NASA Investigation Board Report On The Initial Flight Anomalies of Skylab 1 May 16, 1973

t-1780
NASA INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT

ON THE
INITIAL FLIGHT ANOMALIES
OF SKYLAB__1_
ON MAY 14, 1973
IE-7780) NASa INVESTIGATION E O A B D BEPCRT 08 N79-74788

THE INITIAL FLIGHT ASOBALIES OF SKYLAB 1 08
MAY 1U, 1973 ( H A S A ) 151 p
Onclas
00/15 18706
JULY 13, 1973
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

NASA INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT
ON THE
INITIAL FLIGHT ANOMALIES
OF SKYLAB 1
ON MAY 14, 1973
JULY 13, 1973

~*~^r
BOARD MEMBERSHIP
Chairman
Bruce T. Lundin Director, Lewis Research Center
Members
Vincent L. Johnson, Vice-Chairman. . . Deputy Associate Administrator
for Space Science, NASA
Headquarters
Thomas N. Canning Systems Development Branch,
NASA Ames Research Center
William R. Dunbar Deputy Director of Launch
Vehicles, NASA Lewis Research
Center
E. Barton Geer Director for Systems Engineering
and Operations, NASA Langley
Research Center
Lto Col. Perry W. Harker Manager, Titan in Launch
Services, Space and Missile
Test Center, Vandenberg
Air Force Base
Capt. Robert E. McKean Chief, Titan m Launch Controller,
Space and Missile Test Center,
Vandenberg Air Force Base
Merland L. Moseson Deputy Director of Systems
Reliability, NASA Goddard
Space Flight Center
Counsel to the Board
S. Neil Hosenball Deputy General Counsel, NASA
Headquarters
Executive Secretary
Edward A. Richley Chief, Operations Analysis and
Planning, NASA Lewis Research
Center
Project Liaison
Haggai Cohen Director, Reliability, Quality
and Safety, Office of Manned
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Obersver
Gilbert L. Roth. Special Assistant, Aerospace
Safety Panel, NASA Headquarters
Technical Consultants
Vernon L. Alley, Jr Chief, Engineering and Analysis
for Systems Engineering and
Operations, NASA Langley
Research Center
Robert T. Wingate Head, Engineering Analysis
Branch, Systems Engineering
Division, NASA Langley Research
Center
u
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Board Membership i
Table of Contents iii
Figure List iv
Table List vii
Summary viii
I. The Skylab Program 1-1
H. The Flight of Skylab 1 2-1
m. Detailed Analysis of Flight Data 3-1
IV. The Meteoroid Shield Design 4-1
V. Highlights of the Meteoroid Shield History 5-1
VI. Analysis of Possible Failure Modes of the
Meteoroid Shield 6-1
Vn. Postulated Sequence of the Most Probable
Failure Mode 1- I
VIE. Possible Impact of Costs and Schedules on 8
the Meteoroid Shield -1
IX. The Skylab Management System 9-1
X. Significant Findings and Corrective Actions 10-1
Appendixes
A. Letter Establishing Board A- 1
B. Acronyms and Symbols B- 1
iii
FIGURE LIST
Figures appear at the end of each chapter.
Figure
1-1 Sky lab Cluster
1-2 SL-1 Vehicle
1-3 Sky lab Mission Profile
2-1 Scalar Wind Speed at Launch Time of SL-1
2-2 Altitude Comparisons for Early Portion of
S-V Launch Vehicle Boost Trajectory
2-3 SL-1 Alpha-Beta Limit at Maximum Bending
Moment
2-4 Meteoroid Shield and Solar Array System
2-5 Meteoroid Shield and Instrumentation Layout
3-1 Roll Rate Versus Range Time
3-2 Time Sequence of 63-Second Anomaly In-
strumentation
3-3 Condition of Meteoroid Shield Instrumentation
at R+60. 90 Seconds
at R+62o78 Seconds
at R+62.89 Seconds
at R+62 o 90 Seconds
at R+62.97 Seconds
at R+64. 88 Seconds
3-9 SL-1 Retro-Rocket Impingement Force Schematic
for S-H/SWS Separation
3-10 593 Second Anomaly Time Sequence
3-11 Explanation of 593 Second Anomaly
3-12 Explanation of 593 Second Anomaly
3-13 Plume Impingement Force on SAS-2
3-14 SAS-2 Wing Hinge
3-15 Engine Compartment Gas Temperature
3-16 Base Region Pressures - Assumed Failure Mode:
Interstage Did Not Separate
3-17 Separation EBW Firing Unit Monitor Indications
iv
Figure
3-18 Second Plane Separation System, S-H (block
diagram and location)
3-19 EBW Detonator and Detonator Blocks, Second
Plane Separation System, S-n (installation)
3-20 S-H-13 Interstage Station 196 Tension Strap
Analysis
3-21 Forward Interstage Internal Pressure
4-1 Meteoroid Shield
4-2 Butterfly Hinges Which Connect Meteoroid
Shield to Straps Running Under Main Tunnel
4-3 Photograph of Titanium Frame Springs in
Auxiliary Tunnel
4-4 Trunnion Strap Assembly As Used In Rigging
4- 5 Meteoroid Shield Deployment Ordnance and
Foldout Panels
4-6 Meteoroid Shield In Its Stowed or Rigged Con-
dition for Launch
4-7 Meteoroid Shield Partially Deployed
4-8 Meteoroid Shield Deployed for Orbit
4-9 Ordnance Schematic and Cross Section View for
Meteoroid Shield Release
4-10 Photograph Showing Typical Swing Link and
-- .-,. Latch Detail
4-11 Drawing of Typical Swing Link and Torsion Rod
Assembly
4-12 Assembly View of Auxiliary Tunnel
4-13 Wiring Tunnel for TAGS Running Inside Auxiliary
Tunnel
4-14 Views Showing Vent Area Provision for Auxiliary
Tunnel
4-15 Photographs of Auxiliary Tunnel Boot
4-16 Typical Cross Section Through Members of the
Orbital Workshop Wall
4-17 Longitudinal Joint Detail of MS
4-18 Rain Seal at Typical Top End of MS Flange
4-19 Thrust Block Detail (one of twelve)
4-20 Meteoroid Shield Laid Flat
4-21 Meteoroid Shield Laid Flat
Figure
6-1 View of Kapton Surface of the OWS Showing
Forward Torsion Rod Swing Link
6-2 View of Kapton Surface of the OWS Showing
Aft Torsion Rod Swing Link and Thrust Blocks
6-3 Auxiliary Tunnel Frame Spring Stiffness
6-4 Venting Locations in Meteoroid Shield
6-5 Ordnance Foldout Panel
6-6 Longitudinal Section Through Meteoroid Shield
at Foldout Panel
6-7 Skylab (SL-1, SA-513) Dynamic Pressure Profile
for Boost Phase
6-8 Meteoroid Shield Area Design Differential
Pressures for Smooth Configuration
6-9 SL-1 Auxiliary Tunnel Design Differential Pressures
6-10 Auxiliary Tunnel Forward Vent
6-11 Meteoroid Shield Response - Aft Auxiliary Tunnel
Boot Sealed
6-12 Auxiliary Tunnel Leaks
6-13 Meteoroid Shield Response - Aft Boot Leakage
6-14 Compressibility Waves from the Forward Auxiliary
Tunnel Fairing
6-15 Mathematical Model for Meteoroid Shield Divergence
Analysis
6-16 Air Bladder Test Rig for Tunnel Deflection Tests
7-1 Definition of Axes and Positive Rotations
7-2 Possible Meteoroid Shield Motion from 60.12 Seconds
to 62. 74 Seconds
7-3 Sketches of Possible Shield Dynamics During the
63 Second Anomaly
7-4 Photograph from Orbit Showing Longitudinal
Aluminum Angle Bent Over the SAS-1 Wing
vi
TABLE LIST
Tables appear following the figures at the end of each Chapter
Table
1-1 Major Skylab Contractors
n-1 Maximum wind speed in high dynamic pressure
region for Apollo/Saturn 501 through Saturn 513
vehicles
n-2 Extreme wind shear values in the high dynamic pres-
sure region for Apollo/Saturn 501 through
Saturn 513 vehicles
n-3 Orbit parameters
n-4 Normal major events
IV-1 OWS meteoroid shield swing link settings and
measurements
IX-1 Orbital Workshop Program Meteoroid Shield Design
Reviews
IX-2 Orbital Workshop Program Solar Array System
Design Reviews
vii
SUMMARY
At approximately 63 seconds into the flight of Skylab 1 on May 14,

1973, an anomaly occurred which resulted in the complete loss of
the meteoroid shield around the orbital workshop. This was fol-
lowed by the loss of one of the two solar array systems on the
workshop and a failure of the interstage adapter to separate from
the S-n stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle. The investigation re-
ported herein identified the most probable cause of this flight
anomaly to be the breakup and loss of the meteoroid shield due to
aerodynamic loads that were not accounted for in its design. The
breakup of the meteoroid shield, in turn, broke the tie downs that
secured one of the solar array systems to the workshop. Complete
loss of this solar array system occurred at 593 seconds when the
exhaust plume of the S-n stage retro-rockets impacted the partially
deployed solar array system. Falling debris from the meteoroid
shield also damaged the S-n interstage adapter ordnance system
in such a manner as to preclude separation.
Of several possible failure modes of the meteoroid shield that were
identified, the most probable in this particular flight was internal
pressurization of its auxiliary tunnel which acted to force the for-
ward end of the meteoroid shield away from the shell of the work-
shop and into the supersonic air stream. The pressurization of the
auxiliary tunnel was due to the existence of several openings in the aft
region of the tunneL Another possible failure mode was the separa-
tion of the leading edge of the meteoroid shield from the shell of the
workshop (particularly in the region of the folded ordnance panel) of
sufficient extent to admit ram air pressures under the shield.
The venting analysis for the auxiliary tunnel was predicated on a com-
pletely sealed aft end; the openings in the tunnel thus resulted from a
failure of communications among aerodynamics, structural design,
and manufacturing personnel. The failure to recognize the design
deficiencies of the meteoroid shield through six years of analysis,
design and test was due, in part, to a presumption that the shield
would be "tight to the tank"and "structurally integral with the
S-IVB tank" as set forth in the design criteria. In practice, the
meteoroid shield was a large, flexible, limp system that proved diffi-
cult to rig to the tank and to obtain the close fit that was presumed by
the design. These design deficiencies of the meteoroid shield, as well
Vlll
as the failure to communicate within the project the critical nature
of its proper venting, must therefore be attributed to an absence
of sound engineering judgment and alert engineering leadership
concerning this particular system over a considerable period of
time.
The overall management system used for Skylab was essentially the
same as that developed in the Apollo program. This system was
fully operational for Skylab; no conflicts or inconsistencies were
found in the records of the management reviews., Nonetheless, the
significance of the aerodynamic loads on the meteoroid shield during
launch were not revealed by the extensive review process,. Possibly
contributing to this oversight was the basic view of the meteoroid
shield as a piece of structure, rather than as a complex system
involving several different technical disciplines. Complex, multi-
disciplinary systems such as the meteoroid shield should have a
designated project engineer who is responsible for all aspects of
analysis, design, fabrication, test and assembly.
The Board found no evidence that the design deficiencies of the
meteoroid shield were the result of, or were masked by, the con-
tent and processes of the management system that were used for
Skylab. On the contrary, the rigor, detail, and thoroughness of
the system are doubtless necessary for a program of this magnitude.
At the same time, as a cautionary note for the future, it is empha-
sized that management must always be alert to the potential hazards
of its systems and^take care-that an attention to-rigor,-detail and
thoroughness does not inject an undue emphasis on formalism, docu-
mentation, and visibility in detail. Such an emphasis can submerge the
concerned individual and depress the role of the intuitive engineer or
analyst. It will always be of importance to achieve a cross-fertilization
and broadened experience of engineers in analysis, design, test or op-
erations. Positive steps must always be taken to assure that engineers
become familiar with actual hardware, develop an intuitive understanding
of computer-developed results, and make productive use of flight data
in this learning process. The experienced "chief engineer," who can
spend most of his time in the subtle integration of all elements of the
system under his purview, free of administrative and managerial
duties, can also be a major asset to an engineering organization..
IX
CHAPTER I
THE SKYLAB PROGRAM
Program Objectives
Skylab missions have several distinct goals: conduct of earth re-
sources observations; advance scientific knowledge of the sun and
stars; study the effects of weightlessness on living organisms,
particularly man; study and understand methods for the processing
of materials in the absence of gravity0 The Skylab mission utilizes
man as an engineer and as a research scientist, and provides an
opportunity for assessing his potential capabilities for future space
missions.
Skylab Hardware
Skylab utilizes the knowledge, experience and technical systems
developed during the Apollo program along with specialized equip-
ment necessary to meet the program objectives.
Figure 1-1 shows the Skylab in orbit. Its largest element is the
Orbital Workshop (OWS), a cylindrical container 48 feet long and
22 feet in diameter weighing some 78,000 pounds. The basic struc-
ture of the OWS is the upper stage, or S-IVB stage, of the S-IB and
S-V rockets which served as the Apollo program launch vehicle.
The OWS has no engines, except attitude controtthrusters, and has
been modified internally to provide a large orbiting space laboratory
and living quarters for the crew. The Skylab 1 (SL-1) space vehicle
included a payload consisting of four major units (OWS, Airlock
Module (AM), Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA), Apollo Telescope
Mount (ATM)) and a two-stage Saturn-V (S-IC and S-n) launch vehicle
as depicted in figure 1-2. To provide meteoroid protection and
thermal control, an external meteoroid shield (MS) was added to
cover the OWS habitable volume. A solar array system (SAS)was
attached to the OWS to provide electrical power.
The original concept called for a "Wet Workshop". In this concept,
a specially constructed S-IVB stage was to be launched "Wet" as a
1-1
propulsive stage on the S-IB Launch System filled with propellants.
The empty hydrogen tank would then be purged and filled with a
life-supporting atmosphere. A major redirection of Skylab was
made on July 22, 1969, six days after the Apollo 11 lunar landing.
As a result of the successful lunar landing, S-V launch vehicles
became available to the Skylab program. As a result, it became
feasible to completely equip the S-IVB on the ground for immedi-
ate occupancy and use by a crew after it was in orbit. Thus it
would not carry fuel and earned the name of "Dry Workshop".
Skylab Mission Plan
The nominal Skylab mission (fig. 1-3) called for the launch of the
unmanned S-V vehicle and workshop payload SL-1 into a near-
circular (235 nautical miles) orbit inclined 50 degrees to the equa-
tor. Then about 24 hours after the first launch, the manned Skylab 2
(SL-2) launch would take place using a Command Service Module
(CSM) payload atop the S-IB vehicle. After CSM rendezvous and
docking with the orbiting cluster, the crew enters and activates
the workshop; Skylab is then ready for its first operational period
of 28 days. At the end of this period, the crew returns to earth
with the CSM, and the Skylab continues in an unmanned quiescent
mode for some 60 days. The second three-man crew is launched
with a second S-IB, this time for a 56-day period of manned opera-
tion. After return of the second crew to earth, the Skylab again
operates in an unmanned mode for approximately one month. The
third three-man .crew is .then launched.with_ttie.tMrd.S.-IB.fpr a
second 56-day period in orbit after which they will return ito earth.
The total Skylab mission activities cover a period of roughly eight
months, with 140 days of manned operation.
Skylab Program Environment
The Skylab Program Office in the Office of Manned Space Flight in
NASA Headquarters is responsible for overall management of the
program. The NASA Center responsibilities are as follows:
1. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
a. Performing overall systems engineering and inte-
gration to assure the compatibility and integration
of the total mission hardware for each flight and
for the orbital assembly.
1-2
b. Developing elements of the flight hardware and re-
lated software, including: S-IB and S-V launch
vehicles, OWS, AM, MDA, ATM and payload shroud.
Co Developing assigned experiments and supporting
hardware and integrating them into the flight hard-
ware,, ' - • • • ' • ' • ' •• •'-. - . - • . ' • • - -• - ••• ?
do Supporting Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Johnson
Space Center (JSC) flight operations and performing
mission evaluation,,
2. Johnson Space Center (JSC)
a. Implementing all flight and recovery operations,
including: mission analyses and associated systems
engineering, related ground equipment and facilities,
preflight preparations, and conducting the flight and
recovery.
b. Providing and training flight crews and developing
crew and medical requirements.
c. Developing elements of the flight hardware and re-
lated software, including: modified command and
service modules, spacecraft launch adapter for
manned launches, trainers and simulators, crew
systems, medical equipment and food.
d. Developing assigned experiments, integrating those
to be carried in the CSM, and providing for stowage
of experiment data and hardware designated for
return from orbit.
d. Performing mission evaluation.
3. Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
a. Providing launch facilities for the four Skylab 1
launches.
1-3
b. Preparing checkout procedures and accomplishing
the pre-launch checkout of flight hardware and
ground support equipment
c. Planning and executing launch operations.
The major Skylab prime and first tier subcontractors and their
responsibilities are shown in table 1-1.
1-4
'
Figure 1-1.
_PSL Payload Shroud
-v Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
'•".v Length 16.8 meters (56 feet)
•'•;.-Weight'11,794 kilograms (26,000 pounds)
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount • -

Wi Width 3.3 meters (11 feet) :
Height 4.4 meters (14.7 feet)
Weight 11,181 kilograms (24,650 pounds)
MDA Multiple Docking'Adapter

Diameter 3 meters (10 feet)
Length 5.2 meters (17.3 feet)
AM Airlock Module
Diameter STS 3 meters (10 feet)
Diameter FAS 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
ID Instrument Unit
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 0.9 meter (3 feet)
OWS Orbital Workshop

Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
S-ll Second Stage ;

Weight 488,074 kilograms (1,076,000 pounds) fueled
• • • 35,403 kilograms (78,050 pounds).dry
Engines J;215) " " " ""*"
Propellents: Liquid Oxygen 333,837 liters (88,200 gallons)
Liquid Hydrogen 1,030,655 liters
(272,300 gallons)
Thrust 5,150,000 Newtons (1,150,000 pounds)
Interstage Approx. 5,171 kilograms (11,400 pounds)
SIC First Stage

Length 42 meters (138 feet)
Weight 2,245,320 kilograms (4,950,000 pounds) fueled
130,410 kilograms (287,500 pounds) dry
Engines F-1 (5)
Propellants: Liquid Oxygen 1,318,315 liters
(348,300 gallons)
RP-1 (Kerosene) 814,910 liters
(215,300 gallons)
Thrust 31,356,856 Newtons (7,723,726 pounds)
Figure 1-2. - SL-1 vehicle.

