Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (2009) 516–520
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Ocean & Coastal Management
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ocecoaman
Combating pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Djibouti Code and the
Somali Coast Guard
James Kraska*,1, Brian Wilson 1
International Law Department, Naval War College, Newport, RI 02841, Rhode Island, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 15 July 2009
The electrifying rescue of a merchant marine captain by U.S.
special operations forces in April 2009 was the most dramatic
episode yet in the surge in Somali piracy that began in 2006. But
the real success in the fight against this age-old threat lies in far
less sensational settings. In international venues, in regional
conferences and in local courtrooms along the shores of East Africa,
states are taking important steps to contain the maritime criminal
activity that has shaken global energy markets and rattled the
shipping industry.
History demonstrates that maritime piracy is impossible to
eradicate, but it can be greatly reduced if local and regional efforts
are broadened. Twenty thousand ships annually pass through the
Gulf of Aden transporting cargo that includes 12 percent of the
globe’s daily oil supply. Notable vessel seizures by pirates in 2008
included the supertanker Sirius Star and a roll-on/roll-off vessel, the
Faina, which was carrying 33 Russian armored battle tanks. Even
though 2008 was a record year for piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the
number of incidents increased in the first six months of 2009 and
only began to hit a lull during the annual monsoon season in mid-
summer.
In response to the attacks, the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO) sponsored a meeting in Djibouti in January 2009 to
develop a regional approach. This strategy, which is reflected in
the Djibouti Code of Conduct, shifts the focus from distant-water
naval forces to localized efforts, and is needed to effectively
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: james.kraska@gmail.com (J. Kraska), brianstwilson@gmail.
com (B. Wilson).
1
James Kraska is a member of the faculty of the International Law Department at
the Naval War College and previously served as Oceans Policy Adviser for the Joint
Staff in Pentagon. Brian Wilson is a senior Navy lawyer in Washington, D.C and
previously served as Oceans Policy Adviser in the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the navy or the Department of Defense.
0964-5691/$ – see front matter Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2009.07.002
counter piracy in the region. An important component of this
initiative includes the development of the Somali coast guard.
Already, 500 sailors are in training, financed by the European
Union. These forces need small boats, radios and armaments to
challenge the pirates. Just as important, the Somali coast guard
units should be paired or coupled with corvettes and patrol craft
from distant-water states to provide training and interoperability.
Capacity-building in East Africa is the next step in combating
piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
Ambitious actions, such as the Djibouti Code, are the culmina-
tion of significant international attention over the past two years.
While attacks have somewhat subsided in the past couple of
months, maritime commerce continues to be at risk. To counter the
threat, nations have for the first time begun to employ maritime
power in the Horn of Africa. Warships from NATO and the European
Union have deployed to the Gulf of Aden to participate in the
multinational Combined Task Force 151. Naval forces from the
United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, France, Pakistan,
India, Iran, Russia and other countries patrol the area. Furthermore,
private military security contractor Blackwater has made available
to commercial shippers the services of a security escort ship in the
Gulf of Aden that includes a helicopter.
These patrols have had limited success. In November, Russia,
Britain, and India separately thwarted multiple piracy attacks.
During the summer and fall, the U.S. Fifth Fleet repelled two
dozen pirate attacks [1]. But for every success there are many
attacks that go undeterred and the pirates have only become
bolder. Naval forces have been unable to prevent most attacks.
Moreover, once pirates successfully board and hijack a ship, they
take the crew hostage and threaten to sink the vessel, limiting
options by on-scene warships to rescue the crew and free the
vessel. Incredibly, 250 seafarers and dozens of ships are being
held for ransom by pirates in the area of Harardhere, Somalia.
