1 MOHAMMED ABDEL SALAM

MONA MOFLEH
2 3092 Delta Tule Way
Sacramento, California 95834
3
916-335-2098 (Tel)
4 916-359-0908(Fax)
5 salamcoint@yahoo.com
6 Plaintiff in Pro Se
Mohammed Abdel Salam and Mona Mofleh
7

9 SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
10

11

12
MOHAMMED ABDEL SALAM Case No.: 34-2010-00082643
MONA MOFLEH
13 , FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
14 Plaintiff, AND
REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL
15 vs.
AND
16 WACHOVIA MORTGAGE,FSB; DECLARATORY INJUNCTION
17
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.;
NDEX WEST, LLC;
18 LSI TITLE COMPANY;
GOLDEN WEST SAVINGS
19
ASSOCIATION SERVICE COMPANY;
20 LINNARIAN Inc.;
FINANCIAL TITLE COMPANY;
21 EAGLE FUNDING;
PIERRE JOSEPH MOUHASSEB;
22
RON POWELL
23
and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive
24 ,

25 Defendant
26

27

28

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS
2 A. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
3 Plaintiffs is MOHAMMED ABDELSALAM and MONA MOFLEH hereinafter shall be
4 referred to as “Plaintiff”) , sue the Defendants set forth above for the violations of
5 several Federal laws: (“RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2607 et seg. Truth in Lending Act
6 ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seg. Federal Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C § 1341 (the “Mail
7 Fraud Act”); Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (the “Wire Act”); Bank Fraud 18
8 U.S.C. §§ 1010, 1014, 1344 (“Bank Fraud”); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
9 Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seg.; Securities Act of 1933 15 U.S.C §
10 77a et seq. (the “33 Act”),.
11 Violations of California statutes and laws. Including: California Consumer Protection ,
12 state common law causes of action for Actual Fraud, Constructive Fraud, Fraud in
13 the Inducement, Fraud in the Factum, Fraud in the Execution, Breach of Contract,
14 Gross Negligence, Lender Negligence, Willful and Reckless Negligence, Negligent
15 Acceptance, Negligent Training, Conspiracy and others.
16

17
II. MISCONCEPTION THAT ONLY BORROWERS ARE AT FAULT

18
Some may consider this matter as a simple issue of whether courts and laws should

19
help “irresponsible,” gullible people who got way over their heads in debt and into

20
expensive home purchases and mortgage loan transactions that they should never

21
have considered . When they “knew” or “should have known” that they could not

22
afford such luxuries and extravagances. Thus, since they “knew” that they could not

23
really afford what they got into, they need only blame themselves for what has

24
happened to them.

25 The issue may then be simply framed whether those directly involved in getting the

26 Plaintiffs into impossible and implausible financial dilemmas that eventually lead

27 to unaffordable situations and possible foreclosure of their homes, are entirely

28 blameless and should be left alone to benefit from the “fruits of their fraud”
without repercussions or accountings of any type.

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1

2 III. BASIC ISSUES BEING CHALLENGED BY THIS LAW SUIT

3 1) This case is not simply a case of innocent, hard working, honest, home
4 purchasers and borrowers being duped and being taken advantage of by unscrupulous
individuals and lending companies. This case deals with arrogant, irresponsible and greedy
5
companies that made predatory, toxic and ultimately unaffordable loans to these Borrowers,
6 and preyed on gullible, unsophisticated consumers, and as such it is challenging, among other
things, the:
7
A. Negative Amortization Loans
8 1. Legality of so-called “Negative Amortization Loans”;
9 2. Legality of lenders’ failure to disclose the aggregate costs involved in so called

10 Negative Amortization Loans”;

11 3. Legality of failure to disclose the aggregate costs of the transaction involved

12 in so-called "Negative Amortization Loans”.

13 The term Negative Amortization loan or NegAm loan in this Complaint refers to mortgage loans
14 that have a “negative amortization” feature. Under the NegAm feature, any accrued interest on a

15 mortgage loan is deferred and added to the outstanding original Principal balance of that

16
mortgage loan, If the minimum monthly payment on such mortgage loan on its interest payment
date is less than the amount of accrued interest due on that mortgage loan on that payment date.
17
As a result, because the initial payments on these NegAm mortgage loans were “teaser rates” .
18
Interest began accumulating from the day of settlement forward. This resulted in a recalculation
19
of the interest rate each month as the principal balance increased each month
20
B. Failure to disclose the aggregate costs involved in so called Negative Amortization
21
Loans
22
4. Legality of failure to completely account for the aggregate costs of a
23
transaction which purports to disclose a “yield spread premium”
24
(“YSP”), but yet entirely fails to include that YSP in the calculations
25
applicable to the Truth in Lending Act Disclosures (“TILA
26
Disclosures”);
27
5. Legality of failure to disclose the applicable “par value” of a loan
28
transaction before the transaction is made or completed.

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 6. Legality of the failure to properly account for, disclose, and calculate or
2 list all the quantifiable reasons for the difference that exists between the
3 YSP and the “par value” costs of a loan so as to properly and adequately
4 inform Borrowers the reasons or guidelines as to why they obtained an
5 “above par value” pricing for their particular loan; especially if, as stated
6 in the loan applications which are the subject of the present Complaint,
7 Plaintiffs, Mohammed Abdelsalam broker in loan application is Eagle
8 Funding, Pierre Mouhasseb, Linnarian Inc.. Collectively functioned as
9 agent for Wachovia Mortgage FSB, the original lender. It seems that a
10 relationship existed between Eagle Funding, Pierre Mouhasseb, Linnarian
11 Inc. and Wachovia Mortgage (loan broker, appraisal, receiver of
12 $15,430.00) POC YSP which were paid by Wachovia. Eagle Funding,
13 Pierre Mouhasseb, Linnarian Inc earned well over their real and
14 unadjusted incomes.
15 C. Whether a “ Boat” of securitized mortgage backed securities, whose
16 associated Boat has been paid by its “loss of value insurer,” or various
17 “credit enhancement policies” may still foreclose on homes belonging to

18 that Boat in a double payment, triple payment or even quadruple payment

19
scheme.
7. Legality of securitized backed mortgage whose associated Boat has been
20
paid by its “loss of value insurer”. That is to say, if the investments have
21
already been paid off or “bailed out” by their “securitized Boat insurer or
22
credit enhancement policy or guarantee” or “bail out federal government
23
entity”, are the putative investors still entitled to foreclose on consumers
24
that have not been “bailed out.”
25
8. Further, if the investors have already been paid once, why do they
26
continue to have the right to get paid out yet a second time if they already
27
had required “loss reserves” insured against the possibility of default; and
28
that is even before a foreclosure is completely processed.

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 To add insult to injury and add profits for the nefarious actors in these schemes, a foreclosure
2 essentially effectuates a potential payment of yet a third time on the same notes, Boats, or
3 tranches of securitized mortgage backed securities. And because of how the Internal Revenue
4 Code is written (e.g. Internal Revenue Code of 1986 Sections 860D and 1031)3 and applied to
5 these Conduit Loan activities, these profits are potentially tax free to the Boat owners or
6 investors, giving them yet a fourth source of profit distribution to the investors that purchase
7 the securitized debt obligations in a securitized mortgages Boat scheme. Considering the
8 “bail out” payments and the totality of the circumstances, the Defendants’ behavior is
9 not just egregious, unconscionable, arrogant, irresponsible, and greedy; it is outright
10 robbery and theft being perpetrated against innocent and unsuspecting victims: the
11 people who signed up for these loans and the American taxpayer.
12
9. Legality of whether a merely putative “holder or servicer of the Note” but
13
not the direct “beneficiary of payments of the Note”, has the standing to
14
enforce any provisions of the Note, including the power to enforce the
15
Note by foreclosure; especially when the original Promissory Note is
16
lost. For In this Complaint, a qualified real estate mortgage investment
17
conduit is defined in §§ 860A through 860G of the Internal Revenue
18
Code of 1986 (the “IRS” Code”),
19
Example, within the housing market itself, just because you are a “holder/tenant” of a house, do
20 you have the right to sell the house? More to the point, just because you are a Property
21 Manager of a group of houses, responsible for collecting payments, paying insurance and taking
22 care of maintenance fees and repairs, do you have the right to foreclose and or sell a house on
23 behalf of the house owners you never met and you never contracted with?

24 One sided practical application of the 33 Act §104 disclosures and SEC Rule 424(b)(5).

25 Specifically, when applied to the mortgage securitization industry, the prospective Boat

26 issuer or sponsor of the Boat or Conduit Loan must comply with the disclosure

27 requirements of the 33 Act by filing a “424(b)(5)” prospectus or private placement

28 memorandum.

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 That Rule 424 filing warns any prospective investors, before the prospective investor buys
2 securitized mortgage certificates, that certain loans in the proposed securitized mortgages
3 Boat possessing Negative Amortization or interest only loan characteristics present a
4 “…likelihood of default, especially in the early years….”
5 Yet, in violation of the 33 Act §10 itself, potential borrowers are Securities Act of 1933, §
6 10(d): Classification of prospectuses: “In the exercise of its powers under subsections (a),
7 (b), or (c), the Commission shall have authority to classify prospectuses according to the
8 nature and circumstances of their use or the nature of the security, issue, issuer, or otherwise,
9 and, by rules and regulations and subject to such terms and conditions as it shall specify
10 therein, to prescribe as to each class the form and contents which it may find appropriate
11 and consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors [emphasis added].
12 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 424(b)(5) requires that: “A form of prospectus that
13 discloses information, facts or events covered … shall be filed with the Commission no later than
14 the second business day following the earlier of the date of the determination of the offering
15 price or the date it is first used after effectiveness in connection with a public offering or sales,
16 or transmitted by a means reasonably calculated to result in filing with the Commission by that
17 date.”
18 Never Warned borrowers that their loans are likely to default because of the nature and
19 characteristics of their loan itself is appropriate and consistent with the public interest. These
20 failures of any putative interested party to have the legal standing to foreclose on defaulting
21 mortgage promissory notes which are part of a mortgage securitization scheme;
22 1) failures to make otherwise valid and non-negative amortization loans to finance home
23 purchases or refinancing;
24 2) failures to aggregate financing costs;
25 3) failures to properly account for all the costs and finance charges associated with
26 Negative Amortization loans;
27 4) failures to account for and aggregate ab initio for the cost effects of subordinate
28 financing in a given transaction;

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 5) failures to adequately create, maintain, and monitor any indicia of quality and/or
2 quality control for those individuals and entities originating loans so that loan
3 applications would be accurately
4 6) This failure to require and enforce appropriate borrower disclosures at the time the
5 securitized loan is made or applied for renders the SEC potentially culpable if not
6 complicit in the predatory lending schemes which are the subject of this Complaint.
7 Basically, what is good for the goose is good for the gander.
8 These Negative Amortization loans actually create a galling and perplexing dichotomy in the
9 respective prospectus filed with the SEC: always protect the investors and disclose all
10 potential default risks in a certain securitized investment Boat, but drown the borrowers
11 themselves and never warn the borrowers; regardless of whether it is in the public interest to

12
warn the borrowers of the default risks inherent in the loans themselves. The effects of these
failures are being felt all over the country.
13
i. failures to properly disclose all other hidden costs in connection with the
14
financing of a consumer transaction;
15
ii. failures to give timely Truth in Lending Disclosures or Good Faith Estimates;
16
iii. failures to properly state the immigration status of certain individuals when
17
stating that certain individuals are US Citizens when in reality they are Legal
18 Permanent Residents or even Undocumented Aliens of this country;
19 iv. failures to make sure that bank statements would not be altered, falsified, or
20 otherwise improperly completed or tampered with so as to show higher than
21 existing savings and checking account balances at the time of loan application;

22
v. failures to show the proper and chronological “chain of custody” of a Promissory
Note in the securitized mortgage backed securities market so as to unquestionably
23
give the right to the “holder” of the Note to enforce the Notes by foreclosure
24
when the Notes default;
25
vi. failures to disclose to borrowers the risks inherent in Negative Amortization
26
loans; and
27
vii. failures to account for “bail out” fund payments, credit enhancement payments
28 (e.g. securitized mortgage Boat default insurer), loss reserve fund payments, and

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 getting paid out perhaps no less than three (3) times on the same mortgage notes
2 when a foreclosure is instituted against the Plaintiffs, are in direct violation of
3 TILA, RESPA, HOEPA, RICO, , Immigration laws, federal and state Bank Fraud
4 laws, and others.

