ASEAN Security

ASEAN SECURITY
VISION 2030
INDIVIDUAL PAPER ON ASEAN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
PREPARED FOR
COURSE DIRECTOR
38TH SESDILU
AND
1ST ASIA-AFRICA MID-CAREER DIPLOMATS’ TRAINING COURSE
PREPARED BY
SYED MUNTASIR MAMUN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
TRAINEE OFFICER
1ST ASIA-AFRICA MID-CAREER DIPLOMATS’ TRAINING PROGRAM
PUSDIKLAT, DEPARTEMEN LUAR NEGERI
JAKARTA, REPUBLIK INDONESIA
M O ND A Y , M A Y 1 4 , 2 0 0 7
FOR ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION, AUTHENTICATION, AND INFORMATION, PLEASE CALL MUNTASIR AT +88-01911-060506, OR,
+6281395221398, OR MAIL TO: SYEDMUNTASIR@YAHOO.COM, OR WRITE TO: SYED MUNTASIR MAMUN; HOUSE NO: 345, ROAD
NO: 5, DOHS BARIDHARA, DHAKA CANTONMENT, DHAKA, BANGLADESH.
THE PICTURE ON THE MARGINS PORTRAYS THE GREAT INDIAN GODDESS - “MOTHER DURGA”. THE 10-HANDED SUPREME
GODDESS IS REVERED IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT (MOSTLY BY ITS ANCIENT HINDU COMMUNITY) AS SAVIOR OF THE PLANET
FROM ALL EVIL FORCES.
2
ASEAN SECURITY: VISION 2030. INDIVIDUAL PAPER ON ASEAN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
38th SESDILU; PUSDIKLAT; DEPARTEMEN LUAR NEGERI MONDAY, MAY 14, 2007
38th SESDILU and 1st Asia-Africa Mid-Career Diplomats’ Training Course
Pusdiklat, Departemen Luar Negeri
73 Jln. Sisingamangaraja
Jakarta, Republik Indonesia
Monday, May 14, 2007
Course Director
38th SESDILU and 1st Asia-Africa Mid- Career Diplomats’ Training Course
Pusdiklat, Departemen Luar Negeri
Re: Submission of the term paper on the “ASEAN Security: Vision 2030”
Revered Director,
With due honor, I submit the term paper on the topic, “ASEAN in the New Millennium”,
titled, “ASEAN Security: Vision 2030”.
The paper has been prepared in accordance with the directives provided in the class.
However, efforts have been made to draw in a synthesis of personal observations and
popular/expert appreciations for the future of the region w.r.t. world security at large.
The word limit has intentionally not been complied with to document maximum
possible content from the perspective of a Foreign Service Officer studying in a foreign
capital. Also, explanatory footnotes have been placed at critical points to make sure
that the recommendations out forward are understood at their basic. It is noteworthy
that personal projection and policy recommendations are encapsulated in sections 7
and 8 (complete with a detailed proposal for the establishment of an ASEAN Legion),
respectively. And the reasoning to sections 7 and 8 are contained in sections 5 and 6.
As for the picture on the cover page (and also on the right margin of the paper), a
unique parallel could have been drawn between the 10-handed Goddess and the 10-
member ASEAN, if all ASEAN leaders could have had committed themselves towards the
eradication of the modern evils, i.e., poverty, malnutrition, hunger, ignorance,
illiteracy, diseases, socio-psychological and development gaps, insecurity, conflict,
intolerance, etc. from the whole world.
Any further clarification and authentication will be provided as and when instructed.
Thank you very much Sir, for your time and kind attention.
I remain sir, most respectfully yours,
Syed Muntasir Mamun

Assistant Secretary: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Government of the People’s Republic of
Bangladesh
Trainee Officer: 1st Asia-Africa Mid-Career Diplomats’ Training Course; Pusdiklat, Departemen
Luar Negeri
3
Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s
T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s .................................................................................................................. 4
......................................................................................................................................... 4
L i s t o f F i g u r e s ......................................................................................................................... 4
L i s t o f T a b l e s .......................................................................................................................... 4
......................................................................................................................................... 4
I n t r o d u c t i o n ............................................................................................................................. 5
A i m ............................................................................................................................................. 5
S c o p e ......................................................................................................................................... 5
M e t h o d o l o g y ............................................................................................................................ 6
C h a n g i n g c o n c e p t o f s e c u r i t y – i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e h u m a n e l e m e n t .........................6
T h e c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y f r a m ew o r k ....................................................................................6
T h e e x i s t i n g s e c u r i t y p a r a d i g m – a s i t s h a p e s A S E A N ..............................................1 0
I n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r a l i s m i n A S E A N ( a n d E a s t A s i a ) ................................................1 2
Q u e s t f o r a n A S E A N i d e n t i t y .............................................................................................1 2
T h e A S E A N R e g i o n a l F o r u m ( A R F ) ................................................................................... 1 3
T h e A S E A N S e c u r i t y C o m m u n i t y ...................................................................................... 1 4
T h e E a s t A s i a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e ...........................................................................1 5
T h e c u r r e n t s t r u c t u r e ......................................................................................................... 1 5
F u t u r e o f U S - P R C e n g a g e m e n t .........................................................................................1 7
H u m a n s e c u r i t y a n d r e g i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m ............................................................1 9
E v o l u t i o n , p r o j e c t i o n , a n d e v a l u a t i o n ............................................................................ 2 0
1 . A S E A N s e c u r i t y – p o l i c y s u g g e s t i o n s .......................................................................... 2 4
A t p o l i c y l e v e l ....................................................................................................................... 2 4
F o r s t u d e n t s a n d l e a r n e r s ................................................................................................. 2 4
F o r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ............................................................................................................ 2 4
F o r c i v i l s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s a n d d i p l o m a t s ........................................................................ 2 5
O n p r o c e s s m e c h a n i s m ...................................................................................................... 2 5
O n g r e a t e r e c o n o m i c e n g a g e m e n t .................................................................................. 2 6
O n m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i e s ........................................................................................................ 2 6
T h e A S E A N L e g i o n ............................................................................................................... 2 7
T h e s t r u c t u r e ........................................................................................................................ 2 7
M o d u l a r i z a t i o n .................................................................................................................... 2 8
R e f e r e n c e s ............................................................................................................................. 2 8
List of Figures
F i g u r e 1 : T h e A S E A N S e c u r i t y E n v i r o n m e n t ...................................................................8
F i g u r e 2 : R e g i o n a l P o w e r S e c u r i t y I n t e r e s t s i n S o u t h e a s t A s i a .............................1 5
L i s t o f Ta b l e s
T a b l e 1 : S e l e c t e d b a s i c A S E A N i n d i c a t o r s ....................................................................1 1
T a b l e 2 : I s s u e - w i s e p r o j e c t i o n f o r A SE A N ' s f u t u r e .....................................................2 1
4
Introduction
Turning and turning in the widening gyre.

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere.
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate
intensity.
(William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming”)
Gone are the days, when security used to be rather a one-dimensional uni-synchronous
monochrome, centered on the pre-historic concepts of territorial integrity and
command. Today’s world is characterized by – (a) multiple (and ever increasing)
dimensions of threat perceptions, and consequently, (b) lack of security (insecurity),
and subsequently, (c) measures for security – which again, feeds into the cycle by
creating even more dimensions/paradigms for an existing system to take care of.
ASEAN is a regional organization of 10 countries of the Southeast Asia. By virtue of its
rich and varied history, extremely important geo-strategic location (in the cross-routes
of trade and civilization), and territorial coverage of the globe, ASEAN – (a) holds
within itself significant parameters of security considerations, (b) posits for the rest of
the world a synergistic and attitudinal security projection, and (c) is constantly being
renewed with a multitude of security threats and changed perceptions.
Complicated as it may be, the paper will focus on the core concepts involved in the
geo-strategic make-up of ASEAN, ARF, and the envisioned ASEAN Security Community
in a larger dimension so as to arrive at a singular base for projection into the year
2030.
Aim
Analyzing security is always a complicated issue – especially when it is aimed at

multilateral initiatives in an essentially multi-polar world1. It is even more difficult to
come up with a single and coherent framework that would balance and further the
security interests of each of the parties to the multilateral initiative (with all their
regional and bilateral concerns addressed).
The aim of this paper is thus two-fold:

a. To analyze the security paradigms involved with ASEAN (as it is, now, in the year
2007)
b. Construct a security projection into the year 2030 (for realizing the envisaged
objectives of the ASEAN Security Community).
Scope
The paper is essentially descriptive in nature. Starting from a general conceptual

framework for security considerations in the region, the paper comes up with a
comprehensive scenario analysis of the ASEAN “security environment”2, and possible
security measures that the institution of ASEAN should incorporate in its policy
framework.
The paper will cover the following points in detail:

a. Changing concept of security – incorporating the human element
b. The existing security paradigm – as that affects (and metamorphoses) the ASEAN
c. The ASEAN Regional Forum and envisaged ASEAN Security Community
d. The evolution of security parameters for ASEAN – an update of 2007
e. Policy projection of ASEAN security into the year 2030.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that individual sections contain policy references

for associating the final recommendations to each situation envisaged.
1
In spite of the fact that experts term the present context of the planet as unipolar, I believe, all the
countries in the world are virtually inter-connected in more than one ways (environment, economy,
appearance and diffusion of political and religious ideologies, etc.
2
As I would like to put it across, as opposed to the more ‘Structuralist’ definition of the ASEAN Security
Community (ASC)
5
Methodology
Only secondary information have been researched and utilized for the purpose of the
paper. However, projections have been constructed to present a consolidated security
forecast for the region as a whole.
Changing concept of security – incorporating the human element
The collective security framework
Security is a wide and diverse subject. There are many and multiple levels of security
considerations and dimensions – like – individual security and rights to exercise
personal freedom, social and cultural security under a greater political/command
structure, economic security with respect to trade and commerce (involving two or
more than two individuals/entities), sovereign and state-centric security, collective
security of more than one individual entities of persons/ societies/ states, etc. It is
noteworthy that all these levels have always co-existed at a given time period for any
given set of individuals/ communities/ regions/ states/ countries. As for my paper,
collective security is what we are concerned about. This section will detail the
concepts of “collective security” – which would serve as the basis for further
elaborations in the later sections on what ASEAN could “do” to achieve the optimal
level of collecti ve security for its members and the region as a whole3 .
Collective security is a notion of a system by which states have attempted to prevent

or stop wars4. Under a collective security arrangement, an aggressor against any one
state is considered an aggressor against all other states, which act together to repel
the aggressor. Collective security arrangements have always been conceived as being
global in scope; this is in fact a defining characteristic, distinguishing them from
regional alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both the League of
Nations and the United Nations were founded on the principle of collective security.
However, neither the League nor the United Nations were able to operate the principle
successfully to prevent aggression because of the conflicts of interest among states,
especially among the major powers. The existence of such conflicts has in fact been
recognized in the institutionalized arrangements of the two world bodies themselves:
under the Covenant of the League of Nations the response to aggression was left to
the member states to decide (article 16, paragraph 3, as amended by interpretive
resolutions adopted in 1921); and under the UN Charter any permanent member of the
Security Council may veto collective action (article 27, paragraph 3). As such, human
security is considered to be the primary focus of all security initiatives in the modern
context.
The Cold War principle of mutually assured destruction paradoxically provided

