005 STONEHILL v.
DIOKNO (LEONG) and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
June 19, 1967 | CONCEPCION, C.J. | Exclusionary Rule
PETITIONER: HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS,
JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK
RESPONDENTS: HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO
ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court
of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City
SUMMARY: Respondent-judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners and the corporations of which they were officers. The documents,
papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. The petitioners filed a writ
of preliminary injunction restraining Respondents-Prosecutors from using the
effects seized in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that a decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring them to be
null and void. The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations. The minor issue in this case is whether the
petitioners have standing to assail the validity of the search warrants issued
pertaining to those effects seized in the offices? NO – The Court held that the
petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and
of the seizures because said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. The MAIN
issue in this case is whether the search warrants issued pertaining to the
effects seized in the residences of the petitioners are valid? NO - The search
warrants are in the nature of a general warrant that violates the Constitutional
right of the petitioners. The Constitution provides: The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to
be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. The same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The Court adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
DOCTRINE: The Constitution provides: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter
— to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it"
Corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of
stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. It is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
FACTS:
13.! Upon application of the officers of the government — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different
dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or
the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
 a.! Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code."
14.! Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void,
as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered
to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law.
15.! On March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court
this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from
using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court,
the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.
16.! In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued
in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
17.! On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
18.! Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUE/s:
9.! Whether the petitioners have standing to assail the search warrants
issued as to the things seized in the first group (things seized in the
offices)? NO. Petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures because said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
10.! Whether the search warrants relating to the things seized in the
second group (things seized in the residences) are valid? NO. The
search warrants are in the nature of a general warrant that violates
the right of the petitioners given in the Constitution.
11.! RULING: We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the
Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants
for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that
the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed
for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
 other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1.! The Court held that petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made
in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of
shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
2.! It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only
by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.
3.! Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above,
since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate
officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Issue 2
6.! The Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
7.! Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
8.! None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no
specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were
abstract.
9.! As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in
the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws.
10.! To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants.
11.! Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection
with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by
providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that
"a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
12.! The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. Thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights —
that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
13.! Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (abandoned),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. The criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the theory that
 the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance,
without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
14.! However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
15.! Federal Supreme Court had declared: The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
16.! The Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the
incentive to disregard it"
17.! The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but
also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause
of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should
not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible
explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this
fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting.
1.! Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for
the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the
places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion
written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null
and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal
the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future." (dissenting part
of the opinion)
a.! ALL the search warrants, without exception, in this case are
admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were
therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in
gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the
suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity
of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the
searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the
petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void
and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal
and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the
words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of
it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search
warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.
2.! Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to
move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects
which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and
effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession
— actual or constructive —of premises searched gives "standing";
and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and
the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed
solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives
"standing.". An examination of the search warrants in this case will
readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the
petitioners personally. The searches and seizures were to be made,
and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
a.! Ownership of matters seized gives "standing." -
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the
petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and
gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful
 search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of
seizure. In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the
constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile.
b.! Control of premises searched gives "standing." -
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the
records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing
to move for return and suppression by virtue of their
proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises
searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have
been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration
and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched.
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in
either the place searched or the articles seize had the
necessary standing to invoke the protection of the
exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, the
case states that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the
rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view
finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
In Henzel vs. United States, the court conclude that the
defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First —
he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second
— he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just
like in the case at bar).
c.! Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s
primarily directed against said person gives "standing." - The
latest United States decision squarely in point is United
States vs. Birrell. The defendant had stored with an attorney
certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of
Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records,
Birrell's attorney *Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the
records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's)
"control and management." The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which
Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the
search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held
that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the
records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return
of all the papers and properties seized.
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for
reargument; the United States did not appeal from this
decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar
to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many
personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not
petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were
"PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND
EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal
search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the
quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were
directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word,
as long as the documents were personal papers of the
petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers)
were held by them in a personal capacity or under their
personal control.
3.! If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and
things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures,
I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers
of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family
residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or
possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the
search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search
warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which
unlawfully seized papers, documents and things are personal/private
of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
4.! Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited
in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of
the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not
withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in
origin or nature.