Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol.

3, 2002)

Abstract

“How International Diplomacy Failed the People

of East Timor”

It was a Wednesday afternoon and the temperature in Jakarta had reached eighty-
eight degrees. Foreign diplomats were closely scrutinizing the preparations for the
first democratic elections in Indonesia since 1955. That day Information Minister
Yunus Yosfiah announced that Indonesia would offer East Timor independence.
Indonesia watchers were surprised. Foreigners and Indonesians alike concurred on
two points: Firstly, the decision would have terrible humanitarian repercussions
and secondly, little could be done to prevent it. It was feared that self-determination
with such a short lead-in period would not only create a civil war within the island
but an international refugee crisis. Preparations for the worst began to be made
but the question remained, why had President Habibie taken such a disastrous
coarse of action and how was the international community involved?

Denis Dragovic

At the time of writing, Denis Dragovic was a researcher funded by a Newsom

Schlarship at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University. In 2000
he worked throughout East Tmor as a humanitarian aid worker. Any correspondence
on this article would be welcomed at dragovid@hotmail.com
 Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol. 3, 2002)

Introduction
The story of East Timor includes a litany of tragedies that have passed intentionally
ignored or willingly unnoticed by the world throughout its history. Little attention
was given to the East Timorese as they valiantly fought the Japanese during the
Second World War or during their bitter struggle for independence from the
Portuguese or even when up to a third of their population died from famine. And
yet, even with the recent spotlight upon this century’s newest nation, remarkably,
even less attention has been given to the grave diplomatic miscalculations that were
taken in the closing months of 1998. This article closely examines the inaction and
mistakes of governments that led to yet one more underserved tragedy to befall
upon the Timorese people before gaining their independence.

As the Cold War came to a close East Timor was, in effect, re-discovered. Its plight
was brought to the world’s attention in 1991 when television cameras captured
Indonesian soldiers massacring nearly two hundred people mourning at Santa Cruz
cemetery, in East Timor’s capital, Dili. Indonesia, riding the wave of economic
success in Southeast Asia, was desperately trying to make the nineties a decade of
growth, of embracing the world, with aspirations of becoming a voice to be heard
throughout the international community. Instead, she became synonymous with
human rights violations in East Timor. Only after President Soeharto left office in
May 1998, did a real opportunity present itself, to both the people of Indonesia and
East Timor, to peacefully settle the issue of East Timor’s future.

Two distinct opinions emerged on how to approach the delicate question. One
group supported a period of wide-ranging autonomy during which the East
Timorese would acquire skills in government, the Indonesian administrators would
gradually withdraw, and the question of self-determination would be postponed.
Supporters of this approach included most foreign policy experts in both
government service and academia, the East Timorese leadership, influential factions
within the Indonesian government and the governments of Australia and the United
States. The second approach, mainly championed by lobby groups, the media,
democracy activists, the Portuguese government and some members of the United
States Congress, favoured holding a vote as soon as possible. Taking advantage of
the opportunity that had presented itself through Indonesia’s disastrous turmoil,
and allowing the East Timorese people to determine their own future.

Those believing in the ballot-first approach exerted a great deal of pressure.

Working through the media and their elected representatives they gently urged and
forcefully maneuvered the issue onto the agenda of bilateral government, IMF and
World Bank meetings. Unceasingly the pressure flowed, even as President Habibie
was making a remarkable offer of wide-ranging autonomy. At the same time voices
from gradualists, those supporting autonomy, while aware of the calamity that a
ballot held in the near future would bring, were silent, fearing being portrayed as
supporters of the status quo—human rights violations, international isolation and
repression. Few foreign and domestic officials believed that President Habibie
would give in to demands for self-determination. They were wrong. In a
 Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol. 3, 2002)

remarkable success for non-official diplomacy, organized lobbying, bad press,

international condemnation and a treacherous lack of support from like-minded
governments weakened Indonesia’s resolve. In January 1999 President Habibie
made a surprise offer, announcing that Indonesia would interpret a rejection of the
offer of substantial autonomy as a desire for independence. The supporters of self-
determination received more than they had asked for, and the people of East Timor
received less than they deserved. As a result of what effectively amounted to an
offer of independence a mad rush ensued in which pro-integrationist militias, with
everything to gain and nothing to lose, began coercing people onto their side. The
price paid for instant freedom stood at hundreds if not thousands dead1, virtually
the entire population numbering hundreds of thousands transformed overnight into
refugees, millions of dollars of valuable physical and human capital destroyed and
relations in the region strained to near breaking.

In this article I will provide a brief history to East Timor and then focus on the
events leading up to President Habibie’s disastrous announcement that the issue of
East Timor be permanently resolved before the end of the year. This paper
examines the positions taken and the roles played only by the official actors in this
process including the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Administration, and
the Australian government. Focusing on the direct and indirect efforts and in
particular the inaction that partially influenced President Habibie into taking his
fateful decision.

