D.P.

LUB OIL V NICOLAS

FACTS: D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. filed a case against private respondents Raul Nicolas and Socorro Valerie
Gutierrez for a sum of money and damages. The complaint contained a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment upon the ground that the claim resulted from the non-payment of the purchase price of fuel oil used for the ten
vessels of the private respondents-defendants 3 and that pursuant to the provisions of the Code of Commerce, the said vessels
may be attached. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued ex parte by a court. Armed with the writ, the Sheriff boarded the
private respondents’ fishing vessel, "Star Vangeline," and placed it under custodia legis. Next day, respondent judge lifting the
attachment upon the posting of a counterbond. Private respondents filed a "Motion to Withdraw Counter-bond and to Dissolve
Writ of Attachment. Despite opposition from the petitioner, the respondent Judge issued the first of the disputed orders which
dissolved the writ of attachment and allowed the private respondents’ withdrawal of their counterbond. 

ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IN THE FIRST PLACE?

RULING: No. The rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly against the applicants. This
stringency is required because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature. If all the requisites for
the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. The petitioner’s prayer for
a preliminary attachment hinges’ on the allegations in paragraph 16 of the complaint and paragraph 4 of the affidavit of Daniel
Pe which are couched in general terms devoid of particulars of time, persons, and places to support such a serious assertion that
"defendants are disposing of their properties in fraud of the creditors." There is thus the necessity of giving to the private
respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side in a hearing, in accordance with due process, in order to determine the
truthfulness of the allegations. But no hearing was afforded to the private respondents the writ having been issued ex parte. A
writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words
of the rules.

DAVAO LIGHT VS CA

FACTS: Davao Light) filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc.
and Teodorico Adarna, it contained an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Defendants Queensland and
Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of
attachment was promulgated and the attachment writ issued, the Trial Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and
over the persons of the defendants. CA decision nullified and set aside the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City 2 in Civil Case No. 19513-89 on application of the plaintiff (Davao Light & Power Co.),
before the service of summons on the defendants (herein respondents Queensland Co., Inc. and Adarna).

ISSUE: whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before acquisition of
jurisdiction of the latter's person by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment may be included m the
complaint, as is usually done, it is likewise true that the Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
until he is duly summoned or voluntarily appears, and adding the phrase that it be issued "ex parte" does not confer said
jurisdiction before actual summons had been made, nor retroact jurisdiction upon summons being made. A preliminary
attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other
party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party taken into the
custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered. 15 It is a remedy which is purely
statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it. 16 Withal no principle, statutory
or jurisprudential, prohibits its issuance by any court before acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Rule 57
in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter."  The phase, "at the
commencement of the action," obviously refers to the date of the filing of the complaint — which, as above pointed out, is the
date that marks "the commencement of the action;" 18 and the reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the
defendant, or even before summons issues. What the rule is saying quite clearly is that after an action is properly commenced —
by the filing of the complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees — the plaintiff may apply for and obtain a
writ of preliminary attachment upon fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do so at any time,
either before or after service of summons on the defendant. 

Anita MANGILA V. CA and Loreta Guina

G.R. No. 125027 | AUGUST 12, 2002
FACTS:
Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private respondent
Loreta Guina is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the
freight forwarding business.
In January 1988, Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as
crabs, prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay cash on delivery.

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Guina’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts, and in case of suit, stipulates
attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit.
On the first shipment, Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three
shipments, March 17, 24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an action
for collection of sum of money.
The Sheriff’s Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangila’s house informed the
sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had left the
Philippines for Guam.
Thus, on September 1988, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her
creditors, Ginua filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ of Preliminary
Attachment was thereafter issued.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was served
on Mangila’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988.
 On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment  without submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the
summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond. The
trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on petitioner.
On February 1989, Mangila moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, claiming that as
stipulated in the invoice of Guina’s freight services, the venue in case a complaint is filed would be in Makati and not Pasay.
For her part, Guina explained that although “Makati” appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by
the printing press whose general manager executed an affidavit admitting such inadvertence. Moreover, Guina claimed that
Mangila knew that private respondent was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.
The RTC ave credence to Guina’s Opposition, denied the Motion to Dismiss, and gave petitioner 5 days to file her
Answer. Petitioner filed an MR but this too was denied. Thus she filed her Answer on June 1989, maintaining her contention
that the venue was improperly laid.
The case was set for pre-trial. Meanwhile, Guina filed a Motion to Sell Attached Properties but the trial court denied the
motion.
On motion of Mangila, the RTC reset the pre-trial but Mangila failed to appear on the rescheduled date. Without declaring
Mangila to be in default, the court allowed Guina to present evidence ex parte.
Mangila filed an MR of the order terminating the pre-trial, and argued that there was no order decalring him in default and
that his attorney was only late but not absent during the rescheduled pre-trial.
Nevertheless, the RTC ruled in favor of Guina and ordered petitioner to pay respondent P109,376.95 plus 18 percent
interest per annum, 25 percent attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Mangila appealed to the CA while Guina filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal but the trial court denied the same.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and
sustained the filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the declaration of default on
petitioner and concluded that the trial court did not commit any reversible error.

ISSUES: 
WON the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment

HELD: 
1) Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.

*Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  this Court
clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
defendant – issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment – these do not and cannot bind and affect the
defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons
or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer
commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the
applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but
also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx.”
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first
obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any
order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

WEE V TANKIANSEE
Petitioner Wee has money placements totaling to more than P210M with the Wincorp, to which, respondent Tansiankee is a
vice president and director Wincorp extended a loan equal to petitioner’s total money placement to a corporation, Power Merge,
with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp
to another corporation [Hottick Holdings]. When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it and its
surety. Settlement was, however, reached in which Hottick’s president, Virata, assumed the obligation of the surety.

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Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick’s president, petitioner’s money placements were transferred without his
knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability.
Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner was enticed to roll over his
placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge. Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a
conduit and connived with Wincorp’s officers and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of
paying the said placements, petitioner instituted suit for damages with the RTC Manila. Respondent was impleaded in the
complaint as one of the defendants. On the basis of the allegations in the complaint and the Affidavit of petitioner, RTC ordered
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from execution of all the defendants subject
to petitioner’s filing of a P50M-bond. The writ was consequently issued. Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that
the bond furnished was grossly insufficient, respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment. The other defendants
likewise filed similar motions. RTC denied all the motions. The defendants, including respondent filed their respective motions
for reconsideration but the trial court likewise denied the same. Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore
the said orders, his co-defendants, Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UEM-MARA), assailed the same via
certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. CA, however, denied it and the motion for reconsideration thereon. In a petition for
review on certiorari before SC, the latter denied the petition and affirmed the CA rulings for Virata’s and UEM-MARA’s failure
to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible error. Respondent filed before the trial court another
Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional
grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp’s board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and (2) that he could
not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major
stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also victimized by its fraudulent schemes. Ruling that the grounds
raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the CA and SC, and that the additional grounds were
respondent’s affirmative defenses that properly pertained to the merits of the case, RTC denied the motion. With the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, respondent filed a certiorari petition before the CA where the appellate court rendered the
assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of the RTC and lifting the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment to the extent that it concerned respondent’s properties. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling,
but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed a petiton for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment against respondent based on additional ground
that allegedly pertains already to the merits of the main action, i.e., lack of factual circumstances of fraud.

HELD: YES. Section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which pertinently reads: Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment
may issue.-At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have
the property of the adverse party attached as security for the aatisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following
cases: (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.For a writ to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently
show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s mere non-
payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has
intended to defraud the creditor.

In the instant case, petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed a fraud. The affidavit
narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or Power Merge, by which SC affirmed the
writ of attachment issued against the latter.As to the participation of respondent in the said transaction, the affidavit merely
states that respondent, an officer and director of Wincorp, connived with the other defendants to defraud petitioner of his money
placements. No other factual averment or circumstance detailing how respondent committed a fraud or how he connived with
the other defendants to commit a fraud in the transaction sued upon. In other words, petitioner has not shown any specific act or
deed to support the allegation that respondent is guilty of fraud. The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain
such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the
writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had
a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general
averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants
to commit a fraud, is insufficient to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ
under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because
established is the rule that fraud is never presumed. Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the
company does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants
to commit a fraud. While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to
whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly and convincingly established.
Considering that petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud
committed by respondent, the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment
against the properties of respondent. The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment
otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion. However, the principle finds
no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ
against the properties of respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or
impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in
support of the application.

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 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION- versus – ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS: China Bank granted respondent Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC) an Omnibus Credit Line
in the amount of P90, 000,000.00.Alleging that ACDC failed to comply with its obligations under the Omnibus Credit Line,
China Bank filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC issued an Order granting China Banks prayer for writ of
preliminary attachment. Consequently, as shown in the Sheriff’s Report, the writ of preliminary attachment was implemented
levying personal properties of ACDC, i.e., vans, dump trucks, cement mixers, cargo trucks, utility vehicles, machinery,
equipment and office machines and fixtures. ACDC filed its Opposition to the June 15, 2000 Motion arguing that there can be
no sale of the latters attached properties in the absence of a final and executory judgment against ACDC. According to the CA,
selling the attached properties prior to final judgment of the appealed case is premature and contrary to the intent and purpose of
preliminary attachment for the following reasons: first, the records reveal that the attached properties subject of the motion are
not perishable in nature; and second, while the sale of the attached properties may serve the interest of China Bank, it will not
be so for ACDC. 

ISSUE: WON the honorable COURT OF APPEALS rendered the questioned resolutions in a manner not in accord with the
provisions of section 11, rule 57 of the rules of civil procedure, as it shelved the demands of equity by arbitrarily disallowing the
sale of the attached properties.

RULING: Section 11, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:  Sec. 11. When attached property may be sold after levy on
attachment and before entry of judgment.-  Whenever it shall be made to appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon
hearing with notice to both parties, that the property attached is perishable, or that the interests of all the parties to the
action will be subserved by the sale thereof, the court may order such property to be sold at public auction in such manner as it
may direct, and the proceeds of such sale to be deposited in court to abide the judgment in the action. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an attached property may be sold after levy on attachment and before entry of judgment whenever it shall be made to
appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice to both parties, that the attached property is
perishable or that the interests of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale of the attached property.

The issue hinges on the determination whether the vehicles, office machines and fixtures are perishable property under Section
11, Rules 57 of the Rules of Court, which is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has
touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United
Stateswhere some of our laws and rules were patterned after, is in order.

