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c
Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
ccc c !" position of member of the National Assembly for the first
" "# district of the Province of Tayabas;
Republic of the Philippines (2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
$%&'(%) canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
Manila National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
EN BANC
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
c !"" "# office;
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS
ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS
CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Que las actas de eleccion de los
%p Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere
presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como
A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from
taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro
Tayabas. Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
the respondents are as follows: Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the () That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
election of said position be nullified; the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: () That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests,
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department
se haya presentado en o antes de este dia. of the Government or the National Assembly;
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. () That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted
Protest", alleging () that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the to them for decision and to matters involving their internal
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
protests against the election of its members should be
presented; () that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, () That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
and () that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period; () That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be
that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental
National Assembly after confirmation; question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an
of Dismissal"; answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing
the following special defenses:
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, () That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the issuance of the writ prayed for: the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day
for the presentation of protests against the election of any Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
member of the National Assembly, it acted within its impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied its quasi-judicial attributes;
powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions () That said respondent presented his motion of protest before
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day
adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in Commission;
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of () That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion
of the Supreme Court; to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the
said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of
() That the resolution of the National Assembly of December prohibition;
3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been () That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit
within the time that might be set by its own rules: the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive
the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
() That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with subsequent thereto;
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an () That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity
"inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial
the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
() That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation,
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within
in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
special defense: Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1
and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution
() That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
fixing the period within which protests against the election of functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in
fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National
(a) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
application to the case at bar. other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive
submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936. notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of
two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
There was no appearance for the other respondents. Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in
special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
following two principal propositions: consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the
appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore,
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate
funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with
protest filed the election of the herein petitioner the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
resolution of the National Assembly? hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the
merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and
been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
case , it would hardly be consistent with our sense the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments,
undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off
vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration. excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has several departments and among the integral or constituent units
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme thereof.
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking constitutional question raised or the very
presented. Any
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a and legislative departments of the governments of the government.
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the
the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors
they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms
case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear and court chambers.
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3,
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9,
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly,
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral
Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931)
Assembly, should be upheld. especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity
of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will
From the very nature of the republican government established in our determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. framework? To ask these questions is to answer them.
The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer
, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system.
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that
namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to
types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein
adopted the American type where the written constitution is petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the
interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the
countries which have declined to follow the American example, petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of
provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law.
This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and
the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin
and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two
intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance. Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of representation to the executive department in the persons of two
July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly representatives to be designated by the President.
shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing
Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. Department, reads as follows:
1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as
follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their
their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,
exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the
This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the members of the party having the largest number of votes
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, therein, three elected by the members of the party having the
clear and complete" (Veloso
Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon
sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific
hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission.
whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee
initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature.
Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934,
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the reads as follows:
majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the
Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the Commission, composed of three members elected by the party
having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
three elected by the members of the party having the second gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives
largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
presided over by one of said justices. necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the not authorize his pay.
following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
said draft: municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards
to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm
xxxxxxxxx their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a
canvass and proclaims ² in this case the municipal council
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there
scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of
11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from
cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another
judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask who was declared elected. From example, in a case when the
from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in
shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission. question.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. K
about the election of a member, there is nothing to be
a
submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to !
a
"
be determined. #
When there is no contest,
there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr.
Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a
while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of
delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft the members.
cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part
of the sections which refers to elections, returns and Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
qualifications.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
Mr. ROXAS. K
$
%
assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its
members?
&
"
#
&K &
&
$
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he
must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral before the Electoral Commission.
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members." Mr. LABRADOR.
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. ROXAS. "
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires. Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon
the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly. even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because
that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly they can only judge.
on its own motion does not have the right to contest the
election and qualification of its members? In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in
this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco,
believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
law, they cannot remove him for that reason. difference between the original draft and the draft as amended,
Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission. xxxxxxxxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria
solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados el triunfo.
al efecto de que la primera clausula del
que dice: "The
elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the xxxxxxxxx
National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la
facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others
que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the
enmendamos el
, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la against fifty-six (56).
Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que
haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to
of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
interpellation also took place: and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite? the commission.
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as
follows:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el
, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la (6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications
Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected
Supremo? by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de
sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as
dar el triunfo. follows:
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
minoria prescindieran del partidismo? Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the
largest number of votes, and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the
the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly. by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges and
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, elections although a select committee was usually what is
1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the
original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All committee, a quorum of the members named was required to
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to
elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention. attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and 154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the questions relating to the right of membership gradually
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan assumed a political character; so that for many years previous
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and
government. determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions,
upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated
edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the attacks upon his government, resigned his office in
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted
passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice
memorandum of March 14, 1936: were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully,
153. From the time when the commons established their right induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious
to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public
qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the
of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave
committees appointed at the commencement of each session, of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of
was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in
whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for
this description which might be referred to them, and to report leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the
their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their
from time to time. When an election petition was referred to respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is
this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious
other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the
with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not
were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the
discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p.
known, that in every contested election, many members of this 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were
house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are
between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of
contention, and take upon themselves the partial management Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each
of the very business, upon which they should determine with house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic
the strictest impartiality." law provides that all protests against the election of members of the
Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The
Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National
name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding
it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1,
commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian
magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral
may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the Commission.
information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by
some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by
been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no
the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37,
abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of
of the house of commons. five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the
House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The
problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the
elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral
the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard,
accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the
by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Constitution [Albany, 1913] ² Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 Commission, p. 25
#
), the experiment has at least abiding
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative
and political development of other countries of the world. When , Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the
constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications legislature.
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not
only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express
now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the prohibition in the Constitution (!
Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate State
Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may
March 4, 1861.) regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections with the power to determine contested cases involving the election,
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative
acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle
composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the
equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in without the necessary means to render that authority effective
its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate
and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
permitted. cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the
proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific
counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great
its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human
out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral
it !
the power regulative in character to limit the time Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which
duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not be
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of
the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally
the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When,
abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3,
creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact,
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case
not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme
that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the
Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons
4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return
Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from
Assembly ² on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp.
power of regulation in such cases ² had already barred the 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26).
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the
to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the
followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have been Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being
contemplated, and should be avoided. informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to
enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had election, or for carrying into execution the determination as
been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the
construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of
at the time when the power to decide election contests was still lodged Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force,
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was
the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each
protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering
legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter
motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests
respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or
is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties approving the returns of such members against whose election no
as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted
provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela],
in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted Second Philippine Legislature, Record ² First Period, p. 89; Urguello
December 6, 1935).
Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature;
Fetalvero
Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record
² First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar
Aldanese [Fourth District,
Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record ² First Period, pp. 1121, execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
1122; Aguilar
Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
Record ² First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The governments.
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387,
section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, () That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National members of the National Assembly.
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations
for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor (a) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the qualifications of their elective members.
National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection
through the medium of confirmation. () That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
Summarizing, we conclude: relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
() That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into () That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried
with it !
the implied power
to
() That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of
of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of filing protests.
the powers granted.
(') That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
() That in cases of conflict between the several departments Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ
and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate partisan influence or consideration, which object would be
constitutional boundaries. frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
() That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review conducting said contests.
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the ($) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
all authority. Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members,
() That the Electoral Commission is an independent but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and Y
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be
required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest. Y
1. On 15 April 1948, Jesus M. Larrabaster applied with the National 7. On 20 August 1956 PEÑA requested NARRA to approve the above-
Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel mentioned transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in view of
Settlement District, Cotabato. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, returning to the Bureau of Lands
the disposition of the lots which remained unallocated by the
2. On 10 July 1950 Larrabaster's application was granted. Home Lot LASEDECO at the time of its abolition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
No. 336 (later known as Lot No. 355) with an area of 1,500 square
meters (hereafter, the Disputed Property) was allocated to him on the 8. The Bureau of Lands did not act on PEÑA's request either,
basis of a report of the supervisor of the Settlement District that the prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators
subject lot was vacant and free from any claim or conflict. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library (BOL), which was created to wind up the affairs of LASEDECO. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library
Meanwhile, "Larrabaster leased the lot to private respondent, Basilio Although LASEDECO bad initially denied the request, it subsequently
MENDOZA, and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the portion confirmed the sale to PEÑA in its Resolution No. 139, series of
thereof" (2nd Indorsement, February 10, 1969, Office of the President, 1964. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4. On 29 June 1956 Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and
interests over the Disputed Property to Jose B. PEÑA. 10. In its Resolution No. 139, series of 1964, the BOL denied the
"Notwithstanding the transfer, PEÑA allowed Mendoza and Geller to request. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Larrabaster, contained only 1,500 sq. ms. but due to accretion, since
the lot was almost surrounded by a creek, the area increased to 18. MENDOZA did so and on ()
*+,* said Office rendered
3,616.93 sq. ms.; and (b) since home lots had an average area of 1,500 its letter-decision (the second one challenged herein) affirming its
sq. ms. only, the Bureau of Lands subdivided the Disputed Property previous Decision of 13 May 1969, having found no cogent reason to
into three [3] parts, namely: Lot No. 107 with an area of 1,455 sq. ms., depart therefrom (Annex "E", Petition). chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
was allocated to Basilio Mendoza; Lot No. 108, with an area of 1,500
sq. ms., was allocated to PEÑA; and Lot No. 109, with an area of 661 19. In the meantime, on 27 January 1970, and while his protest with
sq. ms., was allocated to Arturo Roxas. The BOL then recommended the Office of the President was still pending, MENDOZA resorted to
that PEÑA be awarded Lot No. 108 instead of the whole of former Lot Civil Case No. 98 for
before the then Court of First Instance
No. 355.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry of Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and PEÑA. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law libra ry
13. Excepting to the above, PEÑA alleged that the lot transferred to On 23 June 1978, MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental
him by Larrabaster contains 3,616.93 and not 1,500 sq. ms., this being Petition to annul the administrative Decision of 20 September 1971
the area embraced within the boundaries described in the denying his protest. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
area of PEÑA's lot (Lot No. 108, formerly a part of Lot No. 355) be
maintained at 1,500 sq. ms.. xxx' on the premise that accretion 21. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court in
belonged to the Government. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library its 28 November 1986 Decision,
with the following disposition:
15. Upon PEÑA's motion for reconsideration, the same Office, on 13 WHEREFORE, finding the appeal of petitioner Basilio
Ä 1969, modified its Decision of 10 February 1969 and held that Mendoza to be meritorious, the Decision of May 10,
"the award to PEÑA of the original Lot No. 355 is hereby maintained" 1985 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, of
(p. 9, Annex "D", Petition). It reasoned out that the benefits of Koronadal, South Cotabato, in Special Civil Case No.
accretion, pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code, accrue to the 98 is SET ASIDE. The Decisions of February 10, 1969,
owner, PEÑA, and not to the Government. That Decision of 13 May May 13, 1969 and September 28, 1971 of the Office of
1969 is the first judgment assailed in this Petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law libra ry the President in the administrative case are likewise
SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the reopening of the
administrative case in said Office as to accord all We uphold petitioners' submissions. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
before the then Court of First Instance of Cotabato seeking
to annul the 13 May 1969 Decision. At the time it was presented on 27 And as far as the ownership of the accretion is concerned, the Office of
January 1970, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration with the the President likewise correctly held that "while it may be conceded
Office of the President, involving the same Decision, was still that Lot No. 355 technically belongs to the government because it was
pending. In fact, it was only on 28 September 1971 that said Office bought from the latter under an installment plan, it cannot be rightfully
denied reconsideration. Evidently, MENDOZA had abandoned his concluded that the benefits of accretion must still be retained by the
pending administrative request for reconsideration in favor of judicial said seller" (Letter-Decision, 13 May 1969, p. 7, Annex "D", Petition).
proceedings. Again, therefore, MENDOZA cannot justifiably claim In so ruling, that Office acted on the authority of -
."
that he was denied due process. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
/"
, 87 Phil. 806, at 810, 814 [1950]), reading
in part:
2. Substantial factual evidence support the questioned administrative
rulings. The Office of the President relied on the fact-finding report of ... When the lot bordering on a public stream is sold on
the BOL made sometime in 1969 with respect to the Disputed Property installment basis by the government, said stream is
to the effect that although the area of Lot No. 355 awarded to made the boundary. ... The stream may advance or
Larrabaster was 1,500 sq. ms., it was found situated along a creek and recede but it will always constitute the boundary or
that "it had increased in area to 3,616.93 square meters by accretion."
law library
chanrobles virtual boundaries of the lot, and the purchaser has the right to
insist that the original boundaries be preserved, and all
The question then which confronted the Office of the President was the area inside said boundaries be considered as
the ownership over the increased area. In its Decision of 10 February included in the sale. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
sq. ms. was an unallocated area which the Bureau of Lands had
authority to dispose of so that said Bureau was not remiss in ... In the sale of a friar land, lot or parcel ordering on
subdividing the disputed Property into three (3 lots and allocating only rivers under Act. No. 1120 pending payment in full of
Lot No. 108, with an area of 1,500 sq. ms., to PEÑA, Lot No. 107 to the purchase price, although the government reserves
MENDOZA, and Lot No. 109 to Arturo Roxas. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
title thereto, merely for its protection, the beneficial and
equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion
Upon re-study, however, the Office of the President modified its by the lot even before payment of the last installment
conclusions in its Decision of 13 May 1969, and rightly so. It took into belongs to the purchaser thereof.
account Article 457 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Since the Disputed Property no longer belonged to the Government the
subdivision thereof by the Bureau of Lands into three lots, as well as
the allocation of said lots to two other individuals, was beyond the that the administrative decision in matters within the executive
scope of its authority. Under Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, the jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
authority of the Bureau of Lands to dispose of lots was limited to fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs. Moreno L-17821, November 29,
"unallocated areas." As the Letter-Decision of 28 September 1971 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, L-19100, December 27,
states: "however, it is equally true that the accretions took place after 1963, 9 SCRA 852), which we find absent herein. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
as well as suffer the losses that may befall it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA's filing of a Miscellaneous Sales Application over the
Disputed Property with the Bureau of Lands on 6 November 1962 Y
must similarly be held to have been inappropriate and without any
legal force and effect since the same was no longer public land subject Y
to disposition by the Government. Contrary to the finding of
respondent Appellate Court, no irregularity may be imputed to the Y
administrative decisions by reason of the fact that allegedly a copy of
Y
the investigation report of the BOL was not among those elevated to
the Trial Court or among those marked in evidence. It can be safely Y
assumed that the Office of the President could not have relied upon
said report if the same had not been before it when it rendered the Y
questioned Decisions. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
Y
3. Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing administrative
decisions of the Executive Branch of the government, "the findings of Y
fact made therein must be respected, as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Y
Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]); that it is
Y
not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its Y
own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency
of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun, et al. vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]);
public of the Philippines c4!4 4,5""""
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chanrobles virtual law libra ry On March 22, 1985, the Monetary Board issued another resolution
placing the bank under liquidation and designating Valenzuela as
The antecedent facts of each of the nine (9) cases are as follows: liquidator. By virtue of her authority as liquidator, Valenzuela
appointed the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, et al. to represent Banco
0)),) Filipino in all litigations. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
This is a motion for reconsideration, filed by respondent Celestina On March 26, 1985, Banco Filipino filed the petition for
in
Pahimuntung, of the decision promulgated by thisCourt on April 8, G.R. No. 70054 questioning the validity of the resolutions issued by
1986, granting the petition for review on
and reversing the the Monetary Board authorizing the receivership and liquidation of
questioned decision of respondent appellate court, which annulled the Banco Filipino.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
writ of possession issued by the trial court in favor of petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law libra ry
In a resolution dated August 29, 1985, this Court in G.R. No. 70054
The respondent-movant contends that the petitioner has no more resolved to issue a temporary restraining order, effective during the
personality to continue prosecuting the instant case considering that same period of 30 days, enjoining the respondents from executing
further acts of liquidation of the bank; that acts such as receiving properties on the ground that the resolution of the issue on the validity
collectibles and receivables or paying off creditors' claims and other of the closure and liquidation of Banco Filipino is still pending with
transactions pertaining to normal operations of a bank are not this Court in G.R. 70054.
enjoined. The Central Bank is ordered to designate a comptroller for
Banco Filipino. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary
,),00
Subsequently, Top Management failed to pay its loan on the due date. Petitioner El Grande Development Corporation (El Grande for brevity)
Hence, the law firm of Sycip, Salazar, et al. acting as counsel for is engaged in the business of developing residential subdivisions. It
Banco Filipino under authority of Valenzuela as liquidator, applied for was extended by respondent Banco Filipino a credit accommodation to
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Top Management's finance its housing program. Hence, petitioner was granted a loan in
properties. Thus, the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of the amount of P8,034,130.00 secured by real estate mortgages on its
Cavite issued a notice of extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the various estates located in Cavite. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
from proceeding with foreclosure sale. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioners Top Management and On March 2, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
Pilar Development alleging that Carlota Valenzuela, who was dismissing the petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law l ibrary
)*343
On April 8, 1985, petitioner filed a second supplemental complaint to
On November 8, 1985, petitioner Pilar Development Corporation which respondents filed a motion to dismiss. chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
Central Bank and Carlota Valenzuela, thru the law firm Sycip, Salazar,
Hernandez and Gatmaitan filed an answer to the complaint. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary The order of dismissal was appealed by the petitioner to the Court of
Appeals. On November 4, 1987, the respondent appellate court
On June 23, 1986, Sycip, et al., acting for all the defendants including dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Petitioner Pilar Development filed with the respondent appellate court
+45,3
a petition for
and mandamus to annul the order of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the Petitioner El Grande Development Corporation (El Grande for brevity)
petition. A petition was filed with this Court but was denied in a obtained a loan from Banco Filipino in the amount of P8,034,130.00,
resolution dated March 22, 1988. Hence, this instant motion for secured by a mortgage over its five parcels of land located in Cavite
reconsideration. which were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-82187, T-
109027, T-132897, T-148377, and T-79371 of the Registry of Deeds
)*345 of Cavite. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
When Banco Filipino was ordered closed and placed under He was later replaced by Gilberto Teodoro as conservator on August
receivership in 1985, the appointed liquidator of BF, thru its counsel 10, 1984. The latter submitted a report dated January 8, 1985 to
Sycip, Salazar, et al. applied with the ex-officio sheriff of the Regional respondent Board on the conservatorship of petitioner bank, which
Trial Court of Cavite for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage report shall hereinafter be referred to as the Teodoro report. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
On June 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision The examination findings as of July 31, 1984, as shown
dismissing the petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary earlier, indicate one of insolvency and illiquidity and
further confirms the above conclusion of the
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for Conservator. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
review on
.