*
\
RENDEZVOUS RENDEZVOUS RENDEZVOUS
AND ACTIVATION AND ACTIVATION AND ACTIVATION
DEACTIVATION
AND REENTRY
I
A
t DEACTIVATION
AND REENTRY
i
A
! DEACTIVATION
AND REENTRY
I
NOMINAL1DAY
^^
SL-1 SL-2 SL-3 SL-4
h_\ '\ "MISSJONJL-l/2* - ' ; MISSION SL-3 ;MISSIONSL-4*
MANNED-28 DAYS UNMANNED MANNED-56 DAYS UNMANNED MANNED-56 DAYS

PHASE PHASE
Figure 1-3. - Skylab mission profile.

TABLE M. - MAJOR SKYLAB CONTRACTORS
Contract
amount
Contractor Responsibility (millions)
JSC
Rockwell International Command and service module $354.3
General Electric Automatic checkout equipment reliability and quality 29.7
assurance system engineering.
Martin Marietta Corp Payload and experiments integration and spacecraft 105.4
support.
The Garrett Corp Portable astronaut life support assembly 11.9
International Latex Corp Space suits 16.9
ITEK Corp S190—Multispectral photo facility 2.7
Black Engineering, Inc S191—Infrared spectrometer 2.0
Cutler Hammer Airborne Instrument Lab S194—L-band radiometer 1.5
General Electric S193—Microwave radiometer/scatterometer 11.3
Honeywell Corp S192—10-band mult/spectral scanner 10.8
HDQ
Martin Marietta Corp , Program support. 11.1
MSFC
General Electric . Electrical support equi pment and logistics support 25.0
McDonnell Douglas S-IVB stage 25.7
Martin Marietta Corp . Payload integration and multiple docking adapter as-
sembly 215.5
Rockwell International (Rocketdyne Division). ; Saturn engine support—Saturn V and Saturn IB 10.3
IBM . Apollo telescope mount digital computer and associated
items 29.2
Chrysler. .S-IB stage 30.0
S-IB systems and integration 7.0
McDonnell Douglas—West.. . Orbital workshop 383.3
McDonnell Douglas—East.. . Airlock 267.7
General Electric . Launch vehicle ground support equipment 12.6
IBM . Instrument unit 30.7
Boeing . S-IC stage .9
System Engineering and integration 7.4
American Science & Engineering. . X-Ray spectrographic telescope—S054 8.3
High Altitude Observatory . White light coronagraph-S05f. 14.7
Harvard . UV spectrometer—S055 34.6
Naval Research Laboratory . UV spectrograph/heliograph 40.9
Goddard Space Flight Center . Dual X-ray telescope 2.5
KSC
Chrysler Corp S-IB launch operations support 23.2
Boeing Co Saturn V launch vehicle and launch complex 39, launch
operations 14.4
Rockwell International Command and service module support 17.5
McDonnell Douglas S-IVB launch services 58.9
IBM.. Instrument unit, launch services 12.3
Delco Electronics Navigation and guidance launch operations .9
Martin Marietta Corp Multiple docking adapter support.
MAJOR SKYLAB SUBCONTRACTORS
> JSC
Aerojet General Corp CSM service propulsion system (SPS) rocket engines... $3.1
AiResearch Manufacturing Co CSM environmental control systems (ECS) 5.6
Aeronca Inc CSM honeycomb panels 1.5
AVCO Corp Command module heat shields 2.5
Beech Aircraft Corp CSM cryogenic gas storage system 4.0
Collins Radio CSM communications and data systems 4.7
Honeywell Inc CSM stabilization and control systems 3.1
Marguardt Co Service module reaction control system (RCS) engines..
Northrop Corp Command module Earth landing system
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft CSM fuel cell powerplants 3.2
Bell Aerospace Co RCS.propellant storage tanks 3.4
Simmonds Precision Products, Inc Propellant utilization gauging system. 1.3
MSFC
TRW Solar array system. 23.7
Fair-child Miller Habitability support system 19.0
Hamilton Standard Division of United Air- Centrifugal urine separators 9.6
craft Corp
Hycom Manufacturing Co Orbital workshop viewing window. .9
AiResearch Manufacturing Co Molecular sieve 4.7
CHAPTERn
THE FLIGHT OF SKYLAB 1
Launch and Environment

Skylab 1 was launched at 1730:00 (Range time, R=0) on May 14,
1973, from Complex 39 A, Kennedy Space Center. At this time,
the Cape Kennedy launch area was experiencing cloudy conditions
with warm temperatures and gentle surface winds. Total sky
cover consisted of scattered cumulus at 2,400 feet, scattered
stratocumulus at 5,000 feet, broken altocumulus at 12,000 feet,
and cirrus at 23,000 feet. During ascent, the vehicle passed
through the cloud layers but no lightning was observed in the area.
As shown in tables H-l and IE-2, upper area wind conditions were
benign compared to most other Saturn-V flights. Figure 2-1 shows
a comparison between wind speed, altitude, and time during the
launch. Figure 2-2 shows altitude vs. range time. Figure 2-3 is
a plot showing SL-1 history in the region of maximum bending
moment. As can be seen, the flight environment was quite favorable.
Major Events
The automatic countdown proceeded normally with Guidance Refer-
ence Release occurring at R-17.0 seconds and orbit insertion
occurring at R*599.0 seconds. Table n-3 lists the pertinent orbit
parameters and table n-4 is a summary of the normal major events
through orbit insertion* All times are referenced from Range time,
R=0, which is defined as the last integral second prior to liftoff. As
can be seen from table n-4, the OWS solar array deployment was
commanded on time; however, real time data indicated that the sys-
tem did not deploy fully.
Description of Solar Array System and Meteorpid Shield
The Solar Array System (SAS) on the OWS consists of two large beams
enclosing three major sections of solar cell assemblies within each.
During ascent, the sections are folded like an accordion inside the
beams which in turn are stowed against the workshop as shown in
figure 2-4. The MS is a lightweight structure wrapped around the
2-1
converted S-IVB stage orbital workshop and is exposed to the
flight environment. The MS, and its attachment to the OWS,
is described in detail in Chapter IV of this report. The two hinged
SAS wings are secured to the OWS by tie downs above and below
the MS. Seals attached to the SAS perimeter actually press against
the shield to form an air-tight cavity prior to launch. Once in
orbit, the SAS beams are first deployed out 90 degrees. The MS
is deployed later to a distance of about five inches from the OWS
wall (see fig. 2-4). After the ordnance release is fired, MS deploy-
ment is effected by torsion rods and swing links spaced around the
structure fore and aft. The rods are torqued prior to launch and
simply "unwind" in orbit to move the MS away from the tank. De-
tection of pertinent conditions associated with the MS and SAS is
afforded by measuring various parameters by telemetered instru-
mentation. Figure 2-5 shows a plan view of the MS and SAS con-
figuration and identifies the location of instrumentation sensors.
Early Indication of Anomalies
When the OWS Solar Array System was commanded to deploy, tele-
metered data indicated that events did not occur as planned. The
flight data was analyzed by flight operations personnel to reveal
the possible source of the problem. At about R+60 seconds, the
S-n telemetry reflected power increased slightly. At about 63
seconds, numerous measurements indicated the apparent early
deployment and loss of the MS. At this time, the vehicle was at
about 28, .600 feet altitude and at a velocityof about Mach 1.
At this time, vehicle dynamic measurements such as vibration,
acceleration, attitude error, and acoustics indicated strong dis-
turbances. Measurements which are normally relatively static at
this time, such as torsion rod strain gages, tension strap break-
wires, temperatures, and SAS position indicators, indicated a loss
of the MS and unlatch of the SAS-2 wing. Further preliminary eval-
uation revealed abnormal vehicle accelerations, vibrations, and
SAS temperature and voltage anomalies at about R+593 seconds.
Temperature data loss and sudden voltage drops indicated that the
SAS-2 wing was separated from the OWS at this time. Other data
later in the flight indicated the SAS-1 wing did not fully deploy when
commanded to do so. Although not apparently associated with the
63-second and 593-second anomalies, the S-n stage Range Safety
Receiver signal strengths showed several drops throughout the flight
beginning at about R+260 seconds.
2-2
100
90
ALTITUDE,
km
RANGE
TIME,
SEC
70
60
50
40
0 40 60 80 100
WIND SPEED, m/s
figure 2-1. - Scalar wind speed at launch time of SL-1.
28
- ACTUAL
24 PREDICTED
20
16
ALTITUDE,
km
12
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
RANGE TIME, SEC

Figure 2-2. - Altitude comparisons for early portion of S-V launch vehicle boost trajectory.
MACH = 1.20
51MBAL
ANGLE, STRUCTURAL LIMIT
P, .3
DEC
SL-1 HISTORY IN REGION OF

MAXIMUM BENDING MOMENT
,-66 SEC
0 3 4 5 6 7 8
ANGLE OF ATTACK, a, DEC
Figure 2-3. - SL-1 alpha-beta limit at maximum bending moment.
r-
SAS-1 SAS-2
MS-
(a) STOWED.
SAS-2
•MS-
(b) DEPLOYED.
Figure 2-4. - Meteoroid shield and solar array system.

37006
2.4 2.4
^-AUXILIARY HVWIN '-ORDNANCE
TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATE
0.0 ° DENOTES TIME BETWEEN DATA SAMPLES IN SECONDS

—cm
fc = TEMPERATURE" ~
J G = TORSION ROD POSITION
I K7010THROUGH K7012 = ORDNANCE BREAKSTRIP SENSORS
LK7211 AND K7212 = SAS SECURE
j ^ = INSTRUMENTATION WIRING ROUTING (EXTERIOR TO METEOROID SHIELD)
£/'
Figure 2-5. - Meteoroid shield and instrumentation layout!
U
TABLE II-l. - MAXIMUM WIND SPEED IN HIGH DYNAMIC PRESSURE REGION FOR
APOLLO/SATURN 501 THROUGH SATURN 513 VEHICLES
VEHICLE MAXIMUM WIND MAXIMUM WIND COMPONENTS

NO.
S PEED, DIR, ALT, PITCH, ALT, YAW, ALT,
M/S (KNOTS) DEG KM (FT) wx, KM (FT) KM (FT)
M/S (KNOTS) M/S (KNOTS)
AS-501 26.0 (50.5) 273 11.50(37700) 24.3 (47.2) 11.50(37700) 12.9 (25.1) 9. 00 (29 500)
AS-502 27.1 (52.7) 255 13. 00 (42 600) 27. 1 (52. 7) 13.00(42650) 12.9 (25.1) 15. 75 (51 700)
AS-503 34.8 (67.6) 284 15. 22 (49 900) 31.2 (60.6) 15.10(49500) 22.6 (43.9) 15. 80 (51 800)
AS-504 76.2(148.1) 264 11. 73 (38 480) 74.5(144.8) 11.70(38390) 21.7 (42.2) 11.43(37500)
AS-505 42.5 (82.6) 270 14. 18 (46 520) 40.8 (79.3) 13. 80 (45 280) 18.7 (36.3) 14. 85 (48 720)
AS-506 9.6 (18.7) 297 11.40(37400) 7.6 (14.8) 11.18(36680) 7.1 (13.8) 12. 05 (39 530)
AS -507 47.6 (92.5) 245 14. 23 (46 670) 47.2 (91.7) 14. 23 (46 670) -19. 5 (-37. 9) 13. 65 (44 780)
AS-508 55.6(108.1) 252 13. 58 (44 540) 55.6(108.1) 13. 58 (44 540) 15.0 (29.1) 12. 98 (42 570)
AS-509 52. 8 (102. 6) 255 13.33(43720) 52.8(102.6) 13. 32 (43 720) 24.9 (48.5) 10. 20 (33 460)
AS-510 18.6 (36.2) 063 13.75(45110) -17. 8 (-34. 6) 13. 73 (45 030) 7.3 (14.2) 13. 43 (44 040)
AS-511 26.1 (50.7) 257 11. 85 (38 880) 26.0 (50.5) 11.85(38880) 12.5 (24.2) 15. 50 (50 850)
AS-512 45.1 (87.6) 311 12. 1.8 (39 945) 34.8 (67.6) 12. 18 (39 945) 29.2 (56.8) 11.35(37237)
SA-513 34.4 (66.8) 267 12. 70 (41 666) 26.2 (50.9) 13. 03 (42 732) 24.9 (48.3) 12. 68 (41 584)
TABLE II-2. - EXTREME WIND SHEAR VALUES IN THE HIGH
DYNAMIC PRESSURE REGION FOR APOLLO/SATURN 501
THROUGH SATURN 513 VEHICLES
(Ah =1000 M)
VEHICLE NO. PIT!:H PLANE YAkW PLANE
SHEAR, ALTITUDE, SHEAR, ALTITUDE

SEC"1 KM (FT) SEC"1 KM (FT)
AS -501 0.0066 10. 00 (32 800) 0.0067 10.00(32800)

AS -502 .0125 14. 90 (48 900) .0084 13. 28 (43 500)
AS -503 .0103 16. 00 (52 500) .0157 15. 78 (51 800)
AS-504 .0248 15. 15 (49 700) .0254 14. 68 (48 160)
AS-505 .0203 15. 30 (50 200) .0125 15. 53 (50 950)
AS-506 .0077 14. 78 (48 490) .0056 10. 30 (33 790)
AS-507 . 0183 14. 25 (46 750) .0178 14.58(47820)
AS-508 .0166 15.43(50610) .0178 13. 98 (45 850)
AS-509 .0201 13. 33 (43 720) .0251 11. 85 (38 880)
AS-510 .0110 11.23(36830) .0071 14.43(47330)
.... AS--.51L .;.. .....0».5._. 13,.65J44J80) .0114 15. 50 (50 850)
AS-512 .0177 7. 98 (26164) .0148 10. 65 (34 940)
SA-513 .0139 14. 05 (46 095) .0107 9. 25 (30347)
Table n-3 —• Orbit Parameters *
Difference
Between
Actual and
Parmeter Actual Predicted Predicted
Apogee, nautical
miles 234.5 233.8 0.7
Perigee, nautical
miles 233.8 233.8 0
Inclination, degrees 50.06 50.00 0.06
Ascending Node,
west longitude 129.9° 129.9° 0
* Data source is from radar data processed by the Mission Operations Computer
at JSC.
Table n-4 — Normal Major Events
Difference
Between
Actual Time Predicted Actual and
From R=0 Time From Predicted
Major Event Seconds R=0 Seconds Seconds
Guidance Reference Release

(GRR) -17.0 -17.0 0
S-IC Engine Start Sequence

Command - 8.9 - 8.9 0
Range Time Zero (1730:00) 0 0 0
All Holddown Arms Released 0.2 0.2 0
Liftoff, Begin Time Base 1 0.586 0.520 0
Begin Tower Avoidance Pitch

and Yaw Maneuver 1.6 1.5 0.1
End Tower Avoidance Pitch

ivianeuver
IV/Tfm A11T7AY* — - — _ . . . . — .-. 5- t 0{ j - - - _ - - - . 5 • rr" 0.1
- /\v- ^- -- - - - - __-— .
Begin Pitch and Roll Program 12.2 11.2 1.0
S-IC Outboard Engine Cant 20.5 20.5 0
Mach 1 61.1 61.5 -0.4
Maximum Dynamic Pressure

(Max Q) 73.5 75.0 -1.5
S-IC Center Engine Cutoff

(CECO) 140. 7 140.6 0.1
Begin Time Base 2 140.8 140.7 0.1
S-IC Outboard Engine Cutoff

Enable 152.4 152.4
(Difference
Between
i Actual Time i Predicted Actual and
From R=0 Time From Predicted
Major Event Seconds R=0 Seconds Seconds
Begin Tilt Arrest

(Stop Pitch) 158.1 157.1 1.0
S-IC Engine 1 and 3

Cutoff 158.2 158.2 0
S-IC Engine 2 and 4

Cutoff 158.2 158.2 0
Begin Time Base 3 158.2 158.2 0
S-IC/S-H Separation 159.9 159.9 0
S-n Engine Start Sequence

Command 160.6 160.6
Arm-1, S-H Aft Inter-

stage Separation 183.2 183.2
Arm-2, S-H Aft Inter-

stage Separation 183.3 183.3
S-n Aft Interstage Separation

Command-1 (Second
Plane Separation Command
1) 189.9 189.9
S-n Aft Interstage Separation

Command-2 (Second Plane
Separation Command-2
[Backup]) 190.0 190.0
Start Iterative Guidance Mode

(IGM) Phase 1 197.1 196.2 0.9
Start Steering Misalignment

Calculation 216.4 216.8 -0.4
S-n Center Engine Cutoff 314.0 314.2 -0.2

Difference
Between
i Actual Time •Predicted Actual and
from R=0 Time From Predicted
Maior Event Seconds R=0 Seconds Seconds
Start IGM Phase n 314.5 314. 3 0.2
S-n Engine Mixture Ratio

(EMR) Shift 403. 7 402. 6 1.1
Start IGM Phase m 404. 0 402.5 1.5
Begin Terminal Steering 568. 8 563.7 5.1
S-H Outboard Engine Cutoff

(OECO) 589.0 588.3 0.7
Begin Time Base 4 589.2 588.5 0.7
S-II/Saturn Workshop (SWS)

Separation Command/
Fire Retro Motors -1 591.1 590.5 0.6
S-n/(SWS) Separation
Command/Fire Retro
Motors -2 (Backup) 591. 2 590.6 0.6
Initiate S-n Timer 591.2 590.6 0.6
Orbit Insertion 599.0 598.3 0.7
Start Local Reference Maneuver

(Local Vertical Attitude) 599.6 598.5 1.1
Initiate S-n Safing vent 805.1 800.6 4.5
Start Payload Shroud Jettison/

Begin Time Base 4A 919.2 932.3 -13.1
Payload Shroud Jettison 920.4 934.0 -13.6
Start Solar Inertial Maneuver 958.8 972.3 -13.5

Difference
Between
Actual Time Predicted Actual and
FromR=0 Time From Predicted
Maior Events Seconds R=0 Seconds Seconds
Initiate ATM Deployment 999.1 998. 5 0.6
Initiate ATM Solar

Arrays Deployment 1492.3 1491. 7 0.6
ATM Telemetry On 2209.1 2208. 5 0.6
Initiate OWS Solar Array

System Deployment 2465. 7 2465.1 0.6
Initiate MS Deployment 5764. 1 5763.5 0.6
Thmster Attitude Control

System (TAGS) Command
Transfer to ATM 17400. 7 17400. 1 0.6
Begin Time Base 5 29399.5 29398. 6 0.9

CHAPTER
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF FLIGHT DATA
63 Second Anomaly - Loss of MS

