olympics.
Shady Rat
United Nations,
industry and
defence con-
tractors
The Stuxnet worm destroyed 1 000 nuclear centri-
Destruction
fuges at Natanz and is assumed to have set back
Nuclear facility of uranium
Stuxnet 2010 USB stick the country’s atomic programme by at least two
in Natanz, Iran enrichment
years. It spread beyond the plant and infected over
centrifuges
60 000 computers around the world.
Prior to the bombing of the Syrian nuclear installa-
tions at Kibar, it is assumed that Israel had penet-
rated the Syrian military’s computer network, that
Disabling of they could monitor Syrian activities and – more
Operation Syrian air de-
2007 Syrian air unknown importantly – that they were able to direct their
Orchard fence
surveillance own data streams into the Syrian air-defence net-
work, introducing a false image of a radar screen,
misleading Syrian radar operators and thereby
effectively turning off Syria’s air defence.
A German college student unleashed a virus that
Disabling of had resounding effects all around the world. The
Netsky and
computers E-mail and estimated damage was assumed at USD 500
Sasser
2004 Multiple through vulnerable million. However, experts believed that it could
computer
buffer over- network port have been more as it disabled the Delta Air Lines
worm
flow computer system and resulted in the cancellation
of several transatlantic flights.
Considered to be one of the biggest cyber attacks
Several com-
in history, it not only compromised military intel-
puter networks
ligence and classified data, but also paved the
Titan Rain 2004 including Espionage
way for other hackers and espionage entities to
NASA, Lock-
infiltrate these systems as it left backdoors in the
heed Martin
infected machines.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the use of Pri- ards for clients such as the EU to observe when
vate Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) contracting services with PMSCs which help to
to support military and security missions has ensure respect for human rights and humanitar-
been on the rise.1 In line with this trend, the EU ian law.
is increasingly utilising PMSCs in its crisis man-
agement operations, including CSDP missions.
While these private actors can help to support Overview of standards for
and supplement security, they can also pose sig- clients contracting with PMSC
nificant challenges. In particular, these challenges
include the lack of clear international standards When contracting with PMSCs, clients wield
for the provision of private security services as significant power in determining how services will
well as inadequate or ineffective oversight mech- be carried out. These include putting in place pro-
anisms. As recognised by the European Court of cedures and criteria for the selection and contract-
Justice, the EU has legal obligations to ensure ing of PMSCs, defining and limiting the kinds of
respect for human rights and humanitarian law services that they will provide, setting out require-
within these operations, which may extend to ments for the manner in which services must be
services provided by PMSCs. Fortunately, there carried out, monitoring compliance and support-
now exists a set of international norms and stand- ing accountability.
Definition of PMSCs
The Montreux Document on the use of Private Military and Security Companies defines
PMSCs as
“private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective
of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular,
armed2 guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and
other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and
advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.”
1 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, “Regulating Private Security Companies in Europe: Status and Prospects”,
(2007), DCAF Policy Paper 20, 1. Also see Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry,
(Cornell University Press, 2003). 9-11.
2 The International Code of Conduct (ICoC) for Private Security Service Providers recognises that private security services
may also be provided by unarmed personnel.
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3 This is taken from the Montreux Document, Good Practices for Contracting States, 17.
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As a point of first order, PMSCs should not be • National private security regulation, including
contracted to carry out activities that internatio any legal requirements and/or shortcomings in
nal law explicitly assigns to state agents, such as national frameworks;
acting as the officer responsible for prisoner of • Where considering using armed private secu-
war or internment camps.4 Furthermore, clients rity, assessing the risks against needs/benefits of
should consider whether a particular activity carrying arms;
could involve the direct participation of PMSCs • Particular groups or populations which may be
in hostilities. For example, by providing secu- at a heightened risk of negative human rights
rity services for legitimate military targets, such impacts.
as military convoys or weapons depots, PMSCs
are considered to be directly participating in The information gained from risk and impact
hostilities. assessments will offer guidance on how PMSCs
As such, they lose their civilian protection, should be used, helping to inform context-rel-
becoming legitimate military targets them- evant prevention and mitigation strategies that
selves. address identified risks. The results from such
In all situations, clients should carry out risk assessments can offer insights on how best to
and impact assessments of security arrangements integrate PMSCs in missions, for example by
to identify both risks to the operation and to the identifying activities that are better handled by
PMSC and its personnel, as well as the potential PMSCs versus those that are not, or by provid-
adverse human rights impacts arising out of the ing information on whether using local PMSCs
activities. When conducting a risk and impact will find greater or less acceptance within the
assessment, clients should include the following community as opposed to international PMSCs.
elements: Such findings will help to provide guidance on
• The operating environment and risks, particu- the kind of PMSC that is more appropriate to
larly when operating in areas of weakened gov- use, set the purpose and objectives of the activi-
ernance; ties to be contracted, and should provide the
• How PMSCs – both local and international – basis for the terms of reference for the services
are viewed by the local population and by pub- provided by PMSCs.
lic authorities;
There is an emerging international consensus5 that the resort to the use of force by PMSCs
should be very limited, restricting it to use in self-defence or defence of others – a right
to the use of force that all civilian persons have. This reaffirms the civilian nature of PM-
SCs, underlining that they do not have any additional privileges or rights to use coercive
force than do other civilians. Furthermore, it reinforces clear differences between PMSCs
and state police and military forces, who as state agents typically are authorised to use
a greater spectrum of force in order to protect public safety, including powers of arrest,
search and seizure.
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When contracting with PMSCs, clients should There are a number of international instru-
include mechanisms within the contract to moni- ments, both conventional as well as ‘soft law’,
tor compliance and to ensure accountability. that can offer guidance to those contracting with
These can include requiring that the PMSC per- PMSCs:
form their services in compliance with specific • The European Convention on Human Rights
instruments of international law, establishing • The International Code of Conduct for Private
regular meetings with the PMSC to discuss the Security Service Providers
manner in which it is complying with the terms of • The Geneva Convention of 1948 and its Ad-
the contract, and/or using external actors to carry ditional Protocols
out monitoring. • The Montreux Document on the use of PM-
Monitoring can be carried out by the security SCs
division of the CSDP mission, or by an independ- • UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security
ent third party, such as the International Code of Services from Private Security Companies
Conduct Association (see below). In conducting • The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
monitoring, performance indicators can be used Human Rights
to ensure that conduct is tied to specific outcomes • The American National Standards Institute
such as financial rewards or penalties, or even ter- PSC.1 Standard
mination of the contract. Disciplinary measures
should be sufficient as to provide real deterrence,
and should also provide effective remedies to
those who were injured. Examples of performance
indicators to ensure compliance include: PMSC
record of attendance, number of incident reports,
complaints (internal, client and third party) alleg-
ing violations of international human rights/
humanitarian law, national law, or other terms of
the contract. Furthermore, procedures should be
developed for reporting abuses and violations to
local authorities where appropriate.
Private security service providers who are members in good standing of the ICoCA must
demonstrate that they meet international standards for company systems and policies as
laid down in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, in-
cluding selection and vetting of personnel and subcontractors, training in international hu-
man rights and humanitarian law, management of weapons, incident reporting and provid-
ing effective remedies for those who are damaged or injured by their services. The ICoCA
also conducts ongoing monitoring of members, including in the field, and supervises how
member companies handle grievances.
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Security and protection for civilian CSDP missions primarily rely on the host nation, unless
an executive mandate is at stake.
In the event of high risk and specific security requirements, the mission may be authorised
to use seconded or contracted armed personnel, including a contract with a Private Secu-
rity Company.
Nonetheless, assuming that a contributing state is willing to provide the required assets,
the mission may also have a seconded armed security contingent incorporated into its
structure.
Another option would be the development of synergies between civilian and military CSDP
engagements, if and when operating in the same theatre. For example, in case of colloca-
tion in the same compound and without prejudice to the operational autonomy necessary
to implement their mandates, operational and financial benefits could be achieved through
a cost/benefit analysis of how to better address the respective civilian/ military security
and protection requirements.
Finally, special arrangements might be established, as appropriate, with other organisa-
tions e.g. UN, NATO, AU, etc.
Luigi Bruno
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One of the largest challenges for international sions and operations’ mandates are often based
efforts in the field of crisis management and on partnerships and ownership (think of train-
conflict prevention, and for civilian CSDP mis- ing missions, capacity-building), and linked to a
sions, is to ensure that mandates and operations culture of change (e.g. the increasing introduc-
are found which link into the work of the host tion of security and justice sector reform into
government the mission is assisting. The involve- civilian and military CSDP mandates), it is of
ment and support of civil society with respect key importance for the mission on the ground
to what the mission is trying to achieve is an to build and foster its cooperation with both the
equally important challenge. authorities it works with, and the civil society at
Guidelines and best practices have been devel- large.
oped on a regular basis on engagement with civil When reforms are at stake, the art of achiev-
society in theatres of operations, notably in rela- ing local ownership is not to draft on behalf of
tion to the EU Framework and Action Plan on the mission interlocutors, but to be willing to
Human Rights and Democracy. As CSDP mis- spend the necessary time to have a clear under-
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It is important to keep oversight civil society Work with civil society is also part of a long-
actors, who follow and measure progress in pub- term strategy for the mission and not least for
lic campaigns, on board, and to ensure that they the authorities the mission is working with. It
measure the progress of the work to be under- provides excellent training, in particular for the
taken, in this sense creating a public barometer youth who participate, in how to formulate gov-
for what the government achieves on the basis of ernmental policies and the limitations and obli-
the mission’s advice. gations of the government involved. This creates
Such measures allow the population to follow a more informed public, who may be critical
progress. A strategy like this gives the govern- towards the government’s policies and actions,
ment and its relevant agencies time to imple- but will importantly have a strong sense of local
ment what needs to be implemented, while pro- ownership.
gress is communicated to the public and it is Local and international NGOs and civil soci-
clear to the wider world what will be required ety organisations also efficiently contribute to
and what the final end goal will be. early warning and prevention, and can feed into
Another advantage of civil society and in par- the mission’s situational awareness and even its
ticular think tanks is that as they integrate aca- operational activities. Liaison with civil society
demic research, they are good at inspiring, and at organisations often helps the mission main-
creating town hall meetings, where visions can be stream human rights and gender in its activities,
shared in public, and later met with the bureau- and flag up sensitive areas. These organisations
cratic and not least financial obligations which it can also contribute to the assessment of a mis-
will be just as necessary to accommodate. sion’s activities and mandate implementation.
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Introduction
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before deployment (e.g. fitness screening, vaccina- disease, promote health and prolong life among
tion, malaria prophylaxis) and follow-up measures the population as a whole. Its activities aim to pro-
after deployment (e.g. psychological support), both vide conditions in which people can be healthy,
within national responsibility. and focus on entire populations, not on individ-
Medical plans have to be tailored to the mission ual patients or diseases. Thus, public health is con-
requirements and need to be based on a specific, cerned with the whole system and not only the
detailed health risk assessment to ensure the safety eradication of a particular disease. The three main
and availability of all deployed personnel, in com- public health functions are to:
bination with health promotion measures. • assess and monitor the health of communi-
ties and populations at risk, identifying health
problems and priorities;
What is public health? • formulate public policies designed to solve
identified local and national health problems
The World Health Organisation (WHO) and priorities;
defines health as “a state of complete physical, men- • ensure that all populations have access to appro-
tal and social well-being and not merely the absence priate and cost-effective care, including health
of disease or infirmity”. It is not an absolute con- promotion and disease prevention services.
cept and it should be noted that there is a con- This highlights that public health practice also
tinuum of health status, between well-being and involves engagement within areas outside health-
ill-health. The WHO concept first articulated in care in order to improve the health of the popu-
1948 must, in a military context, be broadened to lation. In the military, public health refers to all
embrace fitness in addition to well-being. organised measures to prevent disease, promote
WHO defines public health as all organised health, and contribute to the sustainability of the
measures (whether public or private) to prevent military force.
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Public health today miology, which can be defined as the study of pat-
terns and determinants of health-related states or
Public health is about populations as opposed events in defined populations, and the application
to individual patients, and takes a long-term of this study to the control of health problems.
view of events beyond a consultation, clinical The collection and analysis of health data from
intervention or finished consultant episode. It EU operations and missions is pivotal. It affects
considers a number of directly and indirectly policy decisions and evidence-based practice by
related subjects, in particular health economics, identifying risk factors for disease and targets for
statistics, health psychology, health sociology, preventive healthcare.
health education and promotion and manage-
ment theory. The gathering and management of
health and social information is crucial. It is a Public health in CSDP operations
rigorous, science-based and evidence-based dis- and missions
cipline which assesses health needs before going
on to assess the effectiveness of health outcomes The Health and Medical Concept establishes
through evaluation. Protection from both com- the basis and the framework for effective planning
municable disease and environmental hazards and implementation of combined and joint multi-
remains a cornerstone of public health. For national health and medical support which reflects
example, research has shown that the simple act the pre-defined medical standards within the EU.
of hand washing with soap can prevent many Specific health and medical support principles
contagious diseases. In other cases, treating a and guidelines are the basis for the planning and
disease or controlling a pathogen can be vital execution of health and medical care during any
to preventing its spread to others, for example kind of civilian or military mission or operation.
during an outbreak of infectious disease, or con- They draw on the medical ethics code of medical
tamination of food or water supplies. personnel, the rules of conduct that express the
The core skill and tool of public health is epide- humanitarian conscience of the Member States,
and the comprehensive and demanding definition
of health by the WHO and the Geneva Conven-
tions. These basic principles and guidelines should
Going upstream: Imagine you are standing beside always govern the implementation of health and
a river and see someone drowning as he floats by. medical care in EU-led missions. One of the basic
You jump in and pull him ashore. A moment later, principles listed in the Health and Medical Con-
another person floats past you, going downstream, cept is ‘Preservation of Health and Prevention of
and then another and another. Soon you are so ex- Disease’.
hausted, you know you won‘t be able to save even
one more victim. So you decide to travel upstream
to see what the problem is. You find that people Force Health Protection
are falling into the river because they are stepping
through a hole in a bridge. Once this is fixed, peo- Force Health Protection (FHP) is the conser-
ple stop falling into the water. When it comes to vation of the working or fighting potential of a
health, prevention means going upstream and fix- force so that it remains healthy, mission/combat
ing a problem at the source. capable and available to the Head of Mission or
Commander. Force Health Protection focuses on
Source: Conrad and Kern, 2nd edition, 1986,
defining and implementing mitigating measures
The Sociology of Health and Illness: Critical Perspectives
to counter the debilitating effect of lifestyles, envi-
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Member States support the Head of Mission/ assessments must be conducted, as changing con-
Force Commander with any medical intelligence ditions may endanger deployed personnel’s health
requested, in accordance with their capabilities. and sustainability, and measures that have already
Assessing the public health burden of death, been implemented can still be optimised. It is vital
diseases, injuries, syndromes or consequences of to address these issues as early as possible.
exposure to environmental or occupational risk
factors is a vital mission task. The circumstances
in which these occur, and their effect on opera- Public health emergency
tional capabilities, must then be identified, as challenges
well as any preventive or counter-measures that
could be applied. Failure to detect public health Public health emergencies can arise and progress
incidents or outbreaks, natural or otherwise, may rapidly, leading to widespread health, social, and
jeopardise the health of EU personnel, EU capaci- economic consequences. Commanders and Heads
ties and missions. of Mission must be prepared to make timely deci-
Health risk assessment is a very complex task, sions to protect lives, property, and infrastructure.
given that data from a local population or health They should expect a level of uncertainty during
system must be transferred to the conditions of the decision-making process, especially during
European deployed personnel in an uncommon early stages of a public health emergency. Current
environment under the special conditions of an operations and crises show that Commanders/
operation/mission. The optimisation of this pro- Heads of Mission and health professionals have a
cess is an ongoing evidence-based task, with the symbiotic relationship during a disease outbreak.
aim of guaranteeing enhanced sustainability and Both play an important role by informing public
health of our personnel. Even when operations perceptions and policy makers in their decision-
and missions are ongoing, regular health risk making process.
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Three functions have to be performed during and continuous health risk assessment took place,
health crises: disseminating accurate informa- with interaction between the Commander and
tion to mission personnel, medical professionals the medical adviser. Considering a possible spread
and policy makers; acting as the go-between for of EVD to Mali led to the early development of
mission staff, decision makers and health and an infectious disease outbreak management plan
science experts; monitoring the performance of and subsequently to the revision and adjustment
the public health response. A Commander’s goal of the CONOPS for EUTM Mali.
is to inform his personnel responsibly in order The Mission Commander’s intent was to pro-
to achieve the public health goals of prevention tect the health and security of all mission staff by
through raising threat-awareness while mini- keeping them regularly informed about EVD and
mising panic. The struggle to strike a balance taking a series of protective actions and measures
between commanding the unit and protecting to minimise its impact. He therefore took meas-
the dignity of patients while also conveying the ures to prepare, train, reinforce and stockpile
severity of an epidemic is harder in the era of the means and resources requested to fight the disease
24/7 news cycle. wherever it threatened the mission. One of the
keys to success was the coordination with Malian
national authorities and other international part-
Ebola virus disease ners such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross to establish an early warning system
On 23 March 2014, the WHO published for- for EVD outbreaks and developments, in order
mal notification of an outbreak of Ebola virus dis- to implement flexible and comprehensive reactive
ease (EVD) in Guinea on its website. On 8 August, measures in time.