Vice Admiral Gortney, commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, said that
coalition warships that patrol the Gulf of Aden have been so
 J. Kraska, B. Wilson / Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (2009) 516–520
frustrated by piracy attacks against merchant shipping that the
vessels will have to assume that if they are attacked they are on
their own [2]. After Sirius Star was seized, Odfjell, a leading
Norwegian shipping group, suspended transits through the area
due to concerns over safety. Danish shipper Maersk, one of the
world’s largest, is considering forgoing the Suez Canal and routing
ships around the Cape of Good Hope in order to avoid piracy-
prone Somalia. In either case, the cost of shipping and the time of
transit would increase.
In 2006, the British Parliament concluded that the growth in
piracy over the past decade represents an ‘‘appalling amount of
violence against the maritime community.’’ Maritime piracy,
which includes hostage-taking or kidnapping, and murder,
imposes human and economic costs on shippers which deter
legitimate marine commerce. In the Indian Ocean and Pacific
Ocean, maritime piracy costs shipping companies between
$13 billion and $15 billion annually in losses [3]. Beyond the
immediate threat to crew, property and ships, maritime piracy
endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of
navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermines
regional stability. Piracy also is corrosive to political and social
development in Africa, interrupting capital formation and
economic development. Left unchecked, the cumulative effect of
piracy eventually can lead to the decline of vibrant commercial
centers. In the late 16th century, for example, piracy from Algerian
and Tunisian corsairs triggered an irreversible decline in the
viability of Venice as a trading city state.
1. The American experience
Since its founding, the United States has fought maritime piracy
and championed freedom of the seas. Piracy prompted President
George Washington to launch the navy by building six frigates to
operate against the corsairs that preyed on shipping in the Medi-
terranean. Many of the most important federal court cases in the
19th century were piracy cases. The large naval forces in Europe
kept a check on piracy and the sea lanes open during the first half of
the 20th century, and the superpowers contained piracy
throughout the Cold War. After a long decline, piracy returned as
a concern only during the last decade. In 2006, an American
warship, the USS Churchill thwarted an attack off the Somali coast,
detaining 10 pirates. After the Churchill’s interdiction, navy lawyers
in the Pentagon reviewed maritime and international law and
policy, and proposed a national policy to articulate U.S. interests in
combating maritime piracy. The result was the development of
a comprehensive and sweeping piracy policy governing diplomatic
and legal action to fight piracy, which President Bush signed in the
summer of 2007. The policy was annexed to the National Strategy
for Maritime Security and establishes the framework for warships
that encounter or interrupt acts of maritime piracy and armed
robbery at sea, as well as for agencies charged with facilitating the
prosecution of perpetrators and the repatriation of victims and
witnesses. The document sets forth several national goals,
including prevention of piracy, deterrence through maritime
presence, vulnerability assessments, accountability, preservation of
freedom of the seas, protection of sea lines of communication, and
a commitment to broaden international efforts to combat piracy.
Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. policy emphasizes collaborative
strategies by states and the maritime sector to prevent pirate
attacks and other criminal acts of violence against U.S. vessels,
persons and interests. To fulfill the goals of the policy, the United
States should accelerate efforts to partner with shipping states,
regional coastal states and major port states to create a more
effective international legal network.
517
The U.S. experience suggests that articulation of a succinct and
consolidated government policy pertaining solely to piracy refines
interagency coordination and clarifies what is important. The
process of developing a national piracy policy further focused the
interagency community on reaching an agreement on defining the
problem and creating a common set of goals and objectives and the
means to achieve them.
There are also a number of related U.S. efforts that support piracy
repression. One with great potential to expand international coop-
eration and engagement is the Global Maritime Partnership. The
concept embraces a figurative ‘‘1000-ship navy,’’ representing the
idea that no nation can do it alone. The goal of GMP is to leverage the
benefits of working together, and capitalizing on international law to
facilitate closer collaboration among states. Admirals from Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway, among others,
have recognized the potential value of the concept in relation to
increasing effective international cooperation to counter piracy [4].
