Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
was defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally parties concerned at least three days before the date of
construed. hearing.
February 5, 1999: RTC ruled that petitioners failed to Section 5 of Rule 15: the notice of hearing be directed
perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
Petitioners filed MR of the order dismissing the appeal place of the hearing of the motion.
and set the motion for hearing on February 19, 1999.
February 8, 1999: RTC issued an order declaring that Ratio:
the hearing set on February 19, 1999 was mooted by The requirements under Rule 15 far from being
its Order dated February 5, 1999. merely technical and procedural as claimed by the
February 10, 1999: respondents filed a motion for petitioners are vital elements of procedural due
execution, claiming that the RTC decision had become process.
final and executory. Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within
February 18, 1999: RTC granted respondent’s motion which the said party may file his reply or opposition,
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. the trial court would have no way of determining
February 26, 1999: Petitioners filed MR of the order whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the
dismissing their appeal and their opposition to the motion and, if he objects, to hear him on his objection.
issuance of a writ of execution. Hence, the need for the movant to set the time and
May 6, 1999: RTC issued an order denying petitioner’s place of hearing of its motion.
MR but recalled the writ of execution it earlier issued In this case, the petitioners received on May 20, 1997
on the ground that public policy prohibited the the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until June 4,
issuance of a writ of execution against the 1997 within which to file their motion for
government. reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their
Petitioners filed with CA a petition for certiorari for appeal from said adverse decision. Although the
the nullification of the February 5, 1999 and May 6, petitioners filed the motion for reconsideration dated
1999 Orders of the RTC. CA denied. It held that May 30, 1997 within the reglementary period, said
petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration motion failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
of the RTC decision did not comply with Section 5, 15. The records show that there is no proof that the
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; hence, a mere scrap of respondents were actually served with a copy of said
paper which did not toll the running of the motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules
reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the RTC of Court. The OSG did not bother to file an amended
decision had already become final and executory. motion for reconsideration containing the
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision Rules of Court.
of the CA. The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to
comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Issue: WON the requirements of Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 Court except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo
are mandatory such that a defective MR will not toll the M. Padilla that his omission was sheer inadvertence,
running of the reglementary period for appeal. caused by heavy pressure of work etc.
Held: Yes, The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and However, the Court directed the reopening of the trial of
5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non- the case for the parties to adduce their respective
compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro evidence. The Court excepts this case from the said rule in
forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court the interest of justice, to avert a grave miscarriage of
has no right to receive and which the court has no justice to the State through the negligence of the OSG.
authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial or What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting
for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of the of no less than 145,682 square meters or less than fifteen
period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo National
pendency of said motion. Park. If the aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest
reserve as claimed by the petitioners but their right to
Laws: adduce their evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the
Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court: a motion for present petition, the said property would be forever lost to
reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be the prejudice of the State.
made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by PREYSLER v MANILA SOUTHCOAST DEVELOPMENT
the movant on the adverse party. CORPORATION
Section 4, paragraph 2 of Rule 15: a notice of hearing (June 28, 2010)
on a motion shall be served by the movant to all the
FACTS:
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio, 3
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
o MR: denied
petitionerFausto R. Preysler, Jr. filed a complaint
for forcible entry with MTC Batangasagainst ISSUE: WON petitioner violated the 3-day rule, particularly
respondent Manila Southcoast Development the notice requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
Corporation concerning a parcel of land located in of the Rules of Court1
SitioKutad, Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu, Batangas.
The disputed land, covered by TCT No. TF-1217in RULING: NO.
the name of petitioner, is also within the property The three-day notice rule is not absolute.
covered by TCT No. T-72097 (which covers three A liberal construction of the procedural rules
contiguous parcels of land) in the name (Section 6, Rule 1 of the RPC) is proper where the
of respondent. lapse has not prejudiced the adverse party and has
MTC: ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondent was not deprived the court of its authority.
ordered to vacate the disputed land and to return Substantial compliance:
the possession of the land to petitioner o no prejudice since the motion was not
RTC: reversed the MTC decision and dismissed considered and resolved until after
petitioner’s complaint. several postponements of which the
o Petitioner : received the RTC Decision on parties were duly notified
9 February 2004 o adverse party actually had the
filed a MR (hearing set on 26 opportunity to be heard and had filed
February 2004) pleadings in opposition to the motion.
sent a copy of the MR to
respondent’s counsel by As an integral component of the
registered mail on 23 February procedural due process, the three-day
2004. notice required by the Rules is not
*During the 26 February hearing, intended for the benefit of the movant.
the judge reset the hearing to 2 Rather, the requirement is for the
April 2004 .All the parties were purpose of avoiding surprises that
notified of the schedule for the may be sprung upon the adverse party,
next hearing* who must be given time to study and
o Respondent: respondent’s counsel meet the arguments in the motion
received a copy of petitioner’s MR only before a resolution of the court.
on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the Principles of natural justice demand
scheduled hearing on 26 February that the right of a party should not be
o 2 April 2004 hearing was reset to 7 May
2004 which was further reset to 6 August
2004.
o After the hearing, respondent filed its 1SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for
Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August motions which the court may act upon without
2004,claiming that non-compliance with prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every
the three-day notice rule did not toll the written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
running of the period of appeal, which
Every written motion required to be
rendered the decision final.
heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its
*MR denied: failure to appeal within the receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
15 days reglementary period and before the date of hearing, unless the court for
declaring the 22 January 2004 Decision as good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
final and executory. Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration was fatally flawed SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The
for failure to observe the three-day notice of hearing shall be addressed to all
notice rule. parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than
Omnibus MR by petitioner: dismissed. ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
CA: dismissed petitioner. The three-day notice SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. –
No written motion set for hearing shall be acted
rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the
upon by the court without proof of service
Rules of Court is mandatory and non-compliance
thereof.
therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro
forma.
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio, 4
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
the date of hearing thereof on February 15, 2000 a compromise agreement that led to the dismissal
at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. by the trial court of the complaint in Civil Case 1.
On the same day, January 31, 2000, the petitioners This compromise agreement was already
also filed a separate motion to cancel the interposed by the petitioners as one of the special
hearing for the presentation of evidence for the and affirmative defenses in their answer to the
defense earlier scheduled on February 3, 2000 so complaint for damages in Civil Case 2. Thus it was
that their motion for reconsideration, scheduled no longer legally possible for the petitioners to file
for hearing on February 15, 2000, may not be the Motion to Exclude on September 24, 1999 in
rendered moot and academic. Civil Case 2 (actually a motion to dismiss the case
The motion to cancel hearing was itself scheduled against them), based on a compromise agreement
to be heard on February 3, 2000. that did not even bind the complainants (herein
During the scheduled hearing for the initial private respondents) who were not parties
presentation of evidence of the defense on thereto. At such stage, the private respondents
February 3, 2000, the trial court denied the were already winding up the presentation of their
motion for reconsideration of the petitioners evidence in Civil Case 2.
for lack of merit. Upon the denial of their Motion to Exclude on
CA dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari. January 10, 2000, the petitioners filed the subject
motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals exceeded its In addition, they moved to cancel the scheduled
jurisdiction when it dismissed the petition. hearing for the initial presentation of their
evidence already scheduled on February 3, 2000
ostensibly to give way to oral arguments in
HELD: NO.
support of their motion for reconsideration which,
as above discussed, was pro forma. By their
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the actuations, it can be conclusively presumed that
petition for the reason that the trial court did not the petitioners had no other intention but to delay
abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ the proceedings in Civil Case 2.
motion for reconsideration on February 3, 2000. Besides, the petitioners cannot validly invoke
It should be noted that the motion for violation of due process to question the trial
reconsideration of the trial court’s resolution court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration.
on January 10, 2000 was filed by the It should be pointed out that the motion to cancel
petitioners on January 31, 2000. The date and the scheduled hearing on February 3, 2000 filed
time of hearing thereof was set by the on January 31, 2000 by the petitioners was itself
petitioners on February 15, 2000 at 8:30 scheduled to be heard on February 3, 2000 which
o’clock in the morning. latter date, incidentally, was previously set by the
In this connection, Rule 15, Section 5 of the trial court for reception of defendants’ evidence.
Revised Rules of Court on motions provides: xxx Admittedly, the petitioners were present during
It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the hearing on said date to argue on the merits of
the said motion for reconsideration was their motion to cancel. On the same occasion, the
beyond the period specified by the Revised private respondents objected to the motion to
Rules of Court which was not later than ten cancel the hearing on February 3, 2000, arguing
(10) days after the filing of the motion, or no that no compelling reason existed to grant the said
later than February 10, 2000. Significantly, the pending motion; they proposed instead that
above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the petitioners avail of the said setting to argue their
mandatory term "must" in fixing the period within motion for reconsideration.
which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing.