WHO declared the epidemic to be a “public health The CONOPS outlined the tasks and responsi-
emergency of international concern”. A thorough bilities of EUTM Mali personnel in terms of reduc-
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ing the risk of, or containing, an outbreak of EVD. Deployment health surveillance is a fundamen-
The plan included public health aspects (preven- tal component within the overall concept of Force
tative measures to reduce exposure to EVD) and Health Protection and is essential for obtaining
briefings to all EUTM Mali personnel. These pre- a clear picture of personnel health status and the
ventive measures comprised precautions, informa- efficacy of measures taken. Medical data collection
tion distribution, restrictions on freedom of move- and analysis from ongoing CSDP operations and
ment, training, stockpiling, temperature controls, missions is pivotal and done by Member States
isolation of staff in special facilities, repatriation, via an informal agreement with the Deployment
specialists in enhanced readiness, stopping mission- Health Surveillance Capability, a branch of the
related tasks, setting the criteria for case definitions, NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medi-
acquisition of medical assets including manpower cine.
and supplies, eligibility for treatment, medical
waste management, sustainability issues and pro-
tection equipment for healthcare workers. Importance for the Commander/
EUTM MALI was prepared and ready to Head of Mission
counter this severe threat even before the first case
appeared in Mali. This shows the importance of an Failing in Force Health Protection measures
immediate and coordinated preventive approach based on a thorough health risk assessment is
to threats like this, based on a functioning infor- not an option. Commanders should encourage
mation and coordination system to counter the all officers to pay close attention to this vital and
spread of a disease. Regarding the Ebola virus mission-critical health aspect in all CSDP opera-
disease, it is clear how infectious diseases can tions and missions.
affect the operability of a whole mission and why Heads of Mission and Commanders have a
continuous medical and health surveillance is an responsibility to consider all threats and counter-
absolute necessity. measures in order to fulfil the mission’s objectives
Without implemented actions the crisis might without jeopardising the sustainability, health and
have had a major impact. A non-military threat well-being of personnel.
might have led to severe consequences, ranging
from minor restrictions to mission objectives to
the withdrawal of the mission. Summary
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2.5.5. Counter-terrorism
by Sofie Rafrafi
Terrorism is one of the main threats the EU While the EU has become an area of increasing
is facing today. The phenomenon has become openness, it is facing the emergence of new terror-
increasingly diverse and geographically diffuse. ist groups, new modi operandi (e.g. foreign fight-
When analysing terrorist attacks over the last ers) and the proximity of their attacks. Upholding
ten years such as the Madrid bombings, the democratic values, maintaining public confidence
very recent shootings in Brussels, Paris (Char- in the Union and the citizens’ perception of their
lie Hebdo) and Copenhagen, together with own security will greatly depend on the capacity
the devastating regional impact of the attacks of its policy-makers to taking strategic action and
from Boko Haram in the Sahel and from ISIL decisions that will guarantee security and stability
(Da’esh) in Syria and Iraq, it is fair to say that in Europe. The success of these actions depend on
the main terrorist threat today is transnational the capacity to follow up on and to adapt existing
and cross-border terrorism. The latter has strategies, to enhance cooperation between EU
become a growing concern for the EU, its citi- institutions, its agencies, financial instruments
zens and their policy-makers as it poses a threat and EU Member States, to deepen partnerships
to the EU’s internal and external security, to the with third countries and to stabilise key frag-
fundamental rights and freedom of its citizens, ile regional partners in order to address the root
to economic prosperity and to the democratic causes of this threat encompassing both an inter-
values of its societies. nal and external security dimension.
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1 Todd Sandler (2015), Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview, Oxford Economic Papers, p. 1-20.
2 The European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05 REV 4, 30 November 2005.
3 Ibid.
4 The European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 14781/1/05 REV1, 24
November 2005.
5 Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing, 11778/1/08 REV 1, 24/25 July 2008.
6 Draft Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: “Towards a European Security Model”, 7120/10, 8 March 2010.
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that a ‘zero risk’ environment does not exist. Yet Why an external dimension of
it is possible to minimise the risk and to create a security?
safer environment by addressing a series of com-
mon threats that pose a challenge to the internal The external dimension of security is inherently
security of the EU. linked to the internal dimension of security. To
The implementation of these strategies and address them separately will not provide lasting
action plans is documented in reports that results.
assess concrete (joint) cooperation activities and The CT actions taken at international level
achieved results. The recent reports of July and are twofold. First, they are aimed at tackling the
November 2014 on the ‘Implementation of the root causes of terrorism in those regions that are
EU CT Strategy’ and the ‘Implementation of the subject to underdevelopment, structural poverty,
Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing’ both food insecurity, state fragility, flows of refugees
show considerable progress. and displaced persons, human trafficking or drugs
The strategic framework lays down its activities and arms trafficking. These phenomena can cause
in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (internal) instability within states which provides opportu-
and in the CFSP (external). It stresses the impor- nities for terrorist groups to flourish and to fur-
tance of coordination between the EU and the ther recruit and radicalise foreign fighters, for
Member States and the need to exploit all exist- example. Second, these CT actions are aimed at
ing tools at national, EU and international level. protecting EU’s interests which are geopolitical,
It further stresses the need to mainstream CT in strategic and economic in nature, such as securing
the EU’s foreign and security policy by strength- sources of energy, establishing economic partner-
ening cooperation with international partners as ships and expanding trade with various partners.
the internal and external dimensions of security The EU also committed itself to promoting the
are intimately related. universally recognised values and human rights
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
Eastern countries and Australia. Dialogue is also borders. The phenomenon of foreign fighters has
increased with the United Arab Emirates, AU, become an increasing concern to which the EU
UN or relevant regional coordination structures needs to adapt itself as well as its strategic frame-
such as the G5 Sahel. The EU supports the UN work. It will have to continue complementing its
Global CT strategy, the implementation of a actions in the area of justice and home affairs and
series of related UNSCR, the latest of which are accompany them with an increased commitment
2170 and 2178, and is an active participant of in the countries of the Middle East, the Sahel,
the Global CT Forum. the Gulf and North Africa. The EU and Mem-
ber States will have to put additional emphasis
on the fight against ISIL and Boko Haram while
What are the next steps? making greater efforts to prevent radicalisation,
recruitment, and the equipping and financing of
Since these threats are cross-border, they must terrorism. However, these efforts against terror-
be countered at both national and international ism will be efficient only if underlying causes are
level. Following the events of early 2015, the addressed through a more comprehensive EU
EU reaffirmed its CT commitments through approach to security and CT.
the Council conclusions of 9 February 2015
that also informed the Foreign Affairs Council
Decision of 12 February 2015. Terrorist groups
are changing their modus operandi while their
attacks take place closer to or inside the EU’s
Terrorism can be found within the CSDP task catalogue of Art. 43 (1) TEU, implicitly in the
mutual assistance clause of Art. 42 (7) TEU and explicitly in the solidarity clause of Art. 222
TFEU. Taking these rules all together, the European Union will face the phenomenon “terrorism”
within and outside the EU, preventively or in the form of consequence management.
There are no clear indications whether one rule will be preferred in practice. One could argue
that the CSDP task catalogue and the mutual assistance clause are designed for the fight against
terrorism outside the territory of the EU, whereas the solidarity clause will be the rule for the EU
territory itself. The fight against terrorism in the sense of preventive engagement remains an open
question.
By including the task “fight against terrorism” in all relevant paragraphs of the Treaty which will
influence capability development in the EU, the Union made a clear and promising statement that
it will be ready and prepared to face the challenge and protect its citizens worldwide against any
kind of terrorist threat.
Jochen Rehrl
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1
2.5.6. Climate security
by Marcus Houben
Climate action is a key priority for the EU. To and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged
respond to the challenges and investment needs droughts are already happening in many parts of
related to climate change, the EU has agreed that the world. Climate change will alter rainfall pat-
at least 20 % of its budget for 2014-2020 – as terns and further reduce available freshwater by as
much as €180 billion − should be spent on cli- much as 20 to 30 % in certain regions. A drop in
mate-related action. To achieve this increase, miti- agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen,
gation and adaptation actions will be integrated food insecurity in the least developed countries
into all major EU spending programmes, in par- and bring about an unsustainable increase in food
ticular cohesion policy, regional development, prices across the board.
energy, transport, research and innovation and the Water shortage in particular has the potential
Common Agricultural Policy. to cause civil unrest and lead to significant eco-
However, climate action has not been main- nomic losses, even in robust economies. The con-
streamed into the Common Security and sequences will be even more intense in areas under
Defence Policy. The purpose of this contribution strong demographic pressure.
is to reflect on this issue by asking three ques- The overall effect is that climate change will fuel
tions: existing conflicts over depleting resources, espe-
1. What climate change challenges do we face? cially where access to those resources is politicised.
2. Is climate change a security issue?
3. Should and can CSDP operations and missions Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and
contribute to EU climate action? critical infrastructure. Coastal zones are the
home of about one fifth of the world’s population,
a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cit-
What climate change challenges ies, with their supporting infrastructure, such as
do we face? port facilities and oil refineries, are often located
by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the
Climate change manifests itself in many ways, increase in the frequency and intensity of natural
from extreme weather to rising sea levels, rising disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and
temperature, changes in storms and hurricanes, their economic prospects.
melting ice and ocean acidification to name a The east coasts of China and India as well
few. If we think about climate change in terms of as the Caribbean region and Central America
its security implications, the following scenarios would be particularly affected. An increase in
come to mind. disasters and humanitarian crises would put
immense pressure on the resources of donor
Conflicts over resources. Reduction of arable land, countries, including capacities for emergency
widespread shortage of water, diminishing food relief operations.
1 This contribution draws heavily on the paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the Euro-
pean Council on ‘Climate change and international security’ (S113/08), dated 14 March 2008.
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Loss of territory and border disputes. Receding Europe, with factors of production and distribu-
coastlines and submergence of large areas could tion concentrated along vulnerable coastlines.
result in loss of territory, including entire coun-
tries such as small island states. More disputes Tension over energy supply. One of the most sig-
over land and maritime borders and other territo- nificant potential conflicts over resources is likely
rial rights are likely. to arise from intensified competition over access
There might be a need to revisit existing rules to, and control over, energy resources. Because
of international law, particularly the Law of the many of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves are
Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate
border disputes. A further dimension of competi- change and because many oil and gas producing
tion for energy resources lies in potential conflict states already face significant socio-economic and
over resources in polar regions which will become demographic challenges, instability is likely to
exploitable as a consequence of global warming. increase.
Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of This has the potential to feed back into greater
degradation, migration and conflicts over terri- energy insecurity and greater competition for
tory and borders that threatens the political sta- resources.
bility of countries and regions. As previously inaccessible regions open up due
to the effects of climate change, the scramble for
Environmentally induced migration. Droughts resources will intensify. Energy corridors, particu-
in southern Africa are contributing to poor har- larly the Black Sea region, are also of increasing
vests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with strategic interest, as they are critical to the energy
millions of people expected to face food shortages. security of the EU.
Migration in this region, but also migration from
other regions through northern Africa to reach Pressure on international governance. Cli-
Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. mate change will fuel the politics of resentment
In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is between those most responsible for it and those
expected to have a negative effect on health, in most affected by it.
particular due to the spread of vector-borne dis- The impacts of climate mitigation policies (or
eases, further aggravating tensions. policy failures) will thus drive political tension
nationally and internationally.
Situations of fragility and radicalisation. Sea- The potential rift not only divides North and
level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of South; there will also be a South-South dimen-
people as 40 % of Asia’s population (almost 2 bil- sion, particularly as the Chinese and Indian share
lion) lives within 60 km of the coastline. Water of global emissions rises. The already burdened
stress and loss of agricultural productivity will international security architecture will be put
make it difficult for Asia to feed its growing popu- under increasing pressure.
lation, which will additionally be exposed to an
increase in infectious diseases.
Changes in the monsoon rains and a decrease in Is climate change a security issue?
melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than
1 billion people. Conflicts over remaining resources Taking international reference documents as a
and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in point of departure2, we can observe that experts
a region that is an important economic partner for agree that climate change and the consequences
2 Among others: the 2014 National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington,
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
of climate change can and indeed do have security From the Nobel Committee, Oslo (12 Octo-
implications. ber 2007):
“By awarding the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007
From the US National Security Strategy (2010): to the IPCC and Al Gore, the Norwegian Nobel
“The danger from climate change is real, urgent, Committee is seeking to contribute to (…) pro-
and severe. (…) we must focus American engage- cesses and decisions (…) necessary to protect the
ment on (…) forging cooperative solutions to the world’s future climate, and thereby to reduce
threat of climate change” (p. 3); the threat to the security of mankind.”
“Climate change and pandemic disease threaten
the security of regions and the health and safety Underlying these lines of convergent thinking is
of the American people” (p. 8). the notion that climate change is a threat multi-
plier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions
From the Communication on Climate Action by and instability. It is stressed that the risks related
the European Commission (2013): to climate change are not just of a humanitarian
“… the extra demands placed on health services nature; they also include political and security risks
and basic infrastructure by climate change and that directly affect national or strategic interests.
increasing political and security tensions over lim- Moreover, it is clear that many issues related to the
ited natural resources such as water.” impact of climate change on international security
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report, retrieved 4 February 2015; 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, Depart-
ment of Defense, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/CCARprint.pdf, retrieved 4 February 2015. Climate action. Build-
ing a world we like, with a climate we like, European Union, 2014, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/climate-action-pbNA0
614034/?CatalogCategoryID=sciep2OwkgkAAAE.xjhtLxJz, retrieved 4 February 2015.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
are interlinked, requiring comprehensive policy seeks to live by and promote. In other words the
responses. The impact of climate change is thus EU, as a community of values, wishes to contrib-
considered to be multidimensional and a cause for ute to a world in which respect for human rights
concern across sectors, including security. Climate is a cornerstone of society. We can view climate
change threatens to overburden states and regions change and climate action along similar lines. Cli-
which are already fragile and conflict prone. Protec- mate change shapes the world in which we live.
tion of the environment and management of the Climate action is needed if we are to manage and
impacts of climate change are strategic (maritime) adapt to climate change, mitigate its consequences
security interests. The conclusion is thus clear: cli- and strengthen our resilience. Human rights and
mate change is a security issue. climate change have this ‘systemic’ quality in com-
mon, guiding and aligning our actions as we seek
to build a world in which we want to live. The
Should and can CSDP operations case can thus be made that climate action should
and missions contribute to the also be mainstreamed into CSDP. Firstly because
EU climate action? we want to be consistent, and secondly because
of its systemic importance: we want to use all of
To answer the normative question (‘should’) we our policies, strategies and instruments to sustain,
can attempt to draw a parallel with human rights preserve and improve our world.
and gender. Both human rights and gender have To answer the practical question (‘can’), let us
been mainstreamed into all EU policies includ- turn to what is already happening in the field.
ing CSDP (each CSDP mission has an appointed CSDP missions often take place in countries
human rights officer). This is considered necessary that are affected by the negative consequences
as respect for human rights is a core value the EU of climate change (e.g. Mali, Niger, Somalia).
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Operation Atalanta, for example, was set up as a • the analysis of how mitigation and adaption
humanitarian mission to protect the shipments of measures can have an impact on the overall se-
food aid from the World Food Programme for the curity situation in the partner/target country;
population in drought-stricken Somalia. CSDP • the appointment of an Environmental Of-
missions are conducted to mitigate or address a ficer in each CSDP mission and operation to
crisis that is the direct result of, or has been exac- strengthen expertise in this area;
erbated by, climate change. Consider the capac- • strengthening of the link between capacity
ity building mission in Mali, for example. What building and local resilience.
would mainstreaming climate action into CSDP In conclusion, the EU is in a unique position to
mean in practical terms? How would this be trans- respond to the impacts of climate change on inter-
lated into practice? Consider the following pos- national security, given its leading role in develop-
sible practical consequences: ment and global climate policy and the wide array
• the assessment of ‘environmental issues’ as a of tools and instruments at its disposal.
theme to be addressed in all Crisis Manage- Moreover, the security aspects of climate change
ment Concepts and Strategic Reviews of CSDP play to Europe’s strengths, with its comprehensive
missions and operations; approach to conflict prevention, crisis manage-
• an examination of the security implications of ment and post-conflict reconstruction, and as
climate change in dialogues with partner/tar- a key proponent of effective multilateralism. It
get countries, including through the sharing of would thus be only logical for climate action to be
analyses; mainstreamed into CSDP.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
The missions and operations conducted under types of marine life, are crucial for maintaining
the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy the earth’s biodiversity and are home to numerous
(CSDP) have been established to address a great unique and diverse marine ecosystems. The global
variety of crises and conflicts around the world. maritime domain is not only used to feed man-
Amongst other things, they aim to address sys- kind and construct ports and offshore installa-
temic instability and insecurity (Central Afri- tions for oil and gas exploration, but also for play,
can Republic), strengthen border management relaxation and tourism. There are as many differ-
(EUBAM Libya) and the rule of law (EULEX ent users as there are different stakeholders. An
Kosovo), and fight piracy (EUNAVFOR Ata increasing number of people live or want to live
lanta). The purpose of this contribution is to offer in cities, and the majority of these large conurba-
a brief reflection on the topic of maritime security tions are located at or near the coast. We call the
and consider seas and oceans (‘the global mari- seas and oceans the ‘global maritime commons’:
time domain’) as an arena for CSDP missions and they belong to us all. Think of the global maritime
operations. The contribution is divided into two domain as a series of crossroads: money, power,
parts: the first part sets out why maritime security influence, people, information, all converge in the
matters and why it is likely that crises will mani- coastal zones of the global maritime domain. Seas
fest themselves in the maritime domain, while the and oceans have become key arenas where multi-
second part looks at maritime security from an ple global interests come together. Now consider
operational and mission-oriented perspective. The territorial disputes as a consequence of competing
contribution concludes with a number of observa- maritime claims, the illegal extension of Exclusive
tions. Economic Zones, illegal fishing, irregular migra-
tion, trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism.
Combine that with the consequences of climate
Why maritime security matters change (extreme weather, ‘climate refugees’) and
the realisation that climate change acts as a threat
The global maritime domain is not only of vital multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, ten-
importance to the EU and European citizens, it sions and instability. The point is that maritime
is of vital importance to all of mankind. ‘Planet risks and threats are multidimensional in nature.
Ocean’ is an enormous ecosystem that sustains life The only way to stand a chance of dealing with
on earth. Seas and oceans are used as a medium these types of risks and threats is through a cross-
to facilitate commerce and international trade, sectoral approach and effective maritime multilat-
are the breeding grounds for fish stocks and all eralism: cooperating with international partners.
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Why is the global maritime It should not be wildly off the mark to assume
domain an important arena? that some of the most complex, multifaceted prob-
lems and crises the world will witness in the 21st
An important lesson learned from EUNAV- century will manifest themselves in the global mar-
FOR Atalanta was how the strategic relevance of itime domain. As these crises require a cross-secto-
the Gulf of Aden has evolved over the past few ral (comprehensive) approach integrating different
years. Its location as a node in the global net- policy instruments into a single strategic frame-
work of maritime trade routes remains of prime work, and require us – more than ever before – to
importance, but the simultaneous presence of work with international partners (public and pri-
three naval operations together with independ- vate), it is clear that CSDP missions and operations
ent deployers made the Gulf of Aden an arena for are crucial instruments, not only to allow the EU
international cooperation. All big players – the access to this particular domain, but to connect and
United States, India, China, Japan, Korea, Rus- work together with international partners.
sia, the EU, NATO, the UK, France, Spain, Italy,
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium – were rep-
resented. Furthermore, as successful cooperation Some operational aspects
at sea often has a positive spin-off in other policy
areas, being present in the Gulf of Aden alongside Over the course of recent years, maritime
these other nations and having the opportunity security has become an important element of
to cooperate became a strategic interest. EUNAV- several of the EU’s CSDP missions. The most
FOR Atalanta thus became a ticket for the EU to well known is probably EUNAVFOR Atalanta,
enter the arena for international cooperation. a military mission launched in December 2008
A second consideration is that, although mari- with an executive mandate to fight piracy at sea.
time security themes have an almost universal rel- Since then, what was once a severe threat to all
evance (e.g. freedom of navigation, sea control), seafarers in the region has become much less so.
the regional context and particular characteristics In 2011, 176 ships were attacked off the coast
determine to a large extent what maritime secu- of Somalia, but during 2014 only two attacks
rity really means for a given region. In Africa for were reported. Though a military mission like
example, maritime security can by and large be EUNAVFOR may prove instrumental in main-
framed as a development and governance issue; taining security by deterring pirates, it is for civil-
piracy and armed robbery at sea can be dealt with ian missions such as EUCAP Nestor to try and
by addressing governance and development issues ensure that threats to security are prevented from
ashore. Irregular migrants – although not a mari- arising in the first place. It is through capacity
time security issue – use the maritime domain building that we can address the root causes of
as a key vector to try to reach Europe. Maritime any threat to security – in the case of the Western
security in a Latin American context is strongly Indian Ocean, the threat arising from piracy.
influenced by organised crime (narco-trafficking) In order to help Somalia fight piracy, the EU
and increasingly by concern for the protection launched the civilian mission EUCAP Nestor in
of offshore oil and gas exploration installations. 2012, working on capacity building in the region.
Maritime security in the South-East Asian context In Somalia itself, the goal is to support the coun-
is, on the other hand, closely linked to sovereignty try in finding a long-term solution to the piracy
issues such as competing territorial claims, the ter- problem. In the East African states of Djibouti
ritorial integrity of the state and freedom of navi- and Tanzania, as well as in the island state of Sey-
gation, and as a consequence is predominantly chelles, the mission aims to help these countries
framed as a defence and military security issue. increase and improve their own ability to fight
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Photo: EU NAVFOR Atalanta/EU Navy Force Media and Public Information Office 2 CSDP Missions and Operations
EUNAVFOR Atalanta: Monitoring a commercial vessel under military escort (Off the Somali Coast, 2013)
piracy. EUCAP Nestor works on the entire chain EUBAM1, which was launched in 2013. Given
of justice. Legal experts give support in review- Libya’s location bordering the Mediterranean,
ing and drafting legislation so that authorities the country’s borders must be controlled at sea as
involved in fighting piracy receive proper legal well as on land. Therefore, the mission in Libya
powers. Maritime experts advise the authorities includes expertise on sea border management,
in charge of maritime security issues on how to with advice and training in fields such as mari-
improve their operational capacity. For their part, time port security, safety at sea, search and rescue,
law enforcement experts train maritime police or etc. These different civilian tasks are often referred
coast guard officers on how to carry out effective to as coast guard functional activities. Although
maritime surveillance. All activities are conducted there is no internationally agreed definition of
on the basis of international law and European these activities, the definition used most often is
standards, and as proposals for the counterparts to the one proposed by the European Coast Guard
use as a standard in their self-sustainable develop- Functions Forum, according to which coast guard
ment of maritime security. There are also CSDP functions include:
missions whose mandate covers the maritime • maritime safety, including vessel traffic man-
domain in parallel with other areas. One example agement;
would be the border assistance mission in Libya, • maritime, ship and port security;
1 At the time of writing, EUBAM Libya is relocated outside Libya due to the political and security situation in the country.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
During the course of the past year, Europe’s subversive tactics. The latter can include vari-
security environment has changed dramatically, ous forms of sabotage, disrupting communica-
with two key developments dominating secu- tions and energy supplies, working through and
rity agendas. To the East, Russia’s aggression in empowering proxy insurgent groups. All this
Ukraine challenges the core principles of inter- is done with the objective of achieving political
national law. Russia’s conduct of massive and influence, even dominance over the country, as
well-coordinated hybrid warfare targets first and part of an overall strategy.
foremost Ukraine’s integrity. It also seeks to cre- A critically important aspect of hybrid warfare
ate uncertainty in the minds of the international is to generate confusion, doubt and ambiguity
community as responses are considered. To the both in the affected population under attack and
South, the advances of ISIL, a barbaric and well- in the broader international community about
resourced terrorist group, threatens to turn an what is actually going on and who may stand
entire region into a zone of failed states and ter- behind the attack. Such ambiguity can paralyse
ror. ISIL’s expansion and aggressive ideology have the ability of an opponent to react effectively and
driven thousands of young Europeans away from mobilise defences and also divide the interna-
traditional European values towards jihad, and tional community, limiting the speed and scope
these same young people have joined the terrorist of its response to the aggression.
group as ‘foreign fighters’. Another fundamental characteristic of hybrid
warfare is that hybrid techniques seek to find and
exploit the target country’s most important vul-
What is hybrid warfare/ nerabilities. The majority of these vulnerabilities
tactics?1 are areas that could be addressed by means of EU
action, both within and beyond CSDP.
Hybrid warfare can be defined as the com- Hybrid tactics are in fact not new, they are
bined, centrally designed and controlled use of as old as war itself. What makes the example
various covert and overt military and non-military seen in Ukraine disturbing is the extremely well-
means and tactics, ranging from conventional coordinated and highly effective deployment of
forces, through economic pressure to intelligence. a large variety of hybrid instruments and tech-
Disinformation campaigns or control of the nar- niques. This poses complex challenges to Euro-
rative are an important part of hybrid tactics. pean countries and their organisations, like the
The attacker seeks to undermine and destabilise EU and NATO.
its opponent through applying both coercive and
1 The recently published EUISS paper (Alert 4/2015) on hybrid warfare provides useful additional analysis.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Responding to and countering hybrid threats rule of law, corruption or the funding of political
remains first and foremost a national responsibil- parties.
ity. However, the EU could play a role in sharing In response to a wide-scale information war-
information, coordinating responses and helping fare, which through denying or distorting facts
to contribute to building resilience. As part of that manipulates large parts of the affected popula-
effort, enhanced coordination and cooperation tions, effective strategic communications need
with NATO are required. to be developed drawing on expertise and
Building resilience to deal with hybrid threats instruments available in Member States, the
requires Member States to recognise and share EU and the affected partner countries. Swift
their own perceived internal vulnerabilities so that decision-making at high political levels will
common steps can be taken to reduce the number be critical for the success of efforts to prevent
of possible attack options. Building resilience in and defend against hybrid threats. Given the
critical areas of vulnerability would seem to be the character of hybrid threats, such decisions may
best way of preventing hybrid attacks from suc- need to be based on assumptions, predictions
ceeding. and trust.
With regard to external EU partners, the EU, Hybrid threats also require a fundamentally
drawing on its wide array of instruments and different mind-set, where traditional separation
expertise, can also play a central role in supporting lines between internal and external, defence and
partner countries, including in areas such as cyber homeland security, civil and military, and in some
security, border management, the energy sector, cases public and private, may no longer be sus-
or by reducing vulnerabilities associated with the tainable.
Graphic: Jochen Rehrl
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
1 Our aim is not to produce an in-depth analysis of the concept, to analyse the various sustainability models or to couple
one or several models with the EU CSDP.
2 Tom Kuhlman and John Farrington (2010), What is Sustainability?, Sustainability, 2, pp. 3436-3448.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
achieving endurable results that are pursued or the ‘exit’ or ‘transition strategy’: sustainability is
sought to make up for something that is lacking, set as a pre-condition for the CSDP mission to
deficient or insufficient in terms of quantity or exit theatre and transition to other instruments
in quality. or local authorities. Yet no specific guidelines are
Sustainability has also become measurable. provided on how to achieve sustainable results.
Over the years, a variety of instruments have been EUCAP Sahel Niger has therefore developed its
developed in order to assess the progress and the own sustainability strategy and action plan, focus-
viability of these results on a quantitative or quali- ing on training6.
tative basis3. The metrics used for the measure- The EUCAP Sahel Niger sustainability strategy
ment of sustainability are evolving: they include, first of all entailed the creation of a series of opera-
amongst other things, benchmarks, standards tional tools and a legislative framework taking
and indicators but also assessment, appraisal and into account the element of local ownership (from
other reporting systems4. the mission, to the NSDF, back to the mission) in
order to achieve the following: 1) the capacity to
transfer knowledge and methodologies from the
The case study of EUCAP Sahel mission to the NSDF, 2) the capacity to autono-
Niger mously reproduce from within the NSDF and 3)
the capacity to evaluate and recreate, both by the
EUCAP Sahel Niger, launched in July 2012 mission and the NSDF.
and part of the European Security and Develop- The action plan envisaged the following ele-
ment Strategy for the Sahel, is a capacity-build- ments/steps:
ing mission. The mission aims at reinforcing the • the creation of standardised EUCAP training
Nigerien Security and Defence Forces (NSDF) in documents, templates and modules, all con-
the fight against terrorism and organised crime. tained each time in a thematic ‘training kit’ (1);
Its activities consist of training, strategic advice • the creation of thematic ‘appropriation com-
and projects (linked to the ‘train and equip’ con- mittees’. This tool was used to ensure the grad-
cept). The mission structure is also the first to ual transfer of technical knowledge and skills
have a proper ‘sustainability policies unit’ in the (training kit) to be officially recognised in the
operations department. It shows that the Civilian NSDF training programmes (1);
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the • the creation of a ‘drafting committee’ to draft
Brussels-based operations headquarters for civilian a consensus-based decree for a “harmonised
CSDP missions and its operational planners are trainers’ statute” that offers legal support in rec-
well aware of the importance of and the need for ognising the appointed Nigerien trainers and
sustainable results. They consistently implement their role in ensuring quality transfer of knowl-
the benchmarking methodology agreed in 20115. edge (1);
Accordingly, the EUCAP Sahel Niger OPLAN • conducting integrated quantitative trainings
makes a direct link between the need for success- and qualitative trainings through the ‘training-
ful sustainable results and the implementation of of-trainers’ (2);
3 Ehrlich, P.R. & Holden, J.P. (1974). “Human Population and the global environment”, in American Scientist,
62(3): 282–292.
4 Bell, Simon and Morse, Stephen (2008), Sustainability Indicators. Measuring the Immeasurable?, Second ed. London:
Earthscan.
5 Cf. Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions, 17110/01, PSC noted in 2011.
6 The main trainings provided in the mission concern forensics, intelligence, border management, intervention techniques,
human resources, logistics and civilian crisis management.
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2 CSDP Missions and Operations
In Niger, the integrated training courses in pedagogical techniques for trainers of the four security forces
(national guard, police, gendarmerie, and Nigerien armed forces) aimed at enhancing sustainability in schools
and training centres (Ecole Nationale de Police, Niamey, June 2013)
• the mentoring and monitoring of the trainers ologies and techniques, which in turn increased
afterwards while re-delivering the modules (2); their interoperability and efficiency on the ground
• the creation of evaluation indicators and tools by enabling them to work together.
to establish ‘hot’ (directly) and ‘cold’ (six
months after) outcome assessments of the gen-
erated change in behaviour and attitudes. The Challenges and suggestions
assessment is made both by the trainee and the
hierarchical superiors (3). There are several challenges ahead when it
The mission strategy mainstreamed local owner- comes to advancing sustainability across CSDP
ship at all levels of hierarchy by integrating secu- missions. The first concerns the development of
rity forces personnel from the lowest to the high- standardised sustainability guidelines. They could
est management level in the development and offer operational tools that the mission would
implementation process. This is also a key element take into account to achieve sustainable results
of success. when planning its activities.
A pilot phase (six months) and a pilot pro- Second, since each host country environment is
ject in the field of forensics, first-level training different, each mission will need to operationalise
was conducted during which the action plan was the guidelines according to local realities. A mis-
implemented. The result in the field of forensics sion could for example develop its own sustain-
is that the NSDF are now capable of autonomous ability strategy and action plan. Missions have to
training and can increase their capabilities in that consider not only historical, political, economic
area (level I). Moreover, they all integrated and or cultural specificities, but also challenges related
officially recognised the use of the same method- to a culture of change, change management, local
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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3 Capabilities
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
HR/VP
EU Cell at
CEUMC SHAPE
DIRECTOR
GENERAL
EUMS EU Liaison
CEUMCWG UN NY
LEGAL DEPUTY
ADVISOR DIRECTOR
GENERAL
ACOS NPLT
ACOS
EXTERNAL
SYNCHRONISATION
RELATIONS
Military
Intelligence Logistics CIS Policy &
Concepts Assessment&
Policy Policy Requirements
Planning
CrisisResponse Information
Force Intelligence Resource
& Current Technology&
Capability Support Support
Operations Security
Exercises,
Intelligence OPSCENTRE Administration
Training &
Production & Watch Keeping & Support
Analysis
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3 Capabilities
capabilities to enable the EU to act. The strategy Europe and for a period of at least one year. Sev-
was re-affirmed in the report on its implementa- eral lesser ambitions were also defined (see fig.
tion in 2008 and some threats were added – such above).
as cyber attacks and maritime piracy. EU Member In answering the question ‘what capacities
States all agreed that the EU should play a more do we need to fulfil this Level of Ambition?’, it is
active role in the field of international security, important to understand the types of situations
drawing on civilian and military capacities. in which European troops on CSDP missions and
operations could be deployed. For this purpose
five ‘illustrative scenarios’ were defined (see Fig.
Headline Goal & Level of next page), in combination with different Stra-
Ambition tegic Planning Assumptions (SPA) – including
reaction time, distance from Europe, the need for
Since the inception of CSDP, the scope of the rotations, the hypothesis according to which sev-
role that the EU wanted to play under this policy eral operations are ongoing at the same time. This
has framed its capability requirements. Drawing led to an extensive list of military requirements
on the definition of the Petersberg tasks (ini- in terms of equipment and personnel. This ‘what
tially defined in 1992 for the Western European do we need?’ was formalised in 2005, in what is
Union), EU Member States established a capacity termed the Requirement Catalogue (RC05).
objective, the Headline Goal. The first ‘Headline
Goal 2003’ was defined in 1999 at the European
Council of Helsinki – the ‘Level of Ambition’
decided upon has not changed since then. The
biggest ambition is to be able to deploy a maxi-
mum of 60 000 troops within 60 days. This must
be possible at thousands of kilometres away from
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Illustrative Scenarios
Three Catalogues
With a view to capacity development, Mem- in the Progress Catalogue (PC), which was lastly
ber States were asked what they could potentially updated in 2014 (PC-14) and agreed upon by the
make available for the Requirement Catalogue. EUMC.
Their contributions are voluntary and non-bind-
ing and cannot be used for Force Generation pro-
cesses. These voluntary contributions (the answer The European Defence Agency
to the ‘What-do-we-have question’) are laid down
in the Force Catalogue (FC). The FC is regularly The European Defence Agency (EDA) plays
updated; the latest update at the time of writ- a crucial role in the whole process of Capability
ing was agreed upon by the EU Military Com- Development. The result of the Headline Goal
mittee (EUMC) in 2014 (FC14). The EUMC is process (the prioritised capability shortfalls) is the
supported in this respect by the EUMC Work- EUMC’s input to EDA’s Capability Development
ing Group/Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), in Plan (CDP). This CDP has four Strands. The
which all Member States have their subject-matter EUMC input is called Strand A. The other inputs
experts represented. are: Strand B, which covers future requirements,
Unfortunately, there are still differences in the long term (e.g. Air-to-Air Refuelling;
between the requirement catalogue, the RC05, Cyber Defence; Government SatCom; Remotely-
and the Force Catalogue, the FC14 (i.e. differ- Piloted Aircraft Systems); Strand C, which covers
ences between the ‘what we need’ and ‘what we the Defence Plans of individual Member States
have’; let’s then call this question: ‘what are we still (here the Member States can see what others have
lacking?’). These capabilities, which are not poten- in their Plans, which could create opportunities
tially made available to achieve the total require- for pooling and sharing of – future – capabilities);
ments as defined in the EU Level of Ambition, and Strand D, which deals with lessons identified
are called ‘shortfalls’. All shortfalls are mentioned during missions and operations (see Fig. p. 239).
238
3 Capabilities
Capability Development
ESS
MS
What we have? Force Catalogue 2014 (FC14)
Contributions
Capability Development
a Shorter Longer B
Term Term
D C
Reality MS Defence Plans &
Lessons Identified
Equipment Programmes
The whole process of capability development duplication of effort, the EU capability develop-
is intense and complicated, but the CDP is very ment planning timelines are aligned with those
usable for all stakeholders. In order to simplify of NATO as much as possible. Using the same
the process, NATO and the EU agreed to use language and timelines symbolises the close
the same information-gathering tool and the cooperation in this realm.
same Capability Codes and Statements (CCS). The EUMC decided in January 2015 to
In addition, the EU Member States who are launch an EU Military Capability Questionnaire
also NATO members do not have to fill in long (EUMCQ-15).
questionnaires twice. Finally, in order to prevent
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Capacity Development:
a continued process
240
3 Capabilities
The nature and form of international crises and ground level training, to providing strategic advice
conflicts have drastically changed over the last to ministers of the interior and justice or mentor-
decade. Finding the right mix of tools to manage ing police or judiciary bodies.
them is far from being an easy task. CSDP is just The EU has established itself as a global actor
one facet of the EU’s external action. However, it and security provider. In early 2015, it deployed
is an essential one and its use is constantly on the around 1500 international experts1 on three con-
rise. tinents for the purpose of civilian CSDP missions.