A Brief History
During the second decade of the sixteenth century, Portuguese traders began
colonizing several outposts in the area known as the Lesser Sunda Islands, a group
of islands lying within the Indonesian archipelago between modern day New Guinea
and Bali. The Portuguese along with the Dutch who controlled all of the
surrounding islands established a trade in sandalwood, beeswax, ponies and slaves.
The first signs of resistance to Portuguese dominance began to be seen in the
seventeenth century. The Topasses, descendants of Portuguese soldiers or traders
and local Timorese women, staged rebellions and sieges of towns, challenging the
continual expansion inland by the Portuguese government. At one stage the whole
island of Timor, apart from the western port of Kupang, was under the control of
these “independence” fighters. After the Portuguese loss of Malacca in 1641, the
Dutch began a concerted effort to increase their power in the region. The
Portuguese, already militarily weak and under threat moved their seat of
government in the Lesser Sunda first from Larantuka on the island of Flores to the
safer area of Lifau in the enclave known today as Oecusse and then finally, in 1769,
to the isolated port of Dili. A series of readjustments between the Dutch and
Portuguese borders eventually led to a final demarcation in 1913 which we are
familiar with today.

1
The numbers may never be known as they are dependant upon the fate of East Timorese refugees who
fled to West Timor
 Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol. 3, 2002)

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Portugal, realizing many of its far-flung
territories were under threat by the Great Powers, reinvigorated its interest in
colonies. Timor was granted autonomy as an administrative unit in 1896. Efforts
were made to bring order to the interior by establishing administrative regions
under Portuguese ‘governance’. Though ‘governance’ would be too generous a term
to describe Portugal’s rule over its territory. Describing the situation in the middle
of the nineteenth century a visitor wrote, “The Portuguese government in Timor is a
most miserable one. Nobody seems to care the least about the improvement of the
country, and…after three hundred years of occupation there has not been a mile of
road made beyond the town.” (Wallace 1964) This neglect continued throughout
the remainder of Portugal’s rule. By the mid-nineteen-seventies adult literacy was
estimated to be between 1-5%. Three doctors served a population of over 600,000
and a total of twenty kilometers of paved road had been constructed. (Weatherbee,
6 December, 1966; Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1996)

In Lisbon, 1932 saw the rise of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and his oppressive
regime. Encouraging nationalism at home and colonialism abroad, the government
sent its secret police to stem rising anti-Portuguese national movements in Africa,
India and East Asia. In East Timor secret police terrorized locals and introduced
forced labor. Not long after, with the onset of World War II the invading Japanese
army replaced the Portuguese oppressors. The war years compounded the
Timorese people’s suffering. While under Japanese rule an estimated 40,000 East
Timorese were killed mainly through indiscriminate brutality, and famine through
food expropriation. But in the process the people of East Timor fought gallantly,
earning a formidable reputation among the Australian soldiers who served with
them.

Four years after the Second World War, on 27 December 1949, the newly formed
United States of Indonesia (later to change its name to the Republic of Indonesia)
had Sukarno sworn into office as the country’s first President. The Dutch had lost
control of all but one of their territories in the region, West New Guinea. While
Holland succumbed to independence movements and international pressure to
grant independence to its colonies, the Portuguese simply returned with renewed
vigor. Even the anti-colonialist movements led by young elites educated in Lisbon,
London or Paris who found their voice in other parts of the Portuguese empire did
not take root in East Timor.

Portugal, in its effort to avoid international criticism amended its constitution in

1951 recognizing East Timor as an ‘overseas province,’ thus avoiding the newly
written United Nations Charter’s calls for all former colonies to become ‘non-self-
governing territories’ (the clause accepted only transitory governance by the
colonialist power until self-determination and self-governance was a viable option).
Beginning in December 1960, the United Nations placed the onus upon the
Portuguese government to provide details on the state of affairs in East Timor and
its other colonies because “such information as is otherwise available in regard to
the conditions in these territories gives cause for concern.” (UN General Assembly
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Resolution 1542, 1960) This requirement, a burden to Portugal at the time, later
allowed Lisbon, still a Portuguese dependency according to the UN, to represent
East Timor in its fight for self-determination 39 years later.

Immediately after gaining independence, the newly formed government in Jakarta

called for the last remaining Dutch territory, West New Guinea, to become part of
Indonesia. Fears abounded in Lisbon and Dili that East Timor would be next? In
response to these calls the First Committee of the United Nation’s General Assembly
heard from the Indonesian representative that “Indonesia had no claims on any
territories which had not been part of the former Netherlands East Indies.”
(Indonesian Representative to the United Nations, 1954)

In April 1974 the Armed Forces Movement in Lisbon overthrew Salazar’s successor,
Caetano, in a coup. Their calls were for democracy at home and peaceful
decolonization abroad. Colonies such as Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique
successfully gained their independence from the new regime but were subsequently
racked by civil war. Portuguese Timor, however, saw the outbreak of civil war even
before independence could be achieved.