predictability to East-West rivalry. Today, while the danger of global nuclear war has
receded, the stable certainty of that era may have been lost. In the first decade of the
post-Cold War period, non-state actors have surfaced prepared to use new forms of
terrorism, directed at both military and civilian targets. We have also witnessed an
unexpected outbreak of regional conflicts and have become increasingly aware of
dangers emanating from so-called “rogue states,” whose leaders abide neither by
international treaties nor by conventional forms of conflict resolution 5. The dispersion
and availability of weapons of mass destruction have accentuated the severity of such
dangers. The undoubted risk of nuclear proliferation has been complemented by
horrific fears of biotechnology dangers (for example, anthrax, botulism, plague, and
smallpox). Whether motivated by ideological or religious zealotry, state and non-state
terrorists have demonstrated their preparedness to adopt inhumane strategies utilizing
3
In his book, Acharya (Acharya, Amitav; 2001; Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN
and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge.) summarized the basic notion of a security
community developed four decades earlier by Deutsch: “A security community, as Deutsch [1961: 98]
defined it, is a group that has ‘become integrated’, where integration is defined as the attainment of a
sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and
widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable’ certainty over a ‘long
period of time’. Such communities could either be ‘amalgamated’ through the formal political merger of the
participating units, or remain ‘pluralistic’, in which case the members retain their independence and
sovereignty”.
4
"Collective Security." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica 2007 Ultimate Reference Suite.
Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2007
5
September 11’s terrorist attacks underscored the need for achieving a new global system of security
governance, but considerable obstacles to achieving such a system remain. These involve – (a) different
threat assessments, (b) divergent perceptions of security threats to states, and (c) differing response
preferences amongst major states ranging from unilateral action, to ad hoc coalitions, and to
institutionalized multilateralism.
6
destructive technology that may have the potential to challenge traditional security
architecture6.
The United Nation's Human Development Report of 1994 sharpened the debate on what
should be the focus of regional and national efforts to promote security: Is it the state
or the people? Is the pursuit of national security and human security compatible?
Which of the two should take precedence? What makes the process of maintaining
regional security at odds with defending human security? Are regional institutions
today capable of pursuing both goals7? At first glance, the issue seems simple. Both
state security and human security should be the objectives of national policy and
regional cooperation. In theory, national security creates favorable environment that
is conducive to the pursuit of human security 8. The issue becomes complicated when
more specific questions are asked, such as whether human security should be a
universal concern beyond national boundaries and whether the principles of human
rights and individual freedom should be integral to human security9. The challenge,
therefore, is to forge a new international consensus on balancing the pursuit of state
and human security. The Commission on Global Governance, in its 1995 report, stated
that, "the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security
of states"10. It has been considered "the most pressing security challenge of the
twenty-first century." To quote United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "The
world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violation of human rights is
taking place with grave humanitarian consequences"11.
ASEAN operates in a greater sphere of the East Asian countries and to an order of
increasing importance, to the mainland Asia, and through Asia to Europe and – (a)
through the US engagement in Asia, and (b) through the pacific to the continental
American nations. If we take a closer look at the following figure, we will find out that
ASEAN is not an isolated community of nations/states/governments. Rather, by means
of both political and trade relationships, it is connected virtually to all other states
and regions of the world! What I would term this phenomenon as is the ASEAN Security
Environment12.
6
Philip Stephens, “A world of fear and uncertainty,” Financial Times, 12 July 2002
7
As beginning statistics, note that The 1994 Human Development Report noted that for too long, the concept
of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. It has always been equated with
the threats to a country's borders. Arms build up and competition has been traced to this traditional concept
of security. In the midst of the financial crisis in 1997, military expenditures of East Asia and Australia
decreased only by 5 percent from $149 billion in 1996 to $142 billion in 1997. Taiwan the world's second
biggest arms importer spent $6.3 billion in 1998. Japan's arm imports were worth $2.1 billion, South Korea
$1.4. billion, and Singapore $900 million. Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea are the three largest arms buying
countries in the region and rank third through fifth world wide, behind Saudi Arabia and Turkey,
respectively. At the global level, military spending is equal the combined income of one-half of humanity
each year. The Third World spends two to three times as much on arms as on the education and health of
their people. While engaged in lip service to the widespread call for disarmament, industrial countries lead
the global trade in arms. The United States leads as the world's biggest arms exporter, with deliveries of
arms and military services in 1998 worth $26.5 billion, a 49 percent global market share. France overtook
Britain in the second place with sales of $9.8 billion, while British exports fell to $9 billion in 1998 from
their peak of $10.9 billion the previous year.
8
In theory, national security enables nation states to pursue long-term national development agenda
without fear of being interrupted by conflict and unwanted surprises either from within or outside the
country. It allows nation states to allocate their resources to productive sectors instead of military hardware
acquisitions. National development, in turn, creates opportunities that can improve the lives and conditions
of the people. Such condition provides a strong foundation for national stability.
9
Ideas and references drawn from “The Challenge of Balancing State Security with Human Security” by M. C.
Abad, Jr., from The Indonesian Quarterly (Journal of the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Jakarta), Vol. XXXVII, No. 4, 2000. The article was based on a paper presented at the 9th Harvard Project for
Asian and International Affairs Conference, Beijing, 27-30 August 2000. Mr. M. C. Abad, Jr. was an Assistant
Director at the ASEAN Secretariat at that time.
10
0ur Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 81
11
Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," The Economist, 18 September 1999, 49

12
Is ASEAN a Security Community? This short note from Professor Donald K. Emmerson’s writings may shed
some light on the way ‘experts’ view and contradict ASEAN’s existence as a Security Community.
Philippine political scientist Estrella Solidum was a graduate student when ASEAN began. She saw it ‘as the
wave of the future in Southeast Asia’ (Solidum, 2003: vi). She was not disappointed. She watched it grow
into a ‘community’ based on cooperation (p. vii). She came to admire the Association’s ‘beliefs, practices,
structures, responses, and values’ – in a phrase, ‘the ASEAN Way’ – as the veritable ‘prototype of an ASEAN
culture’ (p. 93). Looking back on the Association in 2003, Solidum saw nothing but success: With the highest
commitment to its goals of peace, freedom, stability, prosperity, rule of law, and security, unwavering
observance of all the principles which it had adopted from its establishment, and constantly mindful of the
need for newer and appropriate strategies and building blocks, to achieve the aspirations of the people,
ASEAN has remained vibrant and relevant as the 21st century has begun. ASEAN has been able to respond
and adapt to the changing conditions at the regional and international levels in coherent ways. ASEAN has
engaged more friends and partners in all its cooperative endeavors, and within itself, the members have
remained cohesive. The ideal of ASEAN toward which it is moving in the 21st century is summed up in its
ASEAN Vision 2020 which is ‘a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability,
and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in development, and in a community of caring societies. [p.
222]. In Solidum’s eyes, security in Southeast Asia was indelibly an ASEAN product. Security was ‘the
enjoyment of the ASEAN values of peace, economic, social and cultural development, cooperation, political
7
Figure 1: The ASEAN Security Environment
In the context of the greater ASEAN region (incorporating primarily East Asia, and then
South Asia, and then the middle-east, EU and USA, human security continues to be
threatened in the absence of inter-state peace and stability. Cooperative security in
East Asia is made complicated by interrelated and multiple disputes between and
among the regional states. Among the potential threats to peace in the region include
- (a) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (b) the overlapping claims in
the South China Sea, (c) the China-Taiwan Straits relations, and (d) the situation in the
Korean Peninsula.
Also, many of these concerns are becoming global in scope, such as (a) drug abuse
and trafficking, (b) spread of AIDS and other communicable diseases, (c) international
terrorism, (d) trans-boundary pollution and threats to the earth's life support systems,
(e) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms, (f) trafficking in
stability, and regional stability and progress’ (p. 202). To illustrate this definition, she cited: (a) ASEAN
entities and gatherings, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings, the ASEAN
Secretariat, and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies whose ‘Track Two’ diplomacy
brought officials in their personal capacity together with non-governmental experts to discuss regional
problems; (b) ASEAN documents, such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976) and the Hanoi Plan of
Action (1998); and (c) ASEAN concepts such as ‘the ASEAN Way’ whose norms and rules were ‘mutual
restraint and low-key behavior’ and the ‘non-use of force, non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs,
and mutual respect’. (pp. 203–204) From Solidum’s account, the inference is clear: ASEAN is a security
community in the full causal sense. ASEAN’s members enjoy regional security because of the normative
community that ASEAN has created.
David Martin Jones, a professor of government in Australia formerly resident in Singapore, expressed a
different view: ASEAN is neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect. It is,
in fact, an imitation community [comparable to a fake state whose insecure and illegitimate leaders,
ensconced through bogus elections or military coups, wield unrestrained power over those whom they rule].
Such insecurity translated to a regional level produces a rhetorical and institutional shell. The shell delivers
declarations, holds ministerial meetings, and even supports a secretariat, but beyond the flatulent musings
of aging autocrats or postmodern constructivists pontificating in Track Two fora nothing of substance
eventuates. However, because Southeast Asia’s political elites along with their academic fellow travelers
have invested so heavily in ASEAN’s ‘alternative [non-realist] security’ discourse, it is regarded as impolite
to point out [the Association’s] essentially ersatz quality. (Jones and Smith, 2001: 285) In the same year
that Solidum’s encomium to ASEAN appeared, Jones wrote that the Association ‘increasingly resembles other
failed postcolonial Cold War organizations like the Non Aligned Movement, the Organization of African Unity
and the Arab League’ (Jones, 2003: 43). Far from accepting her portrait of a vibrant, relevant, adaptable,
coherent, cohesive – in a word, successful – community, for Jones it was time ‘to cope with the fallout from
the slow motion disintegration of ASEAN’ (p. 44), as if that degeneration were already well underway.
Southeast Asia itself, as a region, had been and remained a mirage – ‘a “region” that never was’ (Jones and
Smith, 2002: 108–109). Solidum did not describe Southeast Asia as a region that always was. But for her
(2003: 1) ‘the concept of “Southeast Asia” begins with a patchwork of continuous settlements where
inhabitants lived from about 2000 BC’. She cited the practice of reckoning descent equally through males
and females as a general and long-standing feature of the area (p. 2). She defined ‘region’ in generously
constructivist terms as ‘an analytic concept created by the selection of features relevant to the interest of
the student or to the problem at hand’ (p. 11). From her own selection of bilateral kinship as a
distinguishing feature of ancient Southeast Asia, one could, therefore, infer the discernible existence of a
‘region’ millennia before modern states arose. Quoted from “Security, Community, and Democracy in
Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN” by Donald k. Emmerson, Director, Southeast Asia Forum, Stanford
University; Japanese Journal of Political Science 6 (2) 165–185 [doi:10.1017/S1468109905001829]
8
persons, and (g) the social impact of global economic competition and restructuring.
Political repression and disenfranchisement and gross violation of human rights
continue to threaten human security. In an annual survey, which measures individual
country's freedom in terms of political rights and civil liberties, only one-third of the
15 East Asian countries is considered free, while two-thirds is either partly or not free
at all13.
The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum was aimed at consolidating the
relative inter-state stability in East Asia at the end of the Cold War. It strives to
promote confidence and trust among its 23 members that include countries in the
broader Asia-Pacific. The ARF undertakes confidence building measures, such as
regular dialogue and consultations at the ministerial and senior officials levels,
publication of defense white papers, promotion of a regional arms registry, promotion
of joint military exercises, disaster relief and search and rescue cooperation between
civilian and military personnel, training for peacekeeping operations in support of the
United Nations, and cooperation among defense colleges. However, the ARF, with its
diverse membership, is yet to forge a consensus on the principles of security
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
The increasing closer relations between Southeast and Northeast Asian countries
through the “ASEAN+3” process are complementing the ARF. No less than the heads of
state or government and several ministerial level bodies are participating in this most
recent regional arrangement. This recent development is fueled by the increasing
economic interdependence of East Asia. For their part, the members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have entered into the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone. The former binds the contracting parties to a set of fundamental principles
in their relations with one another, including an adherence to the processes of pacific
settlement of disputes, while the latter constitutes the member states rejection of
weapons of mass destruction. ASEAN has, been an effective mechanism for maintaining
regional stability in Southeast Asia in the sense that none of its members has ever
gone into war with another member since its establishment more than three decades
ago. At the same time, ASEAN is fully aware that this state of affairs is not
irreversible. It has to be constantly nurtured. To a great extent, regional security in
East Asia depends on the state of relations among the major powers in the region,
particularly between China and Japan. Russia and the United States also have
legitimate interests in the region and have maintained their networks of alliances.
Managing the major power relations is one of the most important tasks of security
multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific.
Certain global trends, such as those pointed out below, define the strategic shift the
world is experiencing today by means of:
(i) Global war on terror – which, in effect, redefines (and partly reinforces) a very
old concept of inter-faith rivalry and clash of communities (not civilizations)
along religious lines
(ii) Globalization à Liberalization14 – leading more prominently to liberalization of
(a) media and elements of ethnocentric cultures to much wider and diverse
communities, (b) freer flow of ideas and ideologies, (c) greater integration of
manufacturing and service sectors – leading to critical interdependence in
economic spheres, (d) overriding interest of the client communities for better
trade/economic gains over purely idealistic chauvinism
(iii) Tendencies towards the creation of FTAs / RTAs – either as footsteps for
ultimate global economic integration, or, more prominently, as a side-diversion
of global economic integration15 - leading to formation of closely knit geo-
strategic groupings of nations – which historically might have been adversaries
only
(iv) Competition for resources, particularly energy, minerals, and fresh water;
competition is taking its roots in the discovery and usage of alternative
trade/connecting routes as well16
13
Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1999-2000 (Washington,
D.C.: Freedom House, 2000)
14
Well-known oil historian Daniel Yergin argues that in the future, stresses can be resolved not through
massive armies and blue-water navies, but through markets and investment within the ever-denser web of
international commerce @ Yergin’s vision rests on the reality that massive energy infrastructure investments
required throughout Asia will require cooperation of neighboring and distant powers, superseding
nationalistic or ideological urges. [Daniel Yergin, Dennis Eklof, and Jeffrerson Edwards, Fueling Asia’s
Recovery, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March 1998), p. 36]
15
A question of Multilateralism vs. regionalism?
9
(v) Joint efforts against diseases, natural disasters – for greater protection of
sovereign subjects through localized combat patterns
(vi) Democratization of governance; anti-corruption/good governance initiatives and
the enhanced roles for the civil society – which shape the way authority is
perceived and practiced in the region. It also shapes the way certain
‘nations/communities’ would ‘behave’ in the state-centric framework
(vii) Human Rights and intervention at sub-national levels by supra-national entities.
This includes the pre-dominance of UN agencies and international organizations
like the Amnesty International in the regional power structure of the Southeast
Asian nations – complete with annual reviews and call for sanctions to curb
(possible) violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
subsequent covenants and conventions
On the other hand, the key factors playing dominant roles in the security paradigm of
the ASEAN region are:
(i) Global trades, especially in energy, using the seabed-lanes through the
regional waters both for the East Asian – booming economies, as well as for
peripheral security of the US/EU energy supplies from the Gulf17
(ii) Possibility of proven gas and other fossil fuel supplies in the Russian east and
Chinese north – which could be expected to flow into the envisaged regional
energy grids18
(iii) Common bases of production for both primary and secondary economic
activities of the Asian continents
(iv) Growth areas in and around the Indian ocean
(v) Differences and contradictions (if not outright confrontations) with regards to
different forms of governance and developmental activities
(vi) Opposing territorial and sovereign claims on the basis of historical perspectives
and economic interests
(vii) Importance of the Southeast Asian region to serve as refueling/servicing
stations for large fleets/armies operating away from home stations
The existing security paradigm – as it shapes ASEAN
During the Cold War, security in Asia, to a large extent, was confined to the global
pattern of U.S.-Soviet rivalry for hegemony and to the interactions of the triangular
relationship among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold
War made more salient the diversified character of Asia that gives rise to divergent
security interests and objectives of each country. The existing disputes over territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, together with the unbalanced national
economic development, makes it more difficult for Asian states to build confidence and
trust. It merits mentioning that the ASEAN-initiated ARF engages all major regional
powers. During the past few years, ARF has gradually had, with respect for
sovereignty, a series of useful experiences, such as reaching a consensus through
consultations, starting cooperation, and proceeding in an incremental manner, while
maintaining its focus on confidence-building19.
The differences between China and Japan, and the complexity of their relations, reflect
a basic characteristic of Asia, diversity. Unlike other regions, Asia is greatly
diversified in terms of country size, type of political system, level of economic
development, and cultural tradition. Even on security, Asian countries differ in their
security environment and objectives. However, these commonalities among Asian
countries should not escape notice:
16
Asia’s rapid economic growth, explosive urbanization, dramatic expansion in the transportation sector,
and politically important electrification programs will have a particularly dramatic effect on Asian
consumption of oil and natural gas and the region’s dependence on oil supplies from outside the region.
Already, at over 19 million barrels per day (b/d), Asia’s oil use exceeds that of the United States. About 60
percent of this amount must be imported from outside the region. By 2010, total Asian oil consumption could
reach 25 to 30 million barrel/day, of which 18 to 24 million b/d will have to be imported.
17
See forecasts tables in “China and Long-Range Asian Energy Security: An analysis of the Political,
Economic, and Technological Factors Shaping Asian Energy Markets”, Baker Institute Study (Houston: Baker
Institute for Public Policy, 1999)
18
Despite some areas of limited promise, Asia’s geology has to date not lent itself to many massive oil
basin discoveries. Rather, over the last decade or more, over two-thirds of hydrocarbons found in Asia have
been natural gas deposits. Some of this gas, such as deposits in Natuna, Burma, and Bangladesh, has been
hard to develop due to technical problems (in Natuna’s case, the field's high CO 2 content remains a major
obstacle to development), political obstacles, and lack of infrastructure or well-developed markets.
19
References and discussion framework heavily drawn from the web-article “Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations
and the Challenges Ahead for Asia” by Wang Yi. Though it may seem like a pro-PRC stance on the fly, deeper
analysis would undoubtedly reveal that security concerns are actually complicated with the involvement of
multiplicities in considerations interest regimes.
10
(i) The majority of countries in Asia are developing ones
(ii) Most of these concentrate on economic development and growth of national
strength, with domestic and foreign policies serving both purposes
(iii) Most attach great importance to domestic stability and consider it an essential
precondition for national prosperity
(iv) All Asian countries share the same oriental roots, which transcend the different
cultures of each country, respect the collective interests of society, and
emphasize harmony and coordination.
These commonalities do not contradict the diversity that is Asia. Indeed, they are
derived from Asia's diversity and even accommodate it. Together, they respect and
live with diversity in an accumulative manner and are creating an awareness of "an
Asian identity," which goes side by side with the rise of Asia and advances its
development20.
Table 1: Selected basic ASEAN indicators
It is justifiable to say that the road of development is a bumpy one and Asia faces
severe challenges ahead. However, bilateral alliances have also been strengthened in
this region. Most notable among them is the reaffirmed Japan-U.S. military alliance.
Some hot spots such as the Korean Peninsula and Afghanistan still lurk in the region. It
should be pointed out that the rationale of a bilateral military alliance is the Cold War
mentality that encourages security through military build-up and military deterrence.
This by no means helps maintain lasting peace nor does it coincide with the theme of
peace and development in today's world.
An ancient continent that has weathered hardships and tribulations, Asia has won
political and economic independence, but in a security dimension, Asia is still
immature. Challenges ahead include nurturing new security approaches and
constructing a regional security mechanism suited to Asia's characteristics. As a large
country, China is fully aware of its responsibilities for safeguarding regional security.
While adhering to its independent foreign policy of peace, China has already put
forward its three basic objectives on regional security:
(i) China's own stability and prosperity