At the time of writing, 11 out of 16 ongo- Recent events in the EU’s southern and eastern
ing CSDP missions are civilian. The last two to neighbourhoods and developments in Africa and
be launched were EUAM Ukraine and EUCAP the Middle East are forceful reminders that we
Sahel Mali, established after deliberations at the will continue to need sufficient civilian capabili-
European Council (EC) in December 2013. It ties to address crisis management challenges. By
was the first time in many years that the heads civilian capabilities we mean the right number of
of state and government sat down to discuss the staff with the right skill-set, but also the adequate
CSDP. Therefore, the event was seen as an oppor- policies, procedures and equipment at hand to
tunity for the EU to move forward with a joint do the job. And these procedures take time to
vision of the capabilities that Europe needs, and develop.
to lay the framework for a more efficient CSDP. The experts in civilian CSDP missions are sec-
However, some disappointment was expressed at onded internationally and hired internationally
the imbalance between the civilian and military and locally. Secondment by a Member State is still
parts of the EC Conclusions. the main applicable employment regime. This
The original idea behind CSDP missions means that the EU relies on voluntary contribu-
was crisis management, mostly understood as a tions from Member States – usually for periods
‘quick-fix’ intervention focused on priority areas of one year at a time. There is no one-stop shop
agreed at the Feira European Council in 2000. As to get the right civilian expertise. Police officers,
crises proliferate and get increasingly complex, so judges, prosecutors and other civilian experts in
does the need to quickly adapt and be flexible in Member States have to be encouraged to apply,
providing response. Nowadays, our CSDP mis- trained, released from their everyday work and
sions are not discrete actions but are well embed- replaced during their time of absence, as well as
ded in overall EU strategies towards a particular adequately integrated back into the system upon
region or country, and cover activities from basic, return from a mission. Therefore, the prime
1 The overall figure decreased due to the downsizing of the largest mission, in Kosovo. In 2014, the closure of EUPOL RDC
and the suspension of the EUBAM Libya also impacted the total approved number of staff required.
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responsibility for capability development for civil- the time was based on scenario-based planning
ian CSDP missions lies with the Member States. and was detached from the operational reality of
It requires a cross-government approach. Further- civilian CSDP missions. This also led to the cri-
more, Member States have each established differ- sis management structures we have today, where
ent national structures, strategies, policies or other civilian capability development is not under one
arrangements on how to train, recruit and deploy unique authority. The same goes for the mission
and pay civilian experts. Civilian CSDP capabil- planning process, which is divided between the
ity planning is multifaceted with many national Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
stakeholders, different layers of decision-making (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct
and budget lines. Capability (CPCC).
The fact that international contracted staff in The CHGs have certainly achieved encourag-
civilian CSDP missions are on the rise and already ing results but also touched the limits of scenario-
make up almost one third of the total number based capability planning. In the post-Lisbon
of international staff in civilian CSDP missions set-up and in order to provide further political
should also not be neglected. impetus, in December 2011 the Council called
Despite the progress made, generating civilian for a multi-annual work programme for civilian
capabilities – for EU rapid deployment in par- capability development. To steer the work, this
ticular – remains a challenge, especially due to led to the adoption, in July 2012, of a Civilian
shortages of well trained personnel in specialised Capability Development Plan and the key action-
profiles. lines for 2012 and 2013, in an additional docu-
In terms of its evolution, Civilian Capability ment.
Development2 followed the example of the mili- The Civilian Capability Development Plan sets
tary, where there is a long history and tradition of out four interlinked drivers that in the civilian
capability development and a well-structured sys- realm replicate the four strands of the EU’s Capa-
tem. It started with the Feira European Council bility Development Plan (CDP) managed by the
in June 2000, which decided to develop the civil- European Defence Agency (EDA).
ian aspects of crisis management in four priority Among the key action-lines were the establish-
areas: police, rule of law, civil administration and ment of a list of generic civilian CSDP tasks and
civil protection. The EU ambition to play a role the finalisation of the Goalkeeper project.
in global security was spelt out in the European The aim of the list of generic civilian CSDP
Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. This allowed tasks is to present the collation of the opera-
the EU to pursue, under the European Security tional objectives that can reasonably be expected
and Defence Policy (ESDP), the development of to occur in CSDP civilian crisis management,
crisis management capabilities needed to face the expressed in a generic non mission-specific way.
challenges and key threats for the EU. It led to It should contribute to the building of a com-
the endorsement by the EC of the two Civilian mon understanding of the generic civilian CSDP
Headline Goals (CHGs), namely CHG 2008 and tasks and provide a coherent vision of the extent
CHG 2010. While the former focused strongly on to which the EU is able to address these tasks as
personnel, the latter also recognised other impor- well as the relative weight of shortfalls identified.
tant factors of capability development such as It will also facilitate work on civilian-military
synergies, lessons learnt, concepts, security, equip- synergies.
ment and the CSDP-FSJ (Freedom, Security and The Goalkeeper software environment is a cru-
Justice) nexus. Civilian capability development at cial mainstay of EU initiatives to facilitate civil-
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ian deployment. It is a web-based information to rapid deployment and ways to make procedures
hub that serves Member States, Brussels HQ and more flexible. Times have changed. Nowadays,
CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, working groups such as the Committee for Civil-
recruitment, and the development of national ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM)
rosters, capability development and institutional and the Political and Military Group (PMG)
memory. In the area of civilian capabilities for are discussing ways to make more savings in the
CSDP, Goalkeeper bridges the operational and CSDP budget without too much of an impact on
strategic levels as initially planned during the operational delivery.
work on the 2010 CHG. It is expected that it will These are just a few examples of different work
be finalised and become operational in 2015. strands with concrete deliverables and impact on
The logistic needs of new civilian CSDP mis- civilian capabilities. One should not neglect the
sions, in particular during start-up, were better work on partnerships, training, lessons learnt
met after the establishment of the permanent and transition strategies, as well as issues beyond
CSDP Warehouse, which became operational in CMPD’s remit such as the revision of the Crisis
June 2013. The Warehouse has the capacity to Management Procedures (CMP). The main dif-
store strategic equipment primarily for the effec- ference remaining between civilian and military
tive rapid deployment of 200 personnel in the area capability planning even today is that the for-
of operations of a newly-launched mission, within mer remains fragmented while the latter is better
30 days of the approval of the Crisis Management structured. In the absence of a coherent strategy,
Concept. It was used to provide equipment to civilian capability development may seem less
EUBAM Libya, established in 2013. There is a viable.
plan to revise the Warehouse framework, which For a successful, efficient and sustainable civil-
should be synchronised or streamlined with the ian CSDP, it is essential to step up the work at the
ongoing work on establishing a Shared Service Member State and EU levels on mechanisms and
Centre to centralise mission support structures. procedures to recruit and train civilian personnel,
In recent times, money issues have also become as well as to provide the adequate supporting tools
an important planning factor. Finances before in order to obtain a better impact by EU CSDP
were not a major consideration but mostly linked missions on the ground.
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When time for action is considered, politically, The complexity of contemporary crisis situa-
as pressing, we refer to such urgency as demanding tions indicates that the EU needs to have capabili-
‘Rapid Response’. A response is measured in time ties across all military dimensions in order to be
from the moment that the EU considers action as able to act/react in a flexible manner that can be
appropriate up to the moment that Forces arrive adapted to the uniqueness of each situation and to
and are able to operate in the area of operations. the tasks that need to be undertaken. Hence, the
At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid EU Battlegroups (EU BG) Concept (2006), the
Response (RR) was identified as an important EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (2007)
aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the and the EU Air Rapid Response Concept (2007)
Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member were conceived, developed and agreed in that
States the objective of being able to make rapid order by Member States.
response elements available and deployable at very In December 2013, the European Council1
high levels of readiness. Subsequently the first EU emphasised the need to further improve the EU
Military Rapid Response Concept (MRRC) was Rapid Response (RR) capability, inter alia by
agreed in early 2003. increasing the operational usability and deploy-
The operational birth of the EU military ability of the EU Battlegroups. In this regard, the
response is more often associated with the Mili- revision of the EU Military Rapid Response Con-
tary Operation in the Democratic Republic of cept was completed and finalised on 17 Decem-
Congo (DRC), code-named Artemis, which was ber 20142: it now also includes the subordinated
launched on 12 June 2013 (seven days after the Land (new), Maritime and Air Rapid Response
Council adoption of the Joint Action). It success- concepts.
fully demonstrated the EU’s ability to operate
with a rather small force at a distance of more than
6 000 km from Brussels. Accordingly, Operation Rapid Response Pillars
Artemis became a reference point and model for
the development of a Battlegroup-sized Rapid To achieve an overall Rapid Response, both the
Response capability. Rapid operational assess- political reaction and the military response need
ment, Member States’ political support, decision to be fast and effective. However, the first step to
making, planning, force generation, together with unlocking this capability must be the EU Member
Member States’ force contributions and deploy- States’ political will to use it. In other words consen-
ment, were identified as critical criteria for success sus amongst Member States must be inseparably
in future operations. linked to the responsibility to properly resource
1 European Council 19/20 December 2013 – Conclusions (EUCO 217/13, 20 December 2013).
2 EU Military Rapid Response Concept (17036/1/14 REV 1, 8 January 2015).
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a response during the informal force sensing, by may be appropriate and invites the EEAS to de-
those same authorities, to match the degree of velop a Crisis Management Concept (CMC).
urgency agreed by Member States. The subsequent key decisions are the follow-
In addition to the aforementioned unavoidable ing: approval of the CMC by the Council, the
requirement for Member States’ political will, the Council Decision establishing the mission/
development of the overall approach is based on operation and the Council Decision to launch
three pillars, which must in all cases be fulfilled in the operation/mission.
order to enable a swift and decisive EU military • Secondly, there is a need to finalise all phases
response: of crisis response planning in a very short
• Firstly, there is a need for an extremely com- period of time. The new Crisis Management
pressed decision-making process in response Procedures established a special procedure,
to a developing crisis. This process follows the called the Fast Track process, in order to accel-
crisis management procedures3. This decision erate this process. Concurrent planning activ-
process is initiated when the PSC analyses the ity, the early appointment of the Operation/
situation and considers whether CSDP action Mission Commander and Force Commander,
3 Suggestions for crisis management procedures for CSDP crisis management operations (7660/2/13 REV 2, 18 June 2013,
public).
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
OVERALL EU RESPONSE
Mission/ Decision to
EU Action
Operation launch the
appropriate
established operation
STANDARD RESPONSE
PSC or
Crisis Council CMC IMD OPLAN
situation tasking to
develop a
CMC
RAPID RESPONSE
Shortcuts after formal Rapid Response decisions
Standard Response process is depicted with blue arrows
Rapid Response process is depicted with red arrows
and the early designation of Operation/Mis- This early identification should trigger the
sion Headquarters (OHQ/MHQ) and Force related rapid response initiation procedures to
Headquarters (FHQ) are of utmost impor- activate and prepare the forces involved and to
tance. better enable their further reaction.
• And thirdly and finally, there is a need to de- In accordance with the crisis management
ploy forces and capabilities already held at procedures, the rapid response label is formally
a very high state of readiness by Member decided by either:
States. These rapid elements are made available • a PSC decision to directly develop a CMC, ex-
by Member States and generated through the cluding the Political Framework for Crisis Ap-
agreed set of rapid response mechanisms. proach (PFCA). This option is called Option for
Urgent Response; or
• a PSC decision to utilise the fast-track process
EU Rapid Response label and for the operation/mission planning. This pro-
shortcuts cess avoids developing the Military Strategic
Options (MSO) and the Concept of Opera
The timeline requirements established for the tions (CONOPS). In addition, the draft
military rapid response forces and capabilities Operation Plan (OPLAN) should be drawn
after the Council Decision to launch the Opera- up in parallel with the preparation of the
tion are extremely demanding. Therefore, in order draft CMC and draft Initiating Military Di-
to facilitate their compliance, it is imperative to rective (IMD). All of this is undertaken with
identify as soon as possible the point at which a view to shortening the operation planning
the EU labels a CSDP mission or operation rapid time.
response.
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Use of EU Rapid Response egy, the Report on its implementation five years
later, the Council conclusions of December
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) pro- 2013, and the Recommendations on EU Bat-
vides the framework for the deployment of mili- tlegroups5 provide further indications regarding
tary assets on missions outside the Union (peace- the significance and possible recourse to military
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening rapid reaction. Taking into account that Rapid
international security). This framework follows Response is decided by a PSC decision, it is in
the principles of the United Nations Charter. In the latter’s remit to decide the scenario in which
addition, drawing on the previously agreed Peters- the military forces and capabilities will develop
berg tasks4, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for the the standard generic military tasks in a rapid
following possible tasks: joint disarmament oper- response format.
ations; humanitarian and rescue tasks; military
advice and assistance tasks; conflict prevention
and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces Military Rapid Response Time
in crisis management, including peace-making and requirements
and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, includ- While the Political Reaction Time is the period
ing by supporting third countries in combating between a crisis being identified and the point at
terrorism in their territories. which the Council takes the decision to launch an
Key EU documents have further elaborated operation, the Military Response Time is meas-
on or described other possible scenarios, threats ured from the point at which the Council takes
or challenges. The 2003 European Security Strat- the decision to launch the operation to the point
4 The Petersberg tasks were first agreed upon at the June 1992 Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers near
Bonn, Germany. Article II.4 of the subsequent ministerial declaration outlined the following three purposes for which
military units could be deployed: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peace-making.
5 PMG recommendations on EU Battle Groups (17150/11, 17 November 2011, non-public).
6 Based on the EU Military Rapid Response Concept.
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EU BG Land RR
Roster FLEXIBILITY Database
TY
BILI
A
US
EU
EU Land
Land RR
RR
Battlegroup
Battlegroup Capabilities
Capabilities
(if
(if required)
required)
MODULARITY
Mar
Mar RR
RR Air
Air RR
RR
Capabilities
Capabilities Capabilities
Capabilities
Maritime RR Air RR
Database Database
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Conclusion
Photo: Council of the European Union
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
When, back in 1999, the European Secu- regarding rapidity in deployment, including the
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced following:
as part of the European Union’s Common For- • guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated
eign and Security Policy (CFSP), the idea was to Police Units (IPUs) and other police elements
obtain ‘crisis management’ capabilities – a notion in the initial stage of an EU-led substitution
clearly indicating rapid response in a post-conflict mission and interoperability of IPUs and Police
scenario. Headquarters
The first Civilian Headline Goal was set in 2000 • guidelines for rapid deployment of police ele-
at the meeting of the European Council in Santa ments in an EU-led substitution mission
Maria da Feira, Portugal. It identified ‘policing’, • a concept for rapid deployment of police ele-
the ‘rule of law’, ‘civil administration’ and ‘civil ments in an EU-led substitution mission
protection’ as four priority areas for the EU in this • guidelines on standard IPU/FPU structures
context. In the area of policing, the 2000 Feira • the Crisis Response Team concept, a pool of
Council set concrete targets whereby EU Mem- pre-selected experts.
ber States would collectively provide up to 5 000 However, already the very first mission, EUPM
police officers for crisis management operations, Bosnia and Herzegovina, launched in January
with 1 000 officers on high readiness (able to be 2003, was not so much a mission in ‘crisis ma-
deployed within 30 days). In the area of justice/ nagement’, but a longer-term capacity-building
rule of law, the 2001 Gothenburg Council sub- mission with tasks including the following:
sequently set the following goal: by 2003, the EU • support to the police reform process;
was to be able to (i) have 200 judges and prosecu- • assistance in the fight against organised crime;
tors prepared for crisis management operations • removal of non-compliant BiH police officers.
in the field of rule of law who could be deployed Also the second mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, and
within 30 days, (ii) establish a pool of experts in its successor, EUPOL RD Congo, was aimed at
the area of civilian administration (including gen- training the Congolese police and later to contri-
eral administrative, social and infrastructure func- bute to wider police reforms. EUPOL COPPS,
tions), and (iii) provide civil protection teams of launched in 2005 in support of Palestinian police
up to 2 000 people, all deployable at very short development, had a similar function.
notice. These teams included two to three assess- These three early missions are examples of mis-
ment/coordination teams consisting of 10 experts sions launched with a longer-term perspective
who could be dispatched within three to seven of capacity building. As a matter of fact, EUPM
hours. At the 2004 Civilian Capabilities Commit- Bosnia and Herzegovina lasted six years, the Con-
ment Conference in Brussels, these targets were golese civilian CSDP mission engagement lasted
declared to have been met (and indeed exceeded). seven years overall and the Palestine mission has
In parallel to these efforts, the responsible Police so far gone on for eight years.
