Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray.

— When, while several persons,

not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot
be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.

Elements:
1. That there be several persons.
2. That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally.
3. That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner.
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray.
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased.
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who
used violence can be identified.

  

"PEOPLE Vs. UNLAGADA

FACTS: On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left
his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, toattend a public
dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2)
hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening,Danilo asked Edwin to take a short
break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside the dance hall.
Once outside, they decided tohave a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle
beer at a nearby store.Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for
a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3)
metersfrom Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man
walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Daniloretaliated by
striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group
of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up onDanilo and hit him with assorted
weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified,
could only watch helplessly asDanilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any medical
assistance.Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to
the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement regarding thekilling incident
and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their
custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit andaffirmed before the police authorities
that the man under detention, whom he later identified as accused Anecito
Unlagada, was the same manwho stabbed his friend Danilo.Respondent however
contended that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was
inside the dance hall, an altercationensued near the gate between the gatekeeper
and a group of four (4) individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior, were
eventually allowedto get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot
suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had taken
placeand that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only
the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo Patos werebrought by a police
officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard
somebody asking who "Lapad" was and analleged eyewitness, who later turned out
to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito
Unlagada and LorenzoPatos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against them
before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against
Lorenzowas dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of murder.The trial
court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the
defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability.Accused Anecito Unlagada now
assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith
and credence to the loneand uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and
in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in
atumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the crime committed was “death caused in a tumultuous
affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code .

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following

MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUEa.k.a.
"Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, plus moral damages in the reducedamount of P50,000.00. Costs against
accused-appellant

.RATIO: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose ofassaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of theaffray someone is killed, and it cannot
be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physicalinjuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs
between several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the
courseof which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.5 The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct groupof
individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as thedefense suggests, a
"tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that
is, a melee or free-for-all, where severalpersons not comprising definite or
identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury ofone or some of them."
  

Art. 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. — When in a

tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the participants thereof and the person responsible therefor cannot
be identified, all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided for the
physical injuries so inflicted.

Elements:
1. That there is a tumultuous affray as referred to in the preceding article.
2. That a participant or some participants thereof suffer serious physical
injuries or physical injuries of a less serious nature only.
3. That the person responsible therefor cannot be identified.
4. That all those who appear to have used violence upon the person of the
offended party are known.

Art. 253. Giving assistance to suicide. — Any person who shall assist
another to commit suicide shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor,1 if such
person lends his assistance to another to the extent of doing the killing
himself, he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.9 However, if the
suicide is not consummated, the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods9 shall be imposed.

Acts punishable as giving assistance to suicide.

1. By assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is
consummated or not.
2. By lending his assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent
of doing the killing himself.

Art. 254. Discharge of firearms. — Any person who shall shoot at another with any
firearm shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods,10 unless the facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute
frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, homicide, or any other crime for which a
higher penalty is prescribed by any of the articles of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person.
2. That the offender has no intention to kill that person.

GERONIMO DADO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 131421, 2002-11-18

Facts:
Before us is a petition for review... of the Regional Trial Court... finding petitioner
Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police
Station formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding,
Sultan Kudarat.
The team, composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members
Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike
At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a
distance of 50 meters.
When he was about 5 meters away from the team,... Alfredo Balinas noticed that
Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas
told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16
armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was...
on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot
The victim turned out to be Silvestre
"Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team
were ordered to intercept.
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident,... When he heard
rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he
immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when... accused Eraso
embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody
was shot.
trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide.
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
A petition for review... was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was
denied... which became final and executory
Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him
guilty of homicide has become final.
Issues:
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused
Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the
evidence presented... by the prosecution.
Ruling:
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that
the prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy.
The words "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in
conspiracy," or their... synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment.
The language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused
contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from
the information.
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same
cannot be considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Although the... agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial
evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like
the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has
been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is... per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso's seemingly concerted and almost
simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a
common plan to kill the victim.
In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the... offense.
Petitioner could... not be made to answer for the acts done by his co-accused,
Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly and personally in the
commission of those acts.
What is decisive... is the result of the Ballistic Examination
Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket
of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,"... and
not a part of a .45 caliber bullet.
said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet
fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner.
Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there
is doubt on which... side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the... accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction.
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the
fatal wound of the victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .
45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
conscience affirm his... conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the
victim's right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving
beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
petitioner's .45 caliber... pistol.
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber
pistol towards the victim.
From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to
prove that... petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held
liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The elements of this crime are: (1)... that the offender discharges a firearm against
or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the... ground of reasonable doubt.
Principles:

Art. 255. Infanticide. — The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.

Elements of infanticide.
1. That a child was killed.
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
3. That the accused killed the said child.

Art. 256. Intentional abortion. — Any person who shall intentionally cause
an abortion shall suffer:
 1. The penalty of reclusion temporal,13 if he shall use any violence upon the
person of the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor,'* if, without using violence, he shall act
without the consent of the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,15
if the woman shall have consented.

Abortion, defined.
Carrara has denned abortion as the willful killing of the foetus in the uterus, or the
violent expulsion of the foetus from the maternal womb which results ih the death of
the foetus. (Guevara)

Ways of committing intentional abortion:

1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman.
2. By acting, but without using violence, without the consent of the woman.
(By administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman without her
consent.)
3. By acting (by administering drugs or beverages), with the consent of the
pregnant woman.
Elements of intentional abortion:
a. That there is a pregnant woman;
b. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the
accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
c. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or
any other act of the accused, the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom;
d. That the abortion is intended.

Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty ofprision correccional in its

minimum and medium periods16 shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause
an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion.
 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.

Art. 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods17 shall be
imposed upon a woman who shall practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent
that any other person should do so.

Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.16
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them,
and they act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, the offenders shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.19
Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the abortion is caused by —
a. the pregnant woman herself;
b. any other person, with her consent; or
c. any of her parents, with her consent for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor.

Art. 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of

abortives. — The penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in their
maximum period, respectively, upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage
of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the
same.

Elements:
1. That there is a pregnant woman who has suffered an abortion.
2. That the abortion is intended.
3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes, or
assists in causing, the abortion.
4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific
knowledge or skill.
 As to pharmacists, the elements are:
1. That the offender is a pharmacist.
2. That there is no proper prescription from a physician.
3. That the offender dispenses any abortive.

Art. 260. Responsibility of participants in a duel. — The penalty of reclusion

temporal2' shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill his adversary in a duel.

Duel, defined.
It is a formal or regular combat previously concerted between two parties in the
presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each side, who make the
selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of the fight.
Acts punished in duel.
1. By killing one's adversary in a duel.
2. By inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries.
3. By making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted.

Art. 261. Challenging to a duel. — The penalty of prision correccional in its

minimum period23 shall be imposed upon any person who shall challenge another,
or incite another to give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall scoff at or decry
another publicly for having refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.

Acts punished under Art. 261:

1. By challenging another to a duel.
2. By inciting another to give or accept a challenge to a duel.
3. By scoffing at or decrying another publicly for having refused to accept a
challenge to fight a duel.

Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua1

shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Two kinds of mutilation:

1. By intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ for reproduction.
2. By intentionally making other mutilation, that is, by lopping or clipping off any part
of the body of the offended party, other than the essential organ for reproduction, to
deprive him of that part of his body.

Elements of mutilation of the first kind:

1. That there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for
generation, such as the penis or ovarium.
2. That the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive
the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. (Guevara)

Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or
assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor,3 if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,4 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an
eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such
member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was
theretofore habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,5 if
in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have
lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
of the work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than
ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period,6 if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the
illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

How is the crime of serious physical injuries committed?

It is committed —
(1) by wounding;
(2) by beating; or
(3) by assaulting (Art. 263)
(4) by administering injurious substance. (Art. 264)
UNITED STATES v. SANTOS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

No. 06–1005. Argued October 3, 2007—Decided June 2, 2008

In an illegal lottery run by respondent Santos, runners took commissions from the
bets they gathered, and some of the rest of the money was paid as salary to
respondent Diaz and other collectors and to the winning gamblers. Based on these
payments to runners, collectors, and winners, Santos was convicted of, inter
alia, violating the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956, which
prohibits the use of the “proceeds” of criminal activities for various purposes,
including engaging in, and conspiring to engage in, transactions intended to promote
the carrying on of unlawful activity, §1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and §1956(h). Based on his
receipt of salary, Diaz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder money. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the convictions. On collateral review, the District Court ruled that,
under intervening Circuit precedent interpreting the word “proceeds” in the federal
money-laundering statute, §1956(a)(1)(A)(i) applies only to transactions involving
criminal profits, not criminal receipts. Finding no evidence that the transactions on
which respondents’ money-laundering convictions were based involved lottery
profits, the court vacated those convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

461 F. 3d 886, affirmed.

   Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg,
concluded in Parts I–III and V that the term “proceeds” in §1956(a)(1) means
“profits,” not “receipts.” Pp. 3–14, 16–17.

   (a) The rule of lenity dictates adoption of the “profits” reading. The statute nowhere
defines “proceeds.” An undefined term is generally given its ordinary
meaning. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U. S. 179, 187. However, dictionaries
and the Federal Criminal Code sometimes define “proceeds” to mean “receipts” and
sometimes “profits.” Moreover, the many provisions in the federal money-laundering
statute that use the word “proceeds” make sense under either definition. The rule of
lenity therefore requires the statute to be interpreted in favor of defendants, and the
“profits” definition of “proceeds” is always more defendant-friendly than the “receipts”
definition. Pp. 3–6.

   (b) The Government’s contention that the “profits” interpretation fails to give the
money-laundering statute its intended scope begs the question; the Government’s
contention that the “profits” interpretation hinders effective enforcement of the law is
exaggerated. Neither suffices to overcome the rule of lenity. Pp. 6–14.

   (c) None of the transactions on which respondents’ money-laundering convictions

were based can fairly be characterized as involving the lottery’s profits. Pp. 16–17.

   Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part IV
that Justice Stevens’ position that “proceeds” should be interpreted to mean profits
for some predicate crimes, “receipts” for others, is contrary to this Court’s precedents
holding that judges cannot give the same statutory text different meanings in
different cases, see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371. Pp. 14–16.

   Justice Stevens concluded that revenue a gambling business uses to pay essential
operating expenses is not “proceeds” under 18 U. S. C. §1956. When, as here,
Congress fails to define potentially ambiguous statutory terms, it effectively
delegates the task to federal judges. See Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U. S. 89, 104.
Because Congress could have required that “proceeds” have one meaning when
referring to some of the specified unlawful activities listed in §1956(c)(7) and a
different meaning when referring to others, judges filling statutory gaps may also do
so, as long as they are conscientiously endeavoring to carry out Congress’ intent.
Section 1956’s legislative history makes clear that “proceeds” includes gross
revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime
syndicates involving such sales, but sheds no light on how to identify the proceeds of
an unlicensed stand-alone gambling venture. Furthermore, the consequences of
applying a “gross receipts” definition of “proceeds” to respondents are so perverse
that Congress could not have contemplated them: Allowing the Government to treat
the mere payment of an illegal gambling business’ operating expenses as a separate
offense is in practical effect tantamount to double jeopardy, which is particularly
unfair in this case because the penalties for money laundering are substantially more
severe than those for the underlying offense of operating a gambling business.
Accordingly, the rule of lenity may weigh in the determination, and in that respect the
plurality’s opinion is persuasive. Pp. 1–6.

   Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which
Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to all but Part
IV. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Breyer, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and
Kennedy and Breyer, JJ., joined.

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Art. 264. Administering injurious substances or beverages. — The penalties
established by the next preceding article shall be applicable in the respective case to
any person who, without intent to kill, shall inflict upon another any serious physical
injury, by knowingly administering to him any injurious substances or beverages or
by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or credulity.

Elements:
1. That the offender inflicted upon another any serious physical injury.
2. That it was done by knowingly administering to him any injurious
substances or beverages or by taking advantage of his weakness of mind or
credulity.
3. That he had no intent to kill.

Art. 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon
another physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require
medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

Matters to be noted in the crime of less serious physical injuries.

1. That the offended party is incapacitated for labor for ten days or more (but
not more than 30 days), or needs medical attendance for the same period of
time.
2. That the physical injuries must not be those described in the preceding
articles.

Qualified less serious physical injuries.

(1) A fine not exceeding P500, in addition to arresto mayor, shall be imposed
for less serious physical injuries when —
(a) there is a manifest intent to insult or offend the injured person, or
(b) there are circumstances adding ignominy to the offense.
(2) A higher penalty is imposed when the victim is either —
(a) The offender's parents, ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers; or
(b) Persons of rank or persons in authority, provided the crime is not direct
assault.