(ii) A long-term and peaceful regional environment
20
However, the case is not so easily made that ASEAN’s member states have the characteristics which allow
for a regional organization with the power and desire to interfere in the domestic affairs of member states
or pressure its neighbors. First, ASEAN shares no common political ideology. All states agree on regional
self determination, but beyond this political and societal diversity abounds. The states of ASEAN read like
examples from a text on comparative government - the military regime in Myanmar trying to come to grips
with separatist insurgents is as far from the city state of Singapore as the Communist regime in Laos is from
the Philippine republic. There exists no standard form of government, no shared political culture, not even a
common level of economic development. It is hard to see Singapore and Laos finding common principles of
domestic government which they would defend with sanctions or other forms of pressure against those who
violate them.
11
(iii) Dialogues and cooperation with all countries on the basis of mutual respect and
equality
China has also been active in exploring new security approaches and has initiated such
important ideas as enhancing confidence through dialogues, achieving security
through cooperation, respecting sovereignty, and settling disputes by peaceful means.
This manifests China's sincerity in and active approach toward regional security.
In Asia, the major problem of security is a lack of mutual confidence among countries
in the region. The theoretical foundation of new security approaches does not lie in
the traditional notion of balance of power, but rather, in the ultimate building of
mutual confidence. The ARF's mission (elaborated later) is to enhance mutual
confidence among its participants to improve the overall security environment of the
region and to create a sound and relaxed atmosphere for peaceful settlement of
disputes between countries. In the foreseeable future, the bilateral military
arrangements and multilateral security processes will proceed side-by-side. However,
with suspicions between Asian countries gradually reduced and mutual confidence
further enhanced, a regional security framework will eventually take shape. This
framework should be based on mutual respect for sovereignty and equal consultation.
It should be open and flexible, and not ostracize the extra-regional powers'
constructive role in maintaining security in Asia as equal participants. Although it will
take time for this prospect to materialize, once it is fulfilled, Asia will enter into a
fruitful maturity on security, which will further strengthen its comprehensive capacity
and enable it to make greater contributions to the cause of peace and development of
mankind.
Institutional structuralism in ASEAN (and East Asia)
Quest for an ASEAN identity
Southeast Asia’s, and ASEAN’s, regional identity developed in response to both inside
and outside pressures and forces, although the internal aspect has been understated
in the existing literature on Southeast Asian studies. Southeast Asia is an invented
region, invented not just by outside powers and intellectuals, but also auto-invented.
Internally, it drew upon common historical legacies, a sense of a rediscovered common
past, and from ASEAN regionalism itself. Externally, it was influenced by the work of
Western intellectuals who, along with Southeast Asia’s nationalist leaders, helped to
imagine Southeast Asia as a distinctive region in relation to China and India. Some
have argued that Southeast Asia was a region created largely by Western powers (for
example the South East Asia Command created during World War II by the allied
powers under Lord Mountbatten) or Western political scientists and historians.
However, even though these “situations” constitute undoubtedly important moments of

history, but this view ignores the crucial role of Southeast Asians themselves. They
constructed a regional identity in response to the interventionist behavior of the great
powers during the cold war. This identity building was geared toward creating a
measure of autonomy so that Southeast Asia would not become an object of
manipulation by the external powers. After World War II, historians of Southeast Asia,
including Westerners, played a major role in conceptualizing Southeast Asia as a
region. Their revisionist, or “autonomous,” historiography presented Southeast Asia’s
past as a common past and identified common historical, cultural, and trade linkages.
Southeast Asia was seen not as “Greater India” or as a region simply occupying a
geographic position “East of India, South of China.” It was portrayed as a place with
its own cultural and political identity. Southeast Asians were not passive recipients of
Indian or Chinese culture or civilization. They were active agents of their own history,
builders of their destiny. This was the first phase of the regional identity-building
process in Southeast Asia. The nationalist leaders of Southeast Asia also contributed
to the imagining of Southeast Asia as a region. Leaders like Aung San of Burma began
speaking of regionalism well before ASEAN was created. So, when ASEAN did happen,
there was already a basis for thinking about regional identity. The founders of ASEAN
built on that. They said, “Regionalism will help us to revive old linkages, commercial,
cultural, and political. Colonialism disrupted identity connections, interactions, and
interdependency within Southeast Asia, but colonialism is over. So, now—with
regionalism—we can revive that to build a common identity.”
Finally, when ASEAN grappled with security and political issues, it did so in the context
of a constant search for autonomy. Identity and autonomy go hand in hand. In
Southeast Asia, autonomy meant not being manipulated by outside powers, be they the
United States, the Soviet Union, or China. It meant trying to reduce and manage the
scope of intervention or intrusion of outside powers into the regional environment, so
that Southeast Asian states would be able to deal with their problems on their own.
That is the idea behind initiatives like the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
12
(ZOPFAN) and other concepts. It is not that ASEAN was completely successful in this
quest for regional autonomy. More important is the fact that it tried at all, which
contributed to its growing sense of regional identity. The expansion of ASEAN to
include Vietnam and other nations—Cambodia, Laos and Burma—can also be seen at
least partly as an identity-building exercise, under a policy framework known as the
“One Southeast Asia” concept, which is also driven and reinforced by regional
economic interdependence and a sense of common fate in the face of globalization21.
T h e A S E A N R e g i o n a l Fo r u m ( A R F )
The Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, which
were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF). The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 199422 .
The objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum are outlined in the First ARF Chairman's
Statement (1994), namely:
(i) To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues
of common interest and concern; and
(ii) To make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.
The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that "The ARF could become an
effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and
security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF
partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the
Asia Pacific"23.
On the tenth year of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ARF Ministers met in Phnom Penh
on 18 June 2003 and declared that "despite the great diversity of its membership, the
forum had attained a record of achievements that have contributed to the maintenance
of peace, security and cooperation in the region"24.
They cited in particular:
(i) The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and
consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and
cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference,
incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all;
(ii) The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security
issues in a multilateral setting;
(iii) The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities;
(iv) The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and security
issues;
(v) The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of
information relating to defense policy and the publication of defense white
papers; and
(vi) The networking developed among national security, defense and military
officials of ARF participants.
The ASEAN Regional Forum adopted in July 1996 the following criteria for participation:
(i) Commitment: All new participants, who will all be sovereign states, must
subscribe to, and work cooperatively to help achieve the ARF's key goals. Prior
to their admission, all new participants should agree to abide by and respect
fully the decisions and statements already made by the ARF. All ASEAN
members are automatically participants of ARF.
(ii) Relevance: A new participant should be admitted only if it can be demonstrated
that it has an impact on the peace and security of the "geographical footprint"
of key ARF activities (i.e. Northeast and Southeast Asia as well as Oceania).
(iii) Gradual expansion: Efforts must be made to control the number of participants
to a manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF.
(iv) Consultations: All applications for participation should be submitted to the
Chairman of the ARF, who will consult all the other ARF participants at the SOM
and ascertain whether a consensus exists for the admission of the new
participant. Actual decisions on participation will be approved by the Ministers.
21
Influenced by ideas from “Constructing Security and Identity in Southeast Asia” an interview by Jillian
Moo-Young on 24 March 2006, of Mr. Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore). Copyright © 2006 by the
Brown Journal of World Affairs (Winter/Spring 2006 • Volume Xii, Issue 2)
22
The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor L'este, United States, and Vietnam.
23
From ARF Website

