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Profissional Documentos
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DDI-1100-77
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,.P*,r!r, ioPy
THE SOVIET
MOTORIZED
RIFLE COMPANY
ocToBER1976
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This document was Fepared by Major Robert M. Frasch6 of the Tactics and
Organization Section, Ground Forc€s[vlBFR Branch, Soviet/WarsawPact Dvision,
Drcctorate for Inteligenc€ (ResearchCenter), and is releasedfor publication by
authodty of the Drector, Defens€lnteligenc€ Agency.
{;ffifW,
cott{tYl,$nAlr
Ml[.rNotvrAs
\o PREFACE
This study war *rittcn for the us€ of serviceschoolsandfor unit inteligence officeF
,s an aid in pr$€nting classeson the organization,biining, tactics,atrdequipm€ntofthe
motodz€drifle company.
Th€ material presert€d on unit organlzationshould be u!€d as a guide or y. Soviet
organizationsvary widely d€p€ndingupon thetr manninglevels,weaponsand equipm€nt
mix,locatton andother factors. Dff€rencesin squadarmam€nt,capabilities,andnumben
of men per .rmor€d penonnel carrter (APC) exist betweenunits. Although old€r APC'S
are dbcu$ed, this study concentrrtespdmarily on the BMP€quipp€dmotorized dfle
comp8nies,sincethey gobably representthe d€sir€dst ndard-
The list of Sovietsymbolsusedmey be found in Appendix I.
Corunents, correctionsand suggestionsfor improvementof this study are requested.
They slrculd be sent thmugh proper channelsto the DefenseIntelligenc€Agercy, Cround
Forc€s/MBFRBranch,ATTN: DB-1B4, Washington,D.C.20301.
)o
lio l
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
l lhis study examinesSovietoffcnsiveand defensive doctrineand the orSanistion,
training,racticsand cquiprnentof the Sovietmotorizedritle company.Emphasisis
placedon tlrc comp,rny equipped with the infantrycombalvehicle(BMP).Themotorized
rifle companyis organized, trainedandcquippcdprimrily fol a wal of rapidmovemcnl
and short durltion. Maneuverduringtacticaloperationsis restdctcdto wcil-rchcrn€d
combal formrtions and is oficn dictated by hisher authodty. Tactical doctrin€
cmph-asizes offensiveaction-Coordination of fire andmovement is practiccd, but usually
in clo!.ly regulated exercises.During operatioff, riflemen Sencrallyremain in lfteir
personnel calriersuntil conionted with seriousanti-rrmorfire, thendismounlto assaolt
positionswith supportfrom tanks,artillery,mortan,andt}lcil own pcrsonnel carriers.
2. Motorizedrine companyofficcrsreceive extensive professional andpoliticaltrainingin
schools,but areSivenlittlc opportunityto exercise initiativeandlackcombalexperience,
Conscripts rcceive prc-induction tmining prior to being assigncd to deir units.Although
th€ effectivcncss of pre'induction trainingis uneven, it has shown improvement in somc
,Jcas and may eventually provide cons(ripts with the n€c€ssarybasic military skills
befor€ they enter the army. About half of th€ consc.ipts,including sergea'tsand APC
crew members, rcccivesix montl$ specialisttrainingbeforethey reportto their units.
Other conscriptslcam thcir duties by repetitiveon-the-jobtrainmg and are not
cross{rained. The lrainingprognm lrnddhciplinarymearure!produccsoldienwho can
perforn their duticsadequately. Thcy arenol expectedto exercise initiaiivc.Tiaining,
andhenceindividualandunil effectiveness, aredegadedby thc lacl tlut conscnpbserve
only two ycars.Ncwtroopsarerotatcdinto unitssemi-annuauy.
3. Equipmentof thc motorizedriile companyprovidestlrc mems neededto conduct
r-o operationsand successfullyaccomplishlikely missions.Tlrc htroduction of the BMP is
lhe most significantrecentimprovemenlin the companytequipffenldnd consrderably
incrcascs its firepower.Shortcomings ofcompanycquipmcntinclude:
a. Squadleade$,whendisrnounted from th€irpenonnclcarriers, haveno radios.
b- Radiosavailablc to platoonleaders in dismounled operations hav€limitcdrange.
c- ThemaingunoI the BMPdoesnor havc stabilizer.
d Saggerantitank guided missilcsclnnol be effectivelyfired at night Mthout
illumination.
4. Sovietmotorind rinc companies, particularlythoseequippedwith BMPS, arecapable
of conductingeffectivccombatoperations. Althoughsomequalitativedeficicncies exist
in trainhg,equipmcntdndofganization, the Sovietsapparendy considcrtllal quantitative
superiorityis adequ,rte compensation.
?l
flo TABLEOF CONTENTS
THESOVIETMOTORIZED
RIFLECOMPANY
P.rr
Prcfacc iii
ExecutiveSunrJn{y
Tableof Corrcnts
List of Figur€s
Introduction xin
CHAPTERI, PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING
CHAPTER2.
Sectionl.
[.
I[.
v.
CTIAPTER3. HIGTIERLINITS 1l
f\l CTIAPIER4.
SectionI.
TIIE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANY
G e D e r.a. l. . . . . . . . . . . . .-.--------- r'1
II. M i s s i o r. s. . . . . . . . . . . . ....-....... l?
llt. O r g r n i z a t ,i o. .n. . . . . . . ............17
lv. E q u i p n e n. .t . . . . . . . . . ..........,. 20
C o m m a na dn dC o n t r o. .l .-.-.---. --- 2l
\{. A d m i n i s t r a tai o nn dS u p p l y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -........... 28
CHA?TER5. MOTORIZEDRIFLECOMPANYTRATNNG
SectionL I n t r o d u c t i.o. n. . . . . . . . -...........3l
[. W e a p oanns dE q u i p m eTnrta j n i n.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3l
llt. M o r a l P o l i t i cTarl a i n i n g ...........3?
IV. chemical Eiological & Radiological Training ,....-........ 38
I a n dN a v i g a t i.o. n. . . . . ...-........38
VI. PhysicalTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vlI. J u n i oO r f f i c earn dN C OT r a i n i n. g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --.... -.... 40
YII. Tactica.lTraining . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 41
'IIIE Plce
CIIAPIER 7. MOTORZEDRIFLE PLATOON
S e c t i oI n. Introductlon .........,.......-..... s5
lI. M o v e m etnotC o n t a c. .t . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . 55
IIL Fornations. - . . . - -..-......---..... 57
lV. OFensiA v ec t i o t r .. . .... ... .... .... . 60
V. Dcfensive Action ... .. . ... . .. .. . .. . . 6l
Appcndix€s
l . L i s to f s y m b o l s . . . . . ...............,123.\24
II. A TypeCareer Patt€min BasicCombatDuty itr Peacetim€. . . - -.... 125
I T I . ( X f i c eAr g eL i m i t a t i o n. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . - . - - . - . - - . . - 1 2 7
I
fio LIST OF FIGURES
page
r . 7 3 m mR c c o ei s s G uS n P C - g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b . M a n p a cAkT G MS e tS a g g (eAr T - 3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - t5
c- l20mmmortar ....-.........-...-- 15
1 6 .T h cm o t o r i z er d i f l ec o m p n n( yB M P € q u i p p e.d. .). . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . , . . 18
t 1 Principle weaponsof thc BMP and/or BTR€quippedmororizcd rifle
c o m p a n r e. -s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . , , . , , . . . . 19
a. 7.62nrm g€neral purposc machinegun, Kalashnikov (PK) .........Ie
b. 7.62nrmlight rnaclincgun,Kalashnikov (RPK)
c. 7.62mmmod€rntedrinc Kalashnikov (AKM) l9
18.
I9
ro tx
Page
Figure 20. P c r s o nCaB l Rp r o t e c t i 8v e e:u ........-..,...... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
a. ShMmask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
b. St*lS mask. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 23
c. OP.f proiectiv€coat-overall. . - . . . - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . . 23
d . I n d i v i d udael c o n t a m i n aktiito,InP P. . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , , . - . . . 2 1
21. Sunner and winter licld uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 24
22. F i e l dC o m b apta c ka n da c c o u t r e m e n. .t.s. . . . . . - - - - . . . - - - - - - . . - - - . . u
23. R-ll3 vehicularrldio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2s
24. R-123vehicularradtowith intercomunit . . . . . . . . - - . . , . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 26
25. R - 1 2 6m a n p a cr ka d i o ... -............. -...25
26. Th€ R-105ard Rlo? railios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
21. Reprcsentativc radionet ofa motorizedrifle company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
28. S o l d i eena t i nign t h cf i € l d .. ....... . .. ..... .29
D . hcliminary w€aponstraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
30. Trdningin firing from an APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .32
3 1 . A n t i t a ntkr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . . . . . .- . . . 3 3 , 3 4
A T C M( S a g S ct ar )i n i n g . - -...... -...... -...3s
33. SA-7(SAM) tnining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
34. Snip€r training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
35. Political indoctination session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3?
36. C B Rt r a i n i n g ..............,............ - 3E
37. Ch€micslrecormaissance personncl preparhgfor an op€ration . .. . . - . . -. 38
38. Traffic regulator
39. Physical fitnesstraining
. . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . 39
.,. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .,. 39
rifl€ squad . . . . . . . . . . . - . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 43
I
40. Thc BTR-equipped
4 t . Exiting the BMP . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 44
42. BMPSsupportinSsquadsby lre . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Tank'borneinfantry in t]€ attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 45
44. Squadon a night reconnaissance mission . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 46
45. S q u a ad s s a ul il nt c ..... -...... -.. -,...... -46
46. A t t a c k i nf gr o ma p o s i t i oinn c f o s ceo n t a c -t . . . . . . . - - . , . . - - - . . . . . . - - . 4 7
4 7 .SquadG)negotiatinga mircfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
48. The squaddef€nsive positionprcparedwith engineer support . . .. . . .. . ..52
49. Th€ MDK-2 ditching machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
50. The squadffte plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 53
5 1 .Themotorized rifleplatoon(BMP€quipped) ... .... . .. . ... . .. . . .. . ..55
52. Th€motorized rifl€platoonattackinS bchindl,nks -...-..- - -.- -..-...56
5 3 .M o t o r i z eddf l ep l a t o ofno r m a t i o (nms o u n t e d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 58
54. Motorizedrifl€ platoonforrnations(disnounted) . .. . . .. . .. . . .,. . .. . . - 59
5 5 .The platoon def€nsiveposition . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A reinforced motorized rifle company as the adidce guard of the
b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 65
5 7 .Thc company commanderof a reinforced motorized riflc company con.
ductingreconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
58. Organizationof a battalion march h anticipation of a meeting engagement66
59. A n S A - 7 g u m € r
in firiru p o s i t i o n
............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 8
I
,"r'!
paSe
Fisure
6 0 . C B Ru n i tc o n d u c t i d ne g c o n t a m i n adt iuorni n a ghar. ................ .68
61. A feinforcedmotorizedriflc battalionconductinga meetingengaSem€nt. 71
62. Thereinforced motodzed rifl€battalion in the defens€........... -.... 76
63. The rnotorizedrillc cornpanystrongpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6 4 . G T - Sa n dG T S Mv e h i c l e .s- - . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - --... -. 84
65. Motorizedrifl€ companyconnanderconductingreconnaissance with sub-
o r d i n a taen da t t a c h ec do n m . n d e r s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - 8 s
6 6 . T a n k tso w i n ign f a n t r y ..................... 86
5 7 . T a n l ( - b o ri n e f a n t rayt t a c k i ni ngw i n t e r. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6 8 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p isn a w i n t edr e f e n s ipvoes i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 87
6 9 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p tsf a i n i ni gn t } I ed e s e r .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,89
70. Reinforced motorized riflebattalion attacking i. the descri -.... -...... 90
71. Reinforced motorizedrifle bathlion attackingin forest€dswampyterain . e2
72.76rnm m o u n t a gi nu n M , 1966............ .............. 94
7 3 . M o t o r i z cr d
i f i et r o o ptsr a i n h g i n t h em o u n l a i n .s. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . es
74. Motonzed rinecompany attacking in mountainoN terrain ..........-.. 96
75. Themururvedrinecompan)in dc defense in mounruuusrerrm ...... 98
7 6 . E x e r c i s" D
e n e p a1' 9 6 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - -.... -.... -.... - 99
77- K'61 and PTStrackedamphibious cericrs unloadingassaulttroops . . . . . r01
78. A reinforced motorized ifle battrtionforcinga waterbarrier .... -..... 102
79. Reinforcedmotodzedrifle battrlion defending a riverbanl . ... . ..... . 704
8 0 . C o m b a t - i n d ttiaecst i c e a xl c r c i s.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . -... -..... 106,10?
fso 81. The rcinforcedmolorizcdrifle companyin the attackin a builfup arca 108
82.Mi4 Hound .. -.... lll
8 3 . M i - 6H o o k ... --.... 111
8,4M . i - 8H i p .......... 111
8 5 . M i - 1 0H a r k e ....... 111
8 6 . M i 1 2H o m e r ................. -......... 1r1
8 7 . M i - lH a r e ---..--.. rt2
8 8 . M i - 2H o p l i t e .......112
89. Mi-24Hind A . . _. . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . _. I 13
90. Helicoptcr mockuptrainingdevice .......... 1i4
9 1 . t R s i g h t i nsgy s . c mm, o d eNi S P - 2 . . - - . . - . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - 116
9 2 . S o v i emt o d ePl P N - l2R s i g h t i nsgy s t e m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 116
93. Comrnande I Rr 'ps c r i l e l e s c m
o pocd cTl K N - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rr1
9 4 - C h a r a c t e r i sotfiscosm ei l l u m i n a t i d oe n v i c c .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.. 11?
9 5 . M o t o r i z er idf l ec o m p a ni n y a n i g h at t t a c k. . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . 1 1 8
96. Possible chxnges in lhe night defensive system of a motorned rifle
b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
xl
INTRODUCTION
x tt l
CHAPTER1. PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING
1. General
The pcrsonnel makeup of rhe motorized rifie company effective as suggestedin officiai statcments.Only career
typifics rhe human elementin tie Soviet gound lbrccs enlistedand officer personnel,who havea vcstcdintcresl
(fieLre I). Th. rypicd muro[,ed rllc conpan) i. in the mi1itary, appear to react favorably to the
conrposedprimdily of conscripts,carccr cniistcd nren indoctrination- Conscdpts are generally unenilusiasric
and office.s constituting a srnal perccnlagc01 th€ total dd, to somedegree,irntated by the training.
strength.Nomally, the majorily ofofficers are members
of thc Comnunisr Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)or r. r.e-rnoudron r rarntnq
the Young Coinnunist League (Komsomol). Most en- Theoretically, the eniisted personneiof the motorizcd
iisled men arc Party or Konsomol membe6 or belongto ritlc company reccivcnilitary training prior to entenng
a subsidiary organization. All evidencethe advrntagcs service.The 1967 law governingnilitary servicein rhe
and disadvantages of Sovict political and military sys- USSR requirespre-induction training for all malesand
tems. These systemsinvolvc continuous,but not neces- o r e { n b e , a ( o m p r e h e n s r vceo u r s eo t i n s l r u r . u o-r- u p
sarily effective, political indoctrinalioni comprehensive. to 140 hou6 ofclassroomwork -in addition to training
b u r u n e t e n l \ i m p l " T e l r e d . p r e - . n J u c L i ornr " i n i . r gp r n with weaponsand equiprnent.'The pros.am, beginning
gramsi and gener.lty adequatcactive duty training. On in the ninlh gade. is unevenlyconductedin schoolsand
balance,soldien shrpcd by these systemsappearto be traini g ccnteB throughout the USSR (Figurc 2).
polirically reliableand capableof performingeffectively, Aflcr 1967, fie USSRreemphasized pre-inductiontfain
although with limited initiatjve at battalion level and ing to compensarefor the rcduction ofconscript se.vice
from three to two yea6. It appeaB,however,that thc
requirementis not uniformly appliedro all individuals,
probably becauseof a lack offacilities in somearcas.As
jt now operates, the program provides most Sovicl
youths with rudimentary military skills, bu1 cannot
. o n p l e r e l y c o m p e n \ a r et o r d r c d u c r o n o l o 1 e y e J r I n
activeduty training time.
Specialisttraining. commencingal agc 17, is the respon
sibility of the AI'Union Volunlary Sociely for Coopera'
tion with tlre Army, Avialion 8nd Fleel (DOSAAF) and
ofthe vocarionaischoolsysicm(Fisure 3).
2. PoliticalTrainingand Control
Thc company is ihc lowcsi cchclon at which a political
officer functions. The politicJl officer, whose cliain of
command is s€pafateand €xtends to the Main Political
Directorateof the Ministry ofDefense,is responsiblefor
political hdoctrination and for ensuringloyalty to the
civilian leadership.He conducts poiilical lraining, pri-
marily in the form of lectufes. and monitors company
actilities for indicationsof dissent.Th€ arnountof time
<= \l-
<.r_____1
\fi- Y;-
Iq
2, FoMard doi.chmsnl
W
#-.ffi
,-\ Mororizedril e companyin rhe dere.se
Figure7. Deplovmenr
ol un ls lrom the ineol marcninroa meeLing
engagement.
a
/r IET
1, Sovi€r first €ch.lon lorc.. achi.ving 6 br6Ekthrcughlnd holdlng the 3houlde6 op€. tor tuther p€nd.Etion
an l srplohlrbn by ..cond 6h6lon 1orc..,
Figure8. Thebr€akthrough.
