NOTES IN POLITICAL LAW (For 2019 BAR)

Jose Edmund E. Guillen, LL.B, LL.M

1. The national baseline laws (RA 9522, March 2009) is not a mechanism to determine the
territories of the Philippines.

- It does not reduce the territories of the Philippines under Article 1.

- It is only a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf under the UNCLOS III (Ratified Feb. 27, 1984)

- Regime of Islands, UNCLOS, Art 121, are islands that are maternally formed areas of
land, surrounded by water, which are above water at high tide. This principle forces
claimant states to maintain peace in the area, because no one country can claim
exclusive ownership of any of these islands.

- Islands, above-water at high tide, capable of sustaining human habitation. It can

generate territorial sea, EEZ

- Rocks- which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Only Territorial sea.

- LTEs and submerged banks don’t generate any maritime entitlements.

2. Joint Venture Agreement with China for exploration and development of marine
resources in the West Philippine Sea which is within the EEZ of the Philippine.
Constitutional?

a) Art. XII, Sec. 2 – exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall
be undertaken
i. Directly by the state

ii. Co – production, joint venture or production sharing with Filipino Citizens

or 60% Filipino Owned Corporation

b) Foreign – owned Corporation – technical or financial assistance for large scale

exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

c) IDEAL vs Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM),

Oct. 9, 2012, the court ruled that the sale of Angat Hydro – Electric Power Plant
(AHEPP) to a foreign corporation pursuant to the privatization mandated by RA 9136
or EPIRA of 2001, does not violate SEC. 2, ART XII.

However, it must be made clear in Operations and Maintenance Agreement that the water
rights shall remain with NPC and cannot be transferred to foreign corporation. NPA shall
continue to hold the water permit even as the operational control and day – to – day
management of AHEPP is in the hands of K-Water (Korean Corporation).

3. Immunity from Suit.

Once there’s express consent (GOCC, LGUs, Chartered entities), it is irrelevant whether
it performs governmental or propriety functions. It is suable.

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 - If unincorporated, then determine the function for which the office is being sued. If
governmental then cannot be sued without its consent.

i. However, Art 3038 is a form of express consent. The government consents

to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between
private parties.

ii. DA vs NLRC, Nov. 11, 1993, Contract for security services entered into
by DA. DA is suable even if unincorporated and performing governmental
functions

iii. But even if there’s already final decision by the court, the liquidated
monetary claim must be filed first before COA. COA has the primary
jurisdiction for the approval of monetary claim.

- The scope of express consent of GOCC is up to execution of judgment.

- Although LGUs are chartered, the scope of consent found in their charters is only up
to the finality of decision. Another consent is needed in the form if an appropriation
ordinance.

i. Mandamus generally cannot lie to compel the Sanggunian to pass an

appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy an adverse decision against the
LGU.

ii. However, if there’s an available fund and the Sanggunian has no valid
reason for their refusal, then mandamus can be availed of.

4. Eminent Domain

- Taking should not be momentary period only, and need not be complete deprivation
of property. It is enough that there’s imposition of additional burden or right of way.

- There’s taking even in voluntary offer to sell under the CARP (Hacienda Luisita, Inc.
vs. PARC)

i. Government leased the piece of land in 1993 by virtue of a 10 – year

contract of lease. In 2003, the government filed an expropriation
proceeding over the same parcel of land. When is the date of taking? 2003.
That’s also the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.

- If only a portion of the property is taken, Just Compensation includes not only the
market value but also the consequential damages, if there’s still one after deduction of
consequential benefits.

- The 20% tax discount granted in favor of senior citizens is an exercise of police
power, not power of imminent domain. It is similar to price regulation and rate of
return on investment control laws which protect consumers from oppressive pricing
systems (Manila Memorial Park, et al. vs Sec. of DSWD et al., Dec. 3, 2013).

- However, the tax credit given to commercial establishments (RA9527) for discount
enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 (Senior Citizen Act) is a form of just

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 compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. (Com. of BIR vs.
Central Luzon Drug. Corp., June 26, 2006).

- The decision of the PARAD need not be appealed to the DARAB Central. But if
appealed to the DARAB and one still wants to question it before the RTC, then it
must be thru petition for determination of just compensation not thru notice of appeal.
But the petition must be filed within 15 days from the time the would be appellant
received the decision of the DARAB. It made beyond 15 days the decision already
became final and executory.

- In agrarian cases, payment of just compensation through a “trust account” opened by

LBP was declared invalid. However, even if the landowner rejects the valuation made
by Landbank of the Philippines, he can still withdraw the amount deposited in the
subject trust account. To rule otherwise is oppressive exercise of eminent domain
considering that the LO is already deprived of possession of his land.

- If there’s delay in the payment of just compensation, the interest is 12% per annum
until June 30, 2013. After that, it is 6% per annum.

- No recovery of property in case of non – payment of just compensation, only case to

compel payment plus interest. Except in Vicente Lim case applies – lapse of 51 years.

WRIT OF POSSESSION : COMPARISON

Rule 67, Sec. 2; Local Government Code RA 8974

- Complaint filed,
- Due notice to LO
- Deposit of assessed
value as stated in Tax
Dec.
15% of the fair market Value
as stated in the Tax Dec.
upon filing of expropriation
proceedings.
100% of the value of the
property based on the
current relevant zonal of
BIR upon filing of the
complaint
RA 10752 – Right of Way
Act

- Right to repurchase expropriated property once the specified purpose is ended or

abandoned, is not automated. It still depends on the character of the expropriation.

i.e. there’s a condition that once the public purpose has ended or abandoned, the
property will revert back to the public to the landowner (Mactan – Cebu vs. CA, Nov.
27, 2000).

i. The above does not apply if the mode of transfer is sale to the government.

- Sec. 17, Art. XII, temporary takeover of public utility

i. President must be granted emergency powers
ii. Temporary and only for a limited period
iii. Required by public interest
iv. Under reasonable terms
v. Privately owned public utility or business

This is an exercise of police power, so there’s no payment of just compensation.

(Lopez vs. PIATCO, May 5, 2003; David vs. Arroyo)

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 - Sec. 18, Art. XII, on the other hand, in an eminent domain power
i. Interest of national welfare or defense
ii. Permanent takeover, transfer of ownership
iii. Payment of just compensation
iv. Vital industries

2. Provision that support the principle that civilian authority is supreme over military

3. The nuclear free provision is not absolute. “Consistent with the national interest” can be
determined by the President and Congress. President is the Chief Architect of foreign
policy.

4. ICC withdrawal without the participation of Congress. It is within the broad power of the
President as Chief Architect of foreign policy. No provision in the constitution that
requires Senate concurrence in withdrawing from a treaty.

- Treaty, once ratified is transformed into a domestic law. Any repeal or withdrawal
can only be done through majority of quorum.

- President is mandated to faithfully execute the laws and make sure that all laws are
faithfully followed. He has no power to repeal or not implement it.

- Pacta Sunt Servanda- Party to a treaty in obliged to comply with the provisions of the
treaty in good faith.

5. Art II, Sec 12 – “Sanctity of Family Life… equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.”

- Framers intended for “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.

- No intention to ban all contraception for being unconstitutional, only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.

-  The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes
that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to
protect it.

- Redefining the meaning of abortifacient by the term “primarily” is invalid.

Abortifacient are those that primarily induce abortion or destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb. This violates Sec. 12 that includes the definition in the IRR
(Sec. 3.01(j) (Imbong vs. Ochoa, April 8, 2014).