Unit within the Council Secretariat developed a Having said that, three other civilian CSDP
number of concepts underpinning the ambitions missions were set up within a very short reaction
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time, actually within just 6 to 8 weeks, as fol- Each of these missions saw the deployment of
lows: mission personnel in record time, within a few
• AMM Aceh in 2005 to support the post-tsuna- weeks only from the agreement that ‘action was
mi demobilisation of Aceh rebels; appropriate’ and each with a full set of the neces-
• EUBAM Rafah in 2005 to provide a third-par- sary legal and planning documents in place.
ty presence at the Rafah Crossing Point, to help What made them so fast?
build relevant Palestinian capacity and to help There are a number of factors contributing to
build up confidence between the Government this:
of Israel and the Palestinian Authority; • First of all, each of these missions saw rather
• EUMM Georgia in 2008 to provide civilian innovative solutions to problems, in part even
monitoring of parties’ actions, including full slightly bending the rules: for Georgia, ‘pre-
compliance with the six-point Agreement with paratory measures’ (a financial instrument for
a view to contributing to stabilisation, normali- the start-up of civilian CSDP missions) were
sation and confidence building. used for the first time, allowing the mission
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
quicker access to funds for procurement, sala- budget for the preparatory phase of a mission,
ries, rent, cars, etc. EUBAM Rafah, by con- before it is actually set up legally and financially
trast, still had to obtain unprecedented ‘vol- by a Council Decision;
untary contributions’ from Member States 3. the revision of the applicable procurement rules
to fill the mission budget quickly and un-bu- that, for now, remain the same as those appli-
reaucratically. The EU Military Staff assisted cable for development projects, which have no
in the setting up of EUMM Georgia with time constraints;
what is called the ‘Rapid Staging and Onward 4. the establishment of a warehouse near Berlin
Movement’ capability (RSOM), which was es- that stores such assets, readily available for any
sential to get the promised 200 monitors on initial deployments and mission start-up;
time to their respective field offices. 5. the revision of the 2003 crisis management proce-
• Secondly, all three missions were monitoring mis- dures in 2013 that allow for an earlier appoint-
sions that do not necessarily require, at least ment and thus also deployment of the Head
initially, high-profile experts. A monitor who of Mission and his/her Core team as well as
understands his role and who can write reports early access to the mission budget which, again,
is all that is needed, at least for a start. By con- mainly facilitates early procurement;
trast, longer-term capacity-building missions 6. in December 2013 EU Heads of State and Gov-
performing mentoring and advisory tasks do ernment for the first time in five years dedicat-
require a certain degree of seniority and pro- ed the European Council Summit to CSDP. In
fessionalism, a good sense of conflict awareness the run-up to this event, there were a number
and, often, even diplomatic skills. Such experts of Member States’ non-papers and proposals
can only be found through proper recruitment on how to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP,
processes that take up to four months. including in the field of civilian capabilities and
• Thirdly, each of these missions met with une- rapid response. The European Council ended
qualled, massive and unanimous political will by up inviting the Commission, the High Rep-
EU Member States. Lessons clearly show that, if resentative and Member States “to ensure that
this is in place, then rules can be adapted and the procedures and rules for civilian missions en-
means are available, almost in abundance. able the Union to be more flexible and speed up
It is worth noting that the latest civilian CSDP the deployment of EU civilian missions”. A ‘road
missions all focus on longer-term capacity-buil- map’ was agreed as a follow-up to this, which
ding and reform support tasks, yet Member States addressed related financial, logistical, decision-
often wish to see them set up rapidly, not least making, planning and other aspects.
for visibility and credibility reasons. This was for The latest civilian CSDP missions planned and
example the case when planning for the EUCAP set up in 2015 (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUAM
Sahel Niger mission, but also EUBAM Libya and, Ukraine) were able to benefit from the above-
most recently, EUAM Ukraine. mentioned steps and the momentum created by
Over the past few years, therefore, major show- the December 2013 Council and saw some real
stoppers in rapid deployment have been addressed, improvements in the speed in which missions can
inter alia through the following: be set up. Yet there is room for improvement and,
1. the conclusion of ‘framework contracts’ that hence, the following avenues are being pursued to
speed up considerably the procurement of further reduce the timelines:
critical enabling material such as soft-skin and • The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has the
armoured vehicles, IT and security equipment capacity to deploy speedily and, for example,
and similar services; mount an interim mission Headquarters and
2. the establishment of ‘preparatory measures’, a show a visible presence on the ground. Whilst
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the EGF is not a European Union body, it has To sum up, the EU has proven that it does
offered its services to the EU in the framework have a real capability for rapid response, but there
of CSDP, and this is now being considered. are also limitations, the main one relating to the
• Whilst the procurement rules have been adapted selection of the right number and quality of mis-
over time and made more flexible, what would sion personnel, which is critical for longer-term
really help is if the Financial Regulations could capacity-building missions that operate in a crisis
be changed in a similar way as was done for environment. These mission personnel need not
ECHO, the EU humanitarian aid and civil least to have sound experience in change manage-
protection department. ment, which makes them scarce and not easy to
• A feasibility study for a ‘Shared Service Centre’ was release from their present jobs.
concluded in 2014 which is now being discussed “Where there’s a will, there’s a way” – this old
with Member States. The basic idea consists in saying also remains true. Unanimous and strong
centralising certain mission support functions for political will can “move mountains”. The main
civilian CSDP missions in Brussels, which should conclusion is that Member States have to set their
considerably facilitate efficiency and standardisa- level of ambition and preparedness. They are the
tion, and ultimately also the speed in delivering ones to dictate the rhythm and speed of decisions
essential services to these missions. taken in Brussels.
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Before the foundation of the ESDC, there was The ESDC was created as a network college
no single entity in the EU devoted to European and therefore relies on certified national training
training and the development of a common Euro- institutes, which provide training on a ‘costs lie
pean security culture. It was only in 2002 that the where they fall’ basis.
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255
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
re
pr
Se wi
in
Jochen Rehrl, Hans-Bernhard Weisserth (eds): HANDBOOK ON CSDP 2nd ed. (rev.)
co th
t
several other publications
nd am
Ed en
iti dm
on e
nt
s
Since 2010, the ESDC has published three
handbooks on the Common Security and
Defence Policy. A total of about 15 000 copies of
these publications have been distributed to date,
Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Other the CommoN SeCurIty aNd defeNCe PolICy
of the euroPeaN uNIoN
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257
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
2. The ESDC provides first-class training, thanks groups are balanced. This approach allows for
to its network structure, its broad variety of lec- exchanges of views on CFSP and CSDP from a
turers including practitioners, academics and variety of vantage points.
officials, its use of participants with a wealth 5. The ESDC supports the regional policies of the
of expertise and professional experience as re- EU by providing tailor-made training for part-
source persons, its eLearning Management tool ners such as the Asia Regional Forum and the
and its standardised, annually updated curricu- Arab League.
la. 6. The ESDC evaluates all training events and in-
3. The ESDC awards its students a certificate, cludes its findings in the annual revision pro-
which is signed by the High Representative cess. This ensures that shortfalls can be limited,
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security good practices can be shared and a high quality
Policy and legally recognised by all EU Member of training can be guaranteed for future train-
States and EU institutions. ing activities.
4. The ESDC follows an inclusive approach, in-
viting civilian, police, military and diplomatic
staff to its courses, and ensuring that training
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259
HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Deployment Redeployment
Civilian Call for Selection Induction Training
Missions Contribution Process
Advanced/Generic Predeployment In-Mission
Training Training Training
260
3 Capabilities
Advanced training may also take the form of com- PDT Modules
plementary training for mission personnel deliv-
ered during the tour of duty in the mission area. Generic Mission mandate
The ESDC provides, for instance, ‘Senior Mission
Leader’, ‘Legal Advisor’, ‘Political Adviser’, ‘Press Mission specific eHEST, HEAT
and Public Information’ and ‘Gender Adviser’
courses. Security CSDP, International actors,
Nominated/selected personnel receive pre- CoC, MMA, Projects,
deployment training just before the mission Reporting, planning,
deployment. It aims to harmonise the manage- Cultural awareness, etc.
Graphic: ESDC/scala
ment culture of CSDP missions and ensure that
Available methods:
the persons concerned receive the knowledge and
• Residental courses
skills they will need to be fully operational from • IDL
the beginning of their tour of duty. This train-
Pre-deployment training consists of generic and mission-
ing also prepares the future mission members to
specific modules and, often, also a security module
make the most of the field induction training, in
order to adapt to the new working environment as
quickly as possible. A number of surveys1 and seminars include
Induction training is given in the mission (area) valuable information on what is needed in terms
immediately after deployment and is complemen- of the content and delivery of pre-deployment
tary to the pre-deployment training. This form of training activities. However, the content and
training aims to further familiarise the person with requirements of pre-deployment training have
the administrative procedures for joining the mis- been defined rather loosely in the existing docu-
sion, as well as the security and communication ments.2
aspects applicable to all mission members. Based on ‘lessons identified’ and training docu-
Some EU Member States have organised ments providing guidance on pre-deployment
debriefings, and Lessons Learned events are also training, pre-deployment training should aim to
organised, aimed at improving the quality of the train personnel so that at the end of their training
seconding authority’s training provision. the participants will:
• understand the EU’s CSDP and how a specific
mission is connected to it;
Pre-deployment training • be familiar with structures and roles of the EU’s
civilian crisis management system;
From a legal point of view, and in more gen- • understand the overall mandate of the speci
eral terms, pre-deployment training is part of the fic civilian crisis management mission and its
employer’s duty of care towards its employees. management;
Hence, seconding authorities and CSDP missions • understand the links between the mission and
(for contracted personnel) are responsible for pre- relevant departments in Brussels-based institu-
paring their personnel to difficult working condi- tions;
tions so that they are aware of their rights, duties • know about the mandates and activities of oth-
and responsibilities. er actors on the ground and how they interlink,
1 i.e. Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training report on survey results and elements for the way ahead
(2011/ 673853).
2 i.e. Future training needs for personnel in civilian crisis management operations (16849/06), Generic Standards of
behaviour (8373/32005), Enhancing civilian crisis management training (15567/2/09).
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especially in the context of the EU’s compre- lar, between the Member States. The first step in
hensive approach to crisis management; such coordination is to standardise the curricula.
• be familiar with the local culture; Pre-deployment and induction training courses
• be able to identify the security risks in the mis- are complementary, so the curricula should be
sion area. developed through close cooperation between the
providers and the recipients.
Security training requirements, such as eHEST Member States should seek ways to combine
for all missions and Hostile Environment Aware- resources in order to be more efficient. This has
ness Training (HEAT) for the high-risk missions, not been successful over the last 10 years owing
would ideally be a precursor to attending the pre- to the lack of coordination. It has been suggested
deployment training. that pre-deployment training can be arranged in
the Member States, whereby certain training insti-
tutions would specialise in preparation for certain
Pooling and sharing requires missions. This solution requires complex logistical
coordination arrangements at the time of deployment. Asking
all 14 missions to apply the same quality stand-
According to the Lessons Learned report 2013, ards at the same time in a range of different loca-
a common foundation of pre-deployment train- tions will be challenging.
ing for all CSDP mission staff can greatly enhance The ESDC is the only training actor solely
mission effectiveness and coherence. The impor- devoted to CSDP training and one of its tasks
tance of proper pre-deployment training was men- is to support the management of training in the
tioned as one of the five most important findings. field of conflict prevention and civilian crisis man-
CIVCOM stressed in its conclusions that training agement. Some progress has been achieved, when
in the field of CSDP is principally a Member State ESDC, with its network institutions, has devel-
competence, and agreed that a common founda- oped a standardised curriculum for ‘Preparatory
tion for both seconded national staff and interna- training for CSDP Missions’, which is certified
tional contracted staff is an important objective. 3 by all EU Member States. This training addresses
Already in 2011 it was identified that a large both generic and mission-specific training needs.
number of mission personnel do not receive pre- In the future, the main challenge will not,
deployment training.4 Primary responsibility for however, be the content, but rather the process
the training of seconded staff lies with Member whereby preparatory training is included as part
States, whilst the CSDP mission is responsible of the ‘in-processing’ of CSDP missions. Deploy-
for the training of contracted personnel. Many ment from home to the pre-deployment train-
of the Member States have found it difficult to ing and from the training to the mission area is
arrange preparatory training for small numbers at the most cost-efficient way to include training in
the time of deployment. For years, Member States the in-processing. So in future pre-deployment
have been encouraged to cooperate in pre-deploy- training should, where possible, be arranged on
ment training courses5, but little real progress has a monthly basis at a place that is easily reached
been made. by both instructors and participants, preferably in
Further coordination and pro-active planning Brussels though also where the institutes involved
is needed among all stakeholders and, in particu- in the network are located.
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4 Conclusions
and Way ahead
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
In order to look beyond the horizon and try to in 2000, have been key stakeholders in the ‘New
figure out how the EU’s Common Security and Horizon’ dynamic and take a substantive part in
Defence Policy (CSDP) could develop over the the annual debate in the C-34, the special com-
next decade, let us posit the following: mittee on peacekeeping operations. Without
With time passing after European troop with- denying the importance of this wide range of
drawal from Afghanistan, the EU’s Common support and involvement, the unspoken reality
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will face a behind these statements is that, since the second
growing risk of inconsistency if it goes on claiming half of the nineties, the EU’s Member States have
a commitment to effective multilateralism while largely deserted UN peacekeeping operations, in
excluding the possibility of deploying CSDP capa- which they used to be very active. For almost 20
bilities under UN command. years now, UN peacekeeping activity has been
Since the early stages of the CSDP, the official staffed mainly by developing countries. The UN
discourse about the use of military capabilities Secretary-General has regularly expressed con-
in support of the EU’s foreign policy has largely cern about such an obvious imbalance at a time
emphasised multilateral peace operations as a of overstretched UN peacekeeping. At the same
major area of activity. It began in the early nineties time, with the same regularity, the EU has praised
with the Petersberg missions and continued there- itself as a major supporter of international peace
after, with the 2003 Security Strategy stating that and security, both through financial support for
“[t]he EU should support the United Nations as UN operations and through the conducting of
it responds to threats to international peace and EU operations mandated by the UN Security
security”. Council.
Five years later, in the first report on the imple-
mentation of the strategy, the Council confirmed
that Enhancing European support
“[t]he UN stands at the apex of the international through the CSDP
system” and states further: “Everything the EU
has done in the field of security has been linked to Let us look at the practical arrangements and
UN objectives. (…) We support all sixteen current available options for the EU to provide military
UN peacekeeping operations”. support to UN peacekeeping.
In New York, the EU’s Member States tend to The first option is participation by some EU
express similar views on the evolution of UN Member States in a UN operation. As already
peacekeeping; they welcomed the Brahimi report mentioned, many European countries took a large
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
subject to unusual arrangements regarding heavy European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini
weaponry, rules of engagement, staffing of the with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
at UN headquarters, New York, 9 March 2015
operational headquarters in Naqura and the crea-
tion of a Military Strategic Cell within DPKO in
New York. Model consists in deploying EU militaries along-
An evolution of that first option could be the side UN troops in order to provide them with
creation of a clearing-house system within CSDP robust capabilities on the ground. EUFOR DRC
structures, enabling DPKO to deal with a single in Kinshasa during the 2006 election process is an
point of contact – at EU level – for the purpose example of that model. In December 2008, the
of UN peacekeeping force generation. The added UN Secretary General officially requested another
value of such a system must however be demon- EU standby operation in support of the MONUC
strated. From the DPKO point of view, adding a in Eastern Congo. For lack of willingness on the
layer of bureaucracy between their office and the part of EU Member States, that request was not
Member States is regarded with scepticism. fulfilled.
The second option is to conduct EU operations The third option consists in providing Euro-
in support of the UN. This means the EU deploy- pean military assets to UN operations under
ing military assets under its own command and DPKO control. That is ‘blue-hatting’ CSDP
control system to perform a UN Security Coun- capabilities. This third option can also unfold in
cil mandate. As envisaged by the Joint Statement different ways. The first one is envisaged in the
on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management above-mentioned Joint Statement. It takes the
of June 2007, it can apply two models of opera- form of a modular participation of European
tions. The Bridging Model consists in using the assets in UN-led operations. One can think about
rapid deployment capacity of the EU to stabilise high-tech, specialised or heavy military assets that
the situation on the ground and enable the rather are usually lacking when the core manning of the
slow UN force-generation system to provide the UN operations is provided by developing coun-
UN troops thereafter. Artemis and EUFOR Chad tries. EU Member States could then, in the frame-
were implementations of that model. The Standby work of the CSDP, usefully provide pooled airlift
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
capabilities, aerial intelligence, Special Forces or Let us look further in the details of the strategic
helicopter units. concept of a joint operation.
A more ambitious way to implement this An EU-UN joint operation would be a UN-
third option would be for the EU to provide the mandated operation in which the EU is the main
core component of a UN mission. This is quite troop and civilian personnel provider. It would be
unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, given characterised by the following principles:
the restrictions and requirements related to partic- • the operation is given international legitimacy
ipating in military missions abroad in the major- through a UN Security Council (UNSC) reso-
ity of EU Member States. lution;
Should this option be considered, it would • the mandate of the operation is jointly designed
most likely draw on the provisions used when by the UNSC and EU Council [the mandate is
negotiating the participation of several EU Mem- actually negotiated during a joint UN-EU Con-
ber States to the reinforced UNIFIL in 2006. ference and then submitted to the UNSC by the
UN Secretary General];
• the strategic control of the operation is jointly
A joint EU-UN operation exercised by the UN and the EU;
• an efficient double reporting line (to the EU-
There is one final possibility that has never identified operation headquarters and to
been seriously considered to date, unless theo- DPKO) is ensured by a strong Joint Strategic
retically: a joint EU-UN operation. The main Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) [JSCM will
added value of that model is that it preserves the be mainly staffed with European civilian and
integrity of the EU’s strategic line of command military officers];
and control. • both civilian and military top management of
Yet this could be a way to escape from the polit- the joint operation will be jointly appointed
ical restrictions that prevent both the majority of by the UNSG and EU Member States in the
Member States and, as a consequence, the EU as Council or the Political and Security Commit-
such from taking part in UN peacekeeping opera- tee [Considering that the EU will be the main
tions. The conduct of a peace operation by the troop contributor, the Joint Special Representative
UN jointly with a regional organisation is not a (JSR), the Force Commander (FC) and the Police
novelty. The United Nations-African Union Mis- Commissioner should be of EU origin];
sion in Darfur (UNAMID), despite its errone- • advanced military planning will be supported
ous nickname ‘Hybrid’, is indeed a joint UN-AU by an EU force HQ;
operation. • operational efficiency will be guaranteed by a
One might argue that UNAMID cannot be single chain of command going top-down from
seen as a prototype of successful operation. Oth- the UNSG through the Under Secretary-Gen-
ers will add that few among the UNAMID stake- eral for Peacekeeping Operation [traditionally
holders express great satisfaction with the UNA- European] to JSR [EU] and FC [EU];
MID Hybrid arrangements. What is suggested • the force HQ will be organised and staffed in
here is that the difficulties experienced in imple- accordance with EU standards; it will be com-
menting UNAMID’s ‘hybridity’ resulted from the plemented by additional personnel from other
major imbalance of capabilities between the UN troop-contributing countries;
and the AU. This UN-AU asymmetry is obvious • the overall management of the operation (in-
in terms of experience, budget, human resources, cluding outfits, flags and markings) will be
management, etc. Such an imbalance would not based on United Nations standards, principles
exist in an EU-UN joint operation. and established practices;
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
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Introduction
The Common Security and Defence Policy Framework for Crisis Approach serves to encour-
(CSDP) has come a long way since its operation- age a more coherent use of different instruments.
alisation in 2003. Three developments stand out. Taken together, these developments under-
First, CSDP missions have taken on a broader pro- score CSDP’s evolutionary capability to max-
file. After an initial focus on police and peace-keep- imise added value. As a policy tool, CSDP also
ing operations, missions and operations now tend needs to adapt to changes in the environment,
to include rule of law, monitoring, security sector including possible emerging security challenges.
reform (SSR), and capacity-building dimensions. The following section highlights emerging chal-
Additional elements, such as gender mainstream- lenges that may have implications for CSDP in
ing, human rights, and a comprehensive approach the future.
are routinely integrated into mission profiles.
