International Think Tank Resources

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International Think Tanks Resources

Issue 8
Table of Content
Lebanon:
 Hezbollah & Iran: Lebanon's Power Couple............................2
 Ahmadinejad bears a message for Israel…………………………….3
 Ahmadinezhad's Lebanon Visit and the Fate of the Hariri

Tribunal………………………………………………………………………………5
 How Israel can use to Syria to thwart Ahmadinejad……………8
 Heroes and villains in Lebanon……………………………………………9
Regional:
 Syria offers Maliki a life jacket………………………………………….11
 Sponsored Corruption and Neglected Reform in Syria………13
Peace Talks:
 The Mideast Moratorium Mess…………………………………………23
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Hezbollah & Iran: Lebanon's Power Couple

By: Mohamad Bazzi
Date: October 14, 2010
Source:Council on Foreign Relations
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's state visit to Lebanon this week has created a media circus in the
West and stirred new debate over the relationship of the Iranian regime to Hezbollah, Lebanon's dominant
Shiite militia and political party. Ahmadinejad's visit "suggests that Hezbollah values its allegiance to Iran over its
allegiance to Lebanon," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said on Wednesday.
Gibbs's analysis is part of an effort by the Obama administration, along with some Arab and Lebanese critics of
Hezbollah, to portray the Party of God as primarily an Iranian proxy. While Hezbollah has become more reliant
on Iran in recent years, it is a mistake for Western and Arab policymakers to think they can undermine the
movement's base of support by casting doubt on its Arab or Lebanese identity. This approach also reflects a
misunderstanding of Shiite history in Lebanon and why that community has grown so dependent on Hezbollah.
There is a long tradition of the Lebanese state leaving Shiites to fend for themselves and waiting for religious or
charitable groups to fill the vacuum. This happened over decades, long before Hezbollah emerged in the early
1980s. Hezbollah's "state within a state" was possible because successive governments left a void in the Shiite-
dominated areas of southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah did what
any effective political movement would do: It created a dependency and social service network that guaranteed
its dominance.
In the 1960s and '70s, when Shiites were first making the migration from the rural south and Bekaa to Beirut and
other cities, the central government left their fate to the clans and feudal landlords who held sway in the
agricultural hinterlands. In 1970, when the Palestine Liberation Organization began creating bases in southern
Lebanon, the Shiites were on the front line of a conflict between the PLO and Israel. More Shiite families fled
their homes in the south and joined relatives who had already settled around Beirut. Around this time, a Shiite
cleric named Musa al-Sadr created Amal, the first major Shiite political party, which later turned into a militia.
When Israeli troops first invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 to drive out the PLO and create a "buffer zone" to
prevent attacks on northern Israel, Shiites welcomed Israeli soldiers with rice and flowers. But that honeymoon
did not last long, and Shiites were soon fighting the Israeli occupation. The Shiites turned out to be more
formidable enemies of Israel than the PLO.
Since it was founded in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has received financial, military, and political support from
Iran. The Islamic Republic's militant clerics, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, once hoped that the group
would help export their revolution to the Arab world. But Hezbollah later abandoned the cause of creating an
Islamic state in multi-confessional Lebanon. This is not to say that Hezbollah became a democratic or liberal
movement. After Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon in 2000, many Lebanese wanted Hezbollah
to disarm and become a strictly political party. The militia's leaders refused, and they have since gone to great
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lengths to protect their weapons. The group has also shown little willingness to become accountable to the non-
Shiite communities in Lebanon.
Without a strong central state that can defend itself and impose its authority throughout the country, Hezbollah
remains the most powerful force in Lebanon--and its weapons guarantee that dominance.
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Ahmadinejad bears a message for Israel

By: Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Source: Asia Times (Middle East)
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press)
On the eve of his much-anticipated visit to Lebanon on Wednesday, which is sure to bolster Hezbollah's national
standing in fractious Lebanese politics, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was busy working the phones to
leaders in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. He assured them that Tehran supported "sustainable security" in
Lebanon and "the unity" of Lebanon's groups, as well as "strengthening the region's resistance".
Ahmadinejad called in his conversation with Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah for "closer coordination" between the
countries to "create regional stability, especially in Lebanon", according to the Iranian press.
In light of King Abdullah's recent visit to Lebanon, reflecting a more proactive Saudi involvement in Lebanese
affairs aimed at sustaining Lebanon's fragile internal peace, such diplomatic gestures by Ahmadinejad build
confidence between Tehran and Riyadh as well as with other Arab capitals. This includes Cairo, which has taken
a positive step in repairing ties with Iran by setting up an air link with Tehran.
Assuming Ahmadinejad's trip to Lebanon goes as planned and without any major hitches, it could go a long way
in improving Iran's relations with the entire Arab world, which is somewhat weary of Tehran's politics of "sphere
of influence" in Iraq and Lebanon, among other countries.
Iran's ambassador to Baghdad made it known in a recent meeting with Iraqi leaders that Tehran preferred the
premiership of Nuri al-Maliki, a comment vilified in some Arab papers as tantamount to interference in Iraq's
internal affairs. Maliki has been struggling since elections in March to form a government that would give him
another term in power.
From Tehran's vantage point, the comment was a reminder of Iran's substantial influence in Iraq's dominant pro-
Iran Shi'ite coalition - a fait accompli worthy of consideration by those pundits in the West who depict Iran as a
"paper tiger". In contrast, some Arab pundits go to the other extreme and portray Iran as a "regional
superpower".
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The fact is, Iran is neither. It is a regional middle power benefiting from a geostrategic and geo-economic
location straddling the two energy hubs of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and it was deeply rattled by the
post-September 11 infusion of Western power in its vicinity threatening its national security.
"The president's intention of the visit to Lebanon is several-fold," said a Tehran University political scientist who
specializes in Iran's foreign relations. "First, he wants to make sure that there is no attempt to weaken Hezbollah
because of the Hariri investigation." This is a reference to the United Nations-backed international tribunal
investigating the assassination of former Lebanese president Rafik Hariri in Beirut in 2005; it is widely expected
to implicate Lebanon's Hezbollah.
"Second, he [Ahmadinejad] wants to improve trade and economic ties between Iran and Lebanon. He will travel
to south Lebanon to send a message to Israel that they can bet there will be a frontal attack on Israel from south
Lebanon if Israel ever dares to attack Iran.
"Third, with Hezbollah's substantial arsenal of missiles, grown several-fold since the 2006 war [with Israel], that
is a warning that no Israeli politician can afford to ignore. Fourth, the president is trying to improve relations
with the Arab world and Lebanon is the gateway," said the political scientist, who added that the timing "is
crucial because of both internal Lebanon politics and the waves of anti-Iran initiatives by the US and its allies. ...
This visit is intended to elevate Iran's regional status."
Ahmadinejad is scheduled to meet President Michel Suleiman, Prime Minister Saad Hariri and parliament
speaker Nabih Berri. He will also meet Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
Given the huge publicity the two-day visit has generated, the stakes appear to be so high that Iran is worried
that nervous Americans and Israelis may play mischief and resort to indirect acts of violence in Lebanon to
deflect some of the attention from Ahmadinejad.
Israeli media are awash with government warnings to the Lebanese authorities not to allow Ahmadinejad to
tour the border between the two countries. Some reports hinted that the president's intention to throw a stone
in Israel's direction was designed to escalate tensions with Israel, a tit-for-tat for Israel's alleged complicity in a
cyber-attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.
According to another analyst at a Tehran think-tank, Iran has learned a precious lesson from Iraq, which was
subjected to years of sanctions prior to the country's invasion in 2003. "Iran will not be another Iraq and Tehran
can answer with hard power the sting of soft-power sanctions," the analyst told the author.
The United Nations, and the United States unilaterally, have imposed a raft of sanctions on Iran over its
uranium-enrichment program. These are "retarding Iran's economic growth", to paraphrase some Iranian
parliamentarians.
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However, Tehran is not in a panic just yet, particularly since the recent US announcement of four major oil
companies quitting Iran in response to the sanctions appears to have been made prematurely, according to
reports from the Iranian Oil Ministry as well as news reports from outside the country. It was reported this
month that France's Total, Royal Dutch Shell, Norway's Statoil and Italian Eni had agreed to abandon their
business ties with Iran to avoid being hit with US sanctions.
A part of the reason Western oil majors are reluctant to end their involvement in Iran is that their lucrative
contracts will most likely be taken over by Chinese companies, especially since the West has little control over
China's economic relations with Iran.
Still, the Iranians continue to be worried about the adverse impact of sanctions in future foreign investment in
the energy sector, which needs tens of billions of dollars to modernize its facilities. For example, a report states
that while Iran's most recent five-year plan had slated some US$200 billion in investment in the oil and gas
sector, only $70 billion had been earmarked to date. In other words, it is definitely in Iran's national economic
interests to contain the nuclear crisis that is having an adverse economic impact on the overall economy.
Regarding the latter, European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton has expressed optimism on the
renewal of nuclear talks "very soon"; this after coming under fire from Iran for "delaying" the dialogue.
Combining the familiar carrot and stick approach, the Europeans seem poised to restart the talks in an
environment most conducive to their strategy, which is why coinciding with Ashton's statement British Foreign
Secretary William Hague vowed "tougher sanctions". The aim is to garner major concessions from Tehran on the
nuclear front.
In this environment, Tehran's response has been to play more overt "sphere-of-influence" politics in the region,
one that conveys the impression that the lion (Iran's national symbol) is capable of roaring back if pressed too
hard.
****************************
Ahmadinezhad's Lebanon Visit and the Fate of the Hariri Tribunal

