UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois

CIVIL DOCKETING STATEMENT

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT HARMONY, LLC, )
SUSAN HINDS, individually and as CEO, )
Strategic Management Harmony, LLC, )
) APPEAL from the UNITED STATES
Plaintiffs- Appellants, ) DISTRICT COURT for the Southern
) District of Indiana, New Albany Division
Vs. ) No. 4:05 cv 0180
) Current Judge: Richard L. Young
ENHANCED BUSINESS REPORTING, ) 2nd Judge: David F. Hamilton appointed 7th Cir.
CONSORTIUM, INC., GRANT THORNTON, LLP, ) 1st Judge: John D. Tinder appointed 7th Cir.
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, LLP, )
AMERICAN INSTITUTE of CERTIFIED PUBLIC ) 1st Appeal: 07-3191 September 10, 2007
ACCOUNTANTS, INC, ) (Not final judgment- appeal held in abeyance)
MICROSOFT, CORPORATION ) 2nd Appeal 10-2098 May 5, 2010 (consolidated)
) 3rd Appeal 10-2118 May 6, 2010 (dismissed, 1 day late)
Defendants-Appellees. ) 4th Appeal 10-2555 June 28, 2010 (consolidated)
) 5th Appeal 10-3457 October 22, 2010 pending

PRO SE APPELLANT’S RESPONSE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ORDER APPEAL 10-3457

Plaintiff-Appellant, Susan M. Hinds, by way of Susan M. Hinds (“Hinds” or “Appellant”

interchangeably), Pro Se, former Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium (“EBRC”) Chief Executive Officer

& President (“CEO”), respectfully and prayerfully submit for entry Pro Se Appellant’s Response Seventh

Circuit Order Appeal 10-3457 (“Appellants Response”) in an oversize brief as previously requested of Seventh

Circuit of forty-seven pages. As directed and in response to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (“Seventh

Circuit”) Order entered on November 30, 2010, requesting Appellant to show cause for her Appeal No. 10-3457.

To show why 10-3457 is not identical to Appeal Nos. 10-2098 and 10-2555 and is not subject to sanctions for

engaging in frivolous litigation, as it appears [based on a preliminary review and no evidence to form this

opinion] to be identical to Appeal Nos. 10-2098 and 10-2555 that was summarily affirmed on September 17,

2010. Pending before the Court is Appellants and Appellees Jurisdictional Memorandum (“JM”) pleadings

related to 10-3457, which is to be considered, in addition to Pro Se Appellant’s Response, when making

rendering final judgment.

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 The Defendants, including Grant Thornton, LLP (“Thornton”), failed to file a legally sufficient

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Cir. Rule 26.1; Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1, if any filed at all. Defendant EBRC

filed an untimely, legally insufficient Disclosure Statement (see Exhibit A attached), which is sanctionable

behavior, which Appellant filed sanctions relief repeatedly, due to Defendants failure to fully disclose pursuant

to Cir. Rule 26.1, and Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1. Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, has followed the procedures, to the best

of her ability, is not untimely nor ‘relitigating’ and should not be threatened with sanctions, but Appellees

should be sanctioned for their collective disrespect and disrepute of Courts procedures: network firm. The

Seventh Circuit should grant Appellants right to appeal, order briefing with forty (40) days for Appellant to fully

brief 10-3457. In support of Appellant’s Response, submits as follows:

I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY & PROCEDURAL POSTURING

1. The original parties to this litigation are as follows, Appellants, represented by legal

counsel, Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP (“MEP Legal”) until January 2008, included, Strategic

Management Harmony, LLC (“Harmony”) and Susan M. Hinds, individually and as CEO of Strategic

Management Harmony, LLC, and BFC Solutions, Inc. (“BFC”)(collectively “Original Plaintiff’s”) and

Defendants-Appellees included, Grant Thornton, LLP (“Thornton”), Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (“PwC”),

Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc. (“AICPA”), and

Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, Inc. (“EBRC”) (collectively “Defendants”), and named Defendants

were voluntarily dismissed due to jurisdictional reach.

2. The jurisdiction is in United States District Court Southern District of Indiana- New Albany

Division (“Southern District of Indiana”) established on August 10, 2007 (Doc. No. 116), by subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13311 and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

3. On August 10, 2007 (dkt 116), Judge ruled on Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss (dkts. 88, 91), by

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MEP Legal, LLP, Former Plaintiff’s Counsel of Record, incorrectly cited in the original appeal, that jurisdiction was
established by diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 filed as Plaintiff’s first Notice of Appeal dated
September 10, 2007; with substantial prejudicial effects to Plaintiffs. On August 10, 2007, Judge John D. Tinder ruled
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal subject matter, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 supplemental jurisdiction for State claims
because they form part of the same case or controversy. (dkt. 116 p. 11) (Footnote 8: Lest there be any confusion, the court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims regardless of what it later decides about Defendants’ statuses as Hinds’
employer. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).

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dismissing causes of action for breach of contract, defamation, and dismissing PwC, Microsoft, AICPA, and

EBRC as defendants from Title VII claims and Equal Pay Act claims (“EPA”), with remaining Defendant

Thornton. Plaintiff BFC’s contract claim was severed because it was ruled that it was not part of same operative

set of facts that led to the other claims, thus failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction (dkt 116 pg 34).

4. In September 2007, MEP withdrew with undisclosed medical problems, (dkt 391, exhibit A

attorney-client privileged not waived), continued to represent client interests pending court release, undisclosed

conflicts discovered during settlement discussions (see Exhibit X- Defendants Thornton, PwC, Microsoft,

AICPA, and EBRC made an offer to settle valued at $150,000), and thereafter. For example, the General

Motors Bankruptcy Chapter 11 civil case 09-50026 (REG) jointly administered by MEP (see Exhibit B), with

MEP in same litigation with law firms, Arent Fox who represents , Toyota, or Defendant PwC’s law firm

Winston & Strawn, and other law firms involved in this litigation. MEP and/or Susan Sparks, was paid over

$60,000 in fees and costs for employment related matters, abandoned Original Plaintiffs (Hinds, Harmony,

BFC) during complex litigation, caused irreparable prejudice to Plaintiff’s standing in violation of the Model

Code of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6-1.9, and Defendant’s should be ordered to provide Appellant, EBRC

officer, adequate legal counsel, as required under Delaware State Law §145 indemnity for officers like Hinds.

5. On January 2, 2008, MEP services were terminated due to misrepresentation2 to Appellant

related to a court ordered deposition (dkt 270, exhibit an- ‘court-ordered deposition’ not court ordered, asking

questions about Mike Willis, PwC partner, EBRC; dkt 270, exhibits ao, ap; dkt 263, exhibit n), these multiple

‘harassing’ depositions had substantial prejudicial and legal detriment to Original Plaintiffs. On August 5, 2009,

Plaintiff Hinds filed a Motion to Supress (dkt 297), the July 2009 deposition, in which Plaintiff Hinds was not

represented by legal counsel (a violation of Hinds indemnity provisions), denied cross-examination time, and

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Importantly, MEP violated the FRCP Rule 30(d)(2), by misrepresenting and fraudently inducing Hinds, into believing
that the court ordered a third day of depositions, that the court did not order (after two full days already completed, this
would be the third day, totaling over twenty-one hours), deposed on detailed questions regarding EBRC Founding
Members, including Microsoft, Mike Willis, PwC Partner/EBRC board member, Thornton, and others and was charged
almost $600 for copies. This is a violation of FRCP 30(d)(3) that caused Plaintiff to be reluctant in any further participation
and violation of FRCP 30(d)(4) as this was done in bad faith, in a manner to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent
(i.e. each video was tampered with leaving much doubt). This is contrary to law and Plaintiff’s rights and the deposition
ordered by Thornton should be suppressed.

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highly prejudicial deposition that the Defendant Thornton based its’ Motion for Summary Judgment on.

Appellant Hinds repeatedly requested from the courts and Defendants for an appointed attorney,

including in her first Pro Se filing on January 28, 2008 (dkts. 147-150; dkt. 161 denied Plaintiff Hinds request

for indemnity and an attorney, and denied Microsoft’s request for attorney fees (who filed this request 3 more

times—to harass, embarrass, humiliate Plaintiff Hinds for her complaints and prejudice the tribunal through

perception partners)), a request for a Hearing under LR 7.5 (dkt 251) was denied. This is an act of discrimination

itself, to deny indemnity is to deny adequate legal counsel and an enforceable ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of

employment and/or membership status, and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided indemnity under

Delaware Law §145. (see Exhibit C).

Importantly, this is an enforceable ‘term and/or condition’ of employment and/or membership status,

and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided mandatory indemnity under Delaware Law §145 (see Exhibit C)

nor can a not-for-profit officer be held personally liable and provided indemnity, in matters of public interest,

and under EBRC bylaws (see Exhibit D) or AICPA Professional Standards BL Section 440 Indemnification (See

Exhibit D-1) as an AICPA committee member and CPA Ambassador (see Exhibit D-2). Additionally, AICPA

Independence Standards is defined ET§100.01.06 Definitions: Independence a. Independence in mind; b.

Independence in appearance (see Exhibit D-3), PwC is Toyota’s auditors with a financial interest as defined in

ET §100.18 Financial Self-Interest threat (Id.) in government and private contacts arising out of EBRC/XBRL

(dkt 270-80) in the hundreds of millions of dollars, of which PwC Defendants are financial beneficiaries of by

“having a direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest in the client [Toyota—who appointed

Hinds to SCEBR then EBRC CEO when under EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement, Consulting, and General

Release Agreement], and ET §100.19 Management Participation Threat (see Exhibit D-4) that states, “Taking

on the role of client management or otherwise performing management functions on behalf of an attest client.

(a) Serving as an officer or director of the client [EBRC sponsored Mike Willis as board member and officer

and PwC is Toyota’s auditors, Mike Willis, PwC was involved in the “hiring, supervising, or terminating of the

client’s [Toyota- Hinds was under EEOC/Toyota contract that was violated by Willis, PwC} employees [Hinds

was a Toyota employee when appointed to SCEBR and under EEOC/Toyota contract when Willis “terminated

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Hinds employment” and a violation of AICPA Independence standards. Additionally, AICPA Independence

Standards are violated, ET§101.06 101-4—Honorary directorships and trusteeships of not-for-profit [EBRC

and XBRL are not-for-profits] organization, states, “…he or she cannot vote or otherwise participate in board

or management functions: Defendants violated this provision in their administration of EBRC/XBRL as they

participated in board or management functions while portraying to the public that they are serving honorary

roles: Independence violation.

6. In January 2008, Appellant Hinds entered an appearance, in Pro Se capacity, thus under Seventh

Circuit standards, her pleadings should be liberally construed, especially technical errors "The essence of liberal

construction is to give a pro se plaintiff a break when, although he stumbles on a technicality, his pleading is

otherwise understandable. "Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998).

7. On March 22, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered in favor of Defendant Thornton on

Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt 371, 372). However, Judge Young did the legal research, analysis, and

writing, on behalf of Defendant’s (dkts. 362-363; 366-67 were never answered by Defendants thus should be

ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendant’s favor, with Toyota perceived to have exparte

communications with Defendant’s and the tribunal, thus Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived

as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors male Defendant’s and their law firms.

8. On April 5, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered (dkt. 377) “Entry Discussing

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment” that denied (dkt. 373—which was to alter/amend dkts. 371-72). Judge

Young ruled under 59(e), stating in part,

“…three valid grounds for a Rule 59(e) motion—newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in
the law, and manifest error in law. See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732, (7th Cir. 1998). It is…
[this sentence is incomplete therefore incomprehensible for a pro se].

On April 5, 2010, District Court Entry (see Exhibit E- dkt 377 paragraph 3 stops sentence with “It is…”

fails to finish this sentence) is an incomplete, incomprehensible ruling, simply because the Entry stops in mid-

sentence, leaving Pro Se Plaintiff unable to make legal arguments due to this substantial, material mistake,

inadvertence, excusable neglect, which is clearly erroneous, and is therefore voidable judgment. Worse, it fails

to address the legal issues raised, like newly discovered evidence, in Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend the

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Final Judgment (see Exhibit F attached- dkt 373). The tolling for Appeal 10-2098 begins with dkt 377, which

must be voided as this critical judgment is incomplete by mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, and is

clearly erroneous, and establishes the beginning of a pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, and favor shown

to Defendants and their law firm. Both the Defendants and Judge Young failed to address the critical questions

regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was ruled in Defendants favor (dkts. 371-72), and

perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, and ‘fraud on the court’ as the evidence is disputed, not

authenticated, nor subject to the rigor of an evidentiary hearing, which has been and continues to be requested

by Appellant who has a “right to be heard3: this judgment must be voided. The District Court Entry (dkt 377)

must be voided due to error, mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and/or ‘fraud

on the court’. The record is incomplete, which affects the substantive rights of Appellant, who cannot

understand the Entry to alter/amend judgments (dkts. 371-73), without the reasoning or case laws behind it (dkt.

377- this judgment must be voided as it is incomplete and incomprehensible). This is not ‘relitigating’ but rather

a Constitutional Right XIV Amendment (due process, equal protection) to due process, that includes the right of

Appellant to recuse or remove a Judge and/or Magistrate when a clear pattern has emerged, and evidence to

support the inference that a ‘reasonable person’ would perceive judicial bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor,

and partiality shown to the Defendants and their law firms: violation of the Judicial Cannons as outlined below.

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After five years of burdensome litigation, subjecting Appellant Hinds to indigent status (i.e. Appellees, with
knowledge, are withholding fair compensation, breaching contacts, and discriminatorily denying access to the
contracts that are estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars: Appellant is due 3% of all government and
private contracts arising out of EBRC business plan, a subject of this litigation) has not been heard at the district
level, in violation of Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon Rule 2.09, Ensure The Right To Be Heard, which states;
RULE 2.09: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard
according to law.*
(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute, but shall not act in a manner that
coerces any party into settlement.
[3] Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only on their objectivity and impartiality, but also
on the appearance of their objectivity and impartiality. Despite a judge's best efforts, there may be instances where information
obtained during settlement discussions could influence a judge's decision-making during trial.

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 Clearly in violation of Judicial Canons, Rule 2.024: Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment; Rule 2.06

Impartiality and Fairness5, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann, Jr. directed and controlled the legal

research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendant’s (dkts. 362-63 Amended Request for Leave of Court to

File Plaintiff’s Surreply- this in part, establishes a ‘fraud on the court’ (see Exhibit G- dkt 363- Defendant-

Appellees failed to timely respond L.R. 7.1); (dkts. 366-67 Amended Request for Admissions (see Exhibit H-

dkt 367) which Appellant is due these responses without court approval, Defendants failed to provide

Admissions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 36: Defendants must be ordered to answer), the Appellants pleadings were

never answered by Defendants, by motion or responsive pleadings, thus should be ruled in Pro Se Plaintiffs

favor, in consideration of the Judicial Cannon Rules 2.02; 206; ; 2.09; 2.10. Yet, Judge Young ruled in

Defendant’s favor, with Toyota perceived to have Ex Parte Communications, in violation of Judicial Canons,

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RULE 2.02: BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND HARASSMENT
(A) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice, and shall not engage in harassment.
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias, prejudice, or harassment,
including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials, and
others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so. This does not preclude legitimate references to those factors
when relevant to an issue in the proceeding.
(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting bias, prejudice, or
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This does not preclude legitimate advocacy
when these or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding.
COMMENTS
[1] A judge who manifests bias in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into
disrepute. Even facial expression and body language can convey to parties or lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media,
and others an appearance of bias. A judge must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.
[2] Examples of manifestations of bias include but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames [‘serial-
litigator’]; negative stereotyping[‘autocrat’- but is acceptable in the accounting profession if a male autocratic accountant
but not females ]; attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggesting a
connection between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal characteristics.
[3] Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or aversion toward an individual on bases
such as race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or
socioeconomic status.
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RULE 2.06: IMPARTIALITY* AND FAIRNESS
A judge shall uphold and apply the law,* and decide all cases with impartiality and fairness.
COMMENT
[3] To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a judge must be objective and open-minded, and must not show
favoritism toward anyone. It is not a violation of this Rule, however, for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to
ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.