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
 1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period;
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party
from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos
when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Republic Act No. 8353 which
took effect on October 22,1997)

Orita

G.R. No. 88724    April 3, 1990

Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
•    March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student
at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates
brought her home from a party.  She knocked at the door of her boarding house
when a frequent visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. 
Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him.  Since the
door which led to the 1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to
the second floor. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand
poking a "balisong" to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they reached
the second floor, he commanded herwith the knife poked at her neck, to look for a
room. They entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her head on the
wall.  With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself. He then ordered her to
take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and panty.  He
ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his
penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told but since she
kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her.  He then laid down on his back
and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis was inserted
into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the
next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the partition, she
ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.
•    Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the
boarding house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door.  When the policemen who were
inside the building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two
other policemen rushed to the boarding house  where they heard and saw somebody
running away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness.  She was taken to
Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
•    Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
•    RTC: frustrated rape

ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount
of P30,000
•    Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
•    Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o    (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony
o    (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will
•    attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force
or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence,
which acts it is his intention to perform
o    If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
•    in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished.  Any penetration of the female
organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ
•    The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on
the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out
penetration of the genital organ of the victim.
Labels: 1990, April 3, art. 6 rpc, Case Digest, cases, crim law 1, G.R. No.
88724, Juris Doctor, No frustrated rape, people v. orita

(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious* or

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female, or a public officer.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;
 (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public officer, (cited in People vs. Mercado, 131 SCRA 501)

People v Gungon
Facts:
It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. Agnes Guirindola, a 20-year
old De La Salle University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra car along Panay
Avenue, Quezon City,on her way to a bookstore, and thereafter, to fetch her mother
from work when a man, passing himself off as a traffic enforcement officer and
wearing a “PNP” reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her to execute a
U-turn towards him. She complied. She came to know that it was Venancio Roxas
who said that she had wrongly traversed a one-way street where, barely
two days ago, a little girl had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her driver’s
license. Roxas told her to open the door. He came on board the car and directed
Agnes to proceed to the next intersection where Roxas motioned her to turn left.
After executing a left turn, she stopped and handed over to him a fifty pesos
(P50.00) bill which he accepted. He then returned her license. Agnes asked Roxas
where she could drop him off, instead, he suddenly pointed a gun at her and
switched off the engine, saying, “Miss kailangan ko lang ito,”
[6] referring to the car. Roxas unlocked the rear door to let another man in. Roberto
Gungon, immediately reclined her seat and pulled her over to the back seat by her
arms while Roxas promptly slid into the driver’s seat. Momentarily, Roxas pulled
over and alighted from the vehicle while Gungon held Agnes and poked a gun at her.
When Roxas returned, he had with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which he
offered to Agnes. Agnes refused to drink after seeing some tablets floating inside the
bottle. The car stopped a second time to load gas at a gasoline station. Once again,
Gungon insisted that she take the drink. Fearing his menacing look and the gun
pointed at her,
she took a sip from the bottle. She was, still later, also forced to swallow two tablets
which Roxas gave to Gungon. She took the tablets but had them under her tongue.
Agnes noticed the address on the signboard reading, “Sto Tomas Batangas and then
she lost consciousness. It was about 9:30 p.m. when she found herself lying at the
back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. She noticed that her pieces of jewelry,
bracelets, earrings, ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as cash, were missing
and that her pair of shoes had been removed. She was told that the items were just
being meanwhile kept for her. The pair of shoes, however, were
returned to her. By this time, a third man was already seated in front of the car with
Roxas. Roxas stopped the car at a deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a place
not far away from the car and there she was shot. When she came to, Roxas,
Gungon, and the third man, as well as the car, were nowhere insight. She managed
to get up and slowly walked down the road until she reached a small house. She was
bleeding profusely from the neck and face. She looked around the house but not
finding anyone, she went to the sala to lie down. People soon arrived on a vehicle.
She again lost consciousness and regained it only at the Batangas Regional Hospital
and
later transferred to a Manila hospital. NBI agent Feneza met with and talked to
Agnes at the V. Luna Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4 pictures from his
files. Agnes had thereby positively identified Roberto Gungon. Gungon could not be
arrested sooner. Based on information given to the NBI, he and his live-in partner
had left Manila by car on a Wednesday, passed through Catbalogan Samar, and
were
bound for Davao. The agents located the arrested him and detained him at their
Regional Office in Davao. They flew him back to Manila of the first available flight on
Monday.

Issues:
WON Gungon is guilty of robbery. WON Gungon is guilty of Anti-Carnapping Act.

Held:

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery to be one committed by any
“person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything xxx.” Robbery may thus be committed two ways: (a) with violence, or
intimidation of persons
and (b) by the use of force upon things. To be then liable for robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons, the following elements must concur.

1) that there be personal property belonging to another;

2) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
3) that the taking must be with intent to gain; and
4) that there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon
things.It would appear that the taking of the victim’s jewelry and cash came only by
way of an afterthought on the part of the appellant. The taking was not attended by
violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes. The absence, however, of
violence or intimidation did not exculpate appellant from liability for the crime of theft,
punishable by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code.
“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
“Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
“1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum ans medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the things stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for
each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of
the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.” Since the value
of the personal property taken from the victim amounted to P38,000.000 the
penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309
which is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods plus one
year for the additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00.
Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have been convicted of violation of
Republic No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, because the taking
of the subject motor vehicle. Roxas had already acquired effective possession of the
subject vehicle. This would have been consequential had there been no finding of
conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In conspiracy, to once again
stress it, the act of the other co- conspirator and, therefore it is of no moment that an
accused had not taken part in the actual commission of every act constituting the
crime each of the conspirators being held in the same degree of liability as the
others.

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. — The penalty of reclusion temporal2 shall be
imposed upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the
next preceding article without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives
him of his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.

Art. 269. Unlawful arrest. — The penalty of arresto mayor* and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than
those authorized by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain
another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

Elements:
1 That the offender arrests or detains another person.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper
authorities.
3. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no
reasonable ground therefor.

Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua* shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody
of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. (As amended by Republic Act No. 18)
 Elements:
1. That the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether
over or under 7 years but less than 21 years of age).
2. That he deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or
guardians.

Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. — The penalty of prision
correccional5 and a fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos shall be imposed upon
anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or
the persons entrusted with his custody.

Elements:
1. That a minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the
home of his parents or guardian or the person entrusted with his custody.
2. That the offender induces said minor to abandon such home.

Art. 272. Slavery. — The penalty of prision mayor1 and a fine of not exceeding
10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or
detain a human being for the purpose of enslaving him.

Elements:
1. That the offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being.
2. That the purpose of the offender is to enslave such human being.

Art. 273. Exploitation of child labor. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed
upon anyone who, under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted with the custody of a minor, shall, against
the tatter's will, retain him in his service.
Elements:
1. That the offender retains a minor in his service.
2. That it is against the will of the minor.
3. That it is under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or person entrusted with the custody of such minor.

Art. 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. — The

penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period9 shall be imposed upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the
payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as
household servant or farm laborer.

Elements:
1. That the offender compels a debtor to work for him, either as household
servant or farm laborer.
2. That it is against the debtor's will.
3. That the purpose is to require or enforce the payment of a debt.

Art. 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one's own

victim. — The penalty of arresto mayor1 shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall
find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can
render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission
shall constitute a more serious offense;
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured;
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age,
shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to
take him to a safe place.

Consti II case digest: ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Double Jeopardy
Same “Offense”

G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991

FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig,
Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and
bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an
Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and (b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code
on Abandonment of one's victim.

On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision in finding the petitioner guilty
of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed from said
Decision to the RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned for violation of Article 365. He entered a plea of not guilty.

He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was denied. He raised before the
SC that that he cannot be penalized twice for an “accident” and another for
“recklessness.” He maintained that since he is facing a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence, which offense carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, he could no longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for
abandonment for failing to render to the persons whom he has accidentally injured.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is a bar to prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code
because it constitutes double jeopardy.

RULING:
No, the SC affirmed that the Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule
on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore,
apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be dismissed for
lack of merit.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code. In People
vs. Doriquez, the SC held that it is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses.  Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other. 
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses. The
first, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. The second, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under
Chapter Two (Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal
Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.

Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against
Security are committed by means of dolo.

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same
statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent
offenses charged.

Art. 276. Abandoning a minor. — The penalty of arresto mayor2 and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall abandon a child
under seven years of age, the custody of which is incumbent upon him.

Elements:
1. That the offender has the custody of a child.
2. That the child is under seven years of age.
3. That he abandons such child.
4. That he has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned.

Art. 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody;

indifference of parents. — The penalty of arresto mayor5 and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who, having charge of the rearing or
education of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other persons,
without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care or, in the
absence of the latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.

Elements of abandonment of minor by one charged with the rearing or

education of said minor.
a. That the offender has charge of the rearing or education of a minor.
 b. That he delivers said minor to a public institution or other persons.
c. That the one who entrusted such child to the offender has not consented to
such act; or if the one who entrusted such child to the offender is absent, the
proper authorities have not consented to it.

Elements of indifference of parents:

a. That the offender is a parent.
b. That he neglects his children by not giving them education.
c. That his station in life requires such education and his financial condition
permits it.

Art. 278. Exploitation of minors. — The penalty of prision correccional in its

minimum and medium periods6 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen years of age to
perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.
2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, ropewalker, diver, wild-animal
tamer or circus manager, or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in
exhibitions of these kinds, children under sixteen years of age who are not his
children or descendants.
3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next
preceding paragraph who shall employ any descendant of his under twelve
years of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher, or person entrusted in any capacity with
the care of a child under sixteen years of age, who shall deliver such child
gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in
paragraph 2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.

Art. 279. Additional penalties for other offenses. — The imposition of the
penalties prescribed in the preceding articles, shall not prevent the imposition upon
the same person of the penalty provided for any other felonies denned and punished
by this Code.

Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will, shall be punished by arresto mayor1 and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Elements of trespass to dwelling.

1. That the offender is a private person.
 2. That he enters the dwelling of another.
3. That such entrance is against the latter's will.

Art. 281. Other forms of trespass. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter the
closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either of them is uninhabited,
if the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not secured the
permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof.

Elements:
1. That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of
another.
2. That the entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited.
3. That the prohibition to enter be manifest.
4. That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the
caretaker thereof.

Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction
upon the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime
he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat
demanding money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful,
and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not
have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be
imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor9 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.

Elements of grave threats where offender attained his purpose:

a. That the offender threatens another person with the infliction upon the
latter's person, honor or property, or upon that of the latter's family, of any
wrong.
b. That such wrong amounts to a crime.
c. That there is a demand for money or that any other condition is imposed,
even though not unlawful.
d. That the offender attains his purpose.

G.R. No. 98400 May 23, 1994] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. CHERRY BONDOC Y LIWANAG, accused- appellant. BELLOSILLO,
J.:

FACTS: On 6 October 1989, Lucita Romero Corpuz went to the Manila City
Jail bringing her 1 year and 4 months old daughter, Carla May, with her to visit
her husband, Antonio Corpuz, but was not allowed this time to bring her
daughter inside. Cherry Bondoc, appellant, who was standing in front of the
gate approached her and volunteered take care of the child while Lucita visits
her husband. After Bondoc’s explanation of her good intentions, Lucita
entrusted her child to her but after fifteen minutes both Bondoc and the child
were nowhere to be found and a woman told Lucita that the appellant had left
with the child; fearing that her child was kidnapped, Lucita reported the
kidnapping to the WPD, which was recorded in the police blotter and then
published in the People’s Journal. Appellant was then placed under arrest for
kidnapping, and on 19 Jan. 1990 an information for kidnapping for the
purpose of selling was filed against her but she denied the
charges,nevertheless, trial court convicted her, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is right in convicting the appellant of
kidnapping defined and penalized under Art. 270 of The Revised PenalCode.

HELD: “The trial court observed that Lucita, testifying before the court in a
spontaneous, straightforward and candid manner, pointed to and identified
appellant as the person to whom she entrusted Carla May and who later
absconded with her child; that prior to Lucita's identification in court she had
immediately pointed to the appellant as the kidnapper of her child on the day
she 241.
2. saw appellant at the Herbosa police station when Carla May was
presented.”1 “The bare denial of appellant that Lucita was not the one who
entrusted Carla May to her constitutes self-serving negative evidence which is
not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of Lucita. As the denial of
appellant was weak, uncorroborated and inherently improbable, the clear and
straightforward testimony of the prosecution witnesses should prevail. Even if
there is no evidence to show appellant's intention to sell the young girl for
profit, the two elements of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Art.
270 of The Revised Penal Code are already present, namely: (a) The offender
has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and (b) The offender
deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardian. 10 With the
positive testimony of Lucita, the prosecution has proved the presence of the
above elements to establish the criminal liability of appellant. Moreover,
appellant has admitted the existence of the two elements by testifying that
after having been given custody of the child, she kept the latter in her sister's
house for three (3) or four (4) days without seeking any assistance from the
police authorities so that the child could be immediately returned to her
mother. This admission shows the falsity of her claim of innocence. Instead, it
affirms her deliberate refusal to return the child to her mother.”2 Cruz, Davide,
 Jr., Quiason and Kapunan,JJ.,concur. 31 Phil. 509 [G.R. No. 10331
September 27, 1915

Art. 283. Light threats. — A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime,
made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be
punished by arresto mayor.