By: Ash Jain and Andrew J. Tabler
Date: October 12, 2010
Source: THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE For Near East Policy
Ash Jain, a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute. Andrew
J. Tabler is a Next Generation fellow in the Institute's Program on Arab Politics.
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Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's trip to Beirut this week will likely produce a flurry of rhetorical
challenges against Israel and perhaps even a visit to the Israel-Lebanon border. But one purpose of the trip may
be aimed at influencing the fate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), charged with investigating the 2005
assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. As the tribunal inches closer to indictments that reportedly
include Hizballah operatives, both the group and Syria -- apparently backed by Tehran -- have stepped up what
seems to be an orchestrated campaign to pressure Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his Western allies into ending
their support for the judicial process.
Background
In mid-July, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah launched a blistering public relations campaign to delegitimize the
STL after reports all but confirmed that prosecutor Daniel Bellemare intended to issue indictments against group
members. In addition to characterizing the tribunal as an "Israeli project" aimed at targeting the resistance and
provoking sectarian strife in Lebanon, he also cited "hard and irrefutable evidence" that Israeli intelligence
agents were behind the Hariri assassination. Then, after raising questions about the STL's credibility, he
demanded a new, "apolitical," Lebanese-controlled investigation that would take Hizballah's evidence into
account.
Later that month, Saudi King Abdullah and Syrian president Bashar al-Asad visited Beirut -- the culmination of
Riyadh's year-and-a-half-long effort to lead Asad away from Iran and back into the "Arab fold." After rumors of
an agreement between the two leaders linking government formation in Iraq with a renewed Syrian role in
Lebanon, Saad Hariri issued a stunning public revocation of previous allegations that Syria was behind his
father's assassination. In September, however, Asad hosted Ahmadinezhad in Damascus and then traveled to
Tehran, reaffirming the Syrian-Iranian "axis of resistance" and signaling their joint support for Hizballah.
Efforts to Derail the Tribunal
As part of its escalating campaign to undermine the STL, Hizballah -- with backing from Damascus and Tehran --
has sought to end all official Lebanese support for the tribunal's operations. The organization has made clear
that it will prevent the cabinet from approving Lebanon's share of STL funding, set by UN Security Council
Resolution 1757 at 49 percent of the tribunal's $56 million annual operating budget. It has also asked the
government to withdraw the Lebanese judges assigned to the STL.
At the same time, Hizballah has intensified political pressure on Saad Hariri to denounce the STL and join the
opposition in publicly calling for its dissolution. This campaign has taken an increasingly ominous tone. For
example, Hizballah ally and speaker of parliament Nabih Berri warned of "civil strife" if the issue dragged on, and
Hizballah's al-Manar website added that Lebanon would face "tough days ahead" if Hariri refused to oppose the
STL by the end of September, a statement interpreted as a threat to his premiership. Syria officially joined this
effort last week when it issued arrest warrants against thirty-three "false witnesses" in the case, including some
of Hariri's closest aides and the first lead UN investigator, a former German state prosecutor.
Both Hizballah and Damascus have also been increasingly vocal in warning that any indictments aimed at the
group could fuel a new round of violence in Lebanon. Nasrallah reportedly told Hariri that if he attempted to
embrace such indictments, Hizballah would take actions that were "a hundred times worse than in 2008." Al-
Manar added that the group would treat any indictments as a "new invasion" of Lebanon. Similarly, in a recent
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Wall Street Journal interview, Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem warned that indictments would risk
"plunging Lebanon into a new round of sectarian strife."
What's Next?
In the face of increasing pressure, Hariri has so far held firm, vowing on September 29 not to "let the blood of
Premier Rafiq Hariri go to waste." But with the expiration of Hizballah's September 30 ultimatum, the stage
appears to be set for a potentially violent political confrontation. Several scenarios are possible:
Hariri concedes. To avert a crisis, Hariri could decide to accept Hizballah's demands, disavowing the STL, ending
Lebanon's funding for it, and calling for the withdrawal of Lebanese judges. Yet Hizballah would probably not be
satisfied with such actions given their limited potential impact on the STL's ongoing investigation. For example,
under Resolution 1757, other UN member states can make up for any shortfall in Lebanese STL funding via
voluntary contributions. Indeed, the Obama administration has pointedly reaffirmed U.S. support for the
tribunal and appears ready to pursue alternative funding sources if necessary. Moreover, as appointees of UN
secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, the Lebanese judges appear to be beyond the reach of any Lebanese cabinet or
parliamentary attempts to remove them.
Hizballah walks out. If the pressure campaign against Hariri fails, Hizballah could seek to bring down his
government by asking its allies to withdraw from the cabinet. The group controls ten of the eleven cabinet
members needed to produce such a collapse, so it would need the support of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt or
one of President Michel Suleiman's appointees (e.g., Adnan al-Sayyed Hussein, a Shiite placed on the cabinet
with Hizballah's consent). If successful, such a move would paralyze Lebanon's political institutions, plunge the
country into another crisis, and put Hizballah in a position to block formation of any new government until the
STL's fate was determined.
Hariri resigns. In an effort to preserve his dignity and uphold his father's legacy amid Hizballah pressure, Hariri
could decide to step down as prime minister -- an option publicly floated last week by a member of his
parliamentary bloc. Although some have suggested that such a move could strengthen Hariri's hand by making it
politically untenable for any other Sunni politician to accept a compromise on the STL, it could also give
Hizballah the leverage needed to block formation of a new government, as in the previous scenario.
Hizballah takes to the streets. If Hariri continues to defy Hizballah's demands, the group could launch street
protests designed to undermine stability and increase pressure on the government. As in the past, this could
lead to clashes with Sunni and Christian supporters of the March 14 coalition. Hizballah may even go further and
attempt a military takeover of Beirut, as it did in May 2008 -- a move that led regional powers to step in and
broker a new governing framework for Lebanon that reflected Hizballah's enhanced political power. By
repeating that scenario, the group could use fears of civil war as leverage, demanding that any new agreement
on Lebanon's political future -- a "Doha II" -- require March 14 and its Western allies to shut the STL down or,
perhaps more likely, place it under greater Lebanese control.
Challenge to the International Community
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Ahmadinezhad's visit -- aimed in part to reinforce Lebanon's further shift toward Syria and Iran -- may signal the
beginning of a new, more dangerous phase in Hizballah's intimidation campaign. This weekend, for example,
Nasrallah reiterated his determination to "stop this American and Israeli attempt to destroy the resistance."
With few other choices, Hariri and the Saudis appear to be placing their faith in Syria to restrain Hizballah and
maintain calm -- a role that Asad relishes as he continues his double game of encouraging the group to proceed
while reassuring Hariri of his support.
Although Hizballah and its allies have directed their pressure campaign against Hariri, their ultimate aim appears
to center on challenging overall support for the STL by forcing the international community to choose between
justice and stability. The Obama administration should use its nascent dialogue with Damascus to make clear
that Syrian efforts to undermine the tribunal will have adverse consequences. The real choice facing Washington
and its allies is whether to surrender Lebanon to the forces of armed intimidation or bolster those fighting to
uphold justice, democracy, and the rule of law. Although the United States has little sway over Hizballah's
actions on the ground, Washington should continue to reaffirm support for the tribunal and make clear that it
will not countenance any political deal over its future.
***************************
How Israel can use to Syria to thwart Ahmadinejad