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Rule 2.10 Ex Parte Communications6 with Defendant’s and tribunal, thus Judge Young and Magistrate

Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors male Defendants and law firms.

Judge Young goes on to say, “…decided on the record as it stands, not on litigants’ visions of what the

facts might some day reveal.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillio-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994)(quoting

Dow v. United Bhd. Of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993). Appellant perceives that “what the facts might

some day reveal” is an indication that the Judge’s chambers were waiting for something to come in the form of

new facts [Hinds called an attorney regarding Toyota] and is perceived ‘ex-parte’ communications.

9. On March 22, 2010, Judgment (dkt 372) was entered in favor of Defendant Thornton with Entry

(dkt 371 pg. 1) stating in part, “Other claims and claims against other defendants were dismissed in the Entry on

Defendants MTD (dkt 116). For the reasons explained in this Entry, the court finds…undisputed evidence shows

that it was not Hinds’ employer and did not direct or control the acts of which she complains.” (Id.). This

conclusion is at odds with Judge Tinder’s ruling (dkt 116- pg. 24-25 “defendants ran the Consortium as a

“defacto” corporation…directed the specific personal actions…parent corporations that direct discriminatory

acts may be liable under Title VII.”). Even defendant Microsoft used the “single-employer test” in MTD Reply

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RULE 2.10 : EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
(A) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the
judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending* or impending* matter, except as follows:
(1) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do
not deal with substantive matters are permitted, provided:
(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, or tactical advantage as a result of the ex
parte communication, and
(b) the judge makes provision by delegation or otherwise promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the ex
parte communication, and allows them an opportunity to respond.
(2) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative
responsibilities, or with other judges, provided that the judge does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the
case and takes reasonable steps to avoid receiving factual information that is not part of the record.
(3) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle
matters pending before the judge.
(4) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law* to do so.
(B) A judge shall not independently investigate facts in a case, and shall consider only the evidence presented.
(C) If a judge inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing on the substance of a matter, the
judge shall make provision by delegation or otherwise promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the
communication and give the parties an opportunity to respond.
(D) A judge shall make reasonable efforts, including the provision of appropriate supervision, to ensure that this Rule is not
violated through law clerks or other personnel on the judge’s staff.

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pleadings (dkt 103 pg. 3), which is the proper legal standard. This is further evidence of prejudice and biased

pattern that has taken precedent over Constitutional rights, Supreme Court, and Seventh Circuit holdings.

10. On May 5, 2010, Appellant filed and Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal No. 10-2098,

amended on May 6, 2010 and docketed Appeal No. 10-2118 (dismissed, one day late). On May 6, 2010, the

Southern District of Indiana Entry (dkt 388) denied the Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to proceed in forma

pauperis (dkt. 383). On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P 59(e) (dkt. 392), arguing filed good faith, with merit, and was not frivolous, but was denied

(dkt. 397). Once again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, or support staff, did the legal research,

analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendant’s (dkts. 383, 388, 392 were never answered by Defendants

thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendant’s favor, thus Judge Young

and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and favors the male

Defendant’s and their law firms. Likewise, May 17, 2010, Appellant filed Motion to Stay Judgment Pending

Appeal (dkt. 391), which was denied (dkt. 397). Again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, or support

staff, did the legal research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendant’s (dkt 391 was never answered

by Defendants thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendant’s favor, thus

Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and

favors the male Defendant’s and their law firms.

11. On June 4, 2010, Appellant entered (dkt. 400) a Motion to Amend/Alter Judgment (dkt. 397),

which addressed the Defendant’s request for attorney fees7, including the over $600,000 purported fees and

costs that were “shocking” to Appellant Hinds, but was denied (dkt. 401), denied the very next day without

Defendant’s receiving mailed copies or filing a responsive pleading? Ex Parte Communications are

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Plaintiff perceives ongoing ‘harassment’ by Defendants, who have made false statements under oath, used
‘shocking’ methods to force Plaintiff to settle (including the Judge changing the legal standard from plausible to frivolous
to award Defendants fees that are excessive, duplicative, and questionable when run through a not-for-profit whose
purported liabilities exceed their assets (raising the ‘piercing the corporate veil’ jurisdictional issue), failed to produce
evidence, the evidence was not tested for admissibility with subjective character assessments based on hearsay, witness’s
with credibility problems, and declaration statements that are false, misleading, mischaracterizing, or misciting the facts or
circumstances.

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perceived to have driven this ‘rush’ judgment and in violation or Judicial Canon Rule 2.10 Ex Parte

Communication. Once again, Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or support staff, did the legal

research, analysis, and writing, on behalf of Defendant’s (neither dkt 400 nor 397 was answered by

Defendants, thus should be ruled in Plaintiffs favor), then Judge Young ruled in Defendant’s favor, thus

Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann are perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and

favors the male Defendant’s and their law firms.

12. On June 25, 2010, Appellant filed Notice of Appeal with Southern District of Indiana and on

June 28, 2010 the Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal No. 10-2555, which was later consolidated with 10-2098

for briefing purposes. The district court Order (dkt 410) Entry Directing Further Proceedings requesting

Appellant to supplement her notice of appeal by July 1, 2010. Appellant filed a Motion for Time Extension to

respond to dkt 410 Entry (dkt 416), which was granted (dkt 418) with a time extension of July 8, 2010.

13. On June 28, 2010, the Southern District of Indiana entered “Order” (dkt 411) stating,

“…as to 383 Notice of Appeal filed by Susan Hinds. It is ordered that plaintiff Strategic Management
Harmony, LLC is voluntarily dismissed as an appellant in this appeal pursuant to Fed.R. App.P. 42(b). This
case shall proceed with Susan Hinds as the only appellant…”

It is this transaction that generated the series of responsive pleadings, Appellant Hinds, Pro Se is being

denied her rights to indemnity at the Appellate level to represent Harmony, as Hinds represented Harmony’s

interests for almost two years with no such disclaimer. This is an act of discrimination itself, to deny indemnity

is to deny adequate legal counsel, an enforceable ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment and/or

membership status, and a not-for-profit officer [Hinds] is provided indemnity under Delaware Law §145 (see

Exhibit C), which mandates that Officer Hinds be provided legal counsel for her representation or her firm,

Harmony, and the AICPA committee membership bylaws and/or EBRC/XBRL bylaws (see Exhibit D to D-4).

Importantly, this is an enforceable ‘term and/or condition’ of employment and/or membership status, and

mandatory provisions for a not-for-profit officer [former EBRC CEO Hinds] is provided mandatory indemnity

under Delaware Law §145 (see Exhibit C) nor can a not-for-profit officer be held personally liable, in matters

of public interest, under EBRC bylaws, or AICPA bylaws, AICPA committee member and CPA Ambassador (see

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Exhibit D to D-4). Appellant Hinds judgment must be voided or remanded for further proceedings.

14. On July 7, 2010, Appellant filed an Amended Motion On Order 410 (dkt. 419) a responsive

motion to the Judge’s request to supplement Appeal No. 10-2555.

15. On July 9, 2010, Appellant filed in response to Southern District of Indiana Order (dkt 411 entered

June 28, 2010), “Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Alter Or Amend Judgment; Alternatively Relief From

Judgment” (dkt 420-25)(see Exhibit L) filed within ten days plus three day mail rule, therefore 59(e) deadline

met. Plaintiff filed this motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P Rule 59(e) and/or Rule 60(b), to prevent substantial

prejudice and injustice, with very limited time to prepare, which is why Plaintiff requested a leave from the

court, to be provided ample time to brief this legally complex but significant development of “newly discovered

evidence”, which would allow Plaintiff to make it legally discernable. Simply put: Plaintiff requested the

Southern District of Indiana to grant Plaintiff a leave from court, to brief the “newly admissible evidence”(dkts.

420-25; 433 ex. B- for example of newly discovered evidence; 436; 438; 439 relevant orders), which has a

material impact on various court judgments and/or orders, including not limited to, dkts 116, 371-72, 377, 388,

397, and 411. On August 12, 2010 the Court dismissed (dkt 436)(see Exhibit M), however, on August 23, 2010,

Appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment for dkt 436 (dkt 438) (see Exhibit N), pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), which was denied (dkt 439)(see Exhibit O) on August 26, 2010. The Judge stated in Entry,

“…(dkt 438) only touches tangentially on the claims resolved in this lawsuit and in doing so presents no basis

for relief…(dkt 438) is denied.” Judge Young ruling is contrary to the parties intentions, as both parties agree

that these claims arise out of this litigation (dkts. 445-46; 453; 455; 456; 459-64- pending motions before the

district court, including Defendants violating the protective order by “leaking” confidential and privileged

communications). Defendants want to “bar Hinds from future filings” in spite of her credentials as a Public

Arbitrator that would be substantially, severely impact her ability to earn a professional livelihood, against

AICPA Professional Standards as a licensed CPA, and against sound public policy as Appellant was EBRC

CEO, not-for-profit officer who is to be provided mandatory indemnity, adequate legal counsel, and no personal

liability.

This is further evidence of “newly discovered evidence” that needs to be reflected in the complaint, as

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“Ongoing Harassment” which allows exceptions to the general rules under Title VII EEOC (see Exhibit P);

“Ongoing Harassment” allows the EEOC to ‘reach-back’ for facts, reported incidents, and patterns of

discrimination or retaliation. But more importantly, the ‘pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutral, favoring, and

showing partiality” to the male Defendant’s and their law firms, who again failed to timely file a responsive

pleading, under L.R. 7.1 as Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann performed the Defendants legal research,

case analysis, and legal writings and then decides in their favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a

responsive pleading.

16. On July 12, 2010, Court Entry (dkt 428), which denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (dkts.

419), even though the Defendants had not yet responded nor was a response due until July 19, 2010, calling

into question the impartiality, neutrality, and bias in judicial decision-making, violation of Judicial Canon

Rule 2.06, which has been prejudiced against Plaintiffs, two women licensed CPA’s from the beginning (BFC

Solutions, Inc. was dismissed from case with no relief provided for breach of her services contract), with

comments like “your case is on life support” by Magistrate Hussmann, with a room full of witnesses, and these

comments were made before discovery began. Entry (dkt 428) denied Plaintiff’s amended motion (dkt 419) with

Judge Young stating,

“The reason for this ruling is that the relief sought in such motion is so hidden from understanding as to be
indiscernible. The plaintiff should endeavor to respond to directions issued by a court with more clarity than
has been demonstrated in her many filings in recent months.”

Appellant received this in the mail around July 15, 2010. Plaintiff Hinds finds it astonishing that

whenever Toyota is involved (i.e. newly discovered evidence) that things are decided in “lightning speed”.

Plaintiff Hinds perceives Ex Parte Communications with Judges, Magistrates, legal staff, law professors or

affiliates (i.e. cronyism and rampant Conflicts of Interest in academics, which includes Defendant PwC,

Thornton, AICPA, Microsoft, EBRC (dkt 420-25 ex.c; dkt 433 1-10 exs. a-h)), or ex parte communications have

occurred within the network of the many law firms or defendants. For example, Judge Young and IU Maurer

School of Law (“IU Law”) [Hinds attended IU Law during this litigation to start in a new profession and

reported threatening notes in her locker (dkt 352) and other acts of intimidation or bullying due to Hinds

involvement in protected activity or political/religious/social beliefs] are networking or their legal staff, which is

12
a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement or Tower Mediated Agreement. Likewise, in

conflict with Appellant Hinds, FINRA Public Arbitrator8 quasi-judicial powers, including the power to issue

subpoenas in RICO or securities fraud cases as part of her public duties] but a simple motion to dismiss took

almost two years to resolve (i.e. Original Complaint filed November 2005). The overt judicial bias, prejudice,

non-neutrality, partiality and favor shown to Defendants and their law firms and not a Pro Se Appellant.

17. On July 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (dkt 433- see Exhibit I),

within ten (10) days of dkt 428 Entry, pursuant to 59(e) which allows relief and a reconsideration due to a

manifest error of law or fact or newly admissible evidence and/or 60(b), requesting a leave of court to prepare a

legally complex brief for admissibility of new evidence. In the present case, newly admissible evidence, which

is of the same subject matter, same parties, same or similar set of facts, and arises out of this litigation, and as

filed “Ongoing Harassment” as defined by the EEOC (see Exhibit P) and is subject to this appeal 10-3457,

which includes but not limited to:

a) Defamation of Character: Hinds is a public arbitrator not a serial litigator, Hinds is challenging
Defendants under professional defamation under Indiana Law, as there is no credible evidence to support
these patently false allegations. Defendants reckless and malicious mischaracterization, misrepresentation,
miscite, and misquote of authorities, by making any inference, that Plaintiff Hinds is a ‘serial litigator’ who
is in fact a public arbitrator with ‘highly recommended character and integrity’. In fact, the Defendants are
the “real serial litigators”. Likewise, Defendants recklessly label others with intent to harm, discriminatory
use of “autocratic”, which Plaintiff Hinds flatly denies ever having ever been labeled as such nor have any
written communication allegedly addressing Plaintiff Hinds autocratic attribute. In fact, with much
relevance, the accounting profession is characterized as male dominated and autocratic leadership styles yet
women are not employable if they have such attributes? These defamatory labels have substantial
professional reputational harm, materially adverse negative impacts to Hinds employment, benefits, terms
and conditions, her contracts (past, present, and future), appointments, and other harms;
b) Unauthorized Access, Copying, And Distribution (Across State Lines) Hinds Medical Records
(Including Highly Sensitive and Confidential Records) And Denied That They Possessed Such
Records When Requested On Record. On January 13, 2010, parties had a Telephonic Status Conference
with Judge Young (dkts 358-360)(dkt 442 ex. C), whereby David Ritter, Defendants legal counsel, denied
having access or possession of Plaintiff Hinds medical records, and has repeatedly denied that they have
these records. Contrarily, Plaintiff Hinds has hard evidence that in fact Defendant Thornton has in their
possession, confidential, sensitive medical records and Hinds rights to privacy and others have been severely
violated- this is newly discovered evidence.
8
On January 22, 2010, Plaintiff Hinds, former Indiana University Law Business Law Society Co-President, became a Public arbitrator (dkt
433- Exhibit A). Hinds, quasi-judicial officer with special protections under law and securities industry regulations, invested months of study,
testing, and certification to become a public arbitrator for the Financial Industries Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)(Id.)(dkt 420-25, Exhibit B-
securities fraud, RICO, and business law cases), with defendant’s and their law firms, agents, and others have obstructed Hinds professional
development, career advancement, board appointments, and other harmful actions, all “but for” this litigation that was orchestrated
(Employee/Employer relationship and Integrated Enterprise—dkt 433 pg 7 footnote 2) by EBRC Founders, like Mike Starr, Grant Thornton,
LLP Chief Operating Officer, former chairperson of Special Committee on Enhanced Business Reporting, former EBRC President, XBRL US
chairperson, aided by his sprawling commercial litigation enterprise, perception partners, and networks.