24
From ARF Website
13
Based on the ARF Concept Paper, which the ARF adopted on 1 August 1995, the ARF
shall be chaired by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee. For the period of
June 2006-July 2007, the Chairman of the ARF is: H. E. Alberto G. Romulo, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. ASEAN has also established the ARF Unit at the
ASEAN Secretariat on 26 June 2004. Based on its Terms of Reference, the ARF Unit’s
role and functions are as follows: (i) to support the enhance role of the ARF Chair,
including interaction with other regional and international organizations, defense
officials dialogue and Track-II organizations; (ii) to function as depository of ARF
documents/papers; (iii) to manage database/registry; and (iv) to provide secretarial
works and administrative support, including serving as the ARF’s institutional memory.
The ASEAN Security Community
Against the recent conflicts and crises facing the region, the spotlight is once again
directed at ASEAN’s plans for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). What is significant
in this slew of crises that have unfolded – be it the looming threat of a failing state or
complex humanitarian emergencies caused by intra-state conflicts – is their uncanny
frequency in occurrence. These issues, often classified as non-traditional security
threats, have demonstrated their capacity to deleteriously affect states and societies
beyond national borders. As such, they require more attention and should be read as
signals to recalibrate the proposals under the ASC.
To be fair, the pioneers who drafted the ASC 2003 blueprint appeared to have had a
good sense of the emerging security challenges that would face the region, as
reflected in the key strategic thrusts outlined in the ASC. These strategic thrusts have
since been expanded from four to five under the 2004 Vientiane Plan of Action and
they are: political development, norms-setting, conflict prevention, conflict
resolution25 and post-conflict peace building. Of the key thrusts identified in the ASC,
two have become extremely important in the light of the current security challenges.
These are the broad areas of conflict resolution26 and post-conflict peace building27.
25
In the United Nations’ experience in peacekeeping operations, it has been noted that the separate tasks
of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding have become much more complex to the point of blurring
the distinction between one operation with another. Especially after the end of the Cold War, the once
limited task of peacekeeping oftentimes referred to as ‘blue helmet’ operations, have now gone beyond the
traditional peacekeeping functions to much more expanded and large-scale operations. From the UN’s peace
operations in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), Somalia (UNOSOM), Kosovo (UNMIK) to East Timor in 2000 (UNTAET), it
became increasingly clear that it was no longer enough to just keep the peace that usually follows a
ceasefire or peace agreement which is generally accepted by the belligerents. Instead, peace operations
have become more robust and now involve an array of tasks including deterrence, protective engagement of
civilians, peace enforcement and reconstruction. The implications of these emerging trends of expanded
peace operations could only mean more commitments from an already resource-tight United Nations. In
response to these developments, the United Nations came up with the 2000 Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations, otherwise known as the Brahimi Report, which underscored the intricate nexus
between peacekeeping and peace building. The report highlighted three key recommendations that were
essential to any successful peace operations. These were: (1) clear organizational structures, (2) achievable
mandate and (3) leadership. More importantly, it also highlighted the need for a task-sharing arrangement
between regional organizations and the UN in responding to cases for humanitarian intervention. These
developments at the global level, particularly the challenge for some kind of a task-sharing arrangement
with the UN, have a significant bearing on ASEAN and its plans for the ASC. This is where a review of the
ASC plans is warranted. This is especially so since amongst the various strategies identified in ASC under
the rubric of conflict resolution was the idea of an ASEAN peacekeeping force. At that time, this was
considered a bold move on the part of ASEAN. To understand the rationale for such an initiative, one would
recall the explanation offered by the spokesperson for the Indonesia government (then chair of ASEAN) who
said that, “ASEAN countries should [already] know one another better than anyone else and therefore have
the option […] to take advantage of an ASEAN peacekeeping force to be deployed if they so wish.” That the
main proponent of the idea was Jakarta is indeed extremely important given that there could have been no
other country in the region which had the greater propensity for intra-state conflicts than Indonesia. (from
“Recalibrating the ASEAN security community” by Mely Caballero-Anthony for the Institute of Defence and
Strategic Studies, 28/06/06)
26
If one were to fast forward the sequence of events from the introduction of the ASC blueprint to 2006, the
current crisis in East Timor is certainly a déjà vu to an ASEAN that has been trying to build regional capacity
to address a growing number of security challenges in the region. It was not too long ago, during the period
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis that the grouping was roundly criticized for its inertia in responding
to series of crises that hit the region, particularly the 1999 conflict in East Timor. Hence, in recalibrating
the ASC, a strong case can be made for revisiting the idea of a regional peacekeeping force which had
previously met strong objections from some ASEAN members. Albeit modified in form and short of being a
regional rapid deployment force, this peacekeeping force could be a non-standing, multi-national mix of
national military and civilian personnel that could be readily volunteered to undertake an array of hybrid
tasks related to, but not exclusively, peacekeeping. Given the history of ASEAN states contributing
peacekeepers to a number of UN-led or UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions, having a regional
peacekeeping force is no longer quite as controversial as it is made out to be. A number of examples already
abound in the region, including: the evolving peace operations in East Timor—from UN Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) to UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and UNMISET; the experiences of
Malaysian peacekeepers monitoring the ceasefire in Southern Philippines between the Philippine government
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); the monitoring missions undertaken by Thai and Filipino
military in Indonesia’s Aceh, as well as the similar involvement of other ASEAN members in the EU-led Aceh
Monitoring Mission (AMM). Altogether, these varying peace operations point to a willingness by ASEAN
member states to “pool their sovereignty” in order to address regional conflicts. Thus, after 39 years of
building a regional community, ASEAN appears to be well fitted to push ahead with this particular initiative
as part of its broader agenda to build regional capacity to respond to regional challenges. (from
27
14
These two elements merit closer attention in order to push the realization of an ASEAN
security community.
Figure 2: Regional Power Security Interests in Southeast Asia
The East Asian institutional structure
The current structure
Maintenance of peace and economic development are still the main stream of
development focus in East Asia. Regional strategic framework is continuing to develop
towards multi-polarization. Growth of economic interdependence between countries
and the end of the Cold War have made more countries accept the new security
concepts. However, there are still some factors which can cause potential uncertainty
Another salient component in the ASC that must be given more attention is in the area of post conflict
peace building. Transitions from post-conflict situations to ‘normalcy’ and sustained peace are said to be the
most critical periods in peace operations. Often it is also this aspect that gets less attention. In this regard,
the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005 is indeed a welcome development.
The creation of a global body designated specifically to the function of peacebuilding provides ASEAN
members an avenue to participate in the drafting of peacebuilding missions in their regions; identify certain
gaps and obstacles that had been encountered and suggest remedial measures. With regard to ASEAN’s own
initiative, one should revive the strategies identified under this rubric in the ASC blueprint, which called for
the establishment of a mechanism for delivery of humanitarian assistance, including providing safe havens
in conflict areas, repatriation of refugees; and creating a regional fund to facilitate post-conflict peace
building (e.g. ASEAN Stability fund). But beyond this, attention must also be given to the human security
concerns of the internally displaced persons (IDPs), especially women and children. ASEAN in collaboration
with UN agencies should examine how humanitarian assistance can best be extended to IDPs and explore
possibilities of providing critical service – including assistance in building health care systems and
monitoring infectious diseases. One way to proceed is for ASEAN to get other actors (NGOs, business
organizations, etc) in their respective countries to contribute toward a more sustainable and long-term
strategy in peacebuilding in the region. Overall, the challenges for ASEAN in building its security
community would be the ability to identify situations where regional action is imperative coupled with an
understanding of where its member states are able and willing to pool their resources to respond to conflicts
with regional implications – particularly those that could potentially lead to humanitarian crises. (from
15
and instability in East Asia28. Relationships among major powers are in readjustment29.
The United States intends to establish a security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region
based upon its military alliances and with it as the leader. This is contrary to the main
stream of peace and development in the world since the end of the Cold War30. NMD31
and TMD32 will complicate the major power relationships and may cause a new arms
race in East Asia. The development of arms in some countries (or regions) has been
too fast. The process of relaxation on the Korean peninsula has begun, but there are
still many uncertainties in the future. In the long run, in East Asia, cooperative
security mechanisms may take shape with multi-levels (including regional level, sub-
regional level and bilateral level), multi-forms (official and unofficial), and multi-
functions coexisting33.
Southeast Asian regionalism has traditionally developed with a supportive but non-
active US participation and a limited Chinese role in the sub-region. This model
however cannot be transferred to the East Asian level. An active US involvement and
an accommodative Chinese participation are necessary. Lately, China’s activism with
regard to the institutions has been effective in not only changing the Southeast Asian
perspective about China but also in bringing new life to regional multilateral
initiatives. The engagement between China and ASEAN is particularly impressive, as
recently celebrated by the commemorative summit marking the 15th anniversary of
ASEAN-China dialogue relations in October 2006. Yet these achievements need not be
at the expense of the US. Beijing’s gain must not be regarded as a loss for
Washington. US influence in the region remains strong and deep rooted and its
participation in the process of institution-building essential. An active US participation
and an accommodative Chinese foreign policy combined with strong regionalism in
Southeast Asia would constitute the best possible scenario for East Asian
institutionalism. It could lead to a stronger ARF and APEC complemented by
arrangements more limited in their participation and geographical scope like ASEAN,
the APT and the EAS. The region should also be aware however of the consequences of
less beneficial scenarios where regional institutions might compete and cancel each
other out.
28
Although East Asia is hardly unique in the non-Western world as a region “given to power politics,
historical animosities, and rising security tensions,” it is true that there was no Asia- or East Asia-wide
regional organization during the cold war. ASEAN, established in 1967, was a sub-regional grouping.
Attempts to create Asia-wide regional organizations, as anticipated in 1947 at the Indian-organized Asian
Relations Conference, did not take off. Even in Southeast Asia, ASEAN came into being only after two earlier
failed attempts at regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and MAPHILINDO (Malaysia,
Philippines and Indonesia). This stands in marked contrast to other regions of the world, such as Western
Europe, (the European Community and the European Union) Africa (the Organization of African Unity, now
known as African Union and sub-regional groupings like ECOWAS or SADCC), the Arab World (the League of
Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council), or Latin America (the Organization of American States, the
Andean Pact, or MERCOSUR). But it is important to bear in mind that these regional organizations have not
been all that successful in managing regional conflicts or promoting regional integration. As a sub-regional
organization, ASEAN had a greater impact on the region and arguably more success in limiting regional
conflict—than its continental or sub-regional counterparts, with the notable exception of the European
Community.
29
Today, the main role played by ASEAN is to act as an anchoring hub for regional socialization. Asia is no
longer lacking in institutional density, especially since the end of the cold war and the establishment of
APEC, ARF, ASEM, APT, and now the East Asian Summit. The common thread among all these organizations is
that they are all ASEAN-based.
30
This is not what one might call structural power—ASEAN as a group of relatively weak powers can never
have that. But ASEAN’s is a type of soft power or institutional authority. The norms and processes of ASEAN
—such as inclusiveness, dialogue, moderation, restraint, non-confrontational posture, and consensus-
building have helped to draw other, more powerful Asian and non-Asian nations into a framework of regional
socialization. Realism has difficulty appreciating this, because—for realists—physical power is all that
matters in shaping regional order. However, if one accepts that international politics is also about soft
power and that norms and socialization, not just power balancing, matter in shaping the behavior of great
powers, then one arrives at a different understanding of ASEAN’s role in the East Asian security
environment.
31
National Missile Defense Systems, commonly referred to throughout the paper