The Investigation Board evaluated the telemetry data in order to
explain the various anomalies that occurred on Skylab 1. The
first anomalous indication was an increase in S-n telemetry
reflected power from a steady 1. 5w beginning at R+59.80 seconds.
At this time the telemetry forward power remained steady at
58.13w. By 61.04 seconds, the reflected power had reached
1.75w, and by 80.38 seconds, the reflected power had stabilized
at about 2. Ow. This abnormal increase in power might be indica-
tive of a vehicle physical configu ration change which altered the
antenna ground plane characteristic.
Shortly after the telemetry reflected power increase, the MS tor-
sion rod 7 forward (measurement G7036) indicated a slight change
toward the deployed condition (see fig. 2-5 for instrumentation
layout). This occurred at Rf 60.12 seconds, and at 61.78 seconds
the vehicle roll rate decreased slightly from a normal value of 1.1
degrees per second clockwise (CW) looking forward. Figure 3-1
is a graph of the roll rate versus range time during the time of
interest. The next torsion rod 7 forward sample at about 62.52
seconds revealed a further relaxation. The increase in telemetry
reflected power and the movement of torsion rod 7 forward tend to
indicate meteoroid shield lifting between positions I and n (see
fig. 2-5).
Between R+62. 75 and 63.31 seconds, several vehicle dynamic
measurements indicated a significant disturbance. A sensor on
the OWS film vault showed an abnormal vibration at 62.75 seconds
followed by disturbances sensed by X and Y accelerometer pickups
in the Instrument Unit (IU), the pitch, yaw, and longitudinal accel-
erometers, and the pitch, yaw, and roll rate gyros. At 62.78
seconds, the roll rate gyro sensed a sudden CW roll rate resulting
in a peak amplitude of 3.0 degrees per second CW at 62.94 seconds.
A sensor at the IU upper mounting showed a maximum peak-to-peak
shock of 17.2 g's at 63.17 seconds. In addition, the S-n engine
actuators experienced pressure fluctuations caused by vehicle
movement against the inertia of the non-thrusting engine nozzles.
3-1
During the time the vehicle was sensing a disturbance, several
slower-rate MS and SAS measurements experienced drastic
changes. Because these measurements are sampled only once
every 0.1 to 2.4 seconds, there is that period of uncertainty
as to when the measurement has actually changed. Figure 3.2
is a graphic representation of the applicable measurements
associated with the 63-second anomaly,. Where only a single
point is shown, the sampling is continuous or has no significant
bearing on the hypotesization of the MS failure mode. For the
MS and SAS data sampled at 0.1, 0. 8, and 2.4 seconds per
sample, the last normal and first abnormal times are shown.
Figures 3-3 through 3-8 are pictorial representations of the
status of the MS and SAS measurements at the indicated period
of time. Figure 3-3 is a time slice at R+60.90 seconds where
all measurements are known to be normal for the last time
(except for the slight movement of torsion rod 7 forward
beginning at 60.12 seconds).
Figure 3-4 is a time slice at the first indication of a measure-
ment failure (R+62.78 seconds). The measurements K7211,
C7013, K7010, K7011, and K7012 can be considered normal
here because they were normal during the previous sample and
were sampled later than 62. 78 seconds and found to still be
-normal. At this time period,. C7Q11 (a temperature measure-
ment) was lost. The cause of this measurement failure could
have been due to the sensor or its cabling (shown in fig. 3-4 by
dashed lines) being damaged. This was most likely a result
of the MS failure in the area between the SAS-2 wing and the
main tunnel (between positions I and n). Furthermore, both
SAS wing secure indications and the ordnance tension strap in-
dications are known to be good. This evidence leads to two
conclusions at this point: the meteoroid shield failure began
prior to the SAS-2 wing becoming unlatched, and the ordnance
did not fire prematurely.
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 are time slices at R+620 89 and R+62.90,
respectively, that show the failure of measurements C7012,
K7010, K7011, and K7211, while K7212 (SAS-1 secured) and
C7013 (MS temperature) were known to be normal by a later
sample. The abnormal telemetry indications C7012, K7010,
3-2
and K7011, like C7011 at R+62.78 seconds, could have been due
to sensor or wiring damage. Measurements K7010, K7011, and
K7012 are, in fact, only breakwires placed across the ordnance
tension strap. Measurement K7211, however, reveals that the
SAS-2 wing was no longer secure to the OWS. This is an indi-
cation that the SAS-2 wing had moved out at least between 0.651
and 2.821 degrees, or between 4.66 and 20.2 inches as measured
at the aft end of the wing perpendicular to the OWS.
Figure 3-7 represents a later time, 62.97 seconds. At this time,
K7012 (tension strap) was detected as failed. Slightly later, at
R+63.04 seconds, the first indication of increased SAS voltage
appeared. Measurement M0103 showed a slight increase in voltage
whichis attributed to sunlight illuminating exposed sections of the
partially-deployed (unlatched) SAS-2 wing. Other SAS voltages
fluctuated throughout the remainder of the launch phase for the
same reason. Between 62.97 and 64 0 92 seconds, all of the MS
failure-related measurements became abnormal. Figure 3-8
shows that the SAS-1 wing secure measurement (K7212) was
still normal.
The data indicate that the most probable sequence of Meteoroid
Shield failure was initial structural failure of the MS between the
SAS-2 wing and the main tunnel (between positions I and n). The
initial failure propagation from this area appears likely since the
wardroom window thermocouple indication (C7013) remained
normal at 62.94 seconds after SAS-2 indicated unlatched at 62.90
seconds and after the K7010 and K7011 tension strap measurements
failed.
593 Second Anomaly
As a consequence of the MS failure at approximately 63 seconds,
the SAS-2 wing was unlatched and partially deployed as evidenced
by minor variations in the main SAS electrical voltages and SAS-2
temperatures. Full deployment was prevented due to the aero-
dynamic forces and accelerations during the remainder of powered
flight.
At the completion of the S-n phase of flight the four 35,000 pound
thrust retro-rockets fired for approximately two seconds com-
mencing at R+591.10 seconds followed by spacecraft separation
3-3
at 591.2 seconds. The effect of retro-rocket plume impirigement
(refer to fig. 3-9 for location and orientation of the retro-rockets
relative to the SAS-2 -wing) was observed almost immediately on
the SAS-2 temperature and on vehicle body rates.
The time sequence of observed changes in the affected measure-
ments is demonstrated in figure 3-10. The response of the vehicle
and the corrective action of the attitude control system may be
seen in figures 3-11 and 3-12.
An analysis of the impingement forces on the wing was made and
compared to the force required to produce the observed vehicle
motion. This comparison provides a reasonable fit for the first
50 to 60 degrees of wing rotation as shown in figure 3-13.
At 593.4 seconds the wing imparted momentum to the vehicle,
probably by hitting and breaking the 90 degree fully deployed
stops and at 593.9 imparted a final kick as it tore completely
free at the hinge linko In-orbit photographs show clearly the
hinge separation plane and the various wires which were torn
loose at the interface (see fig. 3-14).
Interstage Second Plane Separation Anomaly
Post-flight analysis revealed unexpectedly high" temperatur es amT
pressures in the S-n engine compartment following ignition and
continued high after interstage separation command as shown in
figures 3-15 and 3-16. The unusually high temperatures from
S-n ignition and until the S-n interstage separation signal are
considered by MSFC to be caused by a change in the engine heat
shield skirts introduced on this flight, and therefore do not in-
dicate a problem. However, the increasing temperatures after
the time of normal S-n interstage separation are indicative of an
abnormal condition. More detailed investigation based on per-
formance evaluation and axial acceleration time history revealed
that the interstage had not been jettisoned; however, due to the
vehicle performance characteristics and performance margin,
the desired orbit was achieved.
Data analysis confirms that the primary ordnance command was
properly issued at R+189.9 seconds. The back-up command was
3-4
issued 100 milliseconds (ms) later but the exploding bridge wire
circuit discharge was characteristic of an open circuit consistent
with separation of the interstage disconnect by a minimum of
0.25 inch as shown in figure 3-17.
The linear shaped charge (LSC) is mounted circumferentially
around the S-n interstage as shown in figures 3-18 and 3-19.
When fired by the primary command, the charge cuts the tension
straps (in the direction of position n to position I) allowing the
skirt to drop away. Normal propagation time of the LSC is
approximately 4 ms. Assuming a failure to propagate completely
around the structure, analyses were made by appropriate con-
tractor and the government personnel to determine what area
must remain intact in order to retain the skirt and what area
must have been cut to allow rotation of the skirt sufficient to
disconnect the connector panel. An example of the results of
one analysis is shown in figure 3-20. Thevarious analyses iso-
late the region of failure to an arc extending from approximately
9- = 100 degrees to as much as 6- = 200 degrees.
This ordnance installation was different from prior Saturn flights.
Previously, a single fire command from the instrumentation unit
was issued which simultaneously detonated the LSC from both
ends allowing the charge to propagate from both directions. On
this flight, in an attempt to provide redundant firing commands,
the detonators at each end of the LSC were separately connected
to two command channels spaced 100 milliseconds apart due to
the characteristics of the airborne equipment. As a result of the
partial cutting of the interstage, it rotated sufficiently to separate
the electrical connector prior to issuing the back-up command.
A review of the history of manufacturing, acceptance, checkout,
qualification and flight environment revealed no basic cause for
failure. The most probable cause is secondary damage as a
result of the MS failure, attributed to falling debris as evidenced
by the various shock and acoustic disturbances occurring in the
63-second time period.
The redundant mode of ordnance operation of all prior Saturn
flights in which both ends of the LSC are fired at once from a
single command would probably have prevented the failure, de-
pending on the extent of damage experienced by the LSC.
3-5
Forward Interstage Internal Pressure Anomaly
Flight data indicated a deviation of the S-n forward interstage
pressure from analytical values commencing at approximately
63 seconds. Inasmuch as the deviation from the analytical
curve of internal pressure versus time appeared to be coinci-
dent with the MS failure (see fig. 3-21) it was postulated that
a portion of the shield had punctured the forward interstage.
On this basis, it was possible to correlate the flight data with
either an assumed 2.0 square foot hole in the conical section
or an assumed 0.75 square foot hole in the cylindrical section.
Range Safety Receiver Anomaly
During the S-n portion of the flight, the signal strength indi-
cations from both range safety receivers showed drops in level.
From liftoff through R+259 seconds, both receivers maintained
relatively stable values above range requirements. At R+259.57
seconds, receiver 2 signal strength began to drop and between
this time and 522.1 seconds, both receivers indicated various
degrees of signal strength shift. These signal strength shifts
dropped below the 12 db safety margins required by Air Force
Eastern Test Range (AFETR) Manual 127-1. At R+327.81
seconds, the receiver 2 signal strength dropped briefly below
its threshhbld sensitivity. At this instant this receiver probably
would not have responded to any range safety commands. Re-
ceiver 1 was, however, capable of-receiving commands. At-
R+521.16, receiver 2 strength again dropped briefly to its
threshhold sensitivity. None of these drops could be correlated
to ground system performance.
Analysis indicates that the most probable cause of the S-n re-
ceiver signal strength dropout was a variable phase shift within
the vehicle's hybrid coupler due to the changing aspect angle
produced by the moving vehicle and the fixed transmitting site.
Because the decrease in receiver signal strength occurred with
only one receiver at a time, range safety commands could have
been received continuously throughout power flight. During two
of these drops, however, the planned redundancy of range safety
receivers was not available.
During this investigation, it was revealed that the Wallops Island
and Bermuda ground stations did not continuously record ground
transmitter power levels. The Board considers that such continu-
ous recordings would be of value.
3-6
MEASUREMENT NUMBER
O R0006
D R10012
ROLL
RATE, i
DEC/SEC
-3
61.6 61.8 62.0 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63.0 63.2 63.4 63.6 63.8 64.0 64.2 64.4 64.6 64.8
RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-1 . - Roll rate versus range time.
• FIRST ABNORMAL DATA
SAMPLE RATE NOT
PERTINENT TO ANALYSIS
• LAST NORMAL SAMPLE
C7015MSI5TEMP FIR5T ABNORMAL * • 64 89 OFF SCALE
G7037S6 AFT TORSION c»«mr * • 64. 88 FULL
G7030S4FWD TORS ION SAMPLE - ^ , • ;,...-••/• 44 71 FULL
--G703405AFT-TORSION- - . " " • . • • • ' • ' • - -•• • - - : ; « 6 4 . 7 1 FULL
. G7032* 5 FWD TORSION " «'•'••• • «.6468FULL
G7027# 2 FWD TORSION "" - - • - • - . • . •64,57 FULL
G7033I4AR TORSION • • 64, 57 FULL
. G7029#2ARTORSION • • 64 49 FULL
67028*3 FWD TORSION • • 64 32 FULL
G7035 #6 FWD TORSION • • 64. 23 FULL
G700508FWDTORSION * * 64 10 FULL
G1026J7AR TORSION • • • 64 10 FULL
G7018NS08TEMP- ••--••••• • 6 4 0 9 OFF SCALE
G7003 11 FWD TORSION . * • 6402 3% DOWN '
C7017MS07TEMP • • 63. 79 OFF SCALE
C7013MS#3TEMP « • 63. 74 OFF SCALE
C7016MS06TEMP • • 63. 63 OFF SCALE
C7014MS#4TEMP . • • 63. 53 OFF SCALE
G7031 #3 AR TORSION « »63.50FULL
G7006if8ARTORSION « »63.37 !
E0023-115 SIC UPP. TH. RINGVIB • 63.31 ,"
G7004#1AR TORS ION • • 63, 30 3% DOWN
00167-203' D PITCH 'ACT AP • 63.16
D0166- 202 E2 YAW A C T A P • 63,10
M0103 SAS VOLTAGE • • 63. 04 SMALL SHI FTS • CONTINUE
E0001 X AXI S STS VI B • 63.03
R0005 YAW RATE • 63,01
A0004-120 PITCH ACCEL SIC • 63,00
H0069 ROLL ERROR . • 63,00
H0056 ROLL LADDER • 63,00
B0003-219 Sit FWD BND LAY ACOUSTIC • 62,98
D0267-201 El LOX PUMP IN PR • 6298
E0361-206 El'GIMB. PAD VI B • 6298
D0167-201 El PITCH ACT AP • 6198
K7012TENSIONSTRAP#3 • 62 97 OPEN
E0362-206 LOX SUMP PREVALVE VI B • 62, 96
D0167-202E2 PITCH A C T A P •• 62 94
K7010 TENSION STRAP #1 •• 62 90 OPEN
K7011-TENSION-STRAP #-2 - - - - - .. - . . . _.... »• 62900PIN
K7211 SAS 2 SECURE *• 62WDEPtOYIO
C7012 MS * 2 TEMP • • 62, 89 OFF SCALI
D0166-204 E4 YAW A C T A P • 6288
H0010Z ACCEL PICKUP • 6288
H0011X ACCEL PICKUP • 6287
A0006 PITCH ACCEL • 6287
A0002LONG. ACCEL • 6287
R0004 PITCH RATE • 6286
00167-204 E4 PITCH A C T A P • 6281
H0012Y ACCEL PICKUP • 62,11
£0040 IU UPPER MTG RINGVIB • 628!
E0081S-IIFWD S K R A D V I B • 62. 81
E0002 X-AXIS PS VI B • 6280
AD007 YAW ACCEL • 6279
C7011MSHTEMP • • 6i,?SSFFSeALi
E70000WS FILM VAULT VI B •tt.1t '• • - • - . . • : . , ..,.••• -,
R006 ROLL RATE • 61, 7S • 61 71 FAIT -' •

07036*7 FWD TORSION # 57. 72) •», 12, SLOW* 62 S2, < 0 64 ft FULL
N0034TLMRETLPWR 55 10, JftSHIFTDOWN j*SHIFTB0WN
' 1 I 1 1 1 1
$9 £61 62 61 64 l§
TIMI lie
i" FlguPB 3-i, TIMI SIQUINei OF 61-116 ANOMALY INiTRUMINTATieN , .
\
[K7_211|[G7032| 1670351 IG7036I
I
IK7212J IG7003I
\ \ 167080]
A • • A •
•
I* ,'|POS IV
^-AUXILIARY ÔRDNANCE
TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATE
MEASUREMENT NORMAL
MEASUREMENT CONDITION UNKNOWN
MEASUREMENT LOST OR ACTIVATED
Figure 3-3. - Condition of meteoroid shield instrumentation at R + 60.90 sec.

IK7211I[G7032I IG70361 IK7212 [07003] LG7027I IG7028I |G703p|
A •
•
•
• •
~r
3 T
SAS
NO. 2
o rJ^
|POS i ^"""^^^ \
|POS III [07031] am*/IPOS rv
" .
ÂUXILIARY MAIN ^-ORDNANCE
TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATC
—^ MEASUREMENT NORMAL
• MEASUREMENT CONDITION UNKNOWN
X MEASUREMENT LOST OR ACTIVATED

IK72111 IG7032I IG2035I [G70361 IG7005I IK7212J [G70Q3I IG7028I
A • • •
• A. •
^-AUXILIARY '-ORDNANCE
TUNNEL .TUNNEL PLATE

|G7035| [G70361
\
|K7212| IG7003I
• •
A •
:=
SAS
0
NO. 2
o '
rf |POS i IG7026I \ POS in a* /IPOS

\
ÂUXILIARY L
HV1AIN ORDNANCE
TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATE
-*- MEASUREMENT NORMAL . .