China Bank argues that if the CA allowed the attached properties to be sold, whatever monetary value which the attached
properties still have will be realized and saved for both parties. China Bank further claims that should ACDC prevail in the final
judgmentof the collection suit, ACDC can proceed with the bond posted by China Bank. The Court finds said arguments to be
specious and misplaced. Section 4, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Condition of applicants bond.  - The party applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse
party in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the
costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all the damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the bond posted by China Bank answers only for the payment of all damages which
ACDC may sustain if the court shall finally adjudge that China Bank was not entitled to attachment. The liability attaches if the
plaintiff is not entitled to the attachment because the requirements entitling him to the writ are wanting, or if the plaintiff has no
right to the attachment because the facts stated in his affidavit, or some of them are untrue.  Clearly, ACDC can only claim from
the bond for all the damages which it may sustain by reason of the attachment and not because of the sale of the attached
properties prior to final judgment.

Sale of attached property before final judgment is an equitable remedy provided for the convenience of the parties and
preservation of the property. To repeat, the Court finds that the issue of whether the sale of attached properties is for the
convenience of the parties and that the interests of all the parties will be subserved by the said sale is a question of fact. Again,
the foregoing issue can only be resolved upon examination of the evidence presented by both parties which the Court cannot do
in a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION v VALENZUELA

An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Antonio D. Pinzon to recover from Kenneth O. Glass the sum
of P37,190.00, alleged to be the agreed rentals of his truck, as well as the value of spare parts which have not been returned to
him upon termination of the lease. In his verified complaint, the plaintiff asked for an attachment against the property of the
defendant consisting of collectibles and payables with the Philippine Geothermal, Inc., on the grounds that the defendant is a

4
foreigner; that he has sufficient cause of action against the said defendant; and that there is no sufficient security for his claim
against the defendant in the event a judgment is rendered in his favor. 

ISSUE: w/n the writ of preliminary attachment was improper

RULING: Yes. The respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment and in not
ordering the release of the money which had been deposited with the Clerk of Court for the following reasons:

First, there was no ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. Section 1, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, reads, as follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. —A plaintiff or any proper party may, at the commencement of the action or
at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising from contract, express or implied, against a
party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditor;

(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or
an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any
other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;

(c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly detained, when the property, or any part thereof, has
been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an officer;

(d) In an action against the party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which
the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is
brought;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with intent to defraud his
creditors;

(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served by publication.

In ordering the issuance of the controversial writ of preliminary attachment, the respondent Judge said and We quote:

The plaintiff filed a complaint for a sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated September 14, 1977,
alleging that the defendant who is a foreigner may, at any time, depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors
including the plaintiff herein; that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by this action; that the
amount due the plaintiff is as much as the sum for which an order of attachment is sought to be granted; and that defendant has
sufficient leviable assets in the Philippines consisting of collectibles and payables due from Philippine Geothermal, Inc., which
may be disposed of at any time, by defendant if no Writ of Preliminary Attachment may be issued. Finding said motion and
petition to be sufficient in form and substance. 10

Pinzon however, did not allege that the defendant Kenneth O. Glass "is a foreigner (who) may, at any time, depart from the
Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors including the plaintiff." He merely stated that the defendant Kenneth O. Glass is
a foreigner. While Pinzon may have stated in his affidavit that a sufficient cause of action exists against the defendant Kenneth
O. Glass, he did not state therein that "the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof; that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and that the amount due to the applicant is as much as the sum for
which the order granted above all legal counter-claims." It has been held that the failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites
prescribed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the
property of the defendant fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Lastly,
counterbond.

TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES v IAC

FACTS: Tan (Astro Automotive Supply) filed a complaint against Consolidated Mines Inc. and Jose Marino Olondriz, the
president of said corporation, for the payment of the purchase price of certain heavy equipment, parts and accessories sold to
Consolidated Mines, Inc. with a total cost of P271,372.20. In said complaint, plaintiff asked that a writ of preliminary
attachment be issued against defendants on the ground that said defendants were guilty of fraud in securing said equipment.
Court granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon plaintiff's posting of a bond in the
amount of P 271,372.20. Pursuant to said order, a writ of attachment was issued on August 26, 1981. The sheriff served notices
of garnishment on the tenants of the building owned by defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc. garnishing the rentals due from said
tenants, but since there were earlier notices of garnishment served upon said tenants issued in two (2) other cases, the sheriff
was not able to garnish any amount from said tenants. The sheriff levied on the properties of defendant Consolidated Mines,
Inc. and the notice of levy was duly annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title.
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ISSUE: whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that "because the
private respondent through the sheriff could not have levied on the properties but only on the right of redemption or equity of
redemption thereon, there could not have been an over-levy sufficient to justify a quashal of the notice of levy on attachment on
the properties claimed by the petitioner."

RULING: No. Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property after his default in the
performance of the conditions of the mortgage but before the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale, whereas the
right of redemption means the right of the mortgagor to repurchase the property even after confirmation of the sale, in cases of
foreclosure by banks, within one year from the registration of the sale. SC held that the appellate court did not commit any error
in ruling that there was no over-levy on the disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated
Mines' right or equity of redemption, an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be quantified nor
equated with the actual value of the properties upon which it may be exercised.