All the foregoing provides sufficient justification for
,4415 forbidding the bank from engaging in banking. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank was authorized to operate Foregoing considered, the following are recommended:
as such under M.B. Resolution No. 223 dated February 14, 1963. It
commenced operations on July 9, 1964. It has eighty-nine (89) 1. Forbid the Banco Filipino Savings &
operating branches, forty-six (46) of which are in Manila, with more Mortgage Bank to do business in the
than three (3) million depositors. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law libra ry Philippines effective the beginning of
office January 1985, pursuant to Sec. 29
As of July 31, 1984, the list of stockholders showed the major of R.A No. 265, as amended; chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
5. In consequence of the foregoing, to 2. The Legal Department, through the Solicitor General, be authorized
terminate the conservatorship over to file in the proper court a petition for assistance in th liquidation of
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage the Bank; chanrob les virtual law library
Case No. 9675 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati to set aside the
action of the Monetary Board placing BF under receivership. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library 4. Management be instructed to inform the stockholders of Banco
Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank of the Monetary Board's decision
On February 28, 1985, petitioner filed with this Court the instant liquidate the Bank. (p. 167, , Vol. I) chanrobles virtual law library
On March 19, 1985, Carlota Valenzuela, as Receiver and Arnulfo On August 20, 1985, the case was submitted for resolution. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
Three motions for intervention were filed in this case as follows: First,
On October 21, 1988, petitioner BF filed an urgent motion to reopen in G.R. No. 70054 filed by Eduardo Rodriguez and Fortunate M.
hearing to which respondents filed their comment on December 16, Dizon, stockholders of petitioner bank for and on behalf of other
1988. Petitioner filed their reply to respondent's comment of January stockholders of petitioner; second, in G.R. No. 78894, filed by the
11, 1989. After having deliberated on the grounds raised in the same stockholders, and, third, again in G.R. No. 70054 by BF
pleadings, this Court in its resolution dated August 3, 1989 declared Depositors' Association and others similarly situated. This Court, on
that its intention as expressed in its resolution of August 29, 1985 had March 1, 1990, denied the aforesaid motions for intervention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
report and recommendation be set for oral argument before the Court.
On February 7, 1991, this Court denied the request for oral argument While the motion to dismiss was pending resolution, petitioner herein
of the parties.
chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library Metropolis Development Corporation (Metropolis for brevity) filed a
motion to intervene in the aforestated civil case on the ground that as a
stockholder and creditor of Banco Filipino, it has an interest in the The Central Bank filed a supplemental motion to dismiss which was
subject of the action. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library denied. Hence, the latter filed a petition for
with the
respondent appellate court to set aside the order of the trial court
On July 19, 1985, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also denying the motion to dismiss. On March 17, 1986, the respondent
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order later filed by appellate court granted the petition and dismissed the complaint of
Central Bank. On June 5, 1985, the trial court allowed the motion for Banco Filipino with the trial court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
On March 17, 1986, the respondent appellate court rendered a decision After deliberating on the pleadings in the following cases:
annulling and setting aside the questioned orders of the trial court, and
ordering the dismissal of the complaint filed by Banco Filipino with 1. In G.R. No. 68878, the respondent's
the trial court as well as the complaint in intervention of petitioner motion for reconsideration; chanrobles virtual law library
On February 2, 1985, a complaint was filed with the trial court in the
name of Banco Filipino to annul the resolution o the Monetary Board 3. In G.R. No. 81303, the petitioner's
dated January 25, 1985 which ordered the closure of Banco Filipino motion for reconsideration; chanrobles virtual law library
On February 14, 1985, the Central Bank and the receiver filed a 5. Finally, in G.R. No. 90473, the
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the receiver had petition comment and reply.
not authorized anyone to file the action. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chan robles virtual law library
We find the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 68878 and 81303
On March 22, 1985, the Monetary Board placed the bank under and the petitions in G.R. Nos. 77255-58, 78766, 81304 and 90473
liquidation and designated Valenzuela as liquidator and Aurellano and devoid of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
the Philippines and the Monetary Board, has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing The Monetary Board shall thereupon determine within
the assailed order. Coupled with this task is the duty of this Court not sixty days whether the institution may be reorganized or
only to strike down acts which violate constitutional protections or to otherwise placed in such a condition so that it may be
nullify administrative decisions contrary to legal mandates but also to permitted to resume business with safety to its
prevent acts in excess of authority or jurisdiction, as well as to correct depositors and creditors and the general public and shall
manifest abuses of discretion committed by the officer or tribunal prescribe the conditions under which such resumption
involved.chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library of business shall take place as well as the time for
fulfillment of such conditions. In such case, the
The law applicable in the determination of these issues is Section 29 of expenses and fees in the collection and administration
Republic Act No. 265, as amended, also known as the Central Bank of the assets of the institution shall be determined by
Act, which provides: the Board and shall be paid to the Central Bank out of
the assets of such institution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
a
petitioner bank under liquidation. This Court shall likewise take into
!
8a
consideration the findings contained in the reports of the two
commissioners who were appointed by this Court to hold the referral
hearings, namely the report by Judge Manuel Cosico submitted Please be informed that
February 20, 1988 and the report submitted by Justice Consuelo
!
9tentatively scheduled last
Santiago on January 28, 1991. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library December 7, 1984) and
a
#
There is no question that under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act, the Ä "
a8
a
following are the mandatory requirements to be complied with before /a
a bank found to be insolvent is ordered closed and forbidden to do
$
. These shall be submitted to you in due
business in the Philippines: Firstly, an examination shall be conducted time (p. 810, Rollo, Vol. III; emphasis ours).
by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or
his examiners or agents into the condition of the bank; secondly, it It is worthy to note that a conference was held on January 21, 1985 at
shall be disclosed in the examination that the condition of the bank is the Central Bank between the officials of the latter an of petitioner
one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve
bank. What transpired and what was agreed upon during the K
conference was explained in the Tiaoqui report.
a
$
$"
... The discussion centered on the substantial exposure !
"
$
of the bank to the various entities which would have a
÷ "
!
relationship with the bank; the manner by which some
(p. 7. Tiaoqui report; p. 59, , Vol. I)
bank funds were made indirectly available to several
entities within the group; and the unhealth financial In his testimony in the second referral hearing before Justice Santiago,
status of these firms in which the bank was additionally Tiaoqui testified that on January 21, 1985, he met with officers of
exposed through new funds or refinancing petitioner bank to discuss the advanced findings and exceptions made
accommodation including accrued interest. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry by Mr. Dionisio Domingo which covered 70%-80% of the bank's loan
portfolio; that at that meeting, Fortunato Dizon (BF's Executive Vice
Queried in the impact of these clean loans, on the bank President) said that as regards the unsecured loans granted to various
solvency Mr. Dizon (BF Executive Vice President) corporations, said corporations had large undeveloped real estate
intimated that, collectively these corporations have properties which could be answerable for the said unsecured loans and
large undeveloped real estate properties in the suburbs that a reply from BF was forthcoming, that he (Tiaoqui) however
which can be made answerable for the unsecured loans prepared his report despite the absence of such reply; that he believed,
a well as the Central Bank's credit accommodations. ÷ as in fact it is stated in his report, that despite the meeting on January
$
a
21, 1985, there was still a need to discuss the recommended valuation
(pp. 58-59, , Vol. I; emphasis ours) reserves of petitioner bank and; that he however, did not wait anymore
for a discussion of the recommended valuation reserves and instead
Clearly, Tiaoqui based his report on an incomplete examination of prepared his report two days after January 21, 1985 (pp. 3313-3314,
petitioner bank and outrightly concluded therein that the latter's ).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
power of the state. Police power, however, may not be done arbitratrily
or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious, The second requirement provided in Section 29, R.A. 265 before a
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust or is tantamount to a denial bank may be closed is that the examination should disclose that the
of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution condition of the bank is one of insolvency. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(50%) of the accounts should be recommended to be set up. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
Hence, the contention of the Central Bank that a bank's true financial
2. For loans classified as loss, or loans regarded by the examiner as condition is synonymous with the terms "unimpaired capital and
absolutely uncollectible or worthless, valuation reserves of one surplus," "combined capital accounts" and net worth after deducting
hundred percent (100%) of the accounts should be recommended to be valuation reserves from the capital, surplus and unretained earnings,
set up (p. 8, Objections to Santiago report). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry citing Sec. 5 of RA 337 is misplaced. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
The foregoing criteria used by respondents in determining the financial Firstly, it is clear from the law that a solvent bank is one in which its
condition of the bank is based on Section 5 of RA 337, known as the assets exceed its liabilities. It is a basic accounting principle that assets
General Banking Act which states: are composed of liabilities and capital. The term "assets" includes
capital and surplus" (Exley v. Harris, 267 p. 970, 973, 126 Kan., 302).
Sec. 5. The following terms shall be held to be On the other hand, the term "capital" includes common and preferred
synonymous and interchangeable: chan robles virtual law library stock, surplus reserves, surplus and undivided profits. (Manual of
Examination Procedures, Report of Examination on Department of
... f. Unimpaired Capital and Surplus, "Combined Commercial and Savings Banks, p. 3-C). If valuation reserves would
capital accounts," and "Net worth," which terms shall be deducted from these items, the result would merely be the networth
mean for the purposes of this Act, the total of the or the unimpaired capital and surplus of the bank applying Sec. 5 of
"unimpaired paid-in capital, surplus, and undivided RA 337 but not the total financial condition of the bank. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
therefore for both the conclusion of insolvency and for the decision of
the respondent Board to close petitioner bank and place it under Finally, another circumstance which point to the solvency of petitioner
receivership.chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library bank is the granting by the Monetary Board in favor of the former a
credit line in the amount of P3 billion along with the placing of
Concerning the financial position of the bank as of January 25, 1985, petitioner bank under conservatorship by virtue of M.B. Resolution
the date of the closure of the bank, the consolidated statement of No. 955 dated July 27, 1984. This paved the way for the reopening of
condition thereof as of the aforesaid date shown in the Valenzuela, the bank on August 1, 1984 after a self-imposed bank holiday on July
Aurellano and Tiaoqui report on the receivership of petitioner bank, 23, 1984. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are aware of the Central Bank's concern for the safety of Banco
Filipino's depositors as well as its creditors including itself which had
granted substantial financial assistance up to the time of the latter's
closure. But there are alternatives to permanent closure and liquidation
to safeguard those interests as well as those of the general public for $:(: c
the failure of Banco Filipino or any bank for that matter may be
viewed as an irreversible decline of the country's entire banking
system and ultimately, it may reflect on the Central Bank's own
viability. For one thing, the Central Bank and the Monetary Board '+(*
p Ydissenting: chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
Savings and Mortgage Bank (BF) vs. the Monetary Board (MB),
Central Bank of the Philippines (CB), et al.," is an original action for Quezon City for Manila, March 4, 1985. (p. 11-G,
mandamus and
filed in this Court by former officials of BF I.)
to annul the Monetary Board Resolution No. 75 dated January 25,
1985 (ordering the closure of Banco Filipino [BF] and appointing The other eight (8) cases merely involve transactions of BF with third
Carlota Valenzuela as receiver of the bank) on the ground that the persons and certain "related" corporations which had defaulted on their
resolution was issued "without affording BF a hearing on the reports" loans and sought to prohibit the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
on which the Monetary Board based its decision to close the bank, mortgages on their properties by the receiver of BF. These eight (8)
hence, without "administrative due process.", The prayer of the cases are:chanrob les virtual law library
petition reads:
1. G.R. No. 68878 &7;
%
÷
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that a writ
a&involves the repossession by BF of a house and lot
of mandamus be issued commanding respondents which the buyer (Pahimutang) claimed to have completely paid for on
immediately to furnish it copies of the reports of the installment plan. The appellate court's judgment for the buyer was
examination of BF employed by respondent Monetary reversed by this Court. The buyer's motion for reconsideration is
Board to support its Resolution of January 25, 1985 and awaiting resolution by this Court; chanrobles virtual law li brary
on the ground that a stockholder (Metropolis) may not bring suit in the
name of BF while the latter is under receivership, without the authority As previously stated, G.R. No. 70054 &7;
Ä
7 "
"&
of the receiver; chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
is an original special civil action for
and mandamus filed in
this Court by the old management of BF, through their counsel, N.J.
6. G.R. No. 81303, "-
Quisumbing & Associates, using the name of the bank and praying for
÷ "
&is an appeal from the decision dated October 22, 1987 the annulment of MB Resolution No. 75 which ordered the closure of
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12368, "Pilar BF and placed it under receivership. It is a "forum-shopping" case
Development Corporation, et al. vs. Honorable Manuel Cosico, et al.," because it was filed here on February 28, 1985 three weeks after they
dismissing the petition for
against Judge Manuel Cosico, Br. had filed on February 2, 1985 Civil Case No. 9675 "Banco Filipino vs.
136, RTC, Makati, who dismissed the complaint filed by Pilar Monetary Board, et al." in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 143
Development Corporation against BF, for specific performance of (presided over by Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo) for the same purpose of
certain developer contracts. An answer filed by Norberto Quisumbing securing a declaration of the nullity of MB Resolution No. 75 dated
and Associates, as BF's supposed counsel, virtually confessed January 25, 1985. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
All that we may determine in this case is whether the actions of the
Central Bank and the Monetary Board in closing BF and placing it If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm
under receivership were "plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
within the said period that the banking institution is
insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 provides: depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if
the public interest requires, order its liquidation,
Section 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. - Whenever, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a
!
liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the
Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by
Instance, reciting the proceedings which have been the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form
taken and praying the assistance of the court in the of cash or Central Bank cashier's check, in an amount
liquidation of the banking institutions. The court shall twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or
have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate plaintiff, conditioned that it will paythe which the
disputed claims against the bank and enforce individual petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusalor the
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58
necessary to preserve the assets of the banking of the new Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable
institution and to implement the liquidation plan and not inconsistent with the provisions of this section
approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall govern the issuance and dissolution of the
shall designate an official of the Central Bank as restraining order or injunction contemplated in this
liquidator who shall take over the functions of the section.
receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board
under this section. The liquidator shall, with all % "
÷
"
convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking
$a
institution to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose
of the same to creditors and other parties for the " provided, however, that this shall not include
purpose of paying the debts of such bank and he may, the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank
in the name of the banking institution, institute such caused by extra-ordinary demands induced by financial
actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to panic commonly evidenced by a run on the banks in the
collect and recover accounts and assets of the banking banking community.
institution.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
when "its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its
No restraining order or injunction shall be issued depositors and creditors. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
at the bank to keep track of its activities and ascertain its financial
condition (p. 8, Tiaoqui Report). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary 3. Deposit levels, which were at P3,845
million at end-May l984 (its last
Estanislao resigned after two weeks for health reasons. He was "normal" month), dropped to P935
succeeded by Gilberto Teodoro as conservator in August, 1984 up to million at the end of November 1984 or
January 8, 1985. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library a loss of P2,910 million. This
represented an average monthly loss of million in the next two months. (pp. 2-3,
P485 million vs. an average monthly Tiaoqui Report.) chanrobles virtual law library
Financing Corporation
(HFIC), the latter c) Around 71.7% of the
confirmed only P427 total accommodations of
million. P247 million in P2.0677 billions to the
loans were not guaranteed related/linked entities
by HFC. (Teodoro were adversely classified.
Report.)chanrobles virtual law library Close to 33.7% or P697.1
millions were clean loans
(d) Per SGV's report, or against PNs
loans totalling P1.882 (promissory notes) of
million including accrued these entities. Of the
interest, were secured by latter, 52.6% were
collateral worth only classified as loss." (P. 5,
Pl.54 billion. Hence, BFs Tiaoqui Report.) chanrobles virtual law library
unsecured exposure
d) K$6 entities related with each
other and to the bank,
!
"after setting several of which showed
up the additional distressed conditions. (p.
valuation reserves of 7, Tiaoqui Report.)
P612.2 millions and
accumulated net loss of Teodoro's conclusion was that "the continuance of the bank in business
P48.2 millions,
would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors." He
Total recommended "that the Monetary Board take a more effective and
liabilities of P5,282.1 responsible action to protect the depositors and creditors ... in the light
million exceeds total of the bank's worsening condition." (p. 5, Teodoro Report.) chanrobles virtual law library
classified included
unmatured loan of Foregoing considered, the following are recommended:
Pl,482.0 million to
1. Forbid the Banco have cleared
Filipino Savings & themselves. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
Mortgage Bank to do
business in the 4. Refer to the Central
Philippines effective the Banles Legal Department
beginning of office on and Office of Special
January, 1985, pursuant Investigation the report
to Sec. 29 of R.A. No. on the findings on Banco
265, as amended; chanrobles virtual law libra ry Filipino for investigation
and possible prosecution
2. Designate the Head of of directors, officers and
the Conservator Team at employees for activities
the bank, as Receiver of which led to its insolvent
Banco Filipino Savings & position." (pp. 9-10,
Mortgage Bank, to Tiaoqui Report.)
immediately take charge
of the assets and On January 25, 1985 or two days after the submission of Tiaoqui's
liabilities, as Report, and three weeks after it received Teodoro's Report, the
expeditiously as possible Monetary Board, then composed of:
collect and gather all the
assets and administer the Chairman: Jose B. Fernandez, Jr.
same for the benefit of all CB Governor
the creditors, and exercise
all the powers necessary Members:
for these purposes
including but not limited 1. Cesar E.A. Virata, Prime Minister &
to bringing suits and Concurrently Minister of Finance chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
foreclosing mortgages in
the name of the bank.
library
chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law
2. Roberto V. Ongpin, Minister of Trade
& Industry & Chairman of Board of
3. The Board of directors Investment chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
among other things, they found that: chanrobles virtual law libra ry
BF's and Judge (now CA Justice) Consuelo Y. Santiago's argument Tiaoqui's admission that the examination of BF had "not yet been
that valuation reserves should not be considered because the matter officially terminated" when he submitted his report on January 23,
was not discussed by Tiaoqui with BF officials is not well taken for: chanrobles virtual law lib rary 1985 did not make the action of the Monetary Board of closing the
bank and appointing receivers for it, 'plainly arbitrary and in bad
(1) The records of the defaulting debtors were in the possession of faith." For what had been examined by the SES was more than enough
BF.chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry to warrant a finding that the bank was "insolvent and could not
continue in business without probable loss to its depositors or
(2) The "adversely classified" loans were in fact included in the List of creditors," and what had not been examined was negligible and would
Exceptions and Findings (of irregularities and violations of laws and not have materially altered the result. In any event, the official
CB rules and regulations) prepared by the SES, a copy of which was termination of the examination with the submission by the Chief
furnished BF on December 1 7, 1984; chanrobles virtual law library Examiner of his report to the Monetary Board in March 1985, did not
contradict, but in fact confirmed, the findings in the Tiaoqui Report.
chanrobles virtual law library
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Y
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition for
and
mandamus in G.R. No. 70054 for lack of merit. Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Republic of the Philipppines she will kick him. But Lucas touched her again and so she hit Mr.
$%&'(%) Lucas. Suddenly Mr. Lucas shouted at her saying lumabas ka na at
Manila huwag na huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit kailan A verbal exchange
then ensued and respondent Lucas grabbed Raquel by the arm and
EN BANC shoved her towards the door causing her to stumble, her both hands
protected her face from smashing upon the door. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Mr. Lucas, bent on literally throwing the affiant out of the office,
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
". JOSE J. LUCAS, grabbed her the second time while she attempted to regain her posture
. after being pushed the first time. x x x while doing all this, Mr. Lucas
shouted at the affiant, saying, labas, huwag ka nang papasok dito kahit
DECISION kailan.[4]chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
PARDO, :
: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA, issued a
summons requiring respondent to answer the complaint, not to file a
The petition for review on
before the Court assails the motion to dismiss, within five (5) days from receipt. On June 17, 1992,
decision of the Court of Appeals[1] which set aside the resolution of respondent Lucas submitted a letter to Jose P. Nitullano, assistant
the Civil Service Commission[2] and reinstated that of the Board of head, BOPI, denying the charges. According to Lucas, he did not
Personnel Inquiry (BOPI for brevity), Office of the Secretary, touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that
Department of Agriculture,[3] suspending respondent for one month, he accidentally brushed Linatoks leg when he reached for his shoes
for simple misconduct. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was
there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatoks leg. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary
Raquel noticed a chair at her right side which Mr. Jose Lucas, at that
very instant used to sit upon. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On October 29,
his shoe. At that moment she felt Mr. Lucas hand touching her thigh 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the
and running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA,
suddenly faced Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or stating thus: It is true that the Civil Service Act does not define grave
and simple misconduct. There is, however, no question that these Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that in grave
offenses fall under different categories. This is clear from a perusal of misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
memorandum circular No. 49-89 dated August 3, 1989 (also known as corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
the guidelines in the application of penalties in administrative cases) established rule, must be manifest,[10] which is obviously lacking in
itself which classifies administrative offenses into three: grave, less respondents case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with
grave and light offenses. The charge of grave misconduct falls under simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process
the classification of grave offenses while simple misconduct is by convicting him of grave misconduct. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals further ruled that a basic requirement of due Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
process on the other hand is that a person must be duly informed of the fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations investigations and hearings.[14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner anchors its position on the view that the formal charge +/+==*(0, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for
against a respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with review on
and AFFIRMS thedecision of the Court of
the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 37137. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
6. That after the hearing of the case (S.I. No. 00-005) on January 20, xxx xxx xxx chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2000, ATTY. SOMERA approached me and invited me to the room of
ATTY. RONNIE SILVESTRE (herein petitioner), Head of the Law While the above DECISION may not necessarily be controlling in the
Department of the Port of Manila wherein the duo convinced me to resolution of the merits of the instant case insofar as it pertains to
cooperate with them in the withdrawal of the complaint and its respondent SILVESTRE, we cannot help but note its relevancy
eventual dismissal;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary inasmuch as practically no other evidence was presented by the
complainant, other than his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND
7. That I did not commit myself to their proposition to drop the case COMPLAINT to support the charge against respondent SILVESTRE.
but I just continued talking with them with the plan in mind to report Needless to state, this is also the very same and only evidence
the same to LT. GEN. JOSE T. CALIMLIM, Task Force Commander presented before the Court of Appeals which rendered the aforequoted
of Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force DECISION.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ADUANA;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
=*0(the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for
Except this bare allegation of the complainant, however, practically no mootness. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
other evidence was ever presented to substantiate the charge against
respondent SILVESTRE. At this point, it may be noted that well No costs. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
settled is the rule that within the field of administrative law, while
strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be
Y
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SILVESTRE, that what was discussed between him, respondent
SOMERA and Atty. DOCTOR on January 20, 2000, was the legal Y
issue on the continued detention of some kitchen wares which were
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ublic of the Philippines officers were also distinguished from engaging in business activities
$%&'(%) involving garment and textile exports. The decision of the Board was
Manila based on the following initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, to
wit:
FIRST DIVISION
1. Two 40-footer containers declared to consist of 210
c 44!05
!"! bales of acrylic staple fiber weighing 48.211 kgs. with a
value (including taxes and duties) of P1,240,857.00
'
1%*
-).)+'+$(&(
)+(
, vs. arrived from Kobe, Japan on 12 February 1983 on
'++$)(1)(/(&+
0,(&+(,(,
board the S/S Breadeverette. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is a The Bureau of Customs conducted an investigation pursuant to the
corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business for the above initial findings. On July 25, 1983, it rendered a decision
last twenty-seven years. Among the government requirements for absolving the petitioner from any irregularity relative to the subject
engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations shipment in the initial findings. It ruled:
issued by the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
Code, the liability of the exporter is explicit, thus: chanrobles virtual law libra ry
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the The Board appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
petitioner, and among others directed the Board to issue to the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
a
The appellate court should have reversed and set aside the cancellation
of petitioner's export quota allocations and the suspension of its
Section III.
.- Any act or misrepresentation or officers since the very bases of these measures were set aside because
violation of these Rules and Regulations shall, after due of lack of due process. As the trial court correctly pointed out:
hearing, constitute sufficient ground for the imposition
of a fine of not more than ten per cent (10%) of the It is worthwhile to note that the basis of the revocation
gross FOB value of the goods exported or for a total or of the export quotas and export authorizations issued in
partial forfeiture of the offender's Export Quota, Export favor of the petitioner was based on the initial findings
Authorization and Export License and permit or of the Bureau of Customs regarding certain shipments
temporary disqualification from enjoying the privilege but subsequently the acting collector of customs of the
to export under all Agreements on textiles, without port of Manila, Mr. Bienvenido P. Alano, Jr., cleared
prejudice to any liabilities under other applicable laws. the petitioner of any wrongdoing and declared that it
(Sec. III, Part 111, Rules and Regulations). had no participation in the irregularities relative to the
subject shipments. (Decision dated July 25, 1983,
It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent Board is the Exhibit "A"). The decision of the acting collector of
body charged with the function of granting export quota allocations, customs of the port of Manila became final on August
issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses and revoking or 18, 1983. The basis of the revocation has, therefore,
cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also authorized to conduct become ineffective and unenforceable so that the
hearings to determine whether or not violations have been committed revocation has no more leg to stand on. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
by the grantee .The Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely
upon the initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the The petitioner has shown by its evidence and the
allegations of its verified petition that it is entitled to the
reliefs demanded and the whole or part of such reliefs judicial perspective in administrative decision making
consists in restraining the commission or continuance and for maintaining the vision which led to the creation
of the acts complained of and that great or irreparable of the administrative office. (Citing Amberto V. Court
injury would result to the petitioner before the trial or of Appeals, 89 SCRA 240 and Baguio Country Club
termination of this case. It has been shown by the Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
evidence presented during the hearing for the issuance 118 SCRA 557).
of the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for by the
petitioner that foreign companies with whom the Equally important are the requisites of due process in administrative
petitioner have entered into contracts regarding its proceedings reiterated in the case of
%
export business like Itoman (U.S.A.) Inc., New York,
" (136 SCRA 112, 131):
N.Y., and the C. ITOH and Co., Ltd. Tokyo, Japan,
have threatened to cancel their contracts with the xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
The principle of due process furnishes a standard to In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present
which governmental action should conform in order to its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its
impress it with the stamp of validity. Fidelity to such officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by
standard must of necessity be the overriding concern of the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may
government agencies exercising quasi-judicial deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long
functions. Although a speedy administration of action that they have become impressed with property rights especially since
implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the
a trial. Respect for the rights of all parties and the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of
requirements of procedural due process equally apply in some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their
proceedings before administrative agencies with quasi- families. As the appellate court correctly pointed out:
xxx xxx xxx chanrob les virtual law library knew why its export quota allocations had been cancelled was the
initial findings of the Bureau of Customs which were made the sole
. . . This reliance on the 'right privilege' dichotomy has basis by the Board for such cancellation. It is only but logical that
long been denigrated by leading lights in administrative petitioner would only touch on this issue and nothing else. Thus, such
law as 'too crude for consistent application' by courts. request for reinstatement and the subsequent denial by the Board can
Indeed, considering the total topography of this case, hardly be considered a motion for reconsideration that "cured" the
the resort to the right-privilege distinction is too feeble non-observance of due process. Again, as pointed out by the appellate
a refutation of the fact that there has been a disregard of court:
the due process requirement of the Constitution by the
petitioner Board. For the irrefutable fact is that the Nor are We persuaded by the proposition that the
private respondent has long been granted its export subsequent requests for restoration of its export
on their basis, valuable contracts calling for allocations made by the private respondent cured the
textile export shipments have been concluded between due process deficiency on the part of the Board. The
the private respondent and foreign corporation. Stated requests for restoration rest on the allegation of the
otherwise, these export allocations can not anymore be private respondent and its principal officers that they
categorized as mere 'privilege' but are already had no hand in the illicit importation of the
impressed with property rights of the private apprehended shipment. The allegation is buttressed by
respondent, They cannot be arbitrarily revoked without the decision itself of the Acting Collector of Customs of
causing a collision with the constitutional call that there the Port of Manila holding that '. . . a careful scrutiny of
must be due process before anybody can be denied his the facts and the circumstance attendant to the case
right to property. show that the Mabuhay Textile Mills have no
participation in the irregularity relative to the subject
Neither can the petitioner's request for reinstatement be considered as shipment.' It may be technically true that this statement
substantial compliance with the due process requirement so much so does not settle the criminal culpability of the private
that any defect in the initial cancellation of the export quota allocations respondent and its officers for as pointed out by
by the Board is deemed to have been cured by petitioner's request for petitioner Brig. Gen. Ramon Farolan, Acting
reinstatement; an action which is alleged by the Board as being Commissioner of Customs, a decision in a seizure
tantamount to a motion for reconsideration. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry proceedings is'. . final and conclusive as to the a
but
involved therein where
It should be noted that no reply was given by the Board when another proceeding is necessary.' But this all the more
petitioner requested for reinstatement of its allocations until an action sharpens the need for a real hearing where the private
for injunction was filed by petitioner. Only then did the Board deny respondent and its officers should be given a fair
petitioner's request on the basis of the letter of the Commissioner of opportunity to establish their innocence-a factual issue
Customs that his findings were not conclusive as to the persons that cannot be resolved by mere resolution of its
involved therein and on the ground that no new issues were presented requests for reinstatement on the basis of in. formation
by herein petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library known to the Board but unknown to the private
respondent such as the exchange of communications
How can petitioner present any "new issues" when it was never given between petitioner Farolan and the Director General of
the chance by the Board? Furthermore, the only reason the petitioner Customs of Indonesia. Indeed even in judicial
proceedings, the irreducible rule is that the dismissal of Y
an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial
of due process of law if from a consideration of the Y
pleadings it appears that there are
which
cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the Y
merits. In quasi-judicial proceedings, the counterpart
Y
rule is that where an '
is at issue, a trial-
type hearing ought to be held. (Londoner v. Denver, Y
210 US 373, 386, 28 S. Ct. 708, 714, 52 L. ed. 1103
119081). Y
Y
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED and the decision of the appellate court dated January 6, Y
1984 and its order of June 6, 1984 are SET ASIDE. The respondent
Board is hereby ordered to conduct a hearing where the petitioner is Y
accorded due process to determine whether or not the petitioner has
violated any of its rules and regulations. Pending such hearing, and to Y
maintain the status quo ante of the parties, the Board is directed to
issue Textile Export Clearances in favor of the petitioner without Y
prejudice to the revocation of the same if the petitioner is found to be
Y
guilty of any such violation. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
Y
SO ORDERED.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
1
misconduct[7] because he failed to explain his side and settle his
accountabilities in OMB-L-A-03-1060-K. He was meted the penalty of
>c"4 4#$:5""
!? one year suspension from office. In the same decision, however,
OMB-L-A-03-1061-K was dismissed in view of respondent's
(00+(0)*('1%,$'
&)+)+(/$($ restitution of his accountability.[8]
$
'
+(>"?$&(,)
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 with a motion for
,+$+( the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the CA, respondent
assailed the April 11, 2005 joint decision of the Office of the
((
@ Ombudsman insofar as it found him liable in OMB-L-A-03-1060-K.
This petition was captioned : a
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court ÷
" ÷
6".a
"÷and docketed
assailing the resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated as CA - G.R. SP No. 89999. His prayer for the issuance of a writ of
September 11, 2006 and November 21, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. preliminary injunction was granted.
89999 captioned :
a
÷
"
÷
6 ÷".a
"÷. Since it was not impleaded as a respondent in CA- G.R. SP No. 89999,
the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and to
The facts follow. admit the attached motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction.
The motions were denied.
Respondent Joel S. Samaniego was the City Treasurer of Ligao City,
Albay. On separate dates, the Commission on Audit (COA) through its The Office of the Ombudsman now claims that the CA erred in
Regional Cluster Director Atty. Francisco R. Velasco[3] filed two denying its right to intervene, considering that its joint decision was
administrative complaints against Samaniego, docketed as OMB-L-A- the subject of the appeal. It also asserts that the writ of preliminary
03-1060-K[4] and OMB-L-A-03-1061-K,[5] for dishonesty and grave injunction should be recalled.
misconduct.
We rule for the Office of the Ombudsman.[9]
In these administrative complaints, the COA alleged that respondent
incurred shortages in his accountabilities for two separate periods.[6] '
,
)(0)*(00+
Respondent received letters of demand requiring him to explain his (0)*('1%,$'
side and settle his accountabilities.
Section 27, Article II of the Constitution reads:
In his counter-affidavit, respondent averred, among others, that OMB- The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
L-A-03-1060-K was bereft of factual basis. He likewise averred that take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
the alleged amount of his accountability in OMB-L-A-03-1061-K was To implement this, the Constitution established the Office of the
the same amount cited in OMB-L-A-03-1060-K. He also pleaded the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman, one overall deputy and at
defense of restitution of his alleged accountabilities. least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.[10] It was the
intention of the Constitution to make the Ombudsman independent.
In a joint decision dated April 11, 2005, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent liable for grave
The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman is enunciated in Section : :c5c :5c99c:c
12, Article XI of the Constitution: B 57 :c7
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall : .xxx (emphasis supplied)
act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public Full disciplinary authority is one of the broad powers granted to it by
officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency the Constitution and RA 6770. These broad powers, functions and
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled duties are generally categorized into: investigatory power, prosecutory
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants power, public assistance functions, authority to inquire and obtain
of the action taken and the result thereof. information, and the function to adopt, institute and implement
The Office of the Ombudsman is a unique position in the 1987 preventive measures.[17]
Constitution.[11] The Ombudsman and his deputies function essentially
as a complaints and action bureau.[12] Congress enacted Republic Act Actions of the Ombudsman that do not fall squarely under any of these
(RA) 6770[13] providing broad powers,[14] as well as a functional and general headings are not to be construed outright as illegal. The
structural organization, to the Office of the Ombudsman to enable it to avowed purpose of preserving public trust and accountability must be
perform its constitutionally-mandated functions. considered. So long as the Ombudsman's actions are reasonably in line
with its official functions and are not contrary to law and the
RA 6770 states the mandate of the Ombudsman: Constitution, they should be upheld. Defending its decisions in the CA
SEC. 13. Mandate. - The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors is one such power.
of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any The Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," not merely
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government- a passive onlooker.[18] A statute granting powers to an agency created
owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, by the Constitution â¼ such as RA 6770 â¼ should be liberally
civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants construed to advance the objectives for which it was created.[19] In
in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people. 7
;"[20] we held that any interpretation of RA 6770
To aid the Ombudsman in carrying out its tasks, it was vested with that hampers the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
disciplinary authority over government officials.[15] The scope of this
authority was discussed in
÷:[16] Taking all this into consideration, the Ombudsman is in a league of its
[The Office of the Ombudsman] is vested with "full administrative own. It is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies
disciplinary authority" including the power to "determine the of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or
as warranted by the evidence, and necessarily, impose the said dismiss investigations directed against them.[21] Its function is critical
penalty." Thus, the provisions in [RA] 6770 taken together reveal the because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and
manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the employees) is at stake.
Ombudsman administrative disciplinary authority. )7
:cc c7 c9 Ac The Ombudsman concept originated in Sweden and other
B77 77cc
Y c:
c c 7c7 c B7 Scandinavian countries.[22] Its original and classic notion was that of
c9:cc B C7:cc c9 an independent and politically neutral office which merely received
c : : : c :5c99 and processed the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive
:c: c 7::c: government personnel.[23] The Philippine Ombudsman deviated from
the classic model. It retained the characteristic independence and
political neutrality but the range of its functions and powers was The legal interest must be actual and material, direct and immediate.[30]
enlarged. In Äa2.
÷,[31] the interest which entitles a person
to intervene in a suit:
Given the foregoing premises, we cannot limit the powers of the [m]ust be on the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate
Ombudsman if its acts are not contrary to law or the Constitution. character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment. The words "an interest in the
+)/)+(1-)*('1%,$'
+ subject" mean a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded and
$$+=*+*+)$,+$+(+$
$$
+, which would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff
could not recover.
Section 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in The CA denied petitioner's motion for intervention for lack of basis,
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either parties, or an interest reasoning that:
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a In the instant case, the Ombudsman's intervention is not proper
distribution or other disposition of property in the disposition of the considering that, other than its objection to the issuance of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court be allowed to injunctive writ, no legal interest in the matter subject of litigation has
intervene in the action. xxx been alleged by the Ombudsman in the motion for intervention. xxx
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally We disagree.
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him
to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in
proceeding.[24] Its purpose is to settle in one action and by a single the subject matter of litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for
judgment the whole controversy (among) the persons involved.[25] intervention and to admit the attached motion to recall writ of
preliminary injunction averred:
Intervention is not an absolute right[26] as it can be secured only in 2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to
accordance with the terms of the applicable statute or rule. In claiming seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable
the right to intervene, the intervenor must comply with the Court of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the
requirements laid down by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court which implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision imposing upon
provides that the intervenor must have a legal interest in any of the petitioner the penalty of suspension for one (1) year, consistent with
following: the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in &1>?,
(a) the matter in controversy; xxx and $>?,cc, xxx; (citations omitted; emphasis in the
(b) the success of either of the parties; original)
(c) against both parties or In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of
(d) be so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other the Ombudsman correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in
disposition of property in the disposition of the court or of an controversy. In support of its claim, it invoked its role as a
officer thereof.[27] constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary
Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative
rights of the original parties.[28] Moreover, it must be shown that the disciplinary cases against public officials.[32] To hold otherwise would
intervenor's rights may not be fully protected in a separate have been tantamount to abdicating its salutary functions as the
proceeding.[29] guardian of public trust and accountability.[33]
improper). But the Office of the Ombudsman could properly intervene
Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in in the appeal filed by respondent and therefore, the CA could
the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts constituting grave determine whether a recall of the injunctive writ was proper.
misconduct,[34] an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.[35] It was in keeping with its In the interest of justice and practicality, we will rule on the propriety
duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of of the issuance of the injunctive writ.
public service[36] that petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act
fully within the parameters of its authority. The applicable provision of law is Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended:[43]
It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - xxx where the penalty
disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
the court[37] after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances.[38] one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
However, such discretion is not without limitations.[39] One of the be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
limits in the exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised may be appealed to the Court of Appeals xxx.
in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have
considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as provided in the An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. xxx.
Constitution and RA 6770. A literal reading of this rule shows that the mere filing of an appeal
does not prevent the decision of the Ombudsman from becoming
Moreover, the rule on intervention is a rule of procedure whose object executory. However, we clarified this rule in
is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for
.':[44]
justice, not to hinder or delay it.[40] [O]nly orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative cases imposing the penalty of public censure,
Both the CA[41] and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not
to a judge whose decision was in question.[42] This was a tad too equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence,
simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power, duties and immediately executory. + c7: B77
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the : :cc77 :5 : c
Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially : c c9 cc7 c c 7c9 cC c
when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases c c 77B7:c 77c::
against government personnel, the offense is committed against the + 77ccc 5c9
government and public interest. What further proof of a direct 8cc 97:c97:cc::9 c::
constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers :9c97 c97::9c7c
is necessary? cc . It is only then that execution shall perforce issue
as a matter of right. )7977(5
:
&(&+)-
,$$+)-(0+%)+( 77c::9cc 7c B7
+
&&
$(0)*,+$+($(0)*('1%,$'
7c97c : ::. Otherwise, the essential
nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
The CA anchored its denial of the motion to recall the writ of nugatory. (emphasis in the original).
preliminary injunction on its lack of authority over the case. (The The penalty meted out to respondent was suspension for one year
Office of the Ombudsman's motion for intervention was allegedly without pay. He filed an appeal of the Ombudsman's joint decision on
time. In his appeal, he included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of Y
preliminary injunction in order to stay the execution of the decision
against him. Following
.', we hold that Y
the mere filing by respondent of an appeal sufficed to stay the
execution of the joint decision against him. Respondent's prayer for the Y
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (for purposes of staying
Y
the execution of the decision against him) was therefore a superfluity.
The execution of petitioner's joint decision against respondent should Y
be stayed during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.
Y
=*0(the petition is hereby
),. The resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated September 11, 2006 and November 21, Y
2006 are hereby /$, $)
$+,Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals is ordered to allow the intervention of the Office of Y
the Ombudsman in CA-G.R. SP No. 89999. The writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby +0),as the execution of the decision in Y
OMB-L-A-03-1060-K was (and still is) stayed by the filing and
Y
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 89999.
Y
No costs.
Y
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official leave.
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2. To pay complainant actual, nominal and moral
damages, the amount of which will be proved in the
c"4# " hearing; chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
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, vs. P10,000.00; chanrobles virtual law library
Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading
agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120- petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to
square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for be the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
1. To comply and continue with the sale of the house I chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real Private respondents reliance, therefore, on sections 1
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers and 8 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the untenable. Thus, as correctly pointed out by petitioner,
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive section 19, paragraph 6 of said law is material to the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following issue of where jurisdiction lies, and We quote:
nature:
Sec. 19. . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
Y
In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in
ordering petitioners to comply and continue with the sale of the house Y
and lot subject of the contract between the original parties. It cannot be
Y
gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are
necessary incidents to the proper exercise of its powers and functions Y
under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted delineating the scope of authority
of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body those functions so Y
necessary in carrying out its power to regulate housing and land use
Y
EN BANC respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for
May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer"
c
'7#"4 Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father
as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students"
)(,(($
)+
(' c: 57 thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court
'c7'
$ cpetitioner-appellant, of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee
-versus- members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
'+$$%
+)
1
%)+$)
($
+,
&
$1
Supervisor of the place.
'
)%
$'+6+)
+
'
('(
%$)+
+,
'+(%
$
'
(
%(
(
$(,
, The corresponding complaint filed alleged,
: that plaintiff-
0
+$( '0('
(respondents-appellees. petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May
K Ä
a
2
21st, 1965 with the $
, which is disputed; that
the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose
a
2
the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave
abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other
defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and
Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had
1
,(p been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero
Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of
dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 ² for petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that
, injunction and damages ² on the ground that the complaint Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so
therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina,
court # denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs.
order of dismissal. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI,
resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the
The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the
commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of
pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools
in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, which provides that the committee to select the honor students should
the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct
constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial,
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and
Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading
Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and
Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI,
committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a much
Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district
examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other than periodical brought before the court had already become academic. This was
tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the opposed by petitioner.
determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the
Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents
of the place such district examinations were not advisable; that there was granted, the court reasoning thus:
was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent
teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for
Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the being improper and for being academic. In order to
words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully
replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of
unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil
in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner action of
.
personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District
Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave
the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially
adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since
parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of grades one to six, the students closely contending for
P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final class honors were Socorro Medina, Teodoro Santiago,
list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.
that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to
enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V
and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice third
exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that place (grades II and III).
year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in
its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade
graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V)
21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would be shocking to the and once third place (grade VI).
school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly
looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II,
scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for III); once third place (grade I).
the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same
protested list of honor students. Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place
(grade VI).
Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the
petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given
the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the
dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by
and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.
Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in without or in excess of its or his
the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
rivals. the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified
Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the petition in the proper court alleging the
committee on honor students are all grade six teachers facts with certainty and praying that
while the Service Manual For Teachers provides that judgment be rendered annulling or
the committee shall be composed of the teachers from modifying the proceedings, as the law
the fifth and sixth grades. requires, of such tribunal, board or
officer.'
Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and
circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings 'The petition shall be accompanied by a
of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to certified true copy of the judgment or
85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank. order subject thereof, together with
copies of all pleadings and documents
Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district relevant and pertinent thereto.'
examinations upon which ratings were partly based
were not advisable. It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or
Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro order complained of, together with all pleadings and
Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural. documents which are relevant thereto, as required by
the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This
Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and
the petitioner the word "First Place" was erased and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order
changed to "Second Place". of respondents that is submitted for revision or
correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the
Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed petition.
to the school authorities but they only 'passed the buck
to each other.' ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED
SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner
personally appealed to the school authorities who only
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides: 'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not
show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted
'Section 1. Petition for
. ² the administrative remedies of the Department of
When any tribunal, board, or officer Education. The petition implies that this is the first
exercising judicial functions, has acted formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The
administrative agencies of the Department of Education "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which
could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.
with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner
negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if
claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category
remedy. of the
" " !a'
contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the
following tests may be employed:
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of
discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors, In this jurisdiction
is a special civil action
mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer
abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A
jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise judicial function is an act performed by virtue of
of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the
. doing of something in the nature of the action of the
court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the
and so holds, that the petition states no cause of action following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must
and should be, as it is hereby dismissed. be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property and said controversy is brought before a
Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination
moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be of their respective rights and obligations.
futile, hence, this appeal.
'Judicial action is an adjudication upon
Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition the rights of parties who in general
states no cause of action on the grounds ² discussed by the court appear or are brought before the tribunal
# in the appealed order above-quoted ² (1) that the petition does by notice or process, and upon whose
not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it claims some decision or judgment is
has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or rendered. It implies impartiality,
order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse
documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that administrative claims, and is inconsistent with
remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave discretion on the one hand ² for the
abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the tribunal must decide according to law
committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the and the rights of the parties ² or with
court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, dictation on the other; for in the first
they argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal upon the instance it must exercise its own
additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for judgment under the law, and not act
honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is
the under a mandate from another power. ...
The character of its action in a given department of government which is
case must decide whether that action is charged with the declaration of what the
judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or law is and its construction so far as it is
whether it be simply that of a public written law; the authority or power
agent of the country or State, as in its vested in the judges or in the courts; the
varied jurisdictions it may by turns be authority vested in some court, officer,
each.' (In Re Saline County or persons to hear and determine when
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, the rights of persons or property or the
cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines propriety of doing an act is the subject
v. Georgia Public Service Commission, matter of adjudication; the power
181 S. E. 836-837.) belonging to or emanating from a judge
as such; the power conferred upon a
'It may be said generally that the public officer, involving the exercise of
exercise of judicial function is to judgment and discretion in the
determine what the law is, and what the determination of questions of right in
legal rights of parties are, with respect to specific cases affecting the interest of
a matter in controversy; and whenever persons or property, as distinguished
an officer is clothed with that authority, from ministerial power or authority to
and undertakes to determine those carry out the mandates of judicial power
questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex or the law; the power exercised by courts
rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis in hearing and determining cases before
County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772- them, or some matter incidental thereto,
773.) and of which they have jurisdiction; the
power of a court to decide and
(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the pronounce a judgment; the power which
controversy is brought must have the power and adjudicates upon and protects the rights
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision and interests of individual citizens, and
on the controversy construing and applying the laws to to that end construes and applies the law.
that end. "Judicial power" implies the
construction of laws and the adjudication
'The phrase "judicial power" is not of legal rights. It includes the power to
capable of a precise definition which hear and determine but not everyone
would be applicable to all cases. The who may hear and determine has judicial
term has been variously defined as the power. The term "judicial power" does
authority to determine the rights of not necessarily include the power to hear
persons or property by arbitrating and determine a matter that is not in the
between adversaries in specific nature of a suit or action between the
controversies at the instance of a party parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .
thereto; the authority exercised by that
(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that 'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI
branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not
judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the impossible, precisely to define what are
legislative or executive department. judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there
is considerable conflict in the decisions
... the distinction between legislative or in regard thereto, in connection with the
ministerial functions and judicial law as to the right to the writ of
functions is difficult to point out. What
%
" "
is a judicial function does not depend
"
solely upon the mental operation by
" "
which it is performed or the importance
"
of the act. In solving this question, due
a
regard must be had to the organic law of ' #2'
. It is
the state and the division of power of not essential that the proceedings should
government. In the discharge of be strictly and technically judicial, in the
executive and legislative duties, the sense in which that word is used when
exercise of discretion and judgment of applied to the courts of justice, but it is
the highest order is necessary, and sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is
matters of the greatest weight and enough if the officers act judicially in
importance are dealt with. It is not making their decision, whatever may be
enough to make a function judicial that it their public character. ...' "In
!
requires discretion, deliberation, thought, 7
-(86 Minn.
and judgment. %
! 301, 304), the following statements were
'a
made:
a
a
'" "
'The precise line of demarkation between
"
a
what are judicial and what are
a
!
. If administrative or ministerial functions is
the matter, in respect to which it is often difficult to determine. The exercise
exercised, belongs to either of the two of judicial functions may involve the
last-named departments of government, performance of legislative or
it is not judicial. As to what is judicial administrative duties, and the
and what is not seems to be better performance of administrative or
indicated by the nature of a thing, than ministerial duties, may, in a measure,
its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove involve the exercise of judicial
Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of functions. It may be said generally that
Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. the exercise of judicial functions is to
321, 328-329.) [Emphasis supplied]" determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to
a matter in controversy; and whenever For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been
an officer is clothed with that authority, held periodically by schools and colleges in this islands.
and undertakes to determine those Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more
questions, he acts judicially.'
recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in
them either as contestants in their school days (In the
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first
committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and
questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the
functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above- board of judges afterwards. They know some few
quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and
tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award
is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such
made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, contests that the board's decision is final and
before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority unappealable.
to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,# Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of
that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No alibis,
pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to
the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore join the competition to contribute to its success by
automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to
committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen
committee's duties. into a demandable right unless and until they were
proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly arbiters or referees or judges.
one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case
of ;
.
"
"
"the issue presented for Incidentally, these school activities have been imported
determination was whether or not the courts have the authority to from the United States. We found in American
reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and jurisprudence no litigation questioning the
this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the determination of the board of judges.
award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it
would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar Now, the fact that a particular action has had no
competitions. It was reasoned out thus: precedent during a long period affords some reason for
doubting the existence of the right sought to be
enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion
must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before respondent court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in estimating
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of
principle not in harmony with the generally accepted cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court of
views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.) First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of
this Court in G.R. No.
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the L-6191, and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice
matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied
there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of the petition for
on the ground, among others, of failure on
first instance are courts of general jurisdiction. the part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the
decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that then, this Court held:
Imperial suffered some aat the hands of the board
of judges. If at all, there was on the part of one The petition is patently without merit. In the first place,
judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same it is not even sufficient in form and substance to justify
thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It
deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a charges that the Court of Industrial Relations abused its
contestant a
to the prize unless and until he discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of
or she is declared winner by the board of referees or First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings
judges. No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does
not attach to the petition the decisions allegedly
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet violated by the Court below and point out which
in law there are instances of 6#'6. particular portion or portions thereof have been
This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, disregarded by the respondent Court.
it would be a different proposition. But then her action
should be directed against the individual judge or The same principle was applied in the more recent case of ÷ ÷÷
judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not
Ä
."
"4wherein this Court dismissed (by
against the other judges. Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below First Instance of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In
apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of
this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:
appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the
requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the
holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the
of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all respondent court for recovery of property with damages
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached to
cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by the petition.
precedents as well. In the case of ÷'"
%
, where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the
Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and
decision rendered by the respondent court on December erasures in his Grade I certificate ² which appellant never bothered to
10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition. attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably
failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.
Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other
default entered by the respondent court and of the two errors assigned by appellant.
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
default is attached to its petition. appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration "
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was filed for the purpose of enjoining the respondent ; "K$> "::
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court from executing the decision rendered in Civil
Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing Y
pleadings is obvious.
Y
Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of
securing an order commanding the respondent court to Y
approve either the original or the amended record on
Y
appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is attached to
its petition. Y
,+$+( moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, which the HLURB LSG
granted.
1
,p
Meanwhile, the CA gave due course to Ruby Shelter's petition for
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use review and on December 6, 2007 rendered a decision granting the
Regulatory Board (HLURB) over an action to compel a land developer same and setting aside the OP's rulings. The CA ruled that the HLURB
to deliver a promised title over one-fourth of a subdivided lot. had no jurisdiction over the claim of the spouses, thus, this petition.
Sometime in May 2001 petitioners Ernesto and Zenaida Lim (the The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the Lims' action
Lims) bought for P190,000.00 a 318-square meter lot that then formed falls within the jurisdiction of the HLURB.
part of a bigger lot1 in Barangay Triangulo, Naga City. Respondent
cralaw
Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation (Ruby )7 c97c
Shelter), the seller and owner, undertook to subdivide the lot and, upon
approval by the Bureau of Lands, execute a deed of absolute sale in The jurisdiction of a court or a quasi-judicial body over the subject
favor of the Lims. In December 2001 Ruby Shelter delivered the deed matter of the action is determined by the nature of the action pleaded
of sale to the spouses with a promise to give them the title to the lot as as appearing in the allegations of the complaint.2 But where the actual
cralaw
soon as the subdivision plan had been approved. issues are evident from the records of the case, then jurisdiction over
the subject matter need not depend upon the literal assertions in the
Ruby Shelter then caused the approval of a subdivision plan for its lot, complaint, but on the law as applied to established facts based on the
dividing it into four, including the one sold to the Lims, identified as evidence that the parties presented in due course.3 cralaw
Lot 9-E-2-B. But, despite repeated demands, Ruby Shelter did not
deliver the Lims' title. Consequently, the latter filed an action against it Section 1 of Presidential Decree 13444 vests in the National Housing
cralaw
for delivery of title with damages before the HLURB. Authority (now HLURB) exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims
On March 1, 2004 the HLURB Legal Services Group (LSG) rendered involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
a decision for the Lims, which decision the HLURB Board of condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
Commissioners affirmed. On September 5, 2005, acting on Ruby broker or salesman; and (c) cases involving specific performance of
Shelter's appeal, the Office of the President (OP) upheld the HLURB contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot
decision, a copy of which Ruby Shelter got on September 20, 2005. or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
On October 11, 2005 the latter filed a motion for leave to be allowed salesman.
to file an attached belated motion for reconsideration. The OP denied
This provision must be read in the light of the law's preamble, which belief that Ruby Shelter, as licensed land developer, shall abide by its
explains the reasons for enactment of the law or the contextual basis duties and obligations under its contract and the laws.
for its interpretation. The law's introductory clause states that the
HLURB exercises regulatory authority over cases of swindling and Lastly, the CA committed a grave error in giving due course to Ruby
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision Shelter's petition when the OP's Decision dated September 5, 2005 had
sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or already attained finality and had become executory.
titles free from liens and encumbrances.5 cralaw
The plain fact is that the Lims bought a fourth of a parcel of land from Y
Ruby Shelter for P190,000.00. The parties agreed that Ruby Shelter
shall cause the subdivision of the lot and upon approval by the Bureau Y
of Lands, execute the deed of sale. Subsequently, Ruby Shelter gave
that deed to the Lims with a promise to give the title once its Y
subdivision plan had been approved. Ruby Shelter later delivered a
Y
copy of the approved plan to the Lims showing the segregation of the
portion they bought from the rest of the original lot. But Ruby Shelter Y
failed on its promise to deliver the title to the Lims, despite repeated
demands. These circumstances clearly present a case for specific Y
performance that the subdivision lot buyers brought against Ruby
Shelter, a matter properly cognizable by the HLURB. Y
Ruby Shelter of course claims that the transaction did not relate to a Y
land developer's contractual and statutory obligations to a buyer of a
subdivision lot since the lot that the Lims bought from it did not form Y
part of a subdivision development, the size of a community. It merely
Y
subdivided a lot into four and sold one portion to the Lims.