I* ,'|POS IV
ÂUXILIARY -MAIN ^-ORDNANCE

TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATE

X _ \ X
IK7211I [G70321 IG70Q5I |K7212| G7QQ3] fi57028l
A •
SAS
NO. 2
O
IPOS i 1*|POS II\ IPOS in IG7031I n* /|POS iv

A X
J
\
X X
^-AUXILIARY HWAIN '-ORDNANCE
TUNNEL TUNNEL PLATE
MEASUREMENT NORMAL
MEASUREMENT CONDITION UNKNOWN
MEASUREMENT LOST OR ACTIVATED

LOCATION OF I.U.
INSTRUMENTATION
(1) ACCELEROMETERS A0002-603,
A0006-603, AND A0007-603
LOCATED AT POSITION IV.
(2) RATE GYROS R0004-602, S-U\RETROS (4)
R0005-602, AND R0006-602
LOCATED AT POSITION III.
SAS-2 IN DEPLOYED
: POSITION
Figure 3-9. - SL-1 retro-rocket impingement force schematic for S-II/SWS separation.
<; 1_ Q- TEMP. SHIFTED OFF SCALE
LU
O j— Jj
O 1X1
O oo /)
Lu
I
00
o^
0 O
CO
X t—I
s? -4
CQ
O
1—1 t—4
594. 596. 69 C7252 SAS WING 2, SE3, PNL 11 TEMP.
t-H 1—1 h-1 5941 96. 59 C7251 SAS WING 2, SE3, PNL 7 TEMP.
il/"> iyj /I oo LO
594 09 17 .49C7250SAS WING 2, SE3, PNL 5 TEMP.
59Z 89V 9 C7246 SAS WING 2, SE2, PNL 7 TEMP.
5 F 594. 99 C7247 SAS WING 2, SE2, PNL 9 TEMP.
594.09'7 V 594 89 C7243 SAS Wl NG 2, SE1, PNL 3 TEMP.
»n_ — r«i
592.! 4.69C7248SASWING 2, SE2, PNL 11 TEMP.
593. 41 V T 594 21 SAS WING 2, SE3 POS INDICATED SLIGHTLY CHANGE G7013
591. r594.00C7249SASWING2, SE3, PNL 3 TEMP.
T 594.00E70000WS X-AXIS FILM VAULT VI B-SMALL FLARE
T 593. 99 H010 IU Z ACC ST-124M-SMALL FLARE
T 593. 99 H012 IU Y ACC ST-124M-SMALL FLARE
T 593. 99 E040 IU UPPER Rl NG LOC 21 VI B-SMALL FLARE
T 593. 99 E002 X-AXI S ATM ATTCH PT-SMALL FLARE
V593.98A007IU ACC YAW-SMALL FLARE
V 593. 97 E001 X-AXI S AFT BLK ST 23-SMALL FLARE
593.04V V593.84G7012SAS WING 2, SE2POS INDICATED SLIGHTLY CHANGE
59Z 85 V T 593. 65 M0104 SAS ARRAY GP4 VOLTAGE DECREASED SLIGHTLY
- 592.85V T593.65G7011SASWING 2, SE1 POS INDICATED SLIGHTLY CHANGE
592. 62V V593. 42 M0103 SAS ARRAY GP3 VOLTAGE DECREASES SLIGHTLY
59Z 61 V V 593. 41 M0101 SAS ARRAY GP1 VOLTAGE DECREASED SLIGHTLY
59Z 27 V V 593.07 M0107 SAS ARRAY GP7 VOLTAGE DECREASED SLIGHTLY
T 593. 10 E001-505 X-AXI S AFT BLK ST23-SMALL FLARE
T593.05H011 I U X A C C ST124M-SPIKE
T 593. 05 E002 X-AXIS ATM ATTCH PT-FLARE
T 593. 05 E7000 OWS X-AXI S Fl LM VAULT VI B-SMALL FLARE
T593.04E040 IU UPPER RING LOC21 VIB-SPIKE
T 593. 04H012 1 U Y ACC ST124M-SPI KE
T 593. 04 H010 IU Z ACC ST124M-SPI KE
T 593. 03 E039 IU UPPER MTG RING LOC21L-SPIKE
T 59Z 85 A007 IU ACC YAW -FLARE
RQ? Uf
./-£. f!7 V7
V w sen si iumno c&c too AV £D9..Wft
W~J jcAcrn ci IÛTI.V- . . .. . ..
590.30 V v ?? 2 70 C7245 SAS WING 2, SE2, PN3TEMP.
3V1. (51 V T 3V£ 01 (VIUllO irti HKKrtT br? VULIrtbt UtlyKt/OtU iLIUMILT
591.36V T 592. 16 M0108 SAS ARRAY GPS VOLTAGE DECREASED SLIGHTLY
591.26V T592. 06 M0106 SAS ARRAY GP6 VOLTAGE DECREASED SLIGHTLY
^. -\A- J*~ -*A-
c*1 C-J
i-- «3'
V
f
/ ^/
r^T^S g" j,
O*
a
O-
I
o
1 o" a
RANGE TIME
Figure 3-10. - 593 sec anomaly time sequence.
1 62345
2 1 (591) S-II RETRO FIRE COMMAND
R0006-602 o f
\^-~ -^. AND PLUME IMPINGEMENT ON
ROLL RATE, FRAGMENTS IN QUADRANT II-III
DEG/SEC
\\ u_
(59a3) S A S - 2 DEPLOYED INTO
-A 1 1 1 RETRO PLUME AND EXERTS
** FORCE ON SWS
2 r—
3 (593) END OF S-II RETRO FIRE
•—^-' — A
' 4 (593.4) INITIAL TRANSFER OF SAS
PITCH RATE, MOMENTUM TO SWS
DEG/SEC
5 (593.9) FINAL TRANSFER OF SAS
I i i MOMENTUM TO SWS
R0005-602
YAW RATE,
2
0 • . _ •• •
— >•— « •••••
N_. r
(592) TAGS SYSTEM OPERATING TO
NULL OUT RATES AND ATTITUDES
INDUCED BY RETRO IMPINGEMENT
DEG/SEC
-4 1 1 1
590 592 594 596 598

RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-11. - Explanation of 593 second anomaly.
1 62345
1.0 — !
1 (591.2) S-II RETRO FIRE COMMAND
A0002-603 .5 AND PLUME IMPINGEMENT ON
LONG ACC IU,
G
* J I FRAGMENTS IN QUADRANT II-III
2 (592.3) S A S - 2 DEPLOYED INTO
M
c 1 : 1 1 RETRO PLUME AND EXERTS
.5
FORCE ON SWS
1.0 —
~
3 (593) END OF S-II RETRO FIRE

A0006-603 .5 4 (593.4) INITIAL TRANSFER OF SAS
PITCH ACC IU,
G
I -11w*
L fr^
1 4
Llîmr MOMENTUM TO SWS
_ c
.J
i' i i 5 (593.9) FINAL TRANSFER OF SAS
MOMENTUM TO SWS
1.0 6 (592) TACS SYSTEM OPERATING TO
A0007-603 .5 — > NULL OUT RATES AND ATTITUDES
YAW ACC IU, INDUCED BY RETRO IMPINGEMENT
ou
G
- S
If r
-v/1 VM •i^,, r^yVW,*— »•«.
1
.~.—-
1
...-, .
5<10 59 2 594 596 598

RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-12. - Explanation of 593 second anomaly.

1.0x10-
28x10' SAS ARM
ROTATION
.5
24 OBSERVED
CQ
YAW MOMENT
0
20
CQ
—I
-.5
t
§ 16
o CALCULATED
ol -1.0 YAW MOMENT
S 12
ID
—I
-1.5
a.
8
s -2.0
/ WHICH PROVIDES! \ AERODYNAMICALLY
I CALCULATED YAW I CALCULATED PLUME
/ MOMENT \ FORCE
-Z5
o
\
-3.0 I
591 592 593 594 595
GROUND ELAPSED TIME, GET, SEC
Figure 3-13. - Plume impingement force on SAS-2.

Figure 3-14. - SAS-2wing hinge.
400
RANGE OF PREVIOUS
FLIGHT DATA
SL-1 FLIGHT
300 DATA
MEASUREMENT
200
TEMPERATURE,
F
100
S-II-13
IGNITION^
0
rS-IM3 INTERSTAGE SEPARATION
— LIFT OFF
Y I S-II-13 K S-II-13 IS-II-13 OECO
tl lICECO
-100
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-15. - Engine compartment gas temperature.

' ^^ PREDICTED- INTERSTAGE-ON 1 S-II IGNITION
2 INTERSTAGE SEPARATION
3 CECO
4 EMRSHIF
5 S-IIOECO
~~ H
i
0.030
— 0.04
\ ^P^^^^
.020 I ^^^^
/
,
C\\\\\\'v\^Xs\\^sC\\SiN
—.A
S-II-BT ^ 0.02
nin
. U1U
0
I 1
7- •
I
0
NOMINAL (S-IM1H
-.010 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BASE BASE
PRESSURE, (b) HEAT SHIELD FORWARD FACE PRESSURE. PRESSURE,
N/SQ CM PSIA
'i
l!
0.030 - li
— 0.04
/SS^v^î^.
.020
// ' "^^SSS-î
' 1 1 ^^, S-II-137 O. no
Ut
.010 * , ^-^
f\
I
1
^, i
3
n —
\J
V kn
NOMINAL (S-II-11)-//
1 3 4 5
ir i
-.010
150
III
200
1
250
III
300 350
i
400
lf i
450
i
500 550
i 600
RANGE TIME, SEC
(a) THRUST CONE PRESSURE.
Figure 3-16 . - Base region pressures - assumed failure mode: interstage did not separate.
EBW FIRING UNIT 1A
EBW FIRING UNIT IB
VOLTAGE DECAY
TYPICAL OF R/C
VOLTAGE DECAY TIME CONSTANT
TYPICAL OF ASSOCIATED WITH
NORMAL EBW TELEMETRY SYSTEMS
FIRING UNIT , OPEN CIRCUIT FROM
DISCHARGED FIRING UNIT
I I
183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191
RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-17. - Separation EBW firing unit monitor indications.
POS II
-ELECTRICAL INPUT-
POS III
SEPARATION PLANE
— POS I
EBWFIRING EBW FIRING

UNIT UNIT
I"
DETONATOR
DETOfJAIUK • • " *p
DETONATOR
BLOCK BLOCK
D PLANE
ATION
)N 1760
^
:AR
1 IMI
SHA PED
CH/S RGE
FIRST PLANE
SEPARATION
STATION 1564
FIELD SPLICE
STATION 1541
Figure 3-18. - Second plane separation system, S-II (block diagram and location).
r LSC ASSEMBLY
ME901 -0019-0013
TENSION PLATE (199 PLACES)
V7-317765
^CLIP
/ V7-540633
LSC
PROTECTIVE
COVER
V7-540700-51
• STATION
1760
DETONATOR BLOCK
COVER
(PART OF LSC y
RETAINING
ASSEMBLY) —<
CLIP
V7-540699
EBW
DETONATOR
7865742
PROTECTIVE COVER ,
/ (DETONATOR BLOCK)
/ V7-540375
^- LSC ASSEMBLY
J_ / ME901-Q019-0013
STGR 101 DETONATOR BLOCK / <.Pn.mKI . . \

SE
(PART OF LSC / CTION A-A V PACER
STGR 102 ASSEMBLY) -^ ^^5
TO EBW
FIRING UNITS J
Figure 3-19. - EBW detonator and detonator blocks, second plane separation system, S-II (installation).
POS III
TENSION STRAP LOAD IS AT END S-II BURN
DEFLECTION IS AXIAL AT SECOND PLANE SEPARATION
POS
II
LSC INITIATORS
16 8 STGR61&
TENSION STRAP ALLOWABLE CONNECTOR
PANEL
12 QC LSC INTERRUPTION LOCATION BAND
LU
MAXIMUM o
TENSION oc TENSION STRAP LOAD
STRAP 8
LOAD,
KIPS
4 h- = 2
MIN DEFLECTION
REQUIRED ^
0 -H-#-h
90 100 110 130 150 170 190 210 230
POS III POS IV
ARC LENGTH OF TENSION STRAPS ATTACHED, DEG
Figure 3-20. - S-II-13 interstage station 196 tension strap analysis.

12
10
- FLIGHT DATA
INTERNAL 6 - POST FLIGHT ANALYTICAL
TRANSDUCER
PRESSURE, D 163-219 - POSTFLIGHTANALTYICAL
CM2
4 WITH 0.75 SQ FT ON CYLINDER
OR a 0 SOFT ON CONE
ADDED VENT AREA AT S-II
STA. 943
1 M = 1.0
TLM 2 MAXIMUM q
0
DROPOUT
-2 I I
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
RANGE TIME, SEC
Figure 3-21. - Forward interstage internal pressure.
CHAPTER IV
THE METEOROID SHIELD DESIGN
Overall Description
Although fairly simple in concept, the meteoroid shield had to
provide such a variety of functions that it was, in fact, a quite
complicated device. It was, foremost, a very lightly built cylin-
drical structure 270 inches in diameter (in the deployed condition)
by 265 inches long.
The general layout of the MS is illustrated in figure 4-1. The
OWS, which it surrounds, is deleted in this figure for clarity.
In brief, the MS is formed of a set of sixteen curved sheets of
2014 T6 aluminum panels, 0.025 inches thick, assembled at
flanges and other fittings to form the cylinder shown. The for-
ward and aft ends were reinforced with curved 7075 T6 angles.
Various special details were included in the assembly in order to
hold it in place, deploy it in orbit, and provide access to the OWS
interior during prelaunch activities. The principal means of hold-
ing the shield in place in orbit (and to a lesser extent during powered
flight) was a set of tension straps under the main tunnel illustrated
at position n in figure 4-1. These straps were bonded to the OWS
wall and fitted with a hinge on each end to take the butterfly hinge
that attaches to the adjacent MS panel as indicated in figure 4-2.
These butterfly hinges were designed to rotate so as to lie against
the sides of the main tunnel which enclosed the tension straps and
various cable runs on the OWS.
Proceeding clockwise from the tension straps and butterfly hinges
in figure 4-1, the next special feature is the auxiliary tunnel. This
tunnel extends in an arch between panels of the thin meteoroid shield.
The 28 titanium frames of this tunnel (fig. 4-3) provide a very
springy section in the relatively rigid hoop provided by the rest of
the shield. The auxiliary tunnel also encloses a smaller tunnel cov-
ering the wiring for the thruster attitude control system. Farther
around, in position I, there are two curved rectangular smaller
panels, included to provide access to the OWS.
4-1
Between positions I and IV, the two halves of the MS overlap and
are joined by a series of 14 trunnion bolts and straps (shown in
detail in 4-4). These trunnion bolts were used to adjust the ten-
sion with which the MS was held against the OWS. Adjusting the
bolts in the trunnion assemblies was a major aspect in positioning
and tightening the MS against the OWS (rigging).
In order to provide the extra 30 inches of perimeter required when
the MS was deployed, a foldout panel assembly (released by ordnance)
is included in the panel adjacent to the trunnions. The mode of oper-
ation of this foldout panel is indicated in figure 4-5. Detailed descrip-
tions of the ordnance and its function are given later. The only re-
maining distinctive features of the MS are the panels located over the
scientific airlock and wardroom window at position IQ. The MS is
completed at the butterfly hinges and tension straps at position I.
Deployment Provisions
The deployment of the 265 inch long MS was accomplished by pro-
viding two folding panel sections on each side of a contained explosive
pyrotechnic chain which extended axially for the full length of the MS
except for short end reinforcements. These folding panels and a
schematic version of the redundant pyrotechnics were previously
presented in figure 4-5. Illustrations of the shield in the stowed,
partially deployed, and deployed configurations are shown in figures
4-6, 4-7, and 4-8, respectively. A cross section through the ord-
nance and its schematic are shown in figure 4-9. When the ordnance
strip is fired and separates the "fold-over" panel, the segments are
released and the shield is deployed. After release of this folded
panel, a number of swing arms are used to displace the shield away
from the OWS wall and hold it there. A rotational force is applied
to these swing arms by a total of sixteen torsion rods suitably
spaced around the ends of the MS as shown in figures 4-10 and 4-11.
When the MS is stowed for launch, there is a larger twist in the tor-
sion rods than after deployment. Both stowed and deployed torque
settings are tabulated in table IV-1. It can be noted in figure 4-7
how the links on one side of the ordnance chain swing in a direction
opposite to those on the other side. The butterfly hinges on each
side of the main tunnel permit the radial displacement of the shield
at the location of the tension straps.
4-2
The MS should therefore be regarded as a very limp system, which
depends on being stretched tight around the OWS to withstand the
aerodynamic, vibratory, flutter and thrust loads at launch. After
deployment, it needs very little strength to serve its primary ob-
jective as a meteoroid shield.
The Auxiliary Tunnel
The auxiliary tunnel, an assembly of which is shown in figures 4-12
and 4-13, extends from the forward skirt, down the full length of the
MS shield, and below the MS by about 57 inches. Venting of this
tunnel was provided through an outlet of 10 square inches under the
corrugations of the tunnel cover at the aft end of the forward fairing
as detailed in figure 4-14. The tunnel was intended to be sealed at
the aft end by a rubber boot assembly shown in the photographs of
figure 4-15 in both the stowed and deployed position. Note that the
tunnel is displaced some 5 or 6 inches circumferentially upon deploy-
ment of the shield.
The main structural members of the auxiliary tunnel are titanium,
arch shaped, frame springs. These frames provide the structural
tie between two MS panels and provide both regulation of the pre-
loading of the MS to the OWS and act as a flexible relief for diametri-
cal changes resulting from thermal and pressure changes of the OWS.
The tunnel also serves to protect the thrust attitude control system
cables located in a small channel shaped cover permanently attached
to the OWS and shown in figure 4-13. A segmented and corrugated
outer skin form an aerodynamic fairing for the complete system and
seals between forward and aft fairings.
Thermal Control
Although the primary purpose of the meteoroid shield is that of pro-
viding protection of the OWS from meteoroids, it also plays a sig-
nificant role in the thermal control system. Much of the overall
thermal design was accomplished passively by painting the outer
surfaces of the MS black except for a large white cross-shaped
pattern on the earth side during flight. The entire surface of the
OWS wall was covered with gold foil. The overall choice of finishes
biased the thermal design toward the cold side, it being easier to
vernier control by heating rather than cooling.
4- 3
Friction Between MS and OWS Wall
To provide a uniform tension throughout the MS upon assembly and
rigging for flight, and to permit transfer of the trunnion bolt ten-
sion into the frames of the auxiliary tunnel, it was necessary to
minimize friction between the MS and the external surface of the
OWS. This was accomplished by applying a teflon coating to the
entire inner surface of the MS assembly. Special care was also
taken to assure that all fastening rivets be either flush with or below
the teflon surface of the MS. In addition to considerations of fric-
tion, the elimination of rivet head protrusions was important in not
damaging the rather delicate gold surface used to provide the proper
emissivity of the outer OWS wall surfaces as mentioned above. This
was a vapor deposited gold surface applied to a kapton backing and
bonded to the outer workshop wall with an adhesive. A typical cross
section through the entire workshop wall members is shown in fig-
ure 4-16.
Panel Details
The 16 panels comprising the meteoroid shield were formed of
0.025 inch thick aluminum stock fitted with doublers and angles
to permit their assembly. A typical detail of the longitudinal joints
between the sixteen panels is shown in figure 4-17. In each of these
panel joints, 96 holes of 1/8-inch diameter were drilled to vent any
air trapped under the MS skin. In detail B of figure 4-17 is shown
the special panel joint required next to the SAS-1 wing because of
the unavailability of sufficiently wide panel stock for the panel under
SAS-1. It was a "strap" of metal of this special joint that became
embedded in the SAS-1 cover and prevented automatic deployment
of SAS-1 in orbit. It is, perhaps, of passing interest to note the
longer length of exposed bolts in this particular joint.
Around the top of the panels is located an angle and a neoprene rubber
rain or weather seal as shown in figure 4-18. This seal was not in-
tended to be an aerodynamic seal and could not be expected to accom-
modate significant relative deflections between the OWS and MS sur-
faces. To provide meteoroid protection at the two ends of the MS,
small strips of thin stainless steel "fingers" were squeezed down
between the OWS and the MS when stowed. These fingers, deployed,
are visible in the photograph of figure 4-10. The thrust load of the
4- 4
MS, which weighs some 1200 pounds, is transferred to the forward
flange of the aft skirt through a group of twelve thrust blocks as shown
in figure 4-19. Figures 4-20 and 4-21 depict the MS as laid out
flat to identify the relative locations of the various panels, openings,
joints and other features of the complete assembly.
4-5
p
REMOVABLE OS III POS II
PANEL - SAL TENSION STRAPS
UNDER MAIN
REMOVABLE TUNNEL
PANELS - WINDOW
AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
REMOVABLE
PANEL - SAL
-SHADE 1B80780 ACCESS

IROLLED) PANEL
ORD PLATE
(SEVERED) PRELOAD TRUNNIONS
Figure 4-1. - Meteoroid shield.