FBDC vs. YLLAS LENDING CORP

FACTS: FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORP. ( FBDC)  executed a lease contract in favor of Tirreno, Inc. over a unit
at the Bonifacio Global City in Taguig, Metro Manila. The parties had the lease contract notarized on the day of its execution.
Tirreno used the leased premises for Savoia Ristorante and La Strega Bar.
Due to Tirreno’s alleged failure to settle its outstanding obligations, FBDC entered and occupied the leased premises. FBDC
also appropriated the equipment and properties left by Tirreno pursuant to Section 22 of their Contract of Lease as partial
payment for Tirreno’s outstanding obligations. In 2002, Yllas Lending Corporation caused the sheriff of the trial court to serve
an alias writ of seizure against FBDC. FBDC found out that in 2001, respondents filed a complaint for Foreclosure of Chattel
Mortgage with Replevin, against Tirreno, et al. In their complaint, Yllas alleged that they lent a sum of money to Tirreno et al
and in 2000 executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage in favor of Yllas as security for the loan. The Chattel Mortgage covered
properties of the Tirreno’s restaurant and bar. On the same day, FBDC served on the sheriff an affidavit of title and third party
claim. Despite FBDC’s service upon him of an affidavit of title and third party claim, the sheriff proceeded with the seizure of
certain items from FBDC’s premises. The sheriff delivered the seized properties to Yllas. FBDC questioned the propriety of the
seizure and delivery of the properties to respondents without an indemnity bond before the trial court, decided against FBDC

ISSUE:WON the trial court is should have required respondents to file an indemnity bond for FBDC’s protection

RULING: YES. Pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 57, the sheriff is not obligated to turn over to respondents the properties subject
of this case in view of respondents’ failure to file a bond. The bond in Section 14 of Rule 57 (proceedings where property is
claimed by third person) is different from the bond in Section 3 of the same rule (affidavit and bond). Under Section 14 of Rule
57, the purpose of the bond is to indemnify the sheriff against any claim by the intervenor to the property seized or for damages
arising from such seizure, which the sheriff was making and for which the sheriff was directly responsible to the third party.
Section 3, Rule 57, on the other hand, refers to the attachment bond to assure the return of defendant’s personal property or the
payment of damages to the defendant if the plaintiff’s action to recover possession of the same property fails, in order to protect
the plaintiff’s right of possession of said property, or prevent the defendant from destroying the same during the pendency of the
suit. Because of the absence of the indemnity bond in the present case, FBDC may also hold the sheriff for damages for the
taking or keeping of the properties seized from FBDC.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

GOTANG VS CA

FACTS: Carlos Gothong Lines filed a complaint for specific performance against the spouses Dungog (parents of herein
petitioner) to enforce the contract of sale of the parcel of land owned by various individuals. Gothong Lines faulted the spouses
Dungog for non-delivery of some parcels of land, which resulted to an overpayment in the amount paid. The spouses Dungog,
however, contended that it was Gothong Lines which breached the contract by stopping payment on the last four checks
intended as the last installments for the land. The spouses Dungog opposed Gothong Lines' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that Gothong Lines violated the terms of the contract and the other contemporaneous agreements
between them. However, the trial court granted the prayer for injunction, enjoining the spouses Dungog from cancelling the
contract to sell. Thereafter, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Petitioner assailed the order and the writ in a special
civil action forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed outright the petition, as well as denied the
motion for reconsideration. Thus, he filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court. 

In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that petitioner committed a procedural blunder in filing a special civil action
forcertiorari to assail the order and the writ. The petition was not a party to the civil case and, therefore, could not assail the
writ of preliminary injunction through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court was correct in
saying that the petitioner does not possess the requisite standing to file such suit.

ISSUE: W/N THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF INJUNCTION WAS PROPER? YES.

6
RULING: Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action, prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party, court, agency or person to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. A preliminary injunction, as the
term itself suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action. Its purpose is to preserve the
statusquo of the matter subject of the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, if no
preliminary injunction is issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do the act which the plaintiff is seeking the court to
restrain. This will make ineffectual the final judgment that the court may afterwards render in granting relief to the plaintiff. The
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with
except in cases of manifest abuse. The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PROPER; CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, a
preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint. The trial court found
that Gothong Lines had already paid P51,248,348.26 out of the total consideration of P65,520,475.00. Gothong Lines also
consigned with the court an additional P4,048,950.00 leaving a balance of P10,223,176.74. The trial court likewise found that
78% of the properties were already in the possession of Gothong Lines. Moreover, the status quo, which is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy, was that Gothong Lines had access to the lots subject of the
Contract through the entrance gate in Lot 1031-F. That is why Gothong Lines commenced construction of its pier and the
development of the roads within the parcels of land covered by the Contract. The issuance of the Writ would no doubt preserve
the status quo between the Spouses Dungog and Gothong Lines that existed prior to the filing of the case. We agree with the
trial court that the status quo should be maintained until the issue on the parties' respective rights and obligations under the
Contract is determined after the trial.

PINEDA VS CA

FACTS: Spouses Virgilio and Adorita Benitez ("Spouses Benitez") mortgaged a house and lot ("Property") covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-8361 ("TCT 8361") in favor of Juanita P. Pineda ("Pineda") and Leila P. Sayoc ("Sayoc"). The real
estate mortgage secured the Spouses Benitez’s loan of ₱243,000 with a one-year maturity period. 5 Pineda and Sayoc did not
register the mortgage with the Register of Deeds. The Spouses Benitez delivered the owner’s duplicate of TCT 8361 to Pineda.