The new military junta on 17 July 1974 declared that a universal, secret ballot would
be organized in East Timor for October 1976 and after a further two-year period of
guided stewardship Portuguese rule over East Timor would cease. Until the October
elections a High Commissioner appointed by Portugal and five members—two
Portuguese and three East Timorese—would be chosen to govern East Timor.
Meanwhile in East Timor political parties enjoying the new freedom began to form.
Five political parties were created representing a wide spectrum of hope for the future
of East Timor. The first of the two main parties was the Uniao Democratica
Timorense (UDT) advocating a continued relationship with Portugal until some
indeterminate time in the future when sustainable independence was more realistic.
The second was Frente Revolucianara do Timor Leste (Fretilin), a socialist movement
in favor of immediate independence. Three other minor parties were established. Two
supported integration with Indonesia; Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor
(APODETI) believed that East Timor was only a creation of colonial powers and that
the border did not reflect ethnic, cultural or historical realities and Klibur Oan Timur
Aswain (KOTA) supported tribal leadership. The fifth party was the Trabalhista
(Labor Party), which held similar beliefs on this issue to the UDT. Lisbon envisaged
that two of the three East Timorese chosen to help govern East Timor until the 1976
elections would be selected from each of the two main political parties, UDT, Fretilin,
and the third would come from one of the three smaller parties.

In the face of the growing popularity of Fretilin, the UDT chose not to wait until the
elections and instead wrested power from the Portuguese on 11 August 1975. For a
fortnight battles between the two main parties and their supporters raged in Dili
killing an estimated 400 people while the Portuguese soldiers and administrators fled
to nearby Autoro Island. By the end of August Fretilin had successfully driven the UDT
forces out of Dili and towards the Indonesian border along with approximately 40,000
 Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol. 3, 2002)

refugees. Upon reaching the border the UDT leadership was barred by Indonesian
troops from seeking refuge in West Timor unless they signed a petition calling for
immediate integration of East Timor into Indonesia. (Dunn, 1993)

On 28 November 1975, Fretilin, at the time widely perceived as having ties to the
Chinese Communist Party, unilaterally declared independence, gaining assurances of
recognition from 25 mostly Eastern Bloc countries. In the process together with the
UDT’s grab for power, the two acts unraveled any attempts by Portugal to organize a
legitimate process of self-determination in accordance with United Nations principles
of decolonization. The people were divided, many Timorese supported Fretilin, while
others opposed the unilateral act, as did some western government’s whose
overarching concern, above and beyond human rights, or decolonization, was a fear of
the continuing spread of communism. The four remaining political parties released a
joint communiqué three months after Indonesia’s dubious August offer, stating:

“After having been forcibly separated from the strong links of blood, identity,
ethnic and moral culture with the people of Indonesia by the colonial power of
Portugal…

…we therefore solemnly declare the independence and integration of the whole
former colonial Territory of Portuguese Timor with the Republic of Indonesia…

…also urge the Indonesian Government and people to take steps immediately to
protect the lives of the people who now regard themselves as Indonesians.”
(Indonesia’s Representative to the United Nations, 1975)

The self declared independence was to be short lived. On 2 December, Australian Red
Cross delegates were warned by their head office to leave Dili. United States President
Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger flew out of Jakarta on 6 December after,
according to the CIA desk officer in Jakarta, “They came and gave Soeharto the green
light.” (Pilger, 1999) The next day Indonesia invaded East Timor.

The lead up to Habibie’s decision

As communism began to collapse around the world Indonesia’s strategic importance
diminished. No longer was the West forced to turn a blind eye to human rights
violations in order to maintain healthy relations with the anticommunist stalwart,
Indonesia. This new dynamic was first tested in 1991 when Indonesian soldiers
killed nearly 200 mourners in a Dili cemetery. The international reaction was swift
and sharp. Essentially, this was the seminal event for the East Timorese
independence movement. Activists seized this opportunity and lobbied politicians
in their respective countries to take a closer look at East Timor. From this point
forward Indonesia and human rights abuses in East Timor were inextricably linked
together, for better or worse.

With the economy growing rapidly, prosperity reaching many more than ever
before and his family’s wealth continuously accumulating, President Soeharto chose
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platitudes over substance when dealing with East Timor—treading carefully, not
wanting to destabilize his own position or that of his country. But in July 1997 as
Thailand’s newly floated currency plummeted in value, other economies including
Indonesia’s were challenged. In a matter of months Indonesia’s currency collapsed
in value by 86%, businesses closed their doors, debtors defaulted, and people began
to call for Soeharto’s resignation.