. o
E )-e"'ffflJ,T3:ff-i-":,".x?'i" | |
-E.'1*.r*-e^r^"L -r.'-
.^-,.-- - J",.,t**,"",
p,-1,:^'^*-"^*"i' I )oEA i
_p....-r.',13":)R*--+::"-*,{i,r*
-*-AJJ"i[hT^.^| |
-
J--.,-,#;-"i:L
E C O M P A NA\ n A C r
- --r'\-'.
-aOr\rACr
---\J- . ---l"\- . --\J
J
. r---aL . --\J-
IJ
. ---l'\L.
I \
--l'-L --
I
-_F. D v sto\ 7o\r
E---\J-
o'A''oN
E (
S. OOUBLE
ENVETOPMENT
WIIH FRONTAL
ATTACK
!9!c
A n e n v e l o p m e n t n 6 y b e s i n g l e o r d o u b l € , 6 h a l lhom
w.oyr6d1e3e0pb. s
accompanisd by! lronral.lrackd€ion.dto "lit"enemy forc.s.
Figure11. Basicforms
of maneuver,
SectionI ll. T H E D E F E N S E
a
SectionlV, WITHDRAWAL
l0
3 . H I G H E RU N I T S
CHAPTER
!aI!
a rifleregiment(BMP-equipped).
Figure12. Themotorized
tl
r-62
c. ATGMlauncher
vehicleAT-3.
13
MOTORI2EO
C O M M I J N I C AOTN S
MAINTENANCE
!9rq
For a lsr ol th€ n!mbers 6nd iypes ol perconne.nd equpmenr ar baxalion,sse lS) SovrerGo!nd Forces
r u ' d eI L J ' D
O r g a n ? d n oG . D l l l 0 O2 . 7 5d a r e oJ u r . 1 9 7 , , .
Figure14. Themotorized
riflebattalion
IBMP-equipped).
. t. Jf*'
IF
l4
:,,'!'
b. lManpackATGlvlSet Sagger(AT-3).
i c. 120mm
mortar.
I
CHAPTER4. THE MOTORIZEORIFLECOMPANY
Sectionl. General
20. Tlc motorizcdiflc companicsoI the mobnzed detachments), whcrcasthe latter does.The company
nfle battalionare organized on the tridngularconcePt headquarlenof the BTRaquippedcompanyis smaller
with threemotorized nfle platoons, €achcomposed of a than the BMP-€quipped h€adquarten.Squadstrength
platoonheadquaners ed three rifle squads. vanesfron 6-11 men, althoughwe believethc desired
standard is 8 mcn in the BMP€quippedunits. Squad
21. The organizalionand equipmentfound in motor- armament also varics, with the BMP+quippedsquads
ued nne compnnieslaries.dependin8
on lhe rypecarricr bcing morc hcavily armcd. Moreover,within the BMP-
they hav€ and the numb€r of troops available.Thc equipp€dcompanies, tholc squadsposs€ssing
the initial
BMPaquippcdmotorizedrifle companyhasone more modelBMP-Iwil havcone RPK light machinegunand
man tlan the BTR€quippedconrpanyand doesnot oneAKM pcr squadin lieu of the two PK machincguns
hive r m3chinetsun serrion (two PK machincSun found in the later model ot the BMP.
Sectionlll. ORGANIZATION
23. The organizationand maj{xitcns of equipnentof plus rine enlistcdmen (thc first serscant,messcngcr/
the BMP.cquipped motoriz€driflc companyareshown companyclerk, nredic,communications specialist,a
in Figures16.18. three-manSA-7 Team, and the BMP crerv members
d. The companyheadquartcrs coflsistsof the com- (driverard sunner).
panycommander, politicalofficer,and tcchnicalofficer ,. The nfle platoon consislsof a plaroonhcad-
quartersandttucc riflesquads.
MOTOFIZ€D
HEADOUAFIEBS
EOUIPMENT
25(15t
62€Ot
7.@mms.ip.r rill.. SVO 3
7.62mm GProchinegun, PKM 20 t2l
Anftanl gr6n.d€l.unch6r,RPG-7 9
SAM,{SA-7,GFAttlg.ip6rockl 3
Armorod pe@.nd @rier,aMP-A 10 tot
1
R,t13/B-123 t0
4,r26
NOTES
1, Fisu6 in par€.rhesc repre*nr rh€ dilt.Gnc$ in nomb.6 ol peMnnd, equipmentand *apons tound in lhd
ATR.equipp€d moroizedine comFny.
t8
,l
c. 7.62mmmodernized
rifleKalashnikov
{AKM). d. Anti-tankgrenade (RPG,7)
launcher
ft
e. 7.62mmsemiautomatic
sniperrifle, f. 9mm pistol,lvlakarov
{PM).
(SVD).
Dragunov
FigurelT.PrincipleweaponsoftheBl!,lPand/orBTBequippedmotorizedriflecompanies.
rl 19
a. BTR50. b. BTRM.
d, BMP,
c. BTR 152.
20
small,somiautomatic pistol with an eight round nuga. naredblastshieldat the rearof the tubeand the thick
zine. lt is the most widcly issucdpistol in thc Sovict heat shield rround the center.The optical sight is
markedfor ranges fron 200 to 500metersat intervalsof
b. 7.62nm modentized assaub nfle, KaJathnikov 100 meters.The RPG'7cu be equipp€d with the NSP-2
(AKtrl) The AK is capableof both seniautonaticand infrured night sightiDgdevices.TheRPG-7Vhasa folding
full automaticfire. The improv€dmodel,designated the
AI<M, is lighterthan its predecessor, hasa greatersight g. 3A 7 'GRAIL". Thc SA-7 is an hfrared-homing,
radius,is fitted with a straidter stock, and has an shorr-range,surface-to-airguided missile,It is shoulder-
improveddetachable bayonet-knife.TIle AKM is litted fired and is usedagainstlow flying aircraft.
for the NSP-2 infrared night sight system. A folding h. Gre de' The Sovi€t company usesa variety of
stock version,lhe AKMS, has also appeared. hand senades(Figurc 19). Both th€ F-l and RG42
c. 7.6hnnt l,ight Machine Gun, Kalash ikov anti-personnel hand Irenadesdate from WorldWar ll,
/RPr). Foundwithin the BTR€quipped rifle squad,the whjle the RKG-3M artitanl hand grenademd rhe
RPK is ess€ntiallyan AKM assaultrifle with a longer ROD.santi-personncl handgrcnadcarepostwarnodels.
heavierbarrel,a bipod,anda differentshoulderstock.It The RGD-s is more compactthan the earliermodels.
has two magazines, a 75 round drum and a 4o-round Thc RKG-3Mis tlle strndardWarsswPactantirank hand
curvedbox. but it canaho usethe 3o-roundAK/AKM Stenade. It hasa IIEAT warhead dnda stlbilizingdroSue
chute which ensuresthe prop€r angl€of impact for the
d. 7.62nm Ceneral-Purpose Machi egunl shapedchage.
(PKll). E^ch of the Soviet rifl€ squadrequipped with
the latesr modcl BMP has two PKM rnachincguns- This 26. Engineer Equipment
weaponhasan cffcctiverangcof 1000meten andis an
Each soldier has an entrenching tool. Whcn extensive
improvedversionof thePK general purposemachinegun.
fortificationwork mustbc donc,shovch,pick maatocks,
Ihe PKM uses2s-roundsectionsof non-djsintegrating
and other tools from th€ engineercompanyin the
metalic feed belts. The PKS model h mountedon a
motorizednfle regimentareissu€d.
tripod.lt doesnot usethesameamrnunition asthc AKM
andRPK.
27. Chemical, BiolosicalandNuolsarEquipment
e. 7.62mrnSnipetRiJIe,Dasunor (SVD). Thercarc
tllroc sniper rifles per motorized rifle company. The In sddition 10 tlle BMP\ CBR filtration system,the
Dragunov is a 8asopcratcdscmiautomatic wcapolwitl 0 Sovictsoldierhasindividualcquipmcntto cnablehim 10
detachable box magazinc.A combination flash sup- survivein a CBR environment.Eachmanha' onc of
pressorandcompcnsator helpsreducefie muzzlejump threestandardprotectivemaskslthe ShMhelrnettype
ard flash. Thc AKM dctachablchife bayonet also fits mask,th€ communicationmask,or the ShMSspecialpro-
the Dragunov.Thc PSO'I optical sight on rhe Dragunov tective rnask(Figure 20), Thesemaskl provideexcellent
is a four-powcr tclcscopcwith an integralrangefinder, a protection agai$t curr€nt NATO chemicalagerts,bio,
batt€ry'powered reticle illumination syst€m, and an logical agents,and large radioactivefalout parti€les.
infraredr€connaissance aid, Each individual is also issucd lhc OP.l protcctive
f. The RPG-7 Antitank &enade Launcher. The coarcoverrl with glovesand anjndividualanti-chemical
RPC-7which replacedthe eadierrnodelsRPG-I and kit for treatingnerveagent,cyanide,and toxic smoke
RPG-2,can be feloaded.It is the squad\ antiiank casualties- Atrophirc is used as un mtidole for newe
weapon.Thc launchcris diithguishable from the eurlier agentpoisoning; sodiumthiosulfatcandrinyl nitratcfor
modelsby the presence of two hand grips, the large cyanide poisoning. Antiradiationpillsafe alsoinctuded.
2l
b. RG-42.
C. RKG-3M,
d. RGD-s.
Figure19. Handgrenades.
22
a. Shl, mask. b. Shl,,lSmask.
rt
d. lndividualdecontaminationkit, IPP
c. OP-1protectivecoat-overall.
Fioure20. PerconalCBRprotectave
gear'
2 8 . S u m m e ta n dW i n t e rF i e l dU n i f o r m s
Sum er Nnd wmtcr ficld unifornrs and accout.ements
a[e sholvn nr Figurc l1 rnd 12. Each man is also issuedr
.amouilagc cate. Spcciai canrouflagesui6 are issuedas
rc.luircd Ior wint€r 3rd sunnner opcrations and i)r
24
I
t4f
Figure23. R-1l3vehicularradio.
25
t
Figure25. R-126manpackradio.
26
R 105 R 107
Figure26. The R-105and R-107radios.
30. a. The Soviets regard conmrnd lts the exerciseof his platoonleadersis routinelor thedeiiveryofcombat
constant and effec.ive control. Thc rnotorized nfle ordersand for supeNisionof preparatio!for combat.
companycommanderis responsiblefor the ope tions of Wirecommunications areprimarilyusedin the defcnse.
his unit. To assisthim he has a politicdl officer and a Companymessengen are usedin both the offenscand
technicalofficer. Tle former aidsin the political training
md indoctrination of the company, while the latter ,. Rzdioneis(Fisurc27).
arsistsin adninistrative, maintenanceand supply mar- (1) The companyconrnmd net, when esrrb-
tels. Thc scnior platoon leader is thc company con- Lished,goesfronr the conpanycommander downto rhe
nander's secondin com,'nand. squad leadersduring nou.ted operations.This net
,. There re no platoon sergeuts. The senior squad udizesthc Rl13 or R 123radio.
leaderis the phtoon lerder'snext in command. (2) Du.ing mounted opcrations,the company
a The squad leader, usudlly an 18 or 19 yearold commandermaintainscomnunicationswirh barbrio!
conscipt sergeant,directly commandshis squad.There throughthe R-ll3/R-123 dnd/ofthe R-107radio.when
afe no fre teamieaders. dismounted, the R 126 radio is used,althoughii hasa
very short range.
31. Control (Jr Auachedor .rppo||rngunirr usc orLanr.
u. The primary means of conrrol of the motodzed radios.Commdnders of attachcdunitsar€normaly with
rifle cornpanyis radio, although personalcontact, wirc, urc company comnande. in both ihe athck dnd the
ncssengcr,.nd a variety ofother nethods are rlso used.
PeNonalcontact betweenthe company conxnanderand
27
F1t3/r23
COMPANYCOMMANDER
BATTALIONCOMMANDEF
NOTES
1, The raciicalcommandnetotan MR unit is contot€d sl the highesttevetpossibte.When lhe companyis houfr€o rn N
APC s lheremay be no companynet p€r se.
2. Fegadlessotwherherornotrhereisacompanynel.rado ft'oned,andlsedprim..itvbvlhe
barralioncommanderand his immedialesubordinaleand arsched unn commandeB ptatoonand squad edoe6 wolro
pnm6rilyreceiveinstructionsand would lransmiri.iiequenity.
Figure27. Representative
radjoner ol a motorizedriflecompany-
SectionVl. ADMINISTRATION
AND SUPPLY
2a
35. Recovefyand Repan capacity of thc REC. whether reinfo.ced or not, is
Soviot recovery and repair policy places emphasison Limited task rcquirjng nore than 30,60 nlinulcs wil
r o u t e ! l e r r ; r g s u l l r d r d r m r g e dv e f u ! l e rJ n d e q u r p m e D l nomally noi bc ttempted. Vehicles requiring this
do not impede dte rdvance. lf the drivcr/mcchanicsat unounr ']1 llmc or more to repair nray bc towed away,
company cannot repair rheir vehiclesin t0-15 minutes, or moved off the route for evacuation or rcpair by
the l€chnical deputy notifies the battalion technicat regimcnt or division. First echeloncompanicswhic.hlose
deputy who coordinatesihe baualion repair and evacu. a cert in percentageof rheir mcn and equipmentwoutd
ation Sroup(REG). The battalion REG, consistingof tbc be replaced by second cchclon units, reiirrmed and
supply and mainrcn cc platoon, may be reinforced
w r h r r e p : r i rr c f l m I r o m r c g r r n e n tB. e ( r u s cr h c r c p a j r
Iil',''
{j,ir
I ii,i
29
CHAPTER5. IV]OTORIZED
RIFLE COIVIPANY
TBAINING
Sectionl. INTBODUCTION
Sectionll. WEAPONS
AND EOUIPIVIENT
TRAINING
o
40. PreliminaryWeaponsTtainins tions of poor visibility. He is lrxincd 1o fire when
nounled in an A?C and in tl1e dismountedrcLeaswell.
a. During ihis phase,training is desiSn€dto srve the
c. Aficr mastcring t]rc basics, the individual is iaught
soldier a thorough undersiandingof his weapon. Thc
to tuc at stationary and moving l3igcls on known
nomenclature, functioning, asscmbly and disassembly,
disiance ranses. He is then taken to more advanced
and carc and cleaningofthe weaponplecedemdkrnan'
rangeswhere he musl rapidly engagemoving,stationary,
ship training. Firing positions, sighl alignmeni, rangc
and surprisetargetsat unknown ranges-Having success
eslimation, trigs€r squccze. and extensivc dry-firing
fully completcd this siage, the soldier is ready to fire
exercisesafe closely supcrvisedby NCOSand otlicers
from molkup A?Cs.
Uve fire is conducted after the basic prhciples have d. Training in firing liom APCS is nornJlly con-
beenmastefed(Figure 29). ducted by phloon, ulilizing the counly fair nefiod of
,. The gorl of markrnanship trahjng is ro devclop instruction. Teclbiques vary according to the type of
thc soldier's ability to fire acculalely and undef condi A?C used.A nunber ofstrtions provide trainingaccord-
ing to specidty Gifleman, machine gunner, RPG, and
SA 7 gunnet, mounting and dismountingfrom the A?C,
and dryfidne exerciseswithin the vehicular mockup
(Figure 30). Thc training progrcsscs from station-ary
mockups to mockups mounted on a rocking ftarnc which
simulatesthe movemenrof APCS.The men are trained
to fire through the firing ports and, in the older model
APCS,over the sides of the vehicle while the vehicle is
stationary and on the move- Antitank grenadiersand
SA-7 gunnersmay fife from the halt or on the move at
1ow speedswhen the ground is farrly level. APC drivers
are trained to provide a slablc platform tbr lhose1iring.
c. Riflemcn also rcccive instruction on the coordi
nated use of infartry weapons lire againsl allacking
aircrrfl- A varicty of aircrdft haining aids arc uscd 10
Figure29. Preliminaryweaponstraining. teach rapid idcniificalion ol thc air largc! and to hclp
the rifleman anticipatcaircraft mancuvcrs.