- The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment
Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control

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 program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary
to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

- Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to

immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on
religious or ethical beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary to Section 29(2),
Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

- The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and

hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers
to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections
7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the freedom of religion. While penalties may be
imposed by law to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must
prevail over the effective implementation of the law. 

- Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24
of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible
distinction between public health officers and their private counterparts. In addition,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protection of this
freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the government.

- Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit
the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the
life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted
provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain to life-threatening cases.

- The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive
means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other
secular steps to ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365
(The Population Act of the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).

- WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring

would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend
a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition

- NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar

on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without the intervention of the State.

- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the right to privacy (marital privacy and
autonomy)

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- YES. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with
only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social
institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State
to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families
or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

- The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is

already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-
family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of
minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what
is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

- However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject
the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.

- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the due process clause

- NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

- The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The
“private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to “private health care service provider.”

- The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.

- The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to

Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

- Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is

unconstitutional for violating the prohibition against involuntary servitude

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 - NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government
health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the
State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty
is imposed should they do otherwise.

- However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

6. Election of Officers – the the constitution is silent as to how the other officers of the
senate and HOR will be elected i.e. minority leader. Political question as to the process or
rules of selecting these officers. (Baguilat vs. Alvarez, July 25, 2017)

7. The process of amending the constitution through initiative and referendum is subject to
judicial review if there’s grave abuse of discretion (Lambino vs. Comelec)

8. Repeal of a national law or passage of a law through initiative and referendum cannot be
vetoed by the President.

9. Residence is identical with domicile. Be careful in determining change of residence. It

must be clearly shown that he abandons his domicile of origin and he intends to
permanently reside in the new address. (Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)
- If there is no change of residence, determine if there is still animus revertendi.

10. The start of term, June 30, may be changed by Congress. The same is true with the date
of election, 2nd Monday of May.

11. Voluntary renunciation of office is not an interruption. Be mindful if the term is 6 years,
and he is appointed to the executive branch. He cannot run within the period of his term,
even though he resigns from his position in the executive.

12. Parameters set in the case of Atong Paglaum.

1) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a) national parties or
organizations, (b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or
organization.

2) National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.

3) Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

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 4) Sectoral Parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented”
lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth.

5) A majority of the members of sectoral party or organizations that represent the

“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of the sectoral parties or
organization that they represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that
represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong
to their respective sectors; or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona fide members of such parties or organization.

6) National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

- Two percent thresholds is no longer mandatory.

- Not limited to marginalized and underprivileged sectors.

13. Vacancy during the term that can validly trigger special election. Senate, at least 18
months before next election and 12 months for HR. If congress is in session, senate or
HR will pass a resolution. If not in session, Senate President or Speaker will write to
COMELEC.

14. Effectivity of increase in salary of the members of the Congress will be upon expiration
of the terms of members of Senate who took part in the passage of the law that made
possible the increase.

15. Immunity from arrest – whether or not Congress is in session is relevant only if the
imposable penalty is not more than 6 years. If more than 6 years immunity from arrest is
not applicable.
- There is a difference between the validity of the issuance of the arrest by the MCTC,
MTC, MTCC and the enforceability of the warrant. The latter is covered by the
immunity provision.

16. Reapportionment – the 250,000 requirement for population applies only to cities. It is not
required in the second legislative district once there is a division into two districts.
(Aquino vs. COMELEC)
- Law creating legislative district does not require a plebiscite for its effectivity.
(Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC)

- Exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. Regional Assembly cannot create legislative

district even though granted authority by Congress. The grant is unconstitutional.
(Sema Case)

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 - Reapportionment in connection with the three term-limit. There is a creation of new
legislative district or new district in the province. Can the incumbent run in the newly
created district if it was created during his second or third term? (Naval vs. Comelec,
July 8, 2014)

17. Parliamentary Immunity- Antero Pobre vs. Santiago

No matter how disrespectful the speech and language, immunity still applies as long as
made during privilege speech or committee hearings and floor deliberations.

- But Senator Santiago can still be disciplined by her fellow senators by 2/3 votes of all
its members on the ground of disorderly behavior. “Of all its members” refers to all
the elected and sitting members regardless of whether or not they are present during
the session. The same determination with the votes of the senate in the impeachment
trial.

- Differentiate the above from the suspension imposed by the Sandiganbayan for 90
days for violation of RA 3019 or plunder law for acts committed before he was
elected to Congress. (Santiago vs. COMELEC)

- RA 3019 or Plunder Law requires only a validly filed information, The suspension
here is preventive in nature.

Sec. 16 (3) is punitive in nature and requires 2/3 votes of all its members. This is for
acts committed while being a member of Congress.

18. Incompatible Office for Congress – only refers to offices “in the government.” Not
prohibited to hold offices in the private sector during weekends and holidays.
“Hold” – refers to permanent appointment or temporary designation or membership in ad
hoc committees under the executive branch or judiciary. Exception here is, if allowed by
the constitution.

19. For Pres. VP, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants, the only exception is
if provided by the constitution. (Sec. 13, Article VII).

- For other appointive officials, the exceptions are a) provided by law, b) allowed by
the primary functions of his office (Sec. 7, Art. IX – B)

20. Prohibited Office- prohibition lasts only during the term when the office was created or
the emolument increased. The next term is not covered.

- Prohibition does not apply if the increase in salary applies to all offices. i.e. salary
standardization law.

21. Quorum – Basis for determining it will be the number of those who are members of the
HR and Senate but within the territory of the Philippines. It will not include those who
are outside the Philippines.
It is different from “majority of all the members” or “2/3 of all the members” which is
based on all the elected members present or outside the Philippines.

22. Conflict between the journal and the enrolled bill—enrolled bill will prevail except those
matters which are required by the constitution to entered in the journal.

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23. Electoral Tribunal – the composition, proceeding and decisions of the electoral tribunal
are subject to judicial review once there is grave abuse of discretion. Take note of the
valid ground by which you can be replaced as member of the tribunal: death permanent
disability, defeated in the election, change of party.

- Who to sit in the tribunal under the parameters of proportional representation is solely
determined by the Speaker of the HR or Senate President. This can be within the
scope of political question.

- Determination of jurisdiction of tribunal in election contest:

a. Validly proclaimed
b. Taken oath
c. Assumed office (Ongsiako – Reyes vs. COMELEC)

- As long as the three requisites are present, the tribunal has jurisdiction even over
party-list representative (Jovito Palparan Case). It does not matter how a member is
elected – in the legislative district or party – list election.

24. Commission on appointment – relate with Art VII, Sec. 16 as to who are those required
to be confirmed by CA.

“… and other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Constitution” refers
to those officials whose appointments are stated in the Constitution, such as regular
members of JBC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President for three
consecutive election after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

25. Investigation in aid of Legislation-

a) In aid of legislation
b) In accordance with duly published rules
c) Rights of person appearing during the investigation must be respected

- It is not required that upon the start of the investigation there is already a draft of the
bill or amendments to be proposed. The court cannot review on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion as to whether or not the investigation is in aid of legislation.
Bengzon vs. SBRC case is not controlling, or not the general rule.

- The rules must be published every 3 years, when the membership of the Senate and
HR changes.

- It is not sufficient that the rules will be published online. However, if there’s a
provision in the adoption of the rules that it shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed, then the rules can be deemed effective beyond the senate that
adopted it.