Lebanon, that little country that has no intrinsic strategic significance, is serving well as the region's boxing
ring.
By: Zvi Bar'el
Source: Haaretz
"How do you feel with Ahmadinejad so nearby?" a farmer from Moshav Avivim, on the Lebanese border, was
asked, as if an actual Iranian nuclear bomb had been laid right next to the border. But it is not Ahmadinejad's
proximity that should worry the farmer, or the dramaturges that accompanied the spectacle. Because this visit
evinced no new threat, no declaration that had not been heard before, no new revolution threatening to
destroy Lebanon.
Bint Jbail, like most of southern Lebanon, has been under Hezbollah control for years. Images of the ayatollahs
Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei have long been a ubiquitous part of the Lebanese landscape. Iranian aid to
Hezbollah needs no new "proper disclosure" from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Lebanese government -
which is of no particular interest to the Iranian president - cannot refuse a visit from him, not after Lebanese
President Michel Suleiman was given such a solicitous welcome in Tehran.
In the absence of genuine new threats they had to be invented, in the form of discerning "hidden messages" in
the great show put on by Hezbollah for the Iranian president: one to Washington, so it knows who's in charge in
Lebanon; a double message to Israel, so it understands that Iran is backing Hezbollah and Hezbollah will
"protect" Iran if Israel attacks it; one warning the Lebanese against accusing Hezbollah of murderering Rafik
Hariri; one message to the Sunnis and another to the Shi'ites. In short, Lebanon, that little country that has no
intrinsic strategic significance, served well as the region's boxing ring. Fierce contests for control and hegemony
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are being fought in that arena - in particular, a cold war between certain Arab states on one side, and Iran and
its allies on the other; between the so-called "pro-Western" and "anti-American" axes.
Lebanon is not the only fight venue in the neighborhood. Iraq, Palestine, Yemen and Sudan offer similar services
to powerful rivals wrestling for regional control. Ahmadinejad has also taken aim at Arab states attempting to
curb Iran's influence. In Egypt, for example, the official organ Ruz al-Yusuf called Ahmadinejad's visit: "The day
on which Beirut became a Shi'ite emirate," while Saudi Arabia's foreign minister said cautionly, "we must first
study all the results of this visit."
Even Syria, which Ahmadinejad visited in September, did not go overboard in responding to the Iranian
president's reception in Lebanon. His statements were quoted selectively in the Syrian press, and on Thursday
the main headlines were grabbed by the important news of the visit to Damascus by outgoing Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, after nearly a year of being shunned. Lebanon is still in Syria's sphere of influence, and
Damascus has no intention of handing it over to Tehran. That is the "secret of success" of the Iran-Syria alliance -
an understanding that they will respect the boundaries of each other's sphere of influence.
Israel could have had a major role in this mighty power play. The renewal of negotiations with Syria, precisely at
the time of Ahmadinejad's visit, and after President Bashar Assad's statement that Iran was supportive of such
talks, would have presented Iran with a serious dilemma regarding its relations with Syria while putting
Hezbollah in the awkward situation of its protector-state negotiating with its worst enemy.
Such negotiations would not necessarily lead to the dissolution of the ties between Iran and Syria, since their
shared common interests are not identical with each state's own interests vis-a-vis other countries. Nor would it
necessarily lead to Hezbollah's disarmament. But a peace agreement between Israel and Syria would
significantly lower the threat from the northern border and create a new strategic equation, one that could be
more important than peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
But for such negotiations to begin Israel would have to declare that it understands the price of peace, or issue
any other declaration that would convince Assad that he will not become a second Mahmoud Abbas. And this
will not happen. Israel prefers to count the rockets in Hezbollah's armories and to quote Ahmadinejad's
promises of the imminent end of the Zionist entity. Israel has always known how to seal the windows of
opportunity with duct tape, lest they form a crack, God forbid.
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Heroes and villains in Lebanon

By: Robert Tait
Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad arrived in Lebanon on Wednesday to a hero's welcome and blaze of
fanfare that belied the country's rising intercommunal tensions and Western misgivings about his visit.
Shouts of "khosh amadi" ("welcome" in Persian) and showers of rice, sweets and petals greeted the Iranian
leader as he waved to crowds from an open-topped car after arriving in Beirut at the beginning of a two-day trip.
It's Ahmadinejad's first visit to Lebanon, where Iran has cultivated close relationship with Hezbollah, the Shi'ite
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Islamist group that fought a bitter five-week conflict with Israel in 2006. He was expected to address a
Hezbollah-organized rally attended by up to 60,000 people after meetings with senior Lebanese politicians,
including President Michel Suleiman, Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri and Nabih Berri, the parliament speaker.
Preparation for his arrival had been underway for weeks, with pro-Hezbollah neighborhoods festooned with
posters of Ahmadinejad along with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The warmth of the reception contrasted with foreboding expressed by Israel, the United States and Sunni
politicians in Lebanon. More than 200 prominent Lebanese citizens signed an open letter in advance of the trip
asking Ahmadinejad to avoid using Lebanon as a "spearhead" for confronting Israel.
That move echoes the feelings of many non-Shi'ite politicians in Lebanon's fragile unity government, who have
accused Ahmadinejad of treating their country as "an Iranian base on the Mediterranean".
Israel - whose demise Ahmadinejad has frequently forecast - has denounced the visit as a "provocation".
Iranian client state?
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, said the Iranian president's
arrival marks a milestone in a Hezbollah takeover of Lebanon aimed at turning it into an Iranian client state.
"The important issue is that we see another step in the 'Hezbollah-ization' of Lebanon,'' Inbar said. "Lebanon is
further losing its independence and Hezbollah is taking over, with Ahmadinejad encouraging these forces and
signaling to the whole Middle East that Lebanon is becoming an Iranian protectorate."
At a news conference with Suleiman, Ahmadinejad rejected charges of Iranian intervention in Lebanon's affairs:
"We believe that the Lebanese people and also the people of the region are capable of conducting their own
affairs on their own and to conduct the relationships with each other on the basis of justice and respect,''
Ahmadinejad said.
"Our region does not need the interference of regional or outside powers. We agreed with his excellency the
president to intensify our calls and meetings and to exchange our experiences in order to reach the maximum of
our capability and success and to support each other."
But that anodyne description will be challenged on October 14 when the president visits southern Lebanon,
where he is expected to address a rally in the town of Bint Jbeil, exalted to mythical status by Hezbollah because
it was heavily bombed in the 2006 conflict with Israel. There have also been suggestions that Ahmadinejad will
travel to the Lebanese-Israeli frontier and court yet more controversy by throwing highly symbolic stones into
Israel.
Stirring the pot
According to Hilal Khashan, a Lebanese political scientist, Ahmadinejad's visit is a projection of Iranian regional
power.
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''He is coming for his own Iranian reasons," Khashan said. "He wants to show the world that Iran is a regional
power, and that Iran is a confrontation state with Israel. The fact that he will be visiting Bint Jbeil in the south,
which Hezbollah calls the capital of liberation, means a lot to him. First he wants to convey to his people that
Iran is preponderant. He wants to show that Iran is a major power player that must be treated with respect and
understanding, and must be engaged instead of confrontation.''
Inbar said Israel sees Iran's backing for Hezbollah as a threat to its security which has the potential to lead to
further conflict.
"It definitely provides a challenge to Israel's security as Lebanon, Syria, and Hamas-ruled Gaza are actually
serving Iranian interests and all of them have threatening capabilities for Israel's civilian population," Inbar said.
"We don't want to provoke a war, but this is something that we have to take into consideration if some kind of
violent contingencies are developing in the area."
Ahmadinejad's arrival also comes against a backdrop of rising sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shi'ite
factions in Lebanese domestic politics. A United Nations-backed court is expected shortly to implicate Hezbollah
figures in the 2005 killing of Sunni prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, father of the present incumbent.
Hezbollah has already dismissed the UN investigation as "politicized". But suggestions of its involvement have
raised fears of a resumption of intercommunal strife 20 years after the end of a civil war that tore Lebanon apart
and increased the suspicion many Sunni and Christian Lebanese feel about Ahmadinejad's visit.
That sentiment was summed up by one man, named as Georges, who told Agence-France Presse: "This is no
longer our country. This country is for [Hezbollah] and Iran now, and God knows [Hezbollah] is cooking up for us
after the visit."
But Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah - who was expected to address Ahmadinejad's Beirut rally by video link -
insists that Lebanese of all persuasions owe a debt to Iran.
''The country that stood by Lebanon during the worst of times, during the worst of wars and the worst fallout
from a war that Lebanon has ever had, how should we treat it in return?" he asked. "Even when we differ
amongst ourselves politically, we should be thankful to this country and respectful to it.''
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Syria offers Maliki a life jacket