Y
But the controlling fact is not the size of the original lot that Ruby
Shelter had subdivided but the fact that the Lims bought their portion Y
of that lot from a licensed land developer whose dealings on properties
are regulated by the HLURB. The Lims bought their lot relying on the Y
ECOND DIVISION Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations. The former has in his favor a certificate of public
convenience to operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck
service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport and vice-versa
c# '7
""4 with the use of twenty (20) units. Private respondent on September
12, 1974 filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of
(=)
$&()
)+((&(
)+(petitioner, a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the
-versus- same line. Eight days later, without the required publication, the
1(
,(0)
$&()
)+( $%)
)
Board issued an order granting it provisional permit to operate such
+respondents. auto-truck service on the line applied for.4 There was a motion for
reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit
Ä% a
filed on October 21, 1974,! but without awaiting final action thereon,
this petition was filed. This is the explanation: "That petitioner has
Ä /÷
not waited for the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration before
7
going to this Court considering that the question involved herein is
purely a legal one, aside from the fact that the issuance of the Order
7
without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is
patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction." "
It is
essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as Y
of the riding public to ascertain whether or not the procedure followed
Y
in this case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the
procedural due process requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication Y
becomes apparent.
Y
To paraphrase what was said in
# where the validity of a
legislation was passed upon in a certiorari proceeding to annul and set Y
aside a writ of preliminary injunction, to so act would be to conserve
both time and effort. Those desiring to engage in public utility Y
business as well as the public are both vitally concerned with the final
determination of the standards to be followed in the procedure that Y
must be observed. There is, to repeat, a great public interest in a
Y
definitive outcome of the crucial issue involved. One of the most noted
authorities on Administrative Law, professor Kenneth Culp Davis, Y
discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view that the resolution of
what could be a debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of Y
the judiciary to work out a solution of the problem posed is a potent
argument for minimizing the emphasis laid on its technical aspect.
Y
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Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0+$),+/+$+( complaint praying for the same reliefs.
In an Order dated January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter computed the The petitionersâ¼ motion for reconsideration dated November 22,
petitionersâ¼ monetary awards reckoned from the time of their 2001 and filed by registered mail on November 26, 2001 is merely
illegal dismissal in June 1994 up to October 29, 1999, pursuant to the noted since there was no October 29, 2001 resolution that was issued
Decision of the Court of Appeals (Special Sixteenth Division) in CA- in this case which the motion for reconsideration seeks to be
G.R. SP No. 50531. Respondents interposed an appeal to the NLRC reconsidered.
(docketed as NLRC Case No. M-006176-2001), contending that the
computation should only be up to June 20, 1995 (the date indicated in On realizing their mistake, petitioners then filed with the Seventh
the Labor Arbiterâ¼s Decision). Division a Motion to Transfer The Case to it.
In an Order dated March 30, 2001, the NLRC modified the Labor In a Resolution promulgated on May 8, 2003, the Seventh Division
Arbiterâ¼s computation and ruled that the monetary awards due to denied petitionersâ¼ Motion To Transfer The Case on the ground,
petitioners should be computed from June 1994 up to June 20, 1995. among others, that the motion is ⼜non-existent⼠since it does not
bear the correct case number, hence, could not be attached to the
Petitioners then filed a petition for
with the Court of records of CA-G.R. SP No. 67068.
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67068, raffled off to the
Seventh Division. However, in its Resolution of October 29, 2001, the Unfazed, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the Seventh Division in its Resolution of October 10, 2003.
thereto would result in outright deprivation of the clientâ¼s liberty
At first glance, the petition before us appears to be a futile attempt to or property or where the interests of justice so require.[5]$c this
revive an extinct motion denied by the appellate court (Seventh Court is not a slave of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion â¼³
Division) by reason of technicality. But in the interest of speedy in rendering justice, it is guided by the norm that on the balance,
administration of justice, we should not only delve in technicalities. technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights. Thus, if the
We shall then address these two issues: (1) whether the Court of application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
Appeals (Seventh Division) erred in holding that affixing a wrong justice, it is always within this Courtâ¼s power to suspend the rules
docket number on a motion renders it ⼜non-existent;⼠and (2) or except a particular case from its application.[6]
whether the issuance by the NLRC of the Order dated March 30, 2001,
amending the amounts of separation pay and backwages, awarded by This case involving a labor dispute has dragged on for over a decade
the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) to petitioners and computed now. Petitioners have waited too long for what is due them under the
by the Labor Arbiter, is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion law. One of the original petitioners, Judith Cotecson, died last
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. September 28, 2003 and has been substituted by her heirs. It is time to
write finis to this controversy. The Labor Code was promulgated to
On the
"the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) is correct promote the welfare and well-being of the working man. Its spirit and
when it ruled that petitionersâ¼ motion for reconsideration of its intent mandate the speedy administration of justice, with least attention
Resolution dated October 29, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 is to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of
⼜non-existent.⼠Petitioners⼠counsel placed a wrong case due process.[7]
number in their motion, indicating CA-G.R. SP No. 50531 (Special
Sixteenth Division) instead of CA-G.R. SP No. 50531 (Seventh We recall that in CA-G.R. SP No. 50531, the Court of Appeals
Division), the correct case number. In .
÷ "[2] (Special Sixteenth Division) held that petitioners Cotecson, Bacolod,
we ruled that where a pleading bears an erroneous docket number and and Magallanes ⼜shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to
thus ⼜could not be attached to the correct case,⼠the said one month salary and backwages c:9c7c97
pleading is, for all intents and purposes, ⼜non-existent.⼠As aptly :c7c97:cc c97
stated by the Special Sixteenth Division, it has neither the duty nor the c â¼ This Decision was promulgated on October 28, 1999.
obligation to correct the error or to transfer the case to the Seventh The respondentsâ¼ motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Division. In Äa. -
Court of Appeals (Former Special Sixteenth Division) on January 13,
2
,[3] which likewise involves a wrong 2000. On April 12, 2000, this Court dismissed respondentsâ¼
docket number in a motion, we ruled that the duty to correct the petition for
" docketed as G.R. No. 142270, and denied their
mistake falls solely on the party litigant whose fault caused the motion for reconsideration with finality as early as July 19, 2000.
anomaly. To hold otherwise would be to impose upon appellate courts
the burden of being nannies to appellants, ensuring the absence of Clearly, the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 50531 had long become final
pitfalls that hinder the perfection of petitions and appeals. Strictly and executory. The Labor Arbiter computed the monetary awards due
speaking, it is a dogma that the mistake or negligence of counsel binds to petitioners corresponding to the period from June 1994 to October
the clients[4] and appellate courts have no share in that burden. 28, 1999, in accordance with the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(Special Sixteenth Division). The award for backwages and money
However, we opt for liberality in the application of the rules to the claims is in the total sum of P912,086.15.
instant case in light of the following considerations.0 the rule that
negligence of counsel binds the client may be relaxed where adherence It does not escape our attention that upon respondentsâ¼ appeal from
the Labor Arbiterâ¼s Order computing the benefits due to Y
petitioners, the NLRC c979 8c,c c9
7cc9
::F$:$8 7,c GB7 Y
77c Bc:c 7c5c:
:c
" c F c(c5
!"G thus, amounting to Y
a lesser amount of P147,673.16.
Y
We sustain petitionersâ¼ contention that the NLRC, in modifying Y
the award of the Court of Appeals, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2A Y
7 75 c:cBcc9c 7
9 8c,c c97::c Under the Y
principle of immutability of judgments, any alteration or amendment
which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is void for Y
lack of jurisdiction.[8] We thus rule that the Order dated March 30,
2001 of the NLRC directing that the monetary award should be Y
computed from June 1994, the date petitioners were dismissed from
Y
the service, up to June 20, 1995 only, is c
Y
=*0( we
) the petition. The challenged
Resolutions dated October 29, 2001, May 8, 2003, and October 10, Y
2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67068 are /$, The Order of the
NLRC dated March 30, 2001 in NLRC Case No. M-006176-2001 is Y
$)
$+,. The Order of the Labor Arbiter dated January 8, 2001 is
+$)
), Y
$((,, Y
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- FGProvide all intelligence units of operating Bureaus or Offices
)'+()%2%(,&
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the conduct of intelligence and investigating
works;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
,+$+(
FGSupervise, monitor and coordinate all the intelligence and
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,(/
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under the Ministry;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this petition for
, prohibition and , petitioners
Buklod Ng Kawaning EIIB, Cesar Posada, Remedios Princesa, FG Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance by the Minister, anti-
Benjamin Kho, Benigno Manga and Lulu Mendoza, for themselves graft and corruption cases against personnel of the Ministry and
and in behalf of others with whom they share a common or general its constituents units;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
interest, seek the nullification of O
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Y% Y(() [2] on the ground that they were issued by F9GPerform such other appropriate functions as may be assigned
the Office of the President with grave abuse of discretion and in by the Minister or his deputies.[5] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.
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In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and to prevent possible
conflicts among agencies in the course of their anti-smuggling
The facts are undisputed: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
operations, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 225 on
March 17, 1989, providing, among others, that the EIIB
On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued
a
2aaa
Executive Order No. 127 [3] establishing the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization
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of the Ministry of Finance. [4] The EIIB was designated to perform the
following functions: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada
issued Executive Order No. 191 entitled -
FGReceive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and
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7
[7] Motivated by the fact that
information and evidence on the nature, modes and extent of
the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the
illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
other existing agencies of the government and that there is a need to
constantly monitor the overlapping of functions among these agencies, Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive
former President Estrada ordered the deactivation of EIIB and the orders is: FGa violation of their right to security of tenure;F5Gtainted
transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the
Bureau of Investigation. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force Aduana, the
functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that of
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 196 [8] EIIB; and FGa usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether
creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force ÷. [9] or not to abolish the EIIB. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
#7c5 7 relating to the status and existence of a public office be settled without
c c 9c5 cc9$c
F#G
+.1c9 delay. We are not without precedent. In -
Ä " [12]
7&7:: c c Dc9c7 5 B7 liberally decreed: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
5c9c c c;c8c9
Ac The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue,
B.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary for two reasons, ®>5?c97 c9:5
7 9c5 7:5,'and because of
)75cc c97++17c8$98( the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the
c""
#c c99c Hc c97 Philippine civil service and the rights of public
++17c Hc B 597 servants.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
C.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the
question - -
%%7
)7& 7 c7cc5c77 CHowever, after coming to terms with the prevailing law and
++1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary jurisprudence, we are certain that the ultimate queries should be G
-
a/
!
Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the
C"5G
a/
C President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize the
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BIR.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Surely, there exists a distinction between the words
and We do not agree.
. To
means to render inactive or ineffective or to
break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, [13] while to x x x x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely. [14] In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
with the office and
. [15] Thus, while in
"
the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in
where the $!.a-
÷
÷a
office continues to exist,
remaining dormant or inoperative. Be
!
7. The heads of departments, bureaus and offices
that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities
measures. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be "
" subject to civil
The Solicitor General only invokes the above distinctions on the service rules and regulations. X x x. ÷
a " a
mistaken assumption that the President has no power to abolish an
of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or
office. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public
office is lodged with the legislature. [16] This proceeds from the legal Said provision clearly mentions the acts of cB :7 c
precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A 5cc of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices
public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and
authority of law. [17] Thus, except where the office was created by the decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that which provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
brought it into existence. [18] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
$
@
/ a/
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2 Unless otherwise
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in created by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
the executive department are concerned, the Presidents power of organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or
control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures
office, [19] or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry and be funded from appropriations by this Act. (italics
out reorganization measures. [20] The case in point is .
ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
!
[21] In this case, it was argued that there is no
law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing )79cc :cc 7cB77&
otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
7cHc99c Hc 7 7c
c9c99 7: c c
x x x x x x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. We adhere to the precedentor ruling in Larin that this provision
No. 292 which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational
changes in the department or agency under the executive structure.
Sec. 20.
Y
. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No.
President shall exercise
8760. [22] Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices
and which are not and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed
specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the FGto conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates,
President in accordance with law. (italic ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and
systems and procedures; F5G identify activities which are no longer
)7:cc :;c97c7:cB 7& essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
7B=7B7 77:cBcc HI down, phased-out or abolished; and FG adopt measures that will result
+& ,c"44
B77 & in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of
,c"" )78: 7& c9 their respective agencies. [23] Section 78 ends up with the mandate
7&7:: 7c 7ccc H7 c that the
a
a
c B77 7:cBcc:c c a/
Y
Y
5 c5c7c99c 99 c c $
Y
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YY
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[24] The
99 c c law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to sustain.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
H The validity of these two decrees
are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all
laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far, have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the
there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees. (Emphasis power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section
supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
÷
*+),), 7& 5Ac7:c
Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order. 78(99 cc7
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ## 777c 7ccc H
7 c97(99c97& For this
In the w clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Agencies to the Office of the President. In /
÷a" [25]
Act 8745 (;*+++÷
÷
), a provision similar we ruled that reorganization c7c c9:c
to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin" thus; chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary c cc c9c99c5cc 7c95c c9c c
c c99 c It takes place when there is an alteration
$44 a/a. % otherwise provided by law or of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
57& c97&7:: , no changes in key including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
authorized in their respective organizational structures and funded [26] It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
from appropriations provided by this Act.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to :cc B7 7 B775c
carry out reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive :c c7);0c$ 7:c B77
department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the );9cc 5Bc9 Y
Y 7 7
reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been :c B778
7c7 9c
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. 77Bc5 5;c7 c
Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of
an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good ( Yp
Y p Y YY
Y
Y
Y Y
faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither
Y
Y Y(Y*Yp
Ypp Y
Y Y
Y
removal nor separation of the incumbents. [38] In the instructive
words laid down by this Court in -
Ä " [39] through Justice Y Y
Ypp Y YY
Y
Y
Abraham F. Sarmiento: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Yp YY Y
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a Y
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. + 7 c Y
F c9Gc:c c
57:cc 9c8
7 Y
c9 Bc c57 BBe that as it may, if the
abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for Y
political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise
not in good faith, no valid abolition takes and whatever abolition is Y
done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is
Y
merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Y
At the very outset, it should be well to set forth the constitutional During the Commonwealth period, we had the Philippine
provision that is at the core of the controversy now confronting us, Constabulary as the nucleus of the Philippine Ground Force (PGF),
thus: now the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The PC was made
part of the PGF but its administrative, supervisory and directional
Article XVI, Section 6: chanrobles virtual law libra ry
control was handled by the then Department of the Interior. After the
war, it remained as the "National Police" under the Department of
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, National Defense, as a major service component of the AFP. chanrobles virtual law libra ry
The set-up whereby the INP was placed under the command of the
Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C. Aquino on military component, which is the PC, severely eroded the INP's
December 13, 1990, it was published on December 17, 1990.
chanrobles virtual law library
civilian character and the multiplicity in the governance of the PC-INP
resulted in inefficient police service. Moreover, the integration of the
Presently, however, petitioner as citizen, taxpayer and member of the national police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the
Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now military component had superior benefits and privileges. " chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore:
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library President, is the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the
. . . the civilian police cannot blossom into full same time and in person,
he will have to delegate some of them to
profession because most of the key positions are being his Cabinet members. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
Hence, the "one police force, national in scope, and civilian in executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
character" provision that is now Article XVI, Section 6 of the 1987 and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution.
chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law libra ry
Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the
imposed upon members of the Philippine National
" a
a Police by the Chief of the PNP; chanrobles virtual law libra ry
(emphasis ours) chanrobles virtual law library (k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through .the regional.
appellate boards over administrative cases against
Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly policemen and over decisions on claims for police
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by benefits;
his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department."
# chanrobles virtual law library xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are Sec. 26. The Command and direction of the PNP shall
placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local be vested in the Chief of the PNP . . . Such command
Government is merely an administrative realignment that would and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, to subordinate officials with respect to the units under
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and their respective commands, in accordance with the rules
public safety agencies created under the assailed Act,
the funding of and regulations prescribed by the Commission. . . .
the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
library
chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the
Constitution that the national police force shall be administered and Sec. 35. . . . To enhance police operational efficiency
controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, and effectiveness, the Chief of the PNP may constitute
the Act in question adequately provides for administration and
such other support units as may be necessary subject to
at the commission level, as shown in the following provisions, to wit: the approval of the Commission. . . .
that the authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law, they intended that the day-to-day 4) . . . City and municipal mayors shall have the
functions of police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention following authority over the PNP units in their
activities, traffic control, etc., would be under the operational control respective jurisdictions: chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
full control remains with the National Police Commission. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary
It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power
to choose the officers in question, the Act went beyond the bounds of We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that
the Constitution's intent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library "there is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is clear
Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional construction that that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the
every presumption should be indulged in favor of constitutionality and NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the
the court in considering the validity of the statute in question should NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions under
give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their
within the fundamental acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM."
It is
law.
!
chanrobles virtual law libra ry significant to note that the local officials, as NAPOLCOM
representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of
Under the questioned provisions, which read as follows: eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to
the PNP) # to be recommended by PNP officials. chanroblesvirtuala wlibrary chanro bles virtual law l ibrary
PNP shall be effected in the following manner: chanrob les virtual law library
precisely underscore the civilian character of the national police force, constitutes an "encroachment upon, interference with, and an
and will undoubtedly professionalize the same. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual la w library abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-
chief powers."chanrobles virtual law library
MR. NATIVIDAD. Yes, Madam President. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed
precisely gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national
MR. RODRIGO. Since the national police is not police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the
integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being
come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the
President of the Philippines. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
MR. NATIVIDAD. They do, Madam President. By law executive control. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law li brary
Y
The Constitution also created an
office called the
"Commission on Human Rights." (Article XIII, Section Y
17[1]).However, this Commission is not on the same level as the
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is Y
independent like the latter Commissions. # It still had to be constituted
Y
thru Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
Y
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the
statutory creation of a national police commission that will administer Y
and control the national police force to be established thereunder. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library
Y
epublic of the Philippines obtained a rating of 81.78% in the senior teacher (promotional)
$%&'(%) examination ... contains certain unauthorized erasures and insertions"
Manila which make it different from the notice as originally issued. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library
"4" Commission and was accordingly dismissed from the service by the
Civil Service Commissioner effective on the last day of duty with pay
0
+$('%*
(petitioner-appellant, vs. *( in a decision dated August 6, 1965. In the same decision, the Civil
1
,($%1+,(cc c9$*( Service Commission likewise directed that the said decision be
/+)
+
(1
,+(,cc9&5$7cc executed immediately in the public interest (Annex A, petition, pp. 12-
'&,($
/+),c $: c9$7cc 14, rec.).
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
,crespondents-appellees.