Elements:
1. That the offender makes a threat to commit a wrong.
2. That the wrong does not constitute a crime.
3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even
though not unlawful.
4. That the offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his
purpose.

Art. 284. Bond for good behavior. — In all cases falling within the two next
preceding articles, the person making the threats may also be required to give bail
not to molest the person threatened, or if he shall fail to give such bail, he shall be
sentenced to destierro.

In what cases may a person be required to give ball not to molest another?
1. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 282.
2. When he threatens another under the circumstances mentioned in Art. 283.

Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum
period12 or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon
in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense;
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with
some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts shows that
he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat, provided that the
circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within the provisions of Article
282 of this Code;
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not
constituting a felony.
Acts punished as other light threats.
 1. By threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in a
quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. By orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm (not)
constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his threat.
Note: The word "not" in this paragraph is enclosed in parenthesis, because
the inclusion of that word in paragraph 2 of Art. 285 is a mistake.
3. By orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony.

Art. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of prision correccional13 and a fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong.

Elements of grave coercions:

The three elements of the crime of grave coercions are:
1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or
wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, threats or
intimidation; and
3. That the person that restrained the will and liberty of another had not the
authority of law or the right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint shall
not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.
(People vs. Rimando, CA., 56 O.G. 1687; People vs. Picunada, C.A., 43 O.G.
2222; U.S. vs. Tupular, 7 Phil. 8; and People vs. Camat, etal., CA-G.R. No.
13777-R, prom. Sept. 22,1955; Timoner vs. People, 125 SCRA 830)
Art. 287. Light coercions. — Any person who, by means of violence, shall
seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to
the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period15 and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no
case less than 75 pesos.

Elements:
1. That the offender must be a creditor.
2. That he seizes anything belonging to his debtor.
3. That the seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence
or a display of material force producing intimidation.
4. That the purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment
of the debt.
Art. 288 . Other similar coercions - (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and
payment of wages by means of tokens). — The penalty of arresto mayor™ or a fine
ranging from 200 to 500 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person, agent, or
officer of any association or corporation who shall force or compel, directly or
indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him or by
such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or
commodities of any kind.

Acts punished as other similar coercions:

1. By forcing or compelling, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permitting the
forcing or compelling of the laborer or employee of the offender to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him.
2. By paying the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or
objects other than the legal tender currency of the Philippines, unless
expressly requested by such laborer or employee.
Elements of No. 1:
a. That the offender is any person, agent or officer of any association or
corporation.
b. That he or such firm or corporation has employed laborers or employees.
c. That he forces or compels, directly or indirectly, or knowingly permits to be
forced or compelled, any of his or its laborers or employees to purchase
merchandise or commodities of any kind from him or from said firm or
corporation.
Elements of No. 2:
a. That the offender pays the wages due a laborer or employee employed by
him by means of tokens or objects.
b. That those tokens or objects are other than the legal tender currency of the
Philippines.
c. That such employee or laborer does not expressly request that he be paid
by means of tokens or objects.

LEE vs. CA
(Case Digest)
G.R. No. 93695, February 4, 1992

FACTS: A complaint for a sum of money was filed by the International Corporate
Bank, Inc. against the private respondents who, in turn, filed a third party complaint
against ALFA and the petitioners. The trial court issued an order requiring the
issuance of an alias summons upon ALFA through the DBP as a consequence of the
petitioner's letter informing the court that the summons for ALFA was erroneously
 served upon them considering that the management of ALFA had been transferred
to the DBP. The DBP claimed that it was not authorized to receive summons on
behalf of ALFA since the DBP had not taken over the company which has a separate
and distinct corporate personality and existence. Subsequently, the trial court issued
an order advising the private respondents to take the appropriate steps to serve the
summons to ALFA. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration submitting that
Rule 14, section 13 of the Revised Rules of Court is not applicable since they were
no longer officers of ALFA and that the private respondents should have availed of
another mode of service under Rule 14, Section 16 of the said Rules, i.e., through
publication to effect proper service upon ALFA. The private respondents argued that
the voting trust agreement dated March 11, 1981 did not divest the petitioners of
their positions as president and executive vice-president of ALFA so that service of
summons upon ALFA through the petitioners as corporate officers was proper. The
trial court upheld the validity of the service of summons on ALFA through the
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
reiterating their stand that by virtue of the voting trust agreement they ceased to be
officers and directors of ALFA, hence, they could no longer receive summons or any
court processes for or on behalf of ALFA and in support thereof, they attached a
copy of the voting trust agreement between all the stockholders of ALFA and the
DBP whereby the management and control of ALFA became vested upon the DBP.
The trial court then reversed itself and declared that service upon the petitioners
cannot be considered as proper service of summons on ALFA. The case was
elevated to the CA which reversed the above-mentioned Orders holding that there
was proper service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners.

ISSUES:
(1)   Whether or not the execution of the voting trust agreement by a stockholder
whereby all his shares to the corporation have been transferred to the trustee
deprives the stockholder of his position as director of the corporation;

(2)   Whether or not the service of summons on ALFA effected through the petitioners,
as president and vice-president, of the subject corporation after the execution of the
voting trust agreement valid and effective;

RULING:

1.     Yes. By its very nature, a voting trust agreement results in the separation of the
voting rights of a stockholder from his other rights. The execution of a voting trust
agreement, therefore, may create a dichotomy between the equitable or beneficial
ownership of the corporate shares of stockholders, on the one hand, and the legal
title thereto on the other hand. In the instant case, the petitioners maintain that with
the execution of the voting trust agreement between them and the other stockholders
of ALFA, as one party, and the DBP, as the other party, the former assigned and
transferred all their shares in ALFA to DBP, as trustee and thus, they can no longer
be considered directors of ALFA. Under the old Corporation Code, the eligibility of a
director, strictly speaking, cannot be adversely affected by the simple act of such
director being a party to a voting trust agreement inasmuch as he remains owner
(although beneficial or equitable only) of the shares subject of the voting trust
agreement pursuant to which a transfer of the stockholder's shares in favor of the
trustee is required. No disqualification arises by virtue of the phrase "in his own right"
 provided under the old Corporation Code. With the omission of the phrase "in his
own right" the election of trustees and other persons who in fact are not beneficial
owners of the shares registered in their names on the books of the corporation
becomes formally legalized. Hence, this is a clear indication that in order to be
eligible as a director, what is material is the legal title to, not beneficial ownership of,
the stock as appearing on the books of the corporation. The facts of this case show
that the petitioners, by virtue of the voting trust agreement executed in 1981
disposed of all their shares through assignment and delivery in favor of the DBP, as
trustee. Consequently, the petitioners ceased to own at least one share standing in
their names on the books of ALFA as required under Section 23 of the new
Corporation Code. They also ceased to have anything to do with the management of
the enterprise. The petitioners ceased to be directors. Hence, the transfer of the
petitioners' shares to the DBP created vacancies in their respective positions as
directors of ALFA. Considering that the voting trust agreement between ALFA and
the DBP transferred legal ownership of the stock covered by the agreement to the
DBP as trustee, the latter became the stockholder of record with respect to the said
shares of stocks. Both parties, ALFA and the DBP, were aware at the time of the
execution of the agreement that by virtue of the transfer of shares of ALFA to the
DBP, all the directors of ALFA were stripped of their positions as such. There can be
no reliance on the inference that the five-year period of the voting trust agreement in
question had lapsed in 1986 so that the legal title to the stocks covered by the said
voting trust agreement ipso facto reverted to the petitioners as beneficial owners
pursuant to the 6th paragraph of section 59 of the new Corporation Code which
reads:
"Unless expressly renewed, all rights granted in a voting trust agreement shall
automatically expire at the end of the agreed period, and the voting trust certificate
as well as the certificates of stock in the name of the trustee or trustees shall thereby
be deemed cancelled and new certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of
the transferors."

On the contrary, it is manifestly clear from the terms of the voting trust agreement
between ALFA and the DBP that the duration of the agreement is contingent upon
the fulfillment of certain obligations of ALFA with the DBP. There is evidence on
record that at the time of the service of summons on ALFA through the petitioners on
August 21, 1987, the voting trust agreement in question was not yet terminated so
that the legal title to the stocks of ALFA, then, still belonged to the DBP.

2.     No. Under section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that:
"Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the
defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors."

It is a basic principle in Corporation Law that a corporation has a personality

separate and distinct from the officers or members who compose it. Thus, the above
rule on service of processes of a corporation enumerates the representatives of a
corporation who can validly receive court processes on its behalf. Not every
stockholder or officer can bind the corporation considering the existence of a
corporate entity separate from those who compose it. The petitioners in this case do
not fall under any of the enumerated officers. The service of summons upon ALFA,
through the petitioners, therefore, is not valid. To rule otherwise, as correctly argued
by the petitioners, will contravene the general principle that a corporation can only be
bound by such acts which are within the scope of the officer's or agent's authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Art. 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or

labor through violence or threats. — The penalty of arresto mayor11 and a fine
not exceeding 300 pesos shall be imposed upon any persons who, for the purpose
of organizing, maintaining, or preventing coalitions of capital or labor, strike of
laborers, or lockout of employers, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree
as to compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their
industry or work, if the act shall not constitute a more serious offense in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.

Elements:
1. That the offender employs violence or threats, in such a degree as to
compel or force the laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of
their industry or work.
2. That the purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent coalitions of capital or
labor, strike of laborers or lockout of employers.

"Mortera et. Al v Atty Pagatpatan A.C. No. 4562 June 15, 2005

Facts: From the execution of a judgment in a civil action for rescission of

contracts,the complainants, then the plaintiffs, secured judgment under which the
defendant in that case was to pay them P155,000 for the property. The plaintiff’s
counsel, Atty. Pagatpatan, agreed with Aguilar (defendant in civil action),
toacceptP150,000 as partial payment of the judgment sum, issuing a receipt for
theamount.He then deposited the money in his personal bank account without
theknowledge of complainants. Until now, respondent adamantly refuses tosurrender
the money to complainants, despite the successive Orders of the RTCand the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this present case for disbarment.Respondent admits his secret
agreement with and receipt of the money from Aguilar, saying that his clients would
not have paid him his fees had he not donewhat he did. Respondent narrated his
years of service as counsel for thecomplainants and their mother. He alleged the
amounts they owed him althoughhe presented no evidence of any agreement
between him and the complainantsfor the exact amount of his compensation.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper for an attorney to appropriate for himself the
judgment sum due to his clients considering the latter’s non payment of fees for
services previously rendered by the former
 Held: No. Respondents responsibility to the complainants is unequivocally stated
inCanons 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The four
rulesgoverning this situation were: he owed candor to his clients; he was bound
toaccount for whatever money he received for and from them; as a lawyer, he
wasobligated to keep his own money separate from that of his clients; and,
althoughhe was entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy his lawful fees, he
wasalso bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver
thefunds to them upon demand or when due.Respondent violated each and every
one of these rules. Respondent issuspended from the practice of law for two years."

Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. — The

penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods1 and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any private individual who, in order to
discover secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents
thereof.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual or even a public officer not in the
exercise of his official function.
2. That he seizes the papers or letters of another.
3. That the purpose is to discover the secrets of such another person.
4. That offender is informed of the contents of the papers or letters seized.
(People vs. Singh, C.A., 40 O.G., Supp. 5, 35)

Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor3
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee,
or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master
and shall reveal such secrets.

Elements:
1. That the offender is a manager, employee or servant.
2. That he learns the secrets of his principal or master in such capacity.
3. That he reveals such secrets.

Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in

its minimum and medium periods4 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon the person in charge, employee, or workman of any manufacturing or
industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the
secrets of the industry of the latter.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a person in charge, employee or workman of a
manufacturing or industrial establishment.
2. That the manufacturing or industrial establishment has a secret of the
industry which the offender has learned.
3. That the offender reveals such secrets.
4. That prejudice is caused to the owner.

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall
take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.

Robbery, defined.
Robbery is the taking of personal property, belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything.

Elements of robbery in general.

a. That there be (1) personal property; (2) belonging to another;
b. That there is (3) unlawful taking of that property;
c. That the taking must be (4) with intent to gain; and d. That there is (5)
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon anything.
Elements of robbery in general.

People vs. Salas

Facts:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he
could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled
the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's rearrest. Abong, however, was gone.
Nonetheless (Bernardo Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain
circumstances. the judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused. The order of the trial court is before the
Supreme Court on certiorari and mandamus.
Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his escape.

Held:

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In all criminal
prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." The purpose of
this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the
past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the
defendant's escape. The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his
presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as
long as the defendant had not reappeared or remained at large.
As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his
escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of
the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19,
which now allows trial in absentia,
 Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and
possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has
been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the
right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same
fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by
escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.