5 Additionally, this suit also raises issues of actual fraud and artifice designed and perpetrated

6 by various parties acting in concert and preying upon unsuspecting consumers. These

7 securitized mortgage Boats were set up in a manner which allows them to function as

8 racketeering activities in glorified schemes operating under the color of law.

10 Further, these deceiving, underhanded, and egregious activities generated (and continue to

11
generate) payments that had the effect of artificially inflating the cost of the consumers' loans,

12
and reap for the Defendants quite substantial, illegal, unconscionable, on-going, and

13
improper profits at the expense of the Plaintiffs.

14
As we now know from the mortgage mess we are all experiencing, these illegal profits are

15
ongoing.

16
Most disconcerting, all these violations had the immediate and incurable effect of

17
1. ruining innocent peoples’ lives;

18
2. ruining Plaintiffs’ American dream of owning a home they could afford;

19
3. ruining Plaintiffs’ credit, credit histories, and credit scores;

20
4. exhausting any Kids Education Savings and Retirement Funds; and

21
5. ruining all Plaintiffs’ health given the enormous stress as Plaintiffs will likely be

22
rendered homeless due to foreclosure of their homes at any given moment

23
because of their inability to pay the mortgage loans that Defendants set up for

24
them.
To make a cruelly and sadly accurate analogy: this is not a simple case of leading lambs to the
25
slaughter. Rather, it is a case of salivating carnivores dressed in lambs’ clothing luring
26
unwitting and docile lambs to the feeding trough with promises of finding delicacies, and then
27
using them to feed their insatiable feeding frenzy.
28

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 Like rapacious scavengers, they pick apart the body and soul of their innocent and unsuspecting
2 victims. Even after the loans started “defaulting” these insatiable scavengers continue to feed on
3 their victims’ bodies and souls by securitizing, collateralizing, and re-selling these loans in
4 “tranched investment Boats”, “securitized investment Boats”, “non-agency mortgage backed
5 security Boats”, and other “securitized debt derivatives” that get cross-defaulted and/or cross-
6 swapped, insured, re-insured and ultimately paid-off (perhaps multiple times) before even
7 reaching the unsuspecting taxpayers and guaranteed government bail-outs. Specific allegations
8 regarding the Defendants' scheme and modus operandi are more fully set forth below.
9

10 IV. DROWNING IN THE BOAT - SIMPLIFYING THE ISSUES OF A VERY

11 COMPLICATED MESS
12

13 We recognize that the issues outlined and challenged by this Complaint are possibly very
14 complicated. In an effort to simplify the issues, however, this Complaint may possibly be better
15 Understood by following the example of the makers, sponsors and the owners of “River Cruising
16 Boats” that are benefiting from the Boat fees and payments of life insurance policies obtained
17 on their unsuspecting drowning victims.
18 1. At the beginning, the “River Cruising Boats” makers, sponsors, managers and owners
19 advertise the opening of their brand new River Cruising Boats, one Boat at a time; just
20 like in typical promotional scheme that attracts new innocent participants all the time.
21 2. Only good or excellent swimmers need apply to become members of the Boats. In fact, if
22 you are not a good swimmer, you will not be accepted into the River Cruising Boats.
23 3. Naturally, the better the quality of swimmers in the Boats, the better the perceived quality
24 of the Boat. Thus, the better the perceived credit quality of mortgage notes signers or
25 borrowers, regardless of their ability to pay or swim in the Boats, which leads to better
26 quality securities for ultimate designation as good “commercial grade/investment grade
27 paper” or real estate investment conduits (“REMICS”).
28 4. The higher the quality of swimmers, the higher the credit rating agencies like Standard &
Poors’, Moody’s or Fitch does designate the characteristics of a particular REMIC Boat.
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 For instance, a triple AAA rating in a given securitized mortgage Boat implies that the
2 investment is sound, is likely to get paid out, has virtually no risk of loss, and the
3 potential investors can feel more comfortable investing their money in the designated
4 securitized Boat certificates.
5 5. Once the first Boat of “investment grade paper or negotiable instruments” is full, the
6 entire Boat gets sold on Wall Street’s securities, secondary markets, or private
7 placements as “good investments.”
8 6. As soon as the first Boat of “excellent credit borrowers” is full it is sold; then it is time to
9 fill the next Boat. The racketeering activity and scheme continues. Any Boats already
10 built but empty are just waiting to get filled by what is called “shelf registrations” with
11 the Securities and Exchange Commission.
12 7. Once the second Boat gets full, that Boat gets sold as well, and so on; just like in typical
13 promotional scheme which attracts new innocent participants all the time.
14 8. This scheme of selling Boats full of apparently good or excellent credit borrowers is
15 nicely packaged by the Boat sponsor or issuer or scheme creator. It creates the
16 appearance that only good, responsible and strong swimmers belong in the Boat and
17 therefore only
18 9. In fact, the better the credit score, the better the quality of the securitized Boat. Thus,
19 if you are not a good swimmer (Credit Scores of over 600), or better yet, an Olympic medal
20 swimmer (Credit Scores of over 750), you could not swim or belong in the Boats.
21 Unbeknownst to all eligible swimmers put into these securitized mortgage Boats, is that the
22 Boat makers, sponsors, participants, associates, co-conspirators and scheme creators know
23 that these borrowers are likely to default on their particular loans especially in the early
24 years, and that the Boat conspirators and creators have made provisions for that dire
25 eventuality.
26 10. However, in order to maximize profits for the Boat builders, the Boat sponsors, the
27 Boat managers, the Boat servicers, and the Boat owners (investors or purchasers of
28 “certificates”), it is not disclosed by the conspirators, co-conspirators and scheme creators