Recently the Chief of Naval Operations reemphasized the impor-
tance of international collaboration in his 2009 guidance, and piracy
is an ideally fertile area for increased cooperation.2
2. The problem of Prosecuting Pirates
A tremendously difficult problem naval powers face with piracy
is not a lack of operational resources to counter the threat, but what
to do with the perpetrators if they are caught. Additionally, what
should be done with victims and witnesses, some who may be
injured? Determining which state should prosecute pirates that are
seized at sea is particularly vexing. It is typical of the vessels
attacked by Somali pirates that the ship is registered in one state,
such as Greece, owned by a corporation located in another state,
such as South Korea, and operated by a crew comprised of nationals
of several additional states, such as the Philippines and Pakistan.
Furthermore, the vessel is likely to be transporting either
containerized cargo or bulk commodities owned by companies in
yet another country, and the piracy attack may have been inter-
rupted by a warship from yet another state. Although any state may
assert jurisdiction in the case of a universal crime, each of these
countries has a special interest in the outcome of the prosecution.
On the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of
a state, such as an ungoverned area like Somalia’s territorial seas,
any nation may take action against piracy. Pirated ships may be
boarded, the pirates can be detained and the property on board the
vessel can be seized and submitted to admiralty and criminal
courts. Only warships and military aircraft or vessels in government
service, however, may exercise this authority.
Boarding hijacked vessels or pirate ships may be conducted
under a variety of legal rationales, including the consent of the flag
state under articles 92 and 94 of the Law of the Sea, the exercise of
the right of self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations (UN)
Charter, the right to visit a vessel under article 110 of the Law of the
Sea if there are reasonable grounds to believe it is engaged in piracy,
and in some cases, the extension of port state control measures.
Under international law, any of these nations could assert juris-
diction, including the state of registry or flag of the attacked vessel,
the nationality of any of the victim crew, and in some cases coastal
and port states in the region. Typically, none of these are great
2
‘‘Dominance is not just about combat power; it is also our ability to work with
other nations to provide global maritime security and prevent conflict.Our rela-
tionships with other navies and nations are integral to our Maritime Strategy.We
must evolve and establish international relationships to increase security and
achieve common interests in the maritime domain.’’ CNO guidance for 2009,
Executing our Maritime Strategy, November 2008.
518 J. Kraska, B. Wilson / Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (2009) 516–520
options because of the time it takes to sort the logistics and legal
issues. Captured pirates cannot be turned over to local authorities
in Somalia because in many cases there are no responsible local
authorities in the failed state. Moreover, some tribal regions might
either let the pirates go or impose excessive, disproportionate
punishments under tribal justice or the Islamic law. The great
expense and logistical and legal burdens of transporting the pirates
to a western country for prosecution are daunting. Flag states, often
a country with an open registry but few judicial and logistic
resources such as Panama or Liberia, may have limited capacity to
prosecute. In 2006, these difficulties caused the United States to
provide temporary custody for Somali pirates on board U.S.
warships for months at a time. These difficulties are the reason
several countries, including France and Britain, have simply
returned captured pirates to the beach without taking any legal
action.
Although it is always preferable to work through regional
states to conduct piracy prosecutions, the countries on the east
coast of Africa have nascent legal systems and are notoriously
lacking in resources for law enforcement and the judiciary. Thus,
while piracy is a universal crime, states that lack vessels and
aircraft to patrol their coastal zone or the legal infrastructure to
bring pirates to justice are not able to play a constructive role in
solving the crisis. Effective action against piracy requires imme-
diate action to develop policy frameworks and legal capacity of
these states.
3. Coordination, not kinetics
Building maritime security capacity among the states of the
Horn of Africa, will solve the piracy problem. Maritime piracy is
a violation of international law and a universal crime that imposes
a duty on all states to take action. The United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, the constitution for the world’s oceans,
defines maritime piracy as an illegal act of violence or detention
committed for private ends. This is distinguished from maritime
terrorism, which is committed for political ends. While any state
may lawfully act to suppress maritime piracy, only major maritime
powers that operate blue water fleets and naval aviation have the
capability to patrol sea lanes for long periods.
