Generals, Diplomats Warn of New START

via Newsmax

More than 30 former defense or foreign policy government officials and related experts
issued an open letter to the Senate Monday expressing their “professional judgment”
that President Barack Obama’s proposed nuclear weapons reduction treaty with the
Russians, called New START, “is not consistent with the national security interests of
the United States,” and “should be rejected by the U.S. Senate,” which is considering it
now.

They argue that Russia easily could cheat secretly to our detriment, that it would
restrict deployment of new U.S. anti-missile defenses, that it would reduce the
survivability and flexibility of our strategic forces and could be militarily destabilizing,
that it permits a continued large Russian superiority in overall nuclear weapons, and
that resulting insecurity among our allies about continued extended deterrence could
lead to intensified production and proliferation of nuclear weapons all unintended,
harmful consequences, the opposite of the Obama Administration’s announced goals for
the agreement.

Among the many signers are: Ambassador Ed Rowny, former U.S. chief START
negotiator; Vice Adm. Robert Monroe, U.S. Navy (Ret), former director, Defense
Nuclear Agency; Judge William Clark, former national security adviser to President
Reagan; Honorable Paula DeSutter, former assistant secretary of State for Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation; Honorable Fred Ikle, former director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Read Hammer, former deputy director,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and former chief U.S. START Negotiator;
Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerny, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former deputy chief of staff;
Ambassador John Bolton, former undersecretary of State for arms control and
international security, and former U.S. ambassador to the U.N.; Ambassador Henry
Cooper, former director, Strategic Defense Initiative of the Department of Defense, and
former U.S. chief negotiator, Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union; and Hon.
Edwin Meese, III, fomer counselor to the president and former U.S. attorney general.

More specifically, despite Obama administration claims to the contrary, the former
officials and experts say that the proposed New START treaty has the following major
problems, among others:

 It would effectively limit further U.S. anti-missile defenses for the American
homeland in the face of growing rogue nation/terrorist nuclear threats, saying “it
would be folly to limit, let alone preclude, available options to do so” in the
future.
 It "is simply not adequately verifiable,” and “the Russians could engage in
militarily significant violations with little fear of detection by the US,” with years
being needed before we could respond adequately.
 It “would reduce the survivability and flexibility of our (strategic) forces.”
  Its low limits on the number of nuclear launchers could end up being militarily
and strategically destabilizing;
 It would solidify a large Russian superiority in nuclear weapons when considering
its 10-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, many of which have strategic
capabilities and roles, and which have been termed an “urgent” problem by the
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.
 It could force cuts in some of our vital conventional capabilities (i.e., heavy
bombers) as well.
 It would “create concerns” among our allies about America’s continuing extended
deterrent capability to protect them, which could lead to “intensified
proliferation” of nuclear weapons.
 "It is unnecessary and ill-advised for the US to make these sorts of deep
reductions in its strategic forces” so that the Russians are authorized/enabled to
modernize and build up to our levels.

The statement closes by saying, “For all these reasons, we urge the members of the US
Senate to resist pressure to consider the New START Treaty during the lame-duck
session. The Senate should reject this accord and begin instead a long overdue and
vitally needed process of modernization of the nuclear stockpile and refurbishment of
the weapons complex that supports it. Only by taking such steps can we ensure that we
will, in fact, have the 'safe, secure, and effective deterrent' that even President Obama
says we will need for the foreseeable future.”

Following is the text of the letter and the signers:

OPEN LETTER TO THE U.S. SENATE on the New START Treaty

As you know, President Obama insists that the United States Senate advise and consent
during the present lame-duck session to the bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms
control treaty known as "New START" that he signed earlier this year in Prague. It is
our considered professional judgment that this treaty and the larger disarmament
agenda which its ratification would endorse are not consistent with the national security
interests of the United States, and that both should be rejected by the Senate.