By: Sami Moubayed
Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.
DAMASCUS - After a 14-month absence, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki returned to Damascus on
Wednesday, turning a page with the Syrians after he provoked a diplomatic crisis with them last August.
The former Damascus resident, hours after returning from a similar visit to that capital, accused the country of
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harboring Iraqi Ba'athists that allegedly carried out a triple bombing in Baghdad that killed over 100 civilians. The
Iraqi ambassador was quickly withdrawn from Damascus - only to return last Sunday, three days ahead of
Maliki's visit.
For weeks, positive gestures have been exchanged between Damascus and Baghdad, and Maliki's visit was an
expected culmination of the warming relations.
The rapprochement begun with a visit by Maliki's government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh in August, and was
followed by a phone conversation between Maliki and his Syrian counterpart, Prime Minister Naji al-Ahmed, in
September. A senior delegation from Maliki's State of Law Coalition (SoL) then went to Damascus, followed by
the return of Iraq's ambassador on October 10.
Maliki's visit to Syria comes amid a prolonged political crisis in Iraq that has lasted since its March election. Many
believed that Syria and Saudi Arabia would ensure that Maliki was replaced with former premier Iyad Allawi,
who had won a majority of 91 seats in parliament in the vote. However, neither Allawi nor Maliki have since
been able to form a majority and end the stalemate.
Allawi is strongly allied to the Sunnis and preaches a secular agenda that differs greatly from the religious path
Maliki has drawn since he became prime minister in 2006. The Saudis saw Maliki as a sectarian politician bent on
empowering Shi'ites at the expense of Sunnis, while Syria was furious with Maliki for what happened in the
summer of 2009.
Disappointed with Maliki, Syria saw him as an ungrateful neighbor who had blamed Syria for those infamous
bombings to cover up for his own faults in managing Iraq's security.
The Syrians had hosted Maliki in Damascus for more than 10 years, adamantly refusing to extradite him during
the Saddam Hussein era. When he became prime minister a Syrian embassy was opened in Baghdad, helping
legitimize Maliki in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis - especially Sunnis. This also helped promote him in Arab circles,
where he was seen as a creation of the Iranians. Taking his cue from the Middle East neighborhood that was
seemingly very hostile to Maliki, Allawi invested in a relationship with the Syrians and Saudis.
By September, however, Arab capitals had reasoned that Allawi would never make it to the premiership,
regardless of how many seats he commanded in parliament. Simply put, he could not form a cabinet on his own
- needing a total of 163 seats - which his Iraqi National List did not have.
Coinciding with this shift in Baghdad were several back-to-back visits by Iraqi players to Damascus, including Vice
President Tarek al-Hashemi, Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council
(SIIC), and Allawi, who was in Syria two weeks before Maliki's visit.
The Syrians made it clear to all their visitors - Maliki included - that they would not interfere at a micro-level in
Iraqi politics, stressing nevertheless that any government needed to include all parties, Shi'ites, Sunnis and
Kurds.
The Sunnis and Kurds have to date been reluctant to support Maliki's bid for office, for different reasons. The
Sunnis did not trust Maliki, who had reneged on all promises made to them in 2006. He has not issued a political
amnesty to set thousands of Sunnis free, done nothing about repealing the infamous de-Ba'athification laws that
12
were passed in 2003, and repeatedly failed to disarm Shi'ite militias.
He persecuted armed Sunni tribesmen, known as the Awakening Councils, and refused to empower Sunnis
within the government. When they collectively walked out on him in 2007, he did not lift a finger to appease
them. Only Syria can talk them into a change of attitude today, Maliki has reasoned, offering to grant
concessions that he had repeatedly refused since 2006.
Syria has the ear of influential Sunnis - tribesmen, notables and former Ba'athists - and can talk them into a u-
turn if Maliki agrees to give them proper representation in any new government. He would also need to issue
the general amnesty, revoke the anti-Ba'athification laws, and take serious action against armed militias, be they
Sunni or Shi'ite.
Maliki appears to have reasoned that it was foolish - to say the least - to cross the Syrians over a matter that did
not concern them. After all, the August bombings were followed by similar horrific attacks in October and
December 2009, proving that the root of the problem was security in Iraq itself, and not Iraqi fugitives living in
neighboring Syria.
By blaming it on the Syrians, Maliki actually enabled the real culprits - al-Qaeda - to repeat the same terrorist
stunt within a four-month interval. The group reasoned, having got away with it in August, that Maliki would be
incapable to stop them as this would entail admitting that security was completely lacking in Iraq.
Maliki also reasoned that just like having a Syrian ambassador in Baghdad did wonders to his image in the eyes
of Sunnis, withdrawing him in 2009 had the exact opposite effect. Legitimacy granted - legitimacy withdrawn - is
how Maliki viewed his diplomatic row with Damascus.
It was one thing to be recognized by a pro-Western country like Jordan, for example, but something completely
different when this legitimacy is granted by a country like Syria that still preaches a strong brand of Arab
nationalism and continues to champion the Palestinian cause.
Shortly before the Maliki visit, Allawi seemingly threw in the towel, agreeing to support a different candidate for
the premiership - Adel Abdul Mehdi of the SIIC. Allawi's chances of becoming prime minister, amid the new
mood in the Arab neighborhood and within Iraq itself, have seemingly shrunk to very low levels.
Maliki has offered him a seemingly perfect exit strategy - the post of speaker of parliament in exchange for
supporting Maliki's bid for another term. With Syria willing to give Maliki the benefit of the doubt for another
round in office, several of Syria's allies in Iraq are likely to follow suit, including Sunnis, Kurds and Muqtada.
Maliki has to live up to this new deal by seriously engaging all parties in the cabinet formation, making sure not
to repeat the mistakes of 2006-2008. If not, he risks losing Syrian support all over again.
********************
13
Sponsored Corruption and Neglected Reform in Syria
By: Anna Borshchevskaya