The Civil Service Commissioner coursed the aforesaid decision
'
6
$+
p chanrobles virtual law library
through the respondent Director of Public Schools, who in turn
transmitted the same to the respondent superintendent of city schools
This petition for
and prohibition with the prayer for the of Davao City in a letter dated September 30, 1965, directing that the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was filed by decision of the Civil Service Commissioner be executed immediately
petitioner-appellant Francisco M. Cucharo by way of appeal (p. 144, "but not beyond ten days from receipt thereof" and requesting that
rec.) from the order dated July 20, 1966 respectively dismissing the three copies of the special order covering the dismissal of petitioner-
petition as well as denying appellant's motion for summary judgment appellant from the service together with the advice of the date he
and from the order of August 4, 1966 denying the motion for acknowledges receipt of the decision be furnished his office (Director
reconsideration of the order of July 20, 1966 (pp. 128, 142., rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law li brary
of Public Schools) by return indorsement thereof (Annex B of the
petition, p. 14, rec.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In another letter also dated December 1, 1965 addressed to Mr. On December 27, 1965, petitioner-appellant filed a motion to declare
Primitivo Raquel, Principal of Calinan Central Elementary School, respondent division superintendent of city schools in contempt of court
Davao City, the respondent-appellee superintendent of city schools for having designated the principal teacher of Calinan Elementary
designated the former "as Principal in Charge of Calinan District vice School to assume the duties of District Supervisor of Calinan District
Mr. Francisco Cucharo, separated, effective immediately" and in violation of the preliminary injunction, claiming that he never
instructed him to receive all money and property responsibility from vacated the position, much less turned over the same to the one
Mr. Cucharo, herein petitioner-appellant (Exh. Q, Motion, p. 168, designated to perform its duties (pp. 30-41, rec.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
rec.).
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
On January 5, 1966, the trial court, after hearing, issued an order The three errors assigned by petitioner-appellant shall be discussed
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued on December 4, jointly.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library
On July 20, 1966, the lower court issued an order dismissing the
petition and denied is without merit petitioner-appellant's motion for Petitioner-appellant is indulging in euphemism when he states that the
summary of judgement. (p. 128, rec.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library decision dismissing him from the service cannot be executed
immediately before he could receive it and before he could have the
Hence, this appeal (p. 144, rec.). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry opportunity to read the same, thereby arbitrarily preventing him from
filing a motion for reconsideration or appealing the same; because he
Petitioner-appellant claims that the lower court erred: (1) in not actually received the copy of the decision consisting only of two pages
resolving his urgent motion for reconsideration of the order dated (see Annex A to the petition, pp. 12-13, rec.) which will not take him
January 5,1966 particularly the portion dissolving the writ of five minutes to read and comprehend its contents. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law lib rary
the Civil Service Commissioner, the same would still depend on the
appreciation thereof by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. As Petitioner-appellant will not suffer irreparable injury or damage by
heretofore stated, should he be exonerated by the Civil Service Board awaiting a final administrative action in his case;" because he can
of Appeals or my the Civil Service Commissioner himself acting on collect back salaries should his dismissal be adjudged illegal. The
his motion for reconsideration, petitioner-appellant would be entitled issues involved in the decision the Civil Service Commissioner
to recover back salaries. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library separating him from the service are not purely illegal questions. The
act of the Commissioner of Civil Service is not patently devoid of any
The basic ground that the petition states no cause of action, upon color of authority or manifestly illegal; neither did the Civil Service
which respondent superintendent of city schools predicates his motion Commissioner act without or in excess of his jurisdiction nor commit a
to dismiss before the lower court, which is also alleged as a special grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
defense in the Answer filed by the Solicitor General (p. 85, rec.), is jurisdiction.4
chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
legal, there was no need for the lower court to resolve petitioner-
appellant's motion for reconsideration of the order dated January 5, However that may be, the case of
7a "K
1966 quashing the writ of preliminary injunction and the order dated , ÷
÷
and a
- ,
which were decided subsequently to the Guisadio case, should be Y
decisive of the case at bar since the relevant facts of the aforesaid
cases and of the instant case are analogous. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Y
Y
We are therefore constrained to dismiss as We hereby dismiss the
Y
appeal. With costs against petitioner-appellant.
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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:"!" adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the
reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's loan obligation as
+,%$)+
)&+$$+
, vs. )**( provided in the Memorandum of Agreement ( , p. 38). IEI also
(%)(0
&&
$'
+,%2%'++K prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the
+,%$)+
(&(
)+()**((+'( coal operating contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written
/
$( 7:' c9 confirmation that said contract is valid and effective, and, in due
&*++&&+
)+(
1
6
. course, to convert said contract from an exploration agreement to a
development/production or exploitation contract in IEI's favor. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
'+(*
p
Respondent, Philippine National Bank (PNB), was later impleaded as
This petition seeks the review and reversal of the Decision of co-defendant in an Amended Complaint when the latter with the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12660, " which ruled Development Bank of the Philippines effected extra-judicial
adversely against petitioner herein.chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry foreclosures on certain mortgages, particularly the Mortgage Trust
Agreement, dated 13 July 1981, constituted in its favor by MMIC after
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating the latter defaulted in its obligation totalling around P22 million as of
contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy 15 July 1984. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the case
Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern against the PNB (Resolution, 21 September 1989). chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law lib rary
Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the
Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then rendition of the summary judgment was not proper since there were
Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more
of Makati, Branch 150,
alleging that MMIC took possession of the importantly, that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action
subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED
finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the exploitation and development of coal blocks ( , pp. 43-44). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this petition, to which we resolved to give due course and to thereto; and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such
decide. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library exploitation and development, all in the interest of an effective and
coordinated development of extracted resources. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law l ibrary
For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
(abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked
with the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated ii. The following powers and functions of the Energy
national program for the exploration, exploitation, and development Development Board under PD No. 910 . . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
!
"
"!
a
. . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this
case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and
(2) a
!
" developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts
!
"
"!
over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the
. . . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtua l law libra ry administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act
on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide
(P.D. No. 1206) (Emphasis supplied.) matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation,
development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These
P.D. No. 972 also provides: issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts
to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to
Sec. 8. Each coal operating contract herein authorized proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative
shall . . . be executed by the Energy Development agency.
Board.
One thrust of the multiplication of administrative
Considering the foregoing statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of the agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
BED, in the first instance, to pass upon any question involving the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a
Memorandum of Agreement between IEI and MMIC, revolving as its uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
does around a coal operating contract, should be sustained. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library regular courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National
Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does
demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of
of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an business entrusted to an administrative agency are
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the secured, and the limited function of review by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a resort, for ascertaining and interpreting the
claim is a a/
" and comes into play circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues are better equipped than courts by specialization, by
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
competence of an administrative body, in such case
' procedure (Far East Conference v. United States, 342
a
U.S. 570).
With the foregoing conclusion arrived at, the question as to the
propriety of the summary judgment rendered by the Trial Court
becomes unnecessary to resolve. chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
""
a "::
"
7 c5B 5
ublic of the Philippines the present case, acted otherwise than according to law. They cite the
$%&'(%) following statement in the opinion of the Court:
Manila
The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous case
EN BANC was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining
petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners'
right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous
one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent
c""!"c5" " litigation. In addition, there have been changes in the
membership of the Court, with the retirement of
6+($1
-
+(&(
),(/+)($
(
Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the
++(
+($'
'1
'++(
&%( writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this
($)
&((&*
+'),(0
,( fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of
$
)+
(($
1,*+$)+)
0
the ruling as to petitioners' standing.
0
,(
(%//+)(+(($%
2%+)+$,(('
$0,,+=11$ Petitioners claim that this statement "conveys a none too subtle
=+1)()
<
,
&(6&
(-(
, suggestion, perhaps a Freudian slip, that the two new
vs. '
%'(
)( 7:7 c97 appointees, regardless of the merit of the Decision in the first
&7:: 7$B:;(99 7&*++&&+ Kilosbayan case against the lotto (Kilosbayan, et al. v.
'+'
')(&(
)+(
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) must of necessity align
themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters
RESOLUTION in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second
lotto case." And petitioners ask, "
C"
petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under
its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity For the truth is that the statement is no more than an effort to ! -
Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or rather than to'
- the majority's decision to overrule the ruling in
collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. the previous case. It is simply meant to explain that because the five
Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be members of the Court who dissented in the first case (Melo, Quiason,
reopened. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, ::.) and the two new members (Mendoza
and Francisco, ::.) thought the previous ruling to be erroneous its
Because two members of the Court did not consider themselves bound reexamination not to be barred by
, '
or
by the decision in the first case, petitioners suggest that the two, in conclusiveness of judgment, or law of the case, it was hardly tenable
joining the dissenters in the first case in reexamining the questions in for petitioners to insist on the first ruling. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently to petitioners' question "
a
pronouncements of this Honorable Court in its Decision
a
," implying some ulterior motives on the part of the new of May 5, 1995.
majority in reexamining the two questions, the answer is: None, except
a conviction on the part of the five, who had been members of the The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the
Court at the time they dissented in the first case, and the two new PCSO.
members that the previous ruling was erroneous. The eighth Justice
(Padilla, :.) on the other hand agrees with the seven Justices that the There was thus no "formal commitment" - but
-
ELA is in a real sense a lease agreement and therefore does not violate that the parties were not filing a motion for reconsideration. Even if
R.A. No. 1169. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law libra ry the parties made a "formal commitment," the six (6) dissenting
Justices certainly could not be bound thereby not to insist on their
The decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the contrary view on the question of standing. Much less were the two
retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, :.) and one of the new members bound by any "formal commitment" made by the
dissenters (Bidin, :.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the parties. They believed that the ruling in the first case was erroneous.
first case was later reversed. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library Since in their view reexamination was not barred by the doctrine of
, '
or conclusiveness of judgment or law of the
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is case, they voted the way they did with the remaining five (5)
barred because the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management dissenters in the first case to form a new majority of eight. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
lotto."
chanrobles virtual law libra ry
Nor is this the first time a split decision was tested, if not reversed, in a
To be sure, a new contract was entered into which the majority of the subsequent case because of change in the membership of a court. In
Court finds has been purged of the features which made the first 1957, this Court, voting 6-5, held in ; .÷#, G.R. No. L-
contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO said in its 10201, Sept. 23, 1957 that the phrase "at the time of the election" in
manifestation in the first case was the following: 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 meant that a
candidate for municipal elective position must be at least 23 years of
1. They are no longer filing a motion for age on the
. On the other hand, the dissenters
reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court argued that it was enough if he attained that age on the day he assumed
dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on office.
chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary
Less than three years later, the same question was before the Court
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently again, as a candidate for municipal councilor stated under oath in her
negotiating a new lease agreement consistent with the certificate of candidacy that she was eligible for that position although
authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as she attained the requisite age (23 years) only when she assumed office.
amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the The question was whether she could be prosecuted for falsification. In
.a, 107 Phi. 888 (1960), the Court ruled she could
.
Justice, later Chief Justice, Benison, who dissented in the first case, Congressional effort to limit the appointing power of President
; . ÷#, , wrote the opinion of the Court, holding Johnson. Voting 5-3, the Court declared the acts void. Chief Justice
that while the statement that the accused was eligible was "inexact or Chase wrote the opinion of the Court in which four others, including
erroneous, according to the majority in the Feliciano case," the Justice Grier, concurred. Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented.
accused could not be held liable for falsification, because A private memorandum left by the dissenting Justices described how
an effort was made "to convince an aged and infirm member of the
the question [whether the law really required candidates court [Justice Grier] that he had not understood the question on which
to have the required age on the day of the election or he voted," with the result that what was originally a 4-4 vote was
whether it was sufficient that they attained it at the converted into a majority (5-3) for holding the acts invalid. chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law
read: allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the
PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise
Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners,
protection life, liberty, and property, and the
not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise. chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary
a are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy. Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this
%., 12. The natural and primary right and duty of case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and
and the
shall receive protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
the support of the Government. collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all
%., 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16) chanrobles virtual law libra ry
As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. Petitioners quote extensively from the speech of Commissioner Garcia
They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only before the Constitutional Commission, explaining the provisions on
provide a a
!
. By authorizing independent people's organizations. There is nothing in the speech,
the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined however, which supports their claim of standing. On the contrary, the
that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, speech points the way to the legislative and executive branches of the
the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with government, rather than to the courts, as the appropriate fora for the
respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, advocacy of petitioners' views.
Indeed, the provisions on independent
"the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not people's organizations may most usefully be read in connection with
illegal . . . . %
a
the provision on initiative and referendum as a means whereby the
people may propose or enact laws or reject any of those passed by While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
Congress. For the fact is that petitioners' opposition to the contract in expenditure of public moneys,
question is nothing more than an opposition to the government policy
a
! "a
on lotteries.
chanroblesvirtualawlib rary chanrobles virtual law lib rary !
a
a
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded " (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that
standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
"paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works,
legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being
a
and deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
(2)
. Petitioners do not meet these petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
requirements on standing. public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution
K! are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]),
a
illegal disbursement of public funds. (Pascual v. Secretary of Public Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15
Works, 110 Phi. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 SCRA 479 [1965]). 7"
(1976); Bugnay Const. & Dev. v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240 (1989); City
! 6
" " '
Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47 SCRA 325 [1972]) or where a tax . As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43
measure is assailed as unconstitutional. (VAT Cases [Tolentino v. SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief
Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630 [1994]) >
are allowed to Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to
question the validity of election laws because of their obvious interest whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
in the validity of such laws. (Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (Emphasis added)
[1967])
/can bring suits if the constitutional
question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of
settled early. (Emergency Powers Cases [Araneta v. Dinglasan], 84 taxpayers' suits.
Phi. 368 (1949); Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, 121
Phi. 358 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 122 Phi. 894 (1965); CLU v. Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention
Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]) .a
are allowed that taxpayers have standing to question government contracts
to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim regardless of whether public funds are involved or not. In /.
infringes their prerogatives #legislators. (Philconsa v. Enriquez,
a" ., 94 SCRA 786 (1979), petitioner filed a
235 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659 (1992); Gonzales taxpayer's suit seeking the annulment of a contract between the NHC
v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA and a foreign corporation. The case was dismissed by the trial court.
702 (1971); Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 16, 1995 The dismissal was affirmed by this Court on the grounds of
(Mendoza, :., concurring)) chanrobles virtual law l ibrary '
and pendency of a prejudicial question, thus avoiding the
question of petitioner's standing.
chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various
litigants have. Petitioners assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do On the other hand, in /.#/, 180 SCRA 254 (1989),
not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set petitioner sought the annulment of a contract made by the government
forth in - . , 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit: with a foreign corporation for the purchase of road construction
equipment. The question of standing was not discussed, but even if it
'
was, petitioner's standing could be sustained because he was a
" In the case at bar,
minority stockholder of the Philippine National Bank, which was one petitioners have not shown why, unlike petitioner in the Valmonte
of the defendants in the case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary case, they should be accorded standing to bring this suit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
In the other case cited by petitioners, City Council of ./ , The case of .;
, :. 224 SCRA 792 (1993) is different.
47 SCRA 325 (1972), members of the city council were allowed to sue Citizens' standing to bring a suit seeking the cancellation of timber
to question the validity of a contract entered into by the city licenses was sustained in that case because the Court considered Art.
government for the purchase of road construction equipment because II, 16 a right-conferring provision which can be enforced in the
their contention was that the contract had been made without their courts. That provision states:
authority. In addition, as taxpayers they had an interest in seeing to it
that public funds were spent pursuant to an appropriation made by The State shall protect and advance
a
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Emphasis)
But, in the case at bar, there is an allegation that public funds are being
misapplied or misappropriated. The controlling doctrine is that of In contrast, the policies and principles invoked by petitioners in
/. Ä , 65 SCRA 624 (1975) where it was held that funds this case do not permit of such categorization.
raised from contributions for the benefit of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines were not public funds and petitioner had no standing to Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the
bring a taxpayer's suit to question their disbursement by the President validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they regard to be immoral.
of the Philippines. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to
decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity. chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library
a continuation of the first one. Petitioners also say that inquiry into the
same question as to the meaning of the statutory provision is barred by
The fact is that the phrase in question does not qualify the authority of activities. %
a
"
"
the PCSO under paragraph (A), but rather the authority granted to it by
'
"
"
" This seems to
paragraph (B). The amendment of paragraph (B) by B.P. Blg. 42 was be the only possible interpretation of 1 (A) and (B) in light of its text
intended to enable the PCSO to engage in certain investments, and its legislative history. That there is today no other entity engaged
programs, projects and activities for the purpose of raising funds for in sweepstakes races, lotteries and the like does not detract from the
health programs and charity. That is why the law provides that such validity of this interpretation. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library
investments by the PCSO should "not compete with the private sector
in areas where investments are adequate as may be determined by the III. The Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first
National Economic and Development Authority." Justice Davide, then contract, which were considered to be features of a joint venture
an Assemblyman, made a proposal which was accepted, reflecting the agreement, had been removed in the new contract. For instance, 5 of
understanding that the bill they were discussing concerned the the ELA provides that in the operation of the on-line lottery, the PCSO
authority of the PCSO to invest in the business of others. The must employ "its own competent and qualified personnel." Petitioners
following excerpt from the Record of the Batasan Pambansa shows claim, however, that the "contemporaneous interpretation" of PGMC
this to be the subject of the discussion: officials of this provision is otherwise. They cite the testimony of Glen
Barroga of the PGMC before a Senate committee to the effect that
MR. DAVIDE. May I introduce an amendment after under the ELA the PGMC would be operating the lottery system "side
"adequate". The intention of the amendment is not to by side" with PCSO personnel as part of the transfer of technology. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual
to anybody. And my amendment is to add after Whether the transfer of technology would result in a violation of
"adequate" the words AS MAY BE DETERMINED PCSO's franchise should be determined by facts and not by what some
BY THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND officials of the PGMC state by way of opinion. In the absence of proof
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. As a mater of fact, it to the contrary, it must be presumed that 5 reflects the true intention
will strengthen the
in these areas, of the parties. Thus, Art. 1370 of the Civil Code says that "If the terms
provided that the determination of whether the private of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
sector's activity is already adequate must be determined contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control."
by the National Economic and Development The intention of the parties must be ascertained from their
Authority.chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library
contract and enter into something else in violation of the law is mere
speculation and cannot be a basis for judging the validity of the
(2 RECORD OF THE BATASAN PAMBANSA, Sept. contract. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library
6, 1979,
p. 1007) IV. It is contended that 1 of E.O. No. 301 covers all types of
"
[] for public services or a of supplies, materials
Thus what the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a and equipment to the government or to any of its branches, agencies or
business engaged in sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
instrumentalities" and not only contracts of purchase and sale. To take still another example. Paragraph (d), which does away with
Consequently, a lease of equipment, like the ELA, must be submitted the requirement of public bidding "whenever the supplies under
to public bidding in order to be valid. This contention is based on two procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two
premises: (1) that 1 of E.O. No. 301 applies to any contract whereby consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received
the government acquires title to or the use of the equipment and (2) in each instance were exorbitant or nonconforming to specifications."