Art294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties.

— Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,2 when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or
 when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson;
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua,3 when by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted;
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal,* when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted;
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its medium period,5 if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission
of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of
the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263;
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7659)

People vs Hernandez
People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964

Facts:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal
Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No.
15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-
6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson
and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from,
but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026)
the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are
Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres
Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.

A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision
subject of the present appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held:

The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party

of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had
close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of
the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount
of the costs.

In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP
leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press
releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong
to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a
Communist.

However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz,

Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained
in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas,
Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to
commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code,
and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five
years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their
proportional share of the costs.

Advocacy of Communism put into Action

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be

considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an
advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or
principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and
positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement
forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is
actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet
advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is
not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment.
Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise,
does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-appellants

All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as
charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years
and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs.

Legal Considerations — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other

defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or
facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or
nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the
appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist
Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to
commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby;
and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or
acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the
HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure,
as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom.
By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force,
and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the
ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more,
renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.

Art. 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place

and by a band, or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. — If the
offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article
shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or by a band or by attacking a
moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by entering the passengers'
compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers thereof by surprise
in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the
intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Republic Act No. 12, Sec.
2, and Republic Act No. 373)

When is robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons qualified?

If any of the offenses denned in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of Art. 294 is
committed
1 in an uninhabited place, or
(2) by a band,or
(3) by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle, or airship, or
(4) by entering the passengers' compartments in a train, or in any manner
taking the passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or
 (5) on a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the
use of firearms, the offender shall be punished by the maximum periods of the
proper penalties prescribed in Art. 294.

People vs. Salvilla

184 SCRA 671 (1990)

Facts:
The accused Bienvenido Salvilla together with his co-accused armed with
homemade guns and hand grenade robbed Rodita Habiero in the latter’s office.  In
the office of Rodita; her two daughters Mary and Mimmie were also inside.  One of
the accused asks Mary to get the paper bag which contained money.  All accused
held victims as hostage when the police and military authorities had surrounded the
lumber yard.  After the negotiation fails to proceed, the police makes their move in
assaulting the robbers thus Mary and Mimmie are injured as well the accused also
got an injury.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of robbery was consummated
Held:
Yes.

Ratio:

            From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the
culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.

Art. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. —
When more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery,
it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in
the commission of the offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed
upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum period of the corresponding penalty
provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal possession of
such unlicensed firearm.
 Outline of the provisions.
1. When at least four armed malefactors take part in the commission of a
robbery, it is deemed committed by a band.
2. When any of the arms used in the commission of robbery is not licensed,
the penalty upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the
corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal
liability for illegal possession of such firearms.
3. Any member of a band who was present at the commission of a robbery by
the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by
the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.

PEOPLE v. PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, GR No. L-16177, 1967-05-24

Facts:
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose Guico... to death for the crime... of robbery
with homicide Jose Guico, an ex-convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in common law
relationship Pancho Pelagio Pancho Pelagio came to see the spouses Guico and
Villanueva.  Pelagio's wife had just delivered a child and he wanted to borrow money
for the hospital expenses. Armando Manalang, taking advantage of the said visit,
informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he, Manalang, was planning with some other
friends who later were revealed by Manalang to be Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and
Arcadio Balmeo. Jose Guico's participation in the first meeting is unclear... arch 24,
1955, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set
out for the execution of their... plan
Aling Nena's residence
Caymo ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the latter... did
At the gate, however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio.
they found Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. 
Caymo and Balmeo then rode on it.
When the stranger was very near the taxi already,... Manalang instructed Caymo to
shoot at the man as the latter was a police officer.
Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police Department, fell dead.
aymo and Balmeo proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met Pancho
Pelagio... he latter... explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and
Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house
apparently to summon the police.
Issues:
Appellant Pancho Pelagio... e should only be convicted for simple robbery and not
for robbery with homicide.
Appellant Jose Guico... e cannot justly be convicted for the crime charged.
Ruling:
Principles:

Art. 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain

circumstances. — When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,6 unless
the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this
Code.

Art. 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation.— Any

person who, with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation,
shall compel him to sign, execute, or deliver any public instrument or document, shall
be held guilty of robbery and punished by the penalties respectively prescribed in
this Chapter.

Elements:
1. That the offender has intent to defraud another.
2. That the offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document.
3. That the compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.
Art. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship. — Any armed person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited
house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished by
reclusion temporal,1 if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if
—
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery is
committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools;
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:
1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or
sealed furniture or receptacle;
 2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open
outside the place of the robbery.

1. PEOPLE V. TAYAG
G.R. No. 40512, [March 3, 1934], 59 PHIL 606-609)
DOCTRINE:
 In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by meansof
competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences,however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains,
as in this case, asufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from
that of committing robbery.
FACTS:
 On September 12, 1933, a little after two o'clock on the morning, of the said
twoappellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go
Cuay'sstore/dwelling (with a little more than P40 in cash and merchandise valued at
aroundP1,000) at No. 325-A, San Marcelino Street, Manila. Believing that they
were unnoticed,they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the
tools
—
 bolo and screwdriver
—
 which they then carried and which, of course, were not the proper means for
thatpurpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and
uponbecoming aware that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried
to escapebut policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that time had
been watchingthem, detained and placed them under arrest. The lower
court convicted the accused withattempted robbery.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed is attempted robbery.

HELD:
 No. The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of
trespasscommitted by means of violence, as defined in article 280 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code.In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a
little more than P40 incash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the day
before, and merchandise valuedat around P1,000. However, there is absolutely
nothing of record to show that the saidappellants' intention on that occasion was to
commit robbery, or that they somehow knewthat they would find money amounting to
P40 therein.In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by
means ofcompetent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere
inferences,however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains,
as in this case, asufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from
that of committing robbery.It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that
had the appellants succeeded inentering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay,
they would have carried away all the goodstherein, because they would not have
been able to do so by themselves, not having anyvehicle at their disposal.
Art. 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. — The robbery
mentioned in the next preceding article, if committed in an uninhabited place and by
a band, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided therefor.

Art. 301. What is an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to

religious worship and their dependencies. — Inhabited house means any shelter,
ship, or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the
inhabitants thereof shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is
committed.

Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. — Any

robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than those
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken
exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods,10 provided that any of the following circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for
entrance or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks,
or other similar tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle
has been broken;
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.

Elements:
1. That the offender entered an uninhabited place or a building which was not
a dwelling house, not a public building, or not an edifice devoted to religious
worship.
2. That any of the following circumstances was present:
a. The entrance was effected through an opening not intended for entrance or
egress;
b. A wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window was broken;
c. The entrance was effected through the use of false keys, picklocks or other
similar tools;
d. A door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle
was broken; or
 e. A closed or sealed receptacle was removed, even if the same be broken
open elsewhere.
3. That with intent to gain, the offender took therefrom personal property
belonging to another.

Art. 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or

private building. — In the cases enumerated in articles 299 and 302, when the
robbery consists in the taking of cereals, fruits, or firewood, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. — Any person who shall,
without lawful cause, have in his possession picklocks or similar tools specially
adopted to the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

Elements of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools.

1. That the offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools.
2. That such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the
commission of robbery.
3. That the offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.

Art. 305. False keys. — The term "false keys" shall be deemed to include:

1. The tools mentioned in the next preceding article;

2. Genuine keys stolen from the owner;
3. Any keys other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock forcibly
opened by the offender.

C AS E DIGE ST: PEOPLE V S

DE LA C RU Z; PEOPLE V S. DE LA
C RU Z
10:11 PM
G.R. No. 181545
People vs. Mark Dela Cruz
October 08, 2008

Facts:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the poseur-
buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions identified to be
an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and said that he was
arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the police were after.
His testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Lower court gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the
presumption of regularity in the operation conducted by the officers.

Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from
him in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 (inventory of seized drugs) and Section
21 (3) of the same law(certification of the forensic laboratory examination results).

Ruling:

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.

Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the
custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the prosecution failed to clearly
establish the chain of custody of the seized plastic sachets, containing shabu from
the time they were first allegedly received until they were brought to the police
investigator. There were no records to show that the procedural requirements in
Section 21 were complied with.
The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity
is merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.”

The appellant was acquitted.

Art. 306. Who are brigands — Penalty. — When more than three armed persons
form a band of robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or
kidnapping persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom or for any other
purpose to be attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed
highway robbers or brigands.

There is brigandage when —

1. There be at least four armed persons.
2. They formed a band of robbers.
3. The purpose is any of the following:
a. To commit robbery in the highway; or
b. To kidnap persons for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom; or
c. To attain by means of force and violence any other purpose.

Art. 307. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands. — Any person knowingly and in
any manner aiding, abetting, or protecting a band of brigands as described in the
next preceding article, or giving them information of the movements of the police or
other peace officers of the Government (or of the forces of the United States Army,
when the latter are acting in aid of the Government), or acquiring or receiving the
property taken by such brigands, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period.

Elements:
1. That there is a band of brigands.
2. That the offender knows the band to be of brigands.
3. That the offender does any of the following acts:
 a. He in any manner aids, abets or protects such band of brigands; or
b. He gives them information of the movements of the police or other peace
officers of the Government; or
c. He acquires or receives the property taken by such brigands.

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with
intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to
the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another,
shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him;
and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest
or farm products.

Elements of theft:
1. That there be taking of personal property.
2. That said property belongs to another.
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain.
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner.
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000;
People vs. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598)
Note: In the case of U.S. vs. De Vera, supra, the phrase "taking away" is used
in stating one of the elements of theft. But in the case of People vs. Yusay,
supra, citing Viada, the word "away" is not used in connection with the taking
of personal property.

PEOPLE v. ISAGANI GULINAO Y ALZONA, GR Nos. 82264-66, 1989-12-04

Facts:
Issues:
On March 3, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M., Dr. Chua, appellant Gulinao (driver-
bodyguard of Dr. Chua), Virgilio Caguioa (secretary of Dr. Chua), Vice Mayor Teofilo
Reyes of Malabon, Dante Reyes (nephew... of Vice Mayor Reyes), Boy Salazar and
other politicians were having a caucus in the house of a certain Torre in Acacia,
Malabon.  After the caucus at about 11:00 P.M., the group of Dr. Chua boarded Dr.
Chua's car and that of Vice Mayor
Reyes and proceeded to the Bar-Bar Disco House along McArthur Highway,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila (pp. 5-10, TSN April 6, 1987)
"Upon arriving at the disco house, Gulinao, who had in his possession an Ingram
machine pistol, swapped the same with a .45 caliber pistol in possession of Dante
Reyes.  Gulinao then tucked the .45 caliber pistol in his right waist
(pp. 11-13, TSN May 18, 1987).
"Inside the disco house, Dr. Chua, Gulinao and companions occupied 2 tables which
were joined together near the stage (pp. 14-18, TSN April 6, 1987).  Later, Gulinao
went to the comfort room and cocked the .45 caliber... pistol.  He then returned to his
seat beside Dr. Chua (pp. 14-15 TSN May 18, 1987).
"While Dr. Chua was watching the floor show, Gulinao stood up and shot him on the
head at close range with the .45 caliber pistol (pp. 16-17 TSN May 22, 1987).  When
Gulinao was about to leave the disco house, he turned back to Dr.
Chua and took the latter's gold ring embedded with 12 diamonds (p. 11 TSN October
5, 1987; pp. 28-29 TSN April 6, 1987; Exhs. "H" and "L-1").  Thereupon, Gulinao
rushed outside the disco house to the car of Dr. Chua (p. 27
TSN April 6, 1987).
"Poking the gun at Caguioa who was inside the car, Gulinao ordered the former to
leave the car.  While Caguioa was getting out of the car, Gulinao fired at him but
missed (pp. 27-29 TSN April 6,... 1987).  On the other hand, Dante Reyes tried to fire
at Gulinao with the Ingram machine pistol, but the Ingram jammed.  (pp. 16-17 TSN
May 18, 1987).
"Gulinao drove the car towards Monumento (p. 29 TSN April 6, 1987).  However, he
was constrained to leave the car and take a taxi when the car he was driving figured
in an accident in Malabon (p. 15 TSN July 10, 1987;
Exh. "L-1").
"Dr. Chua, who sustained gunshot wounds on the head, was brought to the nearby
Our Lady of Fatima Hospital where he died on arrival
Ruling:
Principles:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

, 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
 the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph and one year of each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,2 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,3 if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,4 if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor in its full extent,3 if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,6 if such value does not
exceed five pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period7 or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.

Art. 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if
the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended
by Batas Pambansa Big. 71, approved May 1,1980)

Theft is qualified —
1. If the theft is committed by a domestic servant.
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence.
 3. If the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter, or (c) large
cattle.
4. If the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation.
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery.
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERLINDA A. SISON

G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the
requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. She introduced Castuera to
another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with her help. She also
showed Castuera pictures of other people she had supposedly helped to get
employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped
had given her their car as payment. Because of her representations, Castuera
believed in her promise that she could send him to Australia. Appellant asked
Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers.

Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together with
Dedales and Bacomo, appellant convinced Castueara that that it was difficult to get
an Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia to
get one. Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia
was denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of his U.S. visa, which
he paid. However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an
Indonesian passport bearing an Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera
decided to just return to the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of syndicated estafa.

Ruling: Yes. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a

group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.
Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment
for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under
Section 6 of RA 8042.
In this case, appellant herself admits that she has no license or authority to
undertake recruitment and placement activities. Since it was proven that the three
accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal
recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage.

Ratio Decidendi: It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every act.

Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of
the RTC finding Sison guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Section 6, in
relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 8042 or illegal recruitment involving
economic sabotage.

Art. 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. —
If the property stolen be any property of the National Library or of the National
Museum, the penalty shall be arresto mayor8 or a fine ranging from 200 to 500
pesos, or both, unless a higher penalty should be provided under other provisions of
this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished by such higher penalty.

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. —

Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to
another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him,
shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum for the gain which he shall
have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.

Elements:
a. That the offender takes possession of any real property or usurps any real
rights in property.
b. That the real property or real rights belong to another.
c. That violence against or intimidation of persons is used by the offender in
occupying real property or usurping real rights in property.
d. That there is intent to gain.

Art. 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. — Any person who shall alter the
boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks
intended to designate the boundaries of the same, shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 100 pesos, or both.

Elements:
1. That there be boundary marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or
estates, or any other marks intended to designate the boundaries of the
same.
2. That the offender alters said boundary marks.

Art. 314. Fraudulent insolvency. — Any person who shall abscond with his
property to the prejudice of his creditors, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor1 if
he be a merchant, and the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period,2 if he be not a merchant.
Elements:
1. That the offender is a debtor; that is, he has obligations due and payable.
2. That he absconds with his property.
3. That there be prejudice to his creditors.

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period,1 if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,2
if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period,3 if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,4 if such amount
does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
fraud be committed by any of the following means:
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of value which
the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such
obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration;
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received
such money, goods, or other property;
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank,
and by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice
of the offended party or any third person.
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of other similar deceits.
b) By altering the quality, fineness, or weight of anything pertaining to his art
or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice
to the action for calumny, which the offended party may deem proper to bring
against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer
of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
(3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/ or the payee or holder that
said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be
prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
(As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17,1967)
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like
without paying therefore, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by
abandoning or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel,
inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house after
obtaining credit, food, refreshment, or accommodation therein without paying
for his food, refreshment, or accommodation. (As amended by Com. Act No.
157)
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document;
 (b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling
game;
(c) By removing, concealing, or destroying, in whole or in part, any court
record, office files, document, or any other papers.

Elements of estafa in general:

1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit; and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.

CHUA-BURCE V. CA (possession by a bank teller is possession of the bank itself;

mere custodian)

FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant
Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should
total to P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000. After 4
investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta
Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to
explain the shortage, the services of the accused was terminated.

Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime
of estafa. A civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of
criminal case due to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA.
The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued.

The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her
liable for the shortage of P150,000. She appealed both rulings to the CA but the
court affirmed the two TC rulings.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N there was a valid trial
(2) W/N the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:

(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.

The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not intervene with the case
(violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did not present evidence for the criminal case (no
evidence for the accused to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated with the criminal
case. And both parties, during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective
evidences in the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was reduced
into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court. Being bound by the pre-trial
agreement, it is now too late in the day to challenge its contents.

(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.

The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration, or
any other circumstances, with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property

The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee both material and
juridical possession of the personal property. Juridical possession means the
transferee has a right over the thing which he may even set up against the
owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no juridical possession.
Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to that of a bank teller. And
possession of a bank teller is possession of the bank. she was a mere custodian.

*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but double jeopardy is already in
play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER – payment to the teller is a
payment to the bank, he is a mere custodian. AGENT – he can assert his
independent, autonomous right to retain money, even against the owner.

Art. 316. Other forms of swindling. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods9 and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall
convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same;
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose
of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;
3. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its
lawful possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person;
 4. Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract;
5. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief
that it was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when
in fact he did not actually perform such services or labor;
6. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil
action, without express authority from the court or before the cancellation of
his bond or before being relieved from the obligation contracted by him, shall
sell, mortgage, or, in any other manner, encumber the real property or
properties with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.

Elements:
1. That the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or a building.
2. That the offender who is not the owner of said property should
represent that he is the owner thereof.
3. That the offender should have executed an act of ownership (selling,
leasing, encumbering or mortgaging the real property).
4. That the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.

Art. 317. Swindling a minor. — Any person who, taking advantage of the
inexperience or emotions or feelings of a minor to his detriment, shall induce him to
assume any obligation or to give any release or execute a transfer of any property
right in consideration of some loan of money, credit, or other personal property,
whether the loan clearly appears in the document or is shown in any other form, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor10 and a fine of a sum ranging from 10 to 50 per
cent of the value of the obligation contracted by the minor.

Elements:
1. That the offender takes advantage of the inexperience or emotions or
feelings of a minor.
2. That he induces such minor (1) to assume an obligation, or (2) to give
release, or (3) to execute a transfer of any property right.
3. That the consideration is (1) some loan of money, (2) credit, or (3) other
personal property.
4. That the transaction is to the detriment of such minor

Art. 318. Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than
the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit
not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
 Other deceits are:
1. By defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned in
the preceding articles.
2. By interpreting dreams, by making forecasts, by telling fortunes, or by
taking advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, for
profit or gain.

VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997
Facts:
The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140)
hectares to four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain,
but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have
been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After
acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.

In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit

Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was
entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the
requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property
since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over
the property to bolster his claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the
same year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.
In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made
several collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the
Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any
substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands. Unperturbed, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise
dismissed the petition.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity
of Contract ( Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two
parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same time that
he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the
President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his
behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take cognizance
of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving
its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable under Article 1403 (2)
(e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive
prescription and/or laches.

The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by

upholding the lower court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid.

HELD:
No. The provision of the law is specific that public lands can only be acquired in the
manner provided for therein and not otherwise(Sec. 11, CA. No. 141, as amended).
In his sales application, petitioner expressly admitted that said property was public
land. This is formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against interest. The
records show that Villaflor had applied for the purchase of lands in question with this
Office (Sales Application V-807) on 2 December 1948. There is a condition in the
sales application to the effect that he recognizes that the land covered by the same
is of public domain and any and all rights he may have with respect thereto by virtue
of continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to the Government of
which Villaflor is very much aware. It also appears that Villaflor had paid for the
publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the land. He participated in the public
auction where he was declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid the purchase
price thereof. It would be a height of absurdity for Villaflor to be buying that which is
owned by him if his claim of private ownership thereof is to be believed. The area in
dispute is not the private property of the petitioner.

It is a basic assumption of public policy that lands of whatever classification belong

to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the
same as dominus. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied from the government. It is indispensable then that there be
showing of title from the state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
Such sales applicant manifestly acknowledged that he does not own the land and
that the same is a public land under the administration of the Bureau of Lands, to
which the application was submitted, all of its acts prior thereof, including its real
estate tax declarations, characterized its possessions of the land as that of a “sales
applicant”. And consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done
so, and is not, therefore, its owner.

The rule on the interpretation of contracts (Article 1371) is used in affirming, not
negating, their validity. Article 1373,which is a conjunct of Article 1371, provides that,
if the instrument is susceptible of two or more interpretations, the interpretation which
will make it valid and effectual should be adopted. In this light, it is not difficult to
understand that the legal basis urged by petitioner does not support his allegation
that the contracts to sell and the deed of relinquishment are simulated and fictitious.
Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purpose
of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different
from that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the
agreements. The intent to sell, on the other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact,
that the agreement to sell (7 December 1948) did not absolutely transfer ownership
of the land to private respondent, does not how that the agreement was simulated.
Petitioner‟s delivery of the Certificate of Ownership and execution of the deed of
absolute sale were suspensive conditions, which gave rise to a corresponding
obligation on the part of the private respondent, i.e., the payment of the last
installment of the consideration mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not
affect the perfection of the contract or prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives
the vendor only the right to sue for collection. Generally, in a contract of sale,
payment of the price is a resolutory condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact
fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach, to rescind the contract under Article
1191 of the Civil Code. However, failure to pay is not even a breach, but merely an
event which prevents the vendor‟s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.

The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the
possession of the qualifications required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the
lack of the disqualifications mentioned therein (under Sections 121, 122,and 123).
Section 121 of the Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from a
grantee: The private respondent, not the petitioner, was the direct grantee of the
disputed land. Sections 122 and 123 disqualify corporations, which are not
authorized by their charter, from acquiring public land; the records do not show that
private respondent was not so authorized under its charter.

Art. 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. — The penalty of

arresto mayor1 or a fine amounting to twice the value of the property shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall knowingly remove any personal property mortgaged under
the Chattel Mortgage Law to any province or city other than the one in which it was
located at the time of the execution of the mortgage, without the written consent of
the mortgagee or his executors, administrators, or assigns.
2. Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already pledged, or any
part thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the consent of the
mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record thereof in
the office of the register of deeds of the province where such property is located.

Elements of knowingly removing mortgaged personal property:

a. That personal property is mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage Law.
b. That the offender knows that such property is so mortgaged.
c. That he removes such mortgaged personal property to any province or city
other than the one in which it was located at the time of the execution of the
mortgage.
d. That the removal is permanent.
e. That there is no written consent of the mortgagee or his executors,
administrators or assigns to such removal.

Art. 320. Destructive arson. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death1 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:
 1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of
burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or
different occasions;
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general
or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as,
but not limited to official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels,
transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or
edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building
is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation, and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

"People v. Macabando (Arson)

FACTS: At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road
holding G.I. pipe, andshouted that he wanted to get even (“ manabla ko
”).  Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
 At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of
water, and poured itscontents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the
barangay headquarters to get a fireextinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bagand a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told thepeople
around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.
 Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio
cassettes for sale had beenstolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after
looking for his missing radio cassette, and thatthe fire had already started when he
woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house andmaintained that he did not
own a gun. He added that the gunshots came from the explosion offirecrackers that
he intended to use during the New Year celebration.The prosecution charged the
appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC.The RTC
found him guilty and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
CA affirmed
.ISSUE: W/N he was guilty? Yes.
HELD: The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of circumstantial
events that leads toan unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of
others, set fire to his house. Thecombination of these circumstances, indeed, leads
to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fireto his house.
We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the firein his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had
nothing to do with the crime. The first impulseof an individual whose house is on fire
is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to humannature, reason
and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the
firein his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant
showed hisdetermination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too,
is the fact that the appellantcarried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind,
showed deliberate planning and preparednesson his part to flee the raging fire; it
likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside hishouse when the fire
broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the
appellant’sindifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the
people who tried to put out the fire,coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning
house, belied his claim of innocence.ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of? Arson
under PD 1613.HELD: Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels,buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercialestablishments by any person or group
of persons.
PD 1613 governs simple arson
.Section 3. Other Cases of Arson . The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua shall beimposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2.  Any
inhabited house or dwelling  ;
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, notincluded in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659. This law punishes simplearson with a lesser penalty because the acts
that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversityand viciousness.  Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, andnational
security implications than destructive arson."

Art. 321. Other forms of arson. — When the arson consists in the burning of other
property and under the circumstances given hereunder, the offender shall be
punished:
1. By reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua:
(a) If the offender shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse, hut,
shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more
persons;
(b) If the building burned is a public building and the value of the damage
caused exceeds 6,000 pesos;
(c) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in instituting prosecution for the punishment
of violators of the law, irrespective of the amount of the damage;
(d) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy
evidence kept therein to be used in any legislative, judicial or administrative
proceedings, irrespective of the amount of the damage: Provided, however,
 That if the evidence destroyed is to be used against the defendant for the
prosecution of any crime punishable under existing laws, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua;
(e) If the arson shall have been committed with the intention of collecting
under an insurance policy against loss or damage by fire.
2. By reclusion temporal:3
(a) If an inhabited house or any other building in which people are
accustomed to meet is set on fire, and the culprit did not know that such
house or building was occupied at the time, or if he shall set fire to a moving
freight train or motor vehicle, and the value of the damage caused exceeds
6,000 pesos.

Art. 322. Cases of arson not included in the preceding articles. — Cases of
arson not included in the next preceding articles shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,10 when the
damage caused does not exceed 50 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period,11 when the damage caused is over 50 pesos but does not
exceed 200;
3. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,12 if the
damage caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000; and
4. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,13 if it is over
1,000 pesos.