- Once the Congress (18th, 19th) adjourns after the last session day of the 3rd regular
session, the investigation is considered terminated. Although Senate as an institution
is a continuing body, its day to day functions, such as committee hearings,
investigations and deliberations are not. They are deemed terminated upon
adjournment. (Neri vs. Senate ; Romero II vs. Estrada)

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 - The detention of a person declared in contempt by the senate is terminated in two
ways.

a) When the committee report is approved or disapproved by the plenary

b) Upon expiration of one (1) Congress, (after three regular sessions when Congress
expires) (Balag vs. Senate of the Phils., July 3, 2018)

- Mere filing or pendency of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or

a quasi- judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry.
Sub- judice rule is not violated if the investigation will proceed so long as the rights
of the resource persons are respected.

- The right of Congress to know through legislative inquiry is not identical with the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern. (Neri vs. Senate
Committees)

- Generally, the right to privacy, being claimed by a private bank over ordinary
financial transactions cannot prevail over the right of the people to access information
on matters of public concern. (Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate committee on
Bank; Miguel vs. Gordon)

- A valid claim of executive privilege may limit what Congress can know in a
legislative inquiry. Executive privilege however depends on the kind of information
being asked by congress NOT on the position of public official being summoned to
appear. That’s why Section 2B and 3 of E.O. 464 is unconstitutional.

- Know, therefore what are those information which are privilege. Section 2A of E.O.
464.

- Executive privilege when property claimed is available in Sec. 21 and 22.

- Legislative inquiry conducted on the law that created the JDF with the objective of
amending the law and improving the provision that would ensure transparency and
accountability. Congress, thru its committee invited the court administrator. Will this
violate the judiciary’s independence and fiscal’s autonomy?

- Senate Committee on Electoral Reforms, invited a general and a colonel to appear

during its investigation in connection with the cheating and irregularities committed
during the last Presidential Election. The President as Commander-in-Chief ordered
the military men not to appear for it may affect national security. (Gudani vs. Senga)
How to resolve if there’s a deadlock?

26. Question Hour – if the ones being summoned by Congress are the heads of executive
departments (Secretaries of DND, DOT, DOF), it does not necessarily follow that the
inquiry is a question hour. You still need to find out from the facts if it is question hour or
investigation in aid of legislation. If the fact is silent, then qualify it in your answer.

- Question Hour is basically an exercise of oversight function of Congress. Other ways

of validly exercising oversight are appropriations hearing, investigation in aid of
legislation, and to some extent, confirmation hearing in the CA.

- Question Hour requires the consent of the Present, which said consent is not required
in investigation in aid of legislation. Thus, even the person invited is a cabinet

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 secretary he cannot simply refuse to appear on the ground that he has no consent from
the President if it is under Sec.21, Art VI. He must appear but during the inquiry, he
can refuse to answer the questions if the kind of information being asked is covered
by executive privilege. The President should claim the executive privilege for the said
Cabinet Secretary (Neri Case) and only he can claim it.

27. Origin Clause – this refers to the bill, not the law subsequently passed. As long as the bill
filed in the HR first, and the HR acted on it, even though there is also an anticipatory bill
filed before the Senate, the provision is not violated. As long as the committee hearing in
the Senate is conducted only after the receipt of the House version.

- Even if the law passed is the complete version of the Senate, there is no violation of
this provision because the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Amendment by substitution is allowed by the Constitution.

28. Three Reading Rule – what is the exception that will make possible the 3 readings in one
day?

- Certification of the President as to the urgency of the bill is grounded on public

calamity and emergency. However, the Supreme Court declared in Tolentino vs Sec.
of Finance, that “growing budget deficit” can be an acceptable ground. So other
grounds may be considered by analogy.

- The bicameral conference committee may propose an entirely new provision, even
several provisions, referred to as “an amendment in the nature of a substitute.”

29. General Rule: partial veto is not allowed except in appropriations, revenue and tariff
bills.

- In allowable partial veto, only an item not a provision can be vetoed, except if the
provision is inappropriate.(The Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision) The provision is
inappropriate if it is:

a) Rider
b) It is unconstitutional
c) It collaterally amends another law
d) It has the effect of blocking or preventing the action of the executive branch for
matters which are mandated already by law.

30. Transfer of funds “within their respective offices” – for example within the executive
department. It requires that the realignment of funds must be to an existing project funded
under the GAA. If the project is not funded in the GAA, funds cannot be transferred to
them. The transfer will be unconstitutional. (Araullo vs. Aquino)

31. “Appropriation made by law” requires two elements:

1) Set apart determinate or determinable amount of money;

2) Allocates the same for a particular purpose. All post- enactment measures that are
necessary for the implementation or enforcement of the appropriation made by
Congress are considered intermediate appropriations which are not constitutional
because they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed. For this
reason the 2013 PDAF article does not constitute “Appropriation made by law.”

12
 - The power to appropriate cannot be delegated to individual legislator. It violates non-
delegability principle. (Belgica et al. vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19, 2013)

32. In the case of Belgica vs. Ochoa, the SC did not apply res judicata inspite of its previous
decision upholding the validity of the CDF (Philconsa) and PDAF as enacted in the
GAA. There was no identity in subject matter. Previous cases only involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF and 2004 PDAF articles in the GAA,
while the instant cases call for a more expansive review of the entire Pork Barrel System.

33. Congressional Pork Barrel in the 2013 PDAF Article. These are the violations:

a) The Principle of Separation of Power

b) The Principle of non-delegability of Legislative Power
c) Deprives the President of the exercise of his prerogative of item-veto, impairs the
system of checks and balances
d) Post-enactment features dilute Congressional oversight and violate Sec 14, Art. VI of
the Constitution (cannot intervene in any matter before any office)
e) Individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and subvert
genuine local autonomy

34. Presidential Pork Barrel- is limited to Malampaya funds and the President Social Fund.
Malampaya Funds – Sec. 8 P.D. 910 which provides “and for such other purpose as
maybe hereafter directed by the President” – invalid delegation of legislation power.

Sec. 12 of PD 1869- Presidential Social Fund (PSF) may be used:

1) “to finance the priority infrastructure development project;”
2) “to finance the restoration of damaged and destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President”

The second use of the PSF is a valid delegation.

35. An act increasing the vote requirement for the amendment and repeal of laws to 2/3 vote
of all members of Congress voting separately. Constitutional?
i. Unconstitutional. Majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business.
- An act requiring that the commission on appointments shall only reject a nominee of
the President by 2/3 votes of those present during the deliberations. Constitutional?
- The grant of emergency powers to the President contains the following conditions:
a) For limited period
b) That if not withdrawn by Congress, it shall terminate on the last session day of the
present session of Congress. Constitutional?

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

36. PET – is the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualification of
President and Vice President

- Can be through election protest or quo warranto

- Comes into play only after the President and Vice President had been elected and
proclaimed.
- Election protest 30 days, quo warranto within 10 days after the proclamation (Poe-
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC)

37. Domicile –

13
 3 types:
a) Origin – acquired at birth
b) Choice – the one chosen after abandoning the old domicile
c) By operation of law – which the law assigns to an individual independently of his
intention. Only one domicile at any given time.

- Acquisition for new domicile.

Requisites:
1) Actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2) Bona fide intention of abandoning the former place or residence
3) Establishing a new one and definite act which correspond with the purpose.

- Can be considered a resident even before the granting of dual citizenship or the
cancelation of his foreign citizenship or foreign visa.

- However, re-acquisition of citizenship is not a mode of reestablishing domicile. RA

9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.

38. Under the constitution, there is no way that the Senate President or the Speaker of the
HR will BECOME president without an election.

39. Know the difference if the President, Vice President, Senate President and Speaker all
die or are killed or permanently incapacitated at the beginning of their terms compared to
“in the middle of their terms”.