A motion that fails to religiously comply with the
mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro MOTION TO DISMISS
forma and presents no question which merits the
attention and consideration of the court. HEIRS OF LORETO MARAMAG V MARAMAG (NACHURA,
The mandatory character of Rule 15, Section 5 of 2009)
the Revised Rules of Court becomes specially
significant in this case, considering the claim of
FACTS:
the private respondents that the petitioners have
Petitioner heirs seek reduction and revocation of
been engaging in dilatory tactics, an imputation
insurance proceeds of respondents.The petition alleged
not without factual basis. As borne by the records,
that:
herein petitioners and their co-defendants,
Simeon Roxas-Cu and Daniel Cariño, entered into
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio, 6
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
(1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in
children of Loreto Maramag, while respondents the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife.
were Loreto’s illegitimate family;
(2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (was a concubine of The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a
Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is
thus, she is disqualified to receive any proceeds disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the
from his insurance policies from Insular Life insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto,
Assurance Company and Grepalife; being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of
(3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, the proceeds of the policies.Pursuant thereto, it is obvious
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were entitled only that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance
to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the
children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a
Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; situation where the insurance contract was intended to
and benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in
(4) petitioners could not be deprived of their the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a
legitimes, which should be satisfied first. case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the
insurer.
Insular and grepalife on the other hand averred that
indeed eva is disqualified as a beneficiary, and thus the Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts
insurance proceeds should go to odessa, karl brian, and with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the
trisha as the remaining beneficiaries. proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
Lower court ruled in favor of petitioners, stating that the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva
proceeds should go to the legal heirs of the deceased. as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
such in another are of no moment considering that the
Respondents file MR, along with motion to dismiss the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in
claim of petitioner for failure to state a cause of action, Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid.
considering that the Insurance code provides that once eva
as beneficiary has been revoked and disqualified, then the Because no legal proscription exists in naming as
proceeds must go to the remaining beneficiaries, which are beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the
the illegitimate children of the deceased. insured, it is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary,or when the designated
ISSUE:WON motion to dismiss must fail because the beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
grounds interposed by respondents were not found in the proceeds,that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound
allegations in the complaint, but only in their answers and to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
MR.
RULING: NO. Petition denied. MTD valid UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. SPS BELUSO
(2007)
One of the grounds for MTD is failure to state a cause of Chico-Nazario, J.
action, and the ruling must therefore be based on the
allegations in the complaint. However, this rule is subject FACTS:
to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if: Apr 16, 1996:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial UCPB granted the Sps Beluso a Promissory Notes Line
notice; under a Credit Agreement whereby the Belusos could avail
2. such allegations are legally impossible; a credit up to a max amt of P1.2 mil for a term ending on
3. the allegations refer to facts which are Apr 30, 1997. The Belusos, in addition to the promissory
inadmissible in evidence; notes, executed a real estate mortgage over some land in
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the Roxas as additional security.
allegations appear unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to Later on, their Credit Agreement was amended to increase
the court by stipulation of the parties or in the the amount of the Promissory Notes Line to P2.3 mil. The
course of the hearings related to the case. term was also amended: extended to Feb 23, 1998. The
Belusos availed of 3 promissory notes amounting to P2mil,
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the which were renewed several times. Apr 30, 1997, the
trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate payment of the principal + interest of the last 2 notes was
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio, 7
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
debited form their account with UCPB (both added up to the right of the spouses Beluso not to have their property
P1.3 mil). Later, a loan of P1.3mil was still released to them foreclosed for an amount they do not owe, the ROC
under a promissory note whose due date was nevertheless allows the filing of the second action. Civil
Feb 28, 1998. (meaning their loan was still an even P2mil). Case No. V-7227 was dismissed by the RTC of Roxas City
To completely avail of the P2.35 mil credit line, they before the filing of Case No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati
executed 2 more promissory notes amounting to P350k. City, since the venue of litigation as provided for in the
However, they allege that the notes were never released to Credit Agreement is in Makati City.
them so they claim that their debt is still only P2mil.
(Anyway) UCPB applied interest rates on the promissory Rule 16, Section 5 bars the refiling of an action previously
notes ranging from 18% to 34%: From 1996 to Feb 1998, dismissed only in the following instances:
the Belusos paid P763k. From Feb 1998 to June 1998,
UCPB charged them interests and penalties. The Belusos SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.—Subject to the right of appeal,
failed to make any payment on these. an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs
(f), (h) and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of
Sept 1998, UCPB demanded pay P2.93 mil PLUS 25% atty the same action or claim. (n)
fees. Belusos did not pay. Dec 1998, UCPB foreclosed on
the Belusos’ mortgaged properties. (by that time already
ballooned to P3.7 mil). The spouses Beluso filed a Petition Improper venue as a ground for the dismissal of an action
for Annulment, Accounting and Damages against UCPB is found in paragraph (c) of Section 1, not in paragraphs
with the RTC of Makati City. (f), (h) and (i):
UCPB moved to dismiss the petition (originally Case No. When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other
99-314 in RTC, Makati City) on the ground that the spouses party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an
Beluso instituted another case (Civil Case No. V-7227) action is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action
before the RTC of Roxas City, involving the same parties cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the
and issues. It claims that while Civil Case No. V-7227 complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take
initially appears to be a different action, as it prayed for care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition
injunction to stop foreclosure of spouses Beluso’s precedent, as the case may be.
properties, it poses issues which are similar to those of the
present case. To prove its point, it cited the spouses UCPB, however, brings to the SC’s attention a Motion for
Beluso’s Amended Petition in Civil Case No. V-7227, which Reconsideration filed by the spouses Beluso on 15 January
contains similar allegations as those in the present case. 1999 with the RTC of Roxas City, which Motion had not yet
The RTC of Makati denied UCPB’s Motion to Dismiss Case been ruled upon when the spouses Beluso filed Civil Case
No. 99-314 for lack of merit. Petitioner UCPB raised the No. 99-314 with the RTC of Makati. Hence, there were
same issue with the Court of Appeals, and is raising the allegedly two pending actions between the same parties on
same issue with the SC. the same issue at the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 99-
314 on 9 February 1999 with the RTC of Makati. This will
The spouses Beluso claim that the issue in Civil Case No. V- still not change SC’sfindings. It is indeed the general rule
7227 before the RTC of Roxas City, a Petition for Injunction that in cases where there are two pending actions between
Against Foreclosure, is the propriety of the foreclosure the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later
before the true account of spouses Beluso is determined. case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not
On the other hand, the issue in Case No. 99-314 before the absolute.
RTC of Makati City is the validity of the interest rate
provision. The spouses Beluso claim that Civil Case No. V- Allied Banking Corporation v. CA: In these cases, it is
7227 has become moot because, before the RTC of Roxas evident that the first action was filed in anticipation of the
City could act on the restraining order, UCPB proceeded filing of the later action and the purpose is to preempt the
with the foreclosure and auction sale. As the act sought to later suit or provide a basis for seeking the dismissal of the
be restrained by Civil Case No. V-7227 has already been second action. Even if this is not the purpose for the filing
accomplished, the spouses Beluso had to file a different of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the
action, that of Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale, Case No. later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the
99-314 with the RTC, Makati City. ventilation of the issues between the parties.
ISSUES/HELD: WON Sps. Beluso are guilty of forum Ramos v. Peralta: The rule on litis pendentia does not
shopping? NO require that the later case should yield to the earlier case.
What is required merely is that there be another pending
RATIO: Even assuming that only one cause of action is action, not a prior pending action.
involved in the two civil actions, namely, the violation of
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio, 8
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Given, therefore, the pendency of two actions, the ff are the University moved to dismiss the amended complaint on
relevant considerations in determining which action the grounds that: (1) there was "no more cause of action"
should be dismissed: (1) the date of filing, with preference against it since the loan had been settled by GDI; and (2)
generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) the bank "failed to prosecute the action for an
whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed unreasonable length of time." TC denied.
merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing
and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the TC expunged from the record the deed of dacion en pago
action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues on the ground that no compromise agreement was
between the parties. submitted for its approval.