32
Theatre Missile Defense Systems, commonly referred to throughout the paper

33
During recent years, security situation in East Asia has been relatively stable. Most of the countries in
the region have been recovering from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Economic interdependence between
countries has been developing, and has increased the necessity for countries to cooperate with each other
to resolve problems through peaceful means. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis made countries in the region
recognize that they should strengthen their economic cooperation to prevent future crisis, and has caused
them to establish ?ASEAN + three? mechanism. The process of relaxation between North and South Korea
has also begun. Some multilateral mechanisms of security cooperation and dialogue in the region have
taken shape. However, there are still some factors of potential uncertainty and instability in East Asia. In
the world, the Korean Peninsula is the last place in which the Cold War has not ended. If the two Koreas are
reunited in the future, it will have important impacts on the strategic framework in East Asia. Some
separatists in Taiwan still intend to split Taiwan from China. Their intention and action for Taiwan
independence have become the most dangerous factor in the region. Disputes of territory, border and
maritime sovereignty between some countries of East Asia still exists. Major powers in the region also lack
enough mutual understanding and trust between them. Faced with the situation, countries in the region
should strengthen their cooperation in the security field, including the improvement of the existing
multilateral mechanisms of regional security dialogue and cooperation as well as the establishment of some
new ones.
16
Some trends characterize the East Asian multilateral architecture when examined from
a security perspective.
First, the region now accommodates a great variety of security structures, ranging
from bilateral to multilateral arrangements. The nature of such arrangements varies
from military alliances to institutional expressions of cooperative and comprehensive
security.
Second, East Asia has seen the emergence of new multilateral institutions since the
end of the Cold War, such as APEC, the ARF and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as well as
groupings operating at Track Two levels like the Shangri-La Dialogue and the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). East Asia has therefore moved
from being dangerously under-institutionalized, as famously argued by Aaron L
Friedberg in his International Security article, to having a variety of overlapping
multilateral structures.
Third, particularly since the Asian financial crisis, there has been a growing
recognition of the close relationship between economics and security. The APT has
sought to incorporate economic-security linkages as part of its cooperative structures.
ASEAN perceives the construction of security and economic communities in Southeast
Asia as complementary and mutually reinforcing. The objective is to move towards
deeper economic integration while developing a region free from military conflict.
Fourth, existing institutions in East Asia have taken on ‘new’ security roles since 9/11
and the 2002 Bali bombings. ASEAN, the ARF and even APEC, originally formed to
encourage trade and investment liberalization, have been accorded a role in the
campaign against terrorism. Health concerns, transnational crimes and other issues
are also increasingly discussed at the multilateral level.
Finally, despite the presence of a growing number of overlapping structures,

institutionalism in East Asia continues to suffer from weak structural capacities that
limit their ability to respond to security challenges. The ARF has enjoyed some success
in confidence-building but it is questionable whether it will succeed in moving toward
preventive diplomacy. The APT does not have the capabilities to address security
challenges and the complex relations between China and Japan should continue to
undermine its effectiveness. The EAS should in the short to medium term be expected
to be another confidence-building exercise in the region.
The future of East Asian institutionalism will be influenced by the strength of

regionalism in Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian region has been undergoing
political transformations and has faced a series of non-traditional security challenges.
Such changes in regional dynamics raise two significant questions for institution-
building in Southeast Asia. Issues include - (a) How will domestic political changes
impact the stability of key states and the security of the region? (b) If the nature of
the challenges facing the region would lead to further institution-building as suggested
by current efforts to develop an ASEAN Community and Charter?
For more than a decade, ASEAN has been driving multilateral cooperation in East Asia
– whether in the form of the ARF, the APT and the EAS. ASEAN’s assigned managerial
role derives as much from its unparalleled institutional experience in East Asia as from
the lack of an alternative source of leadership acceptable to all. As long as it succeeds
in being innovative, ASEAN should play a leading role in institution-building in East
Asia. Whether ASEAN moves toward a new era of legalization and regionalism as
suggested by recent initiatives (ASEAN Communities and Charter) will therefore have
an impact on East Asian institutionalism.
Fu t u r e o f U S - P R C e n g a g e m e n t
The US is likely to remain the hegemon for years to come although its exercise of
power in East Asia will be complicated by the rise of China. Consequently, the nature
of the US involvement in multilateral arrangements is pivotal. The US has generally
been supportive of multilateral initiatives in East Asia. The long-term relevance of
multilateral structures may be undermined however by unilateralism and bilateralism
in US foreign policy. The Bush administration has repeatedly indicated its preference
for flexibility over institutionalized arrangements. A disinterested US participation
would most likely weaken the multilateral architecture in the region. The negative
impact on the ARF of a non-active US involvement was sensed when Secretary of State,
Dr Condoleezza Rice, decided not to attend the ministerial meeting in Vientiane in July
2005. Dr Rice’s participation at the 13th ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Kuala
Lumpur in July 2006 eased concerns however over the possible diminishing US
commitment to existing institutionalized arrangements. East Asian institutionalism
would certainly benefit from a more active US involvement that looks beyond the
17
issues of terrorism and maritime security34. At present, in order to strengthen its
leadership in the world and to maintain its position as the only superpower, the United
States wants to continue to play the leading role in the Asia-Pacific region. It has
used its forward-deployed military forces and defense alliances in East Asia and the
Pacific as the main pillars to realize its purpose. The United States has maintained
100,000 troops in East Asia, and is strengthening their mobile capabilities and
precision-guided attack capabilities. At the same time, the US is enhancing its military
alliance with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia. The United
State and Japan issued new US- Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines in September
1997. In May 1999, the Japanese Diet passed three bills, which, together, make up the
Guidelines. These provide for Japanese rear-area support for the United States in
regional crises, including search and rescue operations; logistics support including the
use of Japanese hospitals, ports, and airfields, and the provision of fuel and
equipment; and the use of Japanese ships to evacuate Japanese citizens from conflict
areas35. Other reasons why the United Stares has been doing so include that the US is
concerned China may become its future potential threat, and the US is also preparing
for possible military intervention in the Taiwan Strait. The new US-Japan Defense
Cooperation Guidelines expanded the scope of cooperation, providing for cooperation
in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on
Japan’s peace and security36. Thus the area for cooperation is not geographical but
situational. Although at the beginning whether the region covered includes Taiwan
was deliberately left ambiguous, since George W. Bush Administration came to power,
it has been made clearer. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that if US-
Japan Alliance is very close, it can check the disputes between China and Taiwan37.
On the other hand, the PRC’s rapidly expanding economic growth has been
accompanied by even larger increases in defense budgets as well as a more assertive
foreign policy and government-sponsored efforts to enhance nationalistic feelings.
What this implies for the stability and security in Asia and how to respond to it have
been the topics of intense debate among the countries of the Asian-Pacific region.
Essentially, the choices are three:
(i) To accept the concept of China as hegemon and accommodate to it
(ii) To resist it through a combination of unilateral and multilateral actions
(iii) To deny that China is likely to disrupt the status quo or that it will be able to
do so in the foreseeable future.
States frequently weave and tack among these options, in response to both the PRC’s
words and deeds and their own domestic situations. China’s military budget has
increased by double-digit percentages since 1989; that for 2001 was up 17.7 percent
to 141 billion yuan, or US$ 17.5 billion. In past years, the PRC pointed out that
increases in the defense budget barely compensated for inflation rates, although in
the late 1990s, as the economy slowed and actually dipped into deflation, increases of
about 13 percent per year continued. Analysts have also pointed out that the defense
budget lacks transparency and is known not to contain many items, such as personnel
charges as well as very substantial costs of research and development for nuclear
weapons and missiles. Additionally, several billion dollars a year expended on foreign
weaponry, mostly from Russia and Israel, are met with funds that are not part of the
defense budget. China counters that its defense costs, based on its published budget,
are among the lowest in the world on a per capita basis 38. Beijing has also said that
the bulk of the increase in funds for 2001 will go toward pay raises for military
members, whose standard of living had been deteriorating vis-à-vis that of civilians39.
China has added a new diplomatic activism to its growing economic and military
growth. The Chinese ‘charm offensive’ toward Southeast Asia, including its offer of a
free trade area with ASEAN and its support for the EAS, is in contrast to China’s
previous suspicion of multilateralism. Nonetheless, considerable uncertainties remain.
One is related to the evolution of China’s domestic order and how this may impact on
regional stability. Another involves the possibility of a damaging crisis between China
and Japan or between China and the United States over Taiwan. Such events would
34
However, The United States undoubtedly intends to establish the security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific
region with it as the leader and based on its military alliances, which is contrary to the main stream of
peace and development in the world since the end of the Cold War.
35
Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, edit., America?s Asian Alliances, published by the MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2000, pp.38.
36
Ibid.,pp.39
37
Common New Agency, January 23, 2001, Washington, DC

38
Hu Siyi, “China Ranks Seventh in the World in Military Spending and Constitutes No Threat To World
Peace,” Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, March 7, 2001, p. A7
39
Special Dispatch, “A 25 Percent Salary Increase For PLA Officers and Soldiers,” Hong Kong, Ming Pao, March
6, 2001 (net).
18
directly influence the process of institution-building in East Asia. The nature of China’s
future involvement is also uncertain. Will China continue to be an accommodating
power or might it adopt a more assertive position in regional arrangements in the
coming years? Assertiveness could consist of Beijing pressing for change in the norms
of cooperation, adopting a restrictive position on the agenda setting, and/or pushing
for a more exclusive approach in terms of membership. Over the last decade, China’s
regional security behavior has exhibited a four-fold pattern:
(i) A strong, even extreme, assertion of China’s position, generally couched in the
phrase “China’s principled stance”
(ii) A willingness to make conciliatory gestures if resistance is encountered, such
as discussions on fishery rights or participation in free trade zones, but without
conceding the substance of China’s claims
(iii) Attempts to keep other countries on the defensive through establishing
structures and/or carrying out research and patrol activities in disputed areas;
issuing threatening statements which are sometimes backed by military
actions; and using access to the PRC’s market as leverage to induce compliance
with China’s wishes
(iv) Continued probing to test the limits of other nations’ tolerance of its claims and
behavior40
In Robert Gilpin’s formulation, a state dissatisfied with the status quo will seek to
change it through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal
costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits. China is
such a state. The PRC also possesses most of the attributes that would allow it to play
the role of regional hegemon. Thus far, states who feel threatened by Beijing’s
territorial, political, and economic expansion have been unwilling or unable to raise
these marginal costs to anything approaching the level of marginal benefits to China.
Should the benefits to China continue to outweigh the costs of expansion, the chief
constraints on China’s rise to hegemony will not be international but domestic: lack of
agreement within the leadership on where and how quickly to move to assert this
hegemony, and the country’s many internal problems. Until such time as the other
states of Asia can reach a consensus on how to counter the PRC’s assertiveness, there
will be no significant cost to China for continued assertiveness.
The US would most likely refuse to be excluded from regional institution-building. The
Southeast Asian countries would be particularly uncomfortable with an assertive
Chinese leadership. An ongoing accommodative Chinese participation would on the
contrary contribute to the development of an institutional framework where
multilateral arrangements complement one another in the promotion of peace and
stability.
Human security and regional institutionalism
As has been noted in Section 5, the pursuit of human security means that regional
institutions must be change agents. They must have the political will to challenge the
status quo. They must be given sufficient resources and the necessary mandate to
alter situations. To pursue human security means to enhance the capability of regional
organizations to advance universal values effectively and with greater autonomy from
its dominant members and local interest groups:
First, regional institutions must work with other change agents, particularly with the
civil society. In recent years, transnational social forces have been providing an
alternative orientation to globalization, which they call "globalization from below."
Second, regional institutions must be publicly accountable. They must adopt