BUTTERFLY HINGE,
—CRITICAL POINT—
N
- STRAPS BONDED TO
WORKS HOP WALL
BUTTERFLY HINGE,
AUXILIARY TUNNEL SIDE
Figure 4-2. - Butterfly hinges which connect meteoroid shield to straps running under main tunnel,
'
„
Figure 4-3. - Photograph of titanium frame springs in auxiliary tunnel.

r- TRUNNION STRAP
7 MA IN TUNNEL
2014-T6 AL CLAD SHEET
t = 0.040 IN. AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
FOLDED
SECTION LOCATION OF
/ RIGGED
LOCKWIRE irrWni DEVICE
"'mipli
/'
4.25 IN. OVER-
LAP OF MS I
t
TRUNNION /
+
0.875DIA-^ NUT
+ SHIELD
4-
JAMNUT-^
DETAIL TYPICAL
14 PLACES
Figure 4-4. - Trunnion strap assembly as used In rigging.

FOLDOUT PANELS
(SCROLLS) (4)
ORDNANCE COIL SPRING-7

STRAP—-
ORDNANCE TUBES
REINFORCED ENDS
OF SHIELD—
ORDNANCETUBEi
ÔRDNANCE
\ TUBE rSCROLLOR
,' COILSPRINGSn
TANK
Figure 4-5. - Meteoroid shield deployment ordnance and foldout panels.

TRUNNIONS - FOLDOUT PANEL
AND ORDNANCE
SAS-2
i r- MAIN
\ TUNNEL
AUXILIARY
TUNNEL -
SAS-1
BUTTERFLY
HINGES
Figure 4-6. - Meteoroid shield in its stowed or rigged condition for launch,
TRUNNIONS FOLDOUT PANEL
STOP (TYPICAL '
AUXILIARY
TUNNEL—
BUTTERFLY
HINGES
Figure 4-7. - Meteoroid shield partially deployed.

TRUNNIONS ORDNANCE
TUBES
STOP (TYPICAL
FIVE PLACES)
—III
AUXILIARY TUNNEL
BUTTERFLY HINGES
Figure 4-8. - Meteoroid shield deployed for orbit.

INSTRUMENT UN IT (I. U.l
(EBW) EX PLOD ING BRIDGE
POS II WIRE FIRING UNIT
EBW DETONATOR AND

DETONATOR BLOCK
POS III
CONFINED
DETONATING FUSE
LENGTH OF METEOROID SHIELD)

METEOROID
FRANGIBLE JO I NT
SHIELD
EXPANDABLE TUBES
AFTER FIRING-v rBEFOREFIRING
0.025
0.034
"0.026
00161
0.013 rHL 48-8-7 HI-LOCK
TENS ION STRAP / A286CRES, 0.250DIA.
1
ASSEMBLY 2024-T351-\ 0.760.C.
FOLDING PANEL-v
2014-T6 \
t- 0.025
"ff///////////////////
CROSS SECTION OF ORDNANCE
Rgure 4-9. - Ordnance schematic and cross section view for meteoroid shield release.
TORSION THIN STEEL
ROD- FINGERS TO
PROTECT ANNULAR
OPENINGS AT
FORE AND AFT
ENDS OF MS
LATCH USED ONLY

IN 4 LOCATIONS
OF 16 TOTAL—
Figure 4-10. - Photograph showing typical swing link and latch detail.
Figure 4-11. - Drawing of typical swing link and torsion rod assembly.
,,- r |
r 1 \\ Ivltl
Mcrmor
LUKL in
IU 1 1
i 1 —i / on
SHIFi n
IL.LU 1
1
1 1
I / \
i— i— * r^ t f V
T
14. 39 26 /19.4 / ) 14.38

i i . i
i i
t ^^^\i \
^ 4
i Af 1
1 \ T
i i
/ i i
/ u ^ ^
/
FORWARD SKIRT AFT SKIRT
AUXILIARY TUNNEL
5.5
FORWARD FAIRING r AFT FAIRING
Figure 4-12. - Assembly view of auxiliary tunnel.

FORWARD
SKIRT AUXILIARY TUNNEL
FORWARD FAIRING
^—AUXILIARY TUNNEL
WIRE TUNNEL INS IDE

AUXILIARY TUNNEL
AUXILIARY
/ TUNNEL
' AFT FAIRING
METEOROID
SHIELD-"
Figure 4-13. - Wiring tunnel for TAGS running inside auxiliary tunnel.
--FLAP SEAL
— RETAINER
CORRUGATED
TUNNEL COVER
AUXILIARY,
TUNNEL FRAME
^-CORRUGAJED
TUNNEL COVER
RETAINER
SHADEDAREAN
FLAP SEAL- VENT AREA )
FRAME AUXILIARY
TUNNEL FRAMEy SECTION A-A
'CORRUGATED COVER
SECTION B-B
Figure 4-14. - Views showing vent area provision for auxiliary tunnel.
(a) STOWED POSITION.
(b) DEPLOYED POSITION.
Figure 4-15. - Photographs of auxiliary tunnel boot.

SPACE SIDE
TEFLON COATING (0.002/0.003)^ MS SKIN (0.025 IN. t 2014-ALUMINUM)
5 IN,
GOLD KAPTON (0.003)
0.003 ALUMINUM INNER SKIN
INTERIOR OF WORKSHOP
Figure 4-16. - Typical cross section through members of the orbital workshop wall.
0.00 GAP
rTYPICAL SECTION
/ THROUGH JO I NT
BEND RAD I US = 0.18
N
^-0.19 R STRIP
AL ALLOY 6061-T6
0.125x0.68 WIDE
DETAIL C - INTERFACE LONGITUDINAL AND CIRCUMFERENTIAL JOINTS
I j \_,
DETAIL B - LONGITUDINAL PANEL JOINT DETAIL A
Figure 4-17. - Longitudinal joint detail of MS.

DIA. HOU
0.68
,< SEAL MADE FROM
(REF) IX SILICONE RUBBER
ADJUSTED BY PROCEDURE
TO CONTACT TANK WALL
1 ^\ AFTER RIGGING
SIDE OF MS FLUSH WITH

OWS WHEN STOWED
.
^ i I STATION 554.702
(REF)
SL
RAIN SEAL
N
Figure 4-18. - Rain seal at typical top end of MS flange.
METEOROID
**•—,.
•^^THR
THRUST BLOCKS 10P
/
1 I ' ! t
i; \! !/ Vj ^ AAFT
l SKIRT FLANGE
Figure 4-19. - Thrust block detail (one of twelve).

/-FORWARD SKIRT
/ AUXILIARY TUNNEL
TORS ION ROD •' /-AUXILIARY TUNNEL
SAS AND LINK ARM / FORWARD SEAL
STATION NO. 2
POS I / POS II
554.702 f
•INSTRUMENTATION
SPLICED WIRE HARNESS .
SEAL
RAMP
-TEMPERATURE
SENSOR
MRUNNION
'STRAP -SAL
FRAME
(SPRINGM -AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
VENT SIDE SEAL
HOLES
ACCESS
DOOR-- (TYP) HINGE-
N /
TUNNEL
STRAP
0 9
-THRUST
^ AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
STATION^ SUPPORT COVER
286.147
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AFT SKIRT AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
Figure 4-20. - Meteoroid shield laid flat.

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Figure 4-21. - Meteoroid shield laid flat.

TABLE IV-1. - OWS METEOROID SHIELD SWINGLINK SETTINGS AND MEASUREMENTS
SWING SWINGLINK DESIGN FLIGHT ANGLES NOTES ON

LINK EFFECTIVE FLIGHT
NO. LENGTH TORQUE SWING RESIDUAL SAS-1 RELEASED SAS-1 VALUES
ANGLE ANGLE ANGLE BUT JAMMED DEPLOYED
1 6.8" F 180° F 139° F 41° F 65. 57° F 136. 71° F TOLERANCE:

6.8" A 180° A 139° A 41° A 85. 73? A 130. 84° A +9°
2 8.7" F 165° F 150. 5° F 14. 5° F 86.03°F 8438°F -6°
a?" A 165° A 150. 5° A 14. 5° A 161. 11° A POSSIBILITY
10.5" F 173PF 157. 8° F 15. 2° F 17Z42°F EXI STS OF:
3
10.5" A 173° A 157. 8° A 15. 2° A 167. 23° A MECHANICAL
1Z5" F 180° F 163. 3° F 16. 7° F 173. 34° F DISTORTION
4
1Z5" A 180° A 163. 3° A 16, 7° A 179. 51° A THERMODRIFT
5 1Z55" F 180° F 16Z9°F 17. 1° F 186. 49° F ELECTRICAL
1Z55" A 180° A 16Z9°A 17. 1° A 173. 45° A ERRORS
6 10.1" F 173° F 15Z 4° F 20. 6° F 165. 47° F 173. 45° F
10.1" A 173° A 15Z 4° A 20. 6° A 163. 25° A
8.2" F 165° F 148. 3° F 16. 7° F 171. 01° F
7 a 2" A 165° A 148. 3° A 16. 7° A 165. 26° A
No stop
8 6.9" F 180° F 137° F 43° F 144 30° F 143. 42° F
6.6" A 180° A 137° A 43° A 134. 97° A
F = FORWARD LOCATION; A = AFT LOCATION; TO GET TORSION ROD TORQUE VALUES: MULTIPLY
1. 32 x ANGLES AS TABULATED IN DEGREES = TORQUE (IN. -LB)
CHAPTER V
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE METEOROID SHIELD HISTORY
The meteoroid shield of the OWS had its origin in a letter re-
quest of November 1, 1966 from MSFC to the Douglas Aircraft
Company to submit an expedited ECP for a description of
"systems feasible as protection against probable meteoroids. "
A brief proposal was submitted to MSFC in response to this re-
quest on December 7, 1966. There followed a submittal of
design criteria for the MS by MSFC stating, among other things,
that it "shall be designed as a structurally integrated part of
stage 209 capable of withstanding the dynamic forces imposed
during the orbital workshop mission" and that "the weight of
the bumper system shall be a primary design consideration. "
Protection from meteoroid penetration with a probability of
0. 9950 of no penetration for a 12-month mission was also
specified. The ECP of December 7, 1966 was approved on
March 16, 1967 and work on the design and development of the
shield was initiated, leading to the following project milestones
and events.
May 2-10, 1967 Preliminary Design Review on

the orbital workshop.
December 12-15, 1967 A "Delta" Preliminary Design
Review on the orbital work-
shop.
July 22, 1969 NASA decision to change from
a "wet" Saturn S-IVB launched
workshop to a "dry" Saturn V
launched workshop. At the
same time, "Skylab, " as the
5-1
program was to be later desig-
nated, became a major line-item
program in its own right, inde-
pendent of Apollo funding and
schedules.
August 20, 1969 Supplemental agreement No. 2
to contract NAS9-6555 autho-
rizing the change from the
"wet" to the "dry" workshop.
In accordance with Skylab
program policy that no unnec-
essary changes be made, and
based on the full confidence of
MSFC and MDAC-W manage-
ment in the current design, the
basic concept and general design
of the meteoroid shield was re-
tained.
August 1969 Provisions made in the meteoroid
shield for the ground access door,
the wardroom wi ndow and the
scientific airlocks.
November 1969 The introduction, via a MDAC-
W internal memo, of vents
and internal baffles in the
auxiliary tunnel to reduce aero-
dynamic loads on the tunnel
frames.
December 1969 Cluster System Review
September 14-18, 1970 Critical Design Review of
orbital workshop.
5-2
November 1970 - The "Mathews" Subsystem
April 1971 Review
January 1971 Rework of the butterfly hinges
and adjacent panels of the MS
to accommodate a misalign-
ment in the bonding of the
tension straps to the OWS.
March - April 1971 First reference to possibility
of meteoroid shield "burst"
pressures in an internal
MDAC-W memo; venting
of shield by drilling holes
in the panel joints proposed
as solution in a responding
memo.
March 17-18, 1971 Critical Mechanisms Review
April 29, 1971 Completion of re-qualification

of expandable tube explosive
assembly.
May 10, 1971 First deployment test at MDAC-
W. Shield failed to fully deploy
because of gravity loading on
the linkage mechanisms.
May 14, 1971 Test failure of expandable
ordnance tube requiring re-
design and retest.
May 18, 1971 Completion of qualification

testing of MS ordnance system.
5-3
August 1971 An internal MDAC-W memo
suggesting a change to an
unbaffled auxiliary tunnel
with the aft end sealed and
a vent at the forward end.
September 14, 1971 ECP for design changes
arising, in part, from the
failure of deployment test.
Changes included improve-
ments to ordnance, in-
creased torque on swing
links, increased auxiliary
tunnel frame thickness and
redesigned hinge pins. De-
cision to conduct all future
deployment tests at MSFC
on the static test article
(STA).
February 10, 1972 Completion of re-qualifica-
tion of expandable tube and
strap assembly after tube
wall rupture.
March 1972 Completion of series 1 de-
ployment tests. Distance
between fold-over panel and
tank insufficient to provide
meteoroid protection. Ri-
gidity of shield also insuf-
ficient to cause panel to
chord. Scroll springs
accordingly added to four
corners of the fold-over panel.
April 1972 Completion of series 2 de-
ployment test. Latches
failed to engage. Latch
modified and spring relo-
cated to provide greater
angular motion.
5-4
April 15, 1972 Qualification of full-scale
(22 feet) redesigned expand-
able tube and strap assembly
on back-up structure.
May 31, 1972 Doublers added to butterfly
hinges on SAS-2 side of main
tunnel because of failure of
hinges during tank pressuri-
zation test at MSFC.
May 1972 Special development test on
deployment latch mechanism.
June 19-23, 1972 Design Certification Review
of orbital workshop.
August 1972 The completion of four me-
chanical and three ordnance
deployment tests at MSFC on
STA using OWS-1 MS flight
hardware.
September 8, 1972 OWS-1 shipped to KSC. Arrives
on September 22, 1972.
October 28, 1972 Discrepancy Report DR 0136
developed at KSC due to dif-
ficulty encountered in rigging
the shield tight to the tank
(see next section entitled
"Rigging the Meteoroid Shield
for Flight").
November 10, 1972 Discrepancy Report DR 180 written
at KSC on gaps between the
shield and tank. Contains
detailed mapping of the areas
of such gaps and MRB disposi-
tion to "use as is. "
5-5
April 3, 1973 Hardware Integrity Review
April 18, 1973 Flight Readiness Review
May 14, 1973 Launch
As may be noted from the foregoing, the meteoroid shield
experienced a remarkable stability of design, both in basic
concept and in most of its design details, throughout its six
year history. Principal development difficulties, and hence
engineering effect, concerned the achievement of an ordnance
system that would release the shield without a rupture of the
expandable tube and in several minor details of deployment
such as locating latches or obtaining the desired deployment
distances. The major structural failure experienced in
testing was of the butterfly hinge, which was more of a ground
test than a flight problem, and was readily solved by the addi-
tion of hinge doublers.
No deployment tests were conducted under vacuum conditions,
which is quite acceptable in view of the low rate of motion of
the deployment. Vibration, acoustic and flutter tests were
specifically omitted in the test specifications because of the
design requirement that the shield be "tight to the tank. " This
design requirement and pervading philosophy of design and
development also served to omit all aerodynamic tests of the
meteoroid shield. The major difficulty experienced with the
meteoroid shield was in getting it stowed and rigged on the OWS.
Handling such a large, lightweight structure proved difficult,
requiring the coordinated action of a large group of technicians,
and considerable adjustments to the assembly of the various
panels were necessary in an effort to obtain a snug fit between
the shield and the OWS wall. The specific procedure used for
rigging the shield for flight is discussed in the following section.
Rigging the Meteoroid Shield for Flight
The condition of the MS at launch is sensitive to the rigging
procedures used to secure the shield around the OWS. For
this reason, the rigging procedures used at KSC to prepare
the MS for launch are summarized in the following.
5-6
The flight MS was shipped to KSC from MDAC-W fully in-
stalled, but not flight rigged, on the OWS except for the
installation of the ordnance panel. This panel was later
installed at KSC after the mechanical deployment tests
were completed. The deployment tests which were con-
ducted earlier at MSFC utilized a static test article
(STA) version of the shield.
The rigging procedure that was to be used at KSC was de-
veloped jointly by MSFC and MDAC using the STA at MSFC.
The STA shield was, however, different from the flight MS
in four significant aspects. On the flight MS: (1) the double
butterfly hinges on the SAS 1 side of the main tunnel were
bonded to the tension straps while on the STA they were
present but unbonded; (2) the butterfly hinges on each side
of the main tunnel were cut in the middle of a longitudinal
joint and refitted to the adjacent panels at a slight angle as
mentioned earlier. The longitudinal edges of the panels
were also modified to suit the altered hinge line. This change
to the flight MS at MDAC was necessary to accommodate the
misalignment which occurred in the location of the tension
straps on the OWS; (3) a longitudinal misplacement of the ten-
sion straps of 0.15 inch too high also resulted in some bind-
ing of the forward weather seal and torsion rods that had to
be refitted at KSC; and (4) the trunnion bolts, nuts and washers
were initially not lubricated on either the flight MS or the
STA. This lack of lubrication caused difficulties in the final
rigging of the shield at KSC, which was subsequently corrected
by applying a solid film lubricant.
The MS delivered for flight was therefore not identical to
that used to develop the rigging procedures. In this sense,
the flight shield was also the development and qualification
unit.
An abbreviated version of the rigging procedure developed at
MSFC on the STA is presented below. This procedure was
used initially at KSC in rigging the flight MS.
5-7
1. Install zero-g kit.
2. Rotate shield against tank wall. (This process
required the coordinated action of a group of
technicians, one each at the forward and aft
end of each of the sixteen panels.)
3. Loosely install trunnion bolts.
4. Remove auxiliary tunnel covers.
5. Spread each of the 28 auxiliary tunnel frames
1-3/8 inches + 1/8 inch with a spreading fixture.
6. Adjust trunnion bolt nuts finger tight, with dis-
tance between trunnion straps uniform within
+ 0.10 inch.
7. By sequential end-to-end passes, torque the
center 12 trunnion bolts to a value of 100 inch-
pounds. This condition to be reached while
maintaining a uniform spacing between trunnion
straps of less than + 0.10 inch. Sequential
adjustments of all bolts to be such that at steps
of 50 and 75 inch-pounds, an equal torque on
all 12 bolts is obtained.
8. Remove the auxiliary tunnel spreading fixture.
9. Back off the 12 trunnion bolt nuts 3 revolutions.
10. Retorque the 12 trunnion nuts up to 1 revolution,
not to exceed 45. 0 inch-pounds. (Revolution was
the controlling factor.)
11. Torque the top and bottom trunnion bolt nuts to
20 inch-pounds.
12. Torque the trunnion bolt jam nuts to 100 inch-
pounds and lock wire.
5-8
This rigging procedure did not produce a satisfactory fit
of the field to the OWS tank wall. Several "bulges" '
were evident where the shield was not snug to the tank
and significant gaps, of up to an inch in extent at one
point, existed between the shield and the tank along the
upper and lower edges of the shield assembly. The
rigging procedure furnished to KSC therefore had to be
modified considerably in an effort to produce a tightly
fitting shield. These modifications are noted in a dis-
crepancy report (D. R. No. 0136), a summary of which
is presented below.
1. Loosen seal retainers on bottom of two pairs
of panels.
2. Loosen panel joint bolts along bottom 36 inches
of a pair of panels and push panels against
tank. Retighten bolts.
(A gap still existed.)
3. Loosen 6 bolts in the other pair of panels, in-
stall a "puller" to one of these bolts, and pull
panel out in mid-region and push bottom in
against tank. Repeat this pushing and pulling
10 times.
4. While pushing the shield against the tank, loosen
4 other bolts and tighten the others. Push and
pull again in this region 10 times.
5. Repeat step 4 with another pair of bolts loose.
Re-tighten 2 bolts.
6. Repeat step 5 with another pair of bolts loosened.
7. Continue this procedure until one has worked his
way up along the entire length of two longitudinal
joints between two pairs of panels. Remove the
"puller" and replace flight bolts.
5- 9
8. Tighten bottom two trunnion bolts 2 turns, with
torque not to exceed 45 inch-pounds.
9. Tighten third from bottom trunnion bolt 1 turn,
torque not to exceed 45 inch-pounds.
10. Remove shims on bearing blocks, loosen seal
retainers on two more panels, and bolts from a
strap on the ordnance panel.
11. Loosen three bottom trunnion bolts (i. e., undo
steps 8 and 9).
12. Measure tangential length of ordnance panel, the
gap between trunnion straps, and the spread of
tunnel frames.
13. Torque bolts to 90 inch-pounds.
14. Repeat measurements of step 12.
15. Install flight panel over access door.
16. Remove top and bottom trunnion bolts.
17. Loosen up and re-torque the center 12 bolts to 45 inch-
pounds .
18. Remove these 12 bolts, apply lubricant, and
torque to 45 inch-pounds.
19. Torque up the trunnion bolts in sequential end-
to-end passes to 96 inch-pounds, maintaining
a uniform gap between straps within +_ 0. 06
inch.
20. Back off trunnion bolt nuts and torque to 45
inch-pounds.
5-10
21. Install top and bottom trunnion bolts, torque
to 20 inch-pounds.
22. Install jam nuts and lock wire.
23. Measure and record torsion bar/strut fitting
relationship (all okay).
24. Put the bulb seal back in place.
(A gap still existed along edge of panel.)
25. Remove splice plate between two panels (one
of the pair previously re-worked) and slot holes
in shield flange.
26. Reinstall splice plate loosely and push in on the
panel joint. While pushing, tighten up the
splice plate.
27. Set the bulb seal against the tank.
28. Verify torque on aft bolt at 20 inch-pounds, re-
install jam nuts and lock wire.
At the conclusion of the rigging described above, the con-
tact areas, that is, the areas of the shield which were snug
to the tank, were mapped, and it was determined that only
62% of the shield was in contact with the unpressurized OWS.
The OWS was then pressurized to 8 psi above ambient and
the contact areas again mapped. In this condition, about
95% of contact was achieved. Much of the remaining gapping
occurred along the forward edge of the MS. Since the flight
differential pressure was substantially higher than 8 psi,
it was felt that the contact area during the flight would be
substantially higher than 95%. The condition of the MS
was therefore formally accepted as satisfactory for flight
on January 10, 1973. No further adjustments were made
to the MS prior to the flight.
5 - 11
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the MS was very
difficult to rig to the tank. Many hands were required
to push and pull on various joints in the shield while
groups of panel bolts were sequentially loosened and
tightened in an effort to obtain a snug fit. As a result,
the final rigging used prior to flight differed markedly
from that used any previous time. More importantly,
the actual condition of the shield in terms of final tension
in the tunnel springs or in the trunnion bolts were un-
certain at best. Some gaps undoubtedly existed between
the forward and aft ends of the shield and the tank walls
at the time of launch, which could well have increased
as the flight progressed due to the non-uniform growth
of the tank.
5-12
CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FAILURE MODES