In the case at bar, Civil Case No. V-7227 before the RTC of University filed a manifestation regarding its motion to
Roxas City was an action for injunction against a dismiss. The university argued that the grounds for its
foreclosure sale that has already been held, while Civil motion to dismiss were not evidentiary as the deed of
Case No. 99-314 before the RTC of Makati City includes an dacion en pago and the bank’s judicial admission thereof
action for the annulment of said foreclosure, an action were on record.
certainly more proper in view of the execution of the
foreclosure sale. The former case was improperly filed in Bank opposed the motion to dismiss for lack of basis since
Roxas City, while the latter was filed in Makati City, the the deed of dacion en pago had already been expunged.
proper venue of the action as mandated by the Credit
Agreement. It is evident, therefore, that Civil Case No. 99-
314 is the more appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues TC ruled that the bank had no cause of action against the
between the parties, as compared to Civil Case No. V-7227. defendants because its claim for a sum of money had been
Thus, SC ruled that the RTC of Makati City was not in error paid through the dacion en pago and noted that the bank
in not dismissing Civil Case No. 99-314. even admitted the settlement.
judge has determined the truth and falsity of the Choi Sung Bong filed with the RTC of Pasay City, a
allegations and has found the evidence wanting. complaint for injunction and damages against the
same petitioners founded on the same grounds as
Hence, a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action the first case
is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented Petitioners now filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no following grounds: (1) Choi had validly waived his
right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under right to file action;(2) Choi was guilty of laches;
Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be (3) the action had prescribed; (4) Choi had no
ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to cause of action; and later (5) on the ground of
dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to improper venue
evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction
presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. Petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Resolve their Motion to Dismiss. Also,
In this case, the university’s motion to dismiss the they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to
amended complaint was improper under Rule 16 because nullify the RTC order
it was filed after respondent university filed its Answer. CA issued a TRO and writ of preliminary injuction
Also, the motion’s merit could not be determined based enjoining the RTC from implementing its order. It
solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the later dissolved said writ of injunction and
amended complaint, since the motion was based on the remanded the case for further proceedings. CA
deed of dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the also found that the RTC's action in deferring the
complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been resolution of petitioners' Motion to Dismiss was
expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its not sanctioned by Section 3, Rule 16 of the Rules
finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the of Court. CA did not rule on other issues as it
deed. believed that it would result in the pre-judgment
of the main case
In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had "no Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial
more cause of action" or lacked a cause of action against Reconsideration and/or Supplemental Petition
the university. Following Domondon, that motion was a insofar as the CA did not order the dismissal of the
motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer case before the RTC but instead ordered the
to evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had remand of the case for further proceedings.
presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at Petitioners alleged that while the Motion to
bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and Dismiss remained unresolved at the time of the
petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore, the order filing of the petition for certiorari and prohibition
properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper. with the CA, however, the RTC subsequently
issued its Order denying petitioners' Motion to
Dismiss
CHANG IK JIN, ET AL. VS CHOI SUNG BONG Issue and Held:
G.R. No. 166358 Whether the CA erred when it did not rule on the
September 08, 2010 issues of prescription, failure to state a cause of
action and improper venue which petitioners
Facts: raised in their petition filed with the CA? NO
Ratio:
Korean Union Church of Manila, Inc. filed before
the RTC of Parañaque City, a complaint for Petitioners’ 1st argument: RTC's issuance of the
damages and injunction with TRO against writ of preliminary injunction had already
petitioners Korean Christian Businessmen amounted to the denial of petitioners' Motion to
Association, Inc. and Chang Ik Jin, one of the Dismiss, thus the CA erred in its decision when it
incorporators refused to tackle the issues of the complaint's
failure to state a cause of action, prescription and
Complaint alleged that petitioners have been
forum shopping saying that it would result in the
publishing the Korea Post in violation of the
pre-judgment of the main case
constitutional provisions barring foreigners from
engaging in mass media; that it was prohibited by Supreme Court said: such contention has no
its Articles of Incorporation from engaging in basis, since at the time the writ was issued, there
mass media; and that the Korea Post published a was still no Order resolving petitioners' Motion to
defamatory article against the Korean Union Dismiss
Church of Manila Motion to Dismiss therefore was not yet decided
Later, the Korean Union Church of Manila filed a upon by the RTC. CA was correct when it did not
notice of dismissal, which the RTC granted rule on those issues even when petitioners raised
them in their petition with the CA, since to do so
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,10
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
would be overstepping its boundaries since the substitute the same with another [land] which is
Motion to Dismiss was not yet decided at the time untenanted and the size, location and type of
the petition was filed terrain of which [are] acceptable and suitable for
Petitioners’ 2nd argument: CA’s finding that the the purpose of the foundation."
RTC should have first resolved the Motion to After petitioners failed to reply, respondent
Dismiss before issuing the Order granting the writ requested the return of its down
of preliminary injunction had been mooted by the payment. Petitioners failed to return the down
RTC's subsequent denial of the Motion to Dismiss, payment.
thus, the CA could determine the merits of On 1989, the respondent filed a complaint for
petitioners' claim regarding prescription, failure rescission with damages with the RTC Makati.
to state a cause of action and improper venue (Rescission case)
Supreme Court said: such contention is Petitioners and the tenant farmers of the property,
untenable. While the RTC subsequently issued an as plaintiffs, filed the instant case for specific
Order denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, performance with the RTC Laguna. (Specific
such Order cannot be raised in petitioners' Motion performance case)
for Partial Reconsideration and/or Supplemental Rescission case: RTC Makati dismissed the
Petition of the assailed CA Decision without complaint.
violating procedural rules. The Order denying Specific Performance Case
petitioners' Motion to Dismiss was distinct from o Answer with Counterclaim by
the RTC Order which directed the issuance of the Respondent: Specific performance is not
writ of preliminary injunction and which latter possible because the it had already
Order was the only Order which petitioners bought another property
sought to annul in their petition filed with the CA o Counterclaims: 1. In view of failure to
comply with contract of sale, refund of
down payment of 1.2M with bank rate of
DISMISSALS BY THE PLAINTIFF interest per annum from date of receipt
until fully repaid; 2. The project of the
LIMACO VS. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN’S HOUSE defendant has been delayed for which
PHILIPPINES reason they should pay 500K in damages
3. That because of the plaintiffs' refusal to
(Puno, 2005) comply with the demand to refund the
amount paid by the defendant, it was
Facts: constrained to engage the services of the
The Limaco’s (petitioners) entered into a Contract undersigned counsel; pay attorney’ss fees
of Sale with Shonan Gakuen (respondent) over On 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw
parcels of agricultural land situated in Laguna. Complaint considering respondent's special
The parties agreed that respondent shall pay defense that specific performance was no
P1.2M upon the signing of the contract and the longer possible.
balance of P11.33M in seven (7) equal o Petitioners: Counterclaim should be
installments. dismissed since it would have no leg to
Respondent paid the down payment. However, it stand on as it was compulsory in nature.
refused to remit any monthly installment due to o Respondent: 1) Under the ROC if a
petitioners' failure to obtain a clearance and/or counterclaim has been pleaded by a
approval of the sale of the subject land from the defendant prior to the service upon him
DAR. They demanded that petitioners either solve of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the
the problem with the land tenants or substitute action shall not be dismissed against the
the lots with another acceptable, suitable and defendant's objection unless the
untenanted land, pursuant to their agreement. counterclaim can remain pending for
Petitioners informed respondent that as per DAR independent adjudication by the court. 2)
legal opinion, the subject properties should first The dismissal of the counterclaim would
be donated by the tenant farmers to the operate to its "extreme prejudice"
municipality which, in turn, would donate them to considering that: (a) its complaint for
respondent. rescission with the RTC of Makati
Respondent proposed that "since it is now clear involving the same subject matter and
that the property cannot be conveyed to the relief was dismissed to give way to the
foundation (respondent) in the manner specified instant case; (b) petitioners were already
… due to a possible violation of existing law, we about to present their second witness and
(respondent) now request you (petitioners) to dismissing the complaint would result in
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,11
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
the starting all over again of the case; and order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be
(c) respondent had spent considerable without prejudice.
expenses for attorney's fees, acceptance
fees and litigation expenses for the past o There are two ways by which an action may be
six (6) years that the case was pending. dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff.
1. Dismissal as a matter of right - when a notice of
TC: Dismissed complaint of petitioners; ordered them to dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a
pay respondent the remaining balance motion for summary judgment has been served on him by
CA: Ordered petitioners to pay. Denied petitioner’s motion the defendant.
to dismiss the compulsory counterclaim. - takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff
without need of a judicial order
Issue: W/N the counterclaim should have been dismissed 2. Dismissal as discretionary - when the motion for the
after the complaint had been withdrawn (No) dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage
of the proceedings other than before service of an answer
Arguments: or a motion for summary judgment.