Art. 323. Arson of property of small value. — The arson of any uninhabited hut,
storehouse, barn, shed or any other property the value of which does not exceed 25
pesos, committed at a time or under circumstances which clearly exclude all danger
of the fire spreading, shall not be punished by the penalties respectively prescribed
in this chapter, but in accordance with the damage caused and under the provisions
of the following chapter.14

Art. 324. Crimes involving destruction. — Any person who shall cause destruction
by means of explosion, discharge of electric current, inundation, sinking or stranding
of a vessel, intentional damaging of the engine of said vessel, taking up the rails
from a railway track, maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving
trains, destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other system,
and, in general by using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as
those above enumerated, shall be punished by reclusion temporal15 if the
commission has endangered the safety of any person; otherwise, the penalty of
prision mayor16 shall be imposed.
 Elements of crimes involving destruction:
1. The offender causes destruction.
2. Destruction is caused by any of the following means:
a. explosion
b. discharge of electric current
c. inundation, sinking or stranding of a vessel, or intentional damaging of the
engine of said vessel
d. taking up the rails from a railway track
e. maliciously changing railway signals for the safety of moving trains
f. destroying telegraph wires and telegraph posts, or those of any other
system
g. using any other agency or means of destruction as effective as those above
enumerated

Art. 325. Burning one's own property as a means to commit arson. — Any
person guilty of arson or causing great destruction of property belonging to another
shall suffer the penalty prescribed in this chapter, even though he shall have set fire
to or destroyed his own property for the purpose of committing the crime.

Art. 326. Setting fire to property exclusively owned by the offender. — If the
property burned shall be the exclusive property of the offender, he shall be punished
by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period,17 if the arson shall have been committed for the purpose of defrauding or
causing damage to another, or prejudice shall actually have been caused, or if the
thing burned shall have been a building in an inhabited place. (As amended by Rep.
Act No. 5467)

Art. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief. — Any person who shall
deliberately cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms
of the next preceding chapter, shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
Elements of malicious mischief:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.
3. That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.
Note: This third element presupposes that the offender acted due to hate, revenge or
other evil motive.
"YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON
G.R. No. L-7821405 December 1988 Petition for certiorari to review DAR order 
J. Sarmiento
FACTS :    Macario Alicaba & Millenes family, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner,
agreed to lease to private respondent Abajon a portion of subject land to construct the
latter’s house & to plant corns & bananas. They agreed to a monthly rental ofPHP2.00 & 50-
50 share of crops.
   Petitioner Caballes & her husband acquired, through a deed of sale, the whole land
which includes the portion occupied byprivate respondent. They informed private respondent
of their intention to build a poultry close to his house & persuadedhim to transfer his dwelling
to the opposite or southern portion of the land. On his part, private respondent offered to
payrent on the land occupied by his house, but such offer was not accepted.
   Later, the spouses asked private respondent to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. But he refused.Despite the confrontation before the Brgy. Captain, the
parties failed to reach an agreement. All efforts by the landownersto oust private respondent
were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.
   Petitioner then filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against private respondent,
alleging that the latter maliciouslycut down the banana plants worth P50.00, (note: all
banana plants, were planted by Abajon).
   Pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the regional office
of Ministry of Agrarian Reform(MAR) to determine the relationship of the parties. As a result,
MAR issued an order declaring the existence of a tenancyrelationship between Caballes &
Abajon. It also declared the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by petitioner
againstprivate respondent as not proper for trial; since such case is filed patently to harass
and/or eject the tenant from his farm.
   On appeal, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella reversed the certification and declared
the criminal case as proper for trial,since the land involved is a residential lot consisting only
of 60-sq. m.
   On motion for reconsideration, herein respondent and new Minister of DAR, Heherson
Alvarez issued an order finding thecriminal case as not proper for trial due to the existence
of tenancy relations between the parties. o   Private respondent invoked Sec. 10 of RA 3844,
which provided that new owners are bound to respect the tenancyregardless of the size of
the land being tilled.
ISSUE : Whether or not Abajon is a tenant of spouses Caballes.
HELD : NO.
RATIO :    The Supreme Court held that Abajon only occupied a miniscule portion of the
lot. RA 3844, as amended. The 60-sq. m.cannot be considered as an economic family-size
farm protected by the aforementioned law. Planting camote, bananas, &corn on a 60-sq. m.
land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the
farm family’s basic needs.
     The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1.   The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2.   The subject is agricultural land;
3.   There is consent;
4.   The purpose is agricultural production;
5.   There is personal cultivation; and6.   There is sharing of harvests"

Art. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. — Any person who shall cause
damage to obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or
corrosive substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who
causes damage to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any
archive or registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in
common by the public shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,1 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor,2 if such value does not exceed the above-mentioned amount
but is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos.

Art. 329. Other mischiefs. — The mischiefs not included in the next preceding
article shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods,3 if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,4 if such value is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200
pesos or cannot be estimated. (As amended by Com. Act No. 3999)

Art. 330. Damage and obstruction to means of communication. — The penalty

of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods5 shall be imposed upon
any person who shall damage any railway, telegraph or telephone lines.

Art. 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments, or paintings. —

Any person who shall destroy or damage statues or any other useful or ornamental
public monuments, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.

Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil
liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line;
 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living
together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG v.

PEOPLE, GR No. 181409, 2010-02-11
Facts:
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix... of
petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de
Carungcong, filed a complaint... for estafa against her... brother-in-law, William Sato,
a Japanese national.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the
deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
trial court granted Sato's motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case
Issues:
Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification
Ruling:
INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
REPRESENTED BY MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, AS ADMINISTRATRIX,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILLIAM SATO,
RESPONDENTS.
Effect of Death on Relationship
By Affinity as Absolutory Cause
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause... in the crimes of theft, estafa (or
swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil
liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the...
offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held
that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted
children.
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.
It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave
rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.
Under this view, the... relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily
determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the
marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse... ipso facto ends the relationship
by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouse's blood relatives.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues
even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or... not.[29] Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures
even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of
one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
indicated an intent... to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between
these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated
upon the death of one of the married parties.
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First
,... Since... the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision,
the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the
same line" is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of one's living child and the surviving spouse of one's
deceased child (in case... of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her
parents-in-law)... can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as
a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty
of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.
In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.
The view that relationship by... affinity is not affected by the death of one of the
parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and
harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to
resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for
the accused.
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that... the accused shall be
presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.
The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal
statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to... him.
The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the
accused.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives
of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity.
(The same... principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of one's
relatives under Article 11... of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against one's relatives under
Article 13... of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of
accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to
the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief.
As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said
crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender
civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows
that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply... where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is
complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of
the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the
designation of the offense.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged
not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit,
intentionally... defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a)
Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and
induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b)... he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her
taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor
daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolita's
properties in Tagaytay
City;
(c)... relying on Sato's inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d)... using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and despite repeated
demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of
Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by
attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document)
statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita's acts of signing the SPA
and affixing her thumbmark to that... document were the very expression of her
specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only
signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because... of Sato's representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In
signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and
adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that
it involved her taxes. Her signature... and thumbmark, therefore, served as her
conformity to Sato's proposal that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling,
assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita's Tagaytay properties
when the fact was that Manolita... signed and thumbmarked the document presented
by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she
was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1)
"once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute
Sale" and
(2)
"once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said
accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal
use and benefit"... raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified
document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not
simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the
special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit
the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code in his favor.
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for
simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for the complex
crime of estafa through... falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification
of public document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption
from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, simply because the... accused may not be held criminally liable for
simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the
offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property committed by the
offender against... certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject
only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to
property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of
the public interest in the integrity and... presumed authenticity of public documents.
For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a
family relation but a paramount public interest.
Effectively, when the... offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the
integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family
member, he is removed from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under
Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component
crimes separately from each other. While there may be two component crimes
(estafa and falsification of... documents), both felonies are animated by and result
from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.
That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes,
they are treated... only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that
the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered independently of
that for... falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents
are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa
and falsification of public documents.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING
ESTAFA EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not
require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not
mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary
means to commit the estafa under that... provision.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to
commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime under Article 48 of the same
Code.
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,... damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a
public, official or commercial document.
In other words, the crime of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of
the crime of... estafa
Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa.
The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show
that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a
ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in
connection with her taxes. While... the falsification was consummated upon the
execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later
utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and
thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to
Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet
caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was made to sign the
document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the
falsification of the public document was used to... facilitate and ensure (that is, as a
necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of
third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly
the same time as, the... execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the
crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa.[63] On the other
hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who
asked that a document pertaining to... her taxes be prepared for her signature, but
what was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only
been the simple crime of falsification.

Art. 333. Who are guilty of adultery. — Adultery is committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the
man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently declared void.

Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods.1

If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without
justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree2 than that
provided in the next preceding paragraph shall be imposed.

Elements of adultery:

(1) That the woman is married;

(2) That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband;
(3) That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he must
know her to be married.

Arroyo, Jr. v. CA Case Digest

DECEMBER 18, 2018  ~ PINGTHINGLAW
Arroyo, Jr. v. CA
G.R. No. 96602
G.R. No. 96715
November 19, 1991
Facts:
Dr. Jorge Neri filed a criminal complaint against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and
Eduardo Arroyo for adultery. In November 1982, Ruby went to Baguio with Mrs. Sare
and witness Jabunan. They stayed at the Neri spouses’ Mines View Park
Condominium. Arroyo arrived at 7:00 p.m. at the condominium. Jabunan said he
opened the door for Arroyo and knocked on Ruby Neri’s door. Ruby then asked Mrs.
Sare, who was in the room with her, to leave her and Arroyo alone. The two were left
alone in the room and went out 45 minutes later. In December 1982, Dr. Neri then
found incriminating pictures of his wife and Arroyo in bed. When questioned by her
husband, Ruby admitted that she and Arroyo slept together in Baguio.
On August 26, 1991, Dr. Neri filed a manifestation, praying that the case against his
wife and Arroyo be dismissed because he had tacitly consented to his wife’s
infidelity. Ruby moved for reconsideration, contending that pardon had been
extended by her husband and that Dr. Jorge Neri had married another woman with
whom he is cohabiting. Both Arroyo and Ruby Neri filed their respective motions
praying for the dismissal of their cases based on Dr. Neri’s manifestation.
Arroyo and Ruby used Dr. Neri’s affidavit to cast doubts on the doctor’s credibility as
witness.
Issues:
1. Is Dr. Neri’s affidavit of desistance sufficient to cast reasonable doubts on his
credibility?
2. Had Mrs. Neri’s constitutional right against self-incrimination been violated?
3. Does Dr. Neri’s alleged extra-marital affair preclude him from filing the criminal
complaint on the ground of pari delicto?
4. Is Dr. Neri’s manifestation a sufficient basis for granting a new trial?
Ruling:
1. No. It has been the Court’s constant holding that in certiorari proceedings, the
findings of fact of the lower court as well as its conclusions on the credibility of
witnesses are generally not disturbed.
2. No. As held in Gamboa v. Cruz, “the right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confession or admissions from respondent-accused.” Because Dr.
Neri is not an investigating officer, Mrs. Neri’s confession to her husband could not
be rejected by the court. As held in Aballe v. People,
“The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may
be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent
as witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.”
3. No. The concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code but only in
Article 1411 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the said article relates only to contracts
with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not involved any illegal contract.
4. No. Dr. Neri’s manifestation amounts in effect to an attempted recantation of
testimony given by him before the trial court. It is settled that not all recantations by
witnesses should result in the granting of a new trial.

Art. 334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.3
The concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Three ways of committing the crime of concubinage:
1. By keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling; or
2. By having sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife; or
3. By cohabiting with her in any other place.
Elements:
(1) That the man must be married.
(2) That he committed any of the following acts:
a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling,
b. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman
who is not his wife;
c. Cohabiting with her in any other place.
(3) That as regards the woman, she must know him to be married.

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch
139, Makati City, respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological

incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage

based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The

pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness of lewdness;

2. That the act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex;

3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances;

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authoity;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

People v. Perez

Citation. 831 P.2d 1159 (1992)

Brief Fact Summary.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree, premeditated and deliberate murder for the
beating and stabbing death of a woman in her home. The court of appeals reduced
the conviction to second-degree murder. The prosecution challenged the court of
appeals’ decision.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

First-degree murder includes killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated, and
perpetrated with express malice aforethought.
Facts.

On September 30, 1988, Mr. Perez (Defendant) parked his car near the house of
Victoria Mesa. He surreptitiously entered the house while Mesa was warming her
car. Defendant beat Mesa and then stabbed her multiple times with a steak knife
from Mesa’s kitchen. After the steak knife broke, Defendant found another knife in
the kitchen, which he used to inflict additional wounds on Mesa. Mesa died as a
result of the attack. The only connection between Defendant and Mesa was that they
had gone to high school together ten years earlier. Defendant was found guilty of
first degree, premeditated and deliberate murder. Defendant appealed, and the court
of appeals reduced his conviction to second-degree murder. The prosecution
challenged the court of appeals’ decision.