that the words "supplies," "materials," and "equipment" are distinct Again, following the theory of the petitioners, a contract for the lease
from each other so that when an exception in 1 speaks of "supplies," of equipment cannot be entered into even if there are no bids because,
it cannot be construed to mean "equipment." chanrobles virtual law li brary
first, lease contracts are governed by the general rule on public bidding
and, second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (d) applies
Petitioners' contention will not bear analysis. For example, the term only to contracts for the furnishing of "supplies." chanrobles virtual law library
because,
, lease contracts are covered by the general rule and,
second, the exception to public bidding in paragraph (b) covers only b. Whenever the supplies are to be used
"supplies" but not equipment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
in connection with a project or activity
which cannot be delayed without 2. Jurisdiction over Negotiated Contracts. - In line
causing detriment to the public service;
law library
chanrobles virtual
with the principles of decentralization and
accountability, negotiated contracts for public services
c. Whenever the
by an or for furnishing supplies, materials or equipment may
exclusive distributor or manufacturer be entered into by the department or agency head or the
who does not have subdealers selling at governing board of the government-owned or
lower prices and for which no suitable controlled corporation concerned, without need of prior
substitute can be obtained elsewhere at approval by higher authorities, subject to availability of
more advantageous terms to the funds, compliance with the standards or guidelines
government; chanrobles virtual law library prescribed in Section 1 hereof, and to the audit
jurisdiction of the commission on Audit in accordance
d. Whenever the supplies under with existing rules and regulations. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law li brary
e. In cases where it is apparent that the 7. Jurisdiction Over Lease Contracts. - The heads of
requisition of the needed supplies agency intending to rent privately-owned buildings or
aa
is most spaces for their use, or to lease out government-owned
advantageous to the government to be buildings or spaces for private use, shall have authority
determined by the Department Head to determine the reasonableness of the terms of the
concerned; and chanrobles virtual law library lease and the rental rates thereof, and to enter into such
lease contracts without need of prior approval by higher
f. Whenever
is made from authorities, subject to compliance with the uniform
an agency of the government. standards or guidelines established pursuant to Section
6 hereof by the DPWH and to the audit jurisdiction of
Indeed, the purpose for promulgating E.O. No. 301 was merely to COA or its duly authorized representative in
decentralize the system of reviewing a
of purchase accordance with existing rules and regulations.
for the furnishing of supplies, materials and equipment as well as lease
contracts of buildings. Theretofore, E.O. No. 298, promulgated on In sum, E.O. No. 301 applies only to contracts for the purchase of
August 12, 1940, required consultation with the Secretary of Justice supplies, materials and equipment, and it was merely to change the
and the Department Head concerned and the approval of the President system of administrative review of emergency purchases, as
of the Philippines before contracts for the furnishing of supplies, theretofore prescribed by E.O. No. 298, that E.O. No. 301 was issued
materials and equipment could be made on a negotiated basis, without on July 26, 1987. Part B of this Executive Order applies to leases of
public bidding. E.O. No. 301 changed this by providing as follows: buildings, not of equipment, and therefore does not govern the lease
contract in this case. Even if it applies, it does not require public such as the repair and maintenance of
bidding for entering into it. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles vi rtual law library equipment and furniture, as well as
trucking, hauling, janitorial, security,
Our holding that E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts of and related or analogous services.
purchase and sale is conformable to P.D. No. 526, promulgated on
August 2, 1974, which is
. P.D. No. 526 requires local Thus, the texts of both E.O. No. 301, 1 and of P.D. No. 526, 1
governments to hold public bidding in the &
of supplies." and 12, make it clear that only contracts for the purchase and sale of
By specifying &
of supplies" and excepting from the supplies, materials and equipment are contemplated by the rule
general rule & & when made under certain circumstances, P.D. concerning public biddings. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
No. 526, 12 indicates quite clearly that it applies only to contracts of
purchase and sale. This provision reads: Finally, it is contended that equipment leases are attractive and
commonly used in place of contracts of purchase and sale because of
12.
a. - "multifarious credit and tax constraints" and therefore could not have
Procurement of supplies may be made without the been left out from the requirement of public bidding. Obviously these
benefit of public bidding in the following modes: chanrobles virtual law library
credit and tax constraints can have no attraction to the government
when considering the advantages of sale over lease of equipment. The
(1) Personal canvass of responsible
; chanrob les virtual law library
fact that lease contracts are in common use is not a reason for implying
that the rule on public bidding applies not only to government
(2) a ; chanrobles vi rtual law library
purchases but also to lease contracts. ;
a
#
" a"
(3) -
from manufacturers or exclusive
$"
a a
a a. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libra ry
(5)
a
or foreign SO ORDERED.
governments.
in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.[28] One may the timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours) chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to supplant the
private respondents thinking not only because the aforequoted inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
provision apparently does not mention nor include conveyances that criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section
can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent, 68-A to PD 705-is most revealing: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his
duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest
forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by
broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68.
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section
In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would
effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277,
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or .[35] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not Section 68.
a"a
a8
a
eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
2Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber
P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without
petitioners pointed out@ chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations,
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically provides for the 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1,
confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended) chanroblesvirtualawl ibrary
not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have been
involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section
fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or
liable. xxx[37]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct
offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is
and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277
respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a Code and inserted the words shall be punished with the penalties
crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. When
Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can
SECTION 68.
a"a
a8
a
not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and
2Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant
or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool
respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D.705, as amended.
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to ones the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by except through a special civil action for
or prohibition. It
the lower court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary reads :chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded SECTION 8. REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are
solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved
property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.[39] To detain is defined executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
as to mean to hold or keep in custody,[40] and it has been held that aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in
there is tortuous taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision
the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except
pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the through a special civil action for
or prohibition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was
transporting forest products with out the required permit of the DENR Y!
"Y
Y
Y Y Ypp Y
in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by
E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably
warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used
in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
>c"#
4 4 "!
? chanrobles virtual law libra ry Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the
fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of
&*++&&+/)
$1
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Y )* Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive
*((%)(0
&&
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+
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Section 51 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides:
,
/
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,1
6(0)*
&*++&&+$ Section 51. Finality of Determination. -
Any case or controversy before it (DAR)
,+$+( chanrobles virtual law library
determination of the just compensation filed by petitioner for the On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was
taking of its property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform held that:
Program. chanrobles virtual law library
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original
and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision
of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the
courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors
of the legality of administrative action.[10] chanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed
beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case
and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal. chanrobles virtual law li brary
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Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for
Review of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of
)*+,,+/+$+( Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon
filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of
>c"#!"# #"
"? jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review
the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral
(1+)(((
Y Y*(%,+
-
& protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of
0
,3)1 &c& &B officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the
+(2%
( Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election
issued by the DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular
,+$+( No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the
BES by the regular courts of law is an
act and is void for
(3
-$p@ chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a
mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Ligas
This Petition for
and Prohibition with prayer for the internal organization. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of injunction seeks
the reversal of the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its
Puerto Princesa City, [1] Branch 50 in SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 entitled order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of
Elegio F. Quejano, Jr., petitioner vs. Joel Bito-Onon, et. al., Interior and Local Government [2] is vested with the power to
respondents which denied herein petitioners motion to dismiss the establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and
Petition for Review of the Resolution of the Board of Election implementing laws on the general supervision of local government
Supervisors dated August 25, 1997 in case number L-10-97 filed by units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance
herein private respondent with said court. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary thereof by said units. [3] The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-
193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making
It appears from the records that the petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan Administrative Code. [4] Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had
and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada. [5]
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the
other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied [6]
Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for prompting the petitioner to file the present petition wherein the
the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano following issues are raised: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-President in the
August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter
=*)*(())*2%$)+(,&(/+$+(
of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning +''(
,%'+%
4"#=
$+$$%,1-
candidate in the said election prompting Quejano to file a post )*,+$)
-+.$$(0*+$
proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES),
%)*(+)-chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
which was decided against him on August 25, 1997. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1=*)*(())*$&(,)%, Board. This act was no longer a mere act of supervision but one of
(''+)),
/
1%$(0,+$)+(+ control. The Solicitor General submits that the RTC committed grave
+$$%+)*2%$)+(,(,$.[7] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for review of the BES
decision filed before it for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the
In support of his petition, Onon argues that the Supplemental rightful remedy which was to appeal to the National Liga Board. [10]
Guidelines for the 1997 Synchronized Election of the Provincial and chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, [2] the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000,
Republic of the Philipppines conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
$%&'(%) and submitted the matter for ratification. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Manila
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers
1
(PCBC) proclaimed [3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
>c" #"(c5
"? plebiscite. [4] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1
'+
=
+
)* Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former
(''+$$+(()+($ :0 c:7 Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January
c 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking
the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
>c" #
(c5
"?
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
1
'+
=
+
)* required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation
.%)+/$)
-)()*&$+,)(0)* of Section 54 thereof; andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
&%1+(0)*&*++&&+$$)
-(0)*
+)+(
,(
(/')$)
-(0 B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
)*,&
)')(01%,)
,'
') twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities
$(++)(
&(/+(0$($(( of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
'%++&
+)-(0$($(('%++&
+)-(0 plebiscite.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1
(
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner
,+$+( instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition,
seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for
$
,(/
%)+3p@chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the 1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into into a component city; andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By
Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province 2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of
Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor. [1] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated. [5] Section 450. C9cc . (a) A municipality or a cluster
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
the May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of
first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of the following requisites:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political
powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. 8806. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against orchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
R.A. No. 8806 in c" #
. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. [6] inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers Office:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each others acts. [7] The theory Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
with the fundamental law. [8] This Court, however, may declare a law, herein.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
doubtful or argumentative one. [9] In other words, the grounds for identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, [10] for to doubt is to apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
sustain. [11] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
(2) or more islands.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section
10, Article X of the Constitution which provides,
: (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be recurring income. (Emphasis ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of
ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting a municipality or a
cluster of a, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are
No. 8806 has done. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, [13] and may not annul an act of
This contention is devoid of merit. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical. [14] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a cluster of a may Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the one
be c into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of subject-one bill rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
the c by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, to wit: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Constitution, quoted earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his
posture, allows the of local government units to create a Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
province, , municipality or a in accordance with the c 5AB77758: 77c9 (emphasis
criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two
Section 8. Division and Merger. ,c and of existing local principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon,
government units 7c:B77C 7 and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
:59c7c : Provided, however, That such division While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the
shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and
requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the Sorsogon. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
income classification of the original local government unit or units
shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion,
division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due
c or a of existing local government units is c H to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation
under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division 7 of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural
c:B77C :557c and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence,
the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of
reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to
to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor
Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. can it be considered to have deprived the public of fair information on
This argument goes into the Bc of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which this consequence. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
we are not competent to rule. In ÷
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[12] this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in
minute details therein. [15] The rule is sufficiently complied with if the at least two (2) newspapers of general and local
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which circulation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the statute seeks to effect, [16] and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of )(,
-,
proposed law and its operation. [17] Moreover, this Court has a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. [18] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on
September 1, 2000 , which date, according to the COMELEC, should
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16,
No. 8806. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 2000) when the law had not yet been published. The COMELEC
argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a
We now turn to c" #" wherein petitioner assails the law, citing the landmark case of K Y YK
, [19] it could only
validity of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC
ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-
day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should
be conducted within 120 days from the approval of said Act per
express provision of its Section 54, viz: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The COMELEC is correct. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
existence upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes
cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the Section 10. &5C . No creation, division, merger,
present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within c 7 abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
B F"
Gfrom the ::c of this Act. x x x. (Emphasis units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast
ours)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from
E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite the c9799 of the law or ordinance affecting such
was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day action, Bcc 98 c7. (Emphasis
period after the ::c of the Act. This 120-day period having ours) chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
expired without a plebiscite being conducted, the Act itself expired
and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the
December 16, 2000. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date of the
99 of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite allows a law or ordinance to fix another date for conducting a
on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the date of the
Section 65 of the Act states: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary effectivity of the law. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act)
thereof, could only mean effectivity as used and contemplated in ( Yp
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or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in K Y
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Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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Manila These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734),
EN BANC authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the
establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order
issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the
c 4
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Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then
President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order
429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in
certain provinces and cities within the existing regions - Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment
some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as of congressional representatives, the same is not valid
in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of
the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz - and R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986
Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Ä
7a ,# in which the power of the Governor-
Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that -
different legislative districts in provinces and cities." chanrobles virtual law libra ry
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions
E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are
to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by
reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly the establishment of the autonomous region. chanroblesvirtualawlibra ry chanrobles virtual law library
(f) Further rationalization of the (1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative
functions of and administrative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in
relationships among government character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art.
entities.
chanroblesvi rtualawlibra ry chanrobles vi rtual law library XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the
President's discretion; chanrobles virtual law li brary
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and
following actions: the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A.
No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines,
xxx xxx xxx
with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the over local governments [ Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."4 The
was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
government." The Commission on Reorganization created under the municipal boundaries! which has been described in /.÷
law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later or as "administrative in nature." chanrobles virtual law library
than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to
submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power
next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative
submitted would become effective only upon the approval of regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient
Congress. standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the
power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
administrative determination] the existing regions" following the Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination]
back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those
choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the
the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
administration of local governments but also the direction of executive organization of administrative regions. chanroblesvirt ualawlibrary chanrobles virt ual law libra ry
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center
from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the
determination of provincial capitals has always been by act of
Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, " administrative regions
are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no
basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine
regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742,
773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law l ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions for
and prohibition are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
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? 2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units
under the Local Government Code to provide for additional
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,+$+( b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including
the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the
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Before us is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 64 to annul the c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and
decision and resolution , dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with;
1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) andchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished
the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.[3] (italics
stationed in Mandaue City. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity
monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation without need of publication:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In
1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. 5.0 EFFECTIVITYchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all
against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the allowances and additional forms of compensation to
protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the local government employees; xxx. (underscoring
COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the
same be denied. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued
LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides
On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The COA held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary xxx xxx xxxchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the City 5.0 EFFECTIVITYchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to
the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under This Circular shall take effect immediately.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations
xxx xxx xxxchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary promulgated by administrative or executive officer in accordance with,
and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or partake the
Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local nature of a statute (Victorias Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social Security
government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalos Statutory Construction,
compensation policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice Cruzs Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed., p. 103;
March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique; COA letter dated May 17, Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314; Antique
1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17 SCRA 316).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order
No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines xxx xxx xxxchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation and classification of
local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges
of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of in excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local government units
said Administrative Order provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary where they are stationed, this Commission finds no substantial grounds
or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue PER MONTH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN
City, disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the RECEIVING ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00 MONTHLY FOR THE
above-captioned appeal of the MTC and RTC Judges of Mandaue PAST FIVE YEARS?
City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No. 91-7, is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary IVchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx xxx xxx[4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED MARCH 15,
1994 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for MANAGEMENT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONSIDERING
and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for THAT IT WAS NOT DULY PUBLISHED IN ACCODANCE WITH
reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May LAW?[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local
Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges, submitting autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local
the following questions for resolution: government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges
stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by
Ichanroblesvirtuallawlibrary any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the
President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of
HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY AND publication. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO JUDGES On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for
STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO THE CITY? additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par.
(a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
IIchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Code of 1991, which provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC 55
was not exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions. We rule in favor of the petitioner judges.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void.
Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No costs. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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EN BANC MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
CITY OF TAGUM,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 178056 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SERENO, ::.
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF For resolution are (1) the
motion for
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21
December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
Philippines, et al. and (3) the
motion for
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City,
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF and Oroquieta City.
CITY OF TAGUM, violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme
Petitioners-In-Intervention. August 24, 2010
Court 7, again by a majority vote, denied the
x----------------------------------------- respondents' first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April
---------x
2009, the Supreme Court 7, by a
vote, denied
the respondents' second motion for reconsideration.
Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final
and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book one Local Government Code.1 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Decision and without any exceptional and compelling
reason, the Court 7 unprecedentedly reversed the 18
November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality
of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow 7
9c c c9c c
7cc c. Any derogation or
Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Constitution.
Laws unconstitutional.
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Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific
7 c 7 7 "! c5
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7 c5 c 5B : requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
B7 : 7cc 5 7 ""7 c existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that
:7 c7: 5)7 "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to
: c97cc5 7""7c c can no longer be repeated."
99 c 7c :9c
SEC. 7. #. - Where the
court is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated
on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the
gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed;
arbitrary date í the filing of their cityhood bills before the in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall
stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or
end of the 11th Congress - as against all other municipalities motion shall be denied. ( )
that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA
9009.
The 7 Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No.
99-1-09-SC, reads:
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A D E C I S
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification I O N OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT 7÷ OR
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities 7÷ OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE,
can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE
the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional
for violation of the equal protection clause. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED.
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The clear and simple language of the clarificatory
Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:
the Court results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied. The Court's prior majority
4
action on the main decision stands affirmed. cȮa This prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009
clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration
Court " which includes not only cases involving the must be denied.
constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for
heard ." reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left
undecided because there remain the Decision of 18
November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court on the second motion a majority of the Court concurred in declaring the
for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short,
second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009
evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence
November 2008 Decision,
2
of a majority of the Court " are not reconsidered but
.5 The judgment stands in full force.6
cȮa cȮa stand affirmed. 7
These prior majority actions of the Court
Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a
majority Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior
the prior majority Resolution of 31 March 2009 affirmative action.
denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion
for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main
decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for
plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008
Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009,
denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court
reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained
and stated that entry of judgment be made in due course.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration
of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATE the 18
November 2008 Decision declaring
%($)+)%)+(
the Cityhood Laws, namely:
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491.
We NOTE petitioners' motion to annul the Decision of 21
December 2009.
SO ORDERED.
1
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On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No.