Petitioners: - requires the authority of the court before
o On 1996, they filed a Motion to Withdraw dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in
Complaint. With the withdrawal of their the dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon
complaint, respondent's compulsory counterclaim
the rights of the defendant should always be taken into
for the return of P1.2M had no leg to stand on
consideration.
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 17, of the ROC.
o The counterclaim is "inextricably linked and
utterly dependent upon petitioners' complaint o Petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint
and from its very nature, it cannot 'remain after respondent already filed its answer with
pending for independent adjudication by the counterclaim. The reason for their motion for
court.' withdrawal was the special defense of respondent
in its answer that substitution was no longer
Held: possible as it already bought another property in
lieu of the subject lots under the contract.
[Note: Court applied the 1964 ROC because the action was
o The complaint could not have been successfully
commenced prior to 1997.] withdrawn as petitioners admitted that private
The applicable provisions are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 17, of respondent objected to the withdrawal and the
the old Rules of Court are: Trial Court sustained the objection.
o Sec. 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff.-- An action may o Under the old ROC "[i]f a counterclaim has been
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon
court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action
before service of the answer or of a motion for shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
summary judgment. x x x (same in new ROC) objection unless the counterclaim can remain
o Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court.-- Except as pending for independent adjudication by the
provided in the preceding section, an action shall court.”
not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save o What may invariably remain for independent
upon order of the court and upon such terms and adjudication are permissive counterclaims as
conditions as the court deems proper. If a compared to compulsory counterclaims which
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior generally necessitate a simultaneous
to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to adjudication with the complaint itself.
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against Respondent's counterclaim is compulsory in
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim nature, hence, cannot remain for independent
can remain pending for independent adjudication adjudication.
by the court2. Unless otherwise specified in the
On May 28, 1998, Heirs of German Santiago filed Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
a complaint for injunction against Eduardo Pinga and Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault
Vicente Saavedra. The complaint alleged that Pinga and of the plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the
Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In
the Heirs, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to
fruits of the cocount trees therein. the right of defendants to prosecute their counterclaim.
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, Said provision stands in marked contrast to the
Pinga and Saavedra disputed the ownership of the heirs, provisions under Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
asserting that Pinga's father, from whom they derived were superseded by the 1997 amendments3.
their interest over the land, had been in possession thereof
since the 1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968, the The old rule was silent on the effect of such
heirs of German Santiago had already been ordered dusmissal due to failure to prosecute on the pending
ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible counterclaims. As a result, there arose a nagging question
entry was filed by the heirs of Pinga. Pinga and Saavedra of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries
sought the award of damages. with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. The
jurisprudence that plaintiffs cited to support the dismissal
On October 25, 2004, the RTC ordered the of the counterclaim were neither dismissed due to the fault
dismissal of the complaint after the plaintiff sought the of the plaintiff nor upon the instance of the defendant.
postponement of the hearing scheduled then. Plaintiff
moved for reconsideration and such was granted. By July The distinction as to why the complaint is
2005, the trial of the case had not yet been completed. dismissed is relevant or under the rules, it is Section 3,
Heirs of Santiago had failed to present their evidence. At Rule 17 that governs the dismissals due to the failure of
the hearing, plaintiffs' counsel on record failed to appear the plaintiff to prosecute the complaint, as in the case at
and sent instead a representative who sought a bar. Otherwise, it is Section 2 which covers dismissals
postponement. Defendants opposed the postponement ordered by the trial court upon the instance of the plaintiff.
and moved for the dismissal of the case. The RTC
Previous jurisprudence laid emphasis on whether the
dismissed the complaint, noting that there was failure to
counterclaim was compulsory or permissive in character.
prosecute already since plaintiff was still unable to present
The necessity of such distinction was provided in the 1964
evidence given the unreasonable length of time that has
Rules itself, particularly Section 2, Rule 17. Remarking on
passed. The RTC allowed defendants to present their
Section 2 of Rule 17, then Chief Justice Moran noted that
evidence ex-parte.
"[t]here are instances in which a counterclaim cannot
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but not for remain pending for independent adjudication, as, where it
their complaint to be reinstated but that the entire action arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
be dismissed and defendants be disallowed from transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
presenting evidence ex parte. They claim that allowing the opposing party’s claim." This view expressed in
defendant to present evidence ex parte is not in accord Moran's Commentaries was adopted by the Court in cases
with established jurisprudence. where the application of Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1964
Rules of Court was called for. The broad nature of that
The RTC granted plaintiff's motion for statement gave rise to the notion that the mandatory
reconsideration and dismissed the counterclaim citing as dismissal of the counterclaim upon dismissal of the
only ground that “there is no opposition to the Motion for complaint applied regardless of the cause of the
Reconsideration.” complaint’s dismissal.
Issue: WON the dismissal of the complaint necessarily In the case of BA Finance vs Co (1993), the Court
carries the dismissal of the compulory counterclaim ruled that the dismissal of the complaint for
(NO)
3 SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at
Ratio: the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court,
the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,13
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre-trial, upon motion of would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and
the defendants, carried with it the dismissal of their wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists
compulsory counterclaim.The Court reiterated the rule even by mere implication.
that "a compulsory counterclaim cannot remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court… as it is Incidentally, Justice Regalado happened to be a
member of the Rules of Court Revision Committee tasked
auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and merely
with revising the 1964 rules. He proposed before the
derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. BA Finance Committee an amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 that would
advised that the proper remedy for defendants desirous explicitly provide that the dismissal of the complaint due
that their counterclaims not be dismissed along with the to the fault of the plaintiff shall be "without prejudice to
main complaint was for them to move to declare the the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
plaintiffs to be "non-suited" on their complaint and "as in the same or in a separate action,” and was approved. With
default" on their compulsory counterclaim, instead of this amendment the doctrine in BA Finance and all
previous rulings that are inconsistent with the rules are
moving for the dismissal of the complaint.
now abandoned.
Justie Regalado posed a strong objection to the
majority opinion in BA Finance and opined that the DAEL V. SPS. BENEDICTO
compilsory counterclaim was not necessarily dismissed Quisumbing, J.; April 30, 2008
along with the main complaint, pointing out a situation
wherein the dismissal of the complaint was occasioned by Facts:
plaintiff's failure to appear which was governed by Section Frederick Dael filed before the RTC a Complaint for breach
3, Rule 17. He explained that Rule 2 governs where the of contract and damages against respondent-spouses
Benedicto and Vilma Beltran alleging that the spouses sold
dismissal of the complaint is at the instance of the plaintiff,
him a parcel of land but did not disclose that the land was
for whatever reason he is minded to move for such
previously mortgaged. He discovered that an extrajudicial
dismissal and for that reason, to curb any dubuou or foreclosure over the property had already been instituted,
frivolous strategy of plaintiff for his benefit, the former and that he was constrained to bid in the extrajudicial sale
may not dismiss the complaint over the objection of the of the land. Dael argued that the spouses’ non-disclosure
defendant if the latter has a compulsory counterclaim. of the extrajudicial foreclosure constituted breach of
contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property
Section 3, [of Rule 17] on the other hand, (Article 1547, CC).
contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit The spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
petitioner had no cause of action since the contract to sell
justified by causes imputable to him and which, in BA stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the
vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not the
Finance, was petitioner’s failure to appear at the pretrial.
petitioner.
This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by Dael’s counsel moved to reset the hearing on the MTD to
judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of enable Dael to withdraw and have the complaint
defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of dismissed, amended, or to enter into a compromise
whether defendant has a pending agreement. Dael then filed a Notice of Dismissal stating:
“Plaintiff, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court,
counterclaim, permissive or compulsory is not of respectfully files this notice of dismissal of the above-
determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff’s captioned case without prejudice by virtue of Rule 17,
Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. By this
complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of notice, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is then rendered
evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, moot and academic. WHEREFORE, plaintiff Frederick
Dael respectfully prays that this Honorable Court dismiss
hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, the above-captioned case without prejudice.”
The RTC granted the MTD and dismissed the
an adjudication on the merits. This does not,
complaint with prejudice. Dael filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 in the SC.
however, mean that there is likewise such an absence of
evidence to prove defendant’s counterclaim although the Issue 1:
same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint W/N the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold NO.
otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but Ratio 1:
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,14
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Under Section 1, Rule 17, it is mandatory that the trial so the court allowed respondents to present
court issue an order confirming such dismissal and, unless evidence ex parte.