13
 c) Newly Discovered Evidence (Highly Confidential- due to fear of retribution this will be provided
in future- ex. B): On Marcy 22, 2010, Plaintiff Hinds contacted an attorney related to Hinds employment
with Toyota (see letter dated March 22, 2010) of which Hinds is a credible witness of pending litigation, and
other “newly discovered evidence” that is relevant to this litigation, including an unauthorized deduction of
around $5,000 from plaintiff Hinds pension account under Toyota’s administration. This is highly
confidential and will be submitted directly to the investigator, once named and made available at that time:
due to fear of continued retaliation and/or retribution to me and my family’s health, safety, and welfare;
d) Continuing Loss of Employment, Contracts, Appointments, And Committees: One example, of
many, in May 2010, plaintiff Hinds was denied contracts for $393,000, with FINRA (Mike Starr NASDAQ
board member)(Harmony and/or Hindssight2020, competitor of EBRC & the founding partners, and their
law firms) and/or cases as arbitrator which is odd considering the amount of securities fraud cases currently
pending;
e) Potential breach of EEOC Settlement contracts, indemnity agreements, and other contractual or
bylaw provisions;
f) Glass Ceiling: For all named employers, potential employers, former employers, law firms, and co-
conspirators, there remains one commonality: a glass ceiling is firmly in place, (maybe a crack here or there)
and women are still compensated under 80% of male counterparts, in spite of new Equal Pay Act or Lilly
Ledbetter Act. The glass ceiling is defined as positions that are in executive management, board of directors,
partners, equity stake owners, and key leadership roles;
g) Public Policy, Political and/or Religious Beliefs: Hinds has been targeted due to her public policy,
political, and/or religious beliefs and/or affiliations- this will be outlined with the investigator due to the
continued retaliation and/or retribution;
h) Harms: Hinds has experienced emotional distress due to these intentional and malicious actions (i.e.
intentional demeaning, degrading, unethical, humiliating, embarrassing, harassing (which trigger health
issues) and other emotions evoked), professional and personal defamation of character, invasion of privacy,
psychological torture, legal bullying & breach of fiduciary duty, involuntary conversion of assets, loss of
employment compensation, terms/conditions of employment and benefits, denied opportunities to be
“recruited, interviewed, or employed”, loss of committee appointments, network opportunities, speaking
engagements, and other damage, and;
i) Other: Other evidence to be outlined in brief (dkt 433- ex.b for examples of newly discovered evidence;
not all).

18. On September 23, 2010, Judge Young entered, albeit Defendants failed to file a responsive

pleading under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 5-7, 12 (dkt 440)(see Exhibit K) Entry Discussing Selected Matters and

denied Appellants Motion to Alter/Amend (dkt 433)(see Exhibit I), or L.R. 7.1 (Id. At 10) considering it as a

motion under 60(b), and denied the 59(e) request, stating it was four months after judgment. This is perceived as

prejudice, bias, and non-neutral, favoring, and partial to the male Defendants and their law firms. Hence the

reasons for filing a Motion to Recuse (dkts. 441-42)(see Exhibit Q).This motion is pending, brings to issue a

Constitutional right XIV Amendment that allows Appellant the right to remove the Judge. The prejudice

continued, as the Judge, failing to disqualify himself when placing Order (dkt. 443) (see Exhibit R), which

Appellant Hinds argues this is a ‘fraud on the court’ that will be briefed as the evidence is disputed and

unauthenticated, Appellants’ indemnity provisions void this judgment, and a gross violation of EEOC/Toyota

14
contact (see Exhibit S). Appellant Hinds has disputed these unaudited costs submitted by Defendants that

contains $7,400 attorney fees, which is a clear misrepresentation on the court, is sanctionable behavior, and is

pending request for a hearing under L.R. 7.5).

On October 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Remove (dkts. 451-52)(see Exhibit T) in

response to the Order #443, Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann showed clear bias and prejudice by not

disqualifying themselves, taking additional actions that are contrary to the Appellants Constitutional rights XIV

Amendment, Summary Judgment was entered in March 22, 2010 (i.e. without an evidence hearing, evidence is

in dispute, and not authenticated), and no costs were assessed. Appellant assumed that her well-pled Hardship

case, including indigent status, due to this protracted litigation that has been oppressive to Appellant. The

Defendants, who did not file a motion in response to the Motion to Remove, ‘failed to timely file any response

at all’, has no standing in this court and this should Motion to Remove should be ruled in Appellants favor.

Yet, Appellants Motion is incorrectly ruled, untimely, stating it is four months old, tolling from March 22,

2010, which is incorrect, the Order (dkt 410) is dated June 28, 2010, with a specific request to take a leave of

court to brief the newly discovered evidence, which is factually distinct from the case cited, Talana v.

Northwestern Medical Facility Foundation, Inc. Appellant’s Motion was timely filed, pursuant to 59(e), and the

delay was due to the length of time for Judge Young to render judgment (July 12, 2010 entered Order 428;

Appellant timely filed Motion to Alter/Amend July 22, 2010) (dkt 433)(see Exhibit I), to request a leave to brief

for the newly discovered evidence, pursuant to 59(e)), which should have been granted, especially because

Defendants failed to respond at all (see Exhibit I- dkt 433 pg. 5-6, 12), this is clearly erroneous or contrary to

law, and Appellants request for leave to brief newly discovered evidence should be granted.

Even if this is perceived as arising out of Appeal No. 10-2098/10-2555 (consolidated)(dkt 410),

supplemental to the Notice of Appeal filed June 25, 2010 (docketed June 28, 2010) that is irrelevant, as this is

not ‘relitigating’, as this is ‘newly discovered evidence’ (see Exhibit I- dkt 433pgs. 3-9, 11-17), which is

‘specific and not a blanket request’, which entitles Appellant a new trial, amend the complaint to conform to the

evidence, to obtain additional discovery from Defendants that was stayed in error, and to obtain discovery on the

newly discovered evidence. If anyone is late, it is the Defendants as they collectively failed to file a response,

15
the Court should have ruled in Appellants favor on Order entered September 23, 2010 (dkt 440), as this is an

‘abuse of discretion’ and no reasonable person could agree with the district court, as the Defendants failed to

carry their burden under L.R. 7.1 and failed to timely pursue their defenses that were available to them.

In Order (dkt 440)) Judge Young states,

“Given that the motion was filed four months after the entry of judgment on the clerk’s docket, the motion
cannot be treated as a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e). This is true whether the court would apply the 10-day
deadline for filing such a motion in effect prior to December 1, 2009 or the 28-day deadline in effect after
December 1, 2009. “A district court may not extend the time within which a party may move to alter or
amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Talano v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d
757, 761 (7th Cir. 2001)(citations omitted). “…abuse of discretion”[S]uch abuse exists ‘only in situations in
which no reasonable person could agree with district court.’” Hope v. US, 43 F.3d 1140, 1144 (7th Cir. 1994).

Unlike Talano (see Exhibit J), Appellants facts are substantially different, an abuse of discretion is believed to

have been committed, and a reasonable person could disagree with the district court, especially since Defendants

failed to respond at all (dkt 433 pg. 5-6, 12). Unlike Talano, Appellant’s response was timely filed within the

59(e) 28-day deadline. However, Defendant-Appellees failed to file a responsive pleading, Appellant was

specific as to the evidence (dkt 433 pgs. 3-5), which is “substantial & relevant to the evidentiary record

underlying the entry of summary judgment, and the reason Appellant requested a leave for further briefing (dkt

433- see Exhibit I) and not a blanket statement as used in Talano’s case, who to conform his motion to the

requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) by failing to conform to any of the grounds specified in 60(b).

Order (dkt 440) Judge Young stated,

“[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is ‘an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional
circumstances.” Eskridge v. Cook County, 577 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2009)(quoting McCormick v. City
of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 328 (7th Cir. 2000))l such relief is warranted “only upon a showing of
extraordinary circumstances that create substantial danger that the underlying judgment was unjust.”
Margoles v. Johns, 798 F.2d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir. 1986). The motion does not identify such
circumstances…denied pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2).”

Appellant filed the 60(b)(2), meeting the five prong test as outline in pleadings (dkt 433 pgs. 8-13) including: (1)

the evidence was discovered following trial; (2) due diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new

evidence is shown or may be inferred; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence

is material; and (5) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a new result. Harris v. Owens-

16
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 102 F.3d 1429, 1434 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1996). Additionally, Appellant needs to conform

the evidence to the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 15 (dkt 433 pg 10-17) or relation back amendments.

Plaintiff Hinds argues that it has not been four months, as it arises from June 28, 2010 Order (dkt

410), an Amended Motion based on approved time extension (entered July 7, 2010 dkt 419), which the Court

denied (Entry dkt 428 July 12, 2010). On July 22, 2010, Appellants Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment(see

Exhibit I- dkt 433) filed pursuant to 59(e) was timely filed and is not four months late and pursuant to 60(b) as a

‘fall-back’ position: meaning that her arguments are substantial and relevant to the evidentiary record underlying

the entry of the summary judgment (see paragraph 16 above and dkt 433- see ex. I attached for arguments),

require an extraordinary remedy and should be granted for these exceptional circumstances. Critical to this

appeal, July 22, 2010 (dkt 433 (see Exhibit I)- allows Pro Se Appellant a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence. Appellant Hinds, who has been denied her ‘right to a jury trial’, which is a Constitutional right VII

Amendment, was timely filed as a 59(e), within the ten day plus three day mail rule, and the final Order was

entered on September 23, 2010 (dkt 440 (see Exhibit K). The Appellant’s Motions were timely filed, is “newly

discovered evidence”, and again the Defendants failed to respond to the Plaintiffs’ pleadings failing to meet

their deadlines L.R. 7.1 (see Exhibit I- dkt 433 pg. 10), yet the Court continues to show bias and prejudice by

ruling in their favor, without timely filed responsive pleadings, this is non-neutral, favoring and showing

partiality to Defendants and their law firms. A clear pattern is evident and allows an inference of bias,

prejudice, non-neutrality, favoring, and showing partiality” to the male Defendant’s and their law firms, who

repeatedly failed to timely file a responsive pleading, under L.R. 7.1. Then, in violation of Judicial Cannons

Rules cited above, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann, and their legal staff, performed, in part, the

Defendants legal research, case analysis, and legal writings and then after jeopardizing their neutrality, makes

judicial decisions that are in Defendants’ favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a responsive pleading

ever. For example:

i. Entry Directing Further Proceedings (dkt 410) entered June 28, 2010 & Order denying Appellants
request for leave (dkt 440) entered September 23, 2010: newly discovered evidence after appeals filed,
which require a ‘new trial’ with amended complaint, additional discovery, evidence authenticated, and
remand for further proceedings:

17
a) June 28, 2010, Order (dkt 410) requesting supplemental information on Notice of Appeal 10-2555. On
July 1, 2010, Appellant requested a time extension (dkt 416), which was granted on July 6, 2010, Order
granting time extension (dkt 418). On July 7, Appellant filed (dkt 419) an Amended Motion in Response
to Court Order (dkt 410), which was denied (dkt 428) on July 12, 2010 without Defendants responding
to the Motion, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann completed the Defendants legal research,
analysis, and writings, then decided in their favor: prejudiced decision. Evidence has not been
authenticated, nor was an evidentiary hearing held to allow a rendering of final judgment.
b) On July 22, 2010, filed pursuant to 59(e)(dkt 433 pgs. 1-7) (see Exhibit O) to avoid substantial
prejudice and bias, sought leave of court to brief newly admissible evidence, which the Defendants
failed to file a responsive pleading under L.R. 7.1, and by default the Order should have been granted in
favor of Appellant, but was denied on September 23, 2010 (dkt 440). Appellant timely filed her
pleadings, it is not four months old, as timeline above substantiates, and at issue is ‘newly discovered
evidence’. The four months was due to the length of time pending in the judicial process, sixty (60) days
(July 22 to September 23), and is governed by Judicial Canon Rule 2.03 Diligence. As argued
previously, Judge Young failed to apply the doctrine under 59(e) (dkt 433), newly discovered evidence
and failure of Defendants to file a responsive pleading, requires a ‘new trial’: Appellant filed within the
deadlines and is not four months late. Also, Appellant was denied 60(b) relief, in part, for failing to meet
the requirement of ‘an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances’ and
denied the peripheral requests in the motion for amendments, for additional briefing, etc. Appellant
Hinds perceives this as prejudicial and biased in favor of Defendants, who did not timely file a
responsive pleading, nor address any of the legal issues. Judge Young played the non-neutral role of
defense attorney, thus favoring and partial to Defendants, which has substantially prejudiced and biased
this case against Appellant.
ii. Entry Directing Further Proceedings (dkt 411) entered June 28, 2010 & Order dismissing Harmony;
Appellants timely filed 59(e) (dkts. 420-25) on July 9, 2010; denied Order (dkt 436) on August 12, 2010;
Appellant filed a Motion to Alter/Amend (dkt 438) pursuant to 59(e) and/or 60(b) on August 23, 2010;
denied Order (dkt 439) on August 26, 2010: this is an ‘abuse of discretion’ as the Defendants failed to file
a responsive pleading under L.R. 7.1, Judge did the Defendants legal research, analysis, and writings,
then non-neutral decided: newly discovered evidence after appeals filed, which require a ‘new trial’ with
amended complaint, additional discovery, evidence authenticated, and remand for further proceedings:

a) On June 28, 2010 Order (dkt 411) dismissing Plaintiff Harmony as a party at the appellate level, and a
‘new act’ of discrimination by denying Plaintiff Hinds, only female executive, a ‘term, condition, and
privilege’ of employment or committee membership, denied indemnity and legal counsel at the appellate
level, unlike male executives. This is unlawful under Delaware State Law §145 mandatory indemnity
[advanced legal counsel] for not-for-profit officers [Hinds EBRC CEO ruled an employee by IRS

18
 Determination with employment taxes due] that is to be given adequate legal counsel, indemnity, and no
personal liability due to sound public policy reasons. Sanctions against Appellant would violate the laws
and bylaws that are contractual or membership provisions, thus interfering with Appellants rights to
contract. Plaintiff Hinds, Pro Se, represented Harmony’s interests at the district court level since January
2008 but was denied Pro Se representation at the appellate level, an involuntary conversion of assets,
property rights, or legal interests, a ‘fraud on the court’ with additional briefing forthcoming, and a
breach of the EEOC/Toyota Contract (i.e. ‘continuing acts’ and/or newly admissible evidence);
b) On July 9, 2010, timely filed [i.e. Appellant filed within 28-day rule supersedes the 10 day rule; plus 3
day mail time] in response to Order dkt. 411, “Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Alter Or Amend
Judgment; Alternatively Relief From Judgment” filed pursuant to 59(e) (see Exhibit L- dkts. 420-425;
to avoid substantial prejudice and bias, leave of court to brief newly admissible evidence) and/or 60(b)
for newly discovered evidence that Appellant requested a leave to brief [legally complex for a Pro Se];
denied August 12, 2010 (see Exhibit M- dkt 436). On August 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to
Alter/Amend Judgment, pursuant to 59(e) and/or 60(b) dkt 436 (see Exhibit N- dkt 438). On August 26,
2010, Judge Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann denied the Motion to Alter/Amend without Defendants
responsive pleadings, which was perceived as biased, prejudiced, non-neutral, partial and ruling in favor
of Defendants and their law firms (see Exhibit O- dkt 439).
c) In almost all instances since March 22, 2010, Defendants have repeatedly failed to file a response, Judge
Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann completed the legal research, analysis, and writings, then in a
perceived non-neutral, biased, and prejudiced manner, ruled in favor of Defendants, which has a material
impact on various court judgments and/or orders, including not limited to, dkts 116, 371-72, 377, 388,
397, and 411.

“Newly discovered evidence” that needs to be reflected in the complaint, as “Ongoing Harassment”

which allows exceptions to the general rules under Title VII EEOC (see Exhibit P); “Ongoing Harassment”

allows the EEOC to ‘reach-back’ for facts, reported incidents, and patterns of discrimination or retaliation. But

more importantly, the ‘pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutral, favoring, and showing partiality” to the male

Defendant’s and their law firms, who again failed to timely file a responsive pleading, under L.R. 7.1 as Judge

Young and/or Magistrate Hussmann performed the Defendants legal research, case analysis, and legal writings

and then decides in their favor, in spite of the Defendants failure to file a responsive pleading: Appellant must be

granted the right to amend her complaint, brief newly discovered evidence, authenticate the evidence prior to

19
final judgments, additional discovery and release of discoverable evidence stayed without reason by Judge

Young, on January 13, 2010 (dkt 354), which substantially biased and prejudiced this litigation in favor of

Defendants.

19. On October 6, 2010, Appellant filed (see Exhibit Q- dkts 441-42) a Motion to Recuse Judge

Richard L.Young and Magistrate G. Hussmann, Jr. (see Exhibit R) that is pending before the court.

Appellant Hinds seeks disqualification (Judicial Canon Rule 2.12 Disqualification) and/or remove Judge

Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or their staff, due to irreparable bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, unfair,

partial to and favoring of male Defendants and their law firms, who have participated, directly or indirectly

in the ‘credible trial threat’ target program. Plaintiff Hinds is a licensed CPA, JD, Public Arbitrator,

specializing in securities fraud, RICO, and business law cases and is a ‘credible witness’ in multiple class-

action lawsuits (involving product liability, securities fraud, RICO, employment discrimination, etc.) that

are currently pending in litigation9. This harassing litigation is attempting to ruin Plaintiff Hinds credibility,

based off hearsay, untested/ unauthenticated evidence that has not been subject to an evidence hearing,

witness credibility and/or subjective character assessments that can only be judged by a fact-finding jury.

Plaintiff Hinds requested a hearing, who has not been ‘heard’ in this case, and a violation of the Judicial

Canon Rule 2.09 Right to Be Heard10.

20. On October 13, 2010, Order Granting Grant Thornton’s Bill of Costs (see Exhibit R- dkt 443)

9
RULE 2.11: JUDICIAL STATEMENTS ON PENDING* AND FUTURE CASES
(A) A judge shall not make any statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a
matter pending or impending* in any court.
(B) The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of staff, court officers, and others subject to the judge’s direction and
control.
(C) A judge shall not, with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges,
promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.
(D) This Rule does not prohibit public statements made in the course of a judge’s official duties or an explanation of court
procedures, nor does it preclude a judge from commenting on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
10
RULE 2.09: ENSURING THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD
(A) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard
according to law.*
(B) A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute, but shall not act in a manner that
coerces any party into settlement.

20
which is disputed currently, with Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal (dkt 445, ex. F pg 5 “Microsoft, as

well as their law firm, Bose, McKinney & Evans, LLP [all defendants and their law firms] are now named

defendants in a ‘continuing actions’ claim filed in July 2010 with the EEOC and OSHA and are before the

court, government agency, and/or Seventh Circuit filings), Motions in Opposition filed (dkt 452-464) and

pending, due in part to, the ‘perceived fraud on the court’ under the Toyota credible trial threat target program,

which is a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement (see Exhibit S), and with disputed

claims of costs [that are to be indemnified by the same individuals under Delaware State Law §145] of

$19,426.29 that includes $7,434 in attorney fees represented as costs, $320 Toyota subpoena costs (breach of

Toyota contract under the ‘credible trial threat target program as these lawyers worked in ‘secret’. This is a

violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Agreement, breach of contract anti-retaliation provisions (see Exhibit

S, pg. 1 paragraph 4), and is perceived as “Ongoing Harassment” and this agreement can be used as evidence

(Id. Paragraph 6). Appellant perceived this as evidence of prejudice, bias, and harassing conduct.

21. On October 18, 2010 (dkt 444) Motion for Summary Ruling Microsoft’s Bill of Costs and

Petition for Attorney Fees, is pending before the court. Appellant Hinds views this as harassment as Defendant

Microsoft and Plaintiff Hinds have filed over a dozen pleadings, and based on Judge David Hamilton’s orders,

Microsoft’s request for fees and costs have been denied, not once, but twice (dkts 193-195 “denied all post-

judgment motions” that denied Microsoft’s request; not only was Microsoft denied costs and attorney fees, but

Plaintiff Hinds ‘request for legal counsel was denied (dkt 147-49- seeking by invoking her indemnity

agreements and an advance for attorney fees, which has substantially prejudiced this litigation); dkt 251). The

denial of Hinds indemnity provisions and rights to adequate legal counsel are pending before the court and

agency reviews for “Ongoing Harassment.” This is a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Agreement,

breach of contract anti-retaliation provisions (see Exhibit S, pg. 1 paragraph 4), and is perceived as “Ongoing

Harassment” and this agreement can be used as evidence (Id. Paragraph 6): Microsoft’s “no-notice”

administrative defect was cured, EEOC has served notice, and prejudicing the tribunal and investigators with

this demand that was denied by Judge Hamilton years ago.

21
 22. On October 20, Defendant Thornton filed Motion for Sanctions (dkt 445-46), violating

protective orders by releasing confidential and privileged communications within the District Court who has no

jurisdiction in these privileged communications, raising substantial Constitutional rights, civil rights, new

jurisdictional issues, line-drawing questions for a licensed CPA duties under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,

threatening a Public Arbitrator quasi-judicial officer by targeted harassment/intimidation/bullying, and others

that affect the substantive rights of Appellant. Appellant filed sanctions against Defendants for violating the

protective order, (dkt 455-56; 459-464) with sanctions requested, and pending before the District Court.

23. On October 22, 2010, Appellant filed Notice of Appeal and Seventh Circuit docketed Appeal

No. 10-3457. Judge Young did not find this appeal to be frivolous nor did Judge Young raise any objection to

this appeal. Appellant Hinds relied on this judicial opinion when proceeding with her appeal for 10-3457 and

was never under any belief that this was frivolous but rather is ‘plausible’ and arguable, in light of Pro Se status

afford liberal interpretations. Appellant was directed by the Seventh Circuit to complete Jurisdiction

Memorandums related to timely filing, which Appellant has timely filed within the 28-day deadline for 59(e),

and for appealable points of law. Not to mention, the Motion to Recuse (dkts. 441-42), the subsequent decision

to grant Defendant Thornton Costs (dkt 443) rather than disqualify themselves was an act of bias, perception of

bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partial to Defendants. This pattern of bias and prejudice that has

emerged during this litigation, became painfully obvious in 2010 judicial decisions, law firm collusion, and is

attributable, in part, to the ‘credible trial threat target program’ contained in the ‘newly discovered evidence’:

these bias and prejudicial decisions became blatantly obvious, after the Notice of Appeals 10-2098/10-2555

were filed, as Defendants repeatedly failed to respond to any post-judgment motions.

24. On October 25, 2010 (see Exhibit T- dkts. 451-52), Appellant filed a Petition to Remove Judge

Young and Magistrate Hussmann, due to reasons argued in pleadings, and pending decision. This is a result of

the ‘perceived pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partiality’ shown to Defendants and their law

firms. A triggering act was Order (dkt 443) Granting Thornton costs, after Appellant had filed a Motion to

Recuse (dkts. 441-42) that was pending [Defendants failed to answer], raised ‘fraud on the court’ issues,

disputed costs with a request for a hearing, breach of EEOC/Toyota contract, a new action requiring indemnity

22
provisions to be invoked under Delaware Law §145, EBRC/AICPA bylaws, and/or EEOC/Toyota contract.

25. On October 27, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal

for dkts. 443, 444, 445-46, in part due to the ‘fraud on the court’, prejudice, bias, and harassing conduct

exhibited pre and post-judgment for reasons outlined in such motion or to be motioned. The motion for ‘fraud

on the court’ is pending motion submission.

26. On November 1, 2010, Appellant was ordered to file a brief memorandum stating why this

appeal should not be LIMITED to a review of the orders entered on September 23, 2010, and October 13, 2010,

noted in the previous paragraph [this appeal appears timely only as to the orders entered on September 23, 2010,

and October 13, 2010, denying appellant Susan Hinds’s motion to alter or amend judgment and awarding Grant

Thornton costs]. The orders to be briefed, include entries after June 28, 2010, that were timely filed under a

59(e) or otherwise, including but not limited to, September 23 and October 13, 2010 Orders, and the ‘pattern of

bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, or partiality toward Defendants’ that has materially prejudiced this

litigation, justice not served, and Constitutional rights violated including I Amend. freedom of speech (two

unilateral protective orders), XIV Amend. (due process, equal protection), and VII Amend. (right to a jury trial).

II. ARGUMENTS

On November 30, 2010, Appellant was ordered by the Seventh Circuit, to show cause by December

14, 2010, why she should not be sanctioned for engaging in frivolous litigation by relitigating issues

already decided by this court. Importantly, district Judge Young did not find Appellants Notice of

Appeal filed October 22, 2010 (dkt 447) frivolous nor relitigating issues. Appellant is focused on

‘newly discovered evidence’, credible trial threat target program administration, orders granting costs

when a ‘fraud on the court’ exists as the evidence is not authenticated therefore no final judgment

should be rendered, and the ‘pattern of bias, prejudice, non-neutrality, favor, and partial to Defendants.

A. APPEAL IS NOT FRIVILOUS ACCORDING TO SEVENTH CIRCUIT STANDARDS, BASED

ON MERITS, AND PERCEIVED BIAS, NON-NEUTRALITY, FAVOR TOWARD
DEFENDANTS REQUIRE JUDCIAL DISQUALIFICATION, DUE TO PREJUDICE

Pro Se Appellant is inferring the Seventh Circuit reference to sanctions for frivolous litigation to be

23
pursuant to Cir. Rule 38 and/or Fed.R.App.P. Rule 38: Damages and Costs for Frivolous Appeals, stating,

“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or
notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee.” printed in 28 U.S.C. R. 38 (1988) (amended 1994).

To apply Rule 38, the federal courts make two determinations. Spiegel v. Continental Illinois National

Bank, 790 F. 2d 638 (7th Cir. 1986). First, to establish that the appeal was frivolous, the court must determine

whether the result of the appeal was obvious or the appellant's argument is wholly without merit. Spiegel, 790

F.2d at 650. Second, the court must determine whether sanctions are appropriate by looking for "an 'indication

of the appellant's bad faith suggesting that the appeal was prosecuted with no reasonable expectation of altering

the district court's judgment and for purposes of delay or harassment or out of sheer obstinacy.'" Spiegel, 790

F.2d at 650, quoting Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983). See Szabo Food Service, Inc. v.

Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1081 (7th Cir.1987). If the decision is reasoned, and the reasoning at least

colorable, an argument based on its reasoning is unlikely to be frivolous. (Id.)

In the present case, the first determination fails as the District Judge did not find Appeal No. 10-3457 as

frivolous as the result is not obvious nor are appellant’s arguments wholly without merit. Appellant has not filed

her appeal brief, therefore the merit of the appeal cannot be measured until in fact the appeal brief has been

submitted for court review. The basis of 10-3457 has merit related to newly discovered evidence (dkts. 419,

420-25, 433, 438- see Exhibit I, L, N; Judgments/Orders/Entries 410, 411, 428, 436, 439, 440- see Exhibit K, M,

O, U, V) , the ‘credible trial threat target program’ that violates the EEOC/Toyota Mediated agreement (Id. See

Exhibit S), Motion to Recuse Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann (i.e. bias, prejudice, non-neutral,

partiality, and favor shown to Defendants)(dkts. 441-42), and Orders for Costs that is based on ‘fraud on the

court’ (dkt 443- see Exhibit R)(see Exhibits F, G, H for some examples of ‘fraud on the court’, disputed and

unauthenticated evidence.

The second determination is one of bad faith with no reasonable expectation of altering the district

court’s judgment. Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, Public Arbitrator, a licensed Certified Public Accountant, filed her

Notice of Appeal, in good faith, and based on her appealable points have a reasonable expectation of altering the

24
court’s judgment by briefing newly admissible evidence, like the ‘credible trial threat target program’, Recusing

the Judge and/or Removing the Judge. Appeal 10-3457 cannot be ‘relitigating’ issues because it is based on

Orders, Entries, or Judgments entered after the Appeal Nos. 10-2098/10-2555. The newly discovered evidence is

related to the subject matter and the underlying summary judgment but are “Ongoing Harassment” as defined by

EEOC (see Exhibit P).

Additionally, Appellant detected “a new pattern emerging” of judicial ‘bias, prejudice, non-neutrality,

partiality, and favor’ shown toward Defendants and their law firms and is therefore not ‘relitigating’ issues

already decided by the court. Appellant filed a Motion to Recuse (see Exhibit Q) based on the fact that the

Judge, Magistrate, and their legal staff was performing legal research, legal analysis, and writings, on behalf of

Defendants who failed to file their responsive pleadings since March 2010, and then ruled in favor of the

Defendants: this a non-neutral decision, biased, prejudiced, and partial to Defendants.

In the alternative, Plaintiff believes that an exception applies, as established by Thompson v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S.Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam). In

Thompson, post-trial motions under Rule 59 were filed untimely, after the entry of judgment. The moving party

alleged that he relied upon opposing counsel's failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when the motions were

filed and the district court's explicit statement that the Rule 59 motion was made "in ample time." The Court said

that under these "unique circumstances" the case should be remanded to be heard on its merits. Id. at 387, 84

S.Ct. at 399.

In the present case, Pro Se Appellant Hinds, who believes that she is being denied her indemnity

provisions discriminatorily that has left her “underrepresented”, pleading significant hardships such as in

indigent status, clearly disadvantaged, not to mention, perceived as overlawyering a Pro Se Plaintiff, whereby

“zealous advocacy” is displaced with “aggressive lawyering”. In spite of this ‘overlawyering’, the Defendants

failed to respond to any Plaintiff pleadings since March 22, 2010 and the ‘credible trial threat’ target program

was requiring answers from them: Defendant’s did not timely file responses to any of Hinds pleadings since

25
March 22, 2010, under the Thompson Rule, the opposing counsels failure to raise a claim of untimeliness when

the motions were filed and failing to file an answer at all, with the Judge acting as both Defense counsel and

Judge, has lost his objectivity, neutrality, and the judicial role is perceived as one of judicial activism. Appellant

Hinds relies on the matter of fact, that the Defendants have not filed many of their responsive pleadings, and the

matter of law, that Judge Young should not perform the legal research, analysis, writing for Defendants

[perceived as bias, prejudiced, non-neutral, favoritism, partial, and show favor to Defendants; Judge Young has

not shown favor to Pro Se, in spite of, Judicial Canon Rule 2.06 comment 3 that allows favoring Pro Se

Plaintiff] and then make a judicial decision on the same writings.

