THIRD DIVISION

ANITA CHENG, Present:

Petitioner, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,

SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and CHICO-NAZARIO,

TESSIE SY, VELASCO, JR.,

Respondents. NACHURA, and

G.R. No. 174238 PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 7, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court of the Order dated January 2, 2006[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses
William Sy and Tessie Sy.

The antecedents are as follows—

Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-
969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for
issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for
P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed
against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.)
22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case
Nos. 341458-59).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for
failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of
Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953
contained a statement, “Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is
purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature.”[4]

Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22
cases in its Order[5] dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner
to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with damages
(Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00
covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22
cases.

In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to
collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in
the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which the court denied in its
Order[9] dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue –

Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the
filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the
present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing
checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to
identify both the accused (respondents herein)?[10]

Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on
January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on
December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is
deemed instituted with the latter—

(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the
resolution of the civil aspect of the case;

(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient

than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for
further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;

(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused amounting to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in
a separate action;

(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist;

(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto
pursuant to Article 31[11] of the Civil Code; and

(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 29[12] of the
Civil Code.

Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the
BP Blg. 22 proceedings.

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to
litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the
amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is
deemed instituted with the criminal cases.[13]

This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases,
the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained
pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14] that the possible single civil liability arising from the
act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed
instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the
prohibition against forum shopping.[15] Prior to the judgment in either the estafa
case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to
have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of the other.[16]
 The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-
969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused
and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability
of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a reservation
by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly
instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.[17]

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on
account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was
deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the
BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.

With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity
of the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the
same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s
action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately
after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?

Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –

xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay
in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It
is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the
time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect
the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[18]

Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP
Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks.
It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the
civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil
action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint
is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when
the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages
the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22
cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on
account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the
cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.[19]

Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not
cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and
should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.[20]

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner

would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00
allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of
Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390
(Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy),
which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an
unreasonable length of time.[21] Expectedly, respondents would raise the same
defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the
amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted
by a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner
indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her
cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the
trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with
the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to
the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to
recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks.
Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance of
evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil
liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the
BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.[22] But this rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in
court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.[23] Tested against
these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.

It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and

rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able
to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar.
[24] Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more
conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.[25] Apparently, the public prosecutor
neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg.
22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed to appeal
the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining
remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to
respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure,
petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their
obligation to pay their loan.

Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed
the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on
the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the
inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust
enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their
obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine
simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust
enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.[26]

Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal
interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest
opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred
by technicalities.[27] For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the
complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,[28] we
thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled

Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks
to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss
said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse
of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise
its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were
upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It
also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No.
381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce
case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of
the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him
in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without
further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife,
or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to

dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.

HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign

absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against
the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and

private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal
Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on
and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus
Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly
filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to
the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking
that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against
her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo
Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the
cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then
pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be
arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment
of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23,
1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for
review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and
not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is
significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian,
such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does
not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended
spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in

pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in
our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render
an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage
vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of
the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the
same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although
the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her
marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a
formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed
before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of
the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore

cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint
for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation
akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET

ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a

"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6
Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our
Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had
a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that
his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground
that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or
annual.

Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia
by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a

certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this
case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40,
52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no
more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent
miserably failed to establish these elements.

Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation
of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil
Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse
or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous
marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document – a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country.32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an

authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and
was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in
that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden
of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised
with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.

Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is
no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or

provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The
court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48,
Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.
According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the

national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal

capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" –
Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5"
– Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and
Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we

REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each
other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a
final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of
heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2
disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed
the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did
it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown
that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On
27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs
of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered
in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although
it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of
the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper
hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is

clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial
court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records
of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which,
with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed
submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised,

among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had
twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing
to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as
the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of
the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14
Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing
but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo
were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that
their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in
Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that
she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did
not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before
another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of
petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not
bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at
the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the
trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the
case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should
be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial
court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously,
there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-

CATINDIG, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the July 25, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which
set aside and declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting petitioner’s motion for
leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-Intervention3 in Civil Case
No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution4 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig5 twice on May
16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist
Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the
Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced four
children.

Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to
separate from each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a
divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court
of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.6

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for
dissolution of conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June
12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of properties between
Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their
union produced one offspring.8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the
court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan
and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
deemed void under Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan about this, the
latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains an annulment
of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would adopt
their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each
of his children with Lily.9

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No.
Q-01-44847.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention10 claiming that
she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain
information which might aid the trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of
the annulment case, which the trial court granted on September 30, 2002.
Petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.

Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition and declared as null and void the September 30, 2002
Order of the trial court granting the motion for leave to file intervention and
admitting the complaint-in-intervention.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that
the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest
in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.

The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper remedy is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This is based on the premise that in
issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered
plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower court.12

It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated the assailed decision and resolution.

We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.13 The word "capricious," usually
used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.14

The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case
can intervene, thus:

Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding.15

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation;
and [b] consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original
parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.16

Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in

litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.17 Such interest
must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant.18

Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years
vests her with the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under
the Rules of Court.
Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of
Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no basis.

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully
married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic
that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will
be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or
to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain
an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.20

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of
Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was
celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as
a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.

Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the
indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the
order granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-intervention was attended
with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly set
aside and declared as null and void the said order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003
and Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74456 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.

FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets

and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994
her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed
that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family
Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed
a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the
case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994.
On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his
position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24
and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also
ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge

Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24,
1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason
and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel,
that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time
of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that
a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from

"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."
The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements
45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the
subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject
petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject
petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and
his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should
no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained
in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed,
to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance

intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce
is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Court’s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we
may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are
not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a
policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in

California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may
be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their
joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who
are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together
as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue
of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and
an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in
the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x
x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife
of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of
the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA,

Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69875 dated August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the
marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on
the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated January 27, 2005, which
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in

Mabini, Pangasinan.4 Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous
since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan
City7 against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as

petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the
merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and

against defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is

declared null and void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral
damages the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of
this suit; and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property
donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan
Evangelista.

SO ORDERED.10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently

REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No.
D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition
for review raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE

NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;

II.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED

MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial
remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence
and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground
of bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved without first determining the
corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had
indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been
judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case,14 there are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when
the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are conflicting, or when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent
Orlando were naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree
in April 1988. However, after a careful review of the records, we note that other
than the allegations in the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the records
are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and

testimonial evidence she presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and
Felicitas are American citizens and had this citizenship status when they secured
their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing in this case with
Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil
Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are
considered by their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to
refute or contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent
Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988,
as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.17 We note that it
was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American
citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule
on the issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have the personality to file the
petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or
the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent
Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the
respondents.25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the
national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has
any interest nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that
the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective,
Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s subsequent marriage since the
validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not
affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in
Niñal v. Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15,
2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the
trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file
the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for its proper disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice