Art II sec 6.
The separation of Church and State occasions might arise when the state will use the
shall be inviolable.
Art III sec 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall
be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any
sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
Establishment Clause
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ
Justice Laurel
1937
FACTS:
 On May 1936, respondent announced in the
newspapers that he would order of postage
stamps commemorating the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress under
Act No. 4052 (cited below)
 Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme
Head of the Phil. Independent Church
(Aglipayan), seeks a writ of prohibition to
prevent respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the said Congress.
o Petitioner alleges that respondent in
issuing and selling the postage
stamps violated the Constitutional
provision on the principle of
separation of church and state,
specifically section 13, subsection 3,
Art. VI which says: “No public
money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination… or
system of religion…”
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitution in
issuing and selling the postage stamps.
HELD: No constitutional infraction.
History of Separation of Church and State:
 “… our history, not to speak of the history of
mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for
Batch 2008A.
church, and the church the state, as a weapon
in the furtherance of their respective ends and
aims.”
 This principle was recognized in the Malolos
Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in
the instructions of McKinley to the Phil.
Commission… and finally embodied in the
Constitution as the supreme expression of the
Filipino people.
 Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom
 guaranteed in the Consti
o What is guaranteed by our Constitution
is religious liberty, not merely religious
toleration.
Religious Freedom:
 Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate
is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in
human affairs.
o Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence,
in order to establish a gov’t that shall
embody their ideals…” in the preamble
of the Constitution.
 General Concessions indiscriminately accorded
to religious sects:
o Tax exemptions properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes
o Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a
priest, preacher, etc. is assigned to the
armed forces, penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium.
o Optional religious instruction in public
schools is allowed by constitutional
mandate, etc.
PRESENT CASE:
 Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to
issue and sell the stamps contemplates no
religious purpose, but gives the Director of the
Posts the discretionary power to determine when
the issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.”
 The present case was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular religious
denomination.
o The stamps were not issued for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church,
nor were money derived from the sale of
the stamps given to the church.
o Purpose of the stamps was “to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourists
to the country”  officials took
advantage of an internationally
important event to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people.
 The stamp as actually printed
instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of
the City of Manila with the
inscription “Seat XXXIII
1
 International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
• What is emphasized
is not the Congress
but Manila, the
capital of the
Philippines, as the
seat of that
congress.
o The propaganda resulting from the
issuance and sale of the staff might
redound to the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church but this was not
the intention and is only incidental
to the original purpose.
 “We are of the opinion that
the Government should not
be embarrassed in its
activities simply because of
incidental results, more or
less religious in character, if
the purpose had in view is
one which could legitimately
be undertaken by
appropriate legislation.”
o There may have peen poor judgment
in issuing and selling the stamp but
a gap still exists between that and
the unconstitutionality of the
issuance and sale which was not
filled by the petitioner.
GARCES vs. ESTENZO
FACTS:
1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council
adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional
socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of
the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron
saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition
of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's
projects. Funds for the two projects would be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations "
2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed
Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance
with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman
Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor
of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain
in his residence for one year and until the election of
his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It
was further provided in the resolution that the image
would be made available to the Catholic parish
church during the celebration of the saint's feast
day. It was ratified in a plebiscite.
3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and
cash donations of the barangay residents and those
of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those
funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the
Batch 2008A.
wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in
Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred
pesos
4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in
the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so
that the devotees could worship the saint during the
mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass
when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña
refused to return that image to the barangay council on
the pretext that it was the property of the church
because church funds were used for its acquisition.
5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on
the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father
Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against
the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in
connection with the disputed image. That incident
provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city
court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
6. Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative
complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office
and the Department of Local Government and
Community Development on the grounds of immorality,
grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public
official and ignorance of the law.
7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained
in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father
Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to
have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the
council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May
12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a
lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for
the recovery of the image
8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc
City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel.
After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of
eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the
image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for
replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said
resolutions.
9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a
member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic
laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed
against the barangay council and its members (excluding
two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance
at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said
resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced
members of the Catholic Church because they could see
the image in the church only once a year or during the
fiesta. <Labo dud!> )
10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints.
ISSUES
1) WON that the barangay council was not duly
constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the
chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not
allowed to participate in its sessions? NO
2
RATIO
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman,
was notified of the sessions of the barangay council
to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not
able to attend those sessions because he was
working with a construction company based at Ipil,
Ormoc City. Mañago's absence from the sessions of
the barangay council did not render the said
resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said
resolutions were passed.