Developing the modern legal capacity and frameworks in
international law necessary to defeat piracy began at the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) in London. The IMO is the
specialized UN agency for maritime matters and has 167 member
states. Because the organization is technical rather than political,
and operates under a consensus decision making rules, it has
served as an effective, no-nonsense venue for making shipping
safer and more secure. In 2005, the IMO adopted Resolution
A.979(24), which strongly urged nations to take legislative, judicial
and law enforcement action to receive and prosecute or extradite
pirates arrested by warships or other government vessels and to
continue consultations by which technical assistance can be
brought to regional states to enhance their capacity for repressing
piracy. Addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, in
November 2007 the IMO adopted Resolution A.1002(25) which
called up regional states in East Africa to conclude an international
agreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy. The Resolution
was the first major international pronouncement to reflect the
growing seriousness of the problem of piracy in the Horn of Africa.
In the summer of 2008, and at the prompting of the IMO, the UN
Security Council turned its attention toward combating piracy,
adopting Resolution 1816. Acting under Chapter VII, the Security
Council called on flag, port and coastal states of the victims and
perpetrators of piracy to cooperate extensively in counter-piracy
actions off the Somali coast. In particular, states should cooperate in
determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution
of pirates. It is especially important that once a piracy attack is
disrupted at sea states coordinate to provide real-time disposition
and logistics assistance with respect to the suspected pirates,
victims and witnesses.
The coordination provisions of Resolution 1816 emphasize the
importance of cooperation in repressing piracy through routine
patrols to deter the crime, as well as action after the pirates are
caught to bring them to justice. Disposition and logistics assistance
include provision of medical care to injured persons, conducting
interviews and an investigation of the incident, providing a venue
for detention and prosecution of suspects, arranging lodging and
repatriation of crew who invariably hail from disparate regions
and vessel services. The resolution also solved one of the most
vexing issues associated with piracydpirates capitalizing on the
lack of Somali government control over territorial waters by
grabbing ships and hostages in international waters and then
fleeing inside territorial waters to evade capture. Now, warships
have a mechanism under the auspices of the Security Council to
cooperate with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
and conduct hot pursuit of pirates that seek refuge in Somalia’s
territorial sea.
Recent collaboration to develop international law to suppress
maritime piracy has exceeded the most optimistic predictions of
2008, laying the groundwork for new authorities and partner-
ships. Collaboration is particularly vital because most of the
ocean’s surface is not under state jurisdiction, and no single
nation has the naval capability to effectively patrol the vast areas
affected by piracy. Although the UN and the IMO have taken steps
to broaden international legal authorities available to suppress
maritime piracy, much more can be done. Now that many of the
legal and policy authorities are in place, the international
community should broaden its focus to include serious efforts to
develop maritime security capacity among the states of East
Africa. Already, some programs are under way. The European
Union, for example, is training elements of the nascent ‘‘Somali
Coast Guard.’’
4. Models for success; Implementing Agreements
In the United States, the interagency community resolves
difficult national-level maritime issues pursuant to a maritime
operational threat response (MOTR) plan that facilitates rapid and
real-time communication among the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the coast guard and other agencies. Each
agency is required to operate continuously a tactical watch center
that can make agency decisions arising from time-sensitive mari-
time diplomatic issues on short notice. The MOTR process is used to
quickly form administration positions and courses of action on the
full range of maritime exigencies, including interdiction of foreign
drug trafficking fast boats and interception of migrants at sea.
Internationally, the problem of prosecuting modern buccaneers can
be solved through the development of an international MOTR plan
that contains 24-hour points of contact in shipping states and
regional partners. In each country, the national police, coast guard
or naval forces, foreign ministries and departments of justice
should be able to quickly make decisions on behalf of the concerned
government.
Models for achieving greater international collaboration during
maritime security operations already exist. For more than a decade,
the United States has worked with countries throughout the
Caribbean and South America under maritime counterdrug agree-
ments. There are nearly 30 such agreements, which commit nations
to expedite communication on legal and jurisdictional issues
associated with emergent counterdrug operations at sea.
 J. Kraska, B. Wilson / Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (2009) 516–520
The IMO has been instrumental in bringing states together in
multilateral operational maritime agreements that facilitate rapid
collaboration. In 1985, four heavily armed terrorists from the
Palestine Liberation Organization hijacked the Italian cruise ship
Achille Lauro and murdered a disabled American passenger, pushing
his wheelchair into the sea. At the time, states lacked adequate
criminal statutes to prosecute vessel hijacking. In response to the
attack, the IMO brought together member states to develop
a maritime criminal law treaty, and the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navi-
gation (SUA Convention) was signed 3 years later. The treaty
entered into force in 1992. The SUA Convention requires state
parties to criminalize acts that endanger the safe navigation of
ships. In 2005, a diplomatic conference at IMO adopted the SUA
protocols to the treaty that created a legal framework for combating
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems on board vessels and fixed platforms, such as oil plat-
forms.3 The SUA protocol provides a framework for criminalizing
the maritime transport terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at
sea.
Now Resolution 1816 encourages exactly the type of partnering
that landed the Delta Ranger pirates in a Kenyan jail. States should
‘‘operationalize’’ the UN mandate with an international MOTR
process and negotiation of bilateral or multilateral disposition
assistance agreements among naval powers, flag states and
regional partners. By developing the capacity to implement these
new commitments, states will become more capable of prosecuting
the legal and logistical ‘‘endgame.’’ Disposition support agreements
also should identify available regional medical facilities so that
states do not have to search indiscriminately for available care for
sick and injured persons. Furthermore, agreements should codify
expectations regarding what support a state can provide, and
importantly, reduce uncertainty to accelerate decision making and
facilitate cooperation.
The IMO has also conducted an anti-piracy project consisting of
a number of regional centers and workshops, with participants
coming largely from piracy-infested areas of the world. The project
includes a number of evaluation and assessment missions to areas
particularly affected by piracy. In 2001–2002, missions were held in
Jakarta, Indonesia, Singapore, Guyaquil, Ecuador and Accra, Ghana.
The IMO also hosted regional meetings in Sana’a, Yemen in April
2005 and Oman in January 2006, for nations in the Gulf of Aden and
Red Sea areas. These efforts are focused on opening up the possi-
bility of regional international agreements to implement anti-
piracy measures. Finally, the IMO developed a draft regional
agreement on cooperation for preventing and suppressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships. This draft agreement is an
ideal model for use by states who are seeking to work more closely
together. Provisions of the draft include procedures for states to
conduct boarding and searches of suspected vessels, and provisions
for criminal enforcement and determining choice of jurisdiction
among coastal and flag states.
Regional cooperation, coupling states with greater capacity with
those who are still developing capacity will work. A regional
approach to piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has led to
significant reductions in the incidents of maritime piracy. Under the
leadership of Japan in 2004, 16 nations signed the ‘‘Regional
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP)’’
against ships in Asia, the first treaty dedicated solely to combating
3
Amendments to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) were approved at
a diplomatic conference at the IMO in the fall of 2005 and will enter into force after
ratification by 12 states. To date, Fiji, Spain, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
have ratified the protocols.
519
piracy. The pact, which entered into force in 2006, established the
Information Sharing Center in Singapore to share piracy-related
information among member states. Seeking to replicate the success
of ReCAAP, the IMO sponsored meetings in Tanzania and Yemen to
reach an agreement among the regional states of the Horn of Africa
for developing a treaty against piracy in the western Indian Ocean.
On the other side of Africa, the IMO also has been instrumental
in helping the 25 nation Maritime Organization of West and Central
Africa (MOWCA) more effectively cooperate to improve maritime
security. Since its inception in 1975, MOWCA has served as a forum
for achieving limited objectives in the maritime domain, such as
port management.