Importantly, should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause

of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal

free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause."). Should a judge

issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her

property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate

commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has

been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor

(provided that he is not a judge). Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be

disqualified" under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the

Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after

he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he

may be biased, engaging in criminal acts of treason, extortion and/or the interference with interstate commerce.

In the present case, after Appellant filed a Motion to Recuse (see Exhibit Q; dkts. 441-42), which the

Defendants failed to respond. The next action of not disqualifying themselves, but rather issued an Order for

Appellant to pay Costs (dkt 443- with no motion filed, unaudited, disputed $7,400 in attorney fees, disputed

evidence with a request for a hearing pending, evidence of EEOC/Toyota Mediated settlement agreement

breach), rather than disqualify themselves as requested was an act of bias or prejudice. Appellants’

26
Constitutional right XIV Amendment (due process, equal protection) have been violated by attempting to

‘fraudently convey assets’ or interfering with interstate commerce as it relates to Hinds rights in the

EBRC/XBRL/ERM contracts (i.e. Appellant Hinds believes she is due 3% of all contracts arising out of Hinds’

original expressions contained in the EBRC business plan). On October 26, 2010, Appellant filed a Motion to

Remove (see Exhibit T) after this ruling, deciding without disqualifying oneself, is an act of bias, favor, and

partiality, in furtherance of the prejudice against Appellant.

Under Rule 38, a court of appeals may award sanctions against an appellant if the appeal is "frivolous,"

meaning that "the result is foreordained by the lack of substance to the appellant's arguments." Independent Lift

Truck Builders Union v. NACCO Materials Handling Group, Inc., 202 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2000).

See Berwick Grain Co. v. Illinois Dep't of Agric., 217 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, because the

imposition of sanctions under Rule 38 is permissive, we may decline to award sanctions even when an appeal is

frivolous. Independent Lift Truck Builders Union, 202 F.3d at 969. Owens has already been sanctioned in the

district court, and considering the harshness of the sanctions relative to her income, along with the lack of merit

of B & S' cross-appeal, we believe further sanctions would serve no purpose. See Libby v. Illinois High Sch.

Ass'n, 921 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1990) ("the balancing of equities . . . is an integral part of the proceeding for an

award of fees"); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 697 (7th Cir. 1985) ("fee awards are an equitable matter,

thereby permitting the district court to consider the relative wealth of the parties").

Appellant relied upon the Southern District of Indiana who did not find her Appeal No. 10-3457 to be

frivolous, Appellant paid the docketing fees of $455, and was directed by the Seventh Circuit to brief

Jurisdictional Memorandums. Appellant has pled a Hardship case, due to the protracted litigation, and

abandoned by MEP during complex litigation due to undisclosed medical problems. In May 2010, since the

filing of the In forma Pauperis, which was withdrawn but plead indigent status, the employment blacklisting has

continued, hence “Ongoing Harassment”, and the inability to pay sanctions that serves no purpose but to punish

Appellant when the standard is one of deterrence not punishment. Microsoft, “No good deed goes unpunished.”

27
B. APPELLANT NOT RELITIGATING ISSUES, RATHER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING“CREDIBLE TRIAL THREAT TARGET PROGRAM” DISCRIMINATORY ON
ITS FACE, “ONGOING HARASSMENT”EXCEPTION

The Order requested if Appellant was engaging in frivolous litigation by relitigating issues already

decided by this court. Appellant is arguing new motions and orders that were filed after Appeals 10-2098

and 10-2555 were filed (consolidated appeal), thus a factual impossibility. In the first consolidated appeal 10-

2098/10-2555, the dispositive question posed by Judge Young, “whether or not Grant Thornton was Hinds’

employer”, then stayed Hinds request for pending discoverable evidence that was being withheld (i.e. evasive

discovery Defendant Thornton), and the arguments focused on this threshold question.

In Robinson, the Court interpreted the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII broadly, specifically stating

that individuals who engage in EEO activity rely on the anti-retaliation provisions in order to maintain

unfettered access to the EEO process. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-

2(a), 3(a) (2000); See Burlington, S. Ct. at 2414 (“[The] purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to ensure that

employees are completely free from coercion against reporting unlawful practices [The employer’s]

contrary view of the statute…employer free to retaliate with impunity. EEOC Amicus Curiae, Passantino v.

Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 97-36191, 98-35036). In 10-3457,

the subject matter is categorized as Title VII, involving the same parties, but is ‘newly discovered evidence’

(dkts. 419, 420-25, 433, 438- see Exhibit I, L, N; Judgments/Orders/Entries 410, 411, 428, 436, 439, 440-

see Ex. K, M, O, U, V), including the ‘credible trial threat target program’ (pink-listed: “but-for” Hinds

involvement in protected activity, she would not have been placed in target program) that violates the

EEOC/Toyota Mediated agreement (Id.)(See Exhibit S), EEOC anti-retaliation provisions, which is not

reflected in the current complaint nor has any decision been rendered on this evidence.

These actions are taken in good faith, are reasonable, and are not frivolous that are subject to

sanctions. Under Title VII, Appellant was given the Right To Sue Determination Letters by the EEOC, in

2005; 2008; and 2010 (jurisdiction not at issue) as an “Ongoing Harassment” complaint (see Exhibit P).

Under Title VII, the rare award of Defendant attorney fees must be based on frivolous, unreasonable

28
complaints, however Appellants complaint has been ruled as ‘plausible’ by Honorable Judge Daniel Tinder

(dkt 116 pg. ) which is a higher threshold then frivolous, therefore this cannot be frivolous.

Importantly, Appellant is acting reasonable, with newly issued Right to Sue Determination Letters

issued by the EEOC on October 26, 2010 (see Exhibit N), jurisdiction is not an issue, and is pending a letter

of reconsideration due to an EEOC administrative mistake or oversight. A Right to Sue would be evidence

that Appellant is acting reasonable, with an “Ongoing Harassment” complaint, with res adjudicate

concerns, and any sanctions would be viewed as punishment, which is contra to the Title VII standard of

deterrence, not one of sanctioning Plaintiffs’ as a punitive measure to chill her rights to petition. Under

Brown, then, Solomen cannot be liable for Redwood’s attorney’s fees unless she knew or should have known

that her claim was frivolous. Solomen v. Redwood Advisory Company, 183 F.Supp.2d 748 (E.D. Pa 2002). The

decision to award attorney’s fees in these circumstances could lead to a chilling effect on future civil rights

plaintiffs, a result that would contravene Congress’ intent in enacting the very civil rights statutes at issue here.

See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419-20. I find plaintiff’s claim neither frivolous, nor

unreasonable, nor without foundation. Accordingly, I will deny defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k). (Id.)(attorney's fees may not be assessed against a plaintiff who fails to state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 unless his complaint is

frivolous). (Id at 422). Unless there is "indisputably absent any factual or legal basis'" for the wrong

asserted in the complaint, the trial court, "[i]n a close case," should permit the claim to proceed at least to

the point where responsive pleadings are required. Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304 (1988).

C. Plaintiff Hinds Request For Relief Are Extraordinary Circumstances That Create Substantial
Danger That The Underlying Judgment Was Unjust Points To ‘Fraud On The Court’ and Toyota’s
Credible Trial Threat Program Affects This Litigation As Hinds, Public Arbitrator, Credible
Witness As A Former Toyota Manager, Is A Target Under Such Program

Appellant Hinds, former Toyota sr. manager, a ‘credible witness’ with personal and professional

knowledge of securities fraud, product liability, RICO, employment discrimination and/or retaliation, and other class

29
action litigation that is currently pending or past or future litigation or evidence attestation. Appellant Hinds argues

that extraordinary circumstances that create substantial danger that the underlying judgment was unjust due to the

administration of the ‘credible trial threat’ target program that has targeted Hinds and labeled her a ‘serial litigator’

but it is really ‘serial retaliation’. Appellant Hinds points to ‘fraud on the court’, which will be further briefed in

future pleadings, in light of the ‘credible trial threat’ target program that the Defendants, law firms, perception

partners, agents, and others, that were paid and conspired together, to conceal evidence, obstruct justice, and

professionally mob Plaintiff Hinds of her character, integrity, and livelihood.

Additionally, this is ‘newly discovered evidence which was previously protected information, until

around September 15, 2010, the press announced the court released discoverable evidence in the case involving

Dimitrious Biller, Toyota’s former legal counsel, who is suing Toyota for RICO, wrongful discharge, emotional

distress, and just won court approval to release protected documents to the public. Biller v. Toyota, cv09-5429-cas

(filed July 24, 2009 Los Angeles CA)11. Plaintiff Hinds is seeking this evidence for this litigation and pending claims,

as Toyota sued Biller and his firm LDT Consulting. Similarly, Harmony being dismissed is akin to an ‘involuntary

conversion of property rights’ attributed to Plaintiff Hinds, while in the capacity of EBRC CEO, a not-for-profit

under Delaware State Law §145 (see Exhibit C) Plaintiff Hinds is provided mandatory indemnity and assures no

personal liability (Id.; Exhibit D to D-4). All of which arises out of EBRC agents materially harmful adverse
11
“Jim Halbrooks [Mike Willis, PwC Toyota’s auditors/EBRC board member in spite of SEC 102(e) violation involving
securities fraud and presentment of contracts…dominating individual, in present case] has been allowed to tarnish my reputation.
In the process, he has exposed Toyota to harms way because I am a “representative” of Toyota.” Biller v. Toyota, Case 2:09 cv-
05429-GHK-RZ filed July 24, 2009) at pg. 81. “There is an inherent conflict of interests between outside counsel and Toyota; the
more work outside counsel performs on cases, the more money outside counsel generates.” Id. at pg. 84. “Furthermore, I am
responsible for managing some of the most high exposure cases, I have taken cases to trial against “Repeat Offenders” to
discourage them from filing more complaints against Toyota and I have taken more rollover cases to trial than anybody. I
have done so to firmly establish the cornerstone of Toyota’s litigation management philosophy (“Credible Trial Threat”).
Defendants, and each of them, are employed by, associated with, and/or comprise, an enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate and foreign commerce…enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity…all in violation of
18 U.S.C. Sec 1962(c). Id. at 63. Defendants, and each of them, have conspired, and continue to conspire, to violate the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. Secs. (a), (b), and (c). Id. “…taking actions to compel BILLER’s [Hinds] silence regarding the crimes
committed by defendants…coercing BILLER [Hinds] to enter into and execute a Severance Agreement…using the
Confidentiality Clause contained in the Severance Agreement as a “sword” to compel BILLER’s [Hinds- including a ‘no
investigation clause’ that is against good public policy as Hinds, licensed CPA, Public Arbitrator] silence…filing misleading and
fraudulent declarations and evidence…destroying…interfering with BILLER’s [Hinds] attempt to assert his [her] rights in Biller
v. LADA’s Office [Hinds v. EBRC, et. al.- the committee that Toyota appointed Hinds to SCEBR to EBRC CEO & President:
both Biller and Hinds became Labor Day Martyrs]…the Severance Agreement [EBRC Settlement Agreement valued at
$150,000, rising to $600,000 based on last offer; Toyota Settlement Agreement valued at $600,000 including payment to Susan
Sparks, former counsel MEP Legal; Breach of Contract March 2005 paid $15,000 for minor breach, liquidated damages and
$100,000 final installment under Toyota consulting agreement] is being used by defendants in furtherance of conspiracy…
racketeering…to conceal, withhold, and destroy evidence and information, obstruct justice, and deceive the judicial system,
litigants, NHTSA, and public at large. Id. at 64-66.

30
employment actions, orchestrated under Toyota’s credible trial threat program.

On August 12, 2010, Judge Young Entry (dkt 436) denied Plaintiff’s motion (dkt 420-25) stating that Rule

60(b) grants relief in ‘an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.’ On August 26,

2010 (dkt 438), Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment dkt 436, requesting a leave from the court to

prepare a legally complex brief for the admissibility of newly discovered evidence, including pending related

complaints of ‘continuing actions’ (dkt 420-26 ex. h; 428, 433; 438, 439-40) which may have a material impact on

the judgments rendered in this case, and the pending consolidated appeals. On August 12, 2010, Judge Young denied

(dkt 439) this request stating ‘an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in exceptional circumstances’ and no such

circumstances are shown. This is contrary to the law as this evidence is extraordinary and these are exceptional

circumstances, like the ‘credible trial threat’ target program with its’ protected evidence, which was just released to

the public on September 15, 2010, and as a matter of law and fact, is subject to de novo review.

Plaintiff Hinds believes she has been targeted (dkts. 247, 252, 420-425, 433, 436, 440), due to her

involvement in protected activity, with pending litigation that she would be a ‘credible witness’, and was placed on

Toyota’s ‘credible trial threat’ target list. Plaintiff Hinds, a Public Arbitrator, quasi-judicial officer, who specializes in

securities fraud and RICO cases is being intimidated, bullied, harassed, and legally overpowered by a squadron of

highly paid attorneys run through EBRC not-for-profit that has purported liabilities exceeding its assets, subjecting

this to the ‘piercing of the corporate veil’ test for Title VII jurisdictional purposes (i.e. 15 employee rule)(dkt 438

ex.b, c). Defendants violated the Standards For Professional Conduct within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit,

intending to impugn Plaintiff Hinds, a Public Arbitrators’ (also, a ‘credible witness’ in the pending securities

litigation involving Toyota (i.e. AICPA and Qorvis Communications, LLC has a client relationships with Toyota,

Don Goldberg12, former EBRC public relations manager/agent (Qorvis’ client is Toyota, with an undisclosed conflict

of interest in this litigation, was engaged in safety related industry standard setting with Toyota), is a witness in

12
Don Goldberg, Qorvis Communications, LLC, a witness in this litigation with credibility issues, including payments to others
to speak out against former Eliot Spitzer (dkt 247, 252) while investigating AIG with PwC advising from behind the scenes, in
EBRC kitchen cabinet meetings. Goldberg was an advisor to former President Bill Clinton, regarding same subject matter as this
litigation, meaning sexual harassment lawsuits, involving former Arkansas State employee, Paula Jones, and Monica Lewinsky,
handled the impeachment proceedings (i.e. perjury, obstruction of justice allegations, later acquitted by the Senate) and was
known for “integrating the communications and legal strategy” that has impacted this litigation; perceived as perjury, obstruction
of justice, and “political” discrimination. Amy Pawlicki, AICPA former support staff, political science major warned, “this is
political” within days of abrupt Labor Day martyrdom. This is a paid politically motivated, professional mobbing, without a fact-
finding jury by trial, as requested, to assess witness credibility and impeach motives: political, promotions, financial interest, or
otherwise.

31
EBRC trial in which Hinds’ character & integrity is at issue) as Hinds is a former Toyota Accounting & Finance

manager responsible for the warranty reserves and contingent liabilities reserves, Securities & Exchange Commission

financial reporting package, and other responsibilities) professional character, by employing hostile, demeaning, or

humiliating words, intended to mischaracterize, misrepresent, misquote, or miscite facts or authorities, thus violating

anti-retaliation provisions under Title VII or contractual provisions (Plain. Amend. Dkt Statement10-2555, pg. 20,

see Exhibit A,B filed June 26, 2010) intended to substantially prejudice the courts, bias the tribunal, and resort to

‘name-calling’ without credible evidence: legal bullying and harassment which the court’s should have stopped under

Judicial Canon Rule 2.02, Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.