32
4 1 . R P Ka n d P ( M T r a i n i n g armor successfully.Antitank training attenpls to build
Machinegun trainingfollows much the sane sequcnccas both confidence and proficiency in combating armor
rifle trdning. Wren the gumer progressesto tuing from and is usualty done in a county fair manner.Different
inside ihe APC. he is rlughr how lo conrpensatefor shlions teach characleristicsof tanks and arnrored
vehicLar movement. He also practices dismounlcd vchiclcs. and conduct practical exerciseswith antitdk
$sault tue. holding his weapon at hip lcvel and firing grenades,RPC'Sand mines(Fisur€ 3l ).
b. RPG gunnersarc lraincd to lirc ai stationary and
moving tank silhouelles which measureapproximatcly
42. Antitank Traininq threeby five mclcls.
Figure31. Antitanktraining.
e ATCM (Sagger) gunnersusullly conducttraining velocity, altjtudc, and boundary of launch zone) are
on m elcctricsimulatormountedin I ZlL,l57 var. Real visualy dispjaycd. Both target trackrng and r ssilc
missilesarc rarcly fired. The SagScrcannotbe fir€d launching are simulated-For dctcrmining thc rypc and
effectivclyduring darkness because of the problemof idcntity ofair targels,silhoucttcsarc used.
dcpthperceptionand the facl tlut fte effectivelangeof ,. Havhg learned how !o rccogrize targ€ts. rhe
the infrffcd sightingdeviceis 350400 rctcrs.Thisdoes gunncr trairs wiih models placcd al diffefent dhtances
not givetlc gunncrcnoud tine to guidethe missileto lnd courseangles.Ifthe trrgctl silhouetteis equalto or
its targct (Figure 32). Tlrc Saggermay, however,be lcss than the dialneler oI thc small cifcle on the front
eff€ctivclyfrcd at nightwrth illuniralion. SaggeropeF sighl thc target is outside the launch zone. When the
ators are caJefully selectedand reportedly fire up to targel ovc ills $e cncle, the missilccan be fired. Moving
2300 simulatedfoundsto qualify as a gunner,Afi€r l!rgel eliccrs arc sho$n rtuuughthc u\e of nro!rng
qualifying,Saggergunnersmay tuc 5060 simulated ta.gel simulalon. After the gunncr first learns how to
roundra weekto maintainproficiency. track low vclocity targets on a horizonlrl counc, he is
trainedto track spinningand diing targets.
tt:|. SA-7T.ainins
4 SA-7 gunnersare trainedon a simulatorwhere
paramclcrsof movinStargets(rangc,cou6e, fli8hr
Figure34. Snipertraining.
45. BIVIP
Training
BMPcrcwI]ternbers rec.i!esi\ nror!hstrainingnr special
trainirg units prior 1o rcponingto their u it. Training
rl
includcsBMP cquip rcnt, 1ac1ics, poliiicalnrstrLrction.
CBRwarlrre.rivcr crossings. ard physicaltruhing.Oniy
tlre BjUP eommanderi! crosrtmined.Tlc BMP is
presenlcd10 traineesas a fast. lrmorcd. all-tcraii
tmnsport€fand a obile bascol iirc 1br diynounted
infant.y. Dismountingand remountingthe vchiclearc
doneal t shorthalt or on thc move.Thelehiclcslovsro
approxnutclyfivc krn/hourandbolh rcardoorsrno urc
F i g u r e3 . SA 7 (SAM) training. commandcr's halch ale opcned.Thc comnrander eits
rhougi rc top of the BMP, while the sqLradexrts
44. SniperTrainins througfidre reafdoors.ThetsIlPlhenfolows thcsquad
For snipetS,thc Sovietst-avornrenwho possess ercellcnl al a dislanccof 400-500neters. and may nole by
vision and hcadng, good menrory, and qLrickreactions.
boundswith other BMP'S.usingfirc and nrovenent.
Nornnlly the BMPengages h ir STOP,F'IREandMOVI
Trlining lbr snipersis conducted periodicrlly a d l sts
paatcrn.Finng thc nraingun on the moveis inrccurale
liom one and a half to tvo months. Sniper targcls
due 10 the lack of a gun slabililer.Whenahesquadis
mcntn)nedby the Sovicl military pressincludc officels,
observers,:rnlitank ,nd reooiucssnfle crcws, machinc
readyto renrounlthc vehicle.rhc platoonlcadernotifies
gunncrs! crews of disablcd tanks, and low'flying hcli the BMPS10 com€ ltrward. Tle Btr{Pdrivessiowly
copters. Initialy, the Soviet sniper conccntrates on firough dle skirmishli]tc pickingup thesquadrDembers.
targctsvirich are holding up attackingunits (Figure 34)-
Mounlinganddismounling aheBMPin thisnanncrtakes
approxnnat€ly l0 s€conds.
36
46. BTRTraining rlained in their separxLespecirllies, progressinSfronr
BTR tratring at comp,nylevelis similarto BMPtrain- fixed mockups 1{) moving nockups and nndly to the
ing.T]rccountyfair methodof insructionis BTR.
enrployed
with individualc.ew and squadnrembediint beins
TRAINING
Sectionlll. MORAL-POLITICAL
Figure35. Politicalindoctrinationsession.
37
TRAINING
SectionlV. CHEMICAL.BIOLOGICALAND RADIOLOGICAL
38
c. Thc Sovieis rely on traffic legulators(Ofganicto
regimentand division) to guide their fonnations(FiSure
38). Traffic regulaiorsfiont boih regin€nr ,nd division
mole witi reconnaissance elenrentsor advancegual.l
unils to mark roules and dilect the rdvdncingcolu'nns r1
criiical points alorg the route. Melhods of tr nsporta-
tion used by lrdflic rcgulatds lncludc moto.cycl€s,
jeeps,light trucks dnd APCS-
53. Trainins
We cannot determinchow ruch land navigationtraining
is conducred al the compdny lcvcl. Duc to the secunly
cLassificalionsof nriiitary maps it is quilc possiblethat
liule map Lrrining is conducted and lhat nap rcading
skillshale sL!ffercdaccordingly. Figure38. Traffic regulator.
SectionVl. PHYSIcALTBAINING
Figure39. Physical
fitnesstraining.
39
SectionVll. JUNIOROFFICERAND NCOTRAINING
4t
RIFLESOUAD
CHAPTER6. THE IV]OTORIZED
Sectionl. GENEBAL
( l ) S q u r dl e a d e r l 2 0 r o u n d s( A K N I )
.. Prolidessecufity for forccs at a hall-
(2) Two PKM mrchine sunneu 2,000 ri,unds.
d. Acts rs thc compmy rcserve.
divided anrongsquadmenbers.
(3) RPc-7 sunnef onc RtC.7 huncher, onc
64. Orqanization
pistol with 16 rounds.and fou| RPG-7rcunds.
d. Bolh tilc BltP-cquipped und BTR.equippedrifle (4) Four AKM rillcncn each with 120 rounds
squadshale n $sault strength of ci-qhlmcn: r squad (AKM). plus some of fie nachine gun ammunition-One
leader. two mrcNne gunncrs(onc nachine sunner and rineman mi-qhtcary four additional rounds of RPC-7
an extm AK[l rii]eman in the BTR-equippeddnd €lrli€r
model BluP-equ'ppedsquads),onc antitanl grenadier.
and four rinemen.Tlvo ofthe four rillcncn arc assislanl 65. Tactics
machjne Sunners.and a thifd riilcman is an assislunt
R P G - 7g u n n e r ( F i s u r c , 1 0 ) . nere has been no fadical chimgein Soviersquadlactics
despile noticeableimprovcmentsin weaponr! and A?C
'1r I'
d#
Figure40. The BTR-equipped
riflesquad.
t 43
a
dcsign. Capabilitics of the squad have, howcver, mcnmaybc mountedon tanks(Figure43). In suchcascs
improvedas a rcsultofthc introductionofthe BMP,the they dismount in thc last conccaledposition befor€ the
issueof two PKM machinegunsper squad,ed the enemyFEBA.
improved CBR protectivc gear.Whcreverpoltible, the
squad\ril assault sndfight fromi1svehjcle,dbmounling 56. Leadelship
orily whcn forced 10 do so. The dismountpoint js Thc Sovietsquadlc der,nonn,ily an l8 or 19 yearold
dictatcd by the tcrrain and the enemyantitank defcnses conscript sergcant with sb( months of active duty
andrnaybe up to 1000metersfrom theenemyposition. training,is rcsponsible lor the training,conduct,and
When it must attack on foot, the squadoccupicsa contrololhis squad.H€hasno fire teamleadeGlo rssist
frontageof 4060 mete6 with 6'8 meteB beaweenmen. him. His abiliry to leadis turtherhamper€d by the fact
Soviet infanhymen are trained to exit from the BMP that whcn he is dismounted, he hasno radio contncl
duringa short hslt or whiic movingat a rcducedsPecd \rith cither his APC or his platoonlcader-lle has no
(Figure 4l). The BMP fires its main gun at lhc halt, or method to coordinateartillery support or the firc
(far lessaccurately)on the movc.The mainmissionof thc supportfrom his own troop crrriet, althoughhe can
BMPcrcw after the squaddismountsis to supportthe indicatetargctsfor thelatterby usingtracers. To control
squadby fire, particularly .gainst enemytanksand other his squadin a disnountedassaultthe squadlcader
armorcdvehiclcs.In most cases,thc BMPwil remrin normrlly placeshims€lfin thc centerand dightly,nead
400-500metersbehindils dismountcd squad(Figure42). of thc assault
line.Hissssistantis thc APCgunncr.
Should their APCSbecomeinoperative,Sovietinfantry
r::i i:r,'. I
M
ri
\f TO CONTACT
Sectionll. ITIOVEMENT
45
,(\
Sectionll l. FORIVlATIONS
l6s.l
50-60m
!!!
(O Squadleader
P Machinesunnet
Pf RPG.Tgunnel
A Riflehan{AKM)
Figurerl5.Squadassauhline.
46
\t
SectionlV, OFFENSIVEACTION
72. General
during the attack; missions for t]rc squad machinc
An attack may bc launchcd fron thc ma.ch or wh€n ir gunncrs!APC gumcr, grenrdier and aulomatic riflcmcn
contact with thc cncmy. In thc lattcr case,thc squad during the attack;conbat formation to bc uscd;tlre time
moves as part of the plaioo to an initial posilion from of attack, signals, ,nd dcsignaiion of a second-in-
which it launchesthe attack. The depth of ihe attack
dependson ihc naturc of the defenses,and tlle terrain. A ,. Due 1o his scanty training and short term ol
squadis assignedan attrck sector. scrvicc, thc Sovict squad Ieader does not function in
batlle in thc as manv of his NATO
T3 Troop L€adinsProcedores counterparts. ln practicc, it is tl€ platoon leader v,ho
a Thc squad leader is taughl to issue r complete usually issu€sthe squad ordcn. lt is the squadleader's
order. In his oider, the squrd leader includes enerny responsibility to execule these orders whcn thc plaaoon
infornalion, to include locationsof penonnel,weapons, leadercmnot overseethe squddt dclions.
and obstaclcs;the platoon ob.jectiveand dircction of
further attack: thc squad direction of ailack rnd 74. Conductof the Auack
mission:missionsof adjaccntsquads;ihe number of tlie ,. When rttacking from a posilion of closecontact,
tank (it tanks are attachcd to th€ platoon) which win rhe squad waits h ttr€ assault trench until its assigned
attack in front of thc squad; locations of passages tmk crosses the lrench, then folows it in the attack
through enemy obstacles,and the procedures10 bc uscd (Fisurc a6).
for negotiatingthemi proceduresfor tucs prior to and
\t
47
,. When attackingmounted from the march,thc r€peatsthe objectiveof the assault,rcdistribut€sammu-
squadassumcs its positionwithin one of the platoon nition, and marks (by use of tracen) targersto bc
formationsG€e Chapter7). Movernentof thc squ,rd altackedby APCandartilery firc.
from thc departureposition to the assaultpositionis
normally conduct€dunder cover of artilery f]Jc. If 75. Conductof ihe Assautr
forced to dismount, the squrd does so in dcfilade or On the platoonleader\signal,thesquadleadcrgiv€sthe
whil€ on the movc under cover of smokc,al a distance command."PRIjPAREFOR THE ASSAULT."Squad
of 500.1000metersfrom the encmypositions.Phasc membeFchecktheir wcapons,fix bayonctsand fcady
Iinesarc usedto aid the platoonleaderin controland their h"nd gr€nades. Then the squadleadergivcsthe
fire supporrcoordination. commarrd"lnto the assadtFORWARDI"The squad,
c. On foot, the squadfires on tlle move.On opcn firingon tie move,attempt!to advance rapidly
gound andwhilc underenemyfirc, the squadmovcsby a NeSotiathga Minefield.Thc methodchosenby
boundsh goups of two-thee men undercoveringfirc. the Soviet squd to crossa minc field depcndsupon rhe
Although covq is used, speedin thc rttack is stresscd. naturc of the cnemy\ defensg,tlre rerrain snd weathcr,
The squadleadercontroh rhe {ircsof his macfuneeunt and tank support.thc squadmay attackmount€dor
2.nd antitank genadier. By concentrating the fires of dismounted,dlthoughwhen attackingpositionswith
thesc wcaponsand by the use of traccn, the squad antitanl defcnses, it will usually0ttackdismounted. Fig-
leader indicatesto his supportingA?C and platoon ure47 illustrates fourmcthodsofdismountcd atrackwith
leaderparticularstrongpoirts which ,re hinderinghis thc squadcarriersuppoflingthe attackby tue. Examplc
advancc.Artilery forwad observers (FOt allachedto oncshos thc squlda acUng
lhrouehr narrowopening
the platoonand/orcompanymay thencal in supporting in thc mine neld without tank support. When
attacking
fircs on thesetarSets.lf the squadcomcsunder enemy with a tank,espccially in dccpsnow,thc squadasa rule
,rtillery or mortar fue, it advancesrapidly out of the attack behindthetank in a column
oftwos followingin
the tank'stracks(example2). In thc thhd €xrmpletwo
d Use of SupportingFifcs. The squadadvanccs rifl€ squadsnttaokin a columnof twos
bchinda tank.
underthe covcrof suppoiingartillcryJnd mortarfirc. When the breach
in the min€ field is suflicientlv widc,
Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizcsspeedin the attack the squad
attack on line behinda taok utilizineits ful
and statcsthat casualtiessuffcrcd from fuendly adllcry tue power to thc front (example4).
Shodd the cneny
are or y a fraction of tlrc casualtiesincurrcd by antitnnl defenscsbe strong, fte infantry mav pr€cede
infantrymon who jag b€hind in the attack. Thc driver the tank, whichwirh th€
A?Cs,wouldsupportby fire.
moveshis vehicleby boundsfrom onecoveredposition b.
Assaultof tle Objective.Whenthesquadis within
to another,attemptingto mdntain a stcadygun plal- 20-30metersof thc enemyposition,it movesinto the
fom for the gumer.Th€ gunnersupportstheattacking final assaultandattemptsto destroy encmyin
the close
squad by fire and att€mpts to kccp the squadleadcr in conbat. Upon discoveringa weak point in the encmy
pocition, lh€ squadprcssesforward.
e, Mutual Support. During t}le cou6e of thc attack,
c Consolidation. ff the assaultis repulsedby the
the squadlcadcrwatchesthe proSres!of adiacentsquads
enemy, the squadconsolidatesnnd digsin. The squad
and takcs advantageof their progrcss,nd fue to move
leader,reor$nizcs his squad,attemptsto neutralize
his own squad forward. If the adjacentsquadsare held
enemyfire and, in cooperationwith adjacentunits,
up, he helpsth€mwitl hissquad'sfire.
i Thc assaultposition. The squadoccupiesan assault
position closc to the en€my. The squad lcader then
4A
\\!
@
o oaoa
aoao
aoao
aoa
@
@ oaoa aoao oo
@ aoao .o a @@
@ @@
-- xr;) PE
EJ 66 d66b A
(9 666 66 @@
>.
t
ilt
oa
ao
oa
ao ttlll
tttll
llll
llll
tlr
tllL
lll
.< l- I )->-\ \
V6
eA9(,u)(.re.L,
I
O to a o.-.
O PT
KO Sqlad ead€r
A
:-----
it Figure47. Squad(s)
negotiating
a minefield.
49
't
76. Battlefor Ra!€rvePositionrof rhe Deteffe squadwould alsobc given! radioandposibly a ndio
a. Majntainingthe Momentum.Whenth€ enemy's operator.Raids arc lupporl€d by artillery firc. TIc
forwardpositionshavebccnoverrun,the battlc for the .ssault €lement altack the obiective dir€cdy and
rescrvepositionsbegins.The squadattemptsto exploit capturesprisoners.The sec|.lalyelcmentprovidesfire
existingfo.tifications,nd lo hil the enemyfrom the supportfor the assault
€lcment.
flanks and rcar- Ernphasisis placcd on naintaining the (4) Due to thc cornplexity of a raid and the
momentumof the attack. degrec of leadershipcaled for, the patrol leader
,. RepellinSEnemy Counterattacks. During rhjr probabfy i5 a career NCO, prapotxhchik, ot tunior
phaseof thc battle, the squad is alert for en€my officef. He is normaly in the assaultelement of the
countcrattacks. It engagesa counleradackby tue andby paror_
assaultas pa( of thc platoon.when adjacentunitsare (5) A juniur commander. whensilen tJlemi\sron
counterattacked, the squadassisls
wili lire, bul docsnot to conducta raid, organizes continuolsobservation of
dackenils advance. Soviettacticrldoctrinestresscsthat rhe objective aJer, makesan cstimatc of the situation
thc best defcNe against a slowdown in racrical andissueshis order,which includesthc followhg:
monlenlumis 3n advance in anysector. (a) Enemydeploy,nent.
(b) MissioDandnethod of cxecution.
77. Pu6uit (c) Compositionand tasksof patrolelements.
(d) Referencepoints.