In 2006, MOWCA conducted a forum in Dakar, Senegal in
conjunction with the IMO for establishing an integrated coast guard
network. This work paid of, leading to the development of a func-
tional MOU on the establishment of a sub-regional coast guard
network for the West and Central African region in July 2008. The
comprehensive agreement establishes an institutional framework
for close cooperation on the suppression of piracy and armed
robbery at sea, countering terrorism at sea, illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing, drug trafficking, fuel theft and smug-
gling, and pipeline security and maritime accident response. The
agreement also provides guidelines for coastal surveillance, main-
taining a naval presence in the exclusive economic zones, and
enforcement of the Law of the Sea Convention.
In 2006, the United States and India affirmed their commitment
to address piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Indo-U.S.
Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation. The agreement calls
for regular meetings on maritime security between governments in
Washington and New Delhi, and could serve as a basis for
expanding bilateral cooperation against piracy and other trans-
national maritime threats in the western Indian Ocean.
Maritime powers should forge ahead with the build-out of
international maritime partnerships, creating a network to facili-
tate a collaborative approach to maritime security. The Indian navy
is one of the largest and most capable on the planet, and many of
the victims of piracy are Indian-flagged vessels or operated by
Indian nationals. The Indo-U.S. maritime security framework
should focus on countering piracy in the western Indian Ocean as
its first substantive activity. West Africa has surged ahead of East
Africa in developing mechanisms for cooperation. MOWCA has
been reenergized after decades of under achievement, and the new
coast guard network for West Africa is promising.
The nations of East Africa are catching up to their West African
counterparts in the collaborating on maritime security, however.
The IMO sponsored negotiations in January 2009 at a meeting in
Djibouti among more than 17 East Africa and Arab nations from the
Western Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea areas. The
meeting was convened by IMO Secretary General Efthimios E.
Mitropoulos and the Prime Minister of Djibouti, H.E. Mr. Dileita
Mohamed Dileitato to address the problem of piracy and armed
robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden. Senior officials, ministers, ambassadors and legal experts
from Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya,
Madagascar, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen
participated in the negotiations. The session adopted a Code of
Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the
Djibouti Code of Conduct). Nine of the participating states signed
the Djibouti Code.
Although the agreement is legally non-binding, it places the
region on the path toward a well-functioning maritime security
arrangement, like ReCAAP and MOWCA. The Djibouti Code
commits the signatories to share and report information through
520 J. Kraska, B. Wilson / Ocean & Coastal Management 52 (2009) 516–520
a system of national focal points and information centers, interdict
ships suspected of engaging in acts of piracy or armed robbery
against ships. The states also agree to arrest and prosecute pirates
and care for and repatriate seafarers who are held hostage. The
Code of Conduct also anticipates that nations will conduct
combined maritime security operations or exchange law enforce-
ment officials to embark in the patrol ships or aircraft of another
signatory. The states intend to coordinate maritime security oper-
ations through three maritime information sharing centers, the
Maritime Rescue Coordination Center in Mombasa, Kenya, the Sub-
Regional Coordination Center in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and a new
regional maritime information center, which is being established in
Sana’a, Yemen.
The Djibouti Code is open for signature by the 21 Arab and East
African states in the region, which require training and resources to
make it an effective framework. The Arab states, including Saudi
Arabia and Egypt, should provide resources for the East African
states to develop greater maritime security capabilities. The Suez
Canal provides the income for 1 percent of Egypt’s economy, and
yet shipping traffic has plummeted due to piracy on the southern
end of the transit. Saudi Arabia also has a special interest in
ensuring freedom of the seas in the western Indian Ocean. The area
is a major transshipment route for oil tankers carrying crude oil
from the Persian Gulf to markets in Europe and the United States. In
November 2008, the Sirius Star was hijacked by Somali pirates
nearly 500 miles off the coast of Kenya. The 1,000-foot Very Large
Crude Carrier (VLCC) is owned by Aramco in Saudi Arabia and was
carrying 2 million barrels of oil valued at more than $100 million.