OF THE METEOROID SHIELD
During the course of this investigation, a total of ten possible

failure modes of the meteoroid shield were postulated and ex-
amined by the Board. These failure modes are presented and
discussed, in increasing order of probability, in the following.
1. Premature Firing of the Meteoroid Shield Separation
Ordnance
The flight data shows that the three ordnance break
wire event sensors on the ordnance strap were still
intact after the first indication of the MS anomaly.
The in-flight firing command was therefore not issued
prematurely. The ground firing command to fire the
ordnance was not given. It was therefore concluded
that the failure of the MS was not a result of a pre-
mature firing of the separation ordnance.
2. Failure of Butterfly Hinges
The flight load on the butterfly hinges at 63 seconds
after lift-off was calculated to be 44 Ibs/inch. This
load is created by pretensioning of the auxiliary tunnel
frames prior to lift-off and by the circumferential
growth of the OWS due to internal pressurization.
Assuming uniform circumferential loading, the factor
of safety of the butterfly hinge on the auxiliary tunnel
side was approximately 5 and on the SAS-1 side was
11. Because of the friction between the MS and OWS
that must be overcome in rigging the shield for flight,
the ground loads on these hinges was undoubtedly higher
than the flight loads. This fact, and the high factor of
safety of the hinges, leads to the conclusion that they
did not initiate the failure.
6- 1
3. Failure of the Trunnion Bolts or Straps
Because of the friction between the MS and OWS, loads
greater than the flight load were probably imposed on
the trunnion system in torquing up the bolts for ground
rigging. The calculated flight load, without friction,
on the trunnion bolts and straps at the 63 second event
was 44 Ibs/inch (see fig. 4-4). This load was arrived
at by assuming that during the boost phase there was
sufficient acoustic and vibration energies to distribute
the load circumferentially even in the MS. With a factor
of safety of 6 in the trunnion bolts, 4 in the trunnion
straps and 3.5 in the trunnion strap rivets, the Board
concluded that the trunnion system did not initiate the
failure.
4. Failure of MS due to Thrust Block Slippage
There are twelve thrust block supports approximately
equally spaced circumferentially between the aft end
of the MS and the forward end of the aft OWS skirt to
take the MS boost loads. The fourteen tension straps
under the main tunnel are bonded to the OWS wall and
attach to the MS through the butterfly hinges. They also
take a portion of MS boost loads. The mating support
blocks are machined at a 10 degree angle so that during
a normal deployment there will be minimum separation
interference. A simple test showed that this 10 degree
slope could produce a radial displacement of the MS
away from the OWS wall when subjected to vibratory
loads. This radial movement is, however, resisted
by the pretensioning of the shield by the auxiliary tunnel
frames, along with the additional tension buildup due to
the thrust blocks moving radially outward under tank
pressurization. The bonded tension straps that also
support the MS introduces a binding-friction cocked-
load between the OWS wall and shield when the shield
is subjected to boost loads. From photographs taken
of the swing links in orbit by the astronauts (see figs.
6-1 and 6-2) it is evident that none of them were bent
downward to an extent which would indicate that the
shield slid down over the aft skirt. Consideration of
the above facts leads to the conclusion that a slippage
over the thrust blocks did not initiate the failure.
6 - 2
5. Buckling Failure at Support Blocks
Two other potential failure modes exist in relation to the
thrust blocks. Conceivably, a failure might result from
buckling and cripling of the longitudinal panel joints due
to high concentrated loads at the block support points.
This could take two forms:
a. A barrell-like mode of buckling failure where the
shield deflects into a circumferentially oriented
corrugated or bellow-like shape and slides down
the OWS wall.
b. A crippling mode of failure where the flanges of
the longitudinal panel joints deflect laterally (cir-
cumferentially) and collapse.
Each of these modes is hindered by friction between the
meteoroid shield and the workshop wall. In addition, the
butterfly hinge would force asymmetric cocking of the MS,
resulting in increased friction and diagonal forces which
would tend to prevent buckling.
Elementary analyses have been made by both MDAC
and LRC, including conservative estimates of radial
support from hoop tension and disregarding friction, the
butterfly hinge restraint, and asymmetric cocking. These
elementary computations reinforced the intuitive analyses
that buckling at the thrust block was not the initiating fail-
ure mode.
6. Crushing Loads on Auxiliary Tunnel Frames
Aerodynamic crush pressures on the auxiliary tunnel tend
to flatten the tunnel frame springs and thus reduce the ten-
sion of the MS around the OWS. If the crush pressure is
very high, the possibility exists that the preloading of the
shield could be lost and the spring frame could collapse
(buckle).
6-3
Data from analyses made at both MDAC and LRC are
shown in figure 6-3 and indicate that the required loss
in preload would not occur until the crush pressures
are more than about 6 times the expected maximum
crush pressure occurring at the aft end of the tunnel.
The expected maximum crush pressure will reduce
the preload at 63 seconds by approximately 10 percent.
Although crush pressures do slightly relax the MS pre-
load, these results indicate that buckling or complete
loss of preload is not a probable failure mode.
7. Meteoroid Shield Flutter
The possibility of panel flutter was considered in detail
in two separate analyses by MSFC and MDAC. Both con-
cluded that brief periods of low amplitude flutter might
have occurred, but that high stresses and structural
fatigue were highly unlikely. No reason to question this
finding has been found and all remaining aerodynamic
discussion will center on steady or slowly varying
pressures.
8. Small Volumes of Entrapped Air Under the MS
Although the meteoroid shield was intended to conform
tightly to the OWS (except under the auxiliary tunnel)
there were many small volumes of enclosed air between
the MS and the OWS which had to be vented in order to
prevent development of burst pressures during ascent
through the atmosphere. Chief among these are the
spaces outside the wardroom window and scientific air-
locks. Smaller volumes were the channels formed along
the longitudinal joints between shield panels, unavoidable
slight wrinkles, gaps under hinges and between the panels
at the pyrotechnic fold-out assembly, and at the butterfly
hinges. Venting was provided by many holes drilled along
the panel joints as shown in figure 6-4. In addition, the
inherent construction of many details of the shield provided
additional venting such as through the butterfly hinges, etc.
Capacity for outflow from these enclosed volumes was
considered adequate.
6-4
9. Lifting of the Forward Edge of the Meteor old Shield
The possibility that the forward edge of the MS projected
far enough into the slip stream to experience high pre s-
sures was examined at length. Several design features
of the ordnance fold-out panel make it by far the most
likely candidate among all portions of the forward edge
as indicated in figures 6-5 and 6-6. In this region, the
total height of the MS edge above the OWS surface is
greater than elsewhere because: (1) there are three
layers of 0.025 inch skin instead of only one; (2) these
layers are separated by stiffeners as shown; (3) the
two hinges add to the bulk; and (4) a torsion link is ex-
erting an outward force of 18 pounds on one side of this
panel. In addition to these features of the fold-out panel,
it must be expected that an additional standoff of about
0.12 inch resulted during flight from the swelling of the
OWS due to internal pressure. When pressurized, the
tank grows about 0.12 inch less in radius at the flanges
than over the middle sections, and the lightly loaded
shield does not conform to these new contours. The
sum of all the above features results in the forward
edge of the MS extending to at least within 0.11 inch of
the outer surface of the forward skirt fairing. Post-
flight wind tunnel measurements conducted at MSFC and
MDAC indicated that the design was such that high
bursting pressures could have been produced during
transonic flight in this region under the MS. This situ-
ation must therefore be classified as a possible failure
mode, although the actual flight data indicate that
another failure mode was more probable.
10. Auxiliary Tunnel Venting
When the 63 second anomaly occurred, the flight dynamic
pressure was near its maximum value as shown in figure
6-7 and the velocity was near Mach 1. A diagram of the
general distribution of pressures predicted to exist over
the Skylab spacecraft at Mach 1 is shown in figure 6-8.
These pressures are deduced from wind tunnel data and
represent the pressure which would occur if the vehicle
were to fly steadily at Mach 1 and there were no flow
fluctuations.
6-5
The local changes in pressure produced by the auxiliary
tunnel are shown schematically in figure 6-9. Dips in
pressure result from expansion of the flow around the
blunt base of the auxiliary tunnel forward fairing and
around the base of the auxiliary tunnel.
The design intent for the meteoroid shield and its
auxiliary tunnel was that the aft end of the tunnel be
sealed for "no leakage" and that the forward end be
vented into the base region of the forward fairing so
as to discharge air into the forward low-pressure re-
gion. The 9-to-10 square inch vent area shown in
figure 6-10 was intended to provide a crushing pressure
(an external pressure exceeding the internal pressure)
over the entire tunnel, as shown schematically on
figure 6-11.
Post-flight investigation revealed that the aft end of the
tunnel was, however, not completely sealed because of:
a. An unexplained omission to seal or cap two hollow
structural stringers on the aft skirt which extended
into the aft fairing of the auxiliary tunnel (see fig.
6-12). These stringers yielded about 2.2 square
inches of leakage area.
b. An inadequate metal-to-metal fit between the aft
fairing of the auxiliary tunnel and the two stringers
to which it was secured resulted in approximately
2 square inches of additional leakage area. This
vent area is shown in figure 6-12, and occurs at
the flare of the aft fairing where the flare mates and
seals with the aft end of the auxiliary tunnel.
c. An unplanned venting resulting from leakage past a
molded rubber boot used to seal the movable joint
and rearward facing end of the auxiliary tunnel.
This boot and adjacent details are shown in figure
6-12. A metal yoke provided a positive clamp to a
molded flange on the bottom of the boot over the rigid
aft fairing. A bonded seal was achieved between the
upper molded flange on the boot and the auxiliary
tunnel.
6-6
Because the auxiliary tunnel was required to lift
freely away from the OWS and move circumfer-
entially upon deployment in orbit into the position
shown in figure 4-15, only a wiping butt seal could
be achieved along the bottom edges of this boot
"seal". When a differential pressure is applied
to the boot, the butt seal deflects away from the
OWS surface and creates two orifices of "semi-
oval" cross section whose size depends upon the
applied pressure differential.
A full-scale test was performed at MDAC to deter-
mine the leak rate at the bottom edge of the rubber
boot. These data indicated that a pressure-dependent
leakage area of 1. 8 square inches would occur under
the flight environment existing at 63 seconds.
The above three sources of unplanned leakage resulted in a
differential pressure distribution over the auxiliary tunnel
significantly different from the design distribution shown
in figure 6-11. Post-flight calculations performed at MDAC,
MSFC, and LRC indicated that, for the total 6 square inches
of leakage area into the aft end of the tunnel, the pressure
distribution along the tunnel at Mach 1.0 would be approxi-
mately as shown in figure 6-13. These deduced pressures
produce large lifting forces on much of the tunnel and part
of the adjacent shield areas near the forward edge of the MS.
With this leakage into the aft end of the tunnel, the effect is
to lift the forward end of the auxiliary tunnel and the adjacent
shield until a critical position is reached where high velocity
ram air rushes under the shield and tears it outward from its
mountings on the OWS.
Another means of producing bursting pressures under the
forward edge of the MS in the region of the auxiliary tunnel
is illustrated in figure 6-14. This is an illustrative view of
the wave pattern produced by the flared portion of the auxili-
ary tunnel forward fairing. At low supersonic flight speeds,
6-7
the high and low pressure regions (the compression and ex-
pansion from the flare) extend to considerable distances away
from the tunnel itself. High pressure over the MS forward
edge and lower pressures aft tend to lift the overall struc-
ture. Lifting due to this mechanism would be indistinguish-
able from that due to auxiliary tunnel leakage described
above.
Because lifting of the auxiliary tunnel as a result of internal
pressure is a prime failure mode, both analytical and exper-
imental post-flight studies have been performed to determine
the. elastic behavior of the MS in the region of the tunnel.
Analytical studies were performed by MDAC using a finite
element model of an area of the meteoroid shield as shown on
figure 6-15. These analyses indicate that the deflection of
the auxiliary tunnel and shield away from the OWS tends to
become divergent. That is, as an area of the shield becomes
exposed to a differential burst pressure, the shield lifts up
exposing additional area, which results in further lifting.
Experimental studies were done by MSFC using the air
bladder test rig shown on figure 6-16 to generate burst pres-
sures over the forward edge of the auxiliary tunnel area and
crush pressures over the rear. The conclusion of both of
these efforts is that the MS and auxiliary tunnel are quite
limp and easily lifted from the OWS tank into the slip stream.
A burst pressure of about 0.5 psi was found to be sufficient to
effect this failure mode.
The above postulated onset of failure is judged to be the most
probable means by which the MS was lifted into the airstream.
Summary and Recommendations
The preceding analysis and discussion of possible failure modes of
the meteoroid shield have identified at least two ways that it could
fail in flight. Although the most probable cause of the present failure
was the lifting of the shield from the OWS tank by excessive pressures
in the auxiliary tunnel, other failure modes could have occurred in
other regions of flight or under more severe flight environments than
were encountered by Skylab 1. Among these other modes of potential
6-8
failure, which could combine in various ways under varying con-
ditions of flight, are excessive pressures under the forward edge
of the shield, or inadequate venting of the folded ordnance panel.
The inherently light spring force of the auxiliary tunnel frames, the
crushing loads on these frames in flight, the inherent longitudinal
flexibility of the shield assembly, the forces applied by the swing
links to deploy the shield, the possible "breathing" of the shield
panels as cavities are vented, the non-cylindrical nature of the
underlying pressurized tank, and the uncertain tension loads applied
to the shield in rigging for flight all contribute to a lack of rigidity of
the shield and a weakness of its structural integrity with the under-
lying tank structure.
A simple and straightforward solution to these inherent problems
of the present shield design is therefore not likely. A fundamentally
different design concept seems in order. One solution is, of course,
to simply omit the meteoroid shield, suitably coat the OWS for thermal
control and accept the meteoroid protection afforded by the OWS tank
walls. Although the Board has not conducted an analysis, meteoroid
flux levels are now know to be considerably lower than those used in
the original calculations. A new analysis, based on these flux levels,
may show acceptable protection.
Should some additional meteoroid protection be required, the Board
is attracted to the concept of a fixed, non-deployable shield. Although
the inherent weight advantages of a separable bumper are not available
in this approach, the mission of Skylab could probably be satisfied in
this manner. One concept would be to bond an additional layer of
metal skin to the surface of the tank with a layer of non-venting foam
between the OWS tank and the external skin. The problem being
statistical in nature, the entire shell of the OWS would not have to be
covered.
6-9
FORWARD TORSION
ROD SWING LINK
tin
Figure 6-1. - View of Kapton surface of the OWS showing forward torsion rod swing link.
THRUST BLOCK
BH
AFT TORSION ROD SWING LINK
Figure 6-2. - View of Kapton surface of the OWS showing aft torsion rod swing link and thrust blxks.
FRAME SPRING, UNLOADED7
AP
CRUSH
/ MODE
y// NN>
\ \
\ \
\«\
60
MAXIMUM
CRUSH,
AP
40
PRELOAD,
-LRC
LB/IN.
20
MDAC LRC
BUCKLE
0 5 10 15 20
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE, PSI
Figure 6-3. - Auxiliary tunnel frame spring stiffness. ,
'-
SHIELD VENTING, ENDS OF FOLDED PANEL
ÔRDNANCE STRAP
RAIN SEAL
VENT - PANEL LONGITUDINAL JOINT

0.020 6061-T6
SHEET ATTACHED BY
SPOT WELD ING FWD.
45° TYP
-45°,
\ I
-©
.&<<*}.<&.
.<-\'-\<~'\v>'<
ASSEMBLY AND VENT HOLE
PATTERN DETAIL -0.25 -0.56-j
- — 0. 88^ -0.125DIA.
-4.00- 1.18
—2.00
1 -SILICONS SEAL
1.50
TYP 12 PLACES/SIDE
THROUGH
4 HOLES
0.38TYP- W T - 12 /3 8 JL 75
| \_j QQ /
96 HOLES TOTAL
EACH JO I NT
SPLICE PLATE
TYP
r FOR WARD SKIRT

,' AUXILIARY
/ TUNNEL FAIR ING FORWARD END
,-METEOROID
/ SHIELD
-TEFLON FLAP SEAL
VENT AUXILIARY
TUNNEL FORWARD FLOW-FOR MORE DETAIL
THIS AREA SEE FIG. 4-14
^""---FORWARD EDGE
OFTUNNELSKIN
-FORWARD EDGE OF BAFFLE
Figure 6-4. - Venting locations in meteoroid shield.