Thc squad'sAPCis caledforwardby th€ platoonleader. (e) Proccduresfor the movcandactionsduring
Thc squadrenrounlsxnd puNucslhe enenry.byplssing the attack.
individualstrong points- Thescwil be attackcdby (l) Withdrawal procedurcsand actions to be
s€cond echebn (reserve)forces designatedfor this
purpose.Retrealingcnemy forccsarc engaged by tie
followed h caseof an unexpectedencounterwith thc
I
(g) Pfocedures for requesting artilery and
mortarfre.
78. R.id andAlnbu3h (h.) Procedurefor cdualty evacuation.
Other forms of offensivccombat conductedby the (i) Patrolleadeisposi.ionwithin the patrol.
squdd,eitler reirforcedor as part of the platoon,arc C) Signalsfor control.
raidsandambushes. (k) Second-in{ommand.
a. the Raid (6) Upon completionof the mission,the assault
(l) A laid is usuallycarriedout on foot and elcment withdraws filst, followed by the security
consistsof a concealcd approachto an objectiveand a clemenl(s)and finrlly the obstaclc-clearing clement.
sudden attack to captureprisoners,documents,or Shouldthe 3ctiviticsof the assaultgroupbe djscovered,
equipmcnt.Whenever possiblcthe raid is conductedat jt withdrawsundcr€overof the securitygroupandcalls
night or underothcr conditio oflimted visibility. for artillery and mortar fire iI needed.
(2) Prcparations for the raid and ambush aJe ,. TheAmbush-
conductedin d€tajlandsecrecy. Sortiesby smrllgoups (l) Soviet writings define rn ambushas fte
miy be madeto gatherroute andobstaclcinforrnation, carefullyconccaled disposinonoI a unit ar a previously
while reheaBrlssre held in rcar arcas- desiSnared posjlionfor rhepurposeof makin8a surprhc
(3) the raid elcrnenth usui ly organized into an attack on the €nemy in ord€r 10 captureprisoners,
obstaclcclearinSgroup,an assault goup rnd a security documents, weapons, and military equipment.
gloup-Thc obslacleclearinggor.lpconsistsof attached Ambushesare set up along the enemy'sprobable
sappers(combatengine€6)who clearandmark a path movement routes, along corununication and rcsupply
throughobstacles andremainat thegapto act as guides,lines,trafficcontrolpoints,etc.
The security group may consist of additional nflem€n (2) A squadgivenan ambushmissionmay consist
attach€dto the squadfor the mission.A rcinforced of assoult, secuity, and observation clements andmight
50
\\'i
SectionV. DEFENSIVEACTION
KEY
f>-'
i@
iE&
- /,,-a
t Y\ 2NDsoo
|
tsTsoD I ___ l \."o
f_+6on "oo
KEY
1. Feferencepoint 1 ocks.
2. Ref@ncepoint2-bush6.
3. Squadnr€ concenrranon 1.
4, Befeencepoinr3 bddge.
5. Sq@d nre concenrrarion 2.
6. Fstersnc.point4looll.
7. Refe€n@poinrSlddmound.
& RefeEne pointGsump.
9. neieE nce point 7-hjll.
10, Reierencepoint&pond:
I 1. The prihary dn6ction ol fre trom one of
schnanking squads m6chi.equnsare
Figure50. Thesquad{ireplan.
82. Conductof the D.l.ns! squad wil distribute its strcngth to combat thc new
a The lirst en€myelementto probe squaddefenses threat whil€ continuhg to cover its odginal scctor of
may be reconnaissance. The plaloon lcaderis author?id fue. Should €nemy tanks overrun thc squadposition,
to fuc on enemyreconnaissance patrolsand,ifordered, squsd m€mbersattempt to destroy them from the rcar
tlrc men fire fron then altemate positions so as to with antitank genades.
deceivethe encmy.
D. DefensivefFes increas€in intcnsity as the enemy 83. lvhhdrawal
approachesthe FEBA. Shouldthe €nemyas$ult include The squad may wilhdraw on ordcn from the platoon
tank, antitarl< weaponsengagcthem, whil€ the other Ieader.The withdrawalbcginswith tle riflcm€nwho
squrd membersconcenfare on the acconpanying movc undercoverof the squad'smachinegunsand of
infantry. An effort is made to separatcenemy tanks the APC. They Mthdraw individualy or in goups,
frorn thcir infantry suppon. dcpendingupon the terrainand thc enemysituation.
a Thoughtllc squadmemben attempt to destroy Simultaneouswi$drawal of thc entire squadnormally
enomy p€nefations irto th€ gapsbetw€cnsquds, they takesplaccundercoverof firc froln supportingunitsor
nrelntain their positions and conc€ntrt€ on their undcrconditionsof limitcdiisibility.
assignedscctor of fte, If attacked from a flanL, the
54
a
I
j
Sectionl. INTRODUCTION
RIFLE
MOTORIZED
EOUIPMENT
6
18
7.62mmsniperdfie,svD l
7-62mmGPmachinesln,PKM 6i0)
Anniank s@mdelauncher,RPG'7 3
ArmoredpeEonnel€nier. BMP A 3 (0)
a 1 r 3 / F2 3 3
F 126
S e c t i o nl l . M O V E M E N TT O C O N T A C T
56
{t\r
t
prot€cting th€ column agaiist a sudden enemy auack. deploy and enier ihe brtlle u dcr nrole favorable
Plaloons glven such a mission tnay be reinforced with
antilank wcapons, Inor1als, cngincc$ and chcnicat
troops, dependinBupor ihe missior and the enenry Patrol
90. SeparateBeconnaissance
situltion. A platoon assigncdas lhc rdvancc gurrd ol a d. The motorized rifle platoon may bc uscd to
column movins on a nuh ans of advancewould be conduct a reconmissancepatrol up to five kilometers
given nue support then on a secondafyaxis ofadvance.
ahcad of the puent unit if dismounted or up to 15
,. Advdce and rear nrarch security elenrentsleador kilometers if mounlcd. These distancesarc dccrcascd
follow the force which they are protecting at a djstance
during conditions of rcduced visibillly. The ptdloc,n
of up to one and one half kilometers.The flank march
accomplishesits missionsby means of observdllonand
security elenrent tu)ves on a lire with the head of rhe
maneuver,but may engagein linrjted conbal il neccs-
column at a distanceofup to one kjlomerer to lhe flank. sary.
During coDditions of limited visibiiity, these disraDces ,. Thc plaloon may be re brccd wiih a vadety of
aJe reduced. All types of march secuity elementsa.e suppor! to rnclude antitmk wcapo s, moftars or arllL-
d r , p a r c h ebd) . h ec o l p " n ) g j \ e nd s . c u r i r ) r n i ) ) i o n . lcry, and chemicdl md cnsincerpeAonnel. Reinforcnrs
c. The reinforced platoon execuling a security mis- weapons usurlly move a5 part of rhe platoont rnajn
sion artempts to dcslroy snra enelny unils by firc and body with t}rc platoon ieader.Conmandersof attached
ag8resive auack. Should this not be possible, ihe units also move with the plaloon leader.The melhod of
platoon occupiesa falorable posjtion and resistsstub- o p e r a r i o li ' $ " d m e 1 \ L h f l o f d r P. q u J d e - o n n d . ' \ 1 n L e
bornly in m effort to give the protectedcolunm tine to patrol-
at S e c t i o nl l l . FORMATIONS
91. Mounted Formations d. Thc invefted wcdge lormation prolidcs thc samc
d. Motorized rifle plaloon formationsusedduring the advantage as tbe wedge ard is often adopled with the
approach narch and cornbat arc thc colum , wedge, intention of execuling ! dorlble envelopnent of the
inverled wcdgc, cchclon (right or lcfl), dnd tllc linc. fte objecrive.
e. Echelon fornrations (right or lefo provide
platoon l€aderllaces himself whcre he crn bcst control
mL\imum tuepowcr 1() tne dght oefO lront and ar€
his squadsmd effects chngcs in lbrmation by lisudl
oflen uscd on t}tc cxposcd llank ol r ldrgcr ibrmation.
signJls.His choicc of iblmation dcpendsupon condi-
They arc dilficult to control wilhoul good visual
tions of visibility, the rerain and thc €nemy situalion.
securityand control (Figure s3).
,. Ille platoon column formatbn is used during lhe /. ftc lnrc ibnnrtion provldcs mrrijmun] firepowcr
and secudty to fie front, but is diificult lor the platoon
m a l h , i n c o n d , i u r . u l r i f l | | c dr . \ i b i l i r ! s. h " r p J . i n g
leaderto control unlesshe has good visual contact-It is
$rough confining terain, ,nd during dre pursuil.
usedin crossjngopen ground and in the assauli.
Alihough it providcs only minimun fircpower and
securily io the front, the colunn folmation allows tbr
92. DismouhtedFormations
rapid movement, naximum control rnd pcrnirs rapid
deploymcnt to other fornatlons. d. Dismounted fomations are similar to mounted
c. The plutoon wcdge is used lrior to contact or lbrmations. The linc forrnation is uscdh ihc assaulland
during the battle for the enemy\ rescffc positionswhen dre file for negotiatingminefields and for rapid cross-
thc plaroon leader wrnts to maintain maximum control county movement.
while dcployed. Ir providescxcclent tirepower to thc ,. Disnounted plaroon attack is likely to occur whelr
front and to eachflank. the enemy position is contiruous and unbroken. with
57
emplacedengineerobstaclcs weil covercdby are. Dis-
mountcdattackis lcsslikely in a CBRenvjronmenr
ufe54).
(Fis-
G
!t!E
e In thc dismountedassautt.sqnadsoccupyfronf
agesof about 50 mererswith six-eighrnercrs berwecn
a
tl
squadmembers,and 20 met€rsbetwcensquads.Thc LI
piatoon attack frontagc is roushty 200 lnercrs.m a
conventiondenvironmcntinrcrvalsbclwe€nindividual WE!!E
soldiefsin extendedLincarercducedto four-sa x,ctoa
in ordcr to increasethe d€nsiryof fire. In dismounrcd ll
assaults,t}Ie platoon A?Cs fo ow tieir squadsat a LI
drslanccof from 400 ro 500 rnete6,depending on rhe
terrain,and supportthenrwirh fire. A?Csarc nornuly
spaccdup io 100metcrsaparr.
d. The piatoonno.rndlyatrackson line(mounreoor
dismounted). Squadtuc andrndeuvcris rafc.Normaly
the platoonicaderis posjrionedro ihe rearofhis center
squad.
!]G!I
a)
tl
I I
!1!!
I
0
0
Figure53. Motorizedrifleplatoonformations(mounted).
58
I
G UNE
------*0
0=-,0o-_--*0--loom
(ATTACHEDTANKSI
F€ 5+60m +l
14L
lr
t: '..--i
lli
+ i._,..
CRDsot6\ / 'IsJ.,sT
souat\
I
UPTO20Om
l.--'-n.-'*'-n
WEDGE
+
/rND sartr^"1
{INVERTEDWEDGEI
t
/rNDaotaDl
3FDSOUAD
ECHELON
+
RIGHT
+
/ rNDsouaD-\
t
/ 3RDdiu;;\
t
. ISTSOUAD'
SOUADIN THEASSAULT
50 60 METEBS _-l
o o o r)
SOUAD
o o
LEAOER
Nol6 KEY
1. tnmounted
8nddasmoo.ted rhssquad.ndplatoon
fomations, l6deB wouldposirion
themselvB
inrhebesttootioft ro
2 APC'Susuallyfollowthensquadsandsupponrhembyire ar s distlnceof betw€en300-500met66-
Ll .cpc
Figure54. lvlotorizedrifleplatoonformations(dismountedl.
59
SectionlV. OFFENSIVEACTION
60
fiDi
V. DEFENSIVE
Section AcTloN
3FO
soD
,-No)^ d
soD\ ---:
r0
ii
,z-,ffi IE!
A Platoohle6der'scommandpo5l
Anriiank gEmde buncher
@
-
c:l Ahehate pGilion lor APC I Seciorol xe.ch wnh comm!.icalionsr.e.ch
o
Fere@ncepoi.t lror arrilbry ins)
Ahemare posirion tor tanl
m
/)
Y
lf
tank and urtitank weaponsf'r€ is increasedasthe enemy 104. Withdnwal
approacheslhe FEBA, with th€ maximumiires dnected when maling a wilh&as,al, the platoon leadeiindicates
at lank! and AFG. It€ plaroon sniper attemptsto pick to his squadr and attachmcnls lhe dircction of thc
off enemy officers, snip€n, observers,8nd machine withdrswal, the intermedirte phnselines, ord€r of th€
gunrrers. withdrawal, security nsxrures, and thc signd for the
d. lf th€ ercmy infantry attacks on foot, efforts are start of th€ withdrawal. The platool withdmwsrapiauy,
made to cut them off froh supporti4 lrmor ard but when forced, defends a $rcc€ssionoI delayinS
dertroy th€m. Tanlc which succ€€din pen€kating the positionsa3p8rt of the corhpany.Methodofwithdrawd
forward defensesare take! undei fire by th€ company depends upon the enemy situstion, th€ terain, and
recond echelon(t€sefl€) atrtit n& weeponsand artillery weather.lf the platoon cannotwithdraw simultarcously,
firing in the diiect fire rolc. It does so by squads,with the platoon l€ad6r
e If the compary or battalion hunches a counter- accomPrnying lhe lasl squd.
attrck, the platoon may furnish fire support or joifl th€
cou[terattackingf orce.
64
a
dn!
CHAPTER8. THE MOTOBIZEDRIFLECOMPANYIN COIMBAT
TO CONTACT
Sectionl. IVIOVEMENT
!!Y
2 Chemicalwarfaredelachmenl
i e c o m p a n y . 10. Disiancesoi parrolvehicles
3 C o m m a n d el sr t m o r o r i z er d from the main
body 128)would vary dependingupon
rhe enemv,wearher,l€iiain rnd oiher laclors.
5. Fnsrmororizedrlleplatoon. Oisrancesb€tweenother vehlcieswouldbe
6. Secondmororizedrlteplaloon.
7. Th rd motorzed ilepbroon
^l Figure56. A reinforced
motorized.ifle guardof the battalion.
companyasthe advance
65
(5) 'Ihe place,titne, and duration of halts for thc
s€curityelementsand for the nuin body (if dcsignated
by the highu commander).
d llaving compl€tedhis study of the highercom-
mandeisor;anirationlbr fie nrach{FjBU,e58) aniihis
own estimate,the companycommanderformulatesa
marchpianwhichincludesthe followingl
(l) The order of marchand the distributionof
personnel andweapons.
(2) the composition and tasks of the elements
dctailed for march security and rcconnaisssceand the
times for them to passthe stait point and the control
<-.cr
oFa-l |-- '1 tr> l- 2556METE6S --
BETryIE\ VEHICLES -
+@+c <"+qr <;o- Gn <"oo- <\0/ €t-o <h'o-o<1'o! ( -o; <t -
I '2 3 4 5 tt
KEY
1. Feconnabs.ncedtDl.
2. Advancep3 yconsBlinoot lhe lsr moio.izeditlecomDanv,s isnkplaroo..an anll€rv batery,
3 plat@n of A/T gons,one engine. squ6dand chemic.lreonn8isncepeMnnd,
3. Themotoiled itle balralionltatl, sisn.lplaroon.andengi.eerpkloon lhinus onesquadl.
4. Anrirankb€nery.
5. Tankcomp.ny (min6one phroo.l.
12. Marchllanl *cu.iry detachm6nr(moroi2edrille plaroonl.om rhe s.cond nobnzed ille comp8ny).
rll d \
Figurem. CBRunhconducring
decontaminarrcn
duringa halt.
qt
110. T6rminaiionof the March fue. The companycommander supervises
the establish-
a Thc march t€rminat€sin the occupationof an mcnt of tlrc companypositions,establishes at del€nsc
ass€mbly rrca, a meetingengagement,or movement into measures, drangcsfor r€-supplyof the company,and
an altack. In occupyinga conccntrationarea, the awaitsordcn from the battalion conmandcr.
companyleavesthe routeof marchwithout haltingand ,. lf the march terminatesin a meetinSengaSement,
occupiesa designated area as pan of a batlalion or the motorircd rifle company operatesas oudined in
rcginental perimeter. lftncdiate steps are tal(en to sectiorlI-
eslablishsecuritypositionscovering
avenuesof approach c. Whenthe motorizcdrifle companymovesinto the
into the area.Thc companyesrablkhes defe0sivcposi- attackofa defensivc position,tle companydeploysinto
tions and coordinates with adjacentunits.Patrolsare combatformationfrom the marchcolumnwell behind
sentout to coverareasnot coveredby obsenationor ihe ltue of contact(S€eSectionIII).