On 21 May 1998, under tremendous pressure, President Soeharto left office and was
replaced by his long time deputy, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, the third president of
the Republic of Indonesia. Habibie was a very energetic man who has been
described as impulsive, reactionary, and even, as one senior United States official
put it, “a chipmunk on speed”. Habibie’s impulsive nature became internationally
renowned in 1992 when as the Research and Technology Minister he went against
the wishes of the military and bought the entire East German fleet—a fleet suited to
the cold of the Baltic Sea and not the humidity of the tropics. His reputation was
confirmed when he decided to establish a domestic plane industry that was
subsequently scuttled by the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) demands for
fiscal responsibility.

President Habibie’s ability to surprise resurfaced at a BBC interview in June 1998

when he offered autonomy to the people of East Timor. He proposed that under the
auspices of the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia should meet to discuss the
future status of the province and its people. Indonesia, he said, was offering two
options: wide-ranging autonomy that would be negotiated between Portugal and
Indonesia or the status quo—acceptance of East Timor as Indonesia’s 27th province.
For the next six months efforts were made through the offices of the United Nations
Secretary General to agree upon the details of the autonomy package and the means
of consulting the people.

Pressure by non-government actors including the media, lobbyists and individual

politicians to offer more than “just” autonomy continued to mount upon President
Habibie. At the same time those advocating autonomy were either silent or sending
mixed messages. In this six-month period United States Senate resolutions
supporting self-determination were passed for the very first time since the takeover
over twenty years earlier. Australia, the only western country to have recognized
Indonesia’s annexation, at this most inopportune time changed its policy to that of
supporting self-determination. The international press began to closely examine
and question bilateral exchanges and financial support exacerbating Habibie’s
perception of isolation. Feeling ambushed by those calling for Timorese
independence and betrayed by the silence of like-minded governments who
supported him but only in private. Habibie believed that international pressure
would subside were he to grant self-determination, allowing his government to
continue the crucial reforms that affected the other 26 provinces unimpeded.

On 27th January Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah with Ali Alitas standing
alongside announced Indonesia’s decision to interpret a rejection of autonomy as a
 Published in the JOURNAL OF ASIA PACIFIC AFFAIRS (Vol. 3, 2002)

desire for independence. Were such a result to eventuate the government would
put to the Mejelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), the Indonesian Parliament, a
proposal to allow East Timor independence. The decision was taken with little
consultation and subsequently even less discussion. Even after the announcement,
many were either skeptical as was Jose Ramos Horta who called it a “smokescreen”
(AFP, January 27, 1999) or unsure of the details as was Indonesia’s liberal Foreign
Minister who said, “There is some misinterpretation here. Indonesia does not
intend to discard East Timor, just like that.” (Williams, 4 February 1999) Even
though the delivery of President Habibie’s decision seems impetuous the events
leading up to this decision were anything but circumstantial. The roles that various
players took in influencing this crucial decision are covered below.

While the details of the autonomy package were being agreed upon in Jakarta and
New York the consequences of Habibie’s offer of independence was beginning to be
felt on the ground. Thousands of Indonesians who had over the last twenty years
migrated (some voluntarily but most involuntarily) from other parts of the country
to East Timor began to leave. Most anticipated the destruction while few felt
pressure from pro-independence militias. By mid-1999, one year after Habibie’s
announcement on BBC, there were fewer than 600 teachers left throughout East
Timor most having fled the impending violence, leaving East Timor with an
educational system similar to that left behind by the Portuguese over 25 years
before (Clad, 2000) 2. Rampaging militias were successfully turning the clock back a
quarter of a century to the time of Portuguese rule.

The United Nations

Early in its history the United Nations adopted not only the Trustee territories left over
from the League of Nations but also, in a different category, territories that countries
voluntarily placed under United Nations auspices. These were known as Non-Self
Governing Territories, meaning that only continuing transitory rule would be
acknowledged, entrusting the colonial power with the responsibility of developing
within the territory a capacity for self-governance, but not necessarily independence.
Although many territories throughout the world were placed under this category none
of the Portuguese colonies were at the time, as Portugal had cunningly chosen in 1951
to rename its colonies, “overseas provinces” avoiding toothless criticism from the
community of nations.

In 1960, sponsored by newly independent states, the United Nations General Assembly
passed Resolution 1514, “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples.” This resolution equated self-governance with independence.
It said that, “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” and “immediate steps shall
be taken…to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories.” (UN General

2
The Portuguese left East Timor with 47 elementary schools, 2 middle schools and no colleges.
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Assembly Resolution 1514, 1960) This was directed to many areas still under colonial
rule, including East Timor.

In December 1960 Resolution 1542 was passed declaring that East Timor along with
other Portuguese colonies were Non-Self Governing Territories and Portugal would be
bound at the very least to help them develop a capacity for self-governance. In
subsequent years Portugal was to receive condemnation on numerous occasions from
the international community for its continued non-compliance with UN resolutions
and for its poor treatment of the people of East Timor.