Source: Middle East Forum
A decade into Bashar al-Assad's rule, the Syrian economy is languishing. The police state Bashar inherited from
his father Hafiz continues to obstruct any kind of reform whether in the political or economic spheres.
Outspoken dissident Riad Seif, who as a member of parliament from 1994 to 1998 had firsthand exposure to the
actual state of affairs, described the situation:
More often than not, the discussions were prefabricated by the speaker as if we were in a theatre rehearsing a
play with a crew of talented speech makers ... If any of the new members … insisted on going against the flow,
he would be brought back to the "correct" path either through incentives if available or through terrorization
and punishments if necessary.[1]
Thus in 2008, Transparency International, the most respected index of perceived corruption, ranked Syria as
second worst in the Middle East and North Africa, after Iraq,[2] with marginal improvement in 2009.[3]
According to the World Bank, Syria ranks among the world's lowest in the ease of doing business—143rd out of
183 countries surveyed, a drop from a previous 138th place.[4] The Syrian government persists in making
superficial gestures of improvement, but most state initiatives are Potemkin reform at best, merely facades.
While it is certainly possible to reform the Syrian economy, Damascus has little incentive to do so, monopolizing
as it does the profits of widespread corruption. Absent pressure from external sources such as the U.S.
government or the European Union, corruption—and security risks to the region and the West which derive
from it—will worsen. The Syrian regime's primary goal is to stay in power and as long as this is so, its interest will
never shift to economic growth and development. Syria's culture of corruption inherently blocks meaningful
long-term domestic reform, and the regime instead will continue to focus on sponsoring terrorism and blaming
Israel and the West for its woes. High hopes for a Damascus spring have ended in an ongoing winter.
State of the Economy
Under the leadership of Hafiz al-Assad (1971-2000), Syria closed itself to the world. Even before the 1970 coup
that brought him to power, the Baath party he would soon head had enacted an emergency law on March 8,
1963, that suspended basic constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and assembly.[5] Article 8 of Syria's
1973 Constitution, developed by the Assad regime, assigned all government posts to Baath Party members. The
Syrian government soon put heavy and impractical regulations in place; any significant commerce required
bribery of key officials.[6] Although Syria struck oil in 1968, and high prices during the 1973-74 oil crisis boosted
the country's economy significantly,[7] by 1995, Syria's oil output began to dwindle due to technological
problems and depletion of oil reserves.[8] By 2007, Syria had become a net oil importer.[9]
To get an appreciation of the current state of the Syrian economy, it is instructive to look first at Syria's gross
domestic income (GDI) per capita. According to the most recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, that
number was $2,579 in 2009. By comparison, Lebanon's GDI was $8,707 and Turkey's, $8,723. Israel's was
$26,797 while two other authoritarian states, Libya and Iran, had a GDI of $9,529 and $4,460 respectively.[10]
14
Inflation, while fluctuating, has increased in relative terms almost every year since 2000, Bashar's first year in
power. It reached double digits in both 2006 and 2008,[11] and by 2007, Syrian newspapers were openly
discussing the price of eggs almost as much as key economic issues.[12]
The unemployment rate has also increased dramatically. While the government acknowledged a rate of around
8 percent in 2007, the International Labor Organization estimated the reality was more than double that.[13]
The IMF assessed Syrian unemployment at the end of December 2009 at close to 11 percent.[14]
In June 2005, the United Nations Development Program found that 30 percent of Syrians (more than five
million) lived in poverty, with 11 percent (almost two million) in extreme poverty.[15] In January 2008, the
official Syrian daily Al-Thawra reported that the "average share of food per capita in the Arab world indicate[s] a
decline in the per capita share of the Syrian individual, ranked second in 2003 among the 19 Arab nations to
sixth place in 2005."[16] As recently as March 2010, Al-Thawra stated that the "real income of the majority of
the population has declined."[17]
The Syrian infrastructure is also severely outdated. In the summer of 2007, widespread blackouts hit Syria.
Former Minister of Industry Issam Zaim complained, "We're seeing none of our officials being held accountable
for their mistakes."[18] While the regime tried to blame sanctions for the power failures, Zaim contended that
real responsibility lay with those who for years procrastinated in upgrading the national power grid, which
operates on decades-old technology.[19] Nevertheless, the blackouts continue.[20]
According to the U.S. State Department, Syria's trade numbers remain "notoriously inaccurate and out-of date,"
raising questions about the veracity of the Syrian government's claims that its non-oil export sector has been
expanding.[21] While it may hope to bolster the economy through trade, its recent agreements are little more
than mirages. Syria now has "all kinds of memoranda of understanding with Iran, but … most of them are
worthless," said former World Bank official Nimrod Raphaeli.[22] Iran and Syria reportedly reached an
agreement in May 2010 to create a joint bank to improve weak economic relations between the two countries.
However, Arabnews.com reported one analyst view that the announcement is most likely "just a propaganda
trick and nothing will really change."[23] Only Qatar and the United Arab Emirates invest significant money in
Syria, mostly in the real estate and tourism sectors, but the amounts are not substantial enough to spur growth.
The tobacco industry may have potential for development, but the Assad family's large and controlling interest
prevents the entry of other investors into the sector. Indeed, Volcker Perthes, director of the German Institute
for International and Security Affairs and an expert on the Syrian economy, said that while corruption might be
"more diversified in Iraq … in Syria it is more strongly linked to the 'royal family'… Nothing moves … politically,
and of course, the best people are leaving the country." He notes by comparison that neighboring "Jordan has
done much better … even though they have less resources."[24]
The country's population has doubled since the mid-1980s[25] with population growth estimates of 3.3 percent
for 2008.[26] By comparison, the World Bank's latest available statistics put the entire Middle East-North Africa
regional population growth at 1.7 from 2008 to 2009 and project it to go down to 1.6 in the next two years.[27]
In fact, Syria was among the top twenty fastest growing populations in the world in the 1980s[28] with average
population growth of 3.4 percent between 1981 and 1990. [29] Adding to the strain on the stagnant economy
are Iraqi refugees, whose numbers are estimated at 300,000,[30] 750,000,[31] or more than a million[32] by
various sources.
The Syrian government may acknowledge difficulties but seldom takes direct responsibility for the state of the
economy. In a 2006 speech to Baath party loyalists, Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri blamed factors such
15
as population pressure, a low level of foreign investment, and low technical standards for Syria's poor economic
performance without drawing any connection to how the Syrian policies themselves led to some if not all of
these problems.
Culture of Corruption
By the beginning of the 1980s, the desire for financial benefit and political advantage had supplanted ideology as
the main reason for Syrians to join the ruling Baath Party.[33] Three families emerged as the new Syrian business
elite—the Assads, the Shalishes, and the Makhlufs with perhaps ten other families forming a second tier.[34]
Upon his death on June 10, 2000, Hafiz al-Assad left Syria's economy in debt, underdeveloped, and in a
shambles. Many Syrians and Western diplomats greeted his son Bashar's accession with optimism.[35] And,
indeed, there was reason for hope: Analysts noted that Bashar was Western-educated and might be more
reform-minded and less inclined to continue his father's rejectionist path.[36] Initially, it indeed looked as if the
younger Assad might tackle corruption; as heir apparent, he had spearheaded an anticorruption drive.[37] But
whatever reduction in corruption occurred at lower levels of government, it was more than offset by increases
at higher levels.
For example, in 2001, when Bashar's maternal cousin, Rami Makhluf, won a monopoly over telecommunications,
prominent businessman and parliamentarian Riad Seif insisted on investigating the licensing and published a
report documenting the corruption involved in the deal, despite the government's warning him off. Seif's bold
declaration resulted in his arrest and imprisonment.[38] Upon his release in 2006, he reiterated his claim and
described how two telephone companies, Syriatel and Ariba, had colluded with the government to create a
monopoly, enabling them to charge exorbitant prices—higher than in the United States—and make enormous
profit while paying little tax.[39] All the while, the government continued to refuse to enforce regulations while
Syriatel and Ariba unilaterally voided consumers' contracts by refusing to supply agreed-upon minutes or
provide promised discounts. These two companies won a contractual concession to provide service for a
maximum 1.7 million persons, but they have already doubled this number and may even double that, which
went against the terms of their contract and further secured their status as twin monopolies.[40]
By 2005, corruption had reverted to the levels of pre-Bashar days, albeit with a smaller circle of participants as
Bashar had purged many of the old guard. The Assad family and assorted cronies appeared to have siphoned off
as much as 85 percent of Syrian oil revenues that year, according to Syrian officials' private estimates.[41] But
the identities of the members of this business elite remain shadowy. It took the Syrian news magazine Al-Iqtisadi
more than a year to compile a list of Syria's top businessmen because of the paucity of publicly-available
information.[42] Even then, some figures were simply too sensitive to include: It is telling that Rami Makhluf,
one of the biggest players in the system, was absent from the list.
According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Syria's score dropped from 2.4 (out of a
possible 10) and 138th place (out of 180) in 2007,[43] to 2.1 and 147th place in 2008.[44] In 2009, Syria still
hovered near the bottom of the list with a score of 2.6 and 126th place.[45] The Heritage Foundation and The
Wall Street Journal's annual Index of Economic Freedom, which measures freedom from corruption, government
intervention in the economy, and the preservation of property rights, rated Syria's economic freedom lower in