NGO VS ALLIED BANKING

FACTS: Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction  filed with the RTC on
May 9,2002, petitioner-spouses alleged in the main that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) unlawfully and unjustifiably
refusedto discharge/release the real estate mortgage constituted on the two lots of spouses Anthony Ngo and So Hon Ngo,
andwithheld the Owner's Duplicate Copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the said lots, despite spouses Ngo's
fullpayment of the P12 million loan secured by the mortgage.Petitioners averred that the funds used by spouses Ngo in paying
for the loan were the proceeds of the sale of the lots tospouses Luis Litam, Jr. and Luzviminda Litam; and that the sale was
known to and permitted by Allied Bank through itsManager, Rodolfo Jose.  The bank, however, vehemently denied giving its
imprimatur to the sale. Allied Bank admitted the satisfaction of the P12 million loan but clarified that the real estate mortgage
on the lots still securesthe unpaid P42,900,000.00 loan of Civic Merchandising, Inc., for which Anthony Ngo stands as a surety.
In support thereof, thebank presented the Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement   executed by Anthony Ngo,
both in his personalcapacity and as the company's president and general manager.On October 1,2002, after hearing the parties,
the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, directing AlliedBank to discharge the real estate mortgage
constituted on the subject properties, and to release to spouses Ngo the owner'scopy of the TCTs of the lots. When its motion
for reconsideration  of the foregoing order was denied,  Allied Bank elevated the incident to the CA by wayof a special civil
action for certiorari  .On April 19, 2006, the CA annulled the RTC's orders upon finding that petitioner-spouses failed to
establish a clear andunmistakable right to warrant the issuance of the provisional injunctive writ against Allied Bank.  This was
affirmed in its April02,2007 Resolution denying petitioner-spouses' motion for reconsideration

ISSUE: W/N PEITION IS METIRORIOUS

RULING: NO.The petition lacks merit.Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of
preliminary injunction, whethermandatory or prohibitory, may be granted if the following requisites are met:(1) The applicant
must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse ;(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;(3)
There is an urgent need to issue the writ in order to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and(4) No other ordinary, speedy,
and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. A preliminary mandatory injunction is more
cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction since, more than its functionof preserving the status quo between the
parties, it also commands the performance of an act.  Accordingly, the issuance of awrit of preliminary mandatory injunction is
justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute.  When the complainant'sright is doubtful or disputed, he does not have
a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatoryinjunction is improper. While it is not required
that the right claimed by applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief

SPS CASTRO V SPS DELA CRUZ

7
FACTS: Respondent Spouses Eduardo and Charito Perez (Spouses Perez) obtained a ₱250,000 loan from Spouses Isagani and
Diosdada Castro (petitioners) on November 15, 1996, to secure which they executed a real estate mortgage in petitioners’ favor
covering an unregistered 417 square meter parcel of land, located in San Isidro, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Tax Declaration
(TD) No. 01844 (the property).

Respondent Spouses Perez having failed to settle their loan, petitioners extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, as the
highest bidder at the public auction, bought the property on February 4, 1999. It turned out that before the foreclosure or
sometime in 1997 respondent Spouses Perez, contrary to a provision of the real estate mortgage, sold the property to respondent
Spouses dela Cruz who had in fact caused the cancellation of TD No. 01844 by TD No. 01892 in their name on August 15,
1997.

Petitioners thus filed on April 8, 1999 a complaint against herein two sets of respondent Spouses, for annulment of Deed of Sale
and TD No. 018921 and damages before the Malolos Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent Marcelino Tolentino, Municipal
Assessor of Hagonoy, Bulacan was impleaded as defendant. The complaint was raffled to Branch 7 of the RTC.

By respondent Spouses dela Cruz’s allegation, before buying the property, they inspected it and found no improvements thereon
that would put them on guard against the integrity of the TD of the sellers-Spouses Perez which TD, contrary to petitioners’
claim, bore no annotation of the mortgage. They had in fact constructed a house on the property in the course of which they
were approached by petitioners who informed them of an existing mortgage thereover, but as petitioners did not present any
document to prove it, they paid no heed to the information.

During the pendency of petitioners’ complaint against respondents spouses, petitioners filed an ex-parte motion before
Branch 16 of the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession over the property by virtue of the foreclosure of the mortgage of
the sale to them of the property. 2 Petitioners’ motion was granted and a writ of possession dated August 2, 2001 was issued and
enforced against respondent Spouses dela Cruz who were evicted from the property.

ISSUE: They were not claiming rights under the spouses Perez. They were and still are the owners in their own right. Hence,
the writ of possession issued was improperly implemented and under Art. 539 of the Civil Code, they must be restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.  

RULING: respondent Spouses dela Cruz actually took possession of the property before the real estate mortgage covering it
was foreclosed, and had in fact cancelled the TD in Spouses Perez’ name and had one issued in their name. It appears, however,
that petitioners did not inform Branch 16, RTC of the previous sale of the property to third parties, herein respondent Spouses
dela Cruz, and the latter’s actual possession thereof.