40. A bill is passed by Congress mandating that once the Pres., VP, Senate President and
Speaker of the House die at the time, then the Chief Justice of the SC shall become
President until the expiration of the term of the President. Under any circumstances he is
not eligible for re – election. Is the law valid? NO.

i. Under the Constitution, any designated survivor must only serve as

ACTING PRESIDENT until the new President is duly elected in a special
election.
- The executive agreement permits Indonesian military troops to participate in War
Games with Filipino Marines off the coast of Batangas in order to enhance the
landing and attacking capabilities of the troops of both countries. Does this agreement
require Senate concurrence?

i. Yes. The Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military bases, troops
or faculties except by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, a clear
limitation on the President’s dual role as defender of the state and as sole
authority in foreign relations. (Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jan. 12, 2016)
ii. Supposed the troops involved are American Troops, should the agreement
be concerned in by the Senate? Not anymore. Two reasons:
a) The agreement is no longer the instrument that allows the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities.
b) It merely aims to implement an existing law on treaty (MDT and VFA)

41. Temporary incapacitated under Sec 11. Congress can only act and decide as to the fitness
of the President after the SECOND letter from majority of the cabinet members.

42. Prohibition on HOLDING any other office during their tenure (both in the government
and outside of government) applies to President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistant secretaries.

14
 - to “hold” means both temporary or permanent capacities, even only as OIC. (Funa
vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita). The only exception here is, if provided by the Constitution.
The exception under the Civil Service (Art IX- B) “unless otherwise provided by law
and the primary function of his office does not apply”

- however, it does not cover ex-officio capacity and without additional compensation as
provided by law and primary function of his office.
-
43. The President is not eligible for any re-election. Two possible interpretations here.

44. Residual Power – can be validly claimed by the President if there’s no violation of the
Constitution, Law or separation of powers. (Marcos vs. Manglapus). Cannot be allowed if
it violates separation of powers (Review Center Assoc. of the Phil. vs. Ermita) or if it
violates the constitution (Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP. Peace Panel)
- Residual Power was validly claimed in the President’s Act of Creating the Phils.
Truth Commission (Biraogo vs. PTC of 2010) President is bound by the faithful
execution clause (Sec. 17) to know that laws have been faithfully executed, he must
investigate, and to investigate effectively he needs to set up an investigation body,
thus, the PTC.

45. The two months ban before the next Presidential election and up to the end of his term
does not apply to appointments of the justices of the SC and by implication, the judiciary
(De Castro Case)

- The appointments also of relatives within the 4th Civil degree of consanguinity and
affinity does not apply to the judiciary ( Sec. 13)

46. Memorandum Circular No. 04, August 22, 2016, Courtesy Resignations of Presidential
Appointees, does not apply to career officials, judiciary, Offices created under the
Constitution. For instance, the City Prosecutor of Iloilo.

- Temporary appointments do not enjoy security of tenure but positions which are
primarily confidential, highly technical and policy determining are protected by
security of tenure (Corpus vs. Cuaderno). However, cabinet members are unique
under the class of official occupying primarily confidential positions. Their term
simply expires once President wants to change them.
-
47. Power of Control. The President exercises power of control over the City Prosecutor.
Thus, he can order the Sec. of DOJ to reverse the decision of the prosecutor but he cannot
order the dismissal of the Prosecutor without valid cause and compliance with due
process.

- This includes the authority to recognize the executive department, which incidentally
may include abolition of an office. This can still be justified under his residual power.

- This power to re-organize can be delegated to cabinet secretaries.

- The alter ego doctrine is applicable to acts of Board of Directors of a GOCC, even if
not all the members of the said GOCC are government officials sitting as ex- oficio
members of the BOD.

15
- The power of general supervision over local government does not exclude the
authority of the President to suspend or dismiss an official through an administrative
case.

- Powers as Commander-in-Chief. If there’s a direct order from the President to the

General or Colonel not to attend the Senate Inquiry in aid of legislation without the
consent of the President, then it is a valid order based on his power as Commander-in-
Chief. Usually not limited by the same degree of restriction attended to executive
privilege or executive control. (Gudani vs. Senga).

- Sequence of graduated powers: from the most to the least benign: calling out,
suspension of the privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus, declaring of Martial Law. The
graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect, not to order of priority.
It really depends on the President which power to use first.

- Martial and Suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus need separate
proclamation.

- “Appropriate proceeding” does not refer to Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It is
a unique proceeding solely for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the
factual basis. It can be denominated as a complaint, case, petition or matter to be
resolved by the court.

- Sufficiency of factual basis test – totality of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or
individually. Not required that there should be absolute correctness of the facts stated
in the proclamation and in the written report. It is simply whether the facts in his
possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for
him to declare martial law or suspend the privilege. It is enough that there is probable
cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

- Note of the differences between the judicial power to review and the review made by
congress, as to its scope, degree of correctness of facts, passiveness and in placed
mechanism for review.
Each one is independent of the other, and can proceed independently.

- There is no limit as to how many times the President may ask for extension and
Congress granting it.

- Void for vagueness doctrine as a ground in facial challenge cannot be used for
questioning the declaration of Martial Law or Suspension of the Privilege of Writ of
Habeas Corpus. It applies only in cases that challenge government regulation and
restriction on speech and expression.

- Even if the arrest is illegal but once there’s Martial Law and the privilege of the writ
is suspended, the person arrested or his family cannot do anything to question the
legality of the arrest within the need 72 hours from the time of the arrest. No habeas
corpus, no petition for bail. Judicial remedies can be availed only after the lapse of
72hour. But only if the person was arrested for rebellion or invasion.

- In David vs. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court quoting Justice Vicente V.

Mendoza’s (Justice Mendoza) Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on
march 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the President as
Commander in Chief may order the “(a) arrest and seizures without judicial warrants;

16
 (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of the news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees xxx”.

Worthy to note, however, that above-cited acts that the President may perform do not
give him unbridled discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law.
This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither
does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.

- If the person is arrested for any other crime, and the warrantless arrest is valid, then
article 125 of RPC applies. If the warrantless arrest is not valid, Art 125 does not
apply, suspect must be released immediately even before inquest proceedings. If not
released, then he can file petition for the issuance of the Writ of habeas corpus.

- If the arrest is by virtue of a warrant, Art. 125 and HC is unavailing.

- Terrorism (RA 9372) and rebellion (Art 134 or RPC) are not mutually exclusive of
each other. But one cannot absorb the other because of differences in elements.

- President’s power under Sec. 18, Art VII are not exactly the same as declaring State
of National Emergency (David vs Arroyo), or state of Emergency in three provinces
in Mindanao (Ampatuan vs. Puno) or State of Rebellion (Sanlakas vs. Executive
Sec.). The Constitutional basis of the first two is Sec. 18, Art. VII (Calling out power)
while the last one is Sec 4, Chap2, Book II, Administrative Code of 1997.

- In this declaration, the President does not exercise emergency powers, such as
promulgating “decrees” or regulations and take over public utility companies under
Sec. 17 of Art XII, which requires congressional grant of emergency powers.

- Provincial governor does not exercise any calling out powers.

48. Give the limitation to the pardoning power of the President.

1) Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec 19, Art. VII)

2) Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without favorable

recommendation of the Commission on Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX- C)

3) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment

4) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation

of powers), or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same)

5) Cannot absolve the convict of liability

6) Cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto vs Factoran, supra)

- No reinstatement if convicted in a criminal case (Monsanto vs. Factoran) But if an

employee is dismissed in an administrative case but subsequently was acquitted in a
Criminal Case because he is completely innocent, and not only because of reasonable
doubt, then the grant of absolute pardon in administrative case can result to
reinstatement. (Garcia vs. COA)

49. Power of the President over foreign affairs in relation to withdrawing from the ICC-
President as the Chief Architect of foreign affairs. It is a political question. The
Constitution does not require any concurrence by the Senate in the act of withdrawing.