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without More than 7 months after the conclusion of
prejudice and could be accomplished by the plaintiff respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence,
through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion petitioner filed a motion for leave to present
subject to approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso evidence on her defense and third-party
facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise complaint. The trial court denied this.
stated in the notice. The trial court has no choice but to TC held petitioner and her driver solidarily liable
consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff to pay the heirs of Sherly.
may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless CA affirmed. MR denied.
of the ground.
Section 1 of Rule 17 does not encompass a Motion to Issue/Held: W/N it was proper for the trial court to allow
Dismiss. The provision specifically provides that a plaintiff private respondents to present their evidence ex parte. |
may file a notice of dismissal before service of YES.
the answer or a motion for summary judgment.
To allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would Ratio:
erroneously result in res judicata and imply that petitioner Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court states that:
can no longer file a case against respondents without The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel,
giving him a chance to present evidence to prove or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel
otherwise. served with such notice is charged with the duty
of notifying the party represented by him.
Issue 2: Petitioner was represented by Atty. Lupeba to
W/N a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is whom the notice was sent. It was incumbent on
proper. YES. the latter to advise petitioner. His failure to do so
Ratio 2: constituted negligence which bound petitioner.
An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final Section 4 of Rule 18 says: It shall be the duty of the
order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings were parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial.
terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower The non-appearance of the party may be excused
court. The remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order. A only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a
party may directly appeal to the Supreme Court from a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of
PRE-TRIAL dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations
or admissions of facts and of documents.
DIAZ VS CA (Corona, 2006) Sec. 5 of Rule 18 states: The failure of the plaintiff
to appear when so required pursuant to the next
Facts: preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal
Petitioner Agapita Diaz operated a common of the action. The dismissal shall be with
carrier, a Tamaraw FX taxi. Petitioner’s taxi, prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
driven by Arman Retes, was moving at an A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to
excessive speed when it rammed into the rear allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte
portion of a Hino cargo truck owned by and the court to render judgment on the basis
respondent Teodoro Lantoria and driven by thereof.
respondent Rogelio Francisco. 9 passengers of the Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to
taxi died including Sherly Moneño. allow respondents to present their evidence ex
The heirs of Sherly Moneño filed an action for parte when petitioner and her counsel failed to
breach of contract of carriage and damages appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.
against petitioner and her driver. Also, in a contract of carriage, it is presumed that
Petitioner filed a third-party complaint against the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when
respondents Lantoria and Francisco. a passenger dies or is injured. This statutory
The pre-trial conference was initially set on July presumption may only be overcome by evidence
11, 1998 but was reset to July 30, 1998 for that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.
petitioner and her counsel’s failure to appear Petitioner failed to establish sufficient evidence to
despite due notice. Notice had been sent to rebut the presumption of negligence.
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Cipriano Lupeba.
Petitioner and her counsel again failed to appear,
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,15
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
ALCARAZ v. CA ISSUE: WON the trial court violated the petitioner’s right
to due process when the private respondent was allowed
FACTS: to present its evidence ex parte. NO.
Gochan v. Gochan: “A motion for continuance or MTCC- ordered petitioners to vacate the premise since
postponement is not a matter of right, but a they occupied the lots by tolerance of respondents and any
request addressed to the sound discretion of the advance inheritance were inchoate.
court. Parties asking for postponement have
absolutely no right to assume that their motions RTC- upheld MTCC but allowed respondents to
would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared appropriate the building and other improvements
on the day of the hearing. Given this rule, the introduced by petitioners, after payment of indemnity.
question of the correctness of the denial of
respondents’ requests for postponements was CA- sustained the lower courts and ruled that petitioners’
addressed to the sound discretion of Judge status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant whose
Dicdican. His action thereon cannot be disturbed term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued
by appellate courts in the absence of any clear by tolerance of the owner. For the improvement,
and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a petitioners had the right to be reimbursed for one half of
denial of substantial justice. Since there was no the value of the improvements made.
such finding with regard to the disallowance of
the requests for postponement, the CA [Court of
(Relevant) Issue: WON the rule on appearance of parties
Appeals] cannot overturn the decision of the
during the Pretrial should apply on appearance of parties
judge. Much less can it assume his bias and
during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit
partiality based merely on the denial of the
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,17
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Held: not by mere tolerance, the lower courts erred in using the
provisions on lease
Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the
appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant during the BPI V. DANDO (Chico-Nazario, September 4, 2009)
preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision,
petitioners claim that the MTCC should have dismissed the FACTS:
case upon the failure of respondents to attend the
conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an BPI filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
attorney-in-fact with a written authorization from against Dando before the RTC. Allegation: 1994, Dando
respondents appeared during the preliminary conference.
availed of a loan of P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit
Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18
Line Agreement. The parties agreed that Dando would pay
on pretrial apply to the preliminary conference. Under
Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be FEBTC the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at
excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the the end of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the
appearance of a representative, who has been fully periods reckoned from the time of availment of the
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, loan. Dando defaulted in the payment and despite
to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his
to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
just and valid obligation. In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged,
documents.
with the former as the surviving entity, thus, absorbing the
rights and obligations of the latter.
Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70.
Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal
Dando filed his Answer with Counterclaim
appearance under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the
preliminary conference. If there are valid reasons or if a
BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. RTC
representative has a “special authority,” a party’s
appearance may be waived. As petitioners are challenging Order on 11 June 2003: set case for pre-trial conference
only the applicability of the rules on pretrial to the rule on on 18 August 2003; RTC Order on 16 June 2003: a Notice
preliminary conference, the written authorization from of Pre-Trial Conference directing the parties to submit
respondents can indeed be readily considered as a “special their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before
authorization.” the scheduled date of pre-trial
RTC granted Dando’s Motion to Dismiss reasoning Section merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the
6, Rule 18 strictly mandates the parties to the case to file other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby
with the Court and serve on the adverse party and SHALL
ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before Herein, BPI instituted the case to recover the amount it
the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs but had lent to Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon,
likewise imposed upon the parties the mandatory duty to clearly, a matter of property. The substantive right of BPI
seasonably file and serve on the adverse party their to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be
respective pre-trial briefs denied or diminished by a rule of procedure, more so,
since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit
BPI filed MR RTC Order: granted MR; set for pre-trial line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of
on February 13, 2004 at 8:30 am BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding
liability to BPI To dismiss the case with prejudice and,
Dando filed MR RTC: denied thus, bar BPI from recovering the amount it had lent to
Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of
Dando filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with CA
BPI
CA: granted petition finding that delay in the filing of
the pre-trial brief was solely due to the heavy load of paper The counsel of BPI invokes “heavy pressures of work” to
work of its counsel, not to mention the daily hearings the explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC
latter had to attend thus excuse is flimsy and to serve a copy thereof to Dando at least three days
prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference True,
ISSUE: Is Section 6, Rule 18 mandatory?
in Olave v. Mistas, we did not find “heavy pressures of
RULING: Yes but there are exceptions work” as sufficient justification for the failure of therein
respondents’ counsel to timely move for pre-trial.
Basic legal construction that where words of command
such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are employed, they are However, unlike the respondents in Olave, the failure of
generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide
where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period
the word “shall” is used, a mandatory duty is imposed, under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was the first
which the courts ought to enforce and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the bank
in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did not manifest an evident
procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a
disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it Rules.
is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of
technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando
even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to by immediately moving to set Civil Case No. 03-281 for
reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to
and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be hear the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC
THUS, exigencies and situations might occasionally dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281.
demand flexibility in their application
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, Court restated the reasons served if the parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the
that may provide justification for a court to suspend a full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate
strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not
of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing
special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any
case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,19
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Issue: Was the motion for intervention filed by Sps. Gutang In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed
and Looyuko in the 3rd civil case was proper considering intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
that the case was already final and executor? judgment by the trial court.
Ruling: Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals: intervention
R12.2 of the Rules of Court prevailing at the time: was allowed even when the petition for review of
Intervention – a person may, before or during a the assailed judgment was already submitted for
trial be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to decision in the Supreme Court.