On 12 December 1975, five days after Indonesia’s invasion East Timor reappeared on
the General Assembly’s agenda. The Assembly voted on a resolution calling upon
Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. Although the vote was overwhelmingly in
favor of the resolution Indonesia did gain some crucial support from its neighbors and
important Non-Aligned members.3 Importantly, the United States abstained, thus
signaling the beginning of its non-committal policy of not recognizing Indonesia’s
annexation but at the same time not allowing reality to weaken bilateral relations. In
subsequent votes standing against motions condemning the invasion but still
withholding recognition of the annexation further confused its position. Australia,
initially in 1975 voted in favor of motions condemning the invasion, but abstained for
the next two years and then began voting against the motions in 1978. Regardless of
these two countries’ votes, every year the General Assembly passed resolutions
reaffirming East Timor’s right to self-determination until 1982 at which time it
requested the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with Indonesia and Portugal.

The consultations began with both sides maintaining their positions; the Portuguese
claimed the self-determination process was incomplete and the Indonesians that the
East Timorese had requested intervention and therefore their rule was legitimate.
New initiatives were made including the Portugal-Indonesia Friendship Association
(1993) and the All Inclusive East Timorese Dialogue (1996), a confidence building
measure that sometimes transgressed its terms of reference and became a means of
consulting the East Timorese people on a political solution. After the June 1998
announcement offering autonomy to East Timor the talks took on a more concrete
goal—devising an autonomy package. These negotiations became the focal point for
East Timorese leaders, because in them lay the peaceful future of the East Timorese
people.

The final package designed under the auspices of the then Special Representative of
the Secretary General, Jamsheed Marker, was a substantial document that offered
wide-ranging autonomy to the East Timorese. This document offered East Timor an
unprecedented level of autonomy, including the right to its own flag and an Olympic
team. Compounding Habibie’s dilemma, foreign governments including Australia and
the United States who wanted to see the autonomy package through, were offering

3
Countries voting against resolution were Benin, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines,
Qatar, and Thailand.
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little in terms of practical support. Those calling for independence had succeeded in
their aims of forcing the issue onto the table but in the process they took away the East
Timorese people’s only chance for a peaceful transition by effectively scuttling the
United Nations’ talks.

The offer of independence, though, didn’t make the document obsolete. Foreign
Minister Alitas petitioned Ambassador Marker for an additional three weeks to review
the package before its public release. Indonesia was willing to allow such a far-
reaching document through the special processes of this unique situation involving the
United Nations and Portugal but not as a template for self-determination in other
provinces. Foreign Minister Alitas returned from Jakarta with a new document. The
final document that was agreed upon by the Indonesian government as the autonomy
package that would be offered to the people was a watered down version of the initial
offer, even less palatable to the Timorese. (Marker, 2000)

Internal Indonesian Dynamics

To understand President Habibie’s decision to give East Timor independence we
must look at the surrounding environment of the time. Indonesia in late 1998 was
under immense financial pressure. The international community was not providing
Indonesia the support and credit that was perceived deserved for its turn towards
democracy. The Indonesian government and its people as a whole were focused on
the upcoming June 1999 nationwide elections. This environment helps us
understand why Habibie would see a rebellious province that drained Indonesian
resources, exacerbated Indonesia’s isolation and undermined the legitimacy of the
general election as a burden that would best be set free. It is thought that President
Habibie, after seeing the degree of autonomy being offered in the package and
realizing that without further sweeteners it would not be acceptable to the
Indonesian establishment decided to set the timetable and agenda himself. On 11
February, 1999, President Habibie said, “from January 1, 2000, we don’t want to be
burdened with the East Timor problem.” (Garran, 12 February, 1999) This
statement made it clear that a decision for autonomy would rule out the option of a
vote on self-determination at a later date. He believed that Indonesia had little to
gain by continuing to funnel tens of millions of dollars into the province while it
enjoyed a degree of autonomy that made it effectively independent. Furthermore he
was concerned that other provinces would then demand the same, bringing Jakarta
to its knees. It was a gross mistake that marked a point of no return for those
supporting an extended period of autonomy. It left those who had quietly
supported autonomy, and were once in line with Jakarta, isolated with no option
other than to become actively involved in minimizing the imminent humanitarian
disaster. But the question remains, why did foreign governments do nothing to stop
these events, which led to the irreversible course of action that we saw?

The Domestic Dissenters

Although the military later became inexorably linked to the pro-integration militias,
the extent of their influence over President Habibie during the closing months of
1998 and early 1999 could be surmised to have been minimal simply because of the
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very acrimonious working relationship that had developed over the years. Their
estrangement culminated in Habibie’s claims of an attempted coup in the days
immediately after assuming office. In the barracks the perception was of betrayal.
The military had been fighting Fretilin for nearly two and a half decades suffering
tremendous losses and gaining some successes in the process. The military was
determined not to allow East Timor to become Indonesia’s Vietnam, where
Indonesia’s sons would die fighting an enemy, viewed as communist insurgents,
intent upon undermining the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. They were not
about to bow to international pressure to accept their enemy’s demands for
independence and in the process forget the cause that their fallen comrades had
fought and died for. After the February decision that allowed for a direct vote the
military began sending reports from the ground informing the Habibie government
of a 60% likely vote in favour of autonomy. (Siregar, 2000) Such actions indicate
either a naïveté on the part of the military or a conspicuous effort to mislead Jakarta.

