Int J Philos Relig (2009) 65:87–92

DOI 10.1007/s11153-008-9182-9

Alvin Plantinga on the ontological argument

William L. Rowe

Received: 3 June 2008 / Accepted: 3 June 2008 / Published online: 29 July 2008
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’

to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully presents Anselm’s ontological
argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God
(a maximally great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists;
his argument begs the question of the existence of God.

Keywords Anselm · Maximal greatness · Maximal excellence · Begs the question

epistemically

Developed in the eleventh century by Saint Anselm of Canterbury, the ontological

argument is both simple and very perplexing. For if we agree that Anselm’s concep-
tion of God as “the greatest possible being” is neither incoherent nor question-begging,
it is, I believe, difficult, if not impossible, to avoid his conclusion that God exists in
reality.
Anselm, perhaps not unreasonably, takes “existence in reality” to be a great-making
property. But once we agree with him that God, as Anselm conceives of him, is a pos-
sible being, a being such that his existence in reality is logically possible, we cannot
avoid his conclusion that God actually exists. For a being that doesn’t exist, but whose
existence is logically possible, is a being than which a greater being is possible. Indeed,
given that existence in reality is a great-making property, that possible being, should
it not exist, would have been greater had it existed. So, in granting Anselm that the
expression, “the greatest possible being,” actually designates a possible being, a being
whose existence in reality is possible, we are, I believe, logically committed to the
actual existence of that greatest possible being. For something that actually exists is

W. L. Rowe (B)
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, 342 Overlook Drive, West Lafayette, IN 47906, USA
e-mail: wlrowe@purdue.edu

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greater than it would have been had it not existed (existed only in the understanding).
Therefore, the only possible being that can satisfy Anselm’s concept of God (the great-
est possible being) is a possible being that actually exists. And what this implies is that
to know that Anselm’s God (the greatest possible being) is, in fact, a possible being,
rather than an impossible being, we must know that God (an omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good being) actually exists. For if no omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good
being actually exists, Anselm’s concept of God is, like the concept of a round square,
a concept that applies to no possible object whatever.1 What this reveals, I believe, is
that Anselm’s argument begs the question epistemically. By this I mean that in order
to know that Anselm’s God (the greatest possible being) is, in fact, a possible being,
we must know the very point that Anselm proposes to prove: that among the beings
that actually exist there is one than which a greater being not only doesn’t exist, but
one than which a greater being is impossible. For if each being that actually exists is
such that either it might have been greater than it is, or some other existing being is
(or logically might have been) greater than it, Anselm’s God is an impossible being.
What then do we have to know if we are to know that Anselm’s God is in fact a
possible being? If we grant that existence in reality is a great-making property, we
have to know the very thing that Anselm proposes to prove: that among the beings
that actually exist there is one that is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
For given that existence in reality is a great-making property, the only possible being
that can exemplify Anselm’s idea of God (the greatest possible being) is a possible
being that actually exists. If no actually existing being is omnipotent, omniscient, and
perfectly good, Anselm’s God (the greatest possible being) is like the round square,
an impossible being. Since no merely possible being (a being that does not exist but
whose existence is possible) can exemplify Anselm’s concept of God; if no omnip-
otent, omniscient, perfectly good being actually exists, Anselm’s God (the greatest
possible being) is, in fact, an impossible being. And what this logically implies is
that Anselm’s God (the greatest possible being) is a possible being only if he actually
exists. Should Anselm’s God not in fact exist, he is an impossible being.
In God Freedom and Evil2 Alvin Plantinga advances a version of Anselm’s famous
argument, a version he holds to be a sound argument for the existence of God. Employ-
ing the idea of possible worlds, Plantinga skillfully expresses Anselm’s argument in
a way that helps us both to understand the argument and to see its persuasive force.
However, in discussing ‘the greatest possible being’ from the perspective of many
possible worlds, Plantinga uncovers a difficulty in Anselm’s argument. For a being
could be maximally great in some possible world, such that no other being in any
world has that degree of greatness, even though that maximally great being does not

1 As we’ve seen, the proposition that Anselm’s God is a possible being entails the proposition that Anselm’s
God (an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being) actually exists. However, the fact that proposition
A entails proposition B does not mean that one cannot know A without knowing B. A child just beginning
to learn arithmetic may know that 3 > 2 without knowing that (5 − 4) + 2 > (7 − 6) + 1, even though it
is entailed by 3 > 2. But for a rational human being who doesn’t already know whether God exists or does
not exist, once he clearly understands that Anselm’s God cannot be a possible being unless Anselm’s God
actually exists, he should be unwilling to say that he knows the former (God is a possible being) if he does
not know the latter (God actually exists).
2 Plantinga (1974a).