democratic decision-making processes. Regional institutions, their organs, officials,
and information must be accessible to the public. Bridging the digital divide, not only
among nations but also within societies, can contribute greatly to building
participative governance.
Finally, regional cooperation must be in sync with the global human security agenda.
They must contribute to facilitating inter-civilization dialogue and understanding. They
should not fuel division among the regions of the world. At the same time, regional
institutions must collaborate with global institutions to mitigate the negative impact of
globalization on one hand, and ensure that all nations, particularly the developing
countries, benefit from the seamless world. In this regard, a United Nations Human
40
References drawn from Brendan Pereira, “PAS Hits Out At US Military ‘Invasion’,” Straits Times, July 31,
2001. Malaysian defense ministry officials described PAS’s objections as a politically motivated effort to
establish itself as the defender of Islam in contradistinction to the ruling Mahathir government
19
Security Council has been proposed to defend the new frontiers of global human
security41.
The pursuit of human security requires changes in the nature and structure of the
existing regional mechanisms in East Asia. The situation could evolve like this:
(i) The ASEAN Regional Forum must balance its current state-centric security
agenda with people-centric security concerns. It must develop and put into
practice the policy of comprehensive security as contained in the Chairman's
Statement of the first meeting of the ARF in 1994.
(ii) The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation must find equilibrium between trade
liberalization and development cooperation in favor of its less developed and
economically vulnerable members. It must heed the danger of an excessively
rapid liberalization pace without commensurate institutional checks and
accountability at the global, regional and national levels. It must address
vigorously the social impact of economic globalization.
(iii) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations should become a political
community. ASEAN should build on its successes in managing inter-state peace
and stability by aiming to establish a community of democracies that promotes
human security. It should provide assistance and incentives to its members
towards achieving certain standards in political governance.
(iv) ASEAN must agree on a road map to become a community of open societies as
envisaged in the ASEAN Vision 2020. It should not renege on its commitment to
establish a regional mechanism for the protection and promotion of human
rights. In the light of the increasing regional interdependence and
interconnections, ASEAN must forge a consensus on the broader meaning and
application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one
another.
A balanced pursuit of state and human security can create an environment favorable
for each other's mutual reinforcement and advancement. No less than fundamental
changes in the political structures and mind-sets at the national level are required to
achieve such regional imperative.
Evolution, projection, and evaluation
The security structure of Southeast Asia and greater East Asia will inevitably revolved
around the approach leaders of the region (as well as that of the more advanced
strategic powers) adopt towards battling the global menaces and miseries of the
human race. The entire structure will revolve around the process which we would see
being employed by the leadership solving the problems of:
(i) Terrorism and non-state forces of cross-border/boundary-less violence
(ii) Energy security
(iii) Trade expansion and security of trade routes
(iv) Possession and security of vital resources including fresh water, arable land,
and exclusive oceanic/sea-based economic zones, fossil fuels, precious minerals
(v) Access and control over intellectual properties and rights to own and operate
critical process mechanisms/manufacturing technologies
(vi) Integration of service sector into global trade and movement of natural persons
for economic reasons.
One must always bear in mind that no state can operate on a global scale without
active collaboration from others (and that, numbering many). It would be tough to
factor in the seemingly innumerable array of variables that would continue to grow – in
numbers, in magnitude, in depth, and in dimensions. What matters most is how things
take shape from here.
There should a thee-pronged approach to realize the ASEAN Security Community

visions – with the individual steps being:
(i) Consolidation of military forces in close collaboration and appreciation of the
other regional actors
(ii) Adoption and promotion of people-to-people contact as a viable and
complementary initiative to strengthen diplomatic endeavors
(iii) Strengthening bureaucratic solidarity across the region – so that there is ever
increasing cohesion in the public policy framework adopted across the
countries.
Here is a set of projections that might come in handy for projecting the future
directions of ASEAN. It may be noted that each “Combat Strategy” – as has been noted
41
Mahbub ul-Haq, "Global Governance for Human Security," in Majid Tehranian (ed.), Worlds Apart: Human
Security and Global Governance (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 91.
20
in the table – is divided into two sections – (a) Philosophy (for negating the adverse
impacts of the situation and reaping the positive benefits), and (b) Action plan (to
implement the strategy).
Table 2: Issue-wise projection for ASEAN's future
Areas Possible Situation in 2030 ASEAN

(Personal Projections) Combat Strategy
Routing Global trade routes will be open in Philosophy
global one way or another from Southeast ASEAN – will have to forge a greater solidarity
trade Asia through South Asia to the Middle amongst its national members to consolidate
East. Part of it will be land based, national boundaries with strong security forces
with the rest seaborne. Two separate – to check infiltration of separatist elements
trade routes – (a) from Japan to China and check the diffusion of weapons of mass
(and from Sakhalin through Russia), destruction into the hands of the separatist /
and (b) from the Central Asian region terrorist elements – operating across borders.
to the European East will be open for Economic ties will have to be solidified with
access (for a fee, may be) to the solid military/security cooperation.
global traders. This would entail
enhanced security challenges arising Action Plan
form the pockets of tribal/separatist Simulations can be arranged for ASEAN
origins, as well as gradual derogation business leaders in close sync with the field
of state authorities take place into troops/naval installations guarding the trade
privately operated security routes. Also, training for appreciation of the
organizations. military forces for the business potential of
Trade routes will continue to be the adjoining regions could be arranged.
fragmented because of national Joint training/exercises could be arranged with
differences. However, they will also forces from South Asian and Central Asian
be unified because of the overriding regions under the aegis of ASEAN to promote
incentive mechanism associated with CBM.
the influx of globalized trading Civil society activists could be drawn in for
patterns. effective cooperation along the trade routes to
It has to be borne in mind that no divert away possible conflict situation (in
matter what the major-power order to reduce social cost of warfare).
involvements become, there will Military forces from South and Central Asian
always be complementarity in regions could be invited to send their senior
services and production pattern. As a officials to effectively cooperate with their
result, for fear of dead-weight-losses, Southeast Asian counterparts for coordinating
even the major powers will engage their activities/campaigns across the
the comparatively smaller ones into a continent. Indonesia could be promoted as a
positive and systematic arrangement base for regional security and maritime
of affairs. patrolling trainings.
Energy Greater dependence on fossil fuels Philosophy
security – will overshadow the development ASEAN Security Community may consider
of East efforts of the East Asian region. As a amassing a conglomerate of tri-dimensional
Asia result, the countries in the East Asia security forces on a voluntary commitment
(coupled with the South Asian region) basis to guard the installations carrying
will increasingly be more dependent energy to the East Asian regions. It is most
on the middle-east as well as that of likely that the East Asian countries will not be
the other energy surplus regions of engaged in wars/battles amongst themselves
the world for their economy and for the possible extent of retribution that a
development. However, it is expected war/battle might take from an economy.
that enhanced technological abilities
will render a correspondingly greater Action Plan
effort towards exploration (and Energy efficient production/ transportation
subsequent fossil fuel discoveries) – processes /options will have to be explored.
in the barren Siberian forests and Public transportation systems must effectively
remote southern seas. As a result, restrain the use of privately operated
there would be issues involved with vehicular movements for economizing fossil
the physical security of the pipe lines fuel alternatives. ASEAN leaders could as well
(which, most likely, will have been incorporate economic use of fossil fuels in
transformed into multinational voluntary commitments.
regional energy grids by that time), Additional investments could be asked for from
and carrier vessels across the seas. rapidly expanding economies like that of PRC
The Korean crisis will either be for research and development.
solved – most probably, by Environmental mitigation techniques could be
civil/peaceful methods. As such, discussed as possible avenues for
there will be no rogue state from the collaboration.
Korean north to threaten the energy
trade / security of the entire East
Asian regions.
Energy USA and EU will be more engaged in Philosophy
security – the Asian region than ever. It is to be ASEAN will have to start cooperation with its
for US and noted that – because of the loss of Southern neighbors for keeping a tag on the
EU valuable strategic depth, and spread security of the South-China Sea, as well as
out engagement patterns, the USA that of the order of peace and stability across
will, most likely, not be able to the Indian Ocean. A viable alternative to
continue in its presence course of taking the entire burden of trade/energy
bellicose/expansionary diplomatic security would be to engage the littoral states
endeavor. Also, EU, being what it is, – Bangladesh and India to provide for offshore
will most likely evolve into an even service (and port) facilities.
newer form of existence with renewed
emphasis on community welfare and Action Plan
rigid politico-trade standards. Engaging land and sea port authorities of the
The most important element of region under the aegis of ASEAN institutions
consideration for both the entities will assist implementation of the ASEAN
will be to find out an optimal balance security initiatives.
of power and wealth – which would Levying passage taxes for EU/US vessels
not bring prosperity to their through the region could be considered for
21
respective nations, but also assist negotiation with regards to financing the
them in maintaining a competitive security initiatives.
edge over all other nations. However, inviting European/US forces would
For PRC, their policy will be not be a good idea to guard the region (since
competitive containment, rather that it would strike an emotional cord with the
upfront confrontation. Chinese).
US USA will remain engaged in Asia Philosophy
engagemen (especially with the emergence of a ASEAN will have to look for alternate power
t in Asia petro-rich Russian Federation and in allies, other than the USA. ASEAN will have to
the face of a fragile Japan and engage both India and Russia for an
threatening China. Nevertheless, an increasingly active naval presence in the
upfront confrontation would most region for maintaining subtler balance of hard
probably be too much of a dead- power.
weight loss for the US business
regime. As such, war-like Action Plan
engagements are unlikely (in spite of Security initiatives will have to be embedded
the occasional show of force). into the diplomatic endeavors of the foreign
Nevertheless, military expenditure service officers operating in the USA.
will continue unabated – as military Effectively cooperating with the AFRICOM,
might will be considered the CENTCOM, and Pacific Command, the diplomats
balancing factor for an international will have to constantly monitor and update
order based on wealth of the nations. their national headquarters about the possible
However, USA is likely to increase courses of action on the US consideration list.
Track II and Public Diplomacy to Lobbying in Washington from all ASEAN
campaign for attainment of its policy countries as a group could align the US
objectives. interest with that of the ASEAN one in the
region. However, caution has to be maintained
to balance both the Democratic and Republican
policy-makers/congressmen for pursuing the
stated objectives.
Chinese China will undoubtedly covet a Philosophy
power prosperous Asia to trade with its own ASEAN will have to maneuver its soft power
projection powerful economy. However, it would with the Chinese by means of technological
inevitably make attempts to diminish superiority and product innovation. As China
the US military presence and might in grows in economic eminence and as its per
the region by means of dissociating capita income rises, the Chinese consumers
the US with the rest of its support will become increasingly more interested in
bases in the Indian Ocean region as advanced products – which ASEAN can fulfill
well as in South Asia. China will seek with its continued investments in R&D.
a strategically neutered Japan42,
integration with Taiwan, and under- Action Plan
command North Korea (prepared at Coordinating ASEAN foreign service officers
the Chinese Will). Also, trade and with the PRC Communist Party officials of
economic reasons are expected to regional significance will be a good way to
override the latent dreams of a start.
revival of the “middle kingdom” and Officers may be asked to engage (both
the reenactment of its “tributary individually and collectively) the senior
system” of economic-cultural officials of the ‘party’ to gain foresight of the
suzerainty. A stationary Chinese future Chinese initiatives. The Chinese
military will project a looming shadow business installations may be asked for
of power across the breadth of enlistment with the ASEAN stock markets as
Pacific. However, actual military well. Incentives will have to be offered for
confrontation is unlikely (partly Chinese investments in the Taiwan Straits as
because of the heavy damages that well as across the Malacca Straits to engage
the opposing sides will have to bear). the Chinese ‘meaningfully’ – so that a regional
However, a stronger PRC will only unrest goes against common sense. Students’
strengthen the Chinese position as a exchange programs can also be deployed for
strategic player. It is, however, not peace-oriented trainings in the region.
to be construed as an actual military At present, all attention has been focused on
threat on sovereignty for the next maneuvering the Washington lobby. However, a
few years. Chinese lobby should firmly be in place from
the ASEAN diplomatic missions in Beijing to
pursue alignment of the Chinese policies in the
region with in sync of the ASEAN objectives.
Re- Russian Federation, with its (sort-of) Philosophy
emergence satellite neighbors will have emerged ASEAN can reap the benefits of a Russian
of Russia as a potent force in the region. deployment by increasing its military/
However, it might not choose to technological ties with the country. Also,
project its military might in the countries like Indonesia could consider
region – except for re-deploying its exporting qualified human resources for
Pacific Fleet. exploitation of the Siberian fossil
Russian discoveries with fuels/minerals.
nanotechnologies will inevitably find
a homegrown industrial clientele in Action Plan
the ASEAN – with its focus on cost- Increasing military hardware and customized
effective and durable technologies. technology transfers from Russia can be
Political projections are unlikely from considered for engaging the modernized
the Russians in next two decades. Russian arsenals for security in the region
(and also to save money on over-priced
American hardware).
Emergence The most significant event in the geo- Philosophy
of non- strategic sphere of the ASEAN and ASEAN can address this issue by a significant
state East Asia will be the rise of non-state effort into community building. Whatever the
actors actors, both sub-national and supra- elements that might arise out of the chaos that
42
As Marvin C. Ott of the National War College would put it through on SAIS Policy Forum Series Report
Number 15, John Hopkins University, April 2002
22
national. Non-state actors will be in is about to ensue because of the ‘pluralization’
the form of: of the regional actors, it will then inevitably
(i) Multinational business fall into one or another category of community
houses that ASEAN as an institution might weave to
(ii) Individual business entities relate itself to the mindset of the population.
(iii) Transnational NGOs working
for human development and Action Plan
disaster management The best possible alternative would be to
(iv) Educational institutions and choose the students as carriers of
scholars of regional and goodwill/friendship across the region. An
global significance internet-based volunteer program (like that of
(v) International terrorists and KADO, ROK) could be initiated from ASEAN
transnational organized countries to go into the remote South and
crimes/criminals Central Asian regions. They could contribute to
(vi) Legal entities enjoying the formation of friends of ASEAN
spiritual adherence of the communities. This is proposed to be internet-
population. based to economize on the cost dimension.
It has to be borne in mind that Also, immediate steps are required to be taken
evolution of non-state actors with for standardizing the legal systems of the
more importance and significance ASEAN countries to do away with the regional
than the sovereign authorities is blockades for free movement of capital (intra-
bound to take place (as technological ASEAN) – which would forge deeper bonds as a
advances take away the direct region amongst the ASEAN countries.
control over the “Thought Scholarships could be offered to selected
Dimensions” of the populations). universities and institutions for students from
International terrorism will threaten extra-ASEAN countries to forge deeper bonds
to grow out of proportion in the of friendship.
absence of sympathetic regimes (for
“their causes”).
Trade Trade engagement of the ASEAN ASEAN leadership should be able to embrace
engagemen countries will take the form of the situation rather than take freight in it
t of ASEAN political integration. This is likely to (because of the diffusion of individual
states be a technical reality rather than an sovereignty in favor of a more regional
emotional consideration. ASEAN will identity). ASEAN Economic Community will
attract cross-cultural business have to work in close sync with the ASEAN
entities because of its large, trained Security Community.
production bases.
Proliferatio ASEAN countries are better known as Philosophy
n of soft-authoritarian states with mass Proliferation of democratic ideals will bring
advanced support for heroic leadership with about diversity in the way ASEAN people think
“democracy absolute control of the future and of and behave. Consequent social innovations can
” in ASEAN prosperity. However, as the masses only “add value” to the ASEAN process/ways
countries gradually integrate with the rest of that is so fervently preached.
the world, and trade/exchanges takes
place in cultural identifications as Action Plan
well, there will be more democratic It is said that a democratic society/country
elements propping onto the never goes into war with another democratic
mainstream of life and living (some society/country. ASEAN leaders could consider
of which is already evident in the instituting youth leadership/exchange
administrative structure of countries programs for countries both within ASEAN+3
like Indonesia, Malaysia, etc). and USA/EU to forge stronger ties of
However, some quarters in the friendship. This would also expose youth from
regional leadership might take the the more restrained societies like that of PRC
proliferation of democracy throughout or Myanmar to co-operate in a world which
the society as a direct threat to their values democracy more than authoritarian
authority and established command rules/prerogatives.
status-quo. This would result in An interesting way forward could be to
stifling efforts for the containment of institute “bureaucrat-camps” – which would
media/internet reach to the individual bring about senior civil service officers of the
in certain parts of the greater East regions for fortnight-long campaigns in the
Asia. Nevertheless, technologies wilderness, and also to participate in cross-
capable of overcoming the barriers country/archaeological excavations in the
will also arise as a viable alternative region. However, careful efforts will have to be
to being controlled by made to bring together senior and influential
governments/authorities. The real officers. This would form bonds of fellowship
challenge will be to manage the and camaraderie amongst the officers – who
transition of authoritarian societies could then appraise their political masters
into modern democratic ones – about their individual reach and experience
without necessarily destroying the with the officers from the region to work for its
social/moral fabric of the common fate.
communities and diverting resources Anti-corruption drives will have to be
away from traditional productive strengthened across the region to project the
usages to ‘popular’ manifestations of identity of the region as a green and clean
wealth and power. zone (much like Switzerland and the
Scandinavian countries). This would boost the
morale and give an ethical upper hand to ‘the
cause’ for ASEAN across Asia.
Rethinking for an administrative system –
where there are three alternative bases of
power – authority and executive supervision
could be though of. Under this system, the
legislative will enact laws and regulations for
the country with the local government bodies
executing the policy and an independent
administrative monitoring the tasks and
responsibilities associated with the actual
projects.
Resource ASEAN will be faced with a gradual Additional discoveries and resource utilization
23
constraints decline of existing resource bases for techniques will bring additional wealth to the
and new further exploitation. However, new region. However, caution has to be exercised
discoveries resources and even newer forms of on how the wealth is used. R&D facilities
resources (precious metals, should be revamped, rather than letting the
particle/elements) are likely to be resources fall into the ever increasing
discovered. consumption spiral.
1. ASEAN security – policy suggestions
Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral mechanisms of regional and sub-regional
security dialogue and cooperation have made tremendous progress in Southeast and
East Asia. In the region, security dialogue and cooperation are developing at multi-
levels, through multi-channels, and through both Track One and Track Two. The Track
One includes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the “ASEAN + 3”, the “Four Party
Talks”, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and etc. The
Track Two includes the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP),
the Northeast Asian Cooperation and Dialogue (NEACD) and etc. Track Two
mechanisms usually can create favorable conditions for Track One mechanisms and are
supplemental to Track One Mechanisms.
Some basic principles of establishment of multilateral security cooperation in