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 in the offerings to the potential swimmers that these River Cruising Boats are
2 specifically designed to drown all swimmers.
3 11. When the swimmers begin to drown the Boats’ insurance policies or credit enhancement
4 provisions of the particular Boats pay-out and the swimmers’ homes are foreclosed.
5 12. One of the beauties of this nefarious racketeering activity and scheme is because of the
6 Applicable REMIC provisions in the IRS Code, all these eventual pay-outs are tax free.
7 13. In reality, precisely because you were a good/excellent swimmer, you were put in the
8 Boat; in the Boat of swimmers that would eventually drown no matter how strong or how
9 much energy (money, savings, and stocks) you had.
10 14. Only a few lucky swimmers eventually survived if they managed to get out of the Boat at
11 the beginning of a Boat’s opening. They either managed to sell their house early or were
12 able to refinance their loans before their credit scores were damaged.
13 15. Also disconcerting is the fact that if the borrower is a good swimmer and survives the
14 drowning Boat that is good for the borrowers but not good for the Boat makers, servicers,
15 Boat owners, and scheme creators.
16 16. Knowing that the borrowers are destined to drown because of their good credit, good
17 credit scores and their relatively low income, the swimming Boat sponsors, issuers,
18 servicers, trustees, owners and scheme creators take out default/disaster insurance (for
19 example through insurers like AIG or its affiliates) against the likelihood that most or all
20 the swimmers will drown.
21 17. Once the previously strong swimmers are drowning, or dead, or holding on to their last
22 breath of life, the Boat managers, sponsors, issuers, trustees, owners, and scheme
23 creators make demand on the appropriate Boat insurer to start paying on the insurance
24 policies the Boat owners purchased, and also demand that the loan loss reserve accounts
25 be activated and pay out.
26 18. Unfortunately for the drowning swimmers and their estates, at that point their houses are
27 still in the drowning swimmer’s name. Because the only way the Boat managers,
28 sponsors, owners and scheme creators can get title to the drowned swimmers’ homes is
through foreclosure of the victims’ homes, the Boat managers, sponsors, owners, and
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 scheme creators start using the legal process to take the drowned victims’ houses away
2 and either put the houses in the Boat owner’s name (through foreclosure or deeds-in-lieu
3 of foreclosure), or sell the houses to other swimmers in new Boats of securitized
4 mortgage loans.
5 19. Thus, like an orchestra that has been perfectly choreographed and through the help of
6 their aiding and abetting associates at foreclosure law firms, the Boat managers,
7 servicers, issuers, owners, or scheme creators start taking the houses away from the
8 swimmers’ estate one at a time to increase the Boat owners’ profits. Although foreclosing
9 law firms and trustees have a fiduciary duty to both a Lender and a Borrower to make
10 sure that the foreclosing entity actually has the power or authority to commence
11 foreclosure proceedings, these collaborating associates in the securitized mortgage Boat
12 or mortgage loan scheme environment rarely comply with and most times even ignore
13 their fiduciary duty to the affected Borrowers. It is not helpful that their unchallenged
14 participation in the foreclosure process provides these conspirators and aiders and
15 abettors with hefty legal fee revenues and, at times, commissions of 5% or more of the
16 sale price of a given foreclosed property. Since their activities are “presumptively valid”
17 by statute in a non-judicial foreclosure jurisdiction like California, these See Powell v.
18 Adams 179 VA 170 (VA Sup Ct 1942)(Deed of Trust Trustee has a fiduciary obligation
19 to all parties of the Deed of Trust; not just the Lender). Participating foreclosure law
20 firms and foreclosing representative entities are hardly ever challenged or questioned in
21 court.
22 20. Before they all drown, the swimmers’ survival instinct pushes them to want to come out
23 of the Boat.
24 21. Unfortunately, by the time the chosen swimmers want to come out of the Boat and realize
25 that they must get out as quickly as possible, it is too late. The borrowers’ once stellar
26 and excellent credit and ability to swim in the Boat is vastly diminished. In fact, the great
27 credit and credit scores that got them in trouble to begin with have by now been
28 destroyed and they cannot even attempt to refinance their homes. Under these unfortunate
conditions, even feeding their families in order to keep swimming becomes a struggle.
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 22. Unable to refinance their homes, the once strong but now failing swimmers wish for a life
2 jacket or boat to help them get out of the Boat. Family members are called in to help
3 them by asking them to throw life lines. At times, even the occasional life line providers
4 are forced into the Boat of swimmers to help save the father, mother, sibling, or friend
5 who is drowning in the Boat and can no longer swim.
6 23. Then the swimmers ask the Boat makers, owners, operators, conspirators and scheme
7 creators to help as well in order to survive and not drown in the Boat. When help is
8 given, which it rarely is, the life boat or life jacket in the form of a proposed loan
9 modification or forbearance period may also be full of holes and, in most cases, only
10 delays their inevitable drowning.
11 24. Little do the drowning swimmers know that default is preferable to the Boat makers,
12 owners, operators, conspirators and scheme creators. Unfortunately for the drowning
13 swimmers, each Boat owner/conspirator/sponsor/ scheme creator may actually make
14 more profit foreclosing on a lower valued property because then the Boat owners can
15 start filling up other new and attractive Boats for any remaining good swimmers out
16 there. In case of a loss on a residential mortgage Boat, these creative scheming
17 conspirators may even start selling tax credits on lower valued foreclosed properties to
18 other interested investors that want to minimize their tax liabilities.
19 25. Thus, since the process can start up again when houses begin getting foreclosed and re-
20 sold, the Boat owners and scheme creators have no real incentive to modify the situation
21 at all.
22 26. Sadly, it is plain to see that swimming Boat owner, operators, conspirators and scheme
23 creators servicing or owning Boats that are full of drowning victims have no real
24 incentive to fix the drowning Boat situation because there is more profit in a foreclosed
25 home loan than in a modified one.
26 27. Viewed from this perspective, it is ironic that the people who could not swim at the
27 beginning of the process, and who had bad credit or no credit at all when these
28 shenanigans started taking place, are better off today than those excellent swimmers who