2010 than in the previous year—145th out of 179 countries, and 15th out of the 17 countries in the region,[46]
ahead only of Iran and Libya at 16th and 17th respectively).[47] The index also notes a decline in areas including
an individual's ability to accumulate private property, how well private property rights laws are written and
enforced,[48] investment freedom, and freedom from corruption. The index's authors stated:
16
the overall entrepreneurial environment is hampered by significant institutional challenges. The regulatory and
legal frameworks are deficient, and persistent state influence in most areas of the economy suppresses market
competition. The judicial system is inefficient and remains vulnerable to political influence and widespread
corruption. Average tariffs are high, keeping trade freedom far below the world average.[49]
Even within Bashar's police state, this sorry situation is widely known. In 2008, Syria Today, the country's only
independent English magazine, reported that "the overwhelming majority of Syrians believe their country's
institutions are inherently corrupt."[50]
Obstacles to Investments
Private sector growth in Syria remains sluggish and rampant corruption undercuts investment. As Volker Perthes
states:
You have laws [in Syria], but you don't have rule of law … You don't have a fair, transparent judiciary system, so
if you are a foreign investor, and you happen to draw the greed … of a figure closely linked to the system, you
may end up with much of your investment lost.[51]
In 2002, the regime established an Expatriate Ministry in order to cultivate direct investment from abroad. But
while the ministry initially attracted investment from the Syrian diaspora, financial backers' patience did not last
long when they saw how unwilling the regime was to tackle corruption. A case involving SyriaTel illustrates
regime tactics. In 2000, SyriaTel received a governmental license for mobile phone services. Rami Makhluf
owned 75 percent of the company while Orascom, an Egyptian company, owned the remaining 25 percent. Two
years later, Makhluf complained in a Damascus court that Orascom had cheated him. The Egyptian CEO and
marketing director claimed they were then threatened by Syrian intelligence (Mukhabarat) and by April 2002,
the CEO was given three days to leave town.[52] As Perthes observed, "If an Egyptian company with good
knowledge of the intricacies of doing business in the Middle East was not able to prevail in the Syrian market,
international investors are unlikely to be optimistic about their prospects."[53] As a result, many investors pulled
out although those who were able to link themselves to high officials in the regime benefited greatly and
stayed.[54]
The majority of Syrians who have no ability to leave the country are all too vulnerable to these kinds of
manipulations. Once a business becomes profitable, the Assad government either demands a share of the profit
or simply does not allow it to operate. Syrian officials who dare to go against the regime find themselves in jail or
worse. Issam Zaim, for example, was forced to give up his post as minister of industry in 2003 because he made
a decision in favor of a German company based on the actual text of Syrian law. His personal assets were frozen,
and he temporarily left Syria in fear of his life.[55] It should come as no surprise then that domestic investment
is paltry.
In 2005, the Baath Party Congress called for the creation of a "social market" economy without defining what
this meant. Subsequent initiatives were haphazard,[56] and it is now evident that the tenth Five Year Plan has
failed to reach its objectives. Today, the Syrian economy is less than a third of Egypt's; the IMF reported Syria's
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 to be $53 billion, in contrast to Egypt's $188 billion. Even in war-
recovering Iraq, GDP was $66 billion.[57] The World Bank ranks Syria as a lower middle-income economy.[58]
The Washington Post recently credited Bashar with reforming the Syrian economy by lifting Soviet-style
economic restrictions while noting the need to tackle widespread corruption.[59] Although Syria looks different
17
today than it did under Bashar's father, movement is not always synonymous with change. Bashar's reforms
ultimately are aimed at keeping the regime alive given new regional and international realities, which
necessitate a different style than his father's. Corruption in Syria prevents it from being as open to the world as
it would like to appear.
Restructuring the Banking Sector
Absent any serious reform in the Syrian banking sector, it will be impossible for Damascus to mobilize foreign
savings and attract foreign capital. Thirteen private banks opened in Syria as of January 2010[60] but the six
state-owned banks—the Commercial Bank of Syria, the Agricultural Bank, and the smaller Real Estate Bank,
Popular Credit Bank, Savings Bank, and Industrial Bank—dominate, making it harder for the private banks to
grow. There has been little restructuring of public banks in order to improve their regulatory and supervisory
framework.[61] The first private bank only opened in Syria in 2004,[62] and while branches have opened around
the country and private banks have increased their market share, the Central Bank of Syria, under the control of
the Ministry of Finance, continues to regulate these banks, so they cannot make such decisions as setting their
own budget or developing a business strategy,[63] a situation reminiscent of eastern Europe during the Soviet
era.
Credit remains centrally allocated and subject to manipulation. A private consultant, who compiled a
confidential study on the Syrian banking sector in 2006, found that bankers expected 15 percent kickbacks on
loans, in exchange for which they overvalued collateral. A bank reform expert explained that only two banks, the
Commercial Bank of Syria and the Real Estate bank, "are allowed to get involved in foreign correspondence,"[64]
further choking off robust growth.
Monetary policy also remains problematic. While the IMF commended Syria in 2008 for "making significant
progress in strengthening the role of the Central Bank of Syria (CBS) in formulating and implementing monetary
policy,"[65] Damascus has not made public information indicating its adherence to the IMF's Code of Good
Practices on Transparency in Monetary Policies. Indeed, in August 2008, the IMF expressed "serious doubts
about the operational independence" of Syria's Central Bank in setting monetary policy and recommended that
Syria establish a new central bank law to strengthen the Central Bank, the country's monetary policy framework,
and banking supervision. [66] Further, the market for Syrian treasury bills, which were introduced in late 2008,
remains relatively thin because the government restricts their use to project financing, resulting in their being
used sporadically rather than on a regular basis.[67] While the IMF observed overall progress in transition to a
market economy, in March 2010, it noted that "the remaining structural reform agenda is substantial."[68]
Syria's regulatory environment and compliance with international standards in 2008 remained "extremely weak"
according to the Financial Standards Foundation in New York:
Nine out of twelve standards are at an "insufficient information" level, indicating a serious lack of transparency.
In two other areas—data dissemination and payment systems—Syria is non-compliant. Although a written
bankruptcy law exists, it is not applied fairly.[69]
The Syrian government is further unwilling to take serious steps necessary to make those banks it controls more
efficient. Knowledgeable insiders report that each of the six publicly-owned banks employs around 12,000
Syrians. One analyst working in the banking sector, who spoke on condition of anonymity, estimated that any
reform would require the firing of between 50-70 percent of these employees.[70] The lack of any social security
net further hampers government options since the regime would be forced to deal with a significantly larger
18
unemployed population without financial or health benefits in a situation where unemployment is already
high.[71]
Nor is it likely that bottom-up reform will occur. A repressive mentality predominates in which employees are
unable, unwilling, or afraid to make decisions, fearing the wrong decision could earn them a jail sentence or
worse. Supervisors hesitate to offer training to subordinates, fearing that they will be eclipsed by their own
employees. Even when employees do receive professional training, they find little opportunity to use their new
skills. The managers, ironically, also have little power. "Unless you're linked to the regime, you have no power,"
explained one member of a banking reform project who spoke on condition of anonymity.[72]
Can Washington Tackle Syrian Corruption?
On February 13, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department issued an executive order linking Syrian corruption to
Damascus's ability to engage in terrorist activities declaring that the corruption "entrenches and enriches the
Government of Syria and its supporters and thereby enables the Government of Syria to continue to engage in
certain conduct that formed the basis for the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338." [73]
(Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, determined that Syria's support of terrorism, its occupation of
Lebanon, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq
and constituted "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of
the United States.")[74] In July 2008, the Treasury Department designated Rami Makhluf, Bashar al-Assad's
material cousin, a specially designated national (SDN),[75] finding that he
used intimidation and his close ties to the Assad regime to obtain improper business advantages at the expense
of ordinary Syrians … The Assad regime's cronyism and corruption have a corrosive effect, disadvantaging
innocent Syrian businessmen and entrenching a regime that pursues oppressive and destabilizing policies,
including beyond Syria's borders, in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories.[76]
How effective such actions are in forcing change in Damascus is a matter of debate. SDNs are subject to the
freezing of their assets, and American "individuals or entities"[77] are prohibited from doing business with them.
However, like most SDNs, Rami Makhluf does not have assets in the United States. Still, it is often not in the best
interest of other countries to do business with any SDN. According to the Treasury Department, the designation
made it hard for Makhluf to do business, and a deal he had struck with Turkcell, Turkey's leading mobile
telephone operator, fell through.[78] However, The Washington Post reports that the effect of the Makhluf
designation was largely political and psychological[79] although still significant. The Syrian business community,
which largely resented Makhluf for his bullying business tactics, was particularly happy to see this restraint on
government-sanctioned corruption.[80]
Conclusion
The Syrian regime's corrupt practice is aimed at only one thing—maintaining power. While Syrian diplomats