Southeast Asia and greater East Asia should be affirmed according to the
characteristics of the region and experiences obtained from the history and the
current processes being employed for realizing the ASEAN Security Community to its
aspired for level. My proposition is to incorporate the three-pronged approach
explained in the previous section, combining – (a) superior (and
affordable/manageable) military strength, (b) people-to-people contact both within and
outside the region, and (c) strong bureaucratic solidarity. The challenge would be,
however, to institutionalize the philosophy (especially with constrained funds). The
following schedule provides a policy brief on ‘projects’ which would ascertain the
realization of the vision.
At policy level
Fo r s t u d e n t s a n d l e a r n e r s
(i) There should be annual dialogues amongst the ASEAN member countries on the
envisaged ASEAN Security Community – involving the scholars from religious,
social sciences, physical sciences, and international relations/business faculties
on mutual cooperation and collaboration. Mutual respects of sovereignty and
territorial integrity and mutual noninterference in other countries’ internal
affairs. One of the most important experiences of member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is not to interfere in each
others internal affairs in any form and in any excuse. In 1994 at the annual
conference of the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS), Singapore
Foreign Secretary said that one of the main reasons why there had been no war
among ASEAN countries for 25 years was that they had insisted on the principle
of noninterference in internal affairs. The dialogues could be held in the
capital cities of the member countries on a rotational basis.
(ii) Uniform school textbooks on the unique history and culture of the region should
be introduced for all member countries – after having them approved by the
ASEAN Council. This would form a sense of solidarity amongst the future ASEAN
citizens/policy-makers/soldiers for appreciating the common challenges and
constraints facing the region.
(iii) School-to-school exchange programs could be arranged between ASEAN

members and greater East Asian countries and EU/US regions – to forge greater
understanding between the countries future leadership.
Fo r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s
(i) Cooperation among National Defense Universities (NDU) and Defense Services
Command and Staff Colleges (DSCSC) should be initiated. These are powerful
mechanisms to foster greater collaboration amongst defense officials across the
region. It may be reminded that there always exists a bond of fraternity
amongst soldiers. It has been observed that, even in multilateral initiatives,
there has always been “us vs. them” attitude amongst the military officers and
24
other bureaucrats/diplomats. So, if the commanding officers of countries from
the region could be introduced to each other, it can be expected that they
would find some common point of agreement/collaboration amongst themselves.
Scholarships could be provided on a government-to-government basis for
exchange of senior military officers for courses in NDU and DSCSC – to a
proportion when at least half of a single class actually would come from foreign
countries.
(ii) Dialogue and consultation on equal footing and to resolve territorial and other
disputes through peaceful means – could be fostered for military officers. A
consolidated effort should be made to make sure that all involved officials
understand that before the final resolution of territorial and maritime territorial
disputes, the disputes should be shelved and any country concerned should not
take any action, which may be regarded as provocative act. Military officers at
the basic training academies across ASEAN countries should be instructed on
making their great efforts to establish Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) so
as to create favorable conditions for the final resolution. They should also
make efforts to create favorable conditions to cooperatively exploit natural
resources, if possible, such as in South China Sea. A consolidated action
program, where he basis management equation of
“authority=accountability=responsibility” holds true, should be instituted in
the “codes of conduct” of the military soldiers/officers.
Fo r c i v i l s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s a n d d i p l o m a t s
(i) Establishment of multilateral security mechanisms under the guide of the

theories of common security and cooperative security. During the post-Cold
War era, with the rapid development of mutual economic interdependence
between countries, security is also mutual. At present, no country can increase
its sense of security under the condition of sacrificing the security interests of
other countries. So common security of all countries in the region should be
the objective of regional multilateral security cooperation. Cross training
programs for bureaucrats and diplomats should be arranged across the ASEAN
and East Asian regions for exchange of ideas and spread of solidarity – so as to
any hasty decision for waging armed conflicts.
(ii) “Regional Centers of Excellence” can be established (or declared – upon

upgrading existing framework arrangements – on the specific institutions) – for
greater emphasis on technological and philosophical breakthroughs. For
example, AIT, Bangkok could be taken as an ASEAN regional center of
excellence for technological research / basic research facilities – or for that
matter, Pusdiklat could be declared and promoted as a regional center of
excellence for training diplomats on law and trade. Specific attention could be
given to areas such as –
i. Law and constitutional/legal structures
ii. Trade mechanisms
iii. Marketing and sales
iv. Medicine and surgery
v. Information technology and cybernetics
vi. Physics and nanotechnology
vii. Aviation and aeronautics
viii. Oceanography and laws of the seas
ix. Military tactics and defense services command and staff
development
x. Administrative service delivery and financial institutions
Experts and trainees could be drawn from across the region as well as from EU,
Africa, and the American continents to promote the benchmarked ideas of
excellences emanating from the greater Southeast Asian and East Asian (as
well as West Pacific and Australian regions) under the aegis of ASEAN. It would
only consolidate the position ASEAN nations as possessing ‘inviolable’
technological and intellectual high grounds.
On process mechanism
(i) The ideal process mechanism would be to advance gradually. To establish