69
,. Uponencountering thc enemyl forwardunits,thc c. Whenthc motorizedrifle companyrcceivesthe
rcinforc€d motorized riflc company, acting a! the order, it attack in line, usuallybehindan attachedtank
r€gimcntalreconnairlance 8roup,rcPoras enemycolltact, platoon(9and abreastof otherrnotorizcdri{lc elemcnts
Th€ companycstablishcs the composition and diection of the main body. An effort is nade to attack tlrc flank
6f the cnemycolumn,attempt!to penctratethc main or rcar of the encmy force and to dcstroy it or force it
body and locateenemychemicrlandnuclearwcapons, to withdraw. Speed in the attack b str$sed, and
and observesthe approachof cnemyrcserves. rinener remain mounaedwhen feasiblc.nd fight from
c. The motorizedrifle companyactingasth€ advance their caJrlers. Enemyforcesarc destroyedor bypassed
guard of the tattalion att€mpts to destroy enemy and rnopped up by second echelon forces of the
reconnarssimce and secudtyelementsandcontinues the rcgimert or by thc secondechelon(re!€rvo)of the
march.Should it encountera superiorenemyforce, tlrc battalion. Should it be necessaryto dismount in the
advancc gurrdcompanytalesup d€fensiv€ Positionsand attack, infantrymenmovebehindthc attachedtanls and
d€fends, inflicting casualties on the cnemy and geining arc supported in the attack by thcir APCs.When the
time for the main body to dcploy. enemyhasbeend€feat€d, the APCSarc caLled forward,
the troops remountand opcrati-or$continue-
114. Deployment andManeurcrPhale d, ff superiorenemyforcesnakc it impossibleto
attack, the battalion commandcrattempts to hold the
d. Thc meetingengagemcntusualy developdrapidly.
enemy to establishfavorableconditionsfor the deploy-
Normsllypositionednearthc lrcadof the column,the
rnent of th€ regirnent.
battalion commander mak€s a rapid cstimate of th€
siruation, assrgnstasks to th€ attsched artillery unit
115. TethinaiionPhale
comnander, d€velops a maneuvff plan for the main
body andissuesa sho( opentions order (Figurc 6 | ). Thc meetingengagemcnt tcrminatcswhcn thc enemy
,- Attached artilery takcs up firing Positions and force has been destro,€d, forced to withdraw, or whcn
immediately opens fue in suppon of thc advancc guard the Soviets have been forced onto the defcnsive,In thc
and lhe marn body. Attached tanks, followed by evenl of tlic formcr, the battalioncontinues its march;in
motorized riflc unitr mounted in th€k APCS,quickly thecaseofenernywithdrawal,a pursuitbegins.
d€ployand attack the mainbody of rhe enemyforce.
70
,-: -.,,,,=-rts,{ -
''' ^;;,,**-;itt""'lI
K-- -
'\.'1\.,.---*6,' t#$tJ /
'.\ \"'-d
..
"
i4l {31
KEY
1. Motonzed nne banalion, reinforced with ranks and artirlory, actins as the sdvance guad of the @gimenr.
2. Seond snillery bttalion
3. Third motufted .ifle compahy.
4. Fi6rrankcompanyll-
5. Badalaon conmander,fnEtMFB,
6. Second mororiz€d dfle company.
7. Fi6r mobrized ifie company wnh an anached rank plaloon acrinq as rhe advanc€suard.
71
oPERATIONS
Sectionlll. BREAKTHROUGH
are attackcdliom the marchby unitsadvancing und€r 121. AttackWhenIn ConractWirhThe Enemy
covcring fires from anillery. mortars,tek, and AlCs. a Unils noving up to attack through forcesin
(9) The battalioncommander commitshissecond contlct occupyan asscmblyareawhich providescon-
echelonGcscrve) companyafter the initialobjective has cealmentand covcr againstdamagccausedby nuclear
bccn taken. This companyis committedin a sector andconventronal wiapons.Usualy the asscmbly ar€ais
whereenemyrcsistanc€ is weakestor whercthe great€st occupicdat night.
successhas bccn attained.The mirsior may be the
furtherdevelopment of the atlackin depthor an attack ,. Conlpanies dismounlat r desgnatcdlocationrnd
on theflanl or rearofan enemystrongpoint holdingup pfoceedby concealed routesto attackpositions.A?Cs
t]rc advance. ln hisorderto thesecondechclon(reserv€) afe lcft in cov€redareasready to move forward to
commander,thc battalion commsnderindicatesth€ supportth€ atiack.
€ncmyand frcindly positions,rhe line of deployment, c. Companics in the battaiion'sfirst echclonoccupy
objcclivcs,the dircctio. of thc subsequent attack,.md the fi|st trcnch systen, while the sccond echclon
coordinationwith &e fiIst echclorcompanies. During (reservc) element occupies the sccond and thnd
its entry into battle, the secondechelor (rcscwe)is trenchcs.Tank units atlachedto the battalion
occupy
supported by artilleryandmonartirc. an assembly arcaprior to dle startof the attack.whjle
e. EnenryCounterattacks.
tank unitsalrcadypositionedin the defenscgo into the
(1) Minor counterattacksre repulscdby fir€
attack from those positions.A coordinationline is
while moving, nd major counterattackarc engrged
assigned to lants for a changcofformation.ltsdistance
with conccntrat€d lucs from thehllt.
from thc encmyFEBAis dchrminedby thc terrain,but
(2) llhcn the counterattlck force has been
it is usualy fron one to two kiiometers. (
sighted.thc company cormandcr issuesordcrs (o
d Thc companycommanderobsefles&e resultsof
repulseir. Srlbunilsoc(up) hasr)posirion(antlorgaruzc
prcpautoryfires,assigns rnissions
for the destruction of
fire plam, whiJc attach€dcngine€6sct up antitank
survivinsor new tngets, and lcporls to the battalion
commander on tllc company's rcadiness to attack.
(3) Whcnthe enemyis within range.the subunits
e. Tanksrnovefrom theirasscmbly areason rcceipt
cngagethem witl fires fron all wc.rpons.lf a nuclear
of a signal.As they approach theljneofdcparture,thcy
slrike was dcliveredon tre countcrartackforcc, the
deploy into platoon columns,rnd then into combat
companyrcncwsthe attackimnredialely afterthc slrike
fomation, movingat highspccd.As th€ tanl$ lpproach
andcomplcles ihe dcstruction of the en€my. the liiendly trenches, the companycommand€f givesthe
/. ThcPunuit. order "PREPARETO ATTACK." Afier the tankshave
(1) When thc enemywithdraws,the motorized passcd, "INTO
h€ orders TtlE
rifle companystlrts pursuitopentions.For morespccd ATTACK - FORWARDI"Personnel leavcthe trenches
and momentumand to creatc bexer conditionsfor and follow the tants in the atlack. Arcs follow their
m,rneuver, thc companyformsinto platooncolurnns and squads md give firc support. Whe. thc enemy's
continuesihc puFuil in approach nrarchformation. resistance hss beenbroken,AlCs arc remountcdand
(2) If theenemyorganizes rcsistanceby hdividual i}Ie attack into the deplhsis swifdy developcd.
units on advantagcous lines to coverhis witndrawd, I W}lcna nuclcaror chcmicalstrike againstencmy
subunitsby-pass themto reachthe flanls andrearofthe positionsin thc irnmediatcareahasbeenlaunchcd,rhe
cncmy\ mainbody,cuning offhis routeolwithdrawcl. cornpanyin this zoneusuallyattack in APCS.
74
a
SectionlV. DEFENSIVEOPERATIONS
122. Genelal hrcs, the rcgimcnul conronder double! thc width :lnd
Sovietdoctrincmakesro cleardistinctionbetweenstatic increases the dcpth of hn brttalion-defended areas.In
'Ihe ,ddition, U-stHped apertures and shieldsare built at
and mobilc defense. sizeand compositionof the
unit involvcd dererni.es the dcgrce of mobility rcgular intcrvals
10 decr€are the blastcffcctsof enemy
employed.Thc largerthe unit, the grcaicr is the degree
of mobilily and flexibility p€rmitted.There is littlc e. A arcutld Dcfe se. Allaroond dcfcnsewithin lhe
Ilexibility at battalion lcvel ind below. A company battalion positionis p.ovidedby thc conslructionof
defendingas part of the first echelonbattrlion is rigidly alternate and supplementary firing positions,the em-
placementof barriersthroudout thc defendedarea,thc
hcld ro delend an assigncdposition.No appreciablc
reserve is held at thjs level.The conrpanystrongpoint close coordination and integation of lues witlt
a seriesof in(erlockingtrench
canonly be properlydnalyzedwithin thc frameworkof neighbofinSunits lnd
position. systems which cnsctlrc shifting of troopsfrom onearca
thebattaliondcfensive
I i'r"
I POS|TTON E
6 .l j-* e
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BNRESERVE
i O N E P LITS T M R
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El ant"nr'in"". il
11 Monarb€nery. 7m
l-\, company.o.n$de/soP.
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.6pl@nr5 "tplan^.d bnt counr.ran8ck p@itionsl.
10@ l50o 2000mele6
76
I
g. Antitank Defense. Extcnsiv€employmentof anti. strong point!, their pdrn!ry and secondaryareasof frc;
tenk min€sand engineerinSobstacl€scoveredby tues of main Jnd alternat€ firing positions for tanls, APCS,
organic and attach€dartitanl weaponsProvidethe antitank and antiakcraft weapons,atd machine8uos,as
battalion with an in'depth antitanl defensivesystem. wel as then main and secondaryarcs of firc; the fire
h. Coofiinated F,'er. The battalion's defensivefire concentration sectorsof cachplatoon;obstacles, field
planconsists of the positioding,use,andcoordhationol dcfenses and shelters; and tlle location of the company
cll weaponsm lhe defendcd area.Thefire planorganizcs
zonesof high density fue in front of the FEBA, on the d Subsequenttasksar€ assignedto the platoons for
nanks and in the rear of the defense.The itre plan is reconnaissance, pmtectionagainstCBR weapons,and
insepafablylinlcd wirh fie barrier plan. logistics.
i. Mobik Auntetuttack Forces. The bsttalion has a
limitcd count€rattack forcc, usudly one reinforced 126. Comm€ndAnd Control
pletoon.Majorcounterattacks arelaunched by regimcdt In the defens.,the companycommander cortrols his
and division,while forward battalionsdefendthef areas. organic and rttached units from a commandtnd
obs€rvationpost. He normally brs two such post', a
125. CompanyT.oop LeadingProcedures primary and an .lternate. These posts arc chooento
a. Aftcr receiving the battalion defcnsc order, the piovide the bcst obserystior of thc batde area, a
companycommandcrcompleteshis plan andissucshis concealedlocation,and to facilitat€control of sub-
order from a point on thc ground from which the ordinatcunils. As a rule, the comtnanders of attached
dcfcnse and enemy avenues of approach can b€ and supporting artillery unit! are located with the
sufley€d. If trc plrtoon and attached leadcrs cannot company conrmander, while antitank sectioo leaders
assembl€at onc location, the order is given in thcir remain with their units.
respective strongpoint locations.
(l) To thc platoons:supportingweaponsand 127- Orsanization of tho Companysdong Points
Inissions: areas of conccntrated fu€ and tasks for a. The companystrong point is organizcdaccording
s€curirgthe flank. boundarics andgapsi to the sameprinciples!s the battalion\ aJeaof defens€.
(2) To Ihc supponinSartilcry: areasol con. ,- The motorized rinc conpany occupiesa strong
centrated firc; point up to 500 metcrsin width (1000 metersunder
(3) To dre antitank weapons:l,liin and altemate nucled conditions)and 250 meten in depth (500 mcters
fire positions,main and secondaryareasof fire, and thc unde. nuclear conditions). Normaly, all three platoons
procedurcfor openinganddeliveringfue; defendon line,(Fisure63).Whcndeployed"two up and
(4) Taslcsfor subuDitsin engagingenemyaircnft; one back", two rifle platoonsusualy occupythe first
(5) th€ methodof engireerprcparation:where, main tench, while the third platoon occupiesthe s€cond
*hen, and how to preparefield foftifications, sh€lters, main trench. A s€condarytrench localed 50 to 100
obstacles,and alsomeasures for camouflage; metersbehind eachmain trefth is occupiedby the third
(6) The time for completionof thc fire plan. squadof cachplatoon,lhe PlatoonconmandPost,and
any attachcdantitank weapons.Eachplaloon in the first
,. Aftcr issuinghis order, the companycomnandcr main trench has a cotununications trench leadhg back
planscoordination, payingattention to thc coordination to the second rnain trench where the main company
of the company fire plan with ihe artill€ry, othcr cornrnandpost is located. Each companylns a similar
wcapons, andadjacent uniti. communicationstrcnch to the third main trench where
c, The company commandergives a skctch of his the third rnotorized rifle compary and thc battalion
defensiyestrong point to the battalion command€r.The conmand post are locatcd.The comPanystong point is
following are usually shown on th€ skctch: reference normaly cenlered on tlrc platoon in tlt€ sccond mairl
poinh anddjstances to them;enemypositions;platoon trench.The w€aponsof the companyare placedso that
77
tiey covcr the cntire companyfront and have inter- (1) One motorizedrifle platoonis designatedthe
lockingfire with adjaccntunils. main suppo( platoonand i! stationedbehindthe two
c Antilark and anti nucled faclorsarc tlle prinlary forward s€curily platooru.thc conrpanycommandcr
considerltions in thc companydefense plan.Theplanis remainswith this platoon, which may act asa rescrve.
organized for atl-lroundantitanl defcnsein the critical (2) Tle two foNard platoonsact as the outpost
se0torof the tcrruinnecessary for stabilizationof the line. The companyoommandef coordinatesthc tuesof
compai) sronts poinr. Thc anriranl dcfcnse i5 a theseplatoonswith units on the llanks.
coordinatedbari€r and {irc systen conrislingof the (3) Ficld securitypostsmannedby rcinforccd
antilankrocketlounchers of eachplatoonand attached riflc squadsare placcdforwrrd of tlle outpostIine to
antitanl gunsandtanks. provid€early wardng.
d. Antiaircnft and CBRdefenscplansarc organizcd (4) The conrpanyactingasa sccurityforcewith-
in accordrncewith the battalionplan- Thc company
comrunder assignsthc nission of cngaginglow-flying
aircraft 1o pcrsonnelmanning automatic wcapons. 128. ConduclOf TheDefense
Prrticuiarstressis placedon maintaining antidrcraftand a. Th€ missionof repeling enemyrcconnaisanceand
chcmical/radiologicllalcrl. supportingoutpostsis hrndledby specialydcsknated
d. Changcslo terrain fealuresarc measrrred, and weuponsfiring from then dtemate positions.Surprise
refercncepointsenicredo lhe platoonand company closcran8elucs repclsmallcnemyforlesandreconnais-
nre plans.lf naturalrcfer€ncepointsee lacking,the sanccunits. L€rg€encmy forccsde eng'aged by machine
companyconrmander establishes artificialones which guns,long rangcmtitanl weaponsand rttachcdtanks,
are conccalcdfrom cnemyobsenation.Thoselaatur€s aI of which lue from their riternate positions.Sone
of
within rhc companystrongpoint which miShrserveas tlesepositionsmaybc locatedIorwardof thc FEBA.
good rcferencepoinrs for th€ encmyafe dcstroyediI D. During thc enemyartillcry prcparation,company
fcasible. personrcl remain under covcr, with or y rnachine
I Belweencompanics.therc are inlcrv.ls varying gunnc and observcrs remainingat their posts.When
accordingto the terrain. The companycommander enemy artillcry fircs shilt to engagetargets in thc
enrurcsthat coordinationis madc with units on the brtlalion rear area,company pe$onnel in the foNard
Ilanksto coverintcn,alsbetweenunitswith fire,patrols, positionoccupytheir stationsand meet the assaulting
enemyvith file. As tlle encmyapproaches the FEBA,
& Time permiuing, dummy fortifications and the intcnsity of fire is increasedto break up the assault.
observationpostsare employedthroughoutthe com- r. Should the encmy pcnetratcr oompanystrong
prny strongpoint in order to misleadthe en€myas to poinl, personnel
continueto def€ndtheir assi$cdarers
thelocationsofthe companypositions. and attempt to dcstroy lhe p€netration by fire. The
i. Thc company may bc given dr€ mission of battalion second
echelon€ompany(reseryc)or tle
providings€curityforwardofth€ FEBAasan outpostof reserve is committedaginst thebreakthrough.
a5 a securitycompanyof a battalio. detailedas an d. Should the cnemy arsaultbe repclled, the com.
outpost.Thc outpostforce is assigned a sccuritysector, pany
commandcrconcentnteshis firc on the encmy
a defensivcposition and a reconnaisMnce ,onc. The
attacking the adjacenlconpany. Whentimc permits,he
reinforcedcompanyreceiv€sa secudtysectorof oneand redistributeshis llring positions,
shifts key weapon
onc'half to two kilometersin width and conducts locations,ordcrsthc repair of trcnchesand
obstacles,
reconnaissance patrolsto d depthof fivekilomcten.The
rcplenishesammunition ard prepar€sfor further enemy
companycommanderassigns reinforccdplatoonstheir
attacks.
sectors,dcsignates the oulpost line of rcsislanc€ and
indicalesthe stuongpointsofthe defensc.