Opposition leaders varied in their stances, Amien Rais, leader of the National
Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), supported a two to three year period
of autonomy, while Ms. Megawati, leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P) was saddened by the
decision to allow a vote on independence. (Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February,
1999) Megawati was the only candidate in the 1999 national vote to visit Dili, a
move that led to the unchallenged interpretation that she shared a desire to keep
East Timor within Indonesia. However, over time her position changed eventually
supporting self-determination while still maintaining her criticism of President
Habibie for pursuing it, believing that at the time he did not hold the political
legitimacy for such an act.

For other politicians the issue was more complex than simply whether or not East
Timorese deserved the right to self-determination. The question of constitutionality
arose. On 31 May 1976 the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) approved the
integration of East Timor into Indonesia and therefore according to the constitution
it was only the MPR who could renounce this directive. The President does not have
the right to override a directive made by the MPR, which in some eyes was seen as
exactly what President Habibie had subtly done. In early May the PDI-P vice
chairman, Dimyati Hartono, threatened that the party would not accept the
proposed ballot on East Timor's future because Dr Habibie, regarded as a
transitional leader, should not have tried to force the MPR to overturn the decision
made by the 1976 parliament which incorporated East Timor into Indonesia. But
Habibie knew that a vote on independence under the close scrutiny of the
international community and the Indonesian people would not be rejected by the
MPR.
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External Pressures

United States
Since 1976 the United States had been walking a very fine line, balancing the strategic
importance of Indonesia as a bastion against communism without legitimizing or
encouraging Indonesia’s annexation and subsequent numerous crackdowns. Although
practically acknowledging the incorporation of East Timor within Indonesia the
United States also recognized that the due process outlined by Portugal and the United
Nations for self-determination had not been undertaken. As the Berlin Wall fell the
pragmatic need to turn a blind eye at the poor human rights record of the Indonesian
government receded, but it did not disappear. Although Indonesia was no longer a
stalwart against communism it nonetheless continued to play a vital role as a regional
ally. She was becoming an important regional economic power practicing a moderate
style of Islam with which the US was comfortable. Throughout Soeharto’s regime the
United States continued to withhold recognition of Indonesia’s annexation of East
Timor. Although noting human rights violations in the province it fell short of
pursuing them with any vigor. The issue of East Timor had become a monkey on the
backs of both countries looking to strengthen their relationship. President Habibie’s
accession in 1998 and his offer of autonomy presented an opportunity to remove the
impediment to improved relations.

In bilateral meetings the United States continued to emphasize to Habibie the

importance of the tripartite talks, believing that they would be the best method
through which a conclusion could be reached, but never actually outlining what
conclusion would be preferred. At no point did the United States officially support
self-determination. Even after Habibie’s offer of independence in early February the
official US policy was to continue supporting the UN brokered talks on autonomy
while separately praising President Habibie’s generous offer on independence but
without ever linking the two. The State Department saw the United Nations talks as
a vital factor in creating a peaceful transition in East Timor. In particular there was
strong support for a lengthy period of autonomy. Regrettably though, as events
unfolded and the likelihood of a period of autonomy diminished, little was done to
change the newly developing disastrous course.

United States Congress

For the first fifteen years all of Washington was quiet on the issue of East Timor
apart from a few isolated voices. Not until the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 did
human rights abuses and Indonesia become inseparable. The two had become so
inextricably intertwined that when meetings were scheduled to discuss Indonesia,
staffers on Capitol Hill, in anticipation of East Timorese issues hijacking the meeting,
would schedule another second meeting to discuss East Timor separately.

After the Santa Cruz massacre Congress actively advocated taking action to restrict
Indonesia’s free hand in East Timor. In 1992 Congress banned the use of public
funds for training Indonesian soldiers through the International Military Education
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and Training Program (IMET); in 1994 it prohibited the use of US military

equipment in East Timor; and in 1997 it began questioning the Pentagon’s Joint
Combined Exchange Program (JCET). Ever since, Indonesia has been fighting an
uphill battle in the United States Congress hampered by a lack of a strong domestic
constituency or lobby group. The Washington bureau chief of the respected
Indonesian magazine, Tempo, suggested, “the fact that Indonesia is the largest
Muslim country in the world, non-aligned, and fairly pro-Palestine makes it less
popular in Congress than other countries.” (Wu, 1994)

The strongest voices raised on behalf of East Timor in opposition to continued

cooperation with Jakarta were those who criticized Indonesia’s human rights
record, the most prominent being Representatives Chris Smith, a Democrat from
New Jersey, and Patrick Kennedy, a Democrat from Rhode Island. Most prominent
in opposing this argument was Republican Congressman Bereuter from Nebraska.
He did not want the US to focus so heavily on the plight of the eight hundred
thousand East Timorese at the expense of over two hundred million Indonesians.
He believed that little would be accomplished were democracy brought to East
Timor but lost in Indonesia.