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-005, the five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as
OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005 and OCD-99-006 entitled as follows: follows:
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and
priority, with high development impact and are equipment;
congruent with the socio-cultural, economic and
development agenda of the Estrada Administration, k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD
such as food security, poverty alleviation, consistent with the aforementioned objectives
electrification, and peace and order, among others. and guidelines;
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising 4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be
from, but not limited to, the following areas of concern: determined by the Oversight Committee on Devolution,
this portion of the LGSEF shall not be used in
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, expenditures for personal costs or benefits under
hospital services and other tertiary services; existing laws applicable to governments. Generally,
this fund shall cover the following objects of
b. delivery of social welfare services; expenditures for programs, projects and activities
arising from the implementation of devolved and
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for regular functions and services:
youth and community development;
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research; critical to the full and effective implementation
of devolved programs, projects and activities;
b. repair and/or improvement of facilities; (e) total cost requirement of the project;
c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment; (f) proponent¶s counterpart funding share, if any, and
identified source(s) of counterpart funds for the
d. acquisition of basic equipment; full implementation of the project;
e. construction of additional or new facilities; (g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by
the LGSEF.
f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or
collective projects among groups of Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee
municipalities, cities and/or provinces related to as contained in Attachment - Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs
devolution and delivery of basic services. were required to identify the projects eligible for funding under the
one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and submit the project
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the DILG for
submit to the Oversight Committee on Devolution appraisal. The project proposals that passed the DILG¶s appraisal
through the Department of Interior and Local would then be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review,
Governments, within the prescribed schedule and evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the Oversight Committee
timeframe, a Letter Request for Funding Support from would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of the Special
the Affirmative Action Program under the LGSEF, duly Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation
signed by the concerned LGU(s) and endorsed by (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the said LGUs.
cooperators and/or beneficiaries, as well as the duly
signed Resolution of Endorsement by the respective K.;
÷÷ (444
Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The LGU-
proponent shall also be required to submit the Project Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the
Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form No. amount of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
99-02, that details the following: the internal revenue taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000
contained a proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for the
(a) general description or brief of the project; LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title
XXXVII ± A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as
(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the that contained in the GAA of 1999.
project, which should highlight the benefits to
the locality and the expected impact to the local The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated
program/project arising from the full and June 22, 2000, adopted the following allocation scheme governing the
efficient implementation of social services and five billion pesos LGSEF for 2000:
facilities, at the local levels;
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be
(c) target outputs or key result areas; allocated to and shared by the four levels of LGUs, i.e.,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, using
(d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
the following percentage-sharing formula agreed upon and local affirmative action projects, to be endorsed to
and jointly endorsed by the various Leagues of LGUs: and approved by the Oversight Committee on
Devolution in accordance with the OCD agreements,
For Provinces 26% guidelines, procedures and documentary requirements:
or P 910,000,000
For Cities 23% or 805,000,000 On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum
For Municipalities 35% or 1,225,000,000 authorizing then Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to
For Barangays 16% or 560,000,000 implement and release the 2.5 billion pesos LGSEF for 2000 in
accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-023.
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of
draw up and adopt the horizontal distribution/sharing President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No.
schemes among the member LGUs whereby the OCD-2001-29 entitled ³ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-
Leagues concerned may opt to adopt direct financial 023 IN THE ALLOCATION, IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE
assistance or project-based arrangement, such that the OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR CY 2000.´
LGSEF allocation for individual LGU shall be released Under this resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF
directly to the LGU concerned; was to be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution No.
OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs, while the amount of 1.5 billion pesos was allocated for the
LGUs are used in accordance with the general purposes LAAP. However, out of the latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be
and guidelines promulgated by the OCD for the allocated and released as follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance
implementation of the LGSEF at the local levels to the LAAPs of LGUs; P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover
pursuant to Res. No. OCD-99-006 dated October 7, the decrease in the IRA of LGUs concerned due to reduction in land
1999 and pursuant to the Leagues¶ guidelines and area; and P74,639,773 for the LGSEF Capability-Building Fund.
mechanism as approved by the OCD;
K.;
÷÷ (44*
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit
to the OCD for its approval their respective allocation In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations
scheme, the list of LGUs with the corresponding law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with
LGSEF shares and the corresponding project categories the IRA of the LGUs therein and the proviso earmarking five billion
if project-based; pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No.
lists of LGUs shall be endorsed to the DBM as the basis OCD-2002-001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as
for the preparation of the corresponding NCAs, follows:
SAROs, and related budget/release documents.
Modified Codal Formula P 3.000 billion
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF Priority Projects 1.900 billion
shall be earmarked to support the following initiatives Capability Building Fund .100 billion
P 5.000 billion On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution
No. OCD-2002-001.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF
which is to be allocated according to the modified codal formula shall The Petitioner¶s Case
be released to the four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, as follows: The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional
and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to
LGUs Percentage Amount the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee¶s
Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-
Provinces 25 P 0.750 billion 2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant
thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs
Cities 25 0.750 and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five
billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the
Municipalities 35 1.050 LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Barangays 15 0.450
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that
100 P 3.000 billion the ³just share´ of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them.
Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority enjoin that the ³just share´ of the LGUs shall be ³automatically and
projects shall be distributed according to the following criteria: directly´ released to them ³without need of further action´ are,
likewise, cited.
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the
2.0 Projects in consonance with the President¶s State of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to
Nation Address (SONA)/summit commitments. compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations,
including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that
capability building fund shall be distributed in accordance with the the LGUs¶ share in the national taxes ³shall be automatically released
recommendation of the Leagues of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities to them.´ The petitioner maintains that the use of the word ³shall´
and Barangays, and approved by the OCD. must be given a compulsory meaning.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest
to the individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the
reconsideration of Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of
Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her to disapprove said resolution as it the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as
violates the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991. The petitioner cites as an example the experience in 2001 when
the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight
Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were The Respondents¶ Arguments
issued therefor. Further, the possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would result in the The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the
diminution of the latter¶s share in the IRA. Court to dismiss the petition on procedural and substantive grounds.
On the latter, the respondents contend that the assailed provisos in the
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed resolutions issued by
resolutions is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally infirm. The
Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA respondents advance the view that Section 6, Article X of the
among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA as follows: Constitution does not specify that the ³just share´ of the LGUs shall be
Provinces ± 23%; Cities ± 23%; Municipalities ± 34%; and Barangays determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991. Moreover,
± 20%. This formula has been improperly amended or modified, with the phrase ³as determined by law´ in the same constitutional provision
respect to the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the means that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to
LGSEF, by the assailed OCD resolutions as they invariably provided determine what is the ³just share´ of the LGUs in the national taxes.
for a different sharing scheme. In other words, Congress is the arbiter of what should be the ³just
share´ of the LGUs in the national taxes.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the
executive branch of a substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local
mentions that in the Letter dated December 5, 2001 of respondent Government Code of 1991, which provides for the percentage sharing
Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to respondent Secretary of the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed
Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of funds to determination of their ³just share´ in the national taxes. Congress may
certain LGUs from the LGSEF
(2) whether the petition involves factual questions that are properly a
cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the issue had been
rendered moot and academic. The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos
contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
K
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991. This is undoubtedly a legal question. On the other hand, the new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for this Court
following facts are not disputed: to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted budget Constitution. Even in cases where supervening events had made the
for 2001; cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for the bench, bar and public.
the allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the
implementing rules and regulations therefor; and Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the
substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their question otherwise moot and academic if it is ³capable of repetition,
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations, including the yet evading review.´ For the GAAs in the coming years may contain
guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight Committee. provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet,
the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It,
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the
question now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need substantive issue now.
not be determined by a trial court. In any case, the rule on hierarchy of
courts will not prevent this Court from assuming jurisdiction over the
%
petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and case calls for the application of a most important constitutional policy
calling for the exercise of this Court¶s primary jurisdiction. and principle, that of local autonomy. In Article II of the Constitution,
the State has expressly adopted as a policy that:
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the
proper legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, the ³transcendental importance´ of the case, as it
necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to
local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof
controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of reiterates the State policy in this wise:
procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
K
autonomy.
a
a
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution
Granting a that, as contended by the respondents, the confines the President¶s power over the LGUs to one of general
resolution of the case had already been overtaken by supervening supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power
events as the IRA, including the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had of control. The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in
already been released and the government is now operating under a -
.:
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a A7, as
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re- 5B, in the national taxes which shall be
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. c released to them.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion that (1) the LGUs shall have a ³just share´ in the national taxes; (2) the
to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order ³just share´ shall be determined by law; and (3) the ³just share´ shall
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. be automatically released to the LGUs.
He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs¶ ³just share´ in this
The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the wise:
mandate of the Constitution. The State policy on local autonomy is
amplified in Section 2 thereof: Sec. 18.
÷ . Local government
units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization
Sec. 2. -
. ± (a) It is hereby declared the policy of that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to create
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which
this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of
local government structure instituted through a system of further action;
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of ...
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units. Sec. 286. ÷
. (a) The share of each local
government unit shall be released, without need of any further action,
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of
each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
for the LGSEF and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
transgress the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. purpose.
K
÷÷ *+++"(444 (b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share
(44*
-
of local government units under existing laws.
Webster¶s Third New International Dictionary defines ³automatic´ as
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads: ³involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of
the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition;
mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.´ Further, the word The ³just share´ of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the
³automatically´ is defined as ³in an automatic manner: without appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the
thought or conscious intention.´ Being ³automatic,´ thus, connotes assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the
LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ³just share´ LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that ³such amount
accruing to them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the shall be released to the local government units subject to the
Local Government Code of 1991, the ³just share´ of the LGUs shall be implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and
released to them ³without need of further action.´ Construing Section guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund
286 of the LGC, we held in
":
÷a, /: among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be
prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution.´ Pursuant
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD
local fiscal autonomy is the
release of the shares of LGUs in resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF such that:
the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the For 1999
release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and ³
'
P2 billion - allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
$
a
P2 billion - Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces ±
.´ As a rule, the term ³$*
´ is a word of 40%;
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, Cities ± 20%; Municipalities ± 40%)
therefore, +'&
)+/. P1 billion ± projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and
liberty upon which these provisions are based.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chief Justice), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Co
1
TINGA,*
CHICO-
NAZARIO, and
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Respondent. November 17, 2004
DAVIDE, JR.,
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EN BANC Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a
special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the
[G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005] Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed
by Republic Act No. 2370,[6] and said orders constituting an undue
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID,
,
THE OFFICE OF THE delegation of legislative power.[7]
PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged
MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and by the
, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled
the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the
REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE),
. well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to
the executive branch,[8] while three justices opined that the nullity of
DECISION the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935
Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over
TINGA, :.: local governments.[9] / was disposed in this wise:
This
presents this Court with the prospect of WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and
our own 7a [1]²the municipality of Andong, Lanao del void
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing
Surʊwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or referred to. It is so ordered.[10]
anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of
Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107
by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core
that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the
hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
disagree.
Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a
The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in current resident of Andong,[11] suing as a private citizen and taxpayer
/
÷
[2] in 1965. As discussed therein, then whose
³is of public and paramount interest especially to
President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders[3] the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them Sur.´[12] He alleges that Andong ³has metamorphosed into a full-blown
was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle
Executive Order No. 107.[4] essential services for the municipality and its constituents,´[13] even
though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed,
These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government
creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass positions of Andong.[14] Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has
Congress.[5] President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education,
these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) ³barangay units´
with their own respective chairmen.[15] From 1964 until 1972, including said municipality in its records and official database as [an]
according to Camid, the public officials of Andong ³have been serving existing regular municipality.´[21] He characterizes such non-
their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,
(sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18)
President Diosdado Macapagal.´ Since the time of Martial Law in municipalities similarly annulled by reason of /. As appropriate
1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG
dated
public funds, with the ³Interim Officials´ serving their constituents ³in 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a ³regular
their own little ways and means.´[16] existing municipality;´ all public respondents, to extend full
recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the
presents to this Court a
issued by the Office of the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents,
Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the particularly the DILG, to recognize the ³Interim Local Officials´ of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying Andong.[22]
the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, ³created under
Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964.´[17] He also Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order
submits a
issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of No. 107. He argues that / has already been modified by
Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence.
fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a Particularly cited is our - Ä
list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly
Ä/,[23] wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the
recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a ³
municipal
recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for corporation.´[24] Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres
the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the
Andong.[18] Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover,
cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government
The petition assails a
dated 21 November 2003, issued by Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned
the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of municipality. The provision reads:
Interior and Local Government (DILG).[19] The
enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as ³existing,´ per Section 442. #
- xxx
DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among
the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
by this Court in /. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding
Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan considered as regular municipalities.[25]
and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.[20]
There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG ³in can be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and
not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition
of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous
on. exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well
as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state.
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual
of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the
special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the factual deficiencies aside, Camid¶s plaint should have undergone the
appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have
confirm several of Camid¶s astonishing factual allegations pertaining been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have
to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camid¶s
it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative
ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant
is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts. prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid¶s present
especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition of action. The assailed issuance is the
issued by the DILG.
municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal But such
does not pretend to bear the authority to create
corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the
n will really do nothing to serve Camid¶s ultimate cause
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without the recognition of Andong. Neither does the
even
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing
prescription.[26] These municipal corporations have exercised their in the document that comments on the present status of Andong.
powers for a long period without objection on the part of the Perhaps the
is assailed before this Court if only to present
government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or pattern of
they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters action that can be annulled through the special civil action of
had been lost.[27] They are especially common in England, which, as certiorari. Still, the relation of the
to Camid¶s central
well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The argument is forlornly strained.
reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable,
since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a
nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided
obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority. by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been
In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less decided before, and its kindred cases pertaining as they
common, but it has been held that when no charter or act of did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were
incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local
and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants
the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the
period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.[28] impression that their town still exists, much less those who may
comport themselves as the municipality¶s ³Interim Government,´
would be well served by a rude awakening.
The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the Two years after / was decided, the issue again came to fore in
substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Ä
: #
.[37] The Municipality of Lawigan
Municipality of Andong never existed.[29] Executive Order No. 107, was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan
which established Andong, was declared ³null and void
´ in was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in /. A
1965 by this Court in /, along with thirty-three (33) other petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the
executive orders. The phrase ³
´ means ³from the executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised
beginning,´[30] ³at first,´[31] ³from the inception.´[32] / was never Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed
reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a
of Ä
: #
"[33]Ä
Äa
new decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void
. The
7
"[34]Ä
E a
Ä .[35] No subsequent Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been
ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No squarely taken up and settled in / which agreed with the
subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a argument posed by the challengers to Lawigan¶s validity.[38]
Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason
to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted In the 1969 case of Ä
Äa
7
,[39] what was
municipality. challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,[40] and
This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled
additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may in /. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked
status
not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from
Government Code and our ruling in Ä
, both nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a
corporation
of which admit to the possibility of
municipal corporations. cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in
an action for #
at the instance of the State, and not by a
To understand the applicability of Ä
and private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court
Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation of conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is
Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our reserved to the State in a proceeding for #
, but only if the
decision in /. municipal corporation is a
corporation.[41]
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in / was that the President Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a
was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Court¶s
executive issuances. The Court therein recognized ³that the President decision in /. The Court declared void the executive order
has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from
corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual performing their official duties and functions.[42] It cited conflicting
operation . . . .´[36] However, the Court ultimately nullified only those American authorities on whether a
corporation can exist
thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.[43] But the
period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence Court¶s final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a
petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this
corporation.
Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities
which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of In the cases where a
municipal corporation was recognized as
power the Court deemed unlawful. such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated,
the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that which did cite / as authority.[50] The RTC dismissed the petition
there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the
organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan matter to this Court.
was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated
cannot conceivably make it a
corporation, as, independently In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the
of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal status of San
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.[44] Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at
bar²that San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years
The Court did clarify in Äa that the previous acts done by the before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the
municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the
necessarily a nullity.[45] Camid devotes several pages of his petition in premise that the said executive order was a complete nullity, the Court
citing this point,[46] yet the relevance of the citation is unclear noted ³peculiar circumstances´ that led to the conclusion that San
considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act Andres had attained the unique status of a ³de facto municipal
of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court corporation.´[51] It noted that / limited its nullificatory effect only
in Äa retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the
of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to
of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the invalidate San Andres as well.[52] This statement squarely contradicts
Revised Administrative Code. Camid¶s reading of that the creation of San Andres, just
like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground
This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Ä
of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in /.[53]
E a
Ä .[47] The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by
President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)[54] of the
municipality, who challenged Santo Tomas¶s legal personality to Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the
institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by provision as follows:
prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal
existence. The blunt but simple ruling: ³Now then, as ruled in the Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to
Pelaez case , the President has no power to create a municipality. the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential
Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
any civil action«.´[48] elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
Nevertheless, when the Court decided Ä
[49] municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality of Section
in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential treatment of 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful
municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. )7:cBc
municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 :c5c 9 c c97
by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. c A7B7 7 c:c$c
FG
Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances 7c. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and
annulled by / in 1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid
Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for # under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon,
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning
against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)[55] the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that
whatever doubt there might be as to the ' character of the
The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Ä
municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local
'
÷ [56]Ä
:/
Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which
7/[57] In ', the juridical personality of the Municipality of provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
in 1984. / was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing at Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia
was strikingly similar to that in ; hence, the town should Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the
likewise ³benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its
Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, ' legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and
municipality.´ [58] officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when
/
÷
was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the
The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created
executive order, was among the issues raised in :/. The Court, in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned
through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired
evolution of the rule. for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66,
§16 of the Rules of Court, a #
suit against a corporation
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years
as a municipal corporation is the ruling in /
÷
from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the
that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
matter and therefore the President was without power to create by recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative
executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by §31 of
has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban
have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Ä
part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering
"=/
Ä/"
, this Court considered the into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The
following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board
corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by of Misamis Occidental.
executive order of the President before the ruling in /
÷
: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the Indeed Sinacaban has attained ' status by virtue of the Ordinance
creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
that following the ruling in Pelaez no #
suit was filed to throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the
question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling
and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class in Ä
"=/
Ä/"., 442(d) of the
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of
defect in the creation of Sinacaban«.[59] elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent
indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town.
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO
applicable rules. / and its offspring cases ruled that the President and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of
has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory attesting to Andong¶s legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, ³to support
before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the del Sur,´[61] thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially present inoperative.
annulled. The
status of such municipalities as San Andres,
Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987
442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal Constitution, which had also been relied upon in :/
defects to title these municipalities had labored under. . This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines,
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a
municipal enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the
corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the
and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that
prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was matter.[62] On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia
expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,[63]
Andong¶s
status by reason of its alleged continued existence Bohol,[64] and Misamis Occidental[65] respectively.
despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a
valid order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in
efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. / but certified as existing in the DILG
presented by
Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in
It bears noting that based on Camid¶s own admissions, Andong does /" legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.[66]
not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these
Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the
municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the
must ³have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code.´ statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes
Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is
all.[60] This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as
annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in /, the national against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it
of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local
elections for the void municipality. Government Code²that it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the
judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The
provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the
municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as /"
: #"andÄa, remain inexistent, unless recreated through
specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18)
municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their
legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive
orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from
the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither /
or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The
legal effect of the nullification of Andong in / was to revert the
constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original
municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and
Tubaran.[67] These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of
Lanao del Sur,[68] and presumably continue to exercise corporate
powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
=*0(, the
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.