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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 started off with good credit and savings to join their respective securitized mortgage
2 Boat.
3 28. Further, it is ironic that the bad credit or no credit people survived no worse off than
4 before, but the good and excellent credit people did not survive at all.
5 29. Steve Biko, one of South Africa’s most significant political activists and considered a
6 martyr of the anti-Apartheid struggle once said “…if you show people how to look at
7 things differently, things change.” Mr. Biko’s perspective helped other people question
8 the legality of apartheid, until that unquestioned “legal policy” was ultimately eliminated.
9 Thus, if you observe the present securitized mortgage Boats from afar and with a bird’s
10 eye view, is it right to blame the swimmers for drowning, or do you blame the Boat
11 makers, Boat sponsors, Boat managers, Boat servicers, Boat trustees, Boat owners,
12 conspirators and scheme creators for building the drowning Boats in the first place.
13 30. To put it more simply and to keep things in perspective, we need to borrow some
14 case law that has developed from the product liability cases. For instance, just because a
15 child plays with a defective toy and loses an eye, the fact the toy maker did not know that
16 the product was defective does not mean they are not liable for making a defective
17 product. Similarly, just because car company executives do not know that their New
18 Model car gas tank would explode on contact in a car accident; it does not mean they are
19 not liable for the deaths of all affected and charred New Model drivers and passengers.
20 31. If the Boat makers, Boat preparers, Boat sponsors, Boat managers, Boat trustees,
21 scheme creators and other interested Boat entities knew or suspected that their swimmers
22 had a likelihood, and even a high likelihood, that the Boat members in a Negative
23 Amortization securitized Boat would drown, especially in the early years as disclosed in
24 their own securitization prospectus filed with the SEC, those individuals and/or entities
25 cannot claim to be faultless just because they were not present when the swimmers first
26 joined the Boat. Furthermore, these schemers and Boat sponsors readily acknowledged
27 in their filed prospectus that the potential losses in their negative amortization loans could
28 be higher than the losses on loans that did not have negative amortization characteristics.
As such, if the Boat maker, sponsor, issuer, conspirator or scheme creator knew that the
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 borrowers may drown, or had a great likelihood of drowning in these Boats, and in fact,
2 intended that they would drown, they may not now shield themselves behind loan
3 origination entities that may not even be longer around.
4 32. Plaintiffs institute this action against Defendants :
5 Real Estate Agent (hereinafter “R/E Agent”);, real estate appraisers,
6 mortgage processors, mortgage underwriters and loan broker/correspondent
7 banking funding bank regional representatives whose identity is yet to be
8 determined, if any, who were also involved in the real estate purchase and
9 real estate loan transactions involved in this case; mortgage loan table
10 funder, mortgage note buyer, assignor/assignee, servicer, securitizing agent,
11 Wachovia Mortgage (“hereinafter “Wachovia”); mortgage loan table
12 funder, mortgage note buyer, assignor/assignee, servicer, securitizing agent,
13 Wells Fargo (“hereinafter “Wells Fargo”);; corporations, partnerships,
14 entities, yet to be determined, if any, also involved in the real estate
15 purchase, real estate loan transaction, mortgage note purchase,
16 securitization, Collateralized mortgage Boat insurer involved in this case
17 corporations, partnerships, entities, yet to be determined, if any, also
18 involved in the real estate purchase, real estate loan transaction, mortgage
19 note purchase, securitization, collateralized mortgage Boat insurer.
20 Corporations, Partnerships, LLCs, putative Promissory Note Beneficiaries
21 and entities yet to be determined, if any, also involved in the securitization of
22 real estate mortgage backed securities having an interest in the Promissory
23 Notes/loans which are the subject of this Complaint; trustee, substitute
24 trustee and/or foreclosure agent NDeX West, LLP (hereinafter “NDeX.”).
25

26 The Plaintiffs seek:

27 Actual damages; statutory penalties and damages; the costs of this action;
28 compensatory and punitive damages; mandated, reasonable and affordable
loan modifications, if applicable, based on verified monthly incomes;
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION
 1 injunctive relief to stop foreclosures of Negative Amortization loans covered
2 by this Complaint pending resolutions of the issues being raised herein; legal,
3 equitable and remedial damages that this Honorable Court may deem
4 necessary or appropriate in its discretion.
5

9 Dated this 9/4/2010

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10
MOHAMMED ABDEL SALAM
11
3092 Delta Tule Way
Sacramento, California 95834
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COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL AND DECLARATORY JUNCTION