For over twenty years no voices were heard from the halls of Congress calling for
East Timor’s right to self-determination. It wasn’t until mid-1998 in a resolution
sponsored by Senator Feingold, which passed unanimously on 10 July that the issue
of self-determination was first considered. For the first time through Resolution 237
the Senate expressed support for East Timor’s claims to independence. In the
process it undermined the United Nations’ efforts to bring a negotiated transition to
the territory. Importantly, though, this new stance came at a precarious time, just as
President Habibie had announced the offer of autonomy. To many Indonesians it
seemed as if Congress could never be satisfied. Not a word was said in support of
President Habibie’s offer of autonomy to the East Timorese. Instead criticisms
emanating from Capitol Hill increased after Habibie’s offer, Congress continued to
recite in every resolution the history of Indonesia’s mismanaged rule of East Timor.
Throughout this period Congressmen chose to ignore the Tripartite Talks that were
working on an autonomy package, and failed to provide President Habibie the
support that he and the East Timorese so badly needed to see the negotiations
through. Human rights became the tail wagging the Indonesian dog.

The Pentagon
The Pentagon persistently supported continuing cooperation with Indonesia
believing that open channels of communication would provide greater leverage than
threats or sanctions. In pursuing this belief the Pentagon initiated IMET bringing
Indonesian military personnel to the United States for training. After the 1991
Santa Cruz massacre, Congress banned spending taxpayers’ dollars on the IMET
program because of an apparent link between IMET graduates and leaders of the
Santa Cruz massacre. The Pentagon circumvented this decision by allowing
Indonesia to pay for IMET and by introducing JCET. This program allowed US
soldiers to train alongside Indonesian troops in urban warfare, psychological
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operations and sniper techniques, skills that were later to be used to devastating
effect (Hamre, 1999).

Australia
Australia’s association with East Timor has lacked the consistency that would
emerge apparent were the relationship built around a common understanding or
mutual aims. Instead, the inconsistency and numerous changes in policy suggest
external driving forces determining the shape and nature of the relationship. In
reaction to the Japanese invasion a “mateship” with the Timorese was formed, the
Cold War and American pressures led Australia to forgo these ties in favor of a
stronger relationship with Indonesia. More recently, with no external force driving
a decision an ambiguity and lack of direction in policy became apparent.

In 1975, shortly after Indonesia’s invasion, Australia along with the vast majority of
nations condemned Indonesia’s actions at the United Nations General Assembly. It
was the belief of the caretaker government of Prime Minister Fraser that a return to
the path of self-determination was needed. The moral high ground initially taken
was quickly lost in the following years. Australia’s official policy began to change in
large part because of strong pressure from within Cabinet, the Department of
Foreign Affairs and from external sources including the U.S. State Department, the
latter fearing a rupture of relations between two politically and strategically
important partners. After abstaining from two votes in the United Nations General
Assembly (1976 and 1977), Australia under the leadership of Prime Minister Frazer
announced in January 1978 that it recognized East Timor as the 27th province
within Indonesia.

As Soeharto’s rule fell and Habibie announced Indonesia’s offer of autonomy

Australia played a “wait and see game.” But in a confusing December 1998 letter
widely believed to have been the final straw for President Habibie, Prime Minister
Howard urged Indonesia to rethink its approach to East Timor. He argued that
Indonesia’s standing in the international community would rise if it rid itself of the
East Timor irritant, suggesting an autonomy package with a built in review
mechanism which “avoids an early and final decision on the future status of the
province”. But creating confusion Howard wrote, “Australia’s support for
Indonesia’s sovereignty is unchanged. It has been a longstanding Australian
position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia and East Timor are best served by
East Timor remaining part of Indonesia.” (Howard, 1999) Habibie, contrary to
revisionist perspectives, reacted negatively to the letter “which did not take into
account Indonesian sensitivities”, vigorously scribbling notes on the margins and in
exasperation deciding upon a fateful course towards independence. (Masters, 2000)
On 12 January Australia announced to the public its recent policy shift calling for
self-determination after a “substantial period of autonomy.” The following day
Foreign Minister Downer cited the former French territory of New Caledonia and
the associated Matignon Accords that allowed for a ten-year period of autonomy as
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a possible template. Jakarta perceived this policy shift, along with Prime Minister
Howard’s letter, as a betrayal by a close friend.