78
POINT}
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fi-$THBEETREES
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2ND PLT-
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lSTPLT 2ND MTF
5THMTF RIFLECO
BIFLECO
:noerr\ 1, 50--61
2ND FLT
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KEY
a i c.mp6nyob*wationpost{onehorizontal
_ platoon
linedenotesa obseruarion
oos0
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16-6.1 Mixedminerierdlanipe.so.netandanrnankl
@ Foinrorcod
shehe.
ffil Buildhq
79
SectionV. WITHDRAWAL
131. R.tirement
l3). Disensasemont a. buring thc reliemenr,a mororizedrifle company
a The disengagemcntof the main body of the may be asipcd r rear.llank. or adlanccguardmission.
bathlion is covercdby designated platoons, In such a rol€ it would be r€inforcedwith a ilery,
fi t-echelon
rcinforcedwith tank, adllery, mortars,lnd engineers. dtitank weapons, tank, andengincers.
The covering force, consistingof ihese platoons, and b. Duringany withdEwal,a "scorchcdearth"policy
norrnally led by the battalion command€r,remainsin is stricdyfolowed; people,livestockrnd equipmentare
positionand scckrto preventthe enemyflom lcarning evacunted,roads,bridges,conmunicationslincs and
of the withdrawalby continuingoperations. Shouldthe otherinstallations andsupplicsaredcstroyed.Obstaclcs
enemy attack, the higher cornmand may mount a includingbooby tr.ps and minesar€ usedto delaythe
counterattack or nuclear strike before the
disengaging
main body. Dsengagemcnt occursunderprotectionol
the coveringforces,artillery fif€s, andsmoke.
80
Vl. RELIEFlN PLACE
secrion
8l
^l CHAPTEB
9 . T H EM O T O B I Z E D
OPERATINU
B I F L EC O M P A N Y
G N D E BS P E C I A C
L ONDITIONS
Section1. GENERAL
UNDEBEXTREIV]E
Sectionll. OPERATIONS WEATHER
CONDITIONS
83
,. Some unitr which habituallyoperatein winter
climates havcthe mcdiumcaterpillartractor,GT-S(CAZ
4?) of theinrproved cat€rpilhrtractorCT.SM(GAZ-?l)
in lieu of APCS.Tlese vchiclesrre not armored,bul
thcir very low groundprcssuremalcs them idealfor
marshyor arcticrcgions(Fis re 64). Thescvehicles havc
b€enusedas reconnaissance vehiclesandprimemovers
for l2onun mortan ind anti.tankguns.Thereis also!
hcaly caleryillartractor,GT-T with twicethe payload
of the GT-SM,and which h usedby thc Sovietsfor I
variely of rolcs. The chassisof the GT-T forms the basis
for the ncw arnloredartillerytracto4APc,the M1970.
.. Trainingfor winleroperations is intcnsive.
Drivers
arc trainedin the operatioD andmainlenance ofvchiclcs
underwinle. conditions. Penonnelaretaught10moveas
ski-drawnand tank'borncinfartry, and to lir€ while
movingon skis. Thcy arc truincdin crossingtrenches
wilh rhc help of skj polcs.and in c'awlin8rnd running
on skis.Menaretaughthowto prevenlfrostbite.to care
and cleanthcir cquipment.andcamouflag€ lechniques.
:l]
84
.!
(5) Furnishing p(ieclion iionl ihe cold and prorec on). Altach€d trnks would pre.ede thc inlanll-v
supplyinghoi food and drink. and eachrank would tow one oI moresqurds(liigure66)
A?Cs wouldfollowat a distanceof tlp 1050 nreten behind
(6) i-rranging for rrpid bartlefield evacurtionirnd
protcction from rhe cold fo[ casualties.Higlcr hcrd- Lhc nt-anrD and suptort by l-rrc.By alta.king in sucha
quartersmay provide dog sled telns and hclicopierstor maDner,si ultaneousarnval ofunks and iJnanlty at rhe
assaultline is assurcd.Ai the assault line. the towcd
,. Reconnaissmcc rcceiv€sadded crnphasis (Figure inlanlrymcn rcleasethe ropes or crbles. lbrm m assault
rerm xssignedro 1e Linemd aiiack h coordinationwith the tdks. Attachcd
65). Frequently.rhe reconnaissance
bartalion 1s augrnenredby pcrsonnel fl(nn each of the crew-seryedwcapons arc mounled on deds a d rdved
firsr echclon attack oompanics.Up lo a platoon fronl
cach ot th€sc companies may be assigncda combat e- When thc snow is dcc!, ih€ infantry mly aftack
reconnaissancenission. Helicopten often assist by nrountedon ranks(Figur€ 67). Squadlcadcrs,posjrioned
transporiing deep patrols and by augnenting ll.rnk behind the tank turels, rnainlain communicationswith
the tark commnders o|cr ihe tank intefconD- At th€
proper time the squdd lcadcr notilles rhe tank conr
nranderto slow down and ordcrs his squad to jump off
r,rre, d k . t t . . q u a d, 1 . c 1r r o \ e ' b F h i l J r h Ft : r t .
I During rhe battle behind the FEBA, ski troops and
ianks attack stft g poinis liom thc flanks and rear.
J p p u r . J b ) I n u | I J\ l n d o r i i l e ) . R * u n l r . s r f p r s
conductcdby dcsignatedsquadsor platoons.
r! s. Thc pursuii nray be conductedby lroops |tou tcd
in AtCs; horvcvcr, in deep snow. the cornlNny corn-
mander mdy scnd }ns APCS by road and mount lxs
infaniry on attach€d lanl$ and codtinue the pul$rir.
W l . e nr I e ' e - r e 1 " r " . d . . L h .t r s u r . o . t e e n e r , !r , ; n .
lank-borneinfantry might be at an rvciagc speedol8-12
142. Defense
a. The depth of snow and ihe cold affect defensive
Figure65. Motorizedrifle companycommander posiiions (Figure 68). The FEBA is s€lectedclose to
conductingreconnaissancewith nalural wintef obstacles-Ir deep snow, ice is used !o
subordinateand attachedcommanders. ibrm slippcrybanksin liont ol the delensesand to build
r b o \ e B r ' ' L n .r . r f h . . i n $ " r n p \ d I e , . .D L r i l C p u -
c. The motodzedrjfle conrpanymay atlack on a
longed opefations.special snow-clearjngoperationsare
frontageof up to 1000 mererswith all threephtoons
However, organized !o keep mirefields and odrer obstacles
abrcirsranda rcinlorccdsquadin feserve. due
to thc fact that wintcr opcrarions
makemaneuvef nror€
,. ln deep snow lionlagcs may be increas€d.The
difficult (espeoialyin deepsnow), res€rv€s are olicn
largcrthanundcrnornal operatingconditions.A batta- motorized riflc company nray be assignedr fronmgc ol
up to 1.000 meters,rnd plaioons up to 500 n1elen.wi$r
Lionoperatingin deepsnow.may attackin one€chelon
grps up to 300 mereN betweencompanicsand up ro 200
andmainrainup 1oa conrpany in reservc.
nretersbetweenplatoons.
d ln nonnuclcalcondiiions,the motofized rifle
.. in organizinga defensiv€positior in ure snorv,tne
companyoften attacksdismounted and on skis(du.ing
. u r r p - r ) 1 ' r ' r . n J L r h l e . e r r sI p r c p l n . i o n ' i n
nuclear conditionsthey would remain nounlcd lbr
addition to lhc nolmal ones:
?
85
(l) To aid thc construclionof dcfensivepo$uons, (4) Wulningsh€trers
_ u€ construcrcd.
thc atrongcstdelenscs !re placedalongroadsandin ureas d.- Engineerruppurt
wiLh lighr snow cover. Poputited rrcrs and fur€sts (^ ro the companyis increa!€d.
ombatcngineeause explusi\echnrges tu corarrucr
provideshclterandareofrenused$ strongpoints.
trenchesand shelters.AlCs usenaruralcovcror Lrcncnes
(2) nanks arc srrengrhencd to counrerski-borne ar-econsrructcd
for rhem.TaJ*saredugrn wir}l rhc.id
altack. The secondcchetonlrcservelcompan)anq/ur
or tiutldozcr a(achmenlr. Tank and ApCs are
Oe ballaUonrese.vc may bc suppljedwirh skis. camouflagedwith winter camouflagesets.
(3) Atlached tanks and artillcry areprovidedwith
.
specral equlpmenl to improve their cross_conntry
mobility.
Figure66.Tankstowing
infanry.
143. Operations
in the DesertandExtremeHeat riencein dcsertoperations.The 6th Currds Tant Anny
D€se( operationsmay be chancterizedby tlrc lack of in prticular encountered JI of drc problemsof desert
movcment in Mongolia. Today, desert warfare
dcvclopedroad networks,difficulty of movemcnlin
najor feature of thc tnining programs
sand,salt marshes and sanddunes,Linitedamountsof techniquesare a
Frequentwinds in those military districtscncompassing desertregions.
waterand fuel, andhigh temperatures.
These include thc Turkestan,Centrul Asian, Transbaikal
andduststormsinterferewith movementandadversely
Far East nilitry districts as wel as the Mongolian
affect comunications capabiiitiesand equipm€nt.At and
night, t}te abiasiveeffect of dust on equipment,dif- People'sRepublic.
ficulty in orientalionand crmouliageJnd a nurnberof
olher factors exert a substanlinlinfluenceon dle actions 145. Doctrine
of personnel and t]rc use of equipment in r dcse.t a. Sovict offensive doctrine for desert operations
envi.onment.The desertalsoposesproblensfor CBR stressesreconnaissancc on a broad front, on nrultiple
defense. In a sandydesertregion,the levelof radiation
axesand in gear dep$. tlc cKisrence of latgeSapsir
h a radioactivecloud is frequentlytwo three times the encrny'sdefenseenablesreconnaissance tcamsto
higher thar in soil havingplant cover.Strongdust clouds
conduct deep pencirationmitsions.Us€ is rnade of
may bringsecondary contamination, to menandequip-
helicoptcrsto transportreconnaissance penonncl.As a
ncnt. Duc io .he extuemeheat dudng the day t.oops flrlc, units attack on a wider ftont and have deeper
can safely wear their insulrted CBR protcctive clothing
objcctives than in other types of terrain. Moreover
aoronly 15-20minutcs. attention is given to ensuretbal attackingrcgimenisand
battalions can operate independerdy. A large part of
144. HinoricalPerspective availableartilery, engineer,and chemicaltroops are
During the 1945 Manchudan Campaign against th€ attrched to ihem- Auxiliary communicationnctworks
Japancsc,illc Sovict Army gaincd coNiderablc expc- may be sct up to maintain communicationswitl wid€iy
dispersed units.
87
,. For a dcfense in thedesert,stong secondechelons r47. Offense
and reserves are crcatedand disposedin geater depth In thc desert,the motorizedrifle companyusua[y
thanundcrnormalcondilioDs. The battalionfrontageis altacks in one cchelon. A batlalion usLlrlly deploys in
the samc as under normal conditions,except when companycolumnsat a distanceof 12-15km from the
occupyinS a secondary avcnueof approach. In the later FEBAandcompanics deployinlo platooncolumnsat a
case,the companiesand platoonswould defcndon a distanccof thr€eto five kilomcters-Depcndingupon the
widerfrontage. statc of the dcfenses,the companyattacks either
mounted or dismountedbehindattachedamor, and
146. Trainins pressesthc attack rapidly (Figure70).
Trrining corcentrrteson basiccombatskills,landnavi-
gation(using dnection.i ryros ai well ar mapsand 148. Delense
other cquipneno in desert terrain and spccialired The motori/edril'lc companyon lhe dcfenseoccupies
mdntenance procedures (Figurc69). Physical trainingis the samefrortagc as during normal operations,except
also st.cssed. Enginecr, chemical, artillery, tanl, and whcn posted along a secondaryenemy avenueof
infantry forcesconductspecinlized aswell ascombincd approach. Normally the defensc is organizedin one
armsilaining.Coordinated hclibomeandgroundassault echelon. In organizing the defensive positions d
operations in thc deserthavebcenreportcdin thc Soviet reinforcingthe wallsof foxioles.ltenches.communica
press. dons trenchesand slrclters,usc is made of sandbags,
mats,and fascines. Shcltersand dugoutsareusuallyofa
light type. Siocksof arununition,waterand fuel arc
built up. Weaponsandvchiclesarc regularlychcck€dand
ir
88
LEVELSANDY l'
taEs€RvEl
<t+_do:
/,i,
*aorii 7gq14r,
. -.RTFIECO
$ooE'
/n
6
/++-\
j
6 vo".r,"a,tn"
in rhe.ttaci "o.pany,
ei.torc.d bvranks, \e/
fi-t;--1 antp.e.nel min6neld
A uotoiz"arrn.cmp.ny inrheatt cr
--a---a- P.sgE lhreuqh.n aniiperionnelminetuld
<-t|-rro' Motoizeddn. comp.nyin m€rchcol|)mn
-=- l22Dm halEsr
A oberyadon pon
90
"lt
AND SWAMPS
lN FORESTS
Sectionlll. OPERATIONS
91
are the first to be alsaulted.To aid initially in navigation Designatedrifle units consolidate and defend seized
and control, the companycommmder designates a roadjunctionsand lancs.Suchjunctionsmay be scized
guideplatoon,andplatoonleadcnassigna guidcsquad. by helibome forces movinSaheadof ihe main attack.
ln the depth of a forest,the companyarcmpb both The attacking troops continue forward, destroyingor
shalowanddeepcnvelopmcnts of lhe enemypositions. roulingth€ cnemyforcesuntil the objectivcsaretaken.
Fu[ fire support is utilizcd. Tanls and antitanl guns Companyand battalion rcseflesarcmaintainedto defeat
cngagecnemy weaponslocatcd on roads and lane!. en€mycounlerattack.
1STMOTORIZEO
RIFTE
(EY
<-F-6 Motoizedille plaroontn DErchcolumn @ D.f6.siv€ po3iio n
Figure71.Reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionattackingin forestedswampyterrain.
92
r53. Delcms rangc.As time permits,attachedengineers construct
a. The defenseof a battrlionin a forcstis basedon a obs.aclcs in the path of probablc €nemy advancc.
systemof fir€s of fortificd companystrongpoints,a Antitank guns are kept well forward in or between
systemof natural,nd camouflagcd artificialobstacles, platoon positions 1o support the company. Monds ale
ambushes, and counterattacks. Dcpending on the situa. posilioncd in clearings to the rcarof the lorward unitsso
tion, the FEBA is either organted in front of thc forest that then fucs can be brought to beareffectively on thc
or scvcralhundrednetcrs insidethe foresi.ln thelattel attackingenemyforces.
ca!€,outposts,scrcening detachmcnts and sA-7gunncrs e As the enemy attack develops,weaponsare
ar€ deploycdalongthe edgeof the woods.Thc batta- brought to bear to disorganizc, disruptand halt bis
lion's secondecheloncompany(rcscrve)is normaly advancc bcforehe reaches the conpanyposition.Should
deployed ncar roads, lanes or openings.Though the enemypenetntethe position,a stubborndefense is
organizedfor perineter dcfens€,it is also prepared to maintained until countcrattacking forces can cngage
counteraltack anlr/hcrein $e batlalion\ defensive area. him. Companysnipcn conc€ntrat€on officc$, machine
Someartilery may be attacfied to compeies and uscd Sunners! weaponscrcws,andsnipers.In forests,hand-to'
primarilyfor diect fire. Tanks,rntitank weapons, and hnnd conbat is commonduc t6 the restrictedfield5of
sef-propclled artillery conduct counterakck with the fire andpoor visibility.
rcservesor are ritachcd to the first echcloncomeaniesto
rcinforce th€ir antitank capability. 194.
,. Normaly, a company defensiveposirion in Tle conplexjtiesof fighting in swmpy and forest€d
forcstcd areasconsistsol a preparedand camouflaged areaswould posedefinit€ problemsfor dle Soviet small
strong point near or at thc edgeof th€ forest. Tarlksand unit lerder,particuhrlyin the arcasoI maprerd$g and
APCSa.e positioned near roads or fire lancs with the cxercisinginitiative.
missionof engaging encmytzn[s andA]fs at ma-\imum
S€ctionlV. OPERATIONS
lN MOUNTAINS
Figure72. gun,M1966.
76mmmountain
94
'l
(2) Act as m envelopinsforce of a battalion or
regrment.
(3) Conductheliborneopennons.
.. The motorizedrifle comprny missionin mountain-
ousrenrn moslofrenmcnLioncd b\ dreSo\ierpres,i" a
flanking or envelopncnt opcntion. ln such a rolc, tlre
t- companymay be given any of the folowing tasks:
T destroying nuclear delivery means, seizing critical
heighrs. crosiings.roadjuncrions.and nrounlairpas{s
in the€n€myrear areasandon his flmks, andretaining
rhemuntillink up wirf lhemainforces. Tle e,rmpany is
reinfofced with lisht aftilery, mortar!, engin€ersand
other subunits and is supportedby th€ artillery of the
95
p $
'P>d
3ROPIT
n... \
ii;lj \
i:l
,i1-i.wooos
Figu.e74. Motorizedriflecompany
attackrngjn mounlainousteffain.
rm. Defense lerain's inhbiting €ffecis or radio communicatioff,
wide useof wne is made.
a The usurl defensive principles appti€d by the
Soviets are not significardy rnodified in mountainous c. Artillery, mortan, antitank, tank, engheer, ard
terrain. A stabledefensecanbc organizedin a shon time chemical defense u ts ar€ normaly attached to a
in tenain possessing motorized rifle compsny occupyiry a forward def€nsive
rivers,vafl€ys,gorgcs,a number of
position. Attached mortars and anil€ry are nonnaly
heights, ridges and irnpassablesecton. Troops are
normalty d€ployedalongroads,valleys,on flat mountain placed on reverseslop€s.Fire plansprovidc covengeof
tops aIId on forward and rev€ne slopes, To protect defiles, roadjunctioN and streamffossings.Significance
personneland equipment,ravines,trenches,nanow and is attached to the secudty ard prctection of gaps
deep gorges,tumels and passageways between strong pohts and at junctiorN. A combit
ar€ uled (Figur€
7s). security detachment(nornaly a squad) md listening
postsfrom the platoonsffe dispatchedto coy€rgapr
,. The battalion d€f€nsi\€ sector is organizedinto
companyand platoon strongpoints which coveravenues d CBR weaponsnay b€ employedby higher head-
quaners to block the en€myadvanceor in conjunction
of approach.and ar€ organizedto provide afl-around
secudty. Att€ntion is focusedon av€nuesof approach liith a counterattack.