trumpet a series of reforms, Bashar al-Assad's regime is simply trying to stay alive, adapting to regional and
international realities while impoverishing the country and eliminating anyone who wants to see change. The
economy, despite many reports about improvement, is headed downward. The culture of corruption and an old,
Soviet-style mentality in both the political and economic spheres prevent meaningful reforms in banking,
telecommunications, and non-oil exports, all of which would help integrate Syria into the global economy as a
respectable partner and improve living standards for its citizens.
19
The Obama administration's shift in focus in an effort to engage Damascus has emboldened the Assad regime.
Bashar al-Assad openly mocked U.S. efforts to try to pry Syria away from its ally Iran only days after U.S.
Undersecretary of State William Burns' visit to Damascus.[81] This is all the more troubling since Syria's
clandestine nuclear program, "together with [its] extensive surface-to-surface missile capabilities, is a major
source of potential contention and conflict between Syria and Israel."[82] A week after Burns was sent to
Damascus, Bashar made clear how little he values U.S. concerns when he hosted Iranian president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah for dinner in Damascus.[83]
Syria's recent revival of economic and political ties with Russia is also a cause for concern. After Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev went to Damascus in May 2010 (the first meeting between the two countries'
leaders in nearly a century), a series of deals was concluded on weapons sales alongside discussions on boosting
economic ties and nuclear cooperation. Abu Dhabi's National wrote that, given slow U.S. rapprochement with
Syria, "Damascus could be forgiven for thinking that, following the Russia summit, it is successfully
outmaneuvering Washington and holding an increasingly stronger hand."[84]
Washington's new policy of engagement has also encouraged Syria to flex its muscles in neighboring Lebanon.
As a consequence of U.S. attempts to diminish Syria's diplomatic isolation, the Lebanese leadership has had little
choice but to work with Bashar, this despite the fact that Syria had occupied it for twenty-nine years and only
recently was forced to leave following international pressure. These developments appear to have done nothing
to hinder the Syrian regime from continuing to operate as usual.
It is in the interests of the United States and the West to put pressure on the Syrian regime rather than to
continue to extend a hand in the hope that the regime will unclench its fist. By catering to Syria's demands, the
West appears to be abandoning the few advocates in Syria who want reform. The corrupt practices of the
regime hurt Syrian citizens but also fuel Syria's terrorist activities and interference in the affairs of neighboring
states with direct consequences for the United States and the West.
Anna Borshchevskaya is a research analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
[1] The Syrian Monitor, Center for Liberty in the Middle East, Washington, D.C., Apr. 21, 2007.
[2] "2008 Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International, Berlin, accessed May 4, 2010.
[4] Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., Table 1.3, p. 4.
[5] "Background Note: Syria," U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Washington, D.C., Feb.
17, 2010.
[6] Author interview with analyst for Western firm in Damascus, Damascus, Aug. 13, 2008.
[7] Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Syria's Troubled Economic Future," Middle East Quarterly, June 1997, 23-9.
[8] Business Intelligence Middle East (Dubai), Dec. 21, 2004; "Syrian Arab Republic: 2008 Article IV Consultation,"
Country Report No. 09/55, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Feb. 2009, p. 9.
[9] "Syrian Arab Republic: 2008 Article IV Consultation," Country Report No. 09/55.
[10] "World Economic Outlook Database," International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Apr. 2010, accessed
May 8, 2010.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Nimrod Raphaeli, "Syria's Fragile Economy," The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MEMRI), June
2007, p. 37.
[13] Ibid, p. 45, 35.
[14] "Syrian Arab Republic—2009 Article IV Consultation Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission,"
20
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Dec. 21, 2009.
[15] Heba El Laithy and Khalid Abu-Ismail, "Poverty in Syria 1996-2004, Diagnosis and Pro-Poverty
Considerations," United Nations Development Programme, New York, June 2005, p. 1.
[16] Al-Thawra (Damascus), Jan. 22, 2008, in "Syria: Population Growth Exceeded Food Production Rate,"
MEMRI Economic Blog, Jan. 22, 2008.
[17] Al-Thawra, Mar. 11, 2010, in "Syria: 5-Year Plan Failed to Meet Objectives," MEMRI Economic Blog, Mar. 3,
2010.
[18] The New York Times, Aug. 15, 2007.
[19] The New York Times, Aug. 15, 2007.
[20] The Moscow Times, May 12, 2010.
[21] "Background Note: Syria," Feb. 17, 2010.
[22] Author telephone interview with Nimrod Raphaeli, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2, 2009.
[23] Arabnews.com, May 27, 2010.
[24] Author telephone interview with Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, Berlin, Mar. 5, 2009.
[25] Paul J. Sullivan, "Perspective: Waters, Wars, Wheat, Watts, Waste and Wasta Add Up to Syria's Liquid
Worries," Circle of Blue-WaterNews (Traverse City, Mich.), Feb. 16, 2010.
[26] Al-Thawra (Damascus), Jan. 22, 2008, in "Syria: Population Growth Exceeded Food Production Rate."
[27] Author calculations: See "Regional Forecast Detail: The Middle East & North Africa," Prospects for the Global
Economy 2010, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., accessed May 10, 2010.
[28] Andrew Tabler, "Global Economic Crisis Boosts Utility of U.S. Sanctinos on Syria," PolicyWatch, no. 1482,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Feb. 26, 2009.
[29] Author calculations: See World Economic Outlook Database, Apr. 2010.
[30] The National (Abu Dhabi), Mar. 3, 2010.
[31] "2010 UNHCR country operations profile: Syrian Arab Republic," The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, accessed May 14, 2010; The National, Mar. 3, 2010.
[32] The National, Mar. 3, 2010.
[33] Author interview with Bashar Elsbihi, Washington executive director, National Salvation Front in Syria,
Washington, D.C., Apr. 16, 2009.
[35] Alan George, Syria, Neither Bread Nor Freedom (London: Zed Books, 2003), p. 33.
[36] See, for example, Farid N. Ghadry, "Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005,
pp. 61-70.
[37] BBC News, June 11, 2000.
[38] Mona Yacoubian and Scott Lasensky, "Dealing with Damascus. Seeking a Greater Return on U.S.-Syria
Relations," The Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, CSR 33, June 2008, pp. 10-
1.
[39] At-Tiyar as-Sooriy ad-Dimocratiy (Coventry, U.K.), July 12, 2006.
[40] Al-Tiyar al-Sooriy al-Dimocratiy, July 12, 2006.
[41] Ghadry, "Syrian Reform: What Lies Beneath," pp. 61-70.
[42] "Qaaima biAhm 100 rijal 'amaal, fi Sooriya, wa Rami Makhluf yaghiib, 'anha," Al-Iqtisadi (Damascus), Apr.
30, 2009.
[44] "2008 Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International.
[45] "2009 Corruption Perceptions Index," Transparency International.
[46] "2010 Index of Economic Freedom: Syria," The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., accessed May 26,
2010.
21
[47] "2010 Index of Economic Freedom: Libya, Iran," The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., accessed May
14, 2010.
[48] "2010 Index of Economic Freedom: Syria"; "2010 Index of Economic Freedom: Property Freedom," The
Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., accessed May 10, 2010.
[49] "2010 Index of Economic Freedom, Ten Economic Freedoms of Syria," Heritage Foundation, Washington,
D.C., accessed May 4, 2010.
[50] Obaida Hamad, "The Cancer Within," SyriaToday (Damascus), July 2008, p. 16.
[51] Author telephone interview with Volker Perthes, Mar. 5, 2009.
[52] Søren Schmidt, "The Developmental Role of the State in the Middle East: Lessons from Syria," presented at
the Economic Research Forum 14th Annual Conference—Institutions and Economics Development, Cairo, Dec.
28-30, 2007.
[53] Volker Perthes, Syria under Bashar al-Asad: Modernisation and the Limits of Change, Adelphi Paper 336
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 38.
[54] Author interview with Bashar Elsbihi, Apr. 16, 2009.
[55] Author e-mail correspondence with Bente Aika Scheller, country director, Heinrich Boell Stiftung,
Afghanistan, Apr. 8-11, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, London, Oct. 14, 2003.
[57] "World Economic Outlook Database," Apr. 2010.
[58] "Syrian Arab Republic, Country Brief," The World Bank, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2010.
[59] The Washington Post, May 26, 2010.
[60] "Background Note: Syria," Feb. 17, 2010.
[61] Author interview with anonymous source, Damascus, Aug. 24, 2008.
[62] Raphaeli, "Syria's Fragile Economy."
[63] Author interview with anonymous source, Damascus, Syria, Aug. 24, 2008.
[64] Ibid.
[65] "Syria: Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary Policy Article IV," EStandardsForum, Financial
Standards Foundation, New York, Aug. 2008.
[66] Ibid.
[67] "Country Report Syria: Economic Performance," Economist Intelligence Unit, London, May 2010.
[68] "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009 Article IV Consultations with the Syrian Arab Republic," International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Mar. 25, 2010.
[69] "Syria: Overall Standards Summary," EStandardsForum, Financial Standards Foundation, New York, Aug.
2008.
[70] Author interview with anonymous source, Damascus, Syria, Aug. 24, 2008.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Executive Order 13460, "Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection with the National
Emergency with Respect to Syria," United States Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 2008.
[74] Executive Order 13338, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods
to Syria," United States Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C., May 13, 2004.
[75] "Treasury Targets Rami Makhluf's Companies," United States Department of Treasury, Washington, D.C.,
July 10, 2008.
[76] "Rami Makhluf Designated for Benefiting from Syrian Corruption," United States Department of Treasury,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 21, 2008.
[77] Executive Order 13460, Feb. 15, 2008.
[78] Author interviews with U.S. Department of Treasury officials: Stephanie Aken, international economist;
Hagar Hajjar, Middle East policy analyst; Dan Moger, Middle East policy advisor, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 2009.
22
[79] The Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2008.
[80] Tabler, "Global Economic Crisis Boosts Utility of U.S. Sanctions on Syria."
[81] Andrew Tabler, "How to React to a Reactor," Foreign Affairs, Apr. 19, 2010.
[82] Ibid.
[83] David Schenker and Matthew Levitt, "Dinner in Damascus: What Did Iran Ask of Hizballah?" PolicyWatch,
no. 1637, Mar. 2, 2010.
[84] The National, May 17, 2010.
********************
The Mideast Moratorium Mess