Those familiar with Indonesia’s political court are aware of machinations

Machiavellian enough to rival any other in the world. To record just one example,
after the Santa Cruz massacre many suspected that the event was intentionally
bungled by the military to embarrass and undermine Soeharto at a time when the
President was distancing the ruling Golkar faction from the military. The lives of the
East Timorese who died in the cemetery were simply collateral damage to the
would-be king makers. Understanding Indonesia’s unique political culture is crucial
when choosing the diplomatic strategy to be adopted. At a time when several
groups were maneuvering behind Habibie’s back, other areas on the archipelago
were becoming restless, the financial crisis that had devalued the Indonesian
currency by 86% had not yet shown signs of recovery, the best that Australia
offered to Habibie to take back with him to the Cabinet rooms and convince those
opposed to autonomy was a contradictory letter and an offer of sending someone to
“discuss them [the suggestions] with you” (Howard, 1999). It is clear that some
foreign affairs advisers were counting their eggs before they had hatched. At a time
when strong and clear messages of recognition for the numerous successes of the
Habibie presidency were needed and when concrete commitments of practical
support should have been attached to any “suggestions” on the future of East Timor,
the Australian government appeared uncommitted and as seen from Indonesia
shores, began arrogantly lecturing from the sidelines. Its hollow new public policy
implicitly gave support to an independent East Timor, while privately the subtle
message gleamed from the Prime Minister’s letter and other avenues indicated to
the Indonesian leadership that Australia didn’t want to see East Timor on its own.

What drove Australia’s change in policy has not yet become clear. According to
some reports the Australian government changed its position after a “low-key
review by one division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade with no
outside advice or formal input from other departments.”(Cleary, 1999) At the time
there wasn’t the slightest indication of the type of domestic pressure including
street protests, boycotts and blanket media coverage that later came to bear upon
the government. The decision was not made in Cabinet nor was there a consultation
period for parliament or the public to discuss the issue. The enormous potential
repercussions of the decision should have warranted a broader and more inclusive
dialogue.

Even after President Habibie’s February offer of independence, Prime Minister

Howard warned that independence for East Timor would lead to civil strife. Adding
that Australia would “encourage the East Timorese and the Indonesians to examine
very hard and think very hard as to whether some basis of a continuing association
through autonomy within the Indonesia state might not be chosen in preference to
full independence”(Garran, 12 February, 1999). But still little of substance was
being offered, no alternative plan of action was being offered, only words of wisdom
were being heard from across the Timor Sea. Even at this late stage, Howard was
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ignorant to how his government’s lack of practical support for its verbal gestations
was being interpreted.

Australia, having pursued a consistent policy towards Indonesia with regards to East
Timor over the previous 20 years became weak at the knees. It acted impetuously,
compounding the very precarious situation that President Habibie was in and
inadvertently pressuring Habibie to make the fateful decision. Australia’s foreign
policy shift betrayed the East Timorese, Indonesia and its own goals—an autonomous
East Timor and good relations with Jakarta—by helping to initiate a process that led
to a situation ten months later where Prime Minister Howard’s prediction of civil strife
following a successful independence ballot became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Conclusion
During the tumultuous closing months of 1998 it was becoming clear to those
following the events closely that, as each day passed, and each new opportunity for
a peaceful transition was missed, East Timor was nearing outright civil war. The
new Habibie government, with a number of substantial and vital early successes
under its belt, could not risk angering powerful political opponents or alienating
allies on an issue that at best would be ignored by the Indonesian people or, at
worst, spark a military revolt and undermine all the positive democratic reforms
that had been implemented to date. The governments of Australia and the United
States recognized this but failed to back their understanding with concrete support,
instead offering only words of advice. Little was done to secure the future of the
official United Nations Tripartite Talks, which would have been more favorable to all
concerned. President Habibie’s concerns and of those who were undermining
moves towards autonomy could have been allayed at much less cost of lives,
material well being and diplomatic goodwill, than the price that was to be paid.

The diplomacy leading to Indonesia’s offer for a vote on independence is a

dangerous example of how a carefully orchestrated plan that would have brought a
stable and gradual transition can be derailed at great cost to human life, capital and
goodwill. The United Nations sponsored talks were on track to deliver an
agreement that would have seen East Timor achieve an unprecedented level of
autonomy. The Indonesian administrators would have gradually withdrawn leaving
in their place trained East Timorese people ready to govern their autonomous
territory and prepare the province and its people for independence. Instead we saw
self-serving actions by lobbyists, crusading politicians and departments destabilize
the situation by pursuing their independent agendas. President Habibie already
under international pressure, seeing the wide-ranging autonomy package agreed to
by his Foreign Minister and understanding the long term repercussions of the
package, weighed the pros and cons and found few of the former and many of the
latter. Indonesia, and President Habibie himself, throughout this period received
little international acclaim, practical support or encouragement to pursue a wide-
ranging autonomy plan, and instead faced increasing domestic and international
criticism. With little domestic support and even less international support for his
wide-ranging autonomy plan President Habibie, understandably, decided to cut his
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and Indonesia’s losses, and offered a vote on independence triggering the all too
familiar humanitarian disaster that shocked the world.

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