Administration efforts to compel the Senate to vote under circumstances in which an

informed and full debate are effectively precluded is inconsistent with your institution's
precedents, its constitutionally mandated quality-control responsibilities with respect to
treaties and, in particular, the critical deliberation New START requires in light of that
accord's myriad defects, of which the following are especially problematic:

 It is unnecessary and ill-advised for the United States to make these sorts of
deep reductions in its strategic forces in order to achieve sharp cuts in those of
the Russian Federation. After all, the Kremlin's strategic systems have not been
designed for long service lives. Consequently, the number of deployed Russian
strategic intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range, nuclear-capable bombers will drop
dramatically, with or without a new arms control agreement.
Russian sources indicate that, within eight-to-nine years, Russian Federation's inventory
of strategic launchers will have shrunk from approximately 680 launchers today (some
of which already are no longer operational) to approximately 270 launchers, simply as a
result of the aging of their systems and the pace of their modernization program. By
contrast, the service life of existing U.S. systems extends several decades. In other
words, the Russians are going to undergo a substantial contraction in the size of its
strategic nuclear arsenal, whether we do or not.

There are serious downsides for the United States in moving to the sorts of low
numbers of strategic launchers called for in the New START Treaty. These include:

 New START would encourage placing more warheads on the remaining

launchers, i.e., "MIRV’ing" —which is precisely what the Russians are doing.
Moving away from heavily MIRV’ed strategic launchers has long been considered
a highly stabilizing approach to the deployment of strategic forces —and a key
U.S. START goal.

 New START would reduce the survivability and flexibility of our forces —which is
exactly the wrong posture to be adopting in the uncertain and dynamic post-Cold
War strategic environment. The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture
Commission concluded that "preserving the resilience and survivability of U.S.
forces" is essential. The very low launcher levels required by New START are at
odds with both of those necessary conditions.

 New START's low ceilings on launchers and warheads can only create concerns
about America's extended deterrent. Allied nations have privately warned that
the United States must not reduce its strategic force levels to numbers so low
that they call into question the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella or
encourage China to see an opportunity to achieve strategic parity with the United
States. Some of those who have long looked to us for security may feel
constrained to develop and field their own deterrents —a formula for intensified
proliferation.

 New START's limitations could result in the destruction of U.S. multi-purpose

strategic bombers, affecting not only the robustness of our nuclear deterrent but
cutting into our conventional capabilities, as well.

 Were the United States to slash its strategic nuclear forces to match those the
Russians can afford, it would ironically ensure that it has far fewer nuclear
weapons —not parity with the Kremlin —when the latter's ten-to-one advantage
in tactical weapons is taken into account. The Russians have consistently refused
to limit their tactical nuclear arms, and will surely continue to do so in the future,
especially since Moscow has little incentive to negotiate limitations on such
weapons when the numbers are so asymmetrical.

This stance should not be surprising since it is this category of weaponry that makes up
the bulk of Moscow's nuclear stockpile. Russian doctrine emphasizes the war-fighting
utility of such weapons and their modernization and exercising remain a priority for the
Kremlin. In fact, some of those weapons with an explosive power comparable to, if not
greatly in excess of, that of the Hiroshima bomb are believed to be aboard submarines
and routinely targeted at the United States. Others are targeted against our allies.
These were among the reasons that prompted the Congressional Strategic Posture
Commission to identify the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal as an "urgent" problem.

Such capabilities constitute a real asymmetric advantage for Moscow. What is more,
given that these Russian tactical nuclear weapons are of greatest concern with regard
to the potential for nuclear war and proliferation, we cannot safely ignore their
presence in large numbers in Russia's arsenal. It is certainly ill-advised to make
agreements reducing our nuclear deterrent that fail to take them into account.

 New START imposes de facto or de jure limitations on such important U.S. non-
nuclear capabilities as prompt global strike and missile defenses. In the future,
the nation is likely to need the flexibility to field both in quantity. It would be folly
to limit, let alone effectively preclude, available options to do so.

 New START is simply not adequately verifiable. Lest assurances that the treaty
will be "effectively" verifiable obscure that reality, the truth is that the Russians
could engage in militarily significant violations with little fear of detection by the
United States. And, for reasons discussed below, it could take years before we
could respond appropriately.