17
 - On the other hand, the President is bound by the faithful execution clause. He shall
faithfully execute the laws. When the Senate ratified the Rome statute, it becomes
part of domestic law which the President is duty bound to execute.

- Application of pacta sunt servenda.

- Treaty and executive agreements. Concurrence by the Senate for Visiting Forces
Agreement does not require that the US Senate must also make their approval to the
same. It is enough that the US accepts it as a binding agreement.

- Every treaty or international agreement is deemed valid upon signing by the heads of
state or their representative. Senate concurrence is only for its effectivity and
enforceability.

50. The decision of President Duterte to allow President Marcos to be inferred in the LNMB
is beyond the ambit of judicial review.

- The interment of President Marcos is not repugnant to the avowed policy of RA

10368, which seeks to recognize the heroism of the human right violation victims
(HRVV) during martial law. 1) RA10368 does not prohibit the burial, 2) interment
will not confer upon him the title of hero, 3) the state will continue to implement and
comply with obligation under RA 10368.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

51. The inversely proportional relationship of power of judicial review and political
question. When the former was expanded under the 1987 constitution, the latter is
deemed restricted in scope.

52. Master the safeguards of judicial independence (See your Memory Aid)

53. Judicial power is not the same as judicial review. The former is found in Art. VIII, Sec.
1(2) while the latter is the power of the courts to test the validity of the executive and
legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution.

- Judicial Review can be exercise by the lower courts as implicitly recognized in Sec.
5, Par. 2, Art. VIII, on the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

- Judicial Review may be limited by political questions, separation of power (judicial

legislation is not allowed) and prohibition on giving of advisory opinions

- In David vs. Arroyo, the SC laid down the exceptions to the rule on not deciding moot
and academic issues:
a) There is grave violation of the Constitution;
b) There is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public is
involved.
c) The constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public; and
d) The case is capable of repetition yet evasive review.

- Standing. Interest here means material interest. It is a present substantial interest, as

distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or
consequential interest.

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 - Elements of standing
a) The petitioner must have personality suffered some actual or threatened injury
which can be legal, economic, or environmental;
b) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
c) The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action (Telecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phil. vs. COMELEC, GR 132922, April 22,
1998)

- To summarize the Rules on the Liberal Approach on Locus Standi, take note of the
following:
a) For taxpayer, there must be claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional
b) For voters, there must be showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
c) For concerned citizen, there must be showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled.
d) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogative as legislators.
e) Government of the Philippines is a proper party to question the validity of its
own laws.

54. Facial challenge (based on overbreadth and void for vagueness) generally applies only in
the area of freedom of expression. Against a legislative act, it is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenge must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the act would be void. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)

- Facial challenge is not only applicable to protected speech, but also to religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress of grievance. All of these are component right
of the right to one’s freedom of expression (Imbong vs. Ochoa).

55. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
(Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. IAC).

56. Operative fact doctrine applies only if its application will promote equity and fair play,
such as it will prevent double jeopardy or unjust enrichment on the part of the
government.

57. Deliberate Process Privilege. Privilege documents or communications and not subject to
disclosure:

a) Court actions such as the result of the raffled of cases and actions taken by the court
on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to
pending cases;
b) Court deliberations on cases and matters pending before the court;
c) Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature;
d) Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in
the course of their official functions;
e) Records of cases that are still pending for decisions are privilege material that cannot
be disclosed.

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58. Regular members of the JBC need confirmation by CA.

59. Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno (May 11, 2018)
- The origin , nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially
different. Impeachment is political in nature, while QW is judicial or a proceeding
traditionally lodged in the courts

Quo warranto Impeachment

a) Causes of action :
Usurping, intruding or unlawful Commission of an impeachable offense
holding a public office
b) Reliefs sought
- Cease to hold public office Removal from public office that he/ she
which she is ineligible to hold is legally holding
c) Mode of initiation
- Filing of a petition before the Filing of a complaint or petition before
court the HR cannot initiate more than one
d) Limitation proceedings against the same public
- One year prescriptive period official within one year.
applies to other parties but not
against the state

- Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly

elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

i. Sec 2, Art. XI uses the words “members of the SC may be removed from
the office.”

- The SC’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
i. The courts exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does
not preclude the HR from proceeding with its own investigation or the
senate from conducting trial should the articles of impeachment be
transmitted to it.
ii. An act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render
such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of quo
warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement
thereof are present. On the contrary, acts or omission, even if it relates to
the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed
and/or validly elected official, cannot be subject of a quo warranto
proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachable if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or
criminal action, if otherwise.

- Failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of integrity.

i. The JBC required the submission of at least 10 SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less considered for
nomination.

20
 - Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her
nomination and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

- The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible thereof is that
his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the
status of a de facto officer.

- The SC’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies
with its own rules.
- In simultaneous vacancies in the SC or CA or Sandiganbayan, or even closely
successive vacancies, the President is not bound to follow the clustering of nominees
for each particular vacancy. The discretionary power of the President to appoint
cannot be limited by grouping of nominees intended for a particular vacancy.
(Aguinaldo vs. Aquino, Nov. 29, 2016)

60. The unanimity rule on integrity (Sec. 2, Rule 10 of JBC - 009) can result to a deprivation
of the requirement of due process.

61. Rule-making power of the SC is not the same as judicial legislation. The latter takes
place when a court steps in to craft missing parts or to fill in the gaps in laws or when it
oversteps its discretional boundaries and goes beyond the law to coin doctrines or
principle where none was before.

62. Procedural changes such as in the issuance of SC Circular No. 1-91 which orders that
appeals from decisions of Administrative bodies shall now be filed with the CA, within
15 days from notice of decision, does not diminish, increase or modify the substantive
right of appeal (First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA).

63. Congress cannot pass a law exempting a certain government entity, local or national
government units from payment of docket and legal fees because under Sec. 5, Art VIII
of the Constitution, only the SC has the power to promulgate its rules on pleadings,
practice and procedures in court. This power is no longer shared with Congress.

64. The requirement that are collegial courts must reach their conclusions and decisions only
after consultation does not apply to administrative cases (Presidential Bank vs. Castro,
158 SCRA 646)

65. Take note of Sec. 1 of the Rule on Writ of Amparo. Can be committed by a private
individual or entity. The same is true with Writ of Habeas Data.
- The writ can be issued only if there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and
legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Right to one’s dwelling, if ordered by
the court to vacate through an executory judgement, does not constitute right to life,
liberty and security.

- The same conclusion if one is denied his right to travel because he has a pending
criminal case in court.

- This Writ also shall not issue when applied for as substitute for the appeal or
certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes.

- It is not a people remedy to regain parental authority and custody of minor child who
was legally put up for adoption.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION

66. The requirement that the appointee must not have been a candidate in the immediately
preceding election refers only to the position of commissioners of CSC, COMELEC,
COA as well as Ombudsman and his deputies. On the other hand, the one year ban from
being appointed in government service refers to those who lost in the immediately
preceding election and it applies to all other officials in the government.

67. If a Commissioner is appointed when congress is not in session (ad interim) and he is by-
passed by the Commission on Appointments, his reappointment is not prohibited by the
Constitution (Matibag vs. Benipayo). Promotional appointment also does not violate the
prohibition on re-appointment because it is not the same as the original appointment to
being a commissioner.

68. All three commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy. The “No Report, no Release Policy,” of
DBM cannot be validly enforced against them. But fiscal autonomy does not imply that
their budget cannot be decreased by Congress compared to the previous year. Only the
SC’s budget cannot be decreased because the Constitution specifically states so.

69. CSC Chairman cannot sit even only as ex oficio member of the Board of Trustees or
Board of Directors of GSIS, PhilHealth, MHDF, and ECC.

- He will be exercising powers which are no longer derived from his being Chairman.

- He will be receiving per diem.

- It will affect the independence of the commission because GOCCs are under the
control of the President ( Funa vs. Chairman, CSC)

70. Decisions of COMELEC and COA can be questioned before the SC through petition for
certiorari within 30 days from receipt while that of the CSC to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari within 15 days from receipt thereof. Decisions of the CA can be raised before
the SC through petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (SC
Revised Circular 1-91 as amended by revised Admin Circular 1-95, June 1995)

71. Only employees of GOCC, with original charter are under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
Employees of GOCCs incorporated under the Corporation Code of the Philippines will be
under the Labor Code, or NLRC regarding matters affecting their employment and
security of tenure.

72. Position considered as primarily confidential, highly technical and policy determining
enjoy the protection of security of tenure (Corpus vs. Cuaderno). However, for primarily
confidential positions, the ground for dismissal will simply be loss of trust and
confidence.

73. Take note of the higher level of eligibility—the CESO, a the highest rank being CESO I.
Security of Tenure sets in only if the CESO rank qualifies to what is required by the
position. The position of Chief Public Attorney carries a Salary Grade 30, so even one is
a CESO holder, if it is only CES Level III, SG 28, the appointment is only temporary and

22
 cannot be protected by security of tenure if another person with CES Level corresponding
to the position if appointed.

74. The classification of a particular position as policy –determining, primarily confidential

and highly technical amounts to no more than executive or legislative declaration that is
not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. (PAGCOR
vs. Rilloraza)

75. The power to appoint is discretionary and CSC is not a co-manager or surrogate
administrator of the government offices and agencies (UP and De Torres vs. CSC).

76. Only appointive official may occupy any other office during his tenure if provided by the
law and the primary function of his office. Elective Officials cannot.

77. CSC now is considered as “party adversely affected” which can appeal the decision of the
court exonerating an employee who was previously dismissed (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, PNB
vs. Garcia) In NAB vs. Mamauag, et.al, it was also pointed out by the court that a private
complainant cannot file an appeal because in an administrative case, he is only a witness.
If the agency is allowed to appeal, it must not be the person or the authority who rendered
the decision which is the subject of the appeal, otherwise it is violative of procedural due
process because the judge is also the same person who appeal the decision. The onw who
can file the appeal should be the personnel who serve as the prosecutor in the case.

78. Employees under the jurisdiction of CSC can organize but they cannot strike. For it to be
considered strike, two elements must be present: a) stoppage of work, b) presence of
compelled demand to the government in the form of forced concession or benefits.
Absence of one, the action will still be considered as protected under the right of freedom
of expression.(Villaviza vs. GSIS)

79. The requirement that all election cases shall be heard and decided by division first refers
only to the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power, i.e. election protest
and pre-proclamation controversies. Administrative function refers to paragraph 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8 and 9 of Sec. 2, Art. IX-C, while paragraph 2 of the same section refers to the
exercise of quasi- judicial function. Deciding a petition for correction of a manifest error
is only an exercise of administrative function.

80. Decision of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative function may be
challenged before the courts in an ordinary civil action or before the CSC if it involves
appointments of personnel or personnel action.

81. Only final orders of the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its quasi- judicial function
may be brought before the SC. The notice to remove Campaign Material (Team Buhay
Team Patay) indeed is not an exercise of quasi- judicial function and not yet a final
decision of the COMELEC en banc. But it can be questioned before the SC under Sec.
5(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution, that is, Petition for Certiorari as there is a violation of
the constitutional rights of the Diocese of Bocolod.

82. Take Note whether or not it is the COMELEC or the MCTC or RTC which has
jurisdiction over the election protest, COMELEC can issue TRO and Injunction only in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The right of the party to seek execution pending
appeal is strictly construed.

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83. If COMELEC en banc denied due course to the COC on the ground of final conviction in
a criminal case with perpetual disqualification, it is an exercise of administrative
function, thus not required to be decided by division first.(Romeo Jalosjos vs. Comelec).
Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC that allows convict to run for public office after lapse of two years
from the time he serves his sentence does not include cases wherein the law imposes an
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification form holding public office (Jalosjos vs.
COMELEC)

84. Sec. 78 – Petition to deny due course to COC or Petition to declare COC as null and void.
Knowledge by electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who place second to the one whose COC was declared as null and
void, can be proclaimed as the winner. The ruling in Labo vs. COMELEC is no longer
controlling (Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al.)

In the same Maquiling also the court ruled that after one’s repatriation under R.A. 9225
and renunciation later of his foreign citizenship for the purpose of running for elective
post, the use of a foreign passport in travelling abroad will have the effect of negating the
act of renunciation and reverting the person back to being a dual citizen. Thus, as dual
citizen, he is not qualified to run for public office.

85. Difference of Sec 68 and 78.

Under Sec 68, there is a valid COC filed but he cannot continue as a candidate or if he
wins he cannot sit and assume office because he is disqualified due to the commission of
prohibited acts before or during election (vote- buying, terrorism, overspending, etc) and
his being a permanent resident in a foreign country. Substitution may happen. The law on
succession applies, so the vice-governor or vice mayor will become governor or mayor
even if the case was decided and became final and executory only after the election.

Under Sec. 78, the COC is null and void from the beginning due to material
misrepresentation. No substitution will happen and the second highest vote getter will be
proclaimed a winner.

Petition to deny due course to the COC – on the ground the ground that he is an
American Citizen, inspite of his acquisition of dual citizenship under RA 9225 but he
continued to use his American Passport after his renunciation of his foreign citizenship
when he filed his COC. His continued use of American passport has the effect of vacating
his renunciation of the his foreign citizenship. (Casan Maquiling vs. Rommel Arnado,
(April 16, 2013)

86. The power of the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses is no longer
exclusive. It is already concurrent (Sec. 43, RA 9369) with other prosecution arms of
government. Creation of a joint panel (COMELEC and DOJ) to investigate election
offenses is valid. The findings of the panel will still be approved by the COMELEC in
accordance with its rules of procedure.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

87. All commissioners of the COA can be both lawyers and CPAs.

88. Promotional appointment is not a prohibited re-appointment. However, promotional

appointment is valid only if the vacancy in the position of the chairman is due to death,
resignation, permanent incapacity and removal due to impeachment wherein he was not

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 able to finish his term. No promotional appointment can be valid if the vacancy happens
due to the expiration of term (Funa vs. COA, Villar)

89. COA has jurisdiction over GOCC with original Charter and GOCC without original
charter on post audit basis. COA also can have jurisdiction over NGOs which receive
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly from or through the government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity.

90. Expenditures may be disallowed by COA even if it is not irregular or illegal as long as it
is unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

91. Impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated if after the filing of the complaint, the same
is referred already to the committee on justice. Consolidation of complaints and referral
to the COJ at the same time is valid.