Judge Young, his staff, and law professors and alumni, have engaged in manifesting bias, prejudice, and/or

harassment based on gender, disability (i.e. alleged lunatic- professional defamation) against Plaintiff Hinds and

advocating “lunacy standards”, Lee v. Clinton, as a legitimate advocacy as these factors are not issues in this

proceeding, nor is ‘frivolous’ as previously ruled by Judge Tinder under a 12(b)(6) heightened pleading standard of

‘plausible’ therefore it cannot become frivolous. Plaintiff Hinds perceives bias, prejudice, legal bullying, and

harassment, and a violation of Judicial Canon Rule 2.02:

RULE 2.02: BIAS, PREJUDICE, AND HARASSMENT

(A) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice, and shall not engage in harassment.
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias, prejudice, or
harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff,
court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so. This does not preclude legitimate
references to those factors when relevant to an issue in the proceeding.
(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting bias, prejudice, or
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation,
marital status, or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or others. This does not preclude
legitimate advocacy when these or other similar factors are issues in the proceeding.

"A petition is not to be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Balke v. Ream, 983 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. App. W.D.

1998). Plaintiff Hinds can prove, with credible admissible evidence the facts as laid out in the MSJ. The trial court

"shall freely grant leave to amend" a deficient pleading. Jordan v. City of Kansas City, 972 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Mo.

App. W.D. 1998); Supreme Court Rule 67.06. Plaintiff Hinds has never been given an opportunity to amend her

complaint, in spite of four years of discoverable admissible evidence, newly discovered evidence, requests for

32
admissions, and to allow the evidence to conform to the complaint: this is substantially prejudicing this case.

On October 6, 2010, Plaintiff Hinds filed “Plaintiff’s Petition To Remove Judge Young and Magistrate

Hussmann13” (dkts. 441-42), filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 59(e). Plaintiff Hinds stated the reasons that the said

judge and/or magistrate is believed, even if based on a perception, to be biased, non-neutral, and prejudiced, who is

incapable of interpreting the rule of law under the ‘reasonable woman’ standard, fails to uphold Supreme Court or

Seventh Circuit rulings, whether procedural or substantive law, and has unjustly narrowed the scope of Title VII

rights, including anti-retaliation provisions, which is not in alignment with Congressional intent to interpret Title VII

broadly to avoid ‘chilling the rights of others.’ (dkt 441-42 ex. a).

Plaintiff Hinds, Pro Se, former EBRC CEO, believes for the reasons that the said Judge Young and/or

Magistrate Hussmann, is believed, even if based on a perception, to be biased, non-neutral, and prejudiced, who

under Rule 60(b)(1) mistakenly, inadvertently, surprise, or excusable neglect failed in interpreting the rule of law,

both procedural and substantive, under the ‘reasonable woman’ standard, failed to uphold Supreme Court or Seventh

Circuit rulings, and narrowed the scope of Title VII rights by judicial activism rather than the Congressional intent of

a broad interpretation of Title VII. The court failed to adhere to the ‘rule of law’ with a Pro Se plaintiff who is misled

on matters of law that substantially prejudiced this litigation, including anti-retaliation provisions that extends beyond

the workplace under Burlington, and failed to move to trial the genuine disputes of material facts that remain in the

present case, that require a trial by jury under United States Constitution Amendment VII. Plaintiff Hinds is

guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, due process and equal protection under the laws, including Amendment XIV,

and under these rights request Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann disqualify themselves or request the court to

remove them due to perceived bias, prejudice, and non-neutrality in the present case.

Whether by mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, fraud on the court, or any other reason justifying

relief from operation of the judgment, that is clearly favoring male executive defendants, while marginalizing female

executive plaintiff Hinds. Plaintiff Hinds, Pro Se, has the right to be heard, has Constitutional rights under

13
September 2007 to January 2008 Magistrate Hussmann played a major role in settlement discussions with parties over several
months, with Defendants offering Plaintiff’s [Plaintiff Hinds, Harmony, BFC Solutions, Inc. were all parties] a mediated
settlement valued around $150,000. However, Plaintiff-Appellant Hinds found that the contract contained what was perceived as
possibly illegal, unenforceable contractual provisions, contrary to plaintiffs best interests, or was against sound public policy due
to the “no-investigations” clause [violates CPA professional standards to take money for no investigations of accounting
professionals], which is contrary to the Congressional intent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, such as, ‘Auditor
Independence’ or ‘Conflicts of Interest’.

33
Amendment XIV14 due process and equal protection under laws, Amendment VII right to a jury trial, has substantial

factual evidence to support her claims that are with merit, and repeatedly requested a protective order be invoked,

including damages calculated, as related to defendants unlawful possession of Hinds medical records (invasion of

privacy, tortuous interference with contracts and business relations, and breach of mediated settlement agreements),

and payment for unauthorized access, copying, distribution, and commercial profit obtained from the EBRC business

plan, containing Hinds’ original expressions copyrighted. Plaintiff Hinds request for a full accounting of all private

and government contracts arising out of EBRC business plan is required to calculate final damages (i.e. 3% of all

contracts under the E&Y/Peoplesoft derived calculation) arising from protective order violation discussed January 13,

2010 Conference Judge Young (dkt 358 trans.).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(2), in light of newly discovered evidence, (dkt 440- prejudiced and biased

ruling whereby Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or his staff performed legal research, analysis, and opinions

contained in this Entry dated September 23, 2010, then ruled on this in favor of defendants, plaintiff objects as

defendants failed to timely file responsive pleadings and Plaintiff Hinds request to amend complaint for newly

discovered evidence must be granted), under the Toyota Credible Trial Threat target program, in which Plaintiff

Hinds was targeted, and “but for” this litigation, no other litigation would have occurred. Plaintiff Hinds, newly

appointed Public Arbitrator A5763015 a quasi-judicial officer of good character and fitness (see Exhibit x), whose

professional reputation is their livelihood. Like Dimitrios P. Biller, former National Managing Counsel in charge of

14
Plain MSJ Response: “The Seventh Circuit generally grants an employer ten days to investigate and take action if
necessary, in accordance with the EEOC's policy." (citing Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th
Cir.1996)). Thornton failed to meet this standard by taking over sixty (60) days to investigate (Facts ¶¶ 13, 21, 23, 26, 30), acted
with malice, reckless indifference and/or negligent in duty of care (Fact ¶ 48), to Hinds EBRC CEO AICPA committee member,
lost the evidence (Facts ¶¶ 26, 30), failed to maintain “neutrality, independence, and confidences” (Facts ¶¶ 21, 23, 26, 48) as
promised “we are not adversaries” stated AICPA Miller (Doc# 334- ex. b), failed to investigate retaliation claims (Facts ¶¶ 5, 14,
21, 23, 26, 30, 32, 46- 49) (“Starr can’t retaliate” before investigating), and failed to follow the AICPA Professional Standards
(Facts ¶ 5, 7, 9, 10, 15-19, 21, 23-42). Meanwhile, signing a secret agreement, CIJDA”, evidence of an “integrated enterprise”
under Title VII, which is an act of discrimination itself as the male licensed professionals bond together and are provided
indemnity, but the female licensed professional is not. "The critical issue, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80,
118 S.Ct. 998 (emphasis in original) (quoting Harris, supra).

15
Hinds attended law school, focusing on business law and securities law, and pursued further education, training, and
certification through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) Public Arbitrator, certified January 22, 2010, but
has received no cases. Likewise, her newly forming not-for-profit Hindssight 2020, LLC was denied a grant or FINRA contract
(dkt 420-425 ex. j) in the amount of $393,000, however EBRC received a grant in the amount of $325,000 (Id.) which includes
an ‘international’ scope which is a violation of the FINRA grant guidelines as the grants are for United States in scope projects.

34
Toyota’s Rollover Program, detailed in cv09-5429-cas filed July 24, 200916, filed complaint as (1) Violation of Civil

Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act; (2) Constructive Wrongful Termination in violation of Public

Policy; and (3) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. This case was ordered to arbitration, which on September

15, 2010, the first evidence was released to the public, due to a favorable ruling for Mr. Biller, therefore “newly

admissible evidence” that was not discoverable, with due diligence, because attorney-client privilege vs. matters of

public interest, Hinds would not have been able to access this evidence any sooner than September 15, 2010: newly

discoverable evidence.

Plaintiff Hinds must be provided additional discovery, due to this material fact for a Pro Set Plaintiff, a

credible witness in the pending class action lawsuits related to securities fraud and product liability cases. The date

that Plaintiff Hinds was discussing legal matters related to Toyota, who made ex parte communications, perceived to

have influenced the tribunal on an expedited MSJ Judgment (dkt 371-72) on March 22, 2010, with bias and prejudice

in favor of defendants. Plaintiff Hinds request to obtain additional discovery [correction this is not additional, but part
16
“Jim Halbrooks [Mike Willis, PwC Toyota’s auditors/EBRC board member in spite of SEC 102(e) violation involving securities fraud and
presentment of contracts…dominating individual, in present case] has been allowed to tarnish my reputation. In the process, he has exposed
Toyota to harms way because I am a “representative” of Toyota.” Biller v. Toyota, Case 2:09 cv-05429-GHK-RZ filed July 24, 2009) at pg. 81.
“There is an inherent conflict of interests between outside counsel and Toyota; the more work outside counsel performs on cases, the more
money outside counsel generates.” Id. at pg. 84. “Furthermore, I am responsible for managing some of the most high exposure cases, I have
taken cases to trial against “Repeat Offenders” to discourage them from filing more complaints against Toyota and I have taken more
rollover cases to trial than anybody. I have done so to firmly establish the cornerstone of Toyota’s litigation management philosophy
(“Credible Trial Threat”). More resources are needed when cases go to trial because more time, money, human resources are needed for a
longer period of time during the course of a case’s life because the case does not settle.” Id. at pg. 90. “Defendants constitute an “enterprise”
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4). Id. at 61. Defendants acts , as alleged above-herein, constitute a “pattern of racketeering
activity” to conceal, withhold, and destroy relevant evidence and materials in their possession, custody, and control, within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). Id. As alleged… defendants, and each of them, are persons who comprise an enterprise which, through a pattern of
racketeering activity, systematically conceals, withholds, and destroys evidence and information in litigation and related matters, and obstructs
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. Defendants, and each of them, do so, in part, through the commission of mail and wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341 and 1343. Id. As alleged…defendants, and each of them, are persons who comprise an enterprise which,
through a pattern of racketeering activity, conspire to conceal, withhold, and destroy evidence and information in litigation and related matters.
Id. Defendants, and each of them, have received, and continue to receive, income derived from the pattern of racketeering activity…used and
invested…the establishment or operation of an enterprise which is engage in, or the activities of which affect, interstate and foreign commerce,
all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec 1962(a). Id. at 62. Defendants, and each of them, through a pattern of racketeering activity…an interest in or
control of an enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate and foreign commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec
1962(b). Id. at 62. Defendants, and each of them, are employed by, associated with, and/or comprise, an enterprise engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate and foreign commerce…enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity…all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
Sec 1962(c). Id. at 63. Defendants, and each of them, have conspired, and continue to conspire, to violate the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Secs. (a),
(b), and (c). Id. “…taking actions to compel BILLER’s [Hinds] silence regarding the crimes committed by defendants…coercing BILLER
[Hinds] to enter into and execute a Severance Agreement…using the Confidentiality Clause contained in the Severance Agreement as a
“sword” to compel BILLER’s [Hinds- including a ‘no investigation clause’ that is against good public policy as Hinds, licensed CPA, Public
Arbitrator] silence…filing misleading and fraudulent declarations and evidence…destroying…interfering with BILLER’s [Hinds] attempt to
assert his [her] rights in Biller v. LADA’s Office [Hinds v. EBRC, et. al.- the committee that Toyota appointed Hinds to SCEBR to EBRC CEO
& President: both Biller and Hinds became Labor Day Martyrs]…the Severance Agreement [EBRC Settlement Agreement valued at $150,000,
rising to $600,000 based on last offer; Toyota Settlement Agreement valued at $600,000 including payment to Susan Sparks, former counsel
MEP Legal; Breach of Contract March 2005 paid $15,000 for minor breach, liquidated damages and $100,000 final installment under Toyota
consulting agreement] is being used by defendants in furtherance of conspiracy…racketeering…to conceal, withhold, and destroy evidence and
information, obstruct justice, and deceive the judicial system, litigants, NHTSA, and public at large. Id. at 64-66.

35
of the initial discovery], Hinds requests for discovery have been evaded by Defendants, like Biller’s case. However,

an evidence hearing is required before a motion to dismiss with prejudice can be ordered, the evidence is

fraudulent, the declaratory statements are not admissible or evidence must be held up to further scrutiny (i.e.

hear say, witness credibility (i.e. motive, financial interest, character) before final judgment can be rendered.

Additionally, the Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff Hinds Motion Request for Admissions (dkt 366-67)

filed March 6, 2010, evasive or incomplete disclosure pursuant Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 37, the plaintiff is entitled to

Requests for Admissions, pursuant Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 36, and does not require court review and approval. The

answers would prove ‘fraud on the court’ and as such these decisions to withhold these answers, is a biased and

prejudiced ruling. Specifically, Plaintiff Hinds requested answers to be submitted with pending MSJ, which

should be decided in conjunction with these new admissions made by Defendant Thornton (dkt 366-67). Lastly,

the surreply17 was legally sufficient response to Defendant Thornton’s ‘fraud on the court’ as Hinds was in fact,

an employee of EBRC, in the capacity CEO & President, but the alleged discriminatory and/or retaliatory action

took place during recruitment, so the traditional employment relationship is not required, nor is it required for

Title VII retaliation claims as they extend beyond the workplace. “The Seventh Circuit standards for

Professional Conduct required the attorneys to “not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or

miscite facts or authorities in any oral or written communication to the court.” Id. In the present case, Plaintiff

17
Hinds Surreply (dkt 366-67) states, in part, “Defendant Thornton has openly objected to Plaintiff’s “disputed facts” and to the
admissibility of Plaintiff’s evidence (Doc. No. 361 p. 1) then proceeds to create “their version” of the facts which is best described by Plaintiff
Hinds as, “[o]ur adversary committed obstruction as to the key jurisdictional facts.” Pollack, et al v. Department of Justice, et al., Case
No. 08-3857 (7th Cir. Sept. 2009). “The Seventh Circuit standards for Professional Conduct required the attorneys to “not knowingly
misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or miscite facts or authorities in any oral or written communication to the court.” Id. In the present
case, Plaintiff Hinds perceives Defendant Thornton engaged in “knowingly misrepresented, mischaracterized, misquoted, or miscited facts or
authorities.” Plaintiff Hinds perceived this conduct as obstructing the justice process [like BILLER’s case], relating to the interpretation of
Judge Tinder’s ruling, multiple misquotes or mischaracterizations of Plaintiff Hinds, and Defendant Thornton’s failure to uphold the stipulated
fact for Summary Judgment purposes established with Judge Hamilton in the August 2009 Pretrial Conference. (Pre-Trial Trans. p. 25- “if we
stipulate that each of these gentlemen [Mike Starr, Mike Krzus, Paul Herring, and Greg Pitzer] made more than she [Hinds] did” per Defendant
Thornton’s stipulated fact for Summary Judgment purposes). Defendant Thornton stipulated that certain male comparables or Thornton
employees/partners made more than Hinds for compensation related claims and EPA claims to avoid producing evidence then later violated this
stipulation in their motion filings but stating that Mike Krzus made less than Hinds (which is not correct if comparing Krzus salary and benefits
when he was performing the role of EBRC President or EBRC Executive Director).
Lastly, Plaintiff Hinds requests the Court to release the outstanding stayed discoverable evidence (Doc. No. 354), after the
Defendant’s liability under Title VII is determined, but before Plaintiff Hinds is required to respond to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment under the Equal Pay and/or Title VII Gender Compensation Claims, with a thirty day response time from the date Plaintiff Hinds
receives all the outstanding discovery from Defendant Thornton. This discovery is needed to complete the “total compensation package
analysis” required for compensation related and Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) claims. This is required to ensure that justice is served, litigation
prejudice is avoided, litigation efficiency (avoids unnecessary appeals), and to preserve the integrity of the civil litigation process.