The ship and 25 crew members were held for ransom for more than
three months until a payment of $3 million was paid to the pirates.
Second, the distant water maritime powers should also focus
more closely on developing appropriate maritime capacity for the
states of the Horn of Africa. The United States and other sponsors
also need to introduce smaller vessels into the theater of opera-
tions. The U.S. Navy, for example, is designed around robust, multi-
function aircraft, submarines and heavily-armed destroyers that
are capable of dominating high-intensity warfare in the air,
throughout the electromagnetic spectrum, on the sea and under-
neath the waves. These forces are wholly inefficient platforms for
conducting counter-piracy and maritime constabulary operations.
Few other countries have the ability to plug in and operate in
tandem with such a force.
The obvious disparity between the high-technology force
operating in the area from distant water states and the nearly
complete lack of maritime security capacity among the states of
East Africa is gaping. The large warships are extremely capable, but
too few in number and are inefficient for conducting maritime
security operations. Instead, the United States, the European Union
and NATO and Japan and other nations should deploy smaller
warships that could serve as a training force while at the same time
hunting for pirates. East African states need assistance in devel-
oping and operating a vast network of small littoral and coastal
forces to protect, stabilize and maintain order in the narrow seas
and offshore regions. Instead, the foreign warships patrolling the
area are members of awe-inspiring task force battle fleets, each one
capable of destroying an entire opposing navy but not particularly
effective at deterring pirates or engaging with regional coast guard
forces.
In this regard, the plan by the European Union to provide mili-
tary training to Somali government forces so that they can prevent
maritime piracy is a step in the right direction. In August 2009, the
EU will begin training Somali coast guard forces in Djibouti. Third,
the states in the region should develop, as part of the Djibouti Code,
an international MOTR. The U.S. government is able to make well-
coordinated decisions arising from maritime exigencies at any time
of the day or night under the MOTR process. This process enables
the various executive departments and agencies to develop a single
position and advise the National Security Council in a time-sensi-
tive fashion. The SUA Convention and protocol provide a ready-
made structure for an international MOTR process that could be
annexed to the treaties. This annex could serve as an international
‘‘phone book’’ that provides 24-h contact information for shipping
states, regional partners and major maritime powers so that these
states can quickly coordinate issues regarding on-scene interdiction
of vessels hijacked by pirates.
International law has become the most effective force multiplier
for developing maritime security. Naval air and sea operational
contributions from the most capable maritime powers have been
unable to arrest Somali piracy because they cannot prosecute the
endgame. What is most needed now development of maritime
security capabilities among the states of East Africa so that they can
begin to police their own maritime commons. As the Somali Coast
Guard begins training, they will need patrol boats, armaments and
communication systems. In order to ensure the force develops in
a productive direction, units of the Somali maritime security forces
should be integrated with elements composed of small warships
from distant water maritime powers. The introduction of smaller
warships will create synergy and cooperation among three groups
of states–Arab nations, distant water maritime powers and East
African states, in order to develop regional maritime security
capacity in the Horn of Africa. This approach will usher in the day
when the states in the region of East Africa can maintain order in
their adjacent offshore commons. An international MOTR process
would create a network of interested states that could begin to
coordinate in real-time, working effectively across legal and juris-
dictional lines of demarcation to bring collective action against this
threat.
References
[1] Mohamed Olad Hassan, Steve Gutterman. Russian, British ships repel Somali
pirate attack. <www.guardian.co.uk>; November 15, 2008.
[2] Philip Ewing. Zappin’ pirates. Navy times; November 10, 2008. p. 8.
[3] Margaret Ryan. Captain counts the cost of piracy. BBC news, available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4669050.stm>; February 2, 2006.
[4] The commanders respond. United States naval institute proceedings, April
2006, 34, 40–51.