Second, numerous mechanisms and bod-
ies have developed to bolster CSDP’s effective- Emerging Security Challenges: A
ness. Examples include the creation of a Civilian possible role for CSDP?
Planning and Conduct Capability to facilitate
command and control for civilian operations The future of CSDP is likely to include new
and the setting up of a Crisis Management types of missions and operations. A starting point
and Planning Directorate to enhance civilian- to gauge which missions and operations might
military planning. Several initiatives have like- be most likely in the future is to analyse changes
wise been unveiled to facilitate the execution in the security environment over the past dec-
of CSDP missions and operations. The Athena ade. The table (see p. 269) provides an overview
mechanism, created in early 2004, finances the of some these changes since the adoption of the
common costs of military CSDP operations. European Security Strategy in 2003. As shown in
In early 2007, an EU Watch-keeping Capabil- the table, it provides an overview of EU-external
ity was formed within the EU Military Staff to developments, such as the rise of a more assertive
streamline information exchanges and to moni- Russia, and intra-EU developments that likewise
tor CSDP missions. Combined, these and other may include a security dimension – e.g. a growth
initiatives contribute to a more active CSDP. in radicalisation across several EU Member
Third, policy-makers have developed concepts States.
and procedures to facilitate CSDP planning pro- A couple of conclusions can be drawn from a
cesses. The EEAS has revised the CSDP crisis cursory overview of these security changes. First,
management procedures to make faster responses the EU is facing a host of new challenges that
possible when needed. The use of a Political originate from within or outside the EU. Second,
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
Table 1: Examples of contextual security changes post 2003 ESS (in no particular order)
a number of these potential security challenges • Addressing a possible rise in illegal immigra-
do not have implications for CSDP. For example, tion to the EU in the aftermath of the Arab
certain demographic trends – such as a rapidly Spring and current hybrid conflicts in parts of
ageing European society – cannot be ameliorated the Middle East.
through CSDP. Third, some of these security • The possibility of significant health security
challenges will require a multi-pronged approach, challenges in the EU’s neighbourhood – a case
which could theoretically benefit from a CSDP in point being the outbreak of Ebola in several
contribution. At least four areas stand out in par- West African countries. The response from the
ticular: United States, which included military person-
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
The world does not stand still; the past year Develop shared analysis – we
has brought about new, dramatic changes in must understand the problem
Europe’s security environment. To the East, Rus-
sia’s aggression in Ukraine and continuing efforts Shared analysis should set out what we under-
to intimidate the neighbourhood; to the South, stand about the causes of a conflict or crisis, the
the advances of a barbaric terrorist group, ISIL, main people and groups involved, the dynam-
which represent a genuine threat to international ics of the situation and potential risks. It should
law and to European ideals. Failing States and the identify EU interests and our potential role in
spread of violence across borders are features of contributing to peace and stability. We can
a deteriorating security landscape. Whether right achieve this by strengthening early, proactive
on Europe’s borders or further away, they chal- and regular information-sharing and coordina-
lenge our security and undermine our interests. tion amongst all EU actors in the field and in
Strategic external changes must be matched by Brussels (especially Delegations, CSDP mis-
strategic internal changes: the EU needs to adapt sions, EU Special Representatives and Member
and evolve both structurally and on policy. There States). Crises do evolve and therefore from time
has been much talk, and more non-papers, on the to time we may have to review and refresh our
comprehensive approach, a key concept giving the earlier analysis. To that end, a continuous, open
EU unique strength in preventing conflicts and dialogue between CSDP missions/operations
managing crises. The concept is no doubt compel- and the Brussels-based crisis management struc-
ling but its true potential is yet to be unleashed. tures is required.
Below are a few thoughts on how this can be In addition we must seek to develop and imple-
translated into effect, building on the key areas for ment a common conflict/crisis analysis meth-
improvement as highlighted in the EEAS/Com- odology involving all relevant EU actors and
mission Joint Communication. CSDP, which is institutions, taking into account perspectives on
part of the EU’s extensive toolbox, does have an development, humanitarian, political and security
important supporting role to play in furthering from both the field and HQ.
our broad state-building objectives.
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
Once launched, a CSDP mission/operation unmeasurable. But we will ask them to assess,
must maintain and foster close links with the rel- propose modifications, seek greater synergies with
evant EUSR and EU Delegation. This will not other instruments, and adapt. This is the best way,
impact on the chain of command, but it should I believe, to ensure that they contribute directly to
impact on the ability to deliver enduring effect. In the desired end-state.
particular, options for transition may be fostered
and enhanced by routine discussion with the EU
Delegation.
Conclusion
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Introduction
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Commander and will report to the PSC at regular
the European Security Strategy (ESS) contain intervals. The EU Military Staff (EUMS), being
the range of tasks for potential CSDP operations part of the EEAS, provides assistance in its sup-
and missions. The successful accomplishment of porting role to the EUMC/CEUMC. At the mili-
these tasks, further developed in five illustrative tary level, the C2 arrangements for any operation
scenarios1, requires an appropriate Command are laid down on a case-by-case basis. In principle,
and Control (C2) Structure. As the EU does not the EU military chain of command encompasses
have a standing military C2 structure, tailored C2 three levels: Military Strategic (with the activa-
arrangements are needed in order to ensure the tion of an Operational Headquarters – OHQ),
successful planning and conduct of EU opera- Operational (with the activation of a Force Head-
tions and missions. However, given the continu- quarters – FHQ), and Tactical. In some cases
ous development of EU military involvement, in (usually for non-executive missions), the Council
particular through non-executive missions2, the might appoint an EU Mission Commander who
current arrangements may need to be revisited to performs the duties of both the Operation Com-
ensure they continue to meet the requirements. mander and the Force Commander.
A tailored command structure Due to the fact that it does not have a standing
command structure, the EU establishes the chain
The political control and strategic direction of of command for EU-led military operations and
any EU military operation or mission is exercised missions on a case-by-case basis. This is achieved
by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), by:
under the responsibility of the Council and of the • selection and activation of HQs listed in the
High Representative / Vice-President. The Chair- Force Catalogue3;
man of the Military Committee (CEUMC) will • the activation of the EU Operations Centre
act as a primary point of contact with the EU (EU OPSCEN);
1 Assistance to Humanitarian Operations, Separation of Parties by Force, Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military Advice
to third countries, Conflict Prevention and Evacuation Operations.
2 A non-executive mission supports the host nation in an advisory and / or training role. A contrario, an executive operation
is mandated to conduct actions in place of the host nation.
3 France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom have listed an OHQ in the Force Catalogue.
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom have listed an FHQ in the Force Catalogue.
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
OpCdr
Military Strategic level (OHQ)
MCdr
(MHQ)
FCdr
Operational level (FHQ)
Graphic: Wosolsobe/scala
Forces Forces Forces Forces
In principle, the EU military chain of command encompasses three levels: military strategic, operational
and tactical.
• having recourse to NATO common assets and Other MS) ‘augmentees’. Augmentation by other
capabilities and utilising SHAPE as an OHQ EU MS is achieved using a list of pre-identified
under the Berlin+ arrangements. personnel (Primary Augmentee Database), and/
• using other ad hoc national/multinational or through a dedicated Manning Conference.
OHQs or MHQs tailored to the mission. This system is intended to allow the designated
To this end, and regardless of the chosen com- EU OHQ to achieve initial operational capacity
mand option, HQs have to be activated, rein- (IOC) within 5 days.
forced by staff coming from different EU Member
States (MS), and fully integrated in a command
structure consisting of a mixture of permanent Concept versus reality
elements from the relevant HQ and augmentees.
Development of non-executive
missions
Augmentation process
Recent developments have witnessed the
Based on advance planning and in discussion deployment of non-executive missions rather than
with other potential EU HQs and EU bodies, a the more traditional executive military opera-
Member State indicates its willingness to provide tions. The command arrangements of these non-
an EU OHQ or an EU FHQ for a possible EU- executive missions have involved the merging of
led military operation. The final agreement on the military strategic and the operational levels of
the chain of command is formalised by a Coun- command into a single Mission Command. The
cil Decision. The designated Parent HQ provides merging of these levels of Command requires the
the Key Nucleus Staff of the EU OHQ which Mission Commander to divide his time and staff
is reinforced by the activation of both national resources between the operational level command
(from the Parent Nation) and multinational (from on his/her mission and the essential strategic level
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Graphic: Scala
and capabilities
requirement to interact personally with Brussels- level) is a critical event in the planning timeline.
based stakeholders. As a consequence, the Mission However, the format in which this handover takes
Commander has limited capacity either to spend place still needs to be more clearly defined.
time in Brussels, interacting with other Brussels- As previously mentioned, the activation of an
based stakeholders (and thereby jeopardising EU HQ requires, among other things, the acti-
the prospect of achieving a truly comprehensive vation of pre-identified augmentees from MS
approach), or to spend sufficient time in the mis- to plan and conduct military operations4. How-
sion area to maintain the desired level of interac- ever, the commitments of MS in the Primary
tion with local actors or to optimise his/her ability Augmentee Database (the list of pre-identified
to command the mission. In this respect, the need augmentees) are in no way binding. As a result,
to support the Mission Commander in areas like there is always a doubt as to whether MS will
Force Generation or Financing has been identi- honour their Primary Augmentee database com-
fied as requiring further examination. mitments. In the event of an MS failing to meet
its commitments, there may be a requirement to
conduct a bespoke manning conference or the
Challenges presented by the non- Parent Nation may have to fill the gaps. Further-
permanent nature of EU HQs more, the Augmentee database (national and Pri-
mary Augmentee) historically tends not to fully
The designation of an EU HQ to plan and address the manning requirements of an OHQ,
conduct an operation takes place relatively late with approximately 20 % of the posts remaining
in the planning process. The handover of plan- unfilled. If it is deemed necessary to address this
ning responsibility between the EEAS/EUMS shortfall, a bespoke manning conference might
(planning at political strategic level) and a newly also be required.
activated OHQ (planning at military strategic In order for an EU HQ to be immediately
4 The manning of a Mission Headquarters (non-executive missions) is addressed by means of dedicated manning
conference(s).
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
A number of factors have influenced the issue of comprehensiveness and cohesiveness. Yet the
of mission delivery in recent years: Lisbon Treaty opened new opportunities in this
First of all, and as outlined in the chapter on regard that both the European Commission and
civilian CSDP missions, these missions have con- the EEAS are actively pursuing.
siderably expanded in terms of mandate and geo- The EEAS for instance now takes part in the
graphic scope, in line with the evolving require- multi-annual financial planning of Commission
ments of the EU’s foreign policy and changing external relations funds, and Commission services
international realities. From the original police in turn are actively contributing to CSDP mission/
missions in the Balkans, they have evolved into operation planning. In the field, this is matched
more encompassing rule of law and security sector by regular contacts, information exchange and
reform missions – see by way of example EUCAP close coordination. Tangible results of this can be
Sahel Niger and Mali, EUCAP Nestor, EUPOL observed in many theatres already – see the many
COPPS, EUAM Ukraine etc. positive examples in other chapters of this Hand-
Their main added value compared to other book of such concerted action ensuring a better
EU instruments still stems from their recourse to outcome.
officials in active service from across all 28 Mem- Linked to this is the discussion on ‘sustainabil-
ber States, be they police officers, judges, border ity’, which is covered in detail in another chapter
guards, customs officers or other law enforcement of this handbook. We came to realise that, what-
officials, as well as the tight political control and ever we do with whatever tool, it will not necessar-
strategic direction the Brussels-based decision ily lead us anywhere in terms of effect, unless we
making structures are exercising in terms of the ensure the necessary sustainability of our efforts.
chain of command (see earlier chapter on this CSDP and other instruments are too costly and
topic). These two distinct features make CSDP the stakes are too high in terms of regional sta-
missions and operations a rather powerful tool bility and security to fail to make sure that our
that is much sought after, complementary to investments last. This requires foremost, as indi-
other EU tools. cated by others, a detailed analysis of needs, risks
This leads to the second main factor: the and opportunities. The support activities, in our
increasing awareness that all these tools are best case CSDP, then have to be calibrated on that
applied if coordinated such that potential syner- basis.
gies and mutual support can be generated. This But it does not stop there: those responsible
debate is not new; in fact, the 2003 crisis man- for the different instruments have to continue
agement procedures already addressed the issue to coordinate amongst themselves the details of
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4 Conclusions and Way ahead
their respective activities, and working arrange- bilities to pursue and fulfil its mandate. This is a
ments must be identified and agreed where pro- very critical step in Member States’ recognition of
jects are linked. Most civilian CSDP missions, the link between mission capability and delivery
for instance, have a ‘project cell’ capability that that was previously not as prominent.
allows missions to provide very limited amounts As Civilian Operations Commander, I take due
of equipment to the host countries if and when note and account of all these strands and evolv-
this directly pertains to the mission mandate and ing thinking. They lead me now to concentrate on
when considered conditional to effective mandate two main issues as my own contribution to future
delivery. But as these cells are very limited, pro- effective mission delivery:
jects run by other instruments or bilateral actors The first main effort relates to more effective
could and should usefully complement these. planning, conduct and support of these missions.
We have seen in the other Handbook contribu- In essence, the 28 EU Member States give mis-
tions that such an approach is particularly relevant sions a budget and personnel with which to deliver
for missions in transition, when exiting a country. on a set of agreed objectives and tasks. On this
This is an area where some lessons are still being basis, Member States, host nations and partners
learned and conceptual work is being pursued. rightly expect timely and sustainable effect on the
The last main factor directly pertaining to mis- ground. My role, together with the missions, and
sion delivery is the wish by Member States to supported by the CPCC, is to make this happen.
see ‘value for money’ in times of shrinking pub- With, as we have seen, public funding shrink-
lic funding and increasing pressure on external ing over the last few years whilst the number of
and internal security. This has led those working crises worldwide has increased, we have to achieve
within the CSDP structures in Brussels to revisit that aim with fewer resources. This, plus a number
our processes and decision-making procedures, of lessons learned from past experiences, has led
examining the way we set up our missions and us to introduce over time a number of measures
how we plan, support and conduct them. that tighten for example the mission internal set
As a result of this, the revised crisis manage- up – see our guidelines on a standardised mission
ment procedures lead us – we believe – to more organisation that include also specific guidance on
lean and efficient missions that are better planned, management principles.1
as the Head of Mission and Core team are on the In view of the ‘comprehensive approach’ and
ground when the CPCC develops the operational search for synergies, we will more pro-actively
planning documents, CONOPS and OPLAN, engage with other EU actors and international
but also, critically, the mission budget. This allows partners to seek synergies. We continue to rein-
inter alia the Core team to sit down with the local force our coordination efforts so that we are
authorities and other actors concerned to work certain that our actions do not duplicate what
towards more detailed, results-based planning is already done by other donors, but rather add
that also ensures the necessary management of value and support national priorities and plans.
expectations and early identification of synergies. In some cases, our initiatives are becoming a plat-
The introduction of the notion of ‘Initial form for other donors to invest in the security
Operational Capability’ (IOC) in civilian CSDP of our neighbours. The importance of partners
missions is a noteworthy new element in this advocating the same reform agendas and pooling
regard: in fact, in accordance with the new crisis efforts to achieve sustainable change cannot be
management procedures, a mission will only be understated.
‘launched’ once it has reached the necessary capa- We are also tightening up the force generation
1 ‘Guidelines to design civilian CSDP mission-specific organisational structures’ (11833/12 of 26 June 2012).
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
and selection procedures so as to help Member and help us, the services, to evaluate mission
States better plan and prepare for their second- impact and effect. As said, we will be measured
ment of mission staff. The visiting experts con- by delivery and so we ought to know, in the first
cept2 has already helped reach out to specialised place, our own perspective on this.
staff who are increasingly needed in our ever The second major focus of my work will be
more complex missions. linked to the security of mission personnel, who
We will invest more in training with a view operate increasingly in non-benign environ-
to increasing the number and quality of mission ments. Despite our already comparatively tight
staff, who are particularly scarce in the field of security provisions, we sadly saw, most recently,
civilian CSDP, as explained in the previous chap- casualties among our personnel serving in Kos-
ters. ovo, Afghanistan and Djibouti.
Operational planning and mission set-up, too, I have since reinforced the security expertise
have been considerably improved, not only by within the CPCC and am reconsidering our cur-
the aforementioned revised crisis management rent security arrangements and protocols. CSDP,
procedures, but also through the introduction of by the nature of its purpose, operates in crisis
the benchmarking methodology that is addressed areas. Not deploying at all is not an option. But
in an earlier chapter of this handbook, and also we can, and have to, do everything in our power
revised reporting procedures that the CPCC has to ensure that we operate as safely as possible, even
issued in 2012. if the environment is not safe. This is another, in
Logistical and financing/procurement the true sense, vital element of mission effect and
arrangements are constantly being reviewed and delivery.
gradually rendered more suited to our needs. The This work requires not only continued pro-
warehouse has proved to be a step in the right cedural and material resources, but also politi-
direction. A Shared Service Centre is being con- cal support and effective situational awareness.
ceived and financial provisions made more flex- Working on this is a top priority at present.
ible. Twelve years of Civilian CSDP in opera-
Furthermore, I am working on a system of tion has seen many successes with real changes
internal support review that will allow me to brought on the ground, but these years have also
check at regular intervals whether a mission is taught us what does not work.
fit for purpose. Such reviews will look at the The present Handbook puts together the
operational, support and management functions whole cycle of policy, concepts, training, imple-
within a mission which will allow me and the mentation, and lesson-learning. It clearly illus-
CPCC to address any shortfalls identified, as trates that we will only succeed if we adapt to
required. ever new challenges. My task is to be ready to
Finally, the CPCC is currently finalising the deliver in whatever circumstances, and I am con-
impact assessment methodology that seeks to fident that we, together, as the European Union,
complement the benchmarking methodology will achieve this.