multilateral security cooperation mechanisms in East Asia should progress step
by step. For example, the ARF regarded its three major functions, namely
CBMs, preventive diplomacy and then seeking for ways to resolve conflicts, as
the three phases of its development. At present, the ARF is going from the first
phase, CBMs, into the second one, preventive diplomacy.
25
(ii) With the establishment of regional multilateral security cooperation
mechanisms, the role of bilateral military alliances should be reduced. Because
military alliances are usually aimed at one specific adversary or potential one,
and only seek for the security of a part of countries. In fact, it puts security of
some countries on instability of other countries and will be unable to meet the
needs of situation during post-Cold War era.
On greater economic engagement
(i) Starting with the increase of mutual understanding and trusts among major
powers. That will be the precondition of establishment of CBMs and
effectiveness of regional multilateral security cooperation mechanisms. Making
greater efforts to develop economic exchanges and cooperation among
countries on the basis of principles of equality and mutual benefits. This is the
basis of regional security cooperation and an important part of establishment of
CBMs. The tri-nation gas pipelines across South Asia and the gas-grid in
Southeast Asia should be promoted by the ASEAN to foster greater economic
integration and stake-holding. ASEAN diplomats should not only promote ASEAN
in multilateral forums. Rather, they should promote a collective identity for
economic exchanges – which would foster greater involvement of all states in
discussions and not confrontations.
(ii) ASEAN should continue to make their great efforts to help to bring about a
formal peace agreement between North Korea and South Korea within the
mechanism of the Four Party Talks. Both China and the United States can play
the role as guarantors of the agreement. After the peace agreement is signed,
the Four Party Talks can be expanded to include Japan, Russia and even
Mongolia, so as to become a sub-regional multilateral security cooperation
mechanism in Northeast Asia43.
On military strategies
(i) Arms control and disarmament should become an important part of multilateral
security cooperation mechanisms. Because military technologies of developed
countries are much advantageous than those of developing countries and
developed countries have exported large amounts of sophisticated weapons to
developing countries, they should take special duty to stop deploying and
transferring the sophisticated weapons, which may cause the region unstable,
to East Asia. It must be promoted in all forums that ASEAN diplomats can get
through (not as some old idealistic concept – but as strategic counter balance
of heavier armed engagements). Reviving NAM stance on de-militarization could
be envisaged.
(ii) ASEAN Countries should adopt a compulsory military service regime for all its
citizens – so that mass secondary defense forces could be drawn at short
notices. It must be remembered that self-help is ultimately the key to success
in an uncertain world.
(iii) A distinct and coherent effort will have to be made to manage the phases of
transition of the traditional and pre-dominantly agrarian ASEAN societies into
information societies. It is to be understood that with the rise of economic
solvency and ease from financial stress, it will be increasingly tougher to enlist
die-hard fighters/soldiers from the peasantry (which counts for the mainstream
of soldiery in the region). Even for the already enlisted soldiers and
commissioned officers, an enhanced appreciation and usage of technological
implements and modern communication equipments (complete with accesses to
virtual societies/internet chat-rooms) – it will be even tougher a situation to
manage in the years 2030. Fledging loyalties to traditional command structures
can be envisaged due to the increasing contact and communication channels at
the disposal of the military soldiers/officers. ASEAN countries should take this
not as a threat to their military structures. Rather, the use of advanced
communication technologies should be promoted to foster thoroughbred CBMs
43
From the long run, in East Asia, cooperative security mechanisms may take shape with multi-levels
(including regional level, sub-regional level and bilateral level), multi-forms (official and unofficial) and
multi-functions coexisting. An increase in cooperative security in the region is likely in the next 2-3 years,
because growing economic interdependence between countries, especially between major powers, will make
them pay great efforts to avoid conflicts, to maintain stable relationship and to seek for cooperation in
security fields, although sometimes they have tensions in their relations. The ideas of “ASEAN + 3” and ARF
are the most likely to work, and, the “ASEAN + 3” will develop into “East Asian Regional Cooperation”
mechanism, which may play an important role in the future regional cooperative security mechanisms.
26
across borders. Military scholars44 and Commanding Officers of battle
stations/fighting units should be given access to “regional centers of
excellence” envisaged in section 8.1.3 (ii) of this paper. Officers’ performances
in building functioning relationships with their counterparts across the regions
could be factored in for their individual appraisals.
(iv) The ASEAN security strategies will have to be coordinated with the UN to give it
a paralegal existence and acceptability across the countries of the globe. In
this regard, ASEAN might consider sending ASEAN contingents to the UN
Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, as opposed to sending
individual units of the ASEAN member countries. This will not only lessen the
burden of the individual member countries to shoulder the troops contribution
weights but also foster greater military- to-military contact and raise
acceptability of ASEAN as the keepers of peace in the Southeast Asian region45.
The ASEAN Legion
An ASEAN standing force of a Corps size could be envisioned to tackle

immediate humanitarian/peacekeeping assistance. The essential components of
the Corps should be:
i. The formation of a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council as

an adjunct to the ASEAN Council
ii. The formation of an ASEAN Field Communication and Liaison
Corps to serve as a modular command, control, and
communication framework for all multinational operations
iii. The development of an ASEAN staff structure in the Secretariat
that is sufficiently large, articulated, and integrated to be able to
plan and manage joint and combined efforts across the full
spectrum of peace operations
iv. The formation and development of a permanent ASEAN standing
force comprising four brigades and a field support structure to
complement and augment member-state contributions to
peace/disaster support operations.
The structure
For the proposed corps, the military field units of the ASEAN standing force
would reside in two commands: Support Command and Forces Command. In
addition, the legion would have Base, General Staff (GS), and Central Support
(CS) elements. Forces Command would comprise approximately of 22,625
officers and troops; Support Command, about 15,775 officers and troops. The
base, general staff, and central support elements would add approximately
5,350 personnel. Thus, the proposed ASEAN standing military would comprise of
approximately 43,750 personnel in all46. Of this total, 32,650 would be
"deployable," allowing the legion to field up to 16,350 troops continuously,
including some service support personnel for non-Legion civilian and military
units. The proposed ASEAN legion would be approximately 2.5 percent as large
as the present US military. The tactical field units of the ASEAN Forces
Command would include:
i. 4 Brigade headquarters,
ii. 5 Motorized Infantry battalions,
iii. 4 Light Mechanized Infantry battalions,
iv. 3 Light Cavalry squadrons,
v. 2 Light Armored Cavalry squadrons,
vi. 6 Self-propelled Mortar batteries,
vii. 3 Light 155-mm Artillery batteries (towed),
viii. 4 Light Mechanized Antitank companies,
ix. 6 Combat Engineer companies,
44
No matter how much odd these two conjoint terms might be at with each other (personal comments).
45
But there is room and, in my view, the need to expand and deepen this relationship. Why is ASEAN the only
major regional organization without observer status at the United Nations? Why have we found little to say
each other on peace and security issues at the very time when new forms of security challenges are
presenting themselves? ASEAN itself is asking these questions, and has decided that it should explore ways
to enhance cooperation with the United Nations. Already, you have attended one of series of meetings the
United Nations has held with regional organizations. We will hold another in June in New York. I hope ASEAN
will accept the UN’s invitation to be there.
“Strengthening ASEAN - United Nations Partnership” by Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United
Nations (Remarks at the ASEAN-UN Summit, Bangkok, 12 February 2000)
46
Based on commonwealth military structures
27
x. 6 Air Defense batteries,
xi. 2 Armed Scout Helicopter squadrons (18 aircraft each),
xii. 1 Troop Transport Helicopter squadron (24 aircraft),
xiii. 4 Signal companies,
xiv. 4 Field Intelligence companies,
xv. 4 Military Police companies,
xvi. 6 Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons,
xvii. 12 Field Security sections, and
xviii. # Field Communication and Liaison teams (400 personnel,
aggregate).
Modularization
The concept of "modularization" informs the legion's design. It is organized

under four large brigade headquarters and with a quantity of units consistent
with four brigades. Nevertheless, the units would only occasionally deploy in
brigade-size packages. Instead, the legion would deploy multi functional force
packages ranging in size from 500 to 15,000 troops, as the situation demanded.
Ground combat force mobility would be based on modern variants of wheeled

vehicles ranging from lightly armored personnel carriers to tanks in the
armored cavalry. In peace operations where local consent is uncertain, the
capacity to quickly redeploy and extract ASEAN forces will substantially reduce
their vulnerability and help keep the operation from falling hostage in a
political-strategic sense. Hence all infantry have some organic means of
mobility -- none are simple foot infantry.
Cavalry units are present in the design in a much higher proportion than would
be expected for a typical mobile force of this size. These units are equipped to
fulfill the function of lightly armored strike forces. In addition, there are
dedicated anti-armor units optimized for defensive operations against hostile
tank forces.
A variety of combat support elements complements the primary units. To permit

maximum flexibility, these are mostly of company (or battery) size or can
deploy as such. People include in the force design armed scout helicopter
squadrons which can serve to provide troops with light fire support, in addition
to performing their primary, scout role. Equipping the helicopters of one of
these squadrons with anti-armor missiles would allow it to assume a secondary
anti-armor role as well. There is also a troop transport helicopter squadron
providing an optional mode of transport to some of the motorized infantry
units. Similarly, several antitank companies, light cavalry companies, and
artillery batteries could train for air mobility.
The design includes a relatively high number of special intelligence and

engineering assets and more artillery than has been the practice in peace
operations forces. This weighting serves to enhance the capacity for protection
and agile defense. Salvo-firing mortar units provide an efficient means of
concentrating firepower in defensive operations. Reconnaissance and
Surveillance platoons, which are equipped with remotely piloted vehicles,
augment the tactical intelligence gathering capacity of the force. The Field
Communication and Liaison teams provide a flexible means of facilitating either
the incorporation of ASEAN units into a member state's field force or inclusion
of member-state units in a force led by an ASEAN field headquarters. Also
noteworthy are the legion's dozen Field Security sections. These are small, two-
vehicle units designed for escort duty and site protection. On the other hand,
Service support units of the Support Command provide field support in several
areas of need: transportation, field supply, maintenance and repair, medical
services, and general services (such as postal, commissary, and kitchen). The
goal guiding the design is a field structure able to sustain an operational force
of 24,000 persons - roughly comparable to two US divisions and also assist in
the support of up to 5,000 civilian operatives.
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ASEAN SECURITY

JAKARTA, REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Monday, May 14, 2007

I remain sir, most respectfully yours,

Syed Muntasir Mamun

Turning and turning in the widening gyre.

Analyzing security is always a complicated issue – especially when it is aimed at

The aim of this paper is thus two-fold:

The paper is essentially descriptive in nature. Starting from a general conceptual

The paper will cover the following points in detail:

Nevertheless, it is important to note that individual sections contain policy references

Changing concept of security – incorporating the human element

The collective security framework

Collective security is a notion of a system by which states have attempted to prevent

The Cold War principle of mutually assured destruction paradoxically provided

Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," The Economist, 18 September 1999, 49

The existing security paradigm – as it shapes ASEAN

(i) China's own stability and prosperity

Institutional structuralism in ASEAN (and East Asia)

Quest for an ASEAN identity

However, even though these “situations” constitute undoubtedly important moments of

From ARF Website

From ARF Website

The ASEAN Security Community

The East Asian institutional structure

The current structure

National Missile Defense Systems, commonly referred to throughout the paper

Theatre Missile Defense Systems, commonly referred to throughout the paper

Finally, despite the presence of a growing number of overlapping structures,

The future of East Asian institutionalism will be influenced by the strength of

Common New Agency, January 23, 2001, Washington, DC

Human security and regional institutionalism

Second, regional institutions must be publicly accountable. They must adopt

Evolution, projection, and evaluation

There should a thee-pronged approach to realize the ASEAN Security Community

Areas Possible Situation in 2030 ASEAN

1. ASEAN security – policy suggestions

Some basic principles of establishment of multilateral security cooperation in

(iii) School-to-school exchange programs could be arranged between ASEAN

(i) Establishment of multilateral security mechanisms under the guide of the

(ii) “Regional Centers of Excellence” can be established (or declared – upon

(i) The ideal process mechanism would be to advance gradually. To establish

On greater economic engagement

The ASEAN Legion

An ASEAN standing force of a Corps size could be envisioned to tackle

i. The formation of a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council as

The concept of "modularization" informs the legion's design. It is organized

Ground combat force mobility would be based on modern variants of wheeled

A variety of combat support elements complements the primary units. To permit

The design includes a relatively high number of special intelligence and

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