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in Mago vs. Court of Appeals: the Court granted
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either intervention despite the case having become final
of the parties, or an interest against both, or when and executory. (Petitioners were unaware of the
he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a proceedings and were lulled into believing that all
distribution or other disposition of property in the was well. The denial of their motion to intervene
custody of the court or of an officer thereof. arising from the strict application of the rule was
A motion for intervention should be made before an injustice to petitioners whose substantial
or during a trial interest in the subject property cannot be
Because of the varying interpretations of the disputed. Petitioners were indispensable parties.)
phrase, the present Rules have clarified that the In both cases, the intervenors were indispensable
motion should be filed “any time before rendition parties. This is not so in the case at bar
of judgment”. R68.1, ROC requires all persons having or claiming
The justification advanced for this is that before an interest in the premises subordinate in right to
judgment is rendered, the court, for good cause that of the holder of the mortgage and be made
shown, may still allow the introduction of defendants in the action for foreclosure. The
additional evidence and that is still within a liberal requirement for joinder of the person claiming an
interpretation of the period for trial. interest subordinate to the mortgage sought to be
Since no judgment has yet been rendered, the foreclosed, however, is not mandatory in
matter subject of the intervention may still be character but merely directory.
readily resolved and integrated in the judgment A subordinate lien holder is a proper, even a
disposing of all claims in the case, and would not necessary, but not an indispensable party to a
require an overall reassessment of said claims as foreclosure proceeding.
would be the case if the judgment had already Sps. Gutang and Looyuo acquire only a lien upon
been rendered the equity of redemption vested in the mortgagor,
The motions for intervention were filed after and their rights are strictly subordinate to the
judgment had already been rendered, when the superior lien of the mortgage
case was already final and executor. Intervention The failure of the mortgagee to join the
can no longer be allowed in a case already subordinate lien holders as defendants in the
terminated by final judgment foreclosure suit did not have the effect of
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or nullifying the foreclosure proceeding, but kept
ancillary to the principal action, and not an alive the equity of redemption acquired by the
independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory purchasers in their respective execution sales.
proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case
between the original parties.
Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no
pending proceeding wherein the intervention may LIMPO v. COURT OF APPEALS
be based.
Here, there is no more pending principal action June 16, 2000; J. Mendoza
wherein the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al.
may intervene. FACTS
A decision was already rendered therein and no
appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment (not related to the Rem Law Rev topic, just for the
in that main case is now final and executory. background facts in case Sir asks)
Intervention is legally possible only "before or
during a trial," hence a motion for intervention Petitioner Reggie Christi Limpo and Bong Diaz were
filed after trial—and, a fortiori, when the case has acquitted in separate criminal cases for BP22 and
already been submitted, when judgment has been estafa, but were held severally liable to private
rendered, or worse, when judgment is already respondent Veronica Gonzales in the total amount of
final andexecutory—should be denied. P275,000.00, plus interests
The decision became final and executory on December
1, 1991. On December 29, 1992, private respondent
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,21
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
filed a motion for the enforcement of the civil liability; On April 25, 2000, while the case was pending
the trial court issued a writ of execution. The sheriff deliberation in the Supreme Court, the spouses
levied upon 2 parcels of land registered in the name of Anselmo and Precilla Bulaong filed a motion for leave
petitioner. to intervene.
After purchasing the parcels of land in the auction sale o It appears that, in a decision rendered on July 30,
and in order to consolidate her ownership, private 1999, in Civil Case No. 170-M-95, the RTC ordered
respondent demanded from petitioner the surrender the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-62002 and T-62003
of her owner’s copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396. in the name of private respondent Gonzales and
Petitioner, however, failed to do so, whereupon the execution of a deed of sale covering the lands
private respondent filed a petition under P.D. No. 1529 in question in favor of the spouses Bulaong; and
(Property Registration Decree) to compel petitioner to the issuance to the latter of new titles upon
surrender her owner’s duplicate certificates of title. payment by them of P275,000.00 to Gonzales
o Despite Limpo’s receipt of the Order setting the representing the judgment debt of petitioner in
case for hearing and then for continuance of Criminal Case Nos. 9638-M to 9653-M.
hearing, however, no opposition was filed, o It appears further that from the decision, both the
prompting the court to enter an Order of general spouses Bulaong and private respondent appealed
default and allowing the presentation of ex parte to the Court of Appeals where the case is now
evidence by Gonzales. pending as C.A. G.R. SP No. 55423.
o The trial court rendered judgment, wherein Limpo In their motion for intervention, the spouses Bulaong
was directed to surrender the owner’s duplicate alleged that:
copies of TCT No. T-30395 and T-30396 to the o On January 13, 1993, the Limpos mortgaged the
Register of Deeds, who was ordered to cancel or lands in question to them for P4.3 million,
annul the same and in lieu thereof, issue new delivering to them the owner’s duplicates of TCT
copies of certificates of title in the name of Nos. T-249639 and T-249641 registered in the
Gonzales name of the persons from whom petitioner bought
No motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been the properties.
filed, the decision became final and executory. The o As the originals of the titles in the Register of
Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT Nos. T- Deeds of Malolos had been destroyed by fire in
30395 and T-30396 in the name of petitioner and, in 1987, they filed a petition for reconstitution,
lieu thereof, issued TCT Nos. T-62002 and T-62003 in resulting in the issuance on February 4, 1993 of
the name of Gonzales TCT Nos. RT-29488 and RT-29489 which were
Because of petitioner’s refusal to vacate the premises, later cancelled when, in their place, TCT Nos. T-
private respondent filed a petition for issuance of a 30395 and T-30396 in the name of petitioner
writ of possession. were issued.
o The trial court granted ex parte the petition for o The spouses found out "to their consternation . . .
issuance of a writ of possession and, on May 26, several entries with various erasures and
1995, a writ of possession was issued superimpositions appearing in the pages of the
On June 19, petitioner filed an urgent motion to stop encumbrance of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396;"
the sheriff from implementing the writ of possession. that "the position, placing, and the number of
She prayed that the order of the trial court and the entries favored spouses Bulaong, while the dates
writ of possession issued pursuant to it be set aside. of entries indicate advantage on the part of
o Petitioner alleged that she had never been Gonzales"
furnished a copy of private respondent’s petition o The mortgage lien of the spouses Bulaong was
for the issuance of a writ of possession, nor given annotated on the reconstituted titles on March 1,
a notice of hearing concerning the same and, 1993. On August 22, 1993, the mortgage was
consequently, she was deprived of due process foreclosed and the properties covered by it were
o The trial court denied petitioner’s motion and her sold for P4.3 million to the spouses Bulaong as
motion for reconsideration and ordered the highest bidders; a certificate of sale was issued to
issuance of an alias writ of possession. them and inscribed on TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of 30396
Appeals, arguing that a writ of possession could be o The spouses Bulaong pray that "the conflict
issued ex parte only in connection with an between the rights of spouses Bulaong as
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act No. mortgagees for P4.3 million as against the entry in
3135; the CA dismissed the petition and denied the primary book for the P275,000.00 judgment
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. claim of Gonzales be resolved."
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
(Rem Law Rev-related set of facts) ISSUE
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,22
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Whether intervention can be allowed at this stage of the Noel Tabuelog and 8 others were duly-licensed importers
proceedings. of vehicles. In April and May of 1998, they imported 72
right-hand drive buses from Japan, when RA 8506 at that
HELD time prohibited such importation of right hand vehicles.
Upon arrival in the Port of Manila, the District Collector of
NO Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered them stored
in the warehouse of Asian Terminals, Inc (ATI), a customs
Intervention may be granted only where its allowance bonded warehouse. Pursuant to Sec. 2607 of the Tarrif and
will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the Customs Code, the District Collector issued Warrants of
original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed Distraint against shipment and set the sale at public
"before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as auction of the cars.
Rule 19, §2 expressly provides.
o After trial and decision in a case, intervention can The importers filed a complaint with the RTC, for replevin
no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary and
allowed on appeal without unduly delaying the mandatory injunction and damages. They contend that the
disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest importation is not prohibited, provided that conversion
of the parties. kits are included in the vehicles. Therefore, there was no
There is no justification for granting the motion for the basis for the seizure.
intervention of the spouses Bulaong which they filed
only on April 25, 2000, after the appeal in this case had RTC:Application for writ of replevin granted, on a 12M
already been submitted for resolution. bond.
o On January 4, 1993, notice of the levy on execution
in Criminal Case Nos. 9638-M to 9653-M was However, George Jeroes, Chief of Customs Police and 4
entered in the primary entry book of the Register customs police, prevented the Sheriff and the police
of Deeds of Malolos and were later annotated on assisting the sheriff to take custody of the vehicles. He
the owner’s duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T- claims the District Collector has jurisdiction over the
249639 and T-249641. buses.