For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable
right to it must be proven by the party seeking it. The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.5

[T]he rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court. It bears reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason that
conflicting claims in an application for a provisional writ more often than not involve a factual determination which is not the
function of appellate courts. Hence, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the trial court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with except when there is manifest abuse, which is wanting in the present case

RIVERA V MIRASOL

FACTS: Benjamin Rivera, Simeon Quilang, Jr. and Nicanor Asuncion filed with the Court an Affidavit-Complaint against
Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela (RTC for brevity) charging him with gross
ignorance of the law.

Complainants are the defendants in Civil Case No. 618, a case for recovery of possession of property filed by the Municipality
of Roxas, Isabela, on September 16, 1999, then pending before the sala of respondent Judge. [2]

Complainants aver that on September 28, 1999, without summons having been served, the municipality filed an unverified
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction against them with motion for writ of demolition.  Complainants filed their answer
to the complaint opposing the motion.[3]

On November 24, 1999, respondent issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction and placing the municipality in
possession of the areas occupied by complainants.[4] Complainants sought reconsideration of the Order but respondent denied
the same.

ISSUE: W/N THE ORDER WAS LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ISSUED BY THE JUDGE

RULING: NO. On the first issue, we find that the Order granting the preliminary injunction was not validly and legally issued
by the respondent Judge.  Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides in part, that: It should be noted that the
respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction was not verified and no bond was executed in relation thereto. 

8
These are patent disregard of the rules and an Order granting an application, which did not conform to the required form and
procedure, was obviously issued with certain irregularity. Thus, by granting the motion, the reliefs sought by the respondent
municipality in its complaint had already been granted and the respondent Judge had already decided the main case without any
trial.  In so doing, "[R]espondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect
practically granted the principal relief sought." Rule 58, Section 4 (a) of the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the procedure
to be followed in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling the applicant to the
relief demanded.  The rule is very explicit in its requirement that a preliminary injunction may be granted only when the
complaint is verified.  Absence of verification makes an application or petition for preliminary injunction patently insufficient
both in form and substance.

China BANK V CIRIACO

FACTS: Spouses Harry and Esther Ciriaco (respondents) obtained a P1,500,000.00 loan 4 from the petitioner, secured by a real
estate mortgage5 over their 526-square meter land in La Trinidad. respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint as well as Motion for Hearing on the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), with a notice of hearing on the omnibus motion scheduled on March 22,
2000.14 The respondents sought to amend the complaint to allege further that fraud attended the consolidation of title in the
petitioner s favor and to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to enjoin the petitioner
from disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.

ISSUE: hether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

RULING: PETITION MERITORIOUS. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 27 It is the "strong
arm of equity,"28 an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution,29 affecting as it does the
respective rights of the parties.30ςrνll

Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case, provide the
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO

No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined. If it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person
to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the
same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary
hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction
can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of
the parties respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the
merits.35 It failed to make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction since it did not
conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or TRO. 

ESTARES V CA

Facts:
The spouses Estares secured a loan of P800k from Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the
loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They however only received P637k as testified by Rosenda Estares in court. She did not
however question the discrepancy. At that time, her husband was in Algeria working. The loan eventually went due and the
spouses were unable to pay. So PLCC petitioned for an extrajudicial foreclosure. The property was eventually foreclosed.

Now, the spouses are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but
PLCC is now charging them 3.5% interest rate per month; they also questioned the terms of the loan.
9
PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan. On the procedural aspect, PLCC claims that the
petition filed by the spouses is invalid because the certification of non-forum shopping was only signed by Rosenda and her
husband did not sign.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by the spouses is valid.

HELD:Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of
action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the
judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is
a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case
can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges
facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it
appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff
pending the litigation.32

The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive
relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of such right.33] To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 34 Thus, an injunctive remedy
may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any
standard compensation.35

In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted
to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage.
Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a
foreclosure sale.

AGOO VS LBP

FACTS: ARMC obtained from the LBP a Term Loan (TL) for P 2,000,000.00 and two (2) Short-Term Loan Lines (STLLs)
amounting to a total of P 15,000,000.00,6Ï‚rνll evidenced by promissory notes. These loans were secured by a Real and Chattel
Mortgage over the ARMCs four (4) commercial lots, including their improvements, and its rice mill machineries and generator.
ARMC made several partial payments to cover the loans interests, 9Ï‚rνll but found it difficult to fully settle its loan obligations
on time. ARMC, through its President, filed with the RTC, Branch 30, San Fernando City, La Union, a complaint for injunction
with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and for recovery of damages. 29ςrνll

ARMC mainly alleged that LBPs proposed extrajudicial foreclosure should be enjoined for being premature, improper and in
violation of ARMCs contractual and property rights since negotiations for the restructuring of its loans were still ongoing. RTC
proceeded with the hearing on the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction 

ISSUE: issue posed for our resolution is the ARMCs entitlement to an injunctive remedy.

RULING: Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain
act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." 45Ï‚rνll For an
injunction to issue, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) there must be a right in esse  or the existence of a right
to be protected; and (2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such right. 46ςrνll

The ARMC filed a complaint for injunction against the LBP on the ground that the latters then impending foreclosure of its
mortgaged properties was in violation of its contractual and property rights, particularly the right of the ARMC to have its
outstanding loan restructured by the LBP. The ARMC alleged that the LBP acted in bad faith and in wanton disregard of its
commitment to restructure the formers loans when it hastily filed for extrajudicial foreclosure while negotiations for the loan
restructuring were still ongoing.