92. The SC can review impeachment proceedings under Sec. 5 (2), Art VIII of the
Constitution. But may not do so if the issue is whether or not a particular act committed
by an impeachable officer is considered a betrayal of public trust, other high crimes or
culpable violation of the constitution. It is solely within the jurisdiction of the HR to
decide what is included those offenses. It may be difficult to point out that HR committed
grave abuse of discretion in its decision to include the infraction committed as
impeachable offense.
-The Solicitor General filed an impeachment case against the Chairman of the
Comelec because of his extra-marital affair with his executive assistant who is
also married. The affair started when both of them were always making overtime
in the office in preparation for the national elections. The President endorsed the
impeachment complaint reasoning that the action of the Comelec chairman is
clearly a betrayal of public trust.
a. Should the impeachment complaint be forwarded to the committee on
justice?
-There is no showing that the complaint was endorsed by a
member of the HR. The president’s endorsement is not relevant.
b. Can a disbarment case against the Comelec chairman be filed even
before the filing of the impeachment proceedings?
-The Chairman of the Comelec must be a lawyer and he must
possess such qualification while holding office. Once he is disbarred, then it
follows that he cannot hold on to the office anymore. The constitution mandates
that he is an impeachable officer.
c. Supposed the case filed is quo warranto, will is prosper?
-Acts committed during his incumbency as chairman of t he
Comelec cannot be a ground for quo warranto for the latter can only be filed if a
public official is ineligible to occupy such office of disloyal to the country. That
means that the grounds must be present before he assumed office and not for acts
committed while in office.

-The provision in the constitution which says that the HR will promulgate its rules on
impeachment does not necessarily mean that the HR must publish the rules in a newspaper of
general circulation or in the official Gazzette. It is within the discretion of congress to determine
how to promulgate its impeachment rules. Thus, there is no violation of due process if the rules
of impeachment were promulgated only one after the consolidated complaints were referred to
the Committee on Justice. (Guttierrez v. HR Com on Justice)

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93. Under RA 10660 which amended PD 1606, even though the public official has a Salary
Grade 26 or lower, if he is among those enumerated in the law, to be under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then RTC will not take jurisdiction i. e. President,
directors, trustees or manager of GOCC, state universities or educational institution or
foundations.

94. Take note of Sec. 2 which amends Sec. 4(c) of PD 1606: “Civil and Criminal cases filed
pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986
(PCGG Cases).
a. RTC will have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information does not
allege (1) any damage to the government or any bribery or (2) alleges damage to
the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions
or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (1,000,000).

95. The president has no power to dismiss the deputy ombudsman as it will violate the
independence of the office. But the Special Prosecutor can be dismissed by the President
(Gonzales III vs. OP, MR)

96. The Ombudsman can investigate any act committed by a public official even though it is
committed not in connection with the function of his office. (Art. XI, Sec. 13) Rape, for
instance committed when the public official is on vacation or on a weekend.

97. Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over GOCC with original charter (Khan vs.
Ombudsman) Sec. 13 (2). But there is no distinction made in Sec. 12 of the constitution
as to the kind of GOCC. To be safe, the distinction made in Leyson vs. Ombudsman can
be helpful.
a. an agency organized as stock or non-stock corporation
b. vested with functions relating to public needs, whether governmental or
proprietary
c. owned by the government directly or through its intrumentalities, either wholly
or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporation, to the extent of at least
51% of its capital stock

98. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge,
and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealabe. In all other cases, the decision may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified Petition for Review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. (Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino vs. CA, G.R. No. 175895 : April 12,
2007)
a. It is already settled in the case of Carpio Morales v. Binay et. al. that the CA can
issue a TRO or injunction to stop the execution of the decision of the
Ombudsman. Thus the provision in the Ombudsman law which states that only
the SC can review its decision or stop its execution is unconstitutional for
encroaching on the rule making power of the SC.
i. The CA in this case issued the TRO because of the application of the
condonation doctrine which affects only administrative cases and not
criminal cases. After the Binay ruling, the SC already abandoned the
condonation doctrine.
b. However, one must take note that generally the findings of fact of the Office of
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. The factual

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 findings of the Office of Ombudsman are generally accorded great weight and
respect, if not finality by the courts, due to its special knowledge and expertise on
matters within its jurisdiction.
i. So the challenge here once given a question on this is to determine
whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the
Ombudsman.

99. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. (Edmundo
Jose T. Buencamino vs. CA, G.R. No. 175895 : April 12, 2007)

The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately executory even

though there is a pending motion for reconsideration. The refusal or failure by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the office of the Ombudsman shall be ground
for disciplinary action against said officer.

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

100. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the state. The onus to overturn by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is part of the inalienable public land, rests with the
applicant. (Director of Lands vs. IAC)

101. The classification and reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive
Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify
or reclassify lands to be included or excluded from the public domain.

- Mere notations appearing on the survey plans or a CENRO certification is insufficient

to prove that the land is already an alienable one. What are required now are 1) CENRO OR
PENRO certification, and 2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

102. Unclassified lands of the public domain, no matter how long it remained as unclassified
cannot be automatically deemed agricultural land. There must be a positive act of the Executive
Department declaring that the subject land is already alienable. (Secretary of DENR v. Yap)

103. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources can be done in two ways:
first, directly by the state and second, by entering into co-production, joint venture and
production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least sixty
(60) percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. Foreign owned corporations can only
participate in these activities through service contracts involving technical or financial assistance
for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country,
a. service contract shall be written in accordance with a general law that will set a
uniform terms, conditions and requirements. P.D. No. 87, the Oil Exploration and Development
Act Act of 1972 is an example of this general law
b. the President shall be the signatory for the government
c. The President shall report the agreement to Congress within 30 days from the
execution of the agreement

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104. In the determination of 60% Filipino ownership, the SC in resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration in the case of Gamboa v. Teves et. al., reiterated that the term “capital “in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as
with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a
corporation.
-The 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens must apply separately
to each class of shares, whether common, preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any other
class of shares.

105. In the case of Narra NIckel Mining and Development Corp. Vs. Redmont Consolidated
Mines Corp., the SC explained that in case of doubt as to the 60-40 Filipino ownership, the
grandfather Test can be applied as a supplement to the control test.

Grandfather Rule determines the actual Filipino ownership and control in a

corporation by tracing both the direct and indirect shareholdings in the corporation.
The Grandfather Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign ownership is in
doubt or where there is reason to believe that there is non-compliance with the provisions of
the constitution on the nationality restriction. Doubts can be inferred from the following:

1. The three mining corporations had the same 100% Canadian owned foreign
investor
2. The similar corporate structure and shareholders composition of the three
corporations
3. A major Filipino shareholder within the corporate layering did not pay any amount
with respect to the subscription
4. The dubious act of the foreign investor in conveying its interests in the mining
corporations to another domestic corporation, among others

106. There are two exceptions provided by the constitution wherein a foreigner can own private
lands in the country. First, is by legal succession and second is to former natural born citizen
who lost his citizenship. The limit of the area for the second exception is 5,000 square meters for
urban areas and 3 hectares in rural areas.

107. Take note of the case of IDEALS vs. PSALM wherein the SC ruled that in the sale of the
Angat Hydro Electric Plant to a foreign corporation, NPC cannot transfer the water rights to a
foreign buyer. Because of the possession of these water rights NPC remain in control of the
operation of the dam even if the day to day management of the dam is placed in the foreign
corporation. The generation of electric power by a foreign owned company using waters already
appropriated by the NPC by virtue of its permit is valid.

108. It is not prohibited under the constitution to set a corporation for the purpose of engaging in
the public utility business with a Filipino owned capital of less than 60%. The 60% Filipino
ownership is required only if the subject corporation will get a franchise, certificate or any form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility. Mere incorporation is not prohibited.