2 ‘Guidelines on the use of Visiting Experts in the context of civilian CSDP Missions’ (8551/12 of 4 April 2012).
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AUTHORS
(in alphabetic order)
Lt. Col. Tomas Abrahamsson has worked at degree in politics and international relations from
the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as Stockholm University, and has published research
an action officer with responsibility for EU bat- on mediation and peacebuilding, peacebuilding in
tlegroups since 2011. He started his military post-modern conflicts, regional security dynam-
training in the Norrbotten Subarctic Infantry ics, and the conflict management challenges fac-
Regiment (19th) in Boden. He received his com- ing subregional organisations.
mission in 1985, after studies at the Military
Academy in Umeå and Boden. He graduated Martin Albani is a crisis response planner and
from the War Academy, Infantry Combat School, project manager at the European Commission’s
in 1990. He graduated from Senior Staff Col- Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI.2).
lege in 2005. In addition, Lt. Col. Abrahamsson He previously served as head of office for a foreign
underwent international EOD officer training in policy spokesperson at the European Parliament.
1999. Lt. Col. Abrahamsson has his background Other postings include the Russia unit of the
in the Subarctic Infantry but in 1990 he trans- Commission’s Directorate-General for External
ferred from the Army to the Air Force, where Affairs (RELEX), the German Institute for Inter-
he became ground defence officer. His career national and Security Affairs (SWP), the German
has included several appointments within the Federal Parliament and the German Permanent
Subarctic Infantry Brigade, from platoon leader Representation to the United Nations in New
to company commander, and he has held simi- York. He has studied international relations at
lar appointments in the Air Force. After his unit Freie Universität Berlin, Sciences Po Paris and the
career he served as officer in command of cur- London School of Economics (M.Sc.).
rent operations at Swedish International Com-
mand (Swedint) and as director of training at the Nina Antolovic Tovornik works as a capability
Swedish EOD and Demining Centre (Swedec). development planner at the Crisis Management
Between 2007 and 2011 he was director of the and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the Euro-
Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) for pean External Action Service. She graduated in
Nordic Battlegroup 08 (stationed in the UK) and politics and international relations in 2003 from
Nordic Battlegroup 11. the University of Ljubljana. She joined the police
service in the same year, where she worked in
Eldridge Adolfo is a conflict and mediation Interpol Section until she was posted for four
adviser at the European External Action Service. years as a delegate of the EU Committee for Civil-
Before joining the European Union, he was a con- ian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to
flict researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in the Permanent Representation of Slovenia to the
Uppsala, Sweden, and worked as a conflict adviser EU. She joined CMPD in September 2013.
at the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding
Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). With the UN, Lt. Col. Bastian Bail has worked for the Ger-
he worked on mediation and peacebuilding in man Ministry of Defence. Currently, he is sec-
several countries in Africa, as well as in Colombia, onded to the European External Action Service/
Georgia, Myanmar and Libya. He holds a master’s European Union Military Staff in Brussels. His
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previous posts included planner for missions and Luigi Bruno, Brigadier of Carabinieri (reserve),
training and development at the headquarters of is a planner at the European External Action Ser-
the German Joint Medical Services. He has been vice /Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
deployed to missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and (CPCC). His professional expertise combines
Mali. He holds a number of doctor’s degrees and 15 years of law enforcement at managerial level
medical specialisations. His publications focus on with 15 years of international crisis management,
medical and military-medical issues. having served with the UN, NATO and the EU.
He holds three bachelor’s degrees: in politics,
Dr Christian Behrmann is attorney-at-law and internal and external security, and international
policy officer in the Managing Directorate for and diplomatic studies. He has drafted a num-
Global and Multilateral Issues of the European ber of major doctrinal documents adopted by the
External Action Service. Before joining the dip- Council in the field of civilian common security
lomatic service, Dr Behrmann practised law pri- and defence policy (CSDP).
vately, at the EU institutions and at the United
Nations. He holds a Ph.D. in public interna- Dr Anne-Marie Buzatu is Deputy Head of the
tional law and lectures at the University of Leu- Operations IV Division (Public-Private Partner-
ven. ships) at the Centre for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF). Before coming to
Prof. Sven Biscop is director of the Europe in the DCAF, Ms. Buzatu practiced human rights law
World Programme at the Egmont – Royal Insti- and worked with human rights and humanitar-
tute for International Relations in Brussels and ian organisations on rule of law and human rights
teaches at Ghent University and at the College of issues. A member of the Texas Bar, she began
Europe in Bruges. He is a member of the Execu- her career working in private international com-
tive Academic Board of the European Security mercial law. She holds a Bachelors of Arts from
and Defence College (ESDC). the University of Texas in Austin, a Juris Doctor
in international law from a joint program with
Helena Bogusławska is deputy head of division Tulane University and Paris II Panthéon-Assass,
in charge of relations with partner countries on and an LLM in international humanitarian and
the common security and defence policy (CSDP) human rights law from the Académie de droit
in the Crisis Management and Planning Directo- humanitaire et droits humains in Geneva, Swit-
rate (CMPD) of the European External Action zerland.
Service. She previously worked as an action officer
in the Planning and Policy Unit of the European Andrew Byrne is currently Head of the Political
Defence Agency (2005-2007) and as first secretary Affairs, Press and Information Section at the EU
and defence adviser to the Political and Security Delegation in Norway. He worked in the Conflict
Committee (PSC) Ambassador at the Polish Per- Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instru-
manent Representation to the EU (2003-2005). ments Division of the European External Action
Before moving to Brussels she worked as a Polish Service. In previous posts, he was the Deputy Per-
civil servant at the Ministry of Defence for seven manent Representative to the UN at the European
years. From 2000 to 2003 she headed a Euro- Commission’s Delegation to the International
pean Security and Defence Policy Unit within the Organisations in Vienna, and Deputy Permanent
Defence Policy Department. She graduated from Representative at the European Commission’s Del-
Warsaw University’s Institute for Applied Linguis- egation to the UN Organisations in Rome. Prior to
tics. She speaks Polish, English, French, German those postings, Mr Byrne worked on transatlantic
and Russian. relations (in particular, agricultural trade aspects) at
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
the European Commission’s Directorate-General From June 2007 to November 2008, Mr Deane
for External Relations (RELEX). performed the roles of Deputy and Acting Head
of Mission in the European Union Police Reform
Giovanni Cremonini is in charge of lessons learnt Programme in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghani-
at the Crisis Management and Planning Directo- stan), before becoming Head of Operations in
rate (CMPD) of the European External Action the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
Service and chairs the CSDP Lessons Working (CPCC) Directorate of the European External
Group. A permanent EU official, in the course Action Service. Mr Deane further performed
of his career he has been posted to the EU Del- the role of Acting Chief of Staff/Deputy Civilian
egations in Russia and in China and has helped Operations Commander between May 2010 and
coordinate the European neighbourhood policy. September 2011. In 2004, Mr Deane undertook
He completed his military service in Italy’s Alpini a six-month secondment with the UK’s Foreign
mountain troops. He holds degrees in Greek and and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Basra,
Latin Classics from Milan Catholic University, in Southern Iraq, where he was a senior police
international relations from the London School adviser to the British Consulate General and
of Economics and in public sector management mentor to the province’s Iraqi Chief of Police. In
from Brussels’ Solvay Business School. early 2005 he again assisted the FCO in devel-
oping anti-terrorist and public order policing in
Cdr. Vincenzo De Benedictis is an Italian navy Macedonia. From June 2006 to June 2007 he
officer who has worked in the Concept and was chief police adviser to the British Ambassa-
Capability Directorate of the EU Military Staff dor in Kabul, which included a six-month spell
(EUMS) since August 2012. His areas of work in Helmand Province and working alongside
include China and South-East Asia, maritime the Commanding General, Combined Security
security, human rights, gender, women, peace and Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A)
security, and mass atrocity prevention. He drafted in assisting US policy development in respect of
the EUMS concept on the protection of civilians Afghan national police reform. He joined the
in EU-led military operations. His previous expe- Royal Ulster Constabulary in October 1980 and
riences include: (a) command of two Italian mili- served in a variety of operational, training and
tary ships, (b) work at NATO (Supreme Allied staffing roles from Constable to Assistant Chief
Command Transformation – Norfolk, VA, USA) Constable rank. Mr Deane holds an honours
in the field of education and training, where he degree in public policy and management from
directed the production of joint functional area the University of Ulster and a post graduate cer-
training guides and (c) team leader, for five years, tificate in education from Canterbury Christ
of the national contributions to both the NATO Church University, Kent.
Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and the EU
Capability Development Process (CDP), at the Kinga Devenyi holds a permanent position as a
Italian Defence General Staff in Rome. training officer at the Crisis Management Centre
(CMC) in Finland, a governmental institution
Kenneth Deane was appointed EU Civilian and a centre of expertise in civilian crisis manage-
Operations Commander and Director of the ment. Currently she is seconded to the EU Inte-
EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability grated Border Management Assistance Mission in
(CPCC) in June 2013. Previous to his current Libya (EUBAM Libya) and is stationed at its head-
position he was appointed Head of Mission of quarters in Brussels. Previously she has worked at
the Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minis-
Support (EUPOL COPPS) on 1 July 2012. try of the Interior, as well as the EU Monitoring
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Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). She holds Simon Duke D.Phil. is a professor at the Euro-
a master’s degree in international relations and a pean Institute of Public Administration, a senior
bachelor’s degree in business studies. research fellow at Maastricht University, adjunct
Maj. Vicente Díaz de Villegas works as the fellow at the Federal Executive Institute (Virginia)
information operations subject matter expert in and co-editor of the Journal of European Integration.
the Current Operations/Crisis Response Plan- He has written extensively on EU external actions
ning Branch of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). and security issues. He is also actively involved in
He graduated from the general staff course at the designing and providing training programmes for
Spanish Armed Forces Centre for Superior Stud- the European External Action Service.
ies (CESEDEN) and his previous appointment
was in the Spanish Armed Forces Joint Opera- Maria Fihl works at the European External Action
tional Command (MOPS). He has an operational Service, in the Civilian Planning and Conduct
background with deployments in the Multina- Capability (Conduct of Operations Division),
tional Stabilisation Force (SFOR), twice in Kos- where she has been working on the daily conduct
ovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), in the former of European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia during Opera- Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union
tion Amber Fox, in Iraq during operation Iraqi Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Geor-
Freedom and in Lebanon for UNIFIL. gia), and lately the European Union Advisory
Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in
Lt. Col. Jerónimo Domínguez Barbero is cur- Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), since 2011. Previ-
rently serving as a seconded national expert to ously she worked for 11 years in the Balkans, with
the European External Action Service in Brus- assignments such as donor in post-conflict areas,
sels, where he is employed as an action officer in working with the UN, the International Civilian
the EUMS Concepts Branch with responsibil- Office contributing to establishing the independ-
ity for EU military rapid response. He has been ence of Kosovo, the EU Special Representative,
dealing with CSDP concepts since 2012. He as well as founding a school – the International
commenced his military career in 1988. Com- Learning Group – in Kosovo.
missioned as an air force officer (fighter pilot),
he has served as fighter instructor (23rd Wing, Dr Florika Fink-Hooijer has spent most of her
Talavera AB 1990-1993), fighter pilot (151 Sqn, career at the European Commission working on
Zaragoza AB 1993-2000), staff officer (Span- external policy matters, and in particular on cri-
ish Air Combat Command 2001-2002, 2003- sis management and conflict prevention. She is
2004), Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP) currently the Director for Strategy, Policy and
instructor (Florennes AB 2001-2003), squadron International Cooperation at the Directorate
commander (122 Sqn, Torrejón AB 2004-2008) General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protec-
and group commander (23rd Wing, Talavera AB tion. Previously she was head of the private office
2009-2012). He attended the ESDP Foundation of Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva, who was
Training in Potsdam (2007). He also attended the responsible for humanitarian aid, international
Collège Interarmées de la Défense (CID) in Paris cooperation and crisis response. At the Com-
(2008-2009) where he was certified as a manage- mission, Dr Fink-Hooijer set up the managerial
ment, command and strategy defence expert, and and financial structures for the common foreign
followed the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East and security policy and crisis management and
studies. He contributed to the Spanish Air force has been directly involved in initiating numerous
Catedra Kindelán seminar (2010) for the develop- EU police, rule of law and protection missions
ment of air concepts and doctrine in operations. in third countries. Her professional experience
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
includes the design and management of various headquarters in Brussels. He has served at the EU
conflict-prevention schemes such as instruments Delegation to the United Nations in New York
to counter the financing of terrorism, as well as and in Israel. He previously worked at the Euro-
the EU’s sanctions management in general. She pean Commission’s Directorate General for Exter-
has also negotiated for the EU in the Kimberley nal Relations, where he was in charge of election
Process Certification Scheme to curb the trade observation. Before joining the EU, Mr Giaufret
in blood diamonds and has been responsible for worked at the OSCE Office for Democratic Insti-
EU relations with Japan, Korea, Australia and tutions and Human Rights. Mr Giaufret has a
New Zealand. At the Secretariat-General of the PhD in the history of international relations from
Commission, she has gained in-depth experience the University of Florence and a master’s in Euro-
in external policy coordination, having advised pean affairs from the College of Europe in Bruges.
Commissioners Monika Wulf-Mathies and Frits
Bolkestein as a member of their private offices on Galia Glume works in the EU’s Civilian Planning
EU external policies at large as well as justice and and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in Brussels, as
home affairs/internal market matters. Dr Fink- a reporting officer for the EU Monitoring Mis-
Hooijer is German. She is a lawyer by training sion in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). Previously she
having specialised in intellectual property rights was seconded by Belgium to EUMM Georgia.
and public international law/foreign policy affairs. Between 2004 and 2011 she worked as an assis-
tant and researcher in the field of international
Mercedes García Pérez is the Head of the Opera- relations at the Université Catholique de Louvain
tions Division of the Civilian Planning and Con- (UCL). She is an expert member of the Réseau de
duct Capability (CPCC), the body of the Euro- Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (University
pean External Action Service in charge of the of Montreal) and associate researcher at the Cen-
planning and conduct of civilian CSDP operations tre d’étude des crises et des conflits internationaux
under the responsibility of the Civilian Operations (CECRI-UCL). She holds a master’s degree in
Commander. Prior to occupying her current posi- international relations (UCL) and a BA in applied
tion, she was the Head of the Europe Section of communication and journalism (IHECS).
the CPCC, and worked as a member of the plan-
ning and methodology section of the CPCC. Ms Eva Gross Ph.D. works as a senior analyst at the
García has been an EU official since 2003, and EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) where
has also worked on development and West Africa she covers CSDP, the Western Balkans, India and
issues. A lawyer by training, from 1998 to 2002 AfPak. Prior to joining the EUISS Ms Gross was a
she worked as a practising attorney in EU law in fellow at the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung in Ber-
Brussels. Until 2011, Ms García was a Member of lin, where she worked on a project on Germany in
the Academic Council of the Institut Supérieur de Europe; and senior research fellow at the Institute
Management Public et Politique. She holds a mas- for European Studies (IES) at the Free University
ter’s degree in European studies from the College of Brussels.
of Europe in Bruges and university degrees in law
and in Spanish language and literature. Canan Gündüz is a mediation adviser at the
European External Action Service. Before joining
Emanuele Giaufret is currently the Head of the EU, she helped set up the European Forum
Division for Democracy and Electoral Observa- for International Mediation and Dialogue in
tion at the European External Action Service. He 2011, where she acted as CEO, partner and board
previously worked on North Africa and the Mid- member. She is a qualified mediator, and brings
dle East at the European External Action Service a background of institutional advisory work to
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private- and public-sector clients on policies and ments abroad also included working in Vienna at
operations in conflict-affected countries, as well as the Hungarian CSCE/OSCE Mission following
peacebuilding work in South and South-East Asia. the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was part of the team
Over the last four years, she has worked on several that negotiated and implemented the CFE treaty.
EU mediation support assignments, including in
Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Joëlle Jenny is Director for Security Policy and
and Georgia. Ms Gündüz holds a BA in modern Conflict Prevention at the European External
European studies from University College Lon- Action Service. Prior to joining the European
don, a master of science degree in development External Action Service she worked successively
studies from the London School of Economics, as a Swiss and a British diplomat, covering inter-
and an MA in mediation from the European Uni- national security issues, non-proliferation/arms
versity Viadrina. She has published extensively on control, and conflict prevention and peace build-
peacebuilding, conflict analysis and mediation. ing, including at the UN. She has worked exten-
sively in Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian Terri-
Marcus Houben D.Phil. works for the European tories, and held postings in New York, Angola,
External Action Service as head of the support Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Rwanda
team for the EU 2014 Chairmanship of the Con- and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
tact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. nia. She holds a master’s degree in international
Mr Houben combines strong academic credentials security from the Fletcher School of Law and
with operational experience as a military officer. Diplomacy in Boston, USA.
Previous assignments include the strategic plan-
ning for the regional maritime capacity-building Dr Arnold Kammel is Director of the Austrian
mission EUCAP Nestor. Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES).
He studied law, European studies and politics in
Gabor Iklódy took up his duties as director of Graz, Vienna and Alcalá de Henares (Madrid).
the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate His research and publications focus on European
(CMPD) of the European External Action Service foreign, security and defence policy from a legal
in June 2014. Until September 2013, Mr Iklódy and political point of view.
had served as NATO Assistant Secretary General
for Emerging Security Challenges. He joined Radek Khol currently works in the Democracy
the NATO International Staff after 27 years of and Election Observation Division of the Euro-
national public service. Before taking up his post pean External Action Service. He worked at the
at NATO, he worked as political director and Institute of International Relations, Prague, from
state secretary in charge of multilateral and secu- 1996 until 2006 (including as head of its Centre
rity issues in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and for Security Analysis from 2001). Since 2006 he
helped prepare his country for its first EU presi- has worked in the crisis management structures
dency in the first half of 2011. Prior to that, Mr of the EU institutions, most recently in the Cri-
Iklódy served two four-year terms in Scandinavia sis Management and Planning Directorate of the
as Ambassador, first in Norway (1999-2003) and European External Action Service. He graduated
later in Sweden (2005-2009). In Budapest, he was from Department of War Studies at King’s Col-
Director General for European Political Coopera- lege London and from Department of Interna-
tion when Hungary joined the European Union tional Relations, Charles University Prague. He
in 2004 and headed the Foreign Ministry’s NATO widely published on CSDP, EU civilian crisis
and WEU Department when Hungary prepared management, NATO enlargement, security poli-
for and joined the NATO in 1999. His assign- cies, civil-military relations and missile defence.