Issue.

Whether combined evidence of planning activity, motive, and manner of killing

supports a finding of first degree murder where any one category of evidence on its
own would be insufficient to prove that the homicide was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.

Held.

Yes. The court of appeals’ ruling is reversed. First-degree murder includes killings
that are willful, deliberate, premeditated, and perpetrated with express malice
aforethought.

Discussion.

First-degree murder includes killings that are willful, deliberate, premeditated, and
perpetrated with express malice aforethought. This means that a defendant commits
first degree murder where he kills intentionally, after carefully considering the
consequences of his actions. To determine whether sufficient evidence has been
presented to support a conviction for deliberate and premeditated murder, courts
typically consider three categories of evidence: planning activity, motive, and manner
of killing. This list of considerations is nonexclusive. Here, the evidence is sufficient
to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. First, evidence of planning
activity can be found in the following: Defendant did not park his car in Mesa’s
driveway; he entered Mesa’s home surreptitiously; and he obtained the murder
weapon from Mesa’s kitchen. Second, evidence of motive may be inferred from the
fact that Defendant and Mesa knew each other from high school, which means that
Mesa could have easily identified Defendant to law enforcement if she survived.
Third, evidence of the manner of killing suggests that Mesa’s death was deliberate
and premeditated to the extent that Defendant sought out a second knife from the
kitchen after the steak knife broke. Although no one of these factors is sufficient on
its own to sustain a finding that Defendant acted deliberately and with premeditation
when he killed Mesa, their combination provides sufficient support for such a finding.
Art. 337. Qualified seduction. — The seduction of a virgin over twelve years and
under eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest,
house servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity,
shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Two classes of qualified seduction:

(a) Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 years of age by certain persons,
such as, a person in authority, priest, teacher, etc.; and

(b) Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her ascendant, regardless

of her age or reputation.

Elements of qualified seduction of a virgin:

1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried

and of good reputation.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of

the offender.

PEOPLE v. ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO, GR No. 177743, 2012-01-25

Facts:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was  walking along the
provincial road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla
suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang.
Olais fell facedown to... the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a
piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel
Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the  sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to
run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their... father-in-law to a medical clinic,
where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.
On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an
information for murder against Fontanilla in the RTC
The accused pleaded not guilty.
The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they
were only several meters away from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they
shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they were able to see and
to identify Fontanilla as the... attacker of their father-in-law because the area was
then well-lighted.
Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
Olais, attested that her post-mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a
fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his death. She opined that a
hard object or a severe force had... hit the skull of the victim more than once,
considering that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull
had been radiating.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident,
he had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick
and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then
talked to Olais nicely,... the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him
with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his
legs; that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which
he had hit the right side of the victim's... head, causing the latter to fall face down to
the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais
was no longer moving
Fontanilla's daughter Marilou corroborated her father's version.
On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged,... The RTC
rejected Fontanilla's plea of self-defense by observing that he had "no necessity to
employ a big stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death"...
due to the victim attacking him only with bare hands. It noted that Fontanilla... did not
suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that Fontanilla did
not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might
have suffered, having been immediately released from the hospital;... that
Fontanilla's failure to give any statement at the time he surrendered to the police was
inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;... and that the manner of attack against
Olais established the attendance of treachery.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of unlawful aggression; that
his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after
he was taken into custody, negated the plea of... self-defense; and that the nature of
the victim's injury was a significant physical proof to show a determined effort on the
part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE.
EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE SPECIAL PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE
SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER.
Ruling:
We affirm the conviction.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had
to prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or... repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established,... self-defense is unavailing, for
there is nothing to repel.[20] The character of the element of unlawful aggression is
aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the... circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril
the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful... aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively
determines the... intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful
aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must
not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must
be offensive and positively strong (like aiming... a revolver at another with intent to
shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing
his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an... angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for
murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he
assumed the burden to... prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one,
Olais did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla's
act of hitting the victim's head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not
proportional... to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim's fistic
attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity
was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital;
hence, the attending... physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate
to him. Nor was any medication applied to him.
In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had
been hit on the head more than once. The plea of... self-defense was thus belied, for
the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted
on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack
from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds... manifested
the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused
Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of Jose Olais P25,000.00 as
temperate damages... and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest
of 6% per annum on such amounts from the finality of the judgment.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an
unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the
accused cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.

Art. 338. Simple seduction. — The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow
of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by
means of deceit, shall be punished by arresto mayor.3

Elements:

1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age.

2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

United States v. Hernandez

Citation. United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 27619,
17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 693 (5th Cir. Tex. Jan. 3, 1985).
Brief Fact Summary. A Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agent and an informant
went undercover in order to obtain evidence sufficient to arrest the defendant on
charges of cocaine trafficking.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An out of court statement made by someone other then
the declarant, which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely that
someone is in fact guilty of criminal charges, is hearsay, and may be so prejudicial
as to warrant reversal of a resultant conviction on those charges.

Facts. An informant and a DEA agent posing as his wife met the defendant in a
coffee shop, during which the two testified there was talk of a cocaine transaction.
The two later met the defendant at a service station and followed him to his tire shop.
At that time, two packages of cocaine were presented, and the defendant was
arrested on the way to the place where payment was to be made. At trial, the
prosecution elicited testimony, over the defendant’s objection, from the DEA agent,
that an investigation had been opened as a result of a tip from another federal
agency that defendant was a drug smuggler. The testimony was reiterated and
embellished during closing argument. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the
testimony was inadmissible.

Issue. Whether the statements by the agent that another agency had tipped off the
DEA that the defendant was drug smuggler constituted reversible error?

Held. Yes. The statements were made out of court by someone other then the
declarant, and they were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. They were
not offered to prove state of mind, which was irrelevant, but rather to show that the
defendant was, in fact, a drug smuggler. These statements were inadmissible under
Federal Rules of Evidence (“F.R.E.”) Rules 802, 403 and 404(b).

Discussion. The statements made by someone else to the DEA agent were out of
court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Even if it were
accepted that the statements were offered for some non-hearsay reason, the
statements were still overly prejudicial as compared to their probativeness, failing the
F.R.E. Rule 403 balancing test. Moreover, evidence of past crimes to show
propensity was inadmissible under F.R.E Rule 404(b). As a result, the statements
constituted reversible error and the conviction was overturned.

Art. 339. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party. — The
penalty of arresto mayor* shall be imposed to punish any other acts of
lasciviousness committed by the same persons and under the same circumstances
as those provided in Articles 337 and 338.

Elements:

1. That the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.

 2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is virgin or single or widow
of good reputation, under 18 years of age but over 12 years, or a sister or
descendant regardless of her reputation or age.

3. That the offender accomplishes the acts by abuse of authority, confidence,

relationship, or deceit.

Art. 340. Corruption of Minors. — Any person who shall promote or facilitate the
prostitution or corruption of persons under age to satisfy the lust of another, shall be
punished by prision mayor5 and if the culprit is a public officer or employee, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, he shall also suffer the
penalty of temporary absolute disqualification.6 (As amended by BJ*. Big. 92,
approved on Dec. 24,1980)

Art. 341. White slave trade. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods1 shall be imposed upon any person who, in any manner, or
under any pretext, shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall
enlist the services of women for the purpose of prostitution. (As amended by BJ*.
Big. 186, March 16,1982)

Acts penalized as white slave trade.

They are:

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution.

2. Profiting by prostitution.

3. Enlisting the services of women for the purpose of prostitution.

Art. 342. Forcible abduction. — The abduction of any woman against her will and
with lewd designs shall be punished by reclusion temporal.1

The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under
twelve years of age.

Elements of forcible abduction:

1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status,
or reputation.

2. That the abduction is against her will.

 3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

REPUBLIC vs CAYANAN GR No. 181796,

November 7, 2017
BERSAMIN, J.

Facts: Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her
husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG. She
contended that a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the
CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo without any warrant of arrest, and
had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame; and that despite
repeated demands, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo.

The CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The
CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or
having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.

Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended
her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo. The RTC issued
the writ of amparo. Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary
protection order and witness protection order, and it was granted. Pascua did not
appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his non-
appearance.

The RTC issued an order maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the CIDG to
continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo; directing respondent
SPO1 Pascua to appear before the proper forum; making the temporary protection
order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina in the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice. The CIDG filed an MR, but it was denied.

Hence, the CIDG filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. It contended
that there was no sufficient evidence to support the writ of amparo; and that a mere
accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for
the court to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity.

             Pascua, on his part, contended that Regina failed to establish by the
required burden of proof that he caused the “forced disappearance” of Pablo
Cayanan within the ambit protected by the rule on the writ of ampar; that following
Mexico’s Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed victim to establish
where he is being held; that Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers “public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity,” which evidently precludes a
government institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP; and that enforced or
forced disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state
perpetrated its commission.

Issues:

1.       Whether or not sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by
the RTC

2.       Whether or not the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo

3.       Whether or not the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo was
defective

4.       Whether or not the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired
Pascua’s right to the presumption of his innocence

Held:

             Although a Petition for Review on Certiorari is usually limited to the

determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo explicitly allows the review by the SC of questions of fact or of law or of
both. 

1.        Yes, the SC held that Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings

involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The respondent must show in the return on
the writ of amparothe observance of extraordinary diligence. Once an enforced
disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies
should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and,
if warranted, to bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the
disappearance.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.  Here, Regina fully discharged her duty to
present substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.

Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay before the NBI, whereby an eyewitness detailed

the events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon was consistent and credible in
itself. 

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting
himself as another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not furnish details of the
abduction that would have given to the investigators firm leads to quickly corner the
perpetrators as well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His
omission was fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part in the
abduction by issuing a blanket denial. It is significant that his denial was already
doubtful in light of Perez’s sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the
leader of the perpetrators of the abduction.

Thirdly, Pascua’s version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no

consideration. For one, he could not even mention the type and the color of the
vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to board. Such inability was
uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him.

Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses to corroborate the allegation on the

occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the
person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.

2.        No, the SC held that the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary
diligence. The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among
its various operating divisions similarly constituted a general denial because the
CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted the search, and how thoroughly
the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the
investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable
the RTC to judiciously determine whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo’s
whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-
compliant in that regard. 

3.        No, the SC held that the petition for the writ of amparo was not defective.
Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the
petition for the writ of amparo. The said section did not require e petition to state the
probable whereabouts of the victim.

The SC clarified that the application and implementation of the rule

of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at
best. Despite its being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other
countries, particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent on how those
other rules of amparo have operated, or have been implemented. Such operation
and implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best practices to be considered
and optionally relied upon, if at all. 

4.        No, the SC held that the issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair
Pascua’s right to the presumption of innocence. The proceedings taken under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal
prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not
determined, and no penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to
give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to
life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In the latter,
the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the
proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the
starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused.

Art. 343. Consented abduction. — The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall be
punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.2

Elements.

1. That the offended party must be a virgin.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender.

4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

RUSTAN ANG v. CA
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

FACTS:

Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish decided to
break up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live‐in partner whom he had
gotten pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with
him. Irish, however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone number but
Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. He used
two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages
but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a

picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure. The
sender's cellphone number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got
the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. He also
threatened to spread the picture through the internet. Irish sought the help of the
police in apprehending Rustan. Under police supervision, she contacted Rustan and
asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort.
 When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him
and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan
was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her identify
a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's
number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got
back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. According to him, this explained why the obscene messages appeared to
have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself
who sent the obscene picture to him.

The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR.
Rustan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this

term is defined in R.A. 9262; and

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in
this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

HELD:

1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that
the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to

her.

Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation

where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun
"romance" to describe a couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Section 3(e) defines
"dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to
a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child."
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved. An "away‐bati" or a fight‐
and‐kiss thing between two lovers does not mean that the romantic relation between
the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding.

2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that
constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman
can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and
face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,

abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.

Prosecution of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of

lasciviousness.

1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by

the offended spouse.

2. Seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted

upon complaint signed by —

a. offended party,

b. her parents,

c. grandparents, or

d. guardians in the order in which they are named above.

CASE DIGEST: PILAPIL V.IBAY-SOMERA

Published by paul on October 4, 2013 | Leave a response

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-

SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
 respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and

respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married
at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany.
The local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair
William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez
issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against
petitioner.

Issue:

Is the action tenable?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting
at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is
logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action
be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country,
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in
view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter of civil status of
persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.
Art. 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. — Persons
guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced:

1. To indemnify the offended woman;

2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so
doing;

3. In every case to support the offspring

Art. 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, or other persons

entrusted with the custody of the offended party. — The ascendants, guardians,
curators, teachers, and any person who, by abuse of authority or confidential
relationship, shall cooperate as accomplices in the perpetration of the crimes
embraced in chapters second, third and fourth of this title, shall be punished as
principals.