These and other deficiencies of the New START treaty are seriously exacerbated by the
context in which Senators are being asked to consent to its ratification. Specifically, the
Senate's endorsement of this accord would amount to an affirmation of the
disarmament agenda for which it is explicitly said to be a building block —namely, Mr.
Obama's stated goal of "ridding the world of nuclear weapons."

This goal has shaped the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and would, if
left unchanged, condemn the United States to a posture of unilateral nuclear
disarmament. (See, in this regard, the attached essay by Vice Admiral Robert Monroe,
which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on August 25, 2010.) By precluding the
development and production of new nuclear weapons and the realistic testing of those
currently in the stockpile and by "devaluing" the role played by these weapons and the
mission of those responsible for maintaining our deterrent, the NPR sets the stage for
the continued obsolescence and atrophying of our arsenal. No other nuclear power is
engaged in such behavior. And, given our global security responsibilities and the
growing dangers from various quarters, neither should we.

For all these reasons, we urge you to resist pressure to consider the New START Treaty
during the lame-duck session. The Senate should reject this accord and begin instead a
long-overdue and vitally needed process of modernization of the nuclear stockpile and
refurbishment of the weapons complex that supports it. Only by taking such steps can
we ensure that we will, in fact, have the "safe, secure and effective deterrent" that
even President Obama says we will need for the foreseeable future.
Sincerely,

Judge William P. Clark, former national security advisor to the president

Hon. Edwin Meese III, former counselor the president; former U.S. attorney general

Hon. Kathleen Bailey, former assistant director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Norman Bailey, former senior director of International Economic Affairs

Hon. Robert B. Barker, former assistant to the secretary of Defense (atomic energy)

Amb. John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, former
undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, former assistant
secretary of State for international organization affairs

Brig. Gen. Jimmy L. Cash, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former vice commander, 7th Air Force

Honorable Fred S. Celec, former assistant to the Secretary of Defense for nuclear and
chemical and biological defense programs

Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, former director, Strategic Defense Initiative, former chief
U.S. negotiator, defense and space talks with the Soviet Union

Honorable Paula DeSutter, former assistant secretary of State for verification,

compliance, and implementation

Honorable Fritz W. Ermarth, former chairman and national intelligence officer, National
Intelligence Council; former member of the National Security Council staff

Frank J. Gaffney Jr., former assistant secretary of Defense for international security
policy (acting)

Daniel J. Gallington, former secretary of Defense representative, defense and space

talks; former general counsel, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
and former special assistant to the secretary of Defense for policy

Honorable Bruce S. Gelb, former director, U.S. Information Agency, former ambassador
to Belgium

Honorable William Graham, former chairman, General Advisory Committee on Arms

Control, former science adviser to the president, former deputy administrator, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration

Ambassador Read Hammer, former U.S. chief START negotiator; former deputy
director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Honorable Fred Iklé, former undersecretary of Defense for policy

Sven F. Kraemer, former arms control director, National Security Council

Dr. John Lenczowksi, former director of European and Soviet affairs, National Security
Council

Ambassador James "Ace" Lyons Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), former commander in chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet

Tidal W. McCoy, former secretary of the Air Force (acting)

Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former deputy chief of staff

Honorable J. William Middendorf II, former secretary of the Navy, former ambassador
to the European Union, the Netherlands, and the Organization of American States

Vice Adm. Robert Monroe, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former director, Defense Nuclear Agency

Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, former senior staff, Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States; former senior staff, Commission to Assess the Threat to
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack

Roger W. Robinson Jr., former senior director of International Economic Affairs at the
National Security Council, former executive secretary of the Cabinet-level Senior Inter-
Governmental Group for International Economic Policy

Ambassador Ed Rowny, former U.S. chief START negotiator; former special adviser to
President Ronald Reagan on arms control

Michael S. Swetnam, former program monitor, intelligence community staff with liaison
responsibilities to INF and START Interagency Groups, and former member of the
Technical Advisory Group to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Maj. Gen. Paul E. Vallely, U.S. Army (Ret.), former deputy commander, U.S. Army
Pacific

Honorable Michelle Van Cleave, former national counterintelligence executive

Dr. William Van Cleave, former director, Department of Defense Transition Team

Honorable Troy Wade, former director, Defense Programs, U.S. Department of Energy.