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Morten Knudsen is a senior policy officer at the Prof. Michel Liégeois teaches international rela-
European External Action Service. Since 2013 tions, geopolitics and security studies at the Cath-
he has worked in the Crisis Management and olic University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium). He is
Planning Directorate (CMPD), in the division also head of the European branch of the research
for concepts, lessons learned and capacity devel- network on peace operations (ROP). His research
opment. Previously he worked for the European and publishing activities focus on peace opera-
External Action Service’s Multilateral Division, tions and the use of force, the regional dimension
and before that for the General Secretariat of the of peacekeeping as well as UN security council
Council of the European Union. Before joining issues.
the European Union in 1997, he was a teacher
of politics and French language and literature. Fredrik Lindblom is a seconded national mari-
He has written articles on EU-UN cooperation, time expert at the European External Action
international humanitarian law and the European Service/CPCC. He previously served as country
security strategy. team leader for EUCAP Nestor (a civilian CSDP
mission with a focus on maritime security capac-
Dr Sari Kouvo is a policy officer focusing on ity building in the Horn of Africa) in the Sey-
human rights and gender at the Partnership chelles and as liaison officer for the same mission
Division of the Crisis Management and Plan- in Tanzania. His position in Sweden is Chief of
ning Directorate (CMPD) of the European Staff for the Swedish Coast Guard Air Surveil-
External Action Service in Brussels. Prior to lance Division and he was formerly the Head
joining CMPD, Ms Kouvo served as co-director of Surveillance and Control at the Headquar-
for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), a ters of the Swedish Coast Guard. Other earlier
field-based policy research organisation focusing postings has been as site commander and project
on politics and security in Afghanistan and its manager for Sweden’s contribution to EUNAV-
region. Sari has also worked in several interna- FOR’s operation ATALANTA and responsibility
tional human rights organisations and taught for Sweden’s contribution to different missions
human rights related subjects at universities in within FRONTEX. Mr Lindblom has university
Belgium, Sweden and the UK. She holds an degrees in seamanship and maritime security,
associate professorship and a doctoral degree in senior maritime engineering and civilian basic
international law from Gothenburg University law. He has also has a degree as a law enforce-
and has published extensively on gender, human ment officer within the coast guard and police
rights and Afghanistan. structures in Sweden.
Jozef Kozlowski Ph.D. currently works for the Dr Gustav Lindstrom is the Head of the Emerg-
Polish Ministry of National Defence in War- ing Security Challenges Programme at the Geneva
saw. From 2011 until 2014 he was seconded to Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). Previously, he
the European External Action Service/European headed the GCSP’s Euro-Atlantic Security Pro-
Union Military Staff in Brussels. He holds an gramme and was the Director of the European
M.Sc. degree in electronics from the Military Training Course. Dr Lindstrom received his doc-
Technical University in Warsaw and a Ph.D. torate in Policy Analysis from the RAND Gradu-
in social sciences from the Warsaw’s National ate School and an MA in international policy
Defence University. His publications focus on studies from Stanford University. Prior to his time
issues of management in the information envi- at the GCSP, Dr Lindstrom served as a senior
ronment of national and international security/ research fellow at the EU Institute for Security
defence structures. Studies (EUISS). His areas of interest and exper-
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tise include the European common security and Michal Narojek worked for the Polish Minis-
defence policy (CSDP), emerging security chal- try of the Interior. He was seconded to Poland’s
lenges, non-proliferation and disarmament, and Permanent Representation to the EU where he
cyber security. served as Justice and Home Affairs Counsellor.
He also served as a national seconded expert in
Snowy Lintern has over 25 years professional the General Secretariat of the Council of the
experience in military operations and crisis man- EU dealing with judicial cooperation in crimi-
agement, including service in Iraq and Afghani- nal matters. In 2010 he joined Europol. He is
stan, warship command, and six years at the politi- responsible for the Agency’s external relations,
cal strategic level in the EU. Currently he works including cooperation with the European Exter-
for the European External Action Service/Crisis nal Action Service. He holds master’s degrees in
Management and Planning Directorate in Brus- law and international relations. He is an alum-
sels. He has developed and written extensively nus of the George C. Marshall European Centre
on transition strategies in an EU/CSDP context, for Security Studies and of the European Secu-
ensuring policy development is coherent with the rity and Defence College.
aspirations of other EU Institutions and Member
States. He holds two master’s degrees in widely dif- José-Miguel Palacios (ES) has been head of the
fering fields: international relations (King’s College Analysis Division at the EU Intelligence Analysis
London) and applied oceanography (University of Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External
Plymouth). Action Service in Brussels since September 2011.
He joined the EU Situation Centre (renamed
Birgit Loeser has been an EU official since 2001. EU INTCEN in 2012), which was part of the
She is currently Deputy Head of Division/Head General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, as
of the Planning and Methodology Section within an analyst in 2006. He previously worked for the
the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Spanish government from 1986 in several ana-
(CPCC) of the European External Action Service, lytical roles. Mr Palacios holds a Ph.D. in poli-
in charge of leading all planning efforts for civilian tics and is the author of ‘Transición democrática
CSDP missions. Before this, she was the CPCC’s postcomunista: democratización y estatalidad en
acting Head of Operations Unit and Head of the la Unión Soviética y en Yugoslavia’ (Post-Com-
Africa Section. Before the setting-up of the CPCC, munist democratic transition: democratisation
she was a member of the Police Unit of the former and statehood in the Soviet Union and in Yugo-
DGE9/EU Council Secretariat. She also worked in slavia) (2003). He is fluent in English, French,
DGE8 on military ESDP operations. From 2005 Russian and Serbian (Croatian, Bosnian).
to 2006 she was seconded to the UK Ministry
of Defence where she worked on UK policy and Annemarie Peen Rodt Ph.D. is Associate Pro-
defence relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. Before fessor in Global Studies at Roskilde University
becoming an EU official, Ms Loeser worked for in Denmark. Her research appraises the role of
five years in the Political Affairs Division of the regional actors like the European Union in con-
Western European Union (WEU). Ms Loeser flict prevention, management and resolution,
holds a master’s degree in politics from both the currently focusing in particular on the protec-
Freie Universität Berlin and the Institut d’Etudes tion of civilians, the responsibility to protect,
Politiques de Paris. and the prevention of mass atrocities. Her recent
monograph, ‘The European Union and Military
Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and
Achieving Success’, published by Routledge in
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
2014, proposes measures for benchmarking and previous posts included press officer in Iraq and
impact assessment with regard to CSDP missions the Balkans. Previously he was Chief of the Air
and operations. Staff at UNIFIL mission in Lebanon and chief
of the press office of EUFOR Althea. He is also
Col. Michael Pesendorfer is the Austrian a journalist.
Defence Attaché to Bosnia and Herzegovina and
a career officer. After graduation from the The- Dr Jochen Rehrl formerly worked for the Aus-
resan Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt he trian Ministry of Defence and Sports. Currently,
served as a platoon leader, company commander he is seconded to the European External Action
and chief of staff in an elite mountain battalion of Service/European Security and Defence College
the Austrian Armed Forces. After he finished his in Brussels. His previous posts include political
law studies at Salzburg University he joined the adviser both in Vienna and Brussels. He holds
Army Higher Administrative and Legal Service. three master’s degrees – in economics, interna-
He served in the European Union Military Staff tional relations and journalism – from the Uni-
in Brussels, in EU civil missions and in several EU versities of Salzburg and Vienna and from the
and NATO military operations as legal adviser as Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. His publications
well as political adviser to the commander. focus on foreign and security policy from a legal
and political point of view.
Sofie Rafrafi works as an independent senior con-
sultant in sustainable capacity building activities Victor Reuter is spokesperson of the Head of Mis-
in the broad area of civilian crisis management. sion in EUAM Ukraine. Previously, he worked in
Previously, from 2013-2014 she was seconded various media related positions both in missions
by Belgium for two years to the EUCAP Sahel and capitals. He was ‘directeur d’antenne’ of RTL
Niger mission, as the head of the Sustainability Tele Lëtzebuerg, director of ELDORADIO and
Policies Unit of the Operations Department. journalist for the Belgian Press Agency BELGA
Between 2005 and 2012 she worked for the and RTL radio. He studied journalism and com-
Egmont Institute, spending five of those years as a munication.
senior training programme manager. She has been
the President of the Belgian Euro-Atlantic Youth Wolfgang Röhrig is the Programme Manager
association. She won the prize of the Minister of Cyber Defence of the European Defence Agency
Foreign Affairs with her thesis and holds a master’s (EDA). After completing the University of the
degree from the VUB in International Relations. Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg as MBA he
served in several officer positions in the German
Giovanni Ramunno is a colonel in the Italian Navy and Joint Services. Since the mid 1990’s
Army Aviation where he worked as a helicopter he was specialised in communications and infor-
pilot and a press officer. Currently, he is sec- mation systems. In March 2012 he joined the
onded to the European Union Military Com- EDA and became programme manager for cyber
mittee in Brussels as a military assistant to the defence on the beginning of 2014. Inter alia he is
Chairman for Public Information/Relations. responsible for the identification of cyber defence
Giovanni has gained a broad operational experi- capability gaps and the development and imple-
ence as a military officer in more than ten years mentation of solutions.
spent abroad working for the EU, NATO, the
OSCE and the UN. In 1998 he was accredited Lt. Col. Jean-Philippe Scherer is Branch Chief in
to the Italian Embassy in Belgrade and started the European Union Operations Centre. He is an
the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission. His active officer in the French Air Force. As a fighter
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ANNEXES
pilot, he was engaged in major operations in the and fight against corruption. Raluca Stefanuc
Middle East, Africa and Central Europe. He has holds an LL M in European law from King’s Col-
been a flight commander, an evaluator at NATO, lege London.
experimental test pilot for Rafale and chief of air
sensors operations. A War College graduate, he Petteri Taitto is training manager at the ESDC
holds a Master of Business Administration (HEC with the responsibility to lead CSDP mission and
Paris) and an engineering degree in Aeronautics operation support and cooperation with other
and Space Systems (IS AE-SUPAER O). civilian training stakeholders. He has previously
worked as project leader and head of training at
Lt. Col. Evert-Jan Slootman MD Dr M.Sc. the Crisis Management Centre Finland, princi-
works for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence. pal instructor at the Emergency Services College
Currently, he is seconded, as a medical expert, and teacher at the National Defence College. He
to the European External Action Service/Euro- is EU Civil Protection coordination expert and a
pean Union Military Staff in Brussels. His pre- member of EU Civilian Response Team (CRT).
vious posts included Medical Coordination and He holds a Master of Education and a General
Plans Officer and Medical Operations Officer at Staff Officer degree.
NATO – SHAPE, Belgium. He holds a master’s
degree in community medicine and epidemiol- Col. Paul van der Heijden is currently the Chief
ogy. His publications focus on applied research on of the Force Capability Branch of the EU Mili-
preventive measures for deployed military person- tary Staff (EUMS). He is a colonel of the Royal
nel. Netherlands Air Force and has served in sev-
eral national and international positions, most
Kees Smit Sibinga has been on a secondment recently in the Netherlands Air Force HQ as Act-
as senior policy officer to the Security Policy and ing Chief of Cabinet and as Head of Management
Sanctions Division of the European External Development. He was also military assistant to
Action Service since 2011. He previously worked the NATO Secretary General and NATO’s Mili-
in various positions at the Dutch Foreign Min- tary Liaison Officer to the United Nations in New
istry and Embassies abroad, including as deputy York. Amongst other assignments he was Com-
Head of Mission. Mr Smit Sibinga holds a degree mander of the Netherlands Air Force Training and
in modern history and international law from Lei- Military Leadership Squadron and he served as a
den University, the Netherlands. UN military observer.
Raluca Stefanuc works as anti-corruption pol- Victoria Walker is the deputy head of DCAF’s
icy desk at the European Commission’s Support International Security Sector Advisory Team
Group for Ukraine. Previously, she was the coor- (ISSAT), where she has worked extensively on
dinator of anti-corruption policies within Direc- security and justice development in Sub-Saharan
torate-General Home Affairs of the European Africa, the Balkans, Latin America and the Carib-
Commission between December 2010 and March bean, and South East Asia. Her previous EU expe-
2014. Prior to this, Raluca Stefanuc had worked rience includes the EU planning team for EULEX
for two years in the EU Delegation in Skopje, Kosovo, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and the
covering the fields of fight against corruption and EU Monitoring Mission in Albania. She also held
organised crime. Before taking up the assignment a commission in the British Army. Victoria holds
in the EU Delegation in Skopje, she had worked master’s degrees in Development Management
for five years in the Romanian Ministry of Justice, and Social Sciences.
dealing with issues related to judiciary reforms
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
Dr Richard Winkelhofer is a rule of law adviser Lt. Gen. Wolfgang Wosolsobe started his mili-
in the Civilian Planning Conduct Capability tary career in 1974. After several assignments as
(CPCC) within the European External Action an infantry officer he attended the General Staff
Service. He holds a master’s degree in Business Officers Course of the Austrian Armed Forces
Administration and a Doctorate degree in Law. (1982-1985) followed by a post as defence plan-
He has been working in the Austrian judiciary ner. He completed his education at France’s ‘École
from 1995, starting full-time practice as a judge in Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées’ and the ‘Cours
2000. From 2008 to 2010 he served for the Rule Supérieur Interarmées’. In 1991, he joined the
of Law mission EULEX Kosovo, as the President Austrian Diplomatic Mission in Geneva as a mili-
of the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of tary adviser on disarmament. His international
Kosovo on Kosovo Trust Agency Related Matters. career continued with his assignment as Defence
Prior to joining the European External Action Attaché to France from 1992 to 1997. After a
Service in 2014, he was then Head of the Justice command period he went on to deal with military
Department in the Permanent Representation of policy, which led him to the post of Defence Pol-
Austria to the EU. icy Director in 2006. From there, he joined Brus-
sels as Austrian Military Representative in 2007.
In 2012, he was elected to the post of Director
General of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as of
28 May 2013.
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ANNEXES
List of abbreviations
A C
ACO Allied Command Operations C2 Command and Control
ACT Allied Command Transformation C34 Special Committee on Peace-
ADL Advanced Distance Learning keeping Operations
AFD French Development Agency CA Comprehensive approach
AFISMA African-led International Support CAR Central African Republic
Mission in Mali CARICOM Caribbean Community
AFRICOM United States Africa Command CB Confidence-Building
AIES Austria Institute for European and CBCR Country-by-country reporting
Security Policy CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological
AMA Agreement on Movement and and Nuclear
Access CCS Capability Codes and Statements
AMANI- CTC Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
Africa EU training and exercise pro- (EU)
gramme supporting the African CDIP Concept Development Implemen-
Union’s capacity to manage and tation Programme
deploy the African Standby Forces CDP Capability Development Plan
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan CEPOL European Police College
AMISOM African Mission in Somalia CERT Computer Emergency Response
AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission Team
APIC Agreement on Privileges and CEUMC Chairman of the Military Committee
Immunities of the International CfC Call for Contribution
Criminal Court CFSP Common Foreign and Security
APSA African Peace and Security Policy
Architecture CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation
APT Advanced Persistent Threat CIVCAS Civilian Casualties
ARF Regional Forum of the Associa- CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of
tion of Southeast Asian Nations Crisis Management
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian CivOpsCdr Civilian Operations Commander
Nations CLS Combat Life Support
ASPR Austria Study Centre for Peace CMC Crisis Management Concept
and Conflict Resolution CMO Crisis Management Operation
AU African Union CMP Crisis Management Procedures
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning
Directorate
B CNO Computer Network Operations
BG Battle Group CP Conflict Prevention
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina CoC Code of Conduct
BP Barcelona Process CoE Council of Europe
CoE Centre of Excellence
Col Colonel
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa
CONOPS Concept of Operations
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HANDBOOK ON CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
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Mil PI/PR Military Public Information/Public ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions
Relations and Human Rights
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional OHQ Operation(s) Headquarters
Integrated Stabilisation Mission OLAF European Anti-fraud Office
in Mali OpCdr Operation Commander
MIP Mission Implementation Plan OPLAN Operation Plan
MISCA/ OPSEC Operations Security
AFISM-CAR African-led International Support OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-
Mission in the Central African operation in Europe
Republic OVI Objectively Verifiable Indicator
MMA Monitoring, Mentoring and
Advising
MNE Multinational Experiment P
MoDS Ministry of Defence and Sports PA Public Affairs
(Republic of Austria) PbP Peace-building Partnership
MoI Ministry of the Interior PC Progress Catalogue
MoU Memorandum of Understanding PD Public Diplomacy
MPA Military Public Affairs PFCA Political Framework for Crisis
MPE Myanmar Police Force Approach
MRRC Military Rapid Response Concept PIR Prioritised Intelligence
MS Member State(s) Requirements
MSO Military Strategic Options PPIO Press and Public Information
MST Mediation Support Team Officer
MSU Mission Support Unit PMG Politico-Military Group
MTIC Missing Trader Intra-Community PMSC Private Military and Security
Fraud Companies
MV Means of Verification POC Protection of Civilians
PSC Political and Security Committee
PsyOps Psychological Operations
N
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer R
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process RC Requirement Catalogue
NEAR Directorate-General for Neigh- RELEX Working Party of Foreign Rela-
bourhood Policy and Enlargement tions Counsellors
Negotiation RoE Rules of Engagement
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation RoL Rule of Law
NSC Nuclear Safety Cooperation RTD Research and technological
development
RR Rapid Response
O RSOM Rapid Staging and Onward
OAS Organisation of American States Movement
OC Orientation Course RUoF Rules for the Use of Force
OCG Organised Crime Groups
OCHA Office for the Coordination of
S
Humanitarian Affairs
SADC Southern African Development
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-
Community
operation and Development
SAR Search and Rescue
ODA Official Development Assistance
SASE Safe and Secure Environment
(OECD)
Satcen EU Satellite Centre
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Jochen Rehrl, Galia Glume (eds): HANDBOOK ON MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK
MISSIONS
AND OPERATIONS