109. Under the Public Land Act mere open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
an alienable land (agricultural) of the public domain under a bonafide claim of acquisition or
ownership for at least 30 years automatically changes the character of the land from public land
to private land. The possessor can claim to have already an imperfect title to the land and he has
to file a petition in court for confirmation of his imperfect title in order to have full ownership
and title to the subject land. Thus after the lapse of 30 years, a Filipino owned corporation can
buy the said land and have it registered in its name. At the time the corporation buys the land it is

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no longer part of the public domain, thus the prohibition that Filipino corporations cannot
acquire lands of the public domain does not apply.

110. Escheat proceedings and Action for reversion are remedies to recover private lands from
disqualified aliens.
-the action of the state for reversion to public domain of land fraudulently granted to
private individuals is imprescriptible
-only the state here is the proper party, not private persons eventhough they are applicants
for sales patents
-estoppel against the state is not favoured; it may be invoked only in rare and unusual
circumstances as it would operate to defeat the effective operation of the policy to protect the
public
-in an action filed by a former Filipino owner against the foreigner, pari delictu will not
apply.

111. In the revocation of Rappler’s Certificate of Incorporation, the CA stressed that the foreign
equity restriction on mass media implies zero foreign control. Any appearance of control that
will influence the corporate actions and decisions of Rappler is already a violation. It does not
matter therefore whether the approval of Omidyar is required only when the action taken by
Rappler will prejudice the rights of Omidyar because it will still nonetheless be required to
secure approval of at least 2/3 of the PDR holders before Rappler can carry out or implement any
action which has the effect of altering, modifying or otherwise changing Rappler’s Articles of
Incorporation or By-Laws.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

112. Requirement of notice and hearing: There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in
the promulgation of a general regulation by an administrative body.
i. where the rule is procedural
ii. where the rules are merely legal opinions
iii. where the class to be affected is large and the question to be resolved involve the use
of discretion committed to the rule-making body – meaning it is in the exercise of the agency’s
delegated rule making powers
iv. where the rules are merely interpretative
v. provisional increase in the rates imposed by the ERB, subject to the final disposition of
whether or not to make it permanent, after the conduct of hearing

-However, take note that notice and hearing is required if the administrative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation which is designed to implement a law by providing its details
and such rule substantially adds to or increases the burden of those concerned.
i. Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, which imposes new tax rate on cigarettes
locally manufactured
ii. where the rules and/or rates imposed by an administrative agency apply exclusively to
a particular party, predicated upon a finding of fact, the agency performs a function partaking of
a quasi-judicial function
iii. imposition of fine as it is clearly punitive in nature in the exercise of the agency’s
quasi-judicial functions

DepEd issued D.O. No. 54, which provides for the organization of PTAs at the school
level and the cessation of the recognition of existing PTCAs. Is D.O. No 54 valid inspite of lack
of public consultation before its issuance?
-Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its
rule-making power. Previous notice and hearing are required when limitation or loss of life or

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vested property rights takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. It is
not essential to the validity of general rules or regulation promulgated to govern future conduct
of a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Quezon City PCTC
Federation Inc. v. DepEd, Feb. 23, 2016)

113. In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is
sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons
only exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the
notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes the end, the
requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, and due process
is served. (Oyster Plaza Hotel v. Melivo, October 5, 2016)

114. The grant of quasi-judicial function cannot be made through an administrative order only.
There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial powers on the
agency. The agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper discharge of its functions is always
circumscribed by the enabling statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with ruke-making power
may circumvent legislative intent by creating new powers for itself through an administrative
order.

115. Does the filing of a motion for reconsideration to raise the lack of opportunity to be heard
cure the defect in procedural due process?
-No. The general rule is that the filing of an MR cures the defect in procedural due
process because the process of reconsideration itself is an opportunity to be heard. However, the
mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure due process defect, especially if the
motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the lack
of opportunity to be heard on the merits remained. (Fontanilla v. COA, June 21, 2016)

116. The Doctrines of Prior Resort or Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies apply only if the agency is exercising its quasi-judicial function. It is not applicable if
the agency is exercising its quasi-legislative functions. In the latter, the aggrieve party can
question the subject decision in court.

117. In the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort, both the court and the administrative
agency have concurrent jurisdiction but the court opts not to exercise its jurisdiction considering
that the agency is more knowledgeable and has an expertise on the subject matter. The case, if
filed in court first, will simply be held in abeyance, and it will be referred to the administrative
body. In non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the case will be dismissed for lack of cause
of action.

ELECTION LAWS

118. In determining the application of the prohibition regarding three term limits, take note of the
different situations enumerated by the SC in the case of Abundo Sr. Vs. Comelec:
1. Assumption of office by operation of law - the term during which the official
assumed and serve the remaining period will not be counted in the determination of the three
term limit. He was not elected to the said position that he assumed
2. Recall election – If he wins in the recall election, he will only serve the remaining
period of the term, so there is an interruption as before he run in the recall he was already a
private citizen.
3. Conversion of a municipality to city - the three limit will apply if the mayor of the
municipality continuously exercise the functions of the office even after the municipality is
already made a city. There is no interruption to speak of

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 4. Preventive Suspension - the period during his preventive suspension cannot be
considered as an interruption as he is still in possession of the office, although he cannot
exercise the functions and prerogatives of the office during his suspension.
5. Election Protest - the application of the three term limits will be affected by the
issue of whether or not he was able to fully serve the term for which he was not validly
elected. If he was able to fully serve, then the three term limit applies. If not, then there is a
gap. The cases of Lonzanida v. Comelec, Ong v. Alegre, Rivera III, and Dizon v. Comelec are
illustrative in this regard. Analyze the situations below:

1. Colas was elected and served as mayor of Igbaras, Iloilo for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and
2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty election, or during his supposed second term, the Comelec
nullified Colas’ proclamation on the ground that there was material misrepresentation in his COC.
However, Comelec’s decision become final and executor on July 4, 2001 when Colas was already starting
to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor–elect of Igbaras. In 2004, Colas filed his COC for the same
position as mayor arguing that he was not validly elected for the 1998-2001 term, thus he did not violate
the three term limit rule. Is Colas qualified to run as mayor for the 2004 election? Reason out.

2. LD was elected and served as mayor of Igbaras, Iloilo for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-
2004. In the 2004 election, she again ran for mayor and won. She was proclaimed by the Comelec. A
petition for quo warranto was filed against her on the ground that she was disqualified to run for the 2004
elections because of the three term limit rule. Comelec and the court ruled against LD, however the
decision became final and executory only on February 14, 2007. Upon receipt of the decision, LD
immediately stepped down as mayor and the vice-mayor assumed as mayor up to June 30, 2007.
However, LD filed her COC for the May 2007 elections. Is she qualified to run for the 2007 for the
position of mayor of Igbaras, Iloilo? Give your reason.

3. Supposed in the same set of terms in number 2 above, LD was not proclaimed as winner in the
2001 election. She filed an election protest before the RTC which together with Comelec ruled against
her. The Supreme Court, however decided that LD actually won the 2001 election. The decision of the SC
became final and executory only on April 11, 2003 and LD was installed as mayor on April 15, 2003. In
the 2004 election LD filed her COC for mayor. Is she qualified to run for mayor in the election of 2004?
Explain.

119. Another situation involving redistricting may be relevant in the determination of the three term limit.
If another district is created and the public official run in the new district after having been an incumbent
in the old district, it is important to determine the composition of the constituent of the two districts. If the
difference in the population of the two districts is only less than 10%, then the three term limit prohibition
will apply. ( Naval v. Comelec, July 8, 2014)

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 Don’t settle for what is mediocre for mediocrity is not a virtue. Always aim
for excellence. Scratch for every inch of the scrimmage. With faith, grit and
determination you will surely succeed.

jeeg101319

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