36
Hinds perceives Defendant Thornton engaged in “knowingly misrepresented, mischaracterized, misquoted, or

miscited facts or authorities.” (dkt 195- Plaintiff requested a hearing under LR 7.5).

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(3), fraud on the court, with misrepresentation of key legal matters,

such as Judge Young narrowly interpreted, and incorrect classification of the threshold jurisdiction question “whether

or not Thornton was Hinds’ employer”, that is in fact, not a jurisdictional matter in the Seventh Circuit but rather a

substantive question of fact and this is a materially prejudicial decision that misrepresented a legal matter to a Pro Se

litigant, which prevented Plaintiff Hinds rightful access to Thornton’s continued evasive discovery, by failing to

produce the records, including but not limited to, compensation, benefits, terms & conditions, personnel records,

gender discrimination/ retaliation/EPA records of investigations, potential or actual lawsuits, settlements: these

records must be produced now and Plaintiff Hinds granted time to amend complaint and supplement MSJ. Prejudicial

and biased legal standards were used, such as changing previously ruled, under Judge John Daniel Tinder (“Judge

Tinder”), the legal standard of ‘plausibility’, which is a higher legal threshold then ‘frivolous’.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(6), any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment, (dkt 440: prejudiced and biased ruling whereby Judge Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and/or his staff

performed legal research, analysis, and opinions contained in this Entry dated September 23, 2010 and then decides

in favor of defendants in light of defendants’ failure to timely file any response at all, this is believed to be a non-

neutral, bias, and prejudice ruling that wrongly denied Pro Se plaintiff’s request for leave to prepare a legally

complex brief for the admissibility of newly discovered evidence (i.e. some evidence not released until September 15,

2010) and ‘continuing actions’ complaints that arise out of the same subject matter, same parties, same or similar set

of operative facts, and for judicial efficiency. Defendants, employees, agents, and their law firms were perceived as

harassing, bullying, and intimidating a Pro Se litigant, Public Arbitrator who specializes in securities fraud, and a

credible trial threat, who was subjected to repeated violations of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model

Code of Judicial Conduct that has substantial and incurable prejudice and bias against plaintiff in the present case.

Under Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann’s continued pattern of defendant bias and prejudice, in

favor of male executive, is believed to be the reason for failure to protect the only female executive, Plaintiff Hinds,

former EBRC CEO rights, property interests (i.e. EBRC business plan and strategies that has resulted in hundreds of

millions of dollars of private and government contracts: an act of retaliation, with malice, reckless disregard of the

37
rights of others, or negligent in their fiduciary duties at best). Substantive questions of fact were mistakenly

transfigured into dispositive threshold jurisdictional questions that inadvertently dispose the case on Summary

Judgment, without credible admissible evidence that has not been subject to an evidentiary hearing (i.e. inadmissible

evidence, witness credibility, including character, motive, hear say, financial interest in the transaction) at issue,

authenticity of evidence not substantiated: this is not in alignment with Congressional intent to interpret Title VII

broadly to avoid ‘chilling the rights of others’. “A judge is not the court”. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410

N.E.2d 626 (1980).

At issue in this Petition To Remove, are new acts of prejudicial, biased, harassing, and/or non-neutral

discriminatory treatment, manifested in this litigation to the detriment of Plaintiffs legal rights, new actions arising

after Notice of Appeal 10-2555 was filed June 25, 2010, and subject to further appeal proceedings, if Judge Young,

Magistrate Hussmann, and staff do not disqualify or remove themselves: a Constitutional Right under Fourteenth

Amendment of due process and equal protection under law (dkt 411- Voluntary Dismissal is perceived by Hinds as a

“Constructive Discharge Voluntary Dismissal” of Strategic Management Harmony, LLC (“Harmony’s”) rights due to

lack of adequate licensed legal representation)(see Exhibit A- Seventh Circuit Jurisdiction Memo; A-1 Seventh

Circuit Plaintiff Reply to Defendants Response To Appellants JM Appeal 10-2098 (defendants provided copies

previously) and a breach of mediated settlement agreements with Toyota Motor Manufacturing, North America

(“Toyota”)(dkt 270 ex. G; dkt 291 ex. E) and Tower Automotive, Inc. (“Tower”)(dkt 270 ex. G-1; dkt 291 ex. D)

including anti-retaliation provisions under Title VII that does not require an employment relationship as it extends

beyond the workplace under Burlington.

Plaintiff Hinds is entitled to her rights and remedies18, under law, including fair compensation after a five

year protracted litigation battle, including but not limited to, her three percent (3%) of all private and government

contracts (dkt 270 ex. O;“excluded from all access and leads to “SEC $54million/$6.6 million”; dkts. 211-6; 222-6)

some examples of Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) contracts, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority

18
“More specifically, Plaintiffs seek an injunction enjoining Defendants…from enforcing the terms of the Severance Agreement
[Hinds has same or similar concerns regarding the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement (dkt 270 ex. g; g-1) and the
EBRC founding partners (Thornton, PwC, Microsoft, AICPA) Settlement Agreement (dkt 270 at 104, 127-29) that contained a
‘no-investigation clause’ and ‘no employment clauses’ (submitted to EEOC and received right to sue Determination letters
March 23, 2009). Plaintiff Hinds requested to amend the complaint for ‘continuing actions’ involving the same subject matter
subject to res judicata in future proceedings, which is against sound public policy and conflicts with Hinds professional licensing
as a Certified Public Accountant]…furthers Defendants’ pattern of racketeering activity…has injured Plaintiffs in their business
or property.” Biller v. Toyota, cv09-5429-cas filed July 24, 2009 Los Angeles, CA. at pg. 64.

38
(“FINRA”) research grant (Plain. MSJ Res. Pg. 5; dkt 420-25 ex. J)) arising out of Hinds’ original expressions

contained within the EBRC business plan and strategies (Copyright TX 6-075-680 filed November 1, 2004 Library of

Congress, effective date November 12, 2004)(dkt 420-25 ex. C)(Id. at 15; dkt 270), as reported in the 2005 EEOC

complaint (Plain. MSJ Res. pgs. 29-30; dkt 270 pgs. 39, 48, 53, 123) under “retaliation” section (i.e. defamation:

portrayal of person in a false light by failing to provide proper attribution), in which all defendants participated,

including Thornton, PwC, Microsoft, AICPA, collectively EBRC founders (Plain. MSJ Res. pg.1; dkt 270 pgs. 60-69,

89), as well as the EBRC Settlement and General Release Agreement (Plain. MSJ Res. pgs. 46-48): there is no

jurisdictional requirement for Title VII retaliation and it’s reach extends beyond the workplace as ruled under

Burlington. Likewise, under the rule of law, the Statute of Frauds does not apply because the contract was under one

year (ten months with three months paid) thus no writing requirement. Plaintiff Hinds is owed seven months that

remains unpaid on the contract (i.e. 7 x $20,000 = $140,000) and two-year right to renew option contract valued at

$480,000 ($240,000 x 2 = $480,000): total contract value $620,000 before fringe benefits are calculated (with fringes

est. around 35% base salary $837,000).

For further reasons that Judge Young, along with staff, and law professors, are biased and prejudiced

against women who seek to enforce their legally protected rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §1983, Civil Rights Act of 1991; Glass Ceiling Act; Indiana Civil Rights Law IC 22-9-1 (1971),

and those who seek to enforce EEOC mediated settlement contracts. Judge Young has been involved in over 266

employment related cases since 2004, has been asked to remove himself on more than one occasion, and has

substantial prejudice with Hinds former employer, Toyota19. Meaning, Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann, has

presided over several Toyota cases, with Jeffrey Saverise, Fischer & Phillips, LLP20, Toyota’s legal counsel and the
19
Filed Jan. 6, 2005: Patterson v. Toyota Mtr. Mfg. IN, Inc., 3:2005-cv-00003-RLY-WGH- Dismissed 12(b)(6) in Toyota’s favor
with Jeffrey A. Savarise, Greenbaum, Doll & McDonald, Toyota’s attorney.
Filed Feb. 2, 2010: Jarrell v. Toyota Mtr. Eng. & Mfg. IN, Inc., 3:2010-cv-00021-RLY-WGH- Filed a Petition for Removal.
Filed Oct. 9, 2007: Eshbaugh v. Toyota Mtr. Mfg. IN, Inc., 3:2007-cv-00138-RLY-WGH.
Filed Mar. 30, 2005: Fitzlaff v. Toyota Mtr. Mfg. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan: 3:2005-cv-00065-RLY-WGH.
20
Thorntons’ and EBRC’s agents and their law firms, are the proximate and direct cause of Hinds’ material harms, along with
professional reputation damage, network damage, blacklisting, and loss of Hinds’ employment, contracts, or appointments, along
with loss of terms and conditions of employment (Plain. MSJ Res. pgs. 1-50; Hinds dep.1-412; Thornton dep. ex. 1-22).
AICPA ran an ad that was offensive, discriminatory gender bias towards women (dkt 239-4), with Toyota’s labor law firm,
Fisher & Phillips, LLP (dkt 330-5; dkt 239-3, 4) advertising the slogan, “we can make her and those like her disappear for good”
as they show a picture of a professional women being turned into a ghost (dkt 239-4, 5): Perception that promotes retaliation not
diversity to chill the rights of others (dkt 290- ex. a; Doc#310-6; Toyota Contract; dkt 270-ex.g; dkt 239-3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). The
credible trial threat program was administered in part by outside law firms, like Fischer & Phillips, LLP’ Jeffrey Savarise,
Toyota’s lawyer who administered the EEOC Mediated Settlement Agreement with Hinds (dkt 270 ex-g, g-1). Hinds was
threatened by Toyota’s outside law firms during the Spring-Fall 2004, regarding Mike Willis, EBRC founder PwC partner

39
lawyer who negotiated and legally bound Hinds to the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement, Consulting, and General

Release Agreement (dkt 270 ex. AA) at issue in this case and a party in the ‘continuing actions’ complaints filed with

the EEOC, newly discovered admissible evidence at issue here (dkt 440) and a violation of the EEOC/Toyota

Contract, at a minimum perceived as ‘bias, prejudice, and influencing the tribunal’ and breach of confidentiality. For

example, Jeffrey Savarise, Toyota’s law firm has ex parte communications with lawyers, judges, like Kentucky

Judges, or Judge Young, and/or Magistrate Hussmann, involved in this subject matter, participated in mediation and

settlement discussions, and participated in the discovery phase within this trial, including amending the subpoenas ex

parte (see Exhibit E;dkt 229; dkt 246 filed March 19, 2009 “ORDER denying (229) Plaintiff Hinds Motion to Quash

Subpoena issued to Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.”- critically, the first subpoena

was issued to Toyota Motor Manufacturing North America, Inc. (“TMMNA”) and then Defendant Thornton and

EBRC founders contacted Toyota’s legal counsel, in violation of the EEOC/Toyota Contract, and Toyota instructed

Defendants to alter the subpoena and change the company name to “Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing,

North America, Inc.” without contacting Plaintiff Hinds as required in the contract: ‘credible trial threat target

program’; dkt 252 filed March 30, 2009): a violation of the EEOC/Toyota Mediated Settlement Agreement.

Oddly, Plaintiff Hinds’ subpoenas to Toyota were ceased even after court approval and being within 100

miles of courthouse (dkt 441-42 ex. e, f- Dion Ogilvie, Toyota General Counsel is named in Biller’s Toyota RICO

case (Id. ex. b), including withholding discoverable evidence, case cv09-5429-cas, who was targeted, intimidated,

harassed, threatened, bullied, and subject to unemployment or blacklisting due to Toyota’s aggressive retaliation

campaign). Just like Hinds, who complains of same treatment, including professional mobbing of a credible witness

(i.e. Hinds has personal knowledge of warranty reserves, contingent liabilities, CCC 21 program, KSF/KPI’s, SEC

(‘Toyota client”) spreading defamatory rumors and disparaging remarks, like “Hinds was fired from Toyota” which was patently
false, or “tell her [Susan] to jump out the fucking window” “need to be a consultant [referring to Toyota consulting contract];
which is patently false, Hinds departed with an EEOC/Toyota Mediated Agreement), placed on the ‘credible trial threat’ target
program, in alignment with Toyota Labor Day Martyr [like Biller, former Toyota lawyer, Whistleblower] decision ‘not-to-hire’
Hinds, that was orchestrated between law firms to target Hinds in retaliation for her involvement in protected activity (dkt 195;
420-25; 433). This included gender segregated meetings, subject to the “intermediate scrutiny standard” meaning Toyota,
promoted gender segregation by way of Women’s Leadership Forum (“WLF”) that was used to spy, bully, intimidate, and
monitor female employees (including their personal time or lunch hours)(dkts. 420-425) that may be involved in protected
activity, due to a ‘steel ceiling’ (see Exhibit B) firmly in place, with no women on the board (dkt 441-42 ex. g) no female
General Managers, Vice Presidents, or above (Id.) during the relevant period of Hinds employ at Toyota (2000-2003), with a new
sexual harassment claim filed in 2005 (dkts. 441-42 ex.g), and a new class action filed in Texas (see Exhibit C). EBRC founders
requested, in the capacity of EBRC CEO & President, to attend ‘gender segregated’ meetings in Detroit, organized by Qorvis
Communications, LLC, Thornton, EBRC Founders, AICPA, Toyota, Tower, Perception Partners (who specialize in ‘targeted
Severance Package savings’ like Hinds recent EEOC severance agreements with Toyota/Tower)(dkt 270-80 ex g, g-1).

40
financial reporting, and other relevant material facts)(dkts. 420-25 Exhibit I) in pending class-action litigation

including securities fraud, RICO, product liability, discrimination, and others. These Defendants, in conspiracy with

another, through networks, law firms, trade organizations, and employment channels is subjecting Hinds’, a Public

Arbitrator, to threats and intimidation, which includes continued blacklisting of employment, contracts, and

appointments. Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann have been substantially prejudiced and biased, which

contradicts the EEOC/Toyota contractual provisions, including confidentiality and indemnity provisions (dkt 270-80;

ex. g).

Plaintiff Hind respectfully and prayerfully requests that Judge Young and Magistrate Hussmann, disqualify

themselves, and/or be removed, or reassigned, with appropriate judgments and orders be overturned, and assigned a

new venue or judge that is qualified to interpret under the ‘reasonable woman standard’, interpret the rule of law as

prescribed in the Supreme Court decisions, Seventh Circuit, or the Congressional intent of broad interpretation of

Title VII claims. In September 2007 to January 2008 Magistrate Hussmann played a major role in settlement

discussions with parties over several months, with Defendants offering Plaintiff’s [Plaintiff Hinds, Harmony,

BFC Solutions, Inc. were all parties] a mediated settlement valued around $150,000. However, Plaintiff-

appellant Hinds found that the contract contained what was perceived as possibly illegal, unenforceable

contractual provisions, contrary to plaintiffs best interests, or was against sound public policy due to the “no-

investigations” clause [violates CPA professional standards to take money for no investigations of accounting

professionals], which is contrary to the Congressional intent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, such as,

‘Auditor Independence’ or ‘Conflicts of Interest21’.