The existence of the ARMCs claimed right to the loan restructuring, however, was not clearly established by the ARMC. A
party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse  or one that is actual or
existing.47Ï‚rνll Such right must be clear and unmistakable,48Ï‚rνll and not contingent, abstract or future rights, or one that
may never arise.49ςrνll

In the present case, both the RTC and the CA found that no agreement was forged between the ARMC and the LBP on the
restructuring of the ARMCs loans at the time the LBP filed an application to extra-judicially foreclose the ARMCs mortgaged
properties; the proposed loan restructuring was not approved by the LBP because the ARMC failed to offer an additional

10
collateral sufficient enough to cover its outstanding loan with the bank. Thus, the ARMC, then, had no actual right to protect or
to enforce against the LBP. It failed to satisfy the first requisite, i.e., the existence of a clear and unmistakable right for the
issuance of an injunction. An injunction suit becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined had already
been consummated.

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY V PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS

FACTS: In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The
municipal government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty,
Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center. Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of
respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the Regional Trial Court. petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the
Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.4 The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC from "further proceeding and issuing any further Order,
Resolution, Writ of Execution, and any other court processes"5 in the case before it. An order granting or denying an application
for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable.9 Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition
for Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65.10

While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper remedy, it may in certain instances proceed to review the
substance of the petition.11 Thus, this Court will treat this Petition as if it were filed under Rule 65.

ISSUE: WHether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo
Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).

RULING: A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights and interests.12 An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted
upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.

Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage.
A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is
issued immediately.13 Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court,14 a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the
writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.

Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. 15

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the
said court for its conclusive determination.16 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not
be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did
not exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

SY VS AUTOBUS

FACTS: petitioner entered into a verbal agreement with respondent Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., 5 a public utility bus
company plying the northern Luzon routes from Manila.6 Under their agreement, respondent would purchase Konvecta air
conditioning units from petitioner and petitioner would finance respondent’s acquisition of twenty-two (22) units of bus engine
and chassis from Commercial Motors Corporation (CMC) and twenty-two (22) bus deluxe bodies to be built by Almazora
Motors Corporation (AMC).7 The parties agreed that respondent would amortize the payments for the Konvecta air conditioning
units and the bus units separately;8 that petitioner would settle respondent’s account with CMC starting on the fourteenth (14th)
month from the time of the first delivery of the bus engines and chassis; and that respondent would pay petitioner the
acquisition cost of the 22 units of bus engines and chassis in 36 monthly installments, starting on the fifteenth (15th) month
from the time of the first delivery of the bus engines and chassis. 9 As security, respondent would execute Chattel Mortgages
over the buses in favor of CMC. espondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction,40 praying for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction commanding petitioner to return to
respondent the five titles.41

ISSUE: whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding petitioner to return to respondent TCT Nos. 292199, 292200, 292201, 292202,
and 292203, and in denying petitioner’s offer to post a counter bond.

RULING: A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction will not be set aside unless it was issued with grave abused of discretion.
A preliminary injunction may be issued at any time before judgment or final order. 69 It may be a prohibitory injunction, which
requires a party to refrain from doing a particular act, or a mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive
act to correct a wrong in the past.70 A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, however, is more cautiously regarded because it
commands the performance of an act.71 Accordingly, it must be issued only upon a clear showing that the following requisites
are established: (1) the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; (2) there is a material and substantial
invasion of such right; and (3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant. 72
11
In this case, the RTC, in granting respondent’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
explained that:

From the verified complaint filed in this case as well as the [respondent’s] verified Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, it is clear that the five (5) land titles registered in the name of Gregorio Araneta III were
delivered by the [respondent] to the [petitioner] to secure the latter’s advances to CMC for the financing of the twenty two (22)
bus chassis which [respondent] purchased from CMC. However, [petitioner] defaulted in his obligations to CMC which
compelled the [respondent] to directly pay CMC some of the obligations of the [petitioner]. Since the condition for the
delivery of the land titles which is the payment by the [petitioner] of the obligations of the [respondent] to CMC has not
been complied with by the [petitioner], there is no further justification for the [petitioner] to hold on to the possession of
the land titles. RTC had sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the
issuance of such writ were established. 

RECEIVERSHIP

YSASI V FERNANDEZ

FACTS: Court rendered judgment herein sustaining petitioner’s right to administer conjugal properties, particularly Hacienda
Manucao-A, in the absence of evidence of maladministration thereof. The decree of this Court directing respondent judge to
"issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering and compelling" private respondents "to turn over to petitioner the
possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A" and other properties, is a continuing mandate. 1 Any violation thereof or
disobedience or obstruction thereto may be dealt with by this Court in the same proceeding in which it was issued. Respondent
judge’s compliance with it by issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction did not automatically terminate this Court’s
control over said order. Enforcement thereof is part and parcel of the certiorari proceedings. It is inherent upon any court to see
to it that its orders are obeyed to the full extent.

RULING:PROVISIONAL REMEDY; WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION; DISSOLUTION

THEREOF UPON FILING OF COUNTERBOUND WAS IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Petitioner may not be
forced to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple expedient of merely charging him with
the naked averment that he has forfeited that right. In short, evidence of abuse of administration is a condition precedent to
deprivation of the husband’s right of administration. Respondent judge’s dissolution in question produced exactly the effect of
what this Court ruled out in the aforesaid decision: It allowed administration by the wife upon mere filing of a bond pending
presentation of evidence on maladministration by the husband. Bond is no substitute for proof of maladministration.