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exist in the possible world that isactual. To repair the argument, given that there are
many possible worlds, Plantinga introduces the concept: maximal greatness. A being
is maximally great in a given possible world only if “it has maximal excellence in every
possible world”.3 He then states his version of the ontological argument as follows:
1. It is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness.
2. So there is a possible being that in some world W has maximal greatness.
3. A being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence
in every world.
4. A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience,
omnipotence, and moral perfection in that world.4
from which it follows that Anselm’s God—an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect
being—exists in the actual world.
As Plantinga notes, this way of expressing the argument dispenses with the need
to suppose that necessary existence is a perfection, “for obviously a being can’t be
omnipotent (or for that matter omniscient or morally perfect) in a given world unless
it exists in that world.” In what follows, I will examine Plantinga’s version of the
ontological argument and endeavor to show that it falls prey to the epistemological
objection that I have raised against Anselm’s ontological argument.
Let us define ‘God’ to be ‘a maximally great being’. Premises 3 and 4 assure us that
God (a maximally great being) is a possible being only if an omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good being exists in every possible world. What then do we have to know in
order to know that God (a maximally great being) is a possible being? At a minimum,
I believe, we have to know that an omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect being exists
in the actual world. For, putting aside other possible worlds, if such a being doesn’t
exist in the possible world that is actual, he isn’t what Plantinga defines him to be: a
maximally great being. Indeed, if he doesn’t exist in the possible world that is actual,
he is an impossible being.
Thus, to be confident that Plantinga’s God is a possible being, I suspect that one has
to know the very thing that Anselm endeavors to prove: that God actually exists. Of
course, if a being actually exists, it most certainly is a possible being. But generally,
one can know that a being is a possible being without having to know that the being
actually exists. We may know, for example, that a President of the United States of
America who is wiser than George W. Bush is possible, without having to know that
some actual president of the United States was or will be wiser than George W. Bush
is—although I suspect that many would claim to have such knowledge.
In The Nature of Necessity5 Plantinga devotes an entire chapter, “God and Neces-
sity”, to Anselm’s ontological argument. It is important to see if the objection I’ve
raised to the ontological argument as presented in God Freedom and Evil can also
be applied to the argument as presented in The Nature of Necessity. For, in my judg-
ment, there is no presentation of the ontological argument that is as carefully devel-
oped, forceful, and clear as Plantinga’s formulation and discussion of the argument on

3 Ibid, p. 108.
4 Ibid, p. 108, italics are mine.
5 Plantinga (1974b).

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pp. 198–202 in The Nature of Necessity, and his defense of a modal version of that
argument on pp. 213–221.
Using Anselm’s own wording, but taking Anselm’s ‘conceivable’ to mean ‘possi-
ble’, Plantinga expresses Anselm’s own account of his ontological argument as fol-
lows:
1. God exists in the understanding but not in reality.
2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.
3. It is possible that God exists in reality.
4. If God did exist in reality, then he would be greater than he is. (from 1 and 2).
5. It is possible that there is a being greater than God is. (from 3 and 4).
6. It is possible that there be a being greater than the being than which a greater
being is not possible. (from 5 and Anselm’s understanding of God as ‘the greatest
conceivable being).
But surely
7. It is false that it is possible that there is a being greater than the being than which
it is not possible that there be a greater.
Therefore,
8. If God exists in the understanding he also exists in reality. But clearly enough, he
does exist in the understanding, as even the fool will testify; therefore, he exists
in reality as well.6
What objection, if any, can be advanced against Anselm’s presentation of his onto-
logical argument (as carefully expressed by Plantinga)? The objection I shall advance
concerns premise 3: “It is possible that God exists in reality.” Normally, when we are
asked whether it is possible that a particular being, X, exists in reality, all we need to
know is that there is nothing contradictory or impossible in the proposition: “X exists
in reality.” Thus, if we are asked whether it is possible that a human being who is
twenty-five feet tall actually has existed, does exist, or will exist on our planet; the
answer, I believe, should be ‘Yes’—provided there is nothing contradictory in the
idea of some human being on our planet growing to be twenty-five feet tall. It may be
that given (a) the way human beings are in fact composed, and (b) the way nature is
constructed, no human being ever will in fact grow to be twenty-five feet tall. Indeed, it
may be physically impossible for any human being in our world to grow to be twenty-
five feet tall. If so, then no human being on our planet ever will grow by natural means
to be twenty-five feet tall. But it is quite another thing for it to be logically impossible
for some human being in our world to grow to be twenty-five feet tall. For even if the
natural laws governing our world are such that it is physically impossible for some
human being to grow to be twenty-five feet tall, that does not preclude its being log-
ically possible that some human being should grow to be twenty-five feet tall in his
lifetime. For to claim that it is logically possible is to claim only that there is nothing
logically contradictory in the proposition that some human being in the actual world
will grow to be twenty-five feet tall. And the fact that the physical laws governing the