21
Importantly, Magistrate Hussmann On or about January 2, 2008, Plaintiffs were provided an EBRC Settlement Agreement
(dkt 270 pg. 129, ex. AA) by the Defendant’s that Plaintiffs viewed, in part, as an act of influence and intimidation of a witness.
Plaintiff’s felt undue influence and pressure to sign off the EBRC Settlement Agreement, not in Plaintiff’s best interests, but to
avoid an “excessive legal bill” from Microsoft’s attorneys (with undisclosed conflicts of interest) and be paid around $100,000 to
not participate in investigations and other acts against public policy (for a licensed CPA not investigating other CPA’s in the
industry—against public interest and public policy). The witness intimidation and influence is found in the settlement agreement
regarding the future employment rights between the Plaintiffs and Defendant’s by way of Paragraph 5; “no right to employment
clause” defined as not seeking employment or remunerative relationship, with or any reference from, the Defendants or their
successors for a period of five years (overly broad as 2 years is standard covenant not to compete and 4 years have already
expired, almost 10 years putting Hinds close to retirement age), perceived as a blacklisting clause as it is overly broad in number
of companies/industries horizontal blacklisting; Paragraph 8: perceived as “no investigation clauses” that violate public policy
and interfere with Hinds’ Professional duties as a licensed CPA or lawyer, and other clauses that Plaintiff’s believed to be in
conflict with public policy or laws in the United States. This agreement is in direct violation of the EBRC/XBRL/AICPA anti-
trust policy (dkt 270-80 Exhibit K), unequal/discriminatory treatment compared to other accounting professionals (dkt 270-80,
Exhibit AP- one example), AICPA member policy, bylaws, and other contractual agreements amongst parties, affiliated to the
Defendant’s organizations: meanwhile the Defendants are self-dealing, self-appointing, nor fairly disclosing, and unjustly

41
 Plaintiff Hinds has character, fitness, and integrity that has been proven by independent opinions (see

Exhibit A-1)(dkt 419-20 ex. E) establishing her as a Public Arbitrator (dkt 420-25 ex.e), not to mention a CPA

Ambassador diplomat with ‘some gray hair’ and she disputes any negative characterizations by Defendant’s, the

real serial litigators (Id. ex. F for some examples- to many to list but an extensive history of RICO cases?),

including not meeting with high level regulators (i.e. SEC Commissioners- Roderick Hills), based on hearsay

and witness declarations and/or affidavits that are not admissible, not credible, irrelevant evidence, based on

subjective character assessments not assessed by a jury, nor has any evidence submitted by Defendant’s been

subject to the rigor of an evidence hearing. All of which Plaintiff Hinds argued is mandatory, before final

judgment can be rendered by MSJ, motion to dismiss with prejudice, res judicate doctrines (i.e. pending EEOC

and OSHA investigations are perceived as being negatively prejudiced, biased, and influenced by this litigation),

or otherwise.

D. INDEMNITY PROVISIONS; DELAWARE STATE LAW §145 NOT-FOR-PROFIT OFFICER

MANDATORY INDEMNITY PROVISIONS

Importantly, only if Appellant’s case is ruled ‘frivolous’ can attorney fees be awarded to the Appellees,

and awarding attorney fees to defendants is a ‘rare’ occurrence, especially if intended to punish plaintiff-

appellant and/or to chill the rights of others. The decision to award attorney’s fees in these circumstances could

lead to a chilling effect on future civil rights plaintiffs, a result that would contravene Congress’ intent in

enacting the very civil rights statutes at issue here. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419-20

(1978). Based on the legislative history and case law surrounding these statutes, it is unlikely that Congress

either envisioned or desired that plaintiffs in civil rights or Title VII actions might be subject to a sanction

greater than that imposed in those lawsuits where Congress had not provided for fee-shifting. Solomen v.

Redwood Advisory Company, 183 F.Supp.2d 748 (E.D. Pa 2002). EBRC is a not-for-profit organized as a

religious organization, and a member organization of AICPA, both with bylaws that provide officers, directors,

or members, like Hinds, indemnity and protection from ‘all personal liability’ arising out of employment as

EBRC CEO (i.e. whether criminal, civil, agency, investigative, etc). As a matter of sound public policy, Hinds,
enriching themselves with contracts and profits from new products and services (dkt 270-80, exs. B, O, AB; for a few examples),
disparately, Plaintiffs are denied equal access and participation in employment, contracts, and business relationships.

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former officer, EBRC not-for-profit is shielded from attorney fees or personal liability under Delaware law §145

(see Exhibit C) and AICPA/EBRC bylaws (see Exhibits D to D-4).

Defendant Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (“PwC”), is Toyota’s auditors with a financial interest in

this litigation as well as Toyota’s litigation. Montgomery, Elsner, Pardieck, LLP (“MEP Legal”) Plaintiff’s

former counsel, has undisclosed conflicts of interest, was paid by Toyota, in sums outside of the signed

contractual agreements (violation of attorney-client privilege) with Plaintiff Hinds, with involvement in

litigation related to auto industry companies, including Arent Fox Toyota (i.e. Dennis Cuneo, former Toyota

executive responsible for the $200 million sexual harassment lawsuit, and pettifogger strike suit (Plain. MSJ

Res. pg. 31), Arent Fox Timken, Winston & Strawn—PwC’s defense counsel in this litigation, and others (see

Exhibit A) that has resulted in increased revenues for MEP, at the expense of their clients best interests, like

Hinds.(dkt 247 filed March 19, 2009; dkt 252 filed March 30, 2009; Exhibit E). In August 2007, Hinds’ was

abandoned in complex litigation, which was orchestrated with Toyota, under the ‘credible trial threat target

program’, with multiple depositions that were not court ordered as misrepresented to Hinds, thus Plaintiffs’

interests have never been adequately represented, substantially prejudicing and biasing this litigation.

The continued denial of Plaintiff Hinds request for indemnity and/or a licensed attorney for Plaintiff

Hinds (dkts. 147-49 January 28, 2008 Plaintiffs filed to invoke indemnity clause provisions with advancement

of attorney fees, injunctive declaratory relief, and protective order)(Seventh Circuit Jurisdictional Memos

Appeal 10-2098, 10-2555), which is to deny Plaintiff Hinds and Harmony adequate legal counsel and from

equal treatment in the use of a term or condition of employment or AICPA committee member (dkt 411-

dismissal of Harmony, at the appellate level, due to no licensed attorney representing Plaintiffs): an act of

discrimination itself, a term or condition of employment, provided to all male executive defendants but not the

female Plaintiff. The only female executive, Plaintiff Hinds is denied her contractual rights, mandatory laws

such as State of Delaware §145 Not-For-Profit Officer indemnity and/or no personal liability statutory

provisions (see Exhibit C), AICPA bylaws & EBRC/XBRL bylaws (see Exhibit D to D-4), and a violation of

various employment or mediated settlement agreements)(see Exhibit S) that results in an ‘involuntary

conversion’ of property, assets, and employment and/or rights to contract, which violates the EEOC/Toyota

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Mediated Settlement, Consulting, and General Release Agreement (i.e. Harmony was formed under EEOC and

was requested to be disrupted upon EBRC CEO appointment)(see Exhibit S), newly admissible evidence (dkt

440- Judge Young and staff did research, legal analysis, writing, and then ruled on those writings, and

Defendant failed to timely file, in fact never filed a response, thus the ruling should be made

Not a ‘voluntary dismissal’ in its purest form, but rather a ‘constructive discharge’ as Plaintiff Harmony

was foreclosed, not by merit, but by the fact that Defendants denied a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of

employment or committee membership (not to mention as mandated under Delaware State Law §145 (dkt 420-

25 ex. a)(see Exhibit C, D to D-4), which mandates indemnity, legal counsel, no personal liability, as a matter of

public policy as EBRC is a not-for-profit 501(6)(c), religious organization and Hinds was the former EBRC

CEO during relevant times of this litigation). Discriminatorily, all male executive Defendants were given legal

counsel, indemnity, no personal liability, unlike the only female executive, who is excluded from all activities,

denied due process, denied legal counsel, indemnity, and continued employment until the matter was resolved

(i.e. alternative opportunity never materialized that was repeatedly promised after the realignment/termination of

the EBRC CEO opportunity): this is cruel and unusual punishment. But at least Hinds, in a Pro Se Capacity,

represented Harmony’s legal interests until the appellate court purportedly had no jurisdiction if Harmony did

not have a licensed attorney and the Defendants denied Plaintiff Hinds request for indemnity or legal counsel: a

‘new act’ of discrimination at the appellate level. This is perceived as an involuntary conversion of Harmony’s

property rights, Plaintiff Hinds believes this is a breach of the EEOC/Toyota Contract under the anti-retaliation

provisions and indemnity provisions (i.e. Harmony was formed in conjunction with the EEOC/Toyota Contract).

The only reason Harmony is being dismissed is because Plaintiff Hinds, Pro Se, does not have a licensed

attorney representing her interests, and her indemnity provisions continued to be denied with substantial

detrimental impact on Plaintiff Harmony’s and Hinds rights.

E. SANCTIONS SHOULD BE ISSUED AGAINST DEFENDANTS FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY

FILE, IF FILED AT ALL, A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
PURSUANT TO CIR. RULE 26.1 REPEATEDLY, VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER,
AND LEGAL HARASSMENT/INTIMIDATION/BULLYING OF PUBLIC ARBITRATOR AND
CREDIBLE WITNESS

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 The Defendants, including Grant Thornton, LLP (“Thornton”), failed to file a legally sufficient

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Cir. Rule 26.1; Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1, if any filed at all, and Defendant

EBRC filed an untimely, legally insufficient Disclosure Statement (see Exhibit A attached). The remaining

Defendants, including Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (“PwC”), and

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) failed to file a Disclosure Statement

pursuant to Cir. Rule 26.1, which is perceived as the potential to substantially bias or prejudice this

litigation without full disclosure and Defendants must be Ordered to file legally sufficient Disclosure

Statements that outline the parent, grandparent, and great grandparent relationships that may exist.

The failure to adhere to the Disclosure Rules is sanctionable behavior, of which Appellant has

requested sanctions repeatedly, on this issue, due to their lack of candor and professionalism. This is the

third time the Defendants failed to file such Disclosure Statements. The Defendants failure to comply with

the rules, in light of Appellants Pro Se status, has a substantial, material prejudicial impact on this litigation.

Importantly, critical jurisdictional issues that are germane to the subject matter of Title VII remain elusive

as the Disclosure Statements, if properly filed, would resolve the Title VII jurisdictional question that was

used as a threshold question, if the Seventh Circuit “pierces the corporate veil” which is as a matter of law

and a matter of fact would allow this case to go to trial on its merits, of which Appellant argues, would

more likely than not, win a favorable jury award.

The parties have a substantial amount at stake in terms of economics and detrimental impact

on Plaintiffs livelihood from loss of compensation, benefits, and other terms and conditions, with the value

of settlement in excess of six figures, attorney fees estimated at over $600,000. Plaintiff perceives Judge

Young, Magistrate Hussmann, and their staff have irreparably damaged this case, requiring recusal or

removal, judgments voided, and Plaintiff Hinds given her day in court. An appeal would only be fair,

equitable, and just, and as a matter of law. Pro Se Plaintiff must be given access to the courts and given a

liberal construction of rules and liberal interpretations of pleadings under the Seventh Circuit standards.

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 Judge Young states that the Motion to Alter or Amend (dkt 438) only touches tangentially on

the claims resolved in this suit and in doing so in this lawsuit has no basis (see Exhibit J attached): yet

this is contrary to the parties as both Defendants (dkt 445-46) and Plaintiff Hinds agree that they do

arise out of this litigation. As is evident by the procedural history provided in the first section, the

Defendants stopped filing responses to Plaintiff Hinds pleadings on March 22, 2010, the day that Plaintiff

Hinds contacted an attorney regarding Toyota, who administers the ‘credible trial threat’ target program,

which Defendants and their law firms, have directly or indirectly participated in, and has substantially

prejudiced this litigation: legal bullying, intimidation, and harassment. Plaintiff Hinds, Public Arbitrator,

specializing in securities fraud, has been denied her indemnity provisions under contract and/or State of

Delaware §145 not-for-profit law for officers [like Hinds, EBRC CEO] of not-for-profits [EBRC 501(c)(6)]

and adequate legal counsel (see Exhibit C; D to D-4). Plaintiff Hinds alleges ‘new acts’ of “Ongoing

Harassment” as reported to governmental agencies, such as EEOC, of discrimination/retaliation, including

the denial of indemnity, adequate legal counsel at the appellate level, including the dismissal of Harmony

(Plaintiff Hinds represented Harmony for two years without an attorney): a denial of a ‘term, condition, or

privilege’ of employment that only is provided to the male Defendants and not the only female.

III.CONCLUSION & RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff-Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, former EBRC CEO, respectfully and prayerfully

submit for entry Appellants Response ‘for Appeal 10-3457, in an oversize brief as previously requested of

Seventh Circuit, as directed and in response to Seventh Circuit Order entered on November 30, 2010, requesting

Appellant to show cause for her Appeal No. 10-3457. Pending before the Court is Appellants and Appellees JM

pleadings related to 10-3457, which is to be considered, in addition to Pro Se Appellant’s Response, when

rendering final judgment. Again, Defendants, including Defendant Thornton, failed to file a legally sufficient

Disclosure Statement pursuant to Cir. Rule 26.1; Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1, if any filed at all, sanctionable actions.

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 Appellant filed for sanctions relief repeatedly, due to Defendants failure to fully disclose pursuant to Cir.

Rule 26.1, and Fed.A.Cir.P. Rule 26.1. Appellant Hinds, Pro Se, who is afforded liberal interpretations, has

followed the procedures, to the best of her ability, did not file her appeal 10-3457 untimely, is not frivolous nor

‘relitigating’ issues, and has pleaded a “hardship” indigent status due to protracted litigation (i.e. over five years)

with a not-for-profit that has purportedly incurred more in legal liability than the asset value, raising ‘piercing

the corporate veil’ issues under Title VII jurisdictional exception. Appellant, Pro Se, filing in good faith, should

not be threatened with sanctions, however, Appellees [i.e. network firms that are operating as an ‘integrated

enterprise’] should be sanctioned for their collective disrespect and disrepute of Courts procedures, by

repeatedly failing to file a mandatory Disclosure Statement within twenty (20) days of appeal docket date.

The Seventh Circuit should grant Appellants right to appeal, order briefing with forty (40) days for

Appellant to fully brief 10-3457, sanction Appellees for failure to file a Disclosure Statement pursuant to Cir.

Rule 26.1, and/or remand to district court for further proceedings to allow Appellant to amend the complaint for

newly discovered evidence, additional discovery, release the stay on discovery dated January 13, 2010,

authenticate the evidence, and prepare for trial, or any other relief or remedy under law.

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the information provided on this docketing statement is accurate.

By: __________________________________
Susan M. Hinds, Pro Se Plaintiff-Appellant
Former EBRC CEO
1313 Gleneagles Place
Greendale, IN 47025
Date: December 13, 2010 (812) 584-2848

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