o Although the spouses Bulaong claim that said
owner’s duplicate copies of the titles were "clean" On motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued an Order
when the Limpos mortgaged the properties to directing the PNP Director to assist the Sheriff in
them on January 13, 1993, they nonetheless admit implementing the writ, and to arrest anyone who will
that when the titles in the name of petitioner obstruct implemention of the order. Thereafter, the Sheriff
Limpo were issued shortly after February 4, 1993 was able to take custody of the business. The District
(TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396), they contained Collector however, agreed to transfer custody of the buses
the notice of levy on execution. They, therefore, to the RTC, on the condition that the required taxes, dues
had notice of private respondent Gonzales’ claims and oter charges be paid. Plaintiffs paid the taxes
over the properties. amounting to 7.5M, and eventually, were able to take
On December 16, 1994, Gonzales filed a petition to possession of the buses.
compel petitioner Limpo, as registered owner, to
surrender her owner’s copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and The defendants, through the OSG, filed an Omnibus Motion
T-30396. seeking reconsideration of the RTC Order granting the writ
o Assuming that the spouses Bulaong were until of replevin. The OSG claims that the Bureau of Customs has
then without knowledge of the sale of the exclusive jurisdiction over the vehicles, and on the issue of
properties to Gonzales, they could not have seizure and detention thereof.
remained unaware of her claim. After all, they
admit they were then in possession of the owner’s ATI then filed a third party claim over the shipment,
copy of TCT Nos. T-30395 and T-30396. alleging it had lien over the vehicles for accumulated and
It took them nearly five years from March 29, 1995, unpaid storage and arrastre charges, and wharfage dues
when private respondent filed a petition for issuance amounting to 13M. It prayed that the vehicles be returned
of a writ of possession, before filing their motion for and remain with it until payment. It filed a motion to
leave to intervene. Such delay amounts to laches and require defendants to post a bond to insure payment of its
justifies the denial of their motion. claims, or to order the Sheriff to return possession of the
buses.
ASIAN TERMINALS VSRICAFORT
The importers opposed the third party claim, saying that
27 October 2006 | Ponente: Callejo
ATI failed to allege any factual or legal basis for the alleged
lien. There was no contract to cover the charges! Before
FACTS
resolving ATI's motion, the importers filed a
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,23
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
"Motion/Notice to Dismiss/Withdraw Complaint" against ISSUE: Was the court correct in dismissing the third
the officials of the Bureua of Customs and the Department party claim and the complaint-in-intervention? YES.
of Finance, since they agreed to implement the writ of
replevin after the plaintiff paid the required taxes. RULING:
The OSG however opposed to this Motion to Withdraw ATI: As held in Metrobankvs RTC Br. 39, dismissal of the
saying that the release of the buses by the Bureau of original complaint cannot result in denial of the complaint-
Customs cannot make the importation legal. The Bureau in-intervention. Its consent as intervenor is necessary for
was just constrained to release the buses because of the dismissal of the main action. The original parties can't
Court's order that the PNP assist the Sheriff in seizing the isolate it and agree among themselves to dismiss the
buses. complaint. The complaint-in-intervention survives the
original complaint for as long as an actual controversy had
ATI then filed a Motion for Intervention and for been established by the pleadings. The intervention has to
Admission of its Complaint-in-Intervention, alleging be heard regardless of the disposition of the principal
that it had a lien on the buses for 13.8M, which action.
represents storage, arrastrage and wharfage dues. The
importers opposed to this, saying that (1) ATI failed to ATI: This case is different from Barangay
present any contract covering the storage of the buses in MaticticvsElbinias, as relied upon by the CA, because in
the warehouse; (2) ATI has no legal interest in the matter that case, the third party complaint was filed after the
in litigation; (3) ATI's rights may be protected in a decision in the main case had already become final. In this
separate proceeding. case, the third-party claim was filed before the RTC
dismissed the action.
Later, the court dismissed the complaint due to the
plaintiff's own motion to dismiss, and since the court has SC: The RTC acted in accordance with the Tariff and
no jurisdiction over the case. It is the CTA which has Customs Code and jurisprudence when it issued its Orders.
jurisdiction. Sec. 602 of that Code provide that the Bureau of Customs
has exclusive jurisdiction over seized and forfeited cars.
ATI filed a Motion for clarification of the order, alleging And in Sec. 2301, the Collector of Customs is empowered
that the court failed to resolve its motion. It pleaded that to make the seizure of the cargo and issue receipt for
the court admit its complaint-in-intervention and its detention. The RTC cannot rule on the validity of forfeiture
motion to require plaintiffs to post a bond to insure proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs. It
payment of the lien. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed such cannot even assume cognizance over such matters through
Complaint-in-intervention. It declared that the rights of petitions for certiorari. Therefore in this case, the RTC has
ATI can be fully protected in a separate proceeding. no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
replevin and to issue a writ of replevin and order its
ATI then filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA, alleging enforcement. The Orders are void.
that it filed its Complaint-in-intervention before the
RTC dismissed the complaint of the importers. SC: The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing the
Dismissal of the main case does not necessarily result complaint-in-intervention. Since it had no jurisdiction
in dismissal of the ancillary action since it has a legal over the importers' action, all proceedings before it
interest in the matter of litigation - that is, it is so would be void. It cannot take cognizance of the
situated as to be adversely affected by the distribution complaint-in-intervention. Moreover, it is ancillary
or other disposition of the property in question. and supplemental to the existing litigation, and never
an independent action. Dismissal of the principal
The CA dismissed the petition. The RTC has no jurisdiction action necessarily results in dismissal of the
over the complaint of the importers. The Collector of complaint-in-intervention. If the court has no
Customs has exclusive jurisdiction to hear questions jurisdiction over the principal action, it doesn't have
relating to seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. The jurisdiction over the complaint-in-intervention. This is
CTA, then, has the power to review the Collector's because jurisdiction of intervention is governed by
proceedings. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of the main action.
main case, it also has no authority to hear the third
party claim or the complaint-in-intervention. In Saw vs
CA, the CA ruled that intervention is not independent VIRRA MALL TENANTS ASSOC VS. VIRRA MALL
proceeding but an ancillary and supplemental one GREENHILLS ASSOC et al
which is subordinate to the main proceeding. Since the
main action was dismissed, there was no more October 5, 2011 | Sereno
proceeding where ATI can intervene in.
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,24
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
Facts: Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas) is Issue: WON it was proper for VMTA to enforce its rights
the owner of the Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC). It through the complain-in-intervention (YES)
entered into a Contract of Lease with Virra Realty
Development Corporation (Virra Realty) for a period of 25 Held: It is clear from the foregoing allegations in its
years set to expire on November 15, 2000. Virra Realty complaint-in-intervention that VMTA’s purported right is
constructed Virra Mall Shopping Center and divided the rooted in its claim that it is the real beneficiary of the
units for lease. insurance proceeds, on the grounds that it had (a)
facilitated the repair and restoration of the insured
Virra Realty organized respondent Virra Mall infrastructure upon the orders of Ortigas, and (b)
Greenhills Association (VMGA), an association of all the advanced the costs thereof. Corollarily, respondents have a
tenants and leasehold right holders, who managed and duty to reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance
operated Virra Mall. On November 22, 2000, the VGMA’s proceeds had already been issued in favor of respondent
president requested for the renewal of the Contract of VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto.
Lease.
VMTA was also able to show its legal interest in
VGMA secure two fire insurance policies, the the matter in litigation — VMGA’s insurance proceeds —
coverage of which will expire simultaneously with the considering that it had already advanced the substantial
Contract of Lease. VGMA against acquired new sets of amount of P18,902,497.75 for the repair and restoration of
insurance policies effective 10 January 2001 to 31 Virra Mall. That VMTA seeks reimbursement from Ortigas
December 2001. is precisely the reason why intervention is proper.
On May 5, 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire. The issuance to Ortigas of a WPA against VMGA
VGMA filed an insurance claim through its insurance puts VMTA in a situation in which it will be adversely
broker. The proceeds of the insurance were released to affected by a distribution or other disposition of the
VMGA. property in the custody of the court, pursuant to the said
writ. The prospect of any distribution or disposition of the
On September 3, 2001, Ortigas renewed the attached property will likewise affect VMTA’s claim for
Contract of Lease effective from November 2, 2001 to reimbursement.
December 2004. On September 11, 2001, VGMA assigned
his rights and interests over the property to Virra Mall Although VMTA could file a separate case against
Tenants Association (VMTA). Ortigas, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and avoid a multiplicity of
Ortigas filed a complaint for specific performance suits.
with writ of preliminary attachment (WPA) against VGMA.