Interviewee:Michele Dunne, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman
Source: Council on Foreign Relatio
date: October 13, 2010
Consulting Editor, CFR.org
Direct peace talks between Israel and Palestinians were halted in early October after the expiration of the ten-
month moratorium on settlement construction. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has so far not
accepted Obama administration incentives to extend the moratorium for two months. The administration is now
scrambling to avoid the collapse of the peace talks, and struggling with a dilemma it helped create by launching
a peace process "without having a solution wired for the expiration of the settlement moratorium," says Michele
Dunne, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin. Dunne believes
Netanyahu is looking for a way to renew the moratorium, but his recent offer a two-month settlement freeze if
Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state is "less a serious proposal than an attempt to show that the
Palestinians are the intransigent party."
President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority went to the Arab League over the past weekend to
vent his unhappiness with the peace talks, which are at a standstill. What was the result of that meeting?
There were two Arab League meetings last week. One was the foreign ministers meeting, and that was followed
by a summit. The Arab League summit dutifully ignored this issue, but the foreign ministers meeting did take up
the Israeli-Palestinian issue. What they said in a statement was that they were supporting Abbas' decision not to
return to talks unless Israeli settlement activity is stopped, and the foreign ministers urged the United States to
pursue efforts to persuade Israel to stop settlement activity. They decided to meet again in a month to revisit
the issue.
Are the Arabs seeking a permanent freeze or just a one- to two-month suspension?
23
The impression that's being created is that Netanyahu is working with the members of his cabinet, who are
more to the right than he is, to get them to agree to, say, a sixty-day settlement moratorium. I don't know
whether moving forward on this loyalty pledge could be part of a deal with them.
At this point they're taking their cue from Abbas. If the Israeli prime minister were to agree to renew the
settlement moratorium--which is not a full freeze but imposes some significant limits on settlement building--
that would last sixty to ninety days, Abbas would return to the direct talks and he would ask the Arab League to
endorse that.
What did you make of Netanyahu's offer for a two-month settlement freeze if the Palestinians recognize Israel
as a "Jewish state"?
Netanyahu has raised this idea in various forums in recent months. On the face of it, he is attempting to get a
concession out of the Palestinian leadership on the refugee issue--specifically, an understanding that no matter
how the issue is resolved, it will not involve the return of a significant number of Palestinians to their pre-1948
homes in what is now Israel--before actual negotiations take place on that issue. I doubt Abbas would make that
deal even if a large-scale and long-term settlement freeze were on the table, and what Netanyahu is offering is
much less than that. Therefore this is less a serious proposal than an attempt to show that the Palestinians are
the intransigent party.
The Israeli cabinet has just adopted a proposed law that any new non-Jewish immigrant has to pledge loyalty to
the "Jewish state." The discussion about a new settlement freeze seems to be on the back burner right now,
although Netanyahu is obviously under a lot of pressure from Obama to extend it.
Correct, and Obama apparently has offered Netanyahu a package of U.S. guarantees or pledges about positions
the United States would take on various things in exchange for a moratorium of some sixty days. We're seeing
various things surface in the Israeli press about the positions of different members of Netanyahu's coalition, in
particular the Shas party and Yisrael Beiteinu [headed by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman]. Regarding the
citizenship loyalty pledge that the cabinet approved, it has to go to the Knesset. I think Netanyahu had promised
Lieberman from the beginning that he would support that kind of an action, at least within the cabinet. It's hard
to know whether this could be part of some kind of a deal. The impression that's being created is that
Netanyahu is working with the members of his cabinet, who are more to the right than he is, to get them to
agree to, say, a sixty-day settlement moratorium. I don't know whether moving forward on this loyalty pledge
could be part of a deal with them.
If something happens positively in the peace talks--like a new moratorium for two months--that would benefit
President Obama and Democrats in the midterm elections. But how much can be accomplished in such a short
period, particularly since Obama seems to be promising Netanyahu that he will only press for a two-month
extension in the settlement freeze?
The fact that this summit--which was attended by Netanyahu, Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and
Jordanian King Abdullah II--was held in early September had a lot to do with the U.S. domestic political calendar.
Obama certainly wanted to create the impression that he and the Israeli prime minister were on the same page
and were cooperating to move the peace process forward. The idea was to make it look as though Obama was
having some success in foreign policy and certainly was not having any strong differences with Israel. Now,
unfortunately, the fact that the administration went ahead with that summit and the launch of the talks without
having a solution wired for the expiration of the settlement moratorium has really created a bit of a mess for the
24
administration because, as you say, it looks as though they launched these talks with great fanfare only to have
them collapse three and a half weeks later because of a problem that everyone knew was there--the expiring
settlement moratorium.
Let's jump to the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting. Why did Abbas have to go to the Arab League
foreign ministers? That's sort of unusual, isn't it?
He has now done this several times. His new modus operandi is to go to the Arab League. The basic reason is the
extreme weakness of the Palestinian position and of Abbas's own position. Because of the divisions between
Fatah and Hamas, with the Palestinian political house divided internally, he feels he needs Arab state support to
show that he is not taking decisions totally on his own. There certainly are accusations by Hamas and others that
he cannot really speak for the Palestinians now with authority. So he is trying to bolster his position by having
Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Jordan standing behind him. I also think it's a bit of a way to bolster
his standing vis-a-vis the United States and the international community. He and the Palestinian Authority have
become completely dependent on international political and financial support. There is a danger inherent in this,
of course, that he has given away the independence of Palestinian decision-making, which was something that
his predecessor Yasser Arafat fought very hard for.
Some commentators, like CFR's Elliot Abrams, have noted that the Palestinians have a functioning West Bank
government, headed by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and they could morph into their own state, and that in
fact Fayyad has a plan for a Palestinian state. Is there any realistic possibility of the Palestinians just
announcing they now have a state?
Unfortunately, the fact that the administration went ahead with that summit and the launch of the talks without
having a solution wired for the expiration of the settlement moratorium has really created a bit of a mess for the
administration.
After the Arab League summit, Saeb Erekat, one of the lead negotiators on the Palestinian side, said that the
Palestinians discussed with the Arab foreign ministers alternative courses of action should there not be renewed
or successful peace talks. And he outlined a couple of possibilities. One of them was that the Palestinians would
ask the United States to recognize the existence of a Palestinian state along the 1967 "green line" [borders] for
the West Bank and Gaza. Another variation on that would be that they would ask the UN Security Council to
recognize the same thing--a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines. I don't know how realistic they are. Frankly, I
think the Palestinians at this point are trying to use them as threats. They're desperately trying to find something
they can use to press the Israelis. This is something that Fayyad has talked about since he launched his plan for
building the institutions of a Palestinian state in August 2009, that the Palestinians would somehow go to the
international community and ask for recognition of the state.
There's no political chance that any U.S. president would recognize the Palestinian state without Israeli
approval, right?
That's extremely unlikely. In fact, what we've heard about the pledges that Obama has offered Netanyahu in
exchange for an extension of the moratorium, one of them was that the United States would veto any Security
Council action along these lines.
25
In 2002, the Arab League adopted a plan first put forward by then-Crown Prince and now King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia for a comprehensive Middle East peace, in which essentially Israel would recognize the borders
of 1967 and the Arabs would establish peace with Israel. Is this plan still floating around?
It's still floating around. Officials in the administration talked about this plan a lot when Obama first came into
office. They seemed to see it as a very important initiative, something that would really offer an important
incentive to Israel. But it hasn't been clear how you put it into operation. One of the problems with it is that the
Arab proposal to offer Israel a full recognition and peace with all members of the Arab League is contingent
upon peace deals not only with the Palestinians, but also with the Syrians and the Lebanese. The understanding
for a long time has been that it would be very difficult for Israel to move on all these fronts at once: to make
peace with the Palestinians, to give up the West Bank and also the Golan, and so forth--that Israel would need to
do these things one at a time, and therefore it's difficult to put into action any kind of a grand strategy that does
it all at once.
The big news in the Middle East this week is the pending visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to
Lebanon. It's stirring up a lot of controversy in Lebanon since it's supposed to be a big plus for Hezbollah,
which is financed heavily by Iran. It's also stirring up concern in Israel that there might be some provocation
on the border with Lebanon. What do you think of this visit?
There is an increasingly tense situation inside Lebanon, and between Israel and Lebanon; there were a couple of
border incidents in the past few months. There is this impending action of the Hariri tribunal [set up in 2005 to
investigate the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri] that could include indicting some people
from Hezbollah. So there are a number of things hanging fire that could cause an outbreak of violence either
inside Lebanon or between Lebanon and Israel. In this context, the visit by Ahmadinejad is troubling--not so
much that anything necessarily would happen during the visit, but whatever he might say and do during his visit
and the controversy that might set in motion.
Amr Moussa, the secretary-general of the Arab League, has raised the idea of expanding the Arab League to
incorporate Iran and Turkey. It isn't clear whether he was proposing them to become full members, or that they
would somehow be present at Arab League summits and have some sort of share in decision-making. Several
Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have opposed this strongly. The Arab League has become a very
weak instrument, and Moussa's proposal is an acknowledgment that it's very difficult for the Arabs to do
anything together when there are these stronger actors in the region.
What's your guess now on the chances for the direct talks to resume?
It's possible that Netanyahu will manage to get a sixty-day settlement moratorium of some kind out of his
cabinet. He's right now playing sort of the "good cop" against Lieberman, the "bad cop." The French and Spanish
foreign ministers met with Lieberman, and so the Europeans are getting into the act too. Everyone's trying to do
various things to help Netanyahu get this sixty-day moratorium. But the difficulty you see with the parties taking
even small steps, such as Netanyahu even extending some limits on settlement construction for sixty days to
continue direct talks, underscores how very difficult it's going to be to make real serious progress with the
current leaderships--the current Israeli prime minister and cabinet, and the current Palestinian president in his
very weak internal situation. I think that right now the United States is just looking to keep things from
collapsing, and to move forward through the U.S. elections and then to reassess after that what's really going to
need to be done if they want to move this thing forward.
26
So it's not a time for optimists?
No.
********************
27

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International Think Tanks Resources

 Hezbollah & Iran: Lebanon's Power Couple............................2

 Ahmadinejad bears a message for Israel…………………………….3

 Ahmadinezhad's Lebanon Visit and the Fate of the Hariri

 How Israel can use to Syria to thwart Ahmadinejad……………8

 Heroes and villains in Lebanon……………………………………………9

 Syria offers Maliki a life jacket………………………………………….11

 Sponsored Corruption and Neglected Reform in Syria………13

 The Mideast Moratorium Mess…………………………………………23

Hezbollah & Iran: Lebanon's Power Couple

Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

Ahmadinejad bears a message for Israel

Ahmadinezhad's Lebanon Visit and the Fate of the Hariri Tribunal

Efforts to Derail the Tribunal

Challenge to the International Community

How Israel can use to Syria to thwart Ahmadinejad

Heroes and villains in Lebanon

Iranian client state?

Stirring the pot

Syria offers Maliki a life jacket

Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.

By: Anna Borshchevskaya

State of the Economy

Restructuring the Banking Sector

Can Washington Tackle Syrian Corruption?

The Mideast Moratorium Mess

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman

Source: Council on Foreign Relatio

date: October 13, 2010

Consulting Editor, CFR.org

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