Persons who cooperate as accomplices but are punished as principals in

rape, seduction, abduction, etc.

They are:

(1) Ascendants,

(2) Guardians,

(3) Curators,

(4) Teachers, and

(5) Any other person, who cooperates as accomplice with abuse of authority
or confidential relationship.

Art. 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another, and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child. — The simulation of births
and the substitution of one child for another shall be punished by prision mayor1 and
a fine of not exceeding 1,000 pesos.

Acts punished under Art. 347.

1. Simulation of births.

2. Substitution of one child for another.

 3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such
child to lose its civil status.

Facts:
At around 6am of June 9,
1968, Ricardo Cortez left his
nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas,
Barrio Biluso,
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba
from a coconut tree nearby.
Flora Sarno, his wife, was left
inside the hut.
While he was on top of the
tree gathering tuba, he was
struck by a volley of shots. He
fell to the ground at
the base of the coconut tree.
Meanwhile, while inside their
hut, Flora, wife of Ricardo,
heard three successive shots
coming from
the south of their hut. She
went out, and from a distance
of about 25 meters saw five
men armed with
long firearms firing at her
husband who was already
lying on the ground at the foot
of the coconut tree.
She saw that the five men
were about 5 meters away
from him. Looking at the five
men, Flora
recognized one of them as
Laureano Sangalang, a
childhood acquaintance, and
the others as Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel,
Perino Canuel and Eleuterio
Cuyom. Flora ran towards
them and shouted why
they were shooting her
husband. As she continued to
approach them, the five men
fired shots at Flora.
Because of this she retreated
to their hut for cover. She
heard more shots were fired,
and after about 5
minutes, the five men left the
place.
Another witness to the event
was Ricardo Sarno, brother of
Flora Cortez, who lived in a
hut about 20
meters aways from the hut of
the Cortez’s. When the
incident happened he and his
family were having
breakfast, when he suddenly
heard shots. He came out of
his hut and saw his brother-in-
law being shot
by the five men he also knew
as Laureano Sangalang,
Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel, and
Eleuterio Cuyom. He saw
Sangalang using a grand
carbine to shoot Ricardo
Cortez, as he was on top of
the coconut tree, and he also
saw him fall to the ground and
being fired at again while lying
helpless on
the ground. He saw his sister
attempting to approach the
five men, and he saw them
fire shots at her.
He wanted to join her, but he
was also fired upon by the five
men, so he retreated to his
own hut.
When the five men left,
Ricardo went to Flora’s hut
and saw her sitting in the hut.
He followed her
as she returned to the spot
where her husband was, they
both saw that he was already
dead. Noticing
this, Ricardo he gathered his
family and brought them to
Sitio Biga, and reported the
killing to the chief of
police who went to the scene
of the crime with some
policemen and Constabulary
men.
The necropsy report of Ricardo
Cortez showed that he
sustained 23 gunshot wounds
on different
parts of his body. Fourteen of
these wounds were bullet
entry wounds, while the other
nine were bullet
exit wounds. Cause of death-
multiple gunshot wounds.
Sangalang’s alibi: He declared
that in the afternoon of June 8,
1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza
went to
the house of Julian Gatdula at
Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's
place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow
money from Gatdula to defray
the matriculation fees of his
children. As
Facts:
At around 6am of June 9,
1968, Ricardo Cortez left his
nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas,
Barrio Biluso,
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba
from a coconut tree nearby.
Flora Sarno, his wife, was left
inside the hut.
While he was on top of the
tree gathering tuba, he was
struck by a volley of shots. He
fell to the ground at
the base of the coconut tree.
Meanwhile, while inside their
hut, Flora, wife of Ricardo,
heard three successive shots
coming from
the south of their hut. She
went out, and from a distance
of about 25 meters saw five
men armed with
long firearms firing at her
husband who was already
lying on the ground at the foot
of the coconut tree.
She saw that the five men
were about 5 meters away
from him. Looking at the five
men, Flora
recognized one of them as
Laureano Sangalang, a
childhood acquaintance, and
the others as Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel,
Perino Canuel and Eleuterio
Cuyom. Flora ran towards
them and shouted why
they were shooting her
husband. As she continued to
approach them, the five men
fired shots at Flora.
Because of this she retreated
to their hut for cover. She
heard more shots were fired,
and after about 5
minutes, the five men left the
place.
Another witness to the event
was Ricardo Sarno, brother of
Flora Cortez, who lived in a
hut about 20
meters aways from the hut of
the Cortez’s. When the
incident happened he and his
family were having
breakfast, when he suddenly
heard shots. He came out of
his hut and saw his brother-in-
law being shot
by the five men he also knew
as Laureano Sangalang,
Conrado Gonzales, Irineo
Canuel, Perino Canuel, and
Eleuterio Cuyom. He saw
Sangalang using a grand
carbine to shoot Ricardo
Cortez, as he was on top of
the coconut tree, and he also
saw him fall to the ground and
being fired at again while lying
helpless on
the ground. He saw his sister
attempting to approach the
five men, and he saw them
fire shots at her.
He wanted to join her, but he
was also fired upon by the five
men, so he retreated to his
own hut.
When the five men left,
Ricardo went to Flora’s hut
and saw her sitting in the hut.
He followed her
as she returned to the spot
where her husband was, they
both saw that he was already
dead. Noticing
this, Ricardo he gathered his
family and brought them to
Sitio Biga, and reported the
killing to the chief of
police who went to the scene
of the crime with some
policemen and Constabulary
men.
The necropsy report of Ricardo
Cortez showed that he
sustained 23 gunshot wounds
on different
parts of his body. Fourteen of
these wounds were bullet
entry wounds, while the other
nine were bullet
exit wounds. Cause of death-
multiple gunshot wounds.
Sangalang’s alibi: He declared
that in the afternoon of June 8,
1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza
went to
the house of Julian Gatdula at
Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's
place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow
money from Gatdula to defray
the matriculation fees of his
children. As
PEOPLE VS LAUREANO
SANGALANG
GR NO. L-32914
Aug. 30, 1974

Art. 348. Usurpation of civil status. — The penalty of prision mayor3 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall usurp the civil status of another, should he do
so for the purpose of defrauding the offended party or his heirs; otherwise, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods4 shall be
imposed.

Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor1 shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

Elements:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

People vs. Mendoza (2017)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO MENDOZA
G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Ricote, together with the CI, met the
appellant in a sari-sari store and the CI introduced P02 Ricote as a buyer of
marijuana. Appellant then told PO2 Ricote that the price per teabag of marijuana
was ₱50.00 to which the latter agreed to buy 4 teabags. Appellant then took out from
his right pocket the four teabags of suspected dried marijuana leaves and handed
them to PO2 Ricote who, in tum, gave the marked two pieces of one hundred peso
bills to the former. PO2 Ricote then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal, and
PO3 Parena, who was inside a parked vehicle which was three meters away from
the sari-sari store, immediately run to help in arresting appellant.
Appellant denied the charges and claimed that he, together with friends, were along
the road, repairing a pedicab. When they all went to a sari-sari store to rest, they
were joined by a certain Andy Makabenta. He then saw the arrival of a white vehicle
and a motorcycle with two people riding on it. A person alighted from the motorcycle
and held the wrist of Makabenta, while another police officer alighted from the
vehicle and pointed to him saying "you also apprehend that.”
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of illegal sale of marijuana.
Ruling: Yes. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and. the seller, the object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.34
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.
In this case, PO2 Ricote, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the
seller of the four teabags of suspected marijuana and to whom he handed the
marked two pieces of one hundred peso bills as payment therefor. The substance
sold by appellant to PO2 Ricote was sent for analysis and upon the examination, it
showed that the four teabags yielded a positive result for marijuana, a dangerous
drug. The marijuana was presented to the court and was identified by PO2 Ricote to
be the marijuana he bought from appellant based on the markings he made thereon.
Ratio Decidendi: The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prevail over
appellant's defense of denial.
Gist: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of
the RTC finding appellant guilty of selling marijuana.

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of

prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods2 shall be imposed upon
any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding
article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not
been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
 Elements:

1. That the offender contracted marriage.

2. That he knew at the time that —

a. the requirements of the law were not complied with; or

b. the marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

Art. 351. Premature marriages. — Any widow who shall marry within three hundred
and one days from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if
she shall have been pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto
mayor3 and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos.

Persons liable for premature marriages:

1. A widow who married within 301 days from the date of the death of her
husband, or before having delivered if she is pregnant at the time of his death.

2. A woman who, her marriage having been annulled or dissolved, married

before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of 301 days after the
date of the legal separation.

Art. 352. Performance of illegal marriage ceremony. — Priests or ministers of any

religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law.

The offender is punished under the Marriage Law.

The penalty is imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two
years, or a fine not less than P200 nor more than P2,000. (Sec. 39, Act No.
3613, Marriage Law)

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a

crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
 Elements of defamation:

1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstance.

2. That the imputation must be made publicly.

3. That it must be malicious.

4. That the imputation must be directed to a natural or juridical person, or one

who is dead.

5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

On September 20, 1986 Leouel and Julia exchanged vows. A year after the
marriage, the couple when quarreling over a number of things including
the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia
finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for
a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed
a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be

appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment
cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed
to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the

performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not
of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. — A libel committed by

means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods1 or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.

A libel may be committed by means of:

1. Writing 6. Phonograph

2. Printing 7. Painting,

3. Lithography 8. Theatrical exhibition,

4. Engraving 9. Cinematographic exhibition,

5. Radio 10. Or any similar means.

Art. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a
compensation. — The penalty of arresto mayor2 or a fine of from 200 to 2,000
pesos, or both shall be imposed upon any person who threatens another to publish a
libel concerning him or the parents, spouse, child, or other members of the family of
the latter, or upon anyone who shall offer to prevent the publication of such libel for a
compensation or money consideration.
 Acts punished under Art. 356:

1. By threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents,

spouse, child, or other members of his family.

2. By offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation, or

money consideration.

Art. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official

proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor3 or a fine of from 200 to 2,000 pesos,
or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor, or manager of a newspaper,
daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with the private life of another
and offensive to the honor, virtue, and reputation of said person, even though said
publication be made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the
narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned.

Elements:

1. That the offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper daily or

magazine.

2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.

3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person.

Art. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period4 if it is of a serious
and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.

Slander is oral defamation.

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term
oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of
base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood. (Villanueva vs. People: G.R. No. 160351,
April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 42)

Two kinds of oral defamation:

1. Simple slander.

2. Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

Art. 359. Slander by deed. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period5 or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and
punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another
person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Elements:

1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against
honor.

2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons.

3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended
party.

Art. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.

The persons responsible for libel are:

1. The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition

of any defamation in writing or similar means. (Art. 360, par. 1)

2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet.

3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial

publication. (Art. 360, par. 2)

4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his
consent and all other persons who in any way participate in or have
connection with its publication. (U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. 752

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may
be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous
is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable
ends, the defendant shall be acquitted.

When proof of truth is admissible.

Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:

 1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of
whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer.

2. When the offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or

omission imputed does not constitute a crime, provided, it is related to the
discharge of his official duties. (See Ocampo vs. Evangelista, et al, C.A., 37
O.G. 2196; Tumang vs. People, 73 Phil. 700)

Art. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not
exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from
criminal liability.

Art. 363. Incriminating innocent person. — Any person who, by any act not
constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the
commission of a crime, shall be punished by arresto mayor.1

Elements:

1. That the offender performs an act.

2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person

the commission of a crime.

3. That such act does not constitute perjury.

Art. 364. Intriguing against honor. — The penalty of arresto menor or fine not
exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed for any intrigue which has for its principal
purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of a person.

Ganaan, Petitioner, vs. IAC, Respondent

Facts:
On October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer,
Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called
again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered
‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at
the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of
the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard

complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with
modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under
Rep. Act No. 4200

Held:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or
arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept,
or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
to be there for ordinary office use.

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless

imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period;1 if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods2 shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period3 shall be imposed.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed, in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile

Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and the maximum periods

"NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 171636 April 7, 2009TINGA,  J

FACTS:

On October 25, 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane
road where the Laguindingan National High School is located toward thedirection of
Moog in Misamis Oriental

.- At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a
fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), wasseen by eyewitness Artman
Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he
was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s
jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, nei ther did
petitionernor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down
the jeepney to ride at that point. The next thing Bongalto saw,Dayatas feet was
pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind
the jeepney

.- Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the
left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate,heard a strong impact
coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle
an obstacle. Dayata was then seenlying on the ground] and caught in between the
rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the
vehicle tiltedto the right side.-

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause
of death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata couldhave been caused by
having run over by the jeepney

.Issue:

WON petitioner is negligent

Held:

Yes but Gaid is not liable.-presence or absence of negligence on the part of

petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which
actuallycomprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata
flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the roadand ended
when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between
the moment immediately after the victim was runover and the point when petitioner
put the jeepney to a halt.