Although some tark fron the regirnentl t Jlk
for taDis. At such points, antita ( ard anti,infarhy ".
battalion ar€ normaly alotted to the fust €chelon
w€apons are coric€ntrated, Min€fields, rock inpedi-
m€nts, and other obstaclesare inst lled. Duc ro the battalions, shong counterattack forces de nahtained
by 'egimenl and division.Batlalons and compdies
maintainsmaler rese e forces,
97
a
0
KEY
i3) Thirdmotorizedrirteptatoonl).
t
I Anrilanksrcnadelauncher.
i Companycommandelscommanda.d obseryaiion
FiE nntituntminus.
]' Fougassesorexptosives.
A APC
Fisure
75.Themotorized
rifiecompanyjn the defense;n
mountainous
terrain.
98
t
SectionV. WATERBARRIEROPERATIONS
162. HistoricalPelspective
a During World WaJII, the Cennanswerc repeatedly
surprisedby tbe speed witn which Soviet units crossed
water obstacles.Cfossingthe Dncpr River in 1943, t}le
I
Germanswere able to use only scven existing bridges.
one float bndge md one improviscdfcrry in a sector300
I miles long. Following closcly bchind lhe Geflnans,tne
Sovi€tsdroppedseveralthousandparachutistsov€I a 200
mile long zone in order 1o cstablishbridgeheads.Soon
thereafterthey built 57 bddges,9 foot bridgesand other
river crossing facilitics for an average of one crossing
elery 4 rniles of river (Thc Germansavefased1 crossing
per 33 nilet. The rapidity rvith which the Soviels
crossedthe Dnepr and other rivcrs, swampsand lakes
placed tremendous prcssureon the retreating German
forces. The Soviets, usudlly crossingwater barri€m at
down cr du\k, used ilrc cover of darkness to the
Figure76. Exercise"Dnepr" 1967.
99
163. Doctrin. occupicdand fortfied in orderto prcvcnlsurpdscand
a Soviet doctrine strcsscs the forcing of water to subjcct attackcf to flanling fire. Th€ dcfense
obstadesfrom the march on a broad front- Should the concentratcs panicularlyon suitablecrossingareasfor
sttack from the mrJchfail, thc waterbarricrwouldbc enemyforces.Antitankguns,tanks,andmtitanj(guided
crossedaftcr a shod pcriodof prepararion. Thc Sovietsmissilcsare movedcloseto thc bank to destroycncmy
believethat successin suchoperaiions depends uponthe armorattemptingto c(xs. Nuclearandchemicaland/or
folowing: convcntional artilery,air andmisrilestrikesareplanned
(l) Reconnaissaftc, to ircludc the oppositeside on the approachesto, the wat€r obstacle and on
of thewatcrobstacle. significant crossingsitcs.
(2) Plannine,bascdupon rcconnaissance reporls
and conductcdw€[ bcfore troops reach the eater 164. Equipment andTr.ining
d, The BMP+quipped and BTR€quippcdmotorized
(3) D€struction of cnerDyforccs on both banks. rille companics(exceptfor thosewith drc BTR 152)
(4) Rapidily n lhc arracl. ro includetic seizure have an amphibiouscapabilitywhich doesnot need
of undamagcdcrossings,crossingon a broad front, aod augmcntation. The SovietAriny possesses a numberof
dcvelopmentof the offensiveon the far bank. racked amphjbianswhich would be u$d in moving
(5) Proper orSaniz-rtionof the assaultforces,and BTR-I52s and attached non-amphibious equipmcnt
the timely uscof crossingcquipment. (suchas artillery,morlars,etc.)acrolsthe waterobsta-
(6) Successful overcomingof obstacles, bot}l in cle. Thc 10 ton K6l (GPT) witl a cargocapacityin
the water and on the banks. exccssof Iive tons andthe 20 ton PTSwith a capacityin
(7) Covcng€of thc crossingsitesand troops fron excessof l0 tons aft id€ally suited for transporting
enemyair strikes, non-amphibiousequipmcnl (Figure 77). Medium tanks
,- Thc Sovietsalsostrcssthe useof tacticalh€libornc attachcdto the motodzedrifle compmyhavesnorkeling
forcesto achievesurprisc,to seizekcy terrain,andaid deviccsfor crossing waterobstaclcs up to 5.5 meten in
ih€ mainrttack. depth.If the wateri! too dcep,tankscrosson bridgcsor
c- While CBR and/or conventiond strikes wil be feri€s erectcdby the regimentalor divisionenginecrs.
planned agrirst enemy forc€s, the Soviets avoid the ,. The purposeof r'ver crossingtrainingis to train
concentrationof their forcesby attackingon a broad unitsto crossa watcrobstacle underdifficultconditions,
lront with minimumdelayin approaching and crorsing without slowingtlle attackand to rvoid concentration
the water obstacle.Battalion crossingsectorsarechosen of troops. Motorizedrine battalions are nained to cross
so that nol mor€ thrn one battalion could be destroyed water obstaclesfrom lhc march. Soldicn are taught to
by a medium yicld nuclearburst. The battalion acthg lis follow thc orders of thc crossinScommandant(usually
the advancegunrdof tle regitnentwould us€two to the engirccrunit commandet.DriversaretauShthow to
thJee company.size crossingpoints. the number of preparcthcir vehiclesfor crossinS operations,and how
crossing points might bc increased by succeeding to ncgotiatewater obstaclesby fording andwhcn afloat.
Tanl drivers are trained in snorkeling operarionsand
d ln the dcfenseof a watcr obstacle,the Soviet! driving over hastily erectedbridgesand only after thcy
normally organizethcir main defenseon their sideof the havepracticedunderwaterdrivingarc they considered
obstacle.Should defenseof a bridgeheadbe necessary, fuly trained. BMPShave bcen noted firing their main
the Sovi€ts would defend on both bank. Islatrdsar€ armamcntduringa watcr crossinS-
100
tr,t
Figure77. K-61andPTStrackedamphibious
carrierc
unloading
assauhtroops.
t0r
,--
i.:q,h?+P
\ \
7*t,t1,
ISTMTS
RIFLECO
@il
$I
A APc <r+--Od lMotorized ite company
li?All .oun"*""o,
$o"o liiEd
",',o,,u".
u i,"a unr,ranripersonner
minerierd
"n,i
@ e
V Helibornerandins
@
Figufe78. A reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionrorcrnga warer
barrier
to2
t A dismountcdmororizcdriile companymay bc off oncefte tanJ(hasemergedfrom rhewater,rherank
landcdby helicopterto scizckcy rerrainto assrsrLnc carnot engagein sustained combatunril de-sealinBhas
crossinSof tfie main body and to fonn a biocking tlten place- a proces lhat takesabout 20 mmures.
position to cul off vithdrawing eftrny forces or ro Bccause of th€vulncrabilities prcscnredby deepfording,
prcvcnt cncmy rcscrvcslrom counrcrallacking. whcn the Sovietspreferto transfertheirtanksto the opposire
sufficientrsrault forceshave crossedover the warer bark by ferry.
obstacleand moveclto exploit the crossing, the pcrson-
ncl cadcrs of thc helibornc unit are brought forward 166. D€r€nse
andrhecompanyremountsllndcontinuesrheattack.
a. Thc motorizedrifle companycommllnderorga
& Expansionand improvementof crossingsitesare nies his dcfcnseon
left to higherhcadquarrers. rhebarisola LarefulreLonnaissan,Je
Bridgcsin lar8cnumbcrsand of the
terrain,the mturc of the riverbanl6,and closc
types ee ivailable for rransporting non-amphibious
coordination with adjacerrunits. The FEBA is described
vehicles.
by thc baltalion command€r.The river bank oppositeis
i. Wehavenoledseveral vulnerabilities
duringSoviet bmught underconcentrated lre at tbe poinrssuitable
rivc! cfossingopcrations.txact uossingsitesmay be
for a crossingwhil€ the entireriverbank is coveredby
prematurely revcalcdby Sovictrecoflnaissancc personncl flanling machhegun fire.
Attempts by the cneny !o
dlus enabling the dcfcndcr ro take effective reconnotter,to bring
up or launchrivcr-crossinSmaterial
countermeasures. snorkelslre wlnerableto hostilefirc and equipment,ro cstablisha
crossingor actuallyto
and may be damugcdprior to the crossinS. Moreover, effect! crossing, aretakenunderfirc (Figurc79).
once the tanl is sealedfor a riv€r crossin8 cannor ,. At night, conrbatoutpostsandobservarion posls
fight, since the turrel is locked and the main gun tube are s€nt forward to
the river banks to detect enemy
blockcd.Althouti the snork€lmay be quickly blown
103
Yu: *.t-S 1SJMTSJIFLE COWITHATANK
PLI 6 2 A(TILLE&Y.
PECEJ @
w
nrrrico a, y i'^'. . i
6rt wooDs.,- a..t,_.-,.\;r,1-,., ,
- '--'-
;;&, 7
sworup ,
lful';*.r
I . :|..'-)1 i,.-';lt.
. -'.' j(9r,'ri.-,l:,1'
rld '
-^5-:
s9ltri,^199 '
,,ri ,
'
tu__
o
____a\_i_
.,r i.'1itl. *-"i
_ _ _ ___/.'\_
ry'+ii,$ri,t*iiiN
KEY
,"s_, Artilleryb3ifaqeldesignared
"A", "8"
Combarvehiclewith anrnankmi$iles
I Headquanerc,
iid mororizedrifle baltalion
ffi euro'nn
/n
\92
104
2t
SectionVl. COMBATlN BUILT-UPABEAS
106
ffiMffi -:,-:
\ I
ffi
:ff
#--b, s -rol ro
\
*"'-
/
(""---
--9. o
l0
I
,*a:i
n,
LrI Ii ll Il
* f
3FDSOD
KEY
O ranr
C apc
--=a Pa$aqelhrousha hixeddinefietd (ant'
lzmm hDwil2er loalo.l
--_T--
-& Recoitte$r e
* oocrwitruuirainss
Figure81.The reinfofcedmotorizedriftecompany
in the attackin a buitt_uparea.
I08
171. Offenre pointi buildnrgslocaied at slrcel intcrs€clionsor on
a. ln planningan altack on a buill up arca,Sovicl squares aregivcnljrst pdority. In eachsiror8point.fire
officersdorvnto companylevelstudy large-scale naps is organized in sevcraitien. with most wcaponslocated
andphotosof the area.Information is alsogleded front on thc lower floorsandin balements. Slructurcswhich
thc localpopulace andrccomaissance. Thednectonlnd intcrferewith fieldsoffire areleveled.
width of streetsandunderground passages,the locations ,. Tllc defensivebatile within the builtup area
of ncjor adminhlralivc buildingr.communkurro'r ccn. usuallybrcaksup into scparateengagemenls lbr indi-
1en,utility buildings.train stationsandotherobjectivcs vidudl platoon and companystrongpoints wldch mLlst
whoseseizurcwouldlssht in the capturcof tlle city arc often fidl independcndy. Consequ€ntly. rhe company
studicdin detail(Figure8l). rr nomrll' rcLnlorccdwith tlnls. urilc'y. cngineers.
,- Bccause of fragmcntadon ofa battlefor a built-up and combat engineers, to includeflanrethrovcrs.ftc
area.motodzedrifle companicsar€ lugmentedwilh company commrnder nor ally retains reinforced
artillery,tanks,cngineen,chenicd, and flamethrowcr
unitsto form assrullgroups. c. Sirongponrtsare organized lbr al-arcunddefense
.. Attack frontrgcs are reduccd and a reservc and mutud firc supportwirh adiaccntstrong points.
mainlain€d at mosllevcls.Althoughattackfrontages and Whenfeaiible. strongpoin(sarejuinedby communicz.
formalionswould depcndupon the densiryandnarurc
of thc buildingsl|nd thc strengthof the dcfcnses, lhe d. Antjtank and dtipclsonnel obsilclcsare estab
motorizcdrifie corupunyusuallyattacksdhmountedin lishedin the strcets,in intcrvalsbetweenslrontpoints,
onecchclonon a flonlagcof200'300melers.A squadis and on approach€s to baricadcs,which arc covcredby
nonnallyretaincdin rcscrveat companylevcl;aphloon flankingand crosslue. Fla ctluowersandmachineguo
positionsare established within the barricades, which
d. Thc depth of objcctiycsis alsorcducedin urban hrvc embrasures to permit firing along slrccts and
fidting. The objectiveof a reinforccdmotorizedrillc squarcs.Tank! md howitzen are attached!o platoons
comPanymight be to scizepart of a larg€bunding,a for mbushesor to buttressstrongpoints.Theirliring
separatebuildingor sevcralsmall buildingswithin an positionsarepreparedin bascmenls or groundfloo$ of
enemyslrongpoint. buildingsor behind stonc walls rn which embmruresarc
e. Artilery attach€dto companiesand platoonsis madcfor firingnndobservation.
usedto providedirectfire support.Aitachedtanksmd a Antiaircrdftwcaponslrom regimentand division
antitankweapons op€rrlcin thc maintrafficdlencs rnd Iurnish air d€fensc,consistnrg of antiaircrutlm,rchine'
helpsealoffareasunderaltackby drecompany- gunsand SA.?smountedon ih€ roofs of ligh buildings
t Withh the conrpanyzonc of operation,buildings and antiancraftgunsand nissilcsspreadthroughoutthe
areclearcdsystematicJly. Trnls nay leadtheassaullin city in locrlions which pcrmit firing in .iI dircctions.
wedg€formalion.with one t rl in the middleof thc Antiaircraltobservation postsafe alsosct up on high
roadand two behindon cachside,with infantrymcnon buildingsprovidingall'aroundobseflation.
both sidcsof the streetmd tuing at buildingson th€ t Passas€s and dfiv€ways,constructedwilhin city
oppositcside.the BMPaddsvaluabi€ fire supportto tlre blocks,and existingunderground tunneh are usedlbr
dismountedinfantrymen.Whcn cncmy resistlnccis the mrncuverof small unils- Obslaclcsare placedin
brokcn,the companyeitherprepareslo repelcounteF unusedunderground passirgcs,
andtheircxitsSuarded.
attacksor continues the rdva ce.
& Frequentsortiesand raidson thc cncmypositions
172. Delense areconsidcrcd asimportant$ thc defense of thc strong
point iiself.
r. The motorizedrifle company'ray defenda snal
buih.up areaor a groupof buitdingswithtn a cily. One
of morebuildingsare uscdfor the creationof a strong
l
109
r73. Vulnerabilities advance for a shortpcriodoftimc. Moreovcr, thehighly
Urban combat,with its fughammunitioncxpenditurc individualisticnaturc of city warfare may initially 1ax
ratcsand long-duratlon combat,may poscconsid€rablc conpany dnd battalion grade officersand NCOS not
problems to a logistics systcm gearedto high rates of accustorncd lo exercisinginitiativc.
SectionVll. HELIBORNEOPEBATIONS
lt0
Figure83. Mi-6 Hook.
...*.''.'/.
Figure85. Mi 10 Harke.
Figure84. Mi-8Hip
Figure86. lvli-12Homer
111
.-],P|.;..
Figure87. Mi 1 Hare.
112
TII
'v purH
tz ru! 68ern6u
\
Figure90. Helicoprermockuptrainingdevice.
I I4
SectionVIll- NIGHTOPERATIONS
115
Figure9l.lR sightingsystem,modelNSP-2.