6 Ibid, pp. 198–199.

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world that happens to be actual are such that, let us say, no human being is able to
grow to be twenty-five feet tall in his lifetime, has little bearing, if any, on the question
of whether it is logically possible for some actual human being in our world to grow
to be twenty-five feet tall. Moreover, if the God of traditional theism (an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being) does exist, he would not be confined by the laws
of nature, and could bring about events that, given only the operation of the laws of
nature, never would (and, perhaps, never could) occur in our world.
I’ve claimed that Anselm’s ontological argument—as stated by Alvin Plantinga—
begs the question. Where, if anywhere, does that argument beg the question? And in
what way does the argument beg the question? Concerning the first question, the where
question, my claim is that it is the third premise (It is possible that God exists in reality)
of Plantinga’s version of Anselm’s argument that begs the question. Concerning the
second question, the way question, my claim is that the way the third premise begs the
question is epistemically. It begs the question epistemically because in order to know
that the crucial premise “It is possible that God exists in reality.” is true, we have to
know that God does in fact exist in reality. For given Anselm’s claim that existence
in reality is a great-making property, should God happen not to exist in reality, God
isn’t what Anselm has defined him to be: the greatest possible being. It is, therefore,
impossible for a merely possible being, a being, let us say, that does exist but logically
might not have existed, to be Anselm’s God. Indeed, since existence in reality is a
great-making property; should God happen not to exist, he is an impossible being—
for Anselm defines ‘God’ as ‘the greatest possible being’ and he takes ‘existence in
reality’ to be a great-making property. It is, therefore, impossible for a possible being
lacking existence in reality to be ‘the greatest possible being’.
Consider Plantinga’s third premise. That premise tells us that God’s existence in
reality is possible. All we are seemingly being asked to agree to, should we accept
that premise, is that God’s existence in reality isn’t impossible—that God isn’t like the
round square: something such that its existence in reality is logically impossible. But
the truth is that once we agree with Anselm that ‘existence in reality’ is a great-making
property, Anselm’s God (the greatest possible being) is a possible being only if he in
fact exists in reality. Should Anselm’s God happen not to exist in reality, Anselm’s
God is in fact an impossible being. Therefore: In order to know that Anselm’s God
(the greatest possible being) is, in fact, a possible being, we must know the very point
that Anselm proposes to prove: that among the beings that actually exist there is one
than which a greater being not only doesn’t exist, but one than which a greater being
is impossible. For if God, as defined by Anselm, does not exist in reality, then, given
that existence in reality is a great making property, God is an impossible being. And
this implies, I believe, that in order to know that Anselm’s God (the greatest possible
being) is, in fact, a possible being, rather than an impossible being, we must know the
very point that Anselm proposes to prove: that among the beings that actually exist
there is one than which a greater being not only does not exist, but one than which a
greater being is impossible. For should it be true than among existing beings each is
such that a greater being than it is logically possible, Anselm’s God not only doesn’t
exist, his existence is impossible. Such is the consequence of adding ‘existence in
reality’ to the definition of a being. Reality is the way it is, and it isn’t determined by
how we define words. Either there is a necessarily existing, omnipotent, omniscient,

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perfectly good being or there isn’t. Anselm’s marvelous argument, even in Planting’s
skillful hands, fails to answer this important question.7 We should, I believe, agree with
Anselm’s idea of God as an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being who exists,
not contingently, but necessarily. The question that remains unanswered, however,
is whether it is possible that such a being actually exists? If Anselm’s God actually
exists, he is a necessary being, and it is impossible that he not exist. On the other hand,
if Anselm’s God does not actually exist, he is an impossible being, it is impossible
that he should exist. Is Anselm’s God a necessary being or an impossible being? To
answer that question we need to find out whether there actually exists an omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being. Anselm’s wonderful argument fails to provide us
with the answer to that very important question.

Acknowledgements I’m grateful to my colleagues, Michael Bergmann and Paul Draper, for some helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References

Plantinga, A. (1974a). God, freedom and evil. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc.
Plantinga, A. (1974b). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

7 Such is the consequence of adding ‘existence in reality’ to the definition of a being. Reality is the way
it is, and it isn’t determined by how we define words. Either there is a necessarily existing, omnipotent,
omniscient, perfectly good being or there isn’t. Anselm’s marvelous argument, even in Plantinga’s skillful
hands, fails to answer this important question.

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