FORWARD SKIRT /- FORWARD EDGE
THERMAL SHIELD^ / OF MS
/
1
;
1.
•
3
1 /
^| A W-J/
1 OQ
r^ 1
(ox— ~" ' /\ /\ ' \^)
i 2:
~7~ i
OWS WALL —'' FOLDOUT /
NOMINAL DESIGN PANEL — ' AS RIGGED ON
STRUCTURAL
TEST ASSEMBLY
Figure 6-5. - Ordnance foldout panel.

rFORWARD SKIRT
/ THERMAL SHIELD
< AIRFLOW
METEOROID
SHIELD
OWSWALL
Figure 6-6. - Longitudinal section through meteoroid shield at foldout panel.

PREDICTED
DYNAMIC
PRESSURE,
PS I
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

TIME FROM FIRST MOTION, SEC
Figure 6-7. - Skylab (SL-1, SA-513) dynamic pressure profile for boost phase.
DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE,
P
EXT" PAUX
TUNNEL VENT,
PSIA
1
100 200 300 400
STATION,
-y
Figure 6-8. - Meteoroid shield area design differential pressures for smooth configuration (M = 1.0).
OPEN STRINGER PRESSURE-,
7 —
•FLARE COMPRESS I ON
-FLARE EXPANSION
DIFFERENTIAL
BOOT AREA
PRESSURE, 4
P
EXPANSION
EXT " PAUX
TUNNEL VENT,
PSIA 3
100 200 300 400

STATION,
Figure 6-9. - SL-1 auxiliary tunnel design differential pressures (M = 1.0). •

FORWARD FAIRING
REARWARD SEAL PLATE
-SEAL
DOUBLER
PLATE
CORRUGATED
TUNNEL
VENT AREAS J
Figure 6-10. - Auxiliary tunnel forward vent.

DESIGN SEALED
(NO FLOW)
DIFFER-
ENTIAL CRUSHING^
PRESSURE PRESSURED
v\
VENT SEAL
(FORWARD) (AFT)
Figure 6-11. - Meteoroid shield response - aft auxiliary tunnel boot sealed.
CORRUGATED
TUNNEL
^-RUBBER BOOT
BONDED PRESSURE DEPENDENT

SEAL — BOOT LEAKAGE
(1.8 IN.2 AT 63 SEC)
YOKE
INADEQUATE METAL
FO METAL FIT
AFT FAIRING
UNCAPPED STRINGERS
(2.2 IN.2)
Figure 6-12. - Auxiliary tunnel leaks.

LEAKAGE
INITIAL PHASE
REDUCED
FLOW
THROUGH
VENT
2.4 PSI
ABOUT 40 IN.
DIFFER-
ENTIAL
PRESSURE
0
1.5 PSI
VENT SEAL
(FORWARD) (AFT)
Figure 6-13. - Meteoroid shield response - aft boot leakage.
FORWARD
FAIRING^
SHOCKS FROM
/ FORWARD FAIRING
HIGH PRESSURES LEAKS
METEOR01D
'-AUXILIARY SHIELD
TUNNEL
Figure 6-14. - Compressibility waves from the forward auxiliary tunnel fairing.
TUNNEL AR SEAL LEAKAGE
M=l
R + 63 SEC
SHIELDLOAD = 45LB/IN.
Figure 6-15. - Mathematical model for meteoroid shield divergence analysis.

INTERNAL CRUSH BAG (- EXTERNAL CRUSH BAG
BACK-UP FIXTURE
Figure 6-16. - Air bladder test rig for tunnel deflection test.
CHAPTER VH
POSTULATED SEQUENCE OF THE MOST PROBABLE FAILURE MODE
The availability of flight data from the instrumentation on the MS

and the vehicle disturbances, the design features of the MS, the
SAS, photographs taken in orbit, descriptions by the astronauts,
and other information permit the following postulation of the probable
sequence of events associated with the MS failure.
Figure 7-1 is furnished to indicate the pitch, roll, and yaw axes and
directions of positive rotations. These axes are related to the po-
sition designations I, n, HE, and IV as indicated on the sketch. A
view of the shield and tunnel separating from the butterfly hinge,
rotating outwardly, and producing roll torques is shown to provide
initial orientation.
In figure 7-2 and 7-3, sketches and details of salient events are cor-
related to the roll rate data around the 63 second anomaly period.
The events are designated on the figures by times which are consistent
with the available data.
60.12 Seconds - MS liftoff and local inflation in the vicinity of the
auxiliary tunnel was indicated by a small shift in position of the tor-
sion rod on the forward edge just to the left of the tunnel (see fig. 7-2).
61. 78 Seconds - Air entered the forward facing opening, raised the
pressure under the shield and high mass flows escaped through the
adjacent holes in the butterfly hinge. This flow produced reactive
forces causing a gradual decrease in roll rate between 61.78 seconds
and 62.74 seconds.
62.74 to 62.79 Seconds - Burst pressure under the auxiliary tunnel
and adjacent MS caused a large tangential load on the forward section
of the butterfly hinge, causing the whole hinge to unzip.
Fly around inspection indicated that the failure of the butterfly hinge
occurred at the hinge line adjacent to the main tunnel.
7- 1
The butterfly hinge was now completely broken. Aerodynamic drag
on the MS including the bulky auxiliary tunnel produced tension in
the shield and pulled on the vehicle so as to roll it in the direction
shown, that is, opposite to that noted earlier. The large area and
mass of this metal "flag" induced a more rapid change in roll rate
than the earlier jetting through the butterfly hinge. This process
terminated as the MS started to wrap around and lift the SAS-2 wing.
62. 79 to 62.90 Seconds - During this interval the shield was wrapping
around SAS-2 wing producing a negative roll torque in the vehicle.
At about 62. 85 seconds the SAS-2 tie-downs were broken,,
62.90 Seconds - Upon release of SAS-2, the tension in the shield
was transferred to the trunnions, causing failure of the trunnion
straps. Upon separation of this section of the shield, the negative
roll tornue ended.
62. 90 to 62. 95 Seconds - In this interval, the remaining section of
the MS began unwinding, introducing a large positive roll torque.
63.17 Seconds - A large shock was detected by the Instrument Unit
(IU) upper mounting ring vibration sensor due to the impact of the
separated section of the MS upon the conical adapter between the
OWS and the S-IE stage.
63. 7 Seconds - The MS continued to unwind and whip until 63. 7
seconds when it reached SAS-1 wing. As the MS began to wrap
around the SAS-1 wing, a negative roll torque resulted. The MS
then ripped apart from top to bottom at the longitudinal joint
adjacent to SAS-1, pulling a portion of the joint assembly over
the SAS-1 wing as the MS section departed. From this point on
the vehicle showed normal response to its roll control system.
Figure 7-4 is a photograph taken by the astronauts which shows
a portion of the MS that remained and how it was attached to the
SAS-1 wing.
7- 2
FWD
II
^- — MAIN TUNNEL
YAW RIGHT
PITCH DOWN
OWS
AUXILIARY TUNNEL
ANDMETEOROID
SHIELD FAILED
PORT
STBD
+Y
+Z
DOWN
Figure 7-1. - Definition of axes and positive rotations.

.'
r BUTTERFLY HINGES
/ AND MAIN TUNNEL
TORSION ROD
LEAKAGE
AIR OUT
AUXILIARY
TUNNEL
SITUATION AT 60.12 TO 61.78 SEC SITUATION AT 62.74 SEC
Figure 7-2. - Possible meteoroid shield motion from 60.12 to 62.74 sec.
SAS 1
POS II
PITCH
AXIS
SAS-2- SAS-2
SITUATION AT 62.79 ! SITUATION AT 62.85 SITUATION AT 62.90
T - TORQUE
SAS-2
SAS-2
SAS-2
-1
SITUATION AT 63.4 SITUATION AT 63.70
Figure 7-3. - Sketches of possible shield dynamics during the 63 second anomaly.
Figure 7-4. - Photograph from orbit showing longitudinal aluminum angle bent over the SAS-1 wing.
(This angle was later cut by astronaut and released the SAS-1 for full deployment.)
CHAPTER Vin
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF COSTS AND SCHEDULES

ON THE METEOROID SHIELD
The origin of Skylab in late 1966—as an extension of the use of

Apollo hardware for experiments in earth orbit—imposed an
initial environment of limited funding and strong schedule pres-
sures on the program. Skylab, then designated the Apollo Ap-
plications Program (AAP), was to "fit in" among the Apollo
flights under schedules imposed by the main-line Apollo program.
Funding was provided out of the Apollo program and thus the needs
of Skylab competed with those of the higher priority Apollo program.
The situation changed in mid 1969 when Skylab became a major
line item in its own right and was to use a Saturn-V launch vehicle
with a dedicated, dry, OWS. From that point on, increased fund-
ing and new flight schedules were established for Skylab. None-
theless, the original concept of the meteoroid shield was retained
when the OWS changed from a Saturn-IB propulsion stage to a dry
workshop launched by a Saturn-V0 The Board was therefore in-
terested in determining the extent, if any, that either the initial
limitation of funds and time, or any subsequent limitations, de-
termined the design or thoroughness of development of the meteor-
oid shield. This inquiry was limited to the possible effect of
funding and schedule of the meteoroid shield as designed and flown
on Skylab 1 and did not consider whether meteoroid protection
could have or should have been provided in some other way had
the program not evolved as it did.
In the Board's review of the evolution of the meteoroid shield
from initial design concept, through testing and development, to
final assembly for flight, particular attention was devoted to any
impacts arising from limitation of funds or time,, Extensive dis-
cussions were also held with management personnel of MDAC-W,
MSFC, JSC and NASA Headquarters on this matter. In no instance
could the Board find any evidence that the design or testing of the
meteoroid shield was compromised by lack of funds or time. Pro-
gram personnel, both government and contractor, had full confidence
8-1
in the basic concept of the MS and thus saw no need to alter the
design when the change to a dry, Saturn-V launched OWS occurred.
Given the concept that the shield was to be maintained tight to the
OWS tank, and thus structurally integrated with the well-established
S-TVB structure, the emphasis of testing given to ordnance reli-
ability and shield deployment was considered proper. Neither the
records of Skylab nor the memories of key personnel revealed any
tests or analyses of the meteoroid shield that were considered
desirable at the time and which were precluded by lack of funds
or time.
8-2
CHAPTER DC
THE SKYLAB MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The management system utilized for the Skylab program was

derived directly from that which had been developed and used
in the Apollo program. As such, it included a series of formal
reviews and certifications at progressive points in the program
life cycle that are intended to provide visibility to contractor
and NASA management on program status, problems and their
resolution.. The selected review points and their primary
purpose are set forth in Skylab Program Directive No. 11A,
which is summarized as follows:
PRR Preliminary Requirements Review. "To verify

by formal review the suitability of the con-
ceptual configuration and to establish the re-
quirements and action necessary to achieve a
design baseline. "
PDR Preliminary Design Review. "To verify by

formal review the suitability of the baseline
design of the Contract End Item. "
CDR Critical Design Review. "To verify by formal

review the suitability of the design of a Con-
tract End Item when the design is essentially
complete. "
CI Configuration Inspection. "To certify that the
configuration for the Contract End Item as
being offered for delivery is in conformance
with the baseline established at the CDR. "
COFW Certification of Flight Worthiness. "To certify
that each flight stage module and experiment
is a complete and qualified item of hardware
prior to shipment. "
DCR Design Certification Review. "To examine the

design of the total mission complex for proof
of design and development maturity. "
9-1
FRR Flight Readiness Review. "A consolidated re-
view of the hardware, operational and support
elements to assess their readiness to begin the
mission. "
The primary thrust of these key program milestones is thus a
formal review and certification of equipment design or program
status; the primary purpose being served is to provide visibility
into these matters to senior NASA and contractor program
management. As noted in the Sky lab Program Directive, the
organization and conduct of the review is a major responsibility
of a senior program or management official. For each review,
specific objectives are to be satisfied, in conformance with pre-
established criteria and supported by specified documentation.
The reviews are.thus highly structured and formal in nature,
with a major emphasis on design details, status of various items
and thoroughness of documentation. Several hundred specialists,
subsystem engineers and schedule managers are generally in
attendance.
The material presented in these reviews is, of course, developed
over a period of time in many lower-level reviews and in monthly
progress reports dealing with various systems and subsystems.
In addition, several other major reviews peculiar to Sky lab were
conducted, including the following:
Cluster System Review of December 1967
Mathews' Subsystem Review Team of August 1970-July 1971
Critical Mechanisms Review of March 1971
Systems Operations Compatibility Assessment Review of
October 1971-June 1972
Structural/Mechanical Subsystem Reviews of July 1971-
May 1972
Hardware Integrity Review of March 1973
MSFC Center Directors' Program Reviews
There was thus no shortage of reviews. In order to determine
the consideration given to the meteoroid shield throughout the
program, the Board examined the minutes, presentation ma-
terial, action items, and close-out of data of each of these re-
views and progress reports. In every case, complete records
9- 2
and documentationwere available for inspection. In no case
did the Board uncover any conflict or inconsistency in the
record. All reviews appeared to be in complete conformance
to Program Directive 11A and were attended by personnel
appropriate to the subject matter under consideration. The
system was fully operational.
And yet, a major omission occurred throughout this process
- consideration of aerodynamic loads on the meteoroid shield
during the launch phase of the mission. Throughout this six-
year period of progressive reviews and certifications the princi-
pal attention devoted to the meteoroid shield was that of achieving
a satisfactory deployment in orbit and containment of the ord-
nance used to initiate the deployment. As noted in the preceding
section on possible failure modes, design attention was also
given to the strength of the hinges, trunnion straps and bolts,
to the crushing pressures on the frames of the auxiliary tunnel,
to flutter and to the venting of both the auxiliary tunnel and the
several panels of the shield. But never did the matter of aero-
dynamic loads on the shield or aeroelastic interactions between
the shield and its external pressure environment during launch
receive the attention and understanding during the design and re-
view process which in retrospect it deserved.
This omission, serious as it was, is not surprising. From the
beginning, a basic design concept and requirement was that the
shield be tight to the tank. As clearly stated in much of the early
documentation, the meteoroid shield was to be structurally
integral with the S-IVB tank - a piece of structure that was well
proven in many previous flights. The auxiliary tunnel frames,
the controlled torque on the trunnion bolts and the rigging pro-
cedure itself were all specifically intended to keep the shield
tight against the tank. The question of whether the shield would
stay there under the dynamics of flight through the atmosphere
was simply not considered in any coordinated manner - at least
insofar as the Board could determine by this concentrated in-
vestigation.
Possibly contributing to this oversight was the basic view of the
meteoroid shield as a piece of structure. Organizationally,
responsibility for the meteoroid shield at MDAC-W was es-
tablished to develop it as one of the several structural subsystems,
9-3
along with such items as spacecraft structure and penetrations,
pressure vessels, scientific airlocks, protective covers and
finishes. Neither the government, (MSFC), or the contractor,
(MDAC-W), had a full-time subsystem engineer assigned to the
meteoroid shield. While it is recognized that one cannot have a
full-time engineer on every piece of equipment, it is nonetheless
possible that the complex interactions and integration of aero-
dynamics, structure, rigging procedures, ordnance, deployment
mechanisms, and thermal requirements of the meteoroid shield
would have been enhanced by such an arrangement. Clearly, a
serious failure of communications among aerodynamics, struc-
tures, manufacturing and assembly personnel, and a breakdown
of a systems engineering approach to the shield, existed over a
considerable period of time. Further, the extensive management
review and certification process itself, in its primary purpose of
providing visibility of program status to management, did not
identify these faults.
Further insight into this treatment of the meteoroid shield as one
of several structural subsystems is obtained by a comparison of
a listing of the design reviews conducted on both the MS and the
SAS. At MDAC-W, the SAS was considered a major subsystem
and was placed under the direction of a full-time project engineer.
A comparison of the design reviews held jointly between MDAC-W
and MSFC on the MS and on the SAS is presented in tables IX-1
and DI-2, respectively. The more concentrated and dedicated
treatment received by the SAS is evident in this comparison.
The Board is impressed with the thoroughness, rigor and formal-
ism of the management review system developed by Apollo and
used by Sky lab. Great discipline is imposed upon everyone by
this system and it has served very well. In a large program as
geographically dispersed and intrinsically complex as Skylab,
such visibility of program status and problems is a management
necessity. We therefore have no wish to alter this management
system in any basic manner. But all systems created by man
have their potential flaws and inherent hazards. Such inherent
flaws and weaknesses must be understood by those who operate
the system if it is not to become their master. We therefore wish
to identify some of those potential flaws as they have occurred to
us in this investigation, not to find fault or to identify a specific
cause of this particular flight failure but to use this experience to
further strengthen the management processes of large and complex
endeavors.
9-4
As previously noted, the management system developed by NASA
for manned space flight places large emphasis on rigor, detail
and thoroughness. In hand with this emphasis comes formalism,
extensive documentation, and visibility in detail to senior manage-
ment. While nearly perfect, such a system can submerge the
concerned individual and depress the role of the intuitive engineer
or analyst. It may not allow full play for the intuitive judgment
or past experience of the individual. An emphasis on management
systems, can, in itself, serve to separate the people engaged in
the program from the real world of hardware. To counteract
these potential hazards and flaws, we offer the following sugges-
tions.
o Deployable systems or "structures" that have to move,
or that involve other mechanisms, devices, or com-
ponents in their operation, should not be considered as
a piece of structure or be the basic responsibility of
a structures organization.
o A complex, multi-disciplinary system such as the
meteoroid shield should possibly have a designated
project engineer who is responsible for overseeing
all aspects of analysis, design, fabrication, test and
assembly.
o Management must always strive to counteract the
natural tendency of engineers to believe that a drawing
is the real world. First-hand experience with how
hardware behaves and can fail is of the essence to de-
sign engineers. Possibly, some design engineers should
be required to spend time in testing, operations, or
failure analysis. Such experience may not contribute
to cleverness or sophistication of analysis, but some-
thing equally valuable - actual experience - may be
added to the design group. An unfamiliarity with hard-
ware, first hand, makes it difficult to conceptualize a
living, breathing, piece of hardware from an analysis
or a drawing.
o The extensive use of the computer for complex analyses
can serve to remove the analyst from the real world.
One should, therefore, require a simplified or supporting
9-5
analysis that provides an understandable rationale
for the phenomena under consideration before ac-
cepting the results of a computer analysis.
The emphasis on "visibility to management" in the
review process should not be extended to the point
that one can be led to believe the job is completed,
or the design is satisfactory, when such visibility
is provided. A major emphasis on status, on de-
sign details, or on documentation can detract from
a productive examination of "how does it work" or
"what do you think. "
Actual flight data is a unique source of information
and should be of special interest to management and
required reading for every subsystem engineer. Even
on fully successful flights, subsystem engineers should
be required to review actual flight data from their sys-
tem and prepare a brief report on how it worked. The
available data from a flight, and what may be learned
from it, should not be buried in the memory of a com-
puter.
Today's organizations seldom include the old-fashioned
"chief engineer" who, relatively devoid of administra-
tive or managerial duties, brings his total experience
and spends most of his time in the subtle integration
of all elements of the system under his purview.
Perhaps we should more actively seek and utilize
these talented individuals in an engineering organization.
9-6
Table IX-1 ORBITAL WORKSHOP PROGRAM METEOROID SHIELD DESIGN REVIEWS
Date Title
May 1967 OWS Preliminary Design Review (PDR)