116
I
It7
184. Offeffe illuminatedlape to aid in mLltualjdentificationand
a. Ge erul. The mototizedrifle companymay attack control.The compmycommandcr assicns eachplaloon
indepcndcnrlyl night,but normallyit attacksasparl of irs own color. A pocket flasl ilht fast€ned on the
the battaliondismounted, in oneechelon.In orderto iid individual's back identifies his unit. white arm bmds
commandand control the altrck is made withoul (black in winter on white unif{rms) oo personnel and
complicaledmancuvcr- The comFny is nomally rein' whitc luninous cncles, squares or dianloods on the sides
lorcedwrth armor.id'jle'y ,nLl/ormnrtars. enginccr,of APCSand tanksprovidefor rccognition ofonc\ unit.
andchemical units(Figure 95)- Movem€nt routcs ,nd passases tluough mineficlds are
b. Trpes of Night Attact Tbe night attack nay bc marked.
supportcd or ur$upporled, illuminated or non. (3) Ihe companycomm.rnder formrialcsa night
iltuminatcd.Normdly it \yill be launchedaftcr an vhion dcvice and illumhltion plan. Within tllc company,
anillery prcparadon md wi]l involveextensiveusc of illumination b cdrried out by rocket and iuuninxring
illuminationto cxposcenemypositions. flar€s uscd by designated teams. Sign l flares and lracer
c. Prcpafation hr Niglx Cotnbat. Due to the in. amrnunition nre used for target identificaLion md
creasedco cxlty of night operations,the conrpany coordination, and to mark phise lines lcached by the
comnrandcrlakcs a numbe. of nreasures to cnsurc platoons. Night vision equipmenl used during tie
conlrol of his unit andaccomplishment of his mission. approach rd berween pcriuJs ,,f lunlm!riun i5 prc-
(l) To xid in navieation,he desiSnates a lcad planncd.
platoon for lhc conpmy. Withi. eachplatoona lend (4) thc conpmy conmanderand platoonleaders
squadis dcsignatcd by tlle platoon leader,a5 wcll .s check for propcrfunctioninSof nightvisiondevices.nd
individuals who monitorthe directionofmovemcntand the inlernal and externalvehicularlightingsystensitr
rcpon any dcviationfron the assigned dtcction to the the assernbly rea prior to thc attack.
(5) Thc cornpanycornnanderstudicsrhe terrain
(2) In additionto th€ uscof radioandmessengers. in detail, .eco.noiters,sclectsplatoon zon€sfor thc
use b madeof a larictv of o&er signaldevicesand advance, designates platoonobjcctivcs, rssignsrcfcrcncc
ll8
I
points identifiable at nighr, inslrucis guidcsand coordi (2) Du.ing the night battle, the conpany com-
nateswith attachedand supportingunils. mander is ded to the possibility of enemy counter
d Al1ack Formationsand Objcctivcs. attack, particularly dudng the consolidation phaseand
(l) Ifenemy resistance is light. thc motorizcd ril1c the batile beyond ihe FEBA. Reconnaissanceand
comprny nray attack mounted or on the back of secuity, especidllyon the fldtrks, is emphdsized.When
attached tanks. Mor€ common. however, wiil be ihe attackedby supefiof enemy forcesdurins consolidation,
dismounted atiack. The company normally attacks on the company attempts to d€stroythe enemy by firc and
line $ith no.eseNe wlrile the battalion usualy maintains subsequentlyby attack on the flanks and rear.Should a
a company in reseNe. The attack frontages for tlle counterattack be launched dudng the pursuit, thc
company afe generally the same ai during daylight motorizcd nne company dcfcals it from the maJch,
operationsand dependprimarily upon lhe nature ofdre thereby ensudng a high rate of advancc.Duing both
terfain and wheiher of not nuciear weaponsare used. tyles of counterattrck, intensive nighl iilunination is
Fof the cotnpany attack over very rugged terrarn rn
non-nuclearconditions, fie frontageis slightly reduced
I Trunsition ffom Night to Day OperatioN. The
(400 to s00 mcicrs). overriding pdnciple in th€ transirion from night to day
(2) ln hilly and woodcd tcrain whcn nuclcar operalionsb continuity oI the offensive-Before dawn,
weapons aJe not used, the depth ol tnc comprny ddditional tasks are ,llocated to the attacking com-
objectivenormrly is fronr one to one and one-hrlf km. panies,arnmunition is rcplenisltd. and measufestakcn
In nore favorable terruin md wilh the use of nuclerr to protecl th€ lroops from enemy use of nuclcar
weapons,thc dcp$ is incrcascd. wcapons.The ballalion reserve,ifnot connitted during
c- Conduct of thc Arlack the right is pfepared for comnritment to maintain the
I (1) Pnor 10 the assault,the comprny atiempts 10 momcntum ol thc atlack. Rcconnaissancc
c a p r u r rn r J e \ l r i ) e n e T ) u u r p u : r J. n J ' F . o n n J r s $ n c .Anliancrall defense dnd cdnoufl€e
is intcnsified.
clenrents by surprise, without opening fire. Obstxcles increasedwith the approachof daylight. Pu|suit begins
rcconnoitcredby dayiighl are destroyedby specialunits prior to dayiight with additional instructions io con-
iusi bclbrc il}c assault.Thc company bcginsthe assault paniesand platoonsbeingissuedduring the nurch.
rt a prcdcsi$atcd tnne, usualy prcccded by adillery
and lnortar fire- Platoonsnonnally assaultofl iine. The 185. Defense
assault forces move forward without stopping, over
rundng their objeclives and vigorously developingthe a. Gencral. Thc dcfcnder nay have an advantagc,
artack in depth- The direction of the attack is because he has had lhe oppoftunity lo organizelns
pcriodicaly rnalked during the course of the battle by position, to preparetue plans,and lo cstablishbarners
aircraft, artilery. and rnorars utilizing illundnating alons iikely avenuesof approach.fte defend€rknows
his location while the attacker may experienceorienta-
amnunirion- To achieve greater coordination and
tion problen1s.The defender, howevef. is hindered by
mutual suppot, the attacled tanks nonnally attack
the frct that darknessrcducestie effeclivenessof ainred
within the combal formations of the platoons.However
if the enemy\ rntitank means have been effectively fire ds weli ar observrtion rrd reconnaissrnce.When
possible, unit begins its defensive phnning and
suppressed and if there is nrtensiveground ilumination, "
ihc ianks attack slightly ahcad of the nfmtry. After the organization during daytight.
,- T1l€ Chdngeoler fron1 Duy to Night Defense.Two
enemy defenseshave been olercome, personnelcarriers
rrc calcd forward to support ihc pursuit or to take parl major considerations in lhe chmgcovcr from day to
night delense are secu.jty xnd illumination. Listening
h the reorganizationof the company's new defensive
posilions. Should lhc assault tuil, thc company con- posts are organizcd and obscrvation of th€ enemy's
h I n l e r \ r r e J s , , l h a l , l e p o 5 s i b i L l )o f s u r f r i s e
solidates on the most forward posilion reached. T]le a f r r v j r e .
is reduccd. Wiihin thc platoons,additional observersare
company withdraws fronr this posjtion only on order of
detailed to keep obstaclesand concealedapproachcs
the batl.lion corrmander.
119
under observation. Patrollbgis increased. Weapons are (2) The company'snighl visiondevicesare uscd
preparedduring daylightfor nighl fuing and drta arc extensively, with primaryand alternrtepositionsbeing
compiledfor propcr use of all wcrpons.Crew-servcddesignatcd for every weaponwith m inJrarcddevice.
weaponswhose positions were exposedduring daylight Coordinationbetwecninfraredspotlightand illumina-
are trmsfenedto altematepositions.Light dd sound tion posts,andproccdures to b€ folowcd for individual
signahare established and signalproccduresfor thc and group target detcction are established.Roving
controlof fifes disseminated. Tracerrouddsand shella. ilumination posts,dummygun positionsind simulated
flarcsand other meansof illumination areissucd. infrar€d sighb ar€ eslablishedin orde. to mislcad the
.: Forwird DefensePosturc. In the night dcfcnse, enemyasto the actualprovisionsfor night defense.
tanks,antitankguns,and rhe batialionrcserve(s€cond e. Organizationof thc Defense
echelon)are normdly movedcloserto tlrc FEBA to (l) Organization of tne night defensivcposition
incrcaic the density of fire in front of the FEBA. may bc done underdiffcrentcircumstances; the com-
Mcther the entire battalion r€servei5 mov€d forward pany may or may not be ableto prepaftits def€nse
dcpcndsupon the situation. The cornmandermost weigh duringdaylighthours.If the companymustprepareits
the dangerof pr€scntingr better iarSetfor eremy defenses duringa periodof poor visibility,the task is
nuclear flres apinst the necessityto hav€ adequalc rnoredifficult. In sucha situation,emphnsis is placedon
combat powcr forward to repel attack. Basically,thc stepp€d-upreconnaiss.rncc, us€of illumination andnight
batialioncommander must decidewh€therto position vision means,andon continousobservalion.The defense
his sccondechelonGeserve) in a counterattack posture is organizcdaccordingto the principlcsoullined in
or for fum retenrionof terrdn behindthc FEBA. If he chaptcr2. Frontages and dcpthsof defendingplatoons
dccideson ihc former,the sccond€chelonGescnc)is and compdnicsar€ approxima.ely the same as during
moved forward prior to darknessinro a concentation daylight operanons.The battalion second cchelon
area favombl€for launchingcountcrattacks. Countcr. (resewc)however,is normdllyup closerto the forward
attrck routesarc preparedduringdaylighthoun. lfhe
dccideson the lattcr, the battulion cornmanderpositions (2) \lhen the companyhasorganizcdits defensivc
his secondechelon(rescrvc)on favorableterrain astride position during daylighl houn, prepaJrtion cent€rson
thc arcaofpossibleenemypenetration. the transition from day ao nidt combal. Daylighl
d. I umination preparation alows for the improvement of theoccupied
(1.) The company corcmander prepares his position and for chmgcs in thc defensivealignment
ilunination plan in accordance with guidance from the (Figurc96).
battalion conmander.Th€ plan includesmea.sules 10: (3) Tte cotnpany commander'sinstructions,
(a) Iluminateth€ sector. issuedto his subordinatesin the form of an operations
O) Blindthe attackingenemy. orderor separate instructions, encompass the following:
(c) ht€rrnine rnutualrecognition signals. (a.) Analysisof possibleenemynight actions,
(d) ldcntiry friendly positionsas well astarget (b) Cornpletiontime for the night dcfcnsive
idcntificationandcontrolof fires.
To accomplish thesetask, illuminationpostsareestab. (c) Designaiionof rccomaissance, raid and
lished within the company perim€ter. Thcrc are
nomally three two-rnar posts pff company, although (d) Method of employmcnt of night vision
this numbcr increasesin forcsted and mountainous devices andi umination.
icrrain.Thesepostsarelocaledfrom 4060 metenapart (e) D€signation of nightreference points.
and all so situated as to provide full illumination (0 hocedurcs for preparingweaponsfor night
coveragewhcn ordered by tlrc superior conmander. operations,and n€cessary chang€sin the fire plan.
Incendiary and tlE rouds may be uscd to start frcs (g) Measuresto conbat fires within the defen-
forwardof th€ FEBAandb€hindthc attackirgtmopsin
orderto silhoucttethem.
t20
I o
/ o,.
.7
^) lX
t F
POSTTTON
#o),",",*1.*'"" c
to
=.)Y fl
\ J / {PLUS
I T A N K P_Tt
LTT
\ .il
:\\ i,,cII
'<-{o) :e-^\ \ te Y.
*\( {
lsl$l \z-*l---A
,r'. 113JP.,-.,
--1
i
i;--;'z
$)V/-"**#'''
9/
JiJ$
//
rPLUs
I TANKPIn *,
14- lttttt*r^"_
)az
JV {
{
h{'i*q
-', +l
\;ro^ /
J
1
^
':\=/----16) -
du""'
r€\
-\Q!-,/rmt rarx etr
-Y / >tt'o itTtoN
"ot't'o"
IMINUSlSTPLTI
l S T P L T / 3 F DC O
{!!
€ APC
A
O
r nockevlbrepGr
A ."n",'on"'o
oo.'
d I commsndob.ryarcn Post
<-9 neconneisnceputot ,\ {ro be occupied
Oeiensiveposilion
\@
u,sr""insp".r
-o< Combarvehaclewith anlitant misilB
t22
APPENDIX
I LISTOF SYIVEOLS
G UNITS
- --.r.d anrianc,arr
sun Fe.onnaisance panol {trofi a lank or
motorized rifle unnl
--ilra gi-,wiu€,
)'--'""
!tiicLEs
ffi!- Adirerybararionon th€ maEh
-l ^'.'
-C ..o-."g o".
o
An lerybatalion in finngposilio.
I
u r"e sa*,ete,ence usea*as SovietArmedForcesM ta'v symbotstU), otA ociober 1970.
'Th€ Sov€rs use four differentsvmbolstor APCS For
simplcitv rhis paiicuar svmbol is used rh.oushourrhe study, and
des'gnates
an APCwirhan amphibious capabrlIy
123
APPENDIX
I LISTOF SYMEOLS
_-__Y_
o I P a s a q et h r o u s h
d m i r d dm i n e f i e l d
% l------
. ola
{Jdipeenne and anrr6nkr
SOUNDARIE.
tanko.motoi?ed lle tte
A@* ot con.€nrrated
-r
-L Bete.encepoinr lor adillery tne
ru' --\-r
Comm.nd/Ob6eruarionposls Resimenrar
boundary
d_-----f-f
A DivGionboundary
MISCELLANEOUS
Pldtoonleaderscommandposr
6 "*.."_..-*,
cdmmandposl
Codpanycommander's
r comm€ndposl
Batrelioncommander's
A
STRUCTURES/OBSTACLES
88888ts889Bu,rd,ns
s
*---r
- t-rr\
@l
t24
Appendixll. A TYPE OF CAREERPATTERN lN BASICCOMBATDUTY lN PEACETIME
SOVIETOFFICERPERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT_GROUND
FORCES
Position Timcrn
Asslgnment Rank
(Yeas) Agc
Polsible Schooling;
CPT/MAJ.. . - . J r A d v a n c eCdo u r s e
MAJ/LTC.. ...Sr Advance Cdo u n e
CPT/MAJ/LTC ... Branch Acadcmy
COL/MAJ-GEN . . MilitaryAcadcmyof
thc Ccncnl Staff
LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Years
sRLT.................................3Yean
CPT....... -...,............... -.......4 Years
MAJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . .4 Years
LTC ... -. -. -................ -,........5 years
Minimum lime-in-glad€ requiremenb for thc rank of
COL and aboveare not cstablished.
U e u t c n a n. t. s. - . . . - . . . , . . . , . . , . - . - . - - - - - . . . . 4 0
C a p t a i n. s. . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . - - . . . - . . . . . . 4 0
M a j o r.s. . , . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -..............45
L i e u t e n aCnot l o n e l-s. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . - - . . . . . . 4 5
C o l o n e l. s- . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . -......50
Generakto
L i e u t c n acnetn e r a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . 5 5
Colon€lGenenlsard abov€ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Mavjmum agesmay be exlcndcd in individunl cascsby
orderofthe CouncilofMinistersot $e U.S.S.X
Captain 40 40 45 50 50 55 55 60
Major 4s 40 45 50 50 55 55 60
Lr Colonel 45 45 50 50 55 55 60 60
Colonel 50 45 55 50 None 55 60 60
+SOURCE: Vyacheslsv
P. Artemie', "Soyie,trlititoy Satice Obtiganos," Infantry, Septect | 19681D.42.
127
o
DISTRIBUTION
o A9t6 B88O
8882
8886
8893
USDAOGI:RIIIANY
USDAOGREECL
USDAO
USDAO
HUNGARY
ITALY
1t101
EOO?
]5]5
usAFE49?RTG(tRC)
SILKPURSE
FICDURLANT
ts040 DI /SC2 (DI0)(2) B9O8 USDAONETHERLANDS J5I? CIINAVSUR|LANT
!055 DIA/DT4B 8912 USDAONORWAY ,,99I TITCLANT
0080 DrA/SWS B9I'1 USDAOPOLAND
B t3 2 D I A / D f li E9I8 USDAOIORTUGAL K005 ctNcP c
BI34 DIA/DD2 B9I9 USDAOROII NIA K020 cotltusTDc
BI59 D I A / D TI A 1 I]93] USDAOTURXEY (1OO PACAF548 RTC
ts162 DIA/DT1A2 ts934 USDAOUSSR K300 rrAc(coDErc-L)
8169 DIA/DT2D A939 USDAOYUGOSLAVIA (5OO CINCPACFLT
8485 DII/IS K515 CONSEVtrNTHFLT
0545 DIA/DI (650 COIINAVSURFTAC
8565 DIA/DIR-IFI Dl]33 K619 FLTCORGRUI
STRATANALSUPICRU
8566 DIA/DIR.IF2 D150 CrrC0NT) (2)
B5?I DIA/DIR4GI DJ59 LO4O SAC544THARTW
NAVAIRDEVCEN
B5?3 DIA/DIR4EI D2O2 NAV1VARCOL
B5?4 DIA/DIR4C5 D2I7 NOOs USRtrDCOM
NA1NWNCEN
8579 DI /DIB 2B2 D249 NAVICSCOL
8580 DIA/DIR1C3(0t0) D280 0?{98D OTHDR
858I DIA/DIR,]B D492 NAVSCOLEOII
8583 DIA/DIR.1D DsO? CONIINI]WARCOM 1055 crA/cRs/ADD/SR(14)
!584 Dr /DrR 184{20) D900 NFOI0 ?085 STATtr(5)
B59t DIA/DIR-IIt D91\ O?-009F ?090 NsA (5)
8585 DLA/DIR.IE D972 0P-009lrIP
8586 DIA/DIR.4DI NAVPHIISCOL RI45 ACDA
DO32
!593 DIA/DIR1C2 D496 DrR SSPO
8594 DrI/DrR 1r (2) D8l4 1 2N D SO3O FRDLI} OFCONG
t29