COMMODITIES STORAGE VS CA

FACTS: spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad obtained a loan of P31,000,000.00 from respondent Far East Bank & Trust
Company to finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The loan was secured by a
mortgage over the ice plant and the land on which the ice plant stands. Petitioner spouses failed to pay their loan. The bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the ice plant was sold by public bidding on March 22, 1993. Respondent bank was
the highest bidder. It registered the certificate of sale on September 22, 1993 and later took possession of the property.

On November 22, 1993, petitioner spouses filed Civil Case No. 956-M-93 against respondent bank before the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan for reformation of the loan agreement, annulment of the foreclosure sale and damages. 2 The trial court
dismissed the complaint for petitioners' failure to pay the docket fees. The dismissal was without prejudice to refiling of the
complaint. As a provisional remedy, petitioners filed on November 16, 1994 an "Urgent Petition for Receivership." They
alleged that respondent bank took possession of the ice plant forcibly and without notice to them; that their occupation resulted
in the destruction of petitioners' financial and accounting records making it impossible for them to pay their employees and
creditors; the bank has failed to take care of the ice plant with due diligence such that the plant has started emitting ammonia
and other toxic refrigerant chemicals into the atmosphere and was posing a hazard to the health of the people in the community;
the spouses' attention had been called by several people in the barangay who threatened to inform the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources should they fail to take action.

ISSUE: W/N REMEDY IS PROPER

RULING: Section 1 of Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

"Sec. 1. When and by whom receiver appointed.-- One or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of
the action, may be appointed by the judge of the Court of First Instance in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the
Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court, in the following cases:

(a) When the corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its
corporate rights;

(b) When it appears from the complaint or answer, and such other proof as the judge may require, that the party applying for the
appointment of receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of the action, and that such property or fund
is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to guard and preserve it;

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(c) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in danger of being
wasted or materially injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or that the parties have so
stipulated in the contract of mortgage;

(d) After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of the appeal, or to dispose of it according to the judgment, or
to aid execution when the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment debtor refuses to apply his property in
satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise carry the judgment into effect;

(e) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible means of
preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation."

A receiver of real or personal property, which is the subject of the action, may be appointed by the court when it appears from
the pleadings or such other proof as the judge may require, that the party applying for such appointment has (1) an actual
interest in it; and (2) that (a) such property is in danger of being lost, removed or materially injured; or (b) whenever it appears
to be the most convenient and feasible means of preserving or administering the property in
litigation.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A receiver is a person appointed by the court in behalf of all the parties to the action for the purpose of preserving and
conserving the property in litigation and prevent its possible destruction or dissipation, if it were left in the possession of any of
the parties.10 The appointment of a receiver is not a matter of absolute right. It depends upon the sound discretion of the
court11 and is based on facts and circumstances of each particular case. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a receiver. Petitioners have not sufficiently shown that
the Sta. Maria Ice Plant is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a "scrap heap."

PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION VS CA

FACTS: an action instituted by Pacific Merchandising Corporation (plaintiff-appellee) to collect the sum of P2,562.88 from
Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., (defendant- appellee) who in turn filed a third-party complaint against Gregorio V.
Pajarillo (third-party defendant-appellant). That the sale at public auction of the above described properties was postponed and
was later cancelled due to thc representation of Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo as Receiver of Paris Theatre operated by Leo
Enterprises, Inc.

ISSUE: whether or not third party defendant-appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo is, under the facts and circumstances obtaining,
liable to plaintiff for the unpaid amount claimed

RULING: A receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action. He is an officer of the court exercising his
functions in the interest of neither plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all the parties in interest. 3 He performs
his duties "subject to the control of the Court," and every question involved in the receivership may be determined by the court
taking cognizance of the receivership proceedings. 4 Thus, "a receiver, strictly speaking, has no right or power to make any
contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the authority or approval of the
court ... . 5 As explained by Justice Moran, speaking for the Court in a 1939 case 6 ... The custody of the receiver is the custody
of the court. His acts and possession are the acts and possession of the court, and his contracts and liabilities are, in
contemplation of law, the contracts and liabilities of the court. As a necessary consequence, receiver is f subject to the control
and supervision of the court at every step in his management of the property or funds placed in his hands. ... 7 He cannot operate
independently of the court, and cannot enter into any contract without its approval. In the case at bar, appellant Pajarillo does
not dispute the fact that he never secured the court's approal of either the agreement of March 11, 1963, with Pacific
Merchandising Corporation or of his Indemnity Agreement with the Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co. Unauthorized
contracts of a receiver do not bind the court in charge of receivership. They are the receiver's own contracts and are not
recognized by the courts as contracts of the receivership. 10 Consequently, the aforesaid agreement and undertaking entered into
by appellant Pajarillo not having been approved or authorized by the receivership court should, therefore, be considered as his
personal undertaking or obligation. Certainly, if such agreements were known by the receivership court, it would not have
terminated the receivership without due notice to the judgment creditor as required by Section 8 of Rule 59 of the Rules of
Court. This must be assumed because of the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. 11 Indeed, if it
were true that he entered into the agreement and undertaking as a receiver, he should have, as such receiver, submitted to the
court an account of the status of the properties in his hands including the outstanding obligations of the receivership.

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