Feb 1970 MS Internal Design Review (IDR)
Feb 1970 MS Workshop Design Review (WDR)
Sep 1970 OWS Critical Design Review (CDR)
Mar 1971 OWS Ordnance & Deployment System Review
Jun 1971 MS Test Review
Jul 1971 Structures, Propulsion & Thermal Control Subsystem Review
Sep 1971 Environmental Control, Pneumatic, Structures & Ordnance Subsystem Review
Oct 1971 Environmental Control, Pneumatic, Structures & Ordnance Subsystem Review
Nov 1971 Pneumatic, Structures, Environmental Control Subsystem Review
Jan 1972 Structures, Ordnance & Pneumatic Subsystem Review
Mar 1972 Structures, Ordnance & Pneumatic Subsystem Review
May 1972 TAGS, Structures, Pneumatic Subsystem Review
Jun 1972 OWS Structural Subsystem OCR
Oct 1972 OWS Design Certification Review (DCR)
Mar 1973 OWS Flight Readiness Review (HIR)
Apr 1973 OWS Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
Table IX-2 ORBITAL WORKSHOP PROGRAM SOLAR ARRAY SYSTEM DESIGN REVIEWS
Date Title
Feb 1970 SAS Internal Design Review (IDR)

Jun 1970 SAS Workshop Design Review (WDR)
Jun 1970 SAS Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
Jan 1971 SAS Critical Design Review (CDR)
Mar 1971 OWS Ordnance & Deployment System Review
Jun 1971 SAS Subsystem Review
Sep 1971 SAS Subsystem Review
Oct 1971 SAS Subsystem Review
Nov 1971 SAS Subsystem Review
Dec 1971 SAS Subsystem Review
Jan 1972 SAS Subsystem Review
Mar 1972 SAS Subsystem Review
Apr 1972 SAS Subsystem Review
May 1972 SAS Subsystem Review
Jun 1972 OWS Structural Subsystem DCR
Oct 1972 OWS Design Certification Review (DCR)
Mar 1973 OWS Hardware Integrity Review (HIR)
Apr 1973 OWS Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
CHAPTER X
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Significant Findings
1. The launch anomaly that occurred at approximately 63 seconds
after lift-off was a failure of the meteoroid shield of the OWS.
2. The SAS-2 wing tie downs were broken by the action of the
meteoroid shield at 63 seconds. Subsequent loss of the SAS-2
wing was caused by retro-rocket plume impingement on the par-
tially deployed wing at 593 seconds.
3. The failure of the S-n interstage adapter to separate in flight
was probably due to damage to the ordnance separation device
by falling debris from the meteoroid shield.
4. The most probable cause of the failure of the meteoroid shield
was internal pressurization of its auxiliary tunnel. This in-
ternal pressurization acted to force the forward end of the
tunnel and meteoroid shield away from the OWS and into the
supersonic air stream. The resulting forces tore the meteor-
oid shield from the OWS.
5. The pressurization of the auxiliary tunnel resulted from the ad-
mission of high pressure air into the tunnel through several
openings in the aft end. These openings were: (1) an imperfect
fit of the tunnel with the aft fairing; (2) an open boot seal between
the tunnel and the tank surface; and (3) open stringers on the aft
skirt under the tunneL
6. The venting analysis for the tunnel was predicated on a com-
pletely sealed aft end. The openings in the aft end of the tunnel
thus resulted from a failure to communicate this critical design
feature among aerodynamics, structural design, and manu-
facturing personnel.
7. Other marginal aspects of the design of the meteoroid shield
which, when taken together, could also result in failure during
launch are:
10-1
a. The proximity of the MS forward reinforcing angle to the
air stream
b. The existence of gaps between the OWS and the forward
ends of the MS
c. The light spring force of the auxiliary tunnel frames
d. The aerodynamic crushing loads on the auxiliary tunnel
frames in flight
e. The action of the torsion-bar actuated swing links applying
an outward radial force to the MS
f. The inherent longitudinal flexibility of the shield assembly
g. The non-uniform expansion of the OWS tank when pressurized
h. The inherent difficulty in rigging for flight and associated
uncertain tension loads in the shield.
8. The failure to recognize many of these marginal design features
through six years of analysis, design and test was due, in part,
to a presumption that the meteoroid shield would be "tight to
the tank" and "structurally integral with the S-IVB tank" as
set forth in the design criteria.
9. Organizationally, the meteoroid shield was treated as a struc-
tural subsystem. The absence of a designated "project engineer"
for the shield contributed to the lack of effective integration of
the various structural, aerodynamic, aeroelastic, test, fabri-
cation, and assembly aspects of the MS system.
10. The overall management system used for Skylab was essentially
the same as that developed in the Apollo program. This sys-
tem was fully operational for Skylab; no conflicts or inconsis-
tencies were found in the records of the management reviews.
Nonetheless, the significance of the aerodynamic loads on the
MS during launch was not revealed by the extensive review
process.
10-2
11. No evidence was found to indicate that the design, development
and testing of the meteoroid shield were compromised by limi-
tations of funds or time. The quality of workmanship applied
to the MS was adequate for its intended purpose.
12. Given the basic view that the meteoroid shield was to be com-
pletely in contact with and perform as structurally integral
with the S-IVB tank, the testing emphasis on ordnance per-
formance and shield deployment was appropriate.
13. Engineering and management personnel on Skylab, on the part
of both contractor and government, were available from the
prior Saturn development and were highly experienced and
adequate in number.
14. The failure to recognize these design deficiencies of the meteor-
oid shield, as well as to communicate within the project the
critical nature of its proper venting, must therefore be attrib-
uted to an absence of sound engineering judgment and alert
engineering leadership concerning this particular system over
a considerable period of time.
Corrective Actions
1. If the back-up OWS or a similar spacecraft is to be flown in
the future, a possible course of action is to omit the meteor-
oid shield, suitably coat the OWS for thermal control, and
accept the meteoroid protection afforded by the OWS tank walls.
If, on the other hand, additional protection should be necessary,
the Board is attracted to the concept of a fixed, nondeployable
shield.
2. To reduce the probability of separation failures such as occurred
at the S-n interstage Second Separation Plane, both linear shaped
charges should be detonated simultaneously from both ends. In
addition, allother similar ordnance applications should be re-
viewed for a similar failure mode.
3. "Structural" systems that have to move or deploy, or that in-
volve other mechanisms, equipment or components for their
operation, should not be considered solely as a piece of struc-
ture nor be the exclusive responsibility of a structures
organization.
10-3
4. Complex, multi-disciplinary systems such as the meteoroid
shield should have a designated project engineer who is respon-
sible for all aspects of analysis, design, fabrication, test and
assembly.
Observations on the Management System
The Board found no evidence that the design deficiencies of the
meteoroid shield were the result of, or were masked by, the con-
tent and processes of the management system that were used for
Skylab. On the contrary, the rigor, detail, and thoroughness of
the system are doubtless necessary for a program of this magnitude,,
At the same time, as a cautionary note for the future, it is empha-
sized that management must always be alert to the potential hazards
of its systems and take care that an attention to rigor, detail and
thoroughness does not inject an undue emphasis on formalism, docu-
mentation, and visibility in detail. Such an emphasis can submerge the
concerned individual and depress the role of the intuitive engineer or
analyst. It will always be of importance to achieve a cross-fertilization
and broadened experience of engineers in analysis, design, test or op-
erationso Positive steps must always be taken to assure that engineers
become familiar with actual hardware, develop an intuitive understanding
of computer-developed results, and make productive use of flight data
in this learning process. The experienced "chief engineer," who can
spend most of his time in the subtle integration of all elements of the
system under his purview, free of administrative and managerial
duties, can also be a major asset to an engineering organization.
10-4
APPENDIX A
MEMORANDUM ESTABLISHING
SKYLAB 1 INVESTIGATION BOARD
A- 1
f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR Mav 22 1973
Mr. Bruce T. Lundin

Director
Lewis Research Center
21000 Brookpark Road
Cleveland, OH 44135
Subject: Skylab 1 Investigation Board
Dear Bruce:
As you know certain anomalies have occurred during the

launch and earth-orbit of Skylab 1, and they have jeopardized
the full attainment of the Skylab mission. It is important
to NASA that the cause of the anomalies be established and
that appropriate preventative measures be taken for future
NASA launches.
I am, therefore, establishing a Board to investigate the

anomalies and request that you act as Chairman of this
Board. The Board is established in accordance with the
policy stated in NMI 8621.1A. I have enclosed a NASA Notice
which describes the Board's purpose, authority, and respon-
sibilities among other matters. I ask that you recommend
to me a slate of candidates for membership on the Board on
or before May 29, 1973. I also request that you meet with
the Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight and the
Director of the Marshall Space Flight center within a week
after the launch of Skylab 2 to establish a schedule for the
Board's activities.
Sincerely,
Fames C. Fletcher
administrator
Enclosure
,
-
11S4
May 22, 1973
Notice
SUBJECT: SKYLAB 1 INVESTIGATION BOARD
1. PURPOSE
This Notice establishes the Skylab 1 Investigation Board and

sets forth its responsibilities and membership.
2. ESTABLISHMENT
a. The Skylab 1 Investigation Board is hereby established

because it is in the public interest to determine the
actual or probable cause(s) of the anomalies which
occurred during the launch and initial earth orbits of
Skylab 1 and to recommend appropriate preventative
measures for future NASA launches.
b. The Chairman of the Board will report to the Administrator
and Deputy Administrator.
3. AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
a. The Board will:
(1) Obtain and analyze whatever evidence, facts, and

opinions it considers relevant by relying upon
reports of studies, findings, recommendations, and
other actions by RASA officials and contractors or
by conducting inquiries, hearings, tests, and other
actions de novo. In so doing, it may take testimony
and receive statements from witnesses.
(2) Impound property, equipment and records to the
extent that it considers necessary.
t
NN 1154 May 22, 1973
(3) Determine the actual or probable cause(s) of the

Skylab 1 anomalies.
(4) Develop recommendations for preventive and other
appropriate actions.
(5) Provide a final written report to the Administrator.
(6) Carry out any other responsibilities that may be
requested by the Administrator or Deputy Adminis-
trator.
b. The Chairman will:
(1) Conduct Board activities in accordance with the
provisions of this Notice and any other instruc-
tions that the Administrator or Deputy Adminis-
trator may issue.
(2) Establish and document, to the extent considered
necessary, rules and provedurer for t.h* organi-
zation and operation of the Board, including any
subgroups, and for the format and content of oral
or written reports to the Board and by it.
(3) Designate any representatives, consultants, experts,
liaison officers, or other individuals who may be
required to support the activities of the Board and
define their duties and responsibilities.
.-• (4) Establish and announce a target date for submitting
a final report and keep all NASA officials concerned,
informed of the Board's plans, progress, and
findings.
(5) Designate another member of the Board to act as
Vice-chairman.
4. MEMBERSHIP
The Chairman, members of the Board, observers and

supporting staff are designated in Attachment A.
:
May 22, 1973 NN 1154
5. MEETINGS
The Chairman will arrange for the conduct of all meetings

and for such records or minutes of meetings as he considers
necessary.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER SUPPORT
a. The Directors of the John F. Kennedy Space Center, the

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, and the Johnson
Space Center will arrange for providing office space and
other facilities and services that may be requested by
the Chairman or his designee.
b. All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the Board
and provide any records, data, and other administrative
or technical support and services that may be requested.
7. DURATION
The Administrator will terminate the Board when it has

fulfilled his requirements.
8. CANCELLATION
This Notice is automatically canceled one year from its

effective date.
dministrator
DISTRIBUTION
t I
SDL 1
ATTACHMENT
A - Members and affiliates of the Skylab 1 Investigation Board
(listed on page ii of this report)
APPENDIX B
ACRONYMS AND SYMBOLS
AAP Apollo Applications Program

AM Airlock Module
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount
CECO Center Engine Cutoff

CSM Command and Service Module
CW. Clockwise
EBW Exploding Bridge Wire

ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EMR Engine Mixture Ratio
g Gravity
IU Instrument Unit
IGM Iterative Guidance Mode
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LSC Linear Shaped Charged
MAX-Q Maximum Dynamic Pressure

MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
MDAC McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDAC-W McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company-West
MS Meteoroid Shield
ms millisecond
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
OECO Outboard Engine Cutoff

OWS Orbital Workshop
B - 1

NASA Investigation Board Report On The Initial Flight Anomalies of Skylab 1 May 16, 1973

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NASA Investigation Board Report On The Initial Flight Anomalies of Skylab 1 May 16, 1973

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t-1780

NASA INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT

IE-7780) NASa INVESTIGATION E O A B D BEPCRT 08 N79-74788

JULY 13, 1973

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

INITIAL FLIGHT ANOMALIES

ON MAY 14, 1973

JULY 13, 1973

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

At approximately 63 seconds into the flight of Skylab 1 on May 14,

ATM Apollo Telescope Mount • -

MDA Multiple Docking'Adapter

OWS Orbital Workshop

S-ll Second Stage ;

SIC First Stage

Figure 1-2. - SL-1 vehicle.

h_\ '\ "MISSJONJL-l/2* - ' ; MISSION SL-3 ;MISSIONSL-4*

MANNED-28 DAYS UNMANNED MANNED-56 DAYS UNMANNED MANNED-56 DAYS

Figure 1-3. - Skylab mission profile.

MAJOR SKYLAB SUBCONTRACTORS

THE FLIGHT OF SKYLAB 1

Launch and Environment

RANGE TIME, SEC

SL-1 HISTORY IN REGION OF

Figure 2-4. - Meteoroid shield and solar array system.

0.0 ° DENOTES TIME BETWEEN DATA SAMPLES IN SECONDS

VEHICLE MAXIMUM WIND MAXIMUM WIND COMPONENTS

VEHICLE NO. PIT!:H PLANE YAkW PLANE

SHEAR, ALTITUDE, SHEAR, ALTITUDE

AS -501 0.0066 10. 00 (32 800) 0.0067 10.00(32800)

Inclination, degrees 50.06 50.00 0.06

Guidance Reference Release

S-IC Engine Start Sequence

Range Time Zero (1730:00) 0 0 0

All Holddown Arms Released 0.2 0.2 0

Liftoff, Begin Time Base 1 0.586 0.520 0

Begin Tower Avoidance Pitch

End Tower Avoidance Pitch

Begin Pitch and Roll Program 12.2 11.2 1.0

S-IC Outboard Engine Cant 20.5 20.5 0

Mach 1 61.1 61.5 -0.4

Maximum Dynamic Pressure

S-IC Center Engine Cutoff

Begin Time Base 2 140.8 140.7 0.1

S-IC Outboard Engine Cutoff

Begin Tilt Arrest

S-IC Engine 1 and 3

S-IC Engine 2 and 4

Begin Time Base 3 158.2 158.2 0

S-IC/S-H Separation 159.9 159.9 0

S-n Engine Start Sequence

Arm-1, S-H Aft Inter-

Arm-2, S-H Aft Inter-

S-n Aft Interstage Separation

S-n Aft Interstage Separation

Start Iterative Guidance Mode

Start Steering Misalignment

S-n Center Engine Cutoff 314.0 314.2 -0.2

Start IGM Phase n 314.5 314. 3 0.2

S-n Engine Mixture Ratio

Start IGM Phase m 404. 0 402.5 1.5

Begin Terminal Steering 568. 8 563.7 5.1

S-H Outboard Engine Cutoff

IPOS i 1|POS II\ IPOS in IG7031I n /|POS iv