It accused them of fraud and misappropriation and
conversion of substantial portions of the insurance
proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the SUBPOENA
repair and restoration of Virra Mall. A WPA was issued
later on. COLLADO V. BRAVO
VMTA filed a complaint-in-intervention, claiming Facts:
that as the assignee or transferee of the rights and
Lorena O. Collado charged respondent Teresita G. Bravo,
obligations of VGMA, it had engaged the services of
Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
contractors and paid over P18M for the repair and Naguilian, La Union, with Grave Misconduct and/or
restoration of the Virra Mall. VGMA moved for the Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention on the ground
Collado alleged that she received through priority mail, a
that it states no cause of action.
subpoena from the MTC of Naguilian, La Union, directing
her to appear before the said court at 2:00 P.M., July 14,
RTC denied the dismissal of the complaint-in-
1997. The subpoena was duly signed by respondent in her
intervention. CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the capacity as Clerk of Court. Before proceeding to said court,
complaint-in-intervention. complainant sought assistance from the Office of the
Governor of La Union and Mr. Arthur T. Madayag, Legal
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,25
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
the right to present his evidence. RTC remanded the cases RTC denied due course to and dismissed the petition for
to it for the reception of petitioner’s evidence. petitioner’s failure to show that Judge Contreras
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
11 March 1999: During the pendency of the remanded or lack of jurisdiction. MR denied.
cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a “Request for
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Petitioner appealed via certiorari to the CA, which
Duces Tecum”, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC. MR denied.
both of Cal’s Corporation or their duly authorized
representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May ISSUE: WON the courts below committed reversible error
1999 and to bring with them certain documents, records in denying petitioner’s request for the issuance of
and books of accounts for the years 1993-19995. subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum.
(No.)
Prosecution did not object to this request. MTCC granted
petitioner’s request. RATIONALE:
Subpoena - a process directed to a person requiring him to
During trial, the private prosecutor manifested that it was
attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or
improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
of the requested subpoenas. Petitioner countered by
Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition
saying the order had become final and hence, immutable.
Nonetheless, TC allowed the prosecution to file its
2 kinds of subpoena:
comment or opposition to petitioner’s request.
1. Subpoena ad testificandum - used to compel a person to
Prosecution argued that Vivian Deocampo, who previously testify
testified for Lota Briones-Roco in Criminal Cases Nos. 94- 2. Subpoena duces tecum - used to compel the production
2177-12 to 94-2182-12 before Branch 1 of the MTC, had of books, records, things or documents therein specified.
earlier attested to the fact that the following documents,
records and books of accounts for 1993 sought by H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
petitioner were already burned. The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the
ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception
Cal's maintained that the production of the documents was that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall
inappropriate because they are immaterial and irrelevant bring with him and produce at the examination the books,
to the crimes. documents, or things described in the subpoena.
MTCC denied petitioner’s request on the following Subpoena duces tecum requisites:
grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and (1) the books, documents or other things requested must
other records were immaterial in resolving the issues appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must
subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the be reasonably described by the parties to be readily
criminal cases. MR denied. identified (test of definiteness).
Petitioner went to the RTC on a petition for certiorari with
H.C. Liebenow: ... it is proper to consider, first, whether the
plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or
and/or TRO imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
rather for specific proof, and secondly, whether that proof
of Judge Contreras,docketed as SP Case No. V-7489.
is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its
production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted
5
a) Sales Journal for the year 1993; with a view to ascertain whether something of value may
b) Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;
c) Sales Ledger for the year 1993;
not show up, will not be enforced.
d) Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence, Accounts Receivable
Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 or 1999);
e) Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al.: it must
Income Statements as of February 1999;
f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance
appear, by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or
Sheet as of February 1999; and document sought to be produced contains evidence
g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,27
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
The books and documents that petitioner requested to be The irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear
subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with on their very face. The checks were drawn and dated in
definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness 1993. Petitioner has not demonstrated the justification, for
is satisfied in this case. the production of the books/records for 1994, and onwards,
up to 1999. Especially so, when the “Informations” against
Aguirre vs. People of the Philippines: xxx what the law the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not the Trial Court, as early as 1994.
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing Petitioner was just embarking on a “fishing expedition” to
a worthless check is malum prohibitum. Elements of Blg. derail “the placid flow of trial”, calculated to merely
22: [a] the making, drawing and issuance of any check to lengthen the proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if
apply to account or for value; [2] the knowledge of the not to fish for evidence.
maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment;
and [3] subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
RE: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM DATED JANUARY 11,
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
2010 OF ACTING DIRECTOR ALEU A. AMANTE, PIAB-C,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC
The gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The offense Facts: a subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Office of
is already consummated from the very moment a person the Ombudsman upon the “Chief, Office of the
issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the Administrative Services or AUTHORIZED
check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within REPRESENTATIVE, Supreme Court, Manila,” for the
five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor given to the submission of the latest Personal Data Sheets and last
drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie known forwarding address of former Chief Justice Davide
presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the and former Associate Justice Austria-
insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the Martinez. The subpoena duces tecum was issued pursuant
issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment to Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15
is thereby rebutted by such payment. of Republic Act No. 6770 in relation to a criminal
complaint entitled Oliver O. Lozano and Evangeline Lozano-
Petitioner admitted that had been issued temporary Endriano v. Hilario G. Davide, Jr., et al. The Office of the
receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing Administrative Services referred the matter to the
his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the Supreme Court with a request for clearance to release the
corporation. The production of the books and documents specified documents and information.
requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his
defense of payment. Even if the temporary receipts issued Subsequently, an order was issued and signed by Acting
may not have been the official receipts for Petitioner’s Director Taytaon-Padios of the Office of the Ombudsman,
payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on Cal's dismissing the Lozano complaint and referring it to the
as official receipts issued by the latter. Supreme Court for appropriate action. This order was
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,28
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco
premised on a previous Memorandum issued by Here, the “matter” that led to the issuance of a subpoena
Ombudsman Marcelo who directed that all complaints duces tecum was a criminal complaint filed by Lozano for
against judges and other members of the Judiciary be the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court Chief
immediately dismissed and referred to the Supreme Court Justice Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Austria-
for appropriate action. Martinez of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). Jurisprudence reveals the rule on
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the subpoena duces the liability of Justices of the Supreme Court for violations
tecum was proper? of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Held: Issue rendered moot and academic due to the In re Wenceslao Lauret,: the Court ruled that insofar as this
dismissal order. However, it is appropriate to discuss the Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation
extent of the Ombudsman’s authority in these types of of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
complaints. that such collective decision is “unjust”
should not prosper; the parties cannot “relitigate in
Generally, the Office of the Ombudsman has full authority another forum the final judgment of the Court,” as to do so
to issue subpoenas, and subpoena duces tecum, for is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial
compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of functions, to another body.
documents and information relating to matters under its
investigation. But this authority is not unlimited, as the In re Joaquin T. Borromeo held that (1) judgments of the
Ombudsman must abide by the terms of the Constitution Supreme Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil
and our laws, the Rules of Court and the applicable and criminal complaints against a judge should not be
jurisprudence on the issuance, service, validity and efficacy turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may
of subpoenas. Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation where the
subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a
under the requirements of reasonableness and judgment of the Court is unjust is an absurdity.
relevance. For the production of documents to be
reasonable and for the documents themselves to be Thus, under our constitutional scheme, only this
relevant, the matter under inquiry should be one that the Court – not the Ombudsman – can declare a
Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and Supreme Court judgment to be unjust. A criminal
rule upon. complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, based on the legal correctness of the official
acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot
In considering whether a criminal complaint is within the prosper. However, Justices are not absolutely
authority of the Ombudsman to entertain, investigate and immune from suit during their term. The
rule upon, is to consider the nature of the powers of the Constitution provides that the appropriate
Supreme Court. This Court is supreme in its task of recourse against them is to seek their removal
adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the from office if they are guilty of culpable violation
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
established by law. As a rule, all decisions and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately public trust. After removal, can they be criminally
go to and stop at the Supreme Court whose judgment is proceeded against for their transgressions.
final. This constitutional scheme cannot be subverted
through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of Section 22 of Republic Act No. 67706, does specifically
imputing a misdeed to the Court and its Members, grants the Ombudsman the authority to investigate
seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long
been laid to rest by the Court. Such criminal complaint is 6
Section 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the
a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate
constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond any serious misconduct in office allegedly
question. committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
Remedial Law Review Case Digests Alconera, Alegre, Antonio, Bejemino, Beley, Cerilles, Dayag, De Guzman, Dela Cruz, Delfin, Felizmenio,29
Atty. Tranquil G.S. Salvador III Gargar, Ko, Magallanes, Mapalo, Navarro,D, Navarro,K, Ngo, Octaviano, Reyes, Ruga, Salanguit, Velasco