2) WON the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provisions that "no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of
religion" and that "no public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or
support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such.
except when such priest, preacher, minister,
or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces,
or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO
Ratio
The wooden image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint
had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as
illegal.
The barangay council designated a layman as the
custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall
any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.
A more practical reason for that arrangement would
be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody,
could easily be made available to any family desiring
to borrow the image in connection with prayers and
novenas.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a
saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the
parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if
Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing
contributions to be solicited from his own
parishioners for the purchase of another image of
San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña
Batch 2008A.
claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The
barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to
determine who should have custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the
image to the Catholic church, that action would not
violate the Constitution because the image was acquired
with private funds and is its private property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover
possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10
and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some
religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions
regarding separation of church and state, freedom of
worship and banning the use of public money or
property.
(Lower Court’s decision affirmed)
LEMON vs. KURTZMAN
(1971)
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early
v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The
cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided
financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public
schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct
supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public
elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to
"church-related educational institutions."
Question Presented
Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making
state financial aid available to "church-related
educational institutions"?
Conclusion
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with
religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute
must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have
principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit
religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." The Court found that the
subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of
religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state
surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions
of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in
religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an
unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning
legislation which appropriates support to religious
schools.
FACTS:
3
This case is actually 2 cases involving two States,
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, laws
were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools
and teachers. In both cases, the statutes were
challenged for being violitive of the first amendment
for creating an entanglement between church and
state.
RHODE ISLAND STATUTE:
Purpose: Keeping the quality of nonpublic
elementary schools.
Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salary to
nonpublic school teachers.
Qualifications: Teaching in a nonpublic school
where average per-pupil expenditure on secular
education is less than the average in the public
schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjects
and must not teach religion else lose the benefits
accorded by the statute.
Background of schools:
Nonpublic schools: 25% of the State’s
pupils. 95% went to RC schools.
Teachers who applied: all come from these
RC schools.
PENNSYLVANIA:
Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising
costs.
Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools on
expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and
instructional materials.
Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught in
public schools. Also limited to secular subjects.
Textbooks must be approved.
Background of schools:
Nonpublic schools: 20% of State’s pupils.
96% attended RC schools.
ISSUE:
WON the statutes enacted violated the first
amendment re: separation of Church and State, and
are therefore unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute
struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded).
RATIO:
What is held to have been violated is the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. In this, the court
stated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was
to protect against:
1) sponsorship
Batch 2008A.
2) financial support
3) active involvement
It also stated 3 tests:
1) Statute must have a secular legislative
purpose
2) Principal or primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion
3) Statute must not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion
Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as
the legislative intent/purpose is most definitely secular.
However, the court states that “the cumulative impact of
the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each
State involves excessive entanglement between
government and religion”.
As the schools taken into are church schools, they are
seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic
faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives
rise to entangling church-state relationships. Also
adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though
the case doesn’t really say why). Also taken into
consideration is the teachers’ means of teaching. There
is no way of ascertaining if the teachers will inject a
religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that
the schools and their teachers are subject to religious
authority, and teachers are even told (in the “Handbook
of School Regulations”) to stimulate interest in religious
vocations and missionary work.
Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actual
entanglement that will be caused through the
implementation of the laws. Due to the need for
surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must
run through applications to see who qualifies), there is
created the entanglement that the Clause protects
against. “...the very restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly
nonideological role gives rise to entanglements...”
The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as it
provides direct financial aid to these schools.
Another consideration is the divisive political potential of
the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance
will entail considerable political activity. This refers to
the division that will occur between those for and against
state aid, thereby making it a political struggle. Here the
state says that while political debate and division are
normal, those predicated on religious lines are what the
First Amendment sought to protect the country from.
The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption
challenge fell to over 200 years of universal practice,
state aid has no such support. Also, these statutes
create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be
avoided. The constitution deems religion to be a private
matter, so the government must exclude itself from such
an area.
BOARD of EDUCATION vs. ALLEN
4

(1968)
Justice White
FACTS:
1. A law (701 of the Education Law) of New
York requires local public school boards to
purchase textbooks and lend those
textbooks free of charge to all students in
grades seven through 12; students attending
private schools are included. The books
loaned are "text-books which are designated
for use in any public, elementary or
secondary schools of the state or are
approved by any boards of education," and
which "a pupil is required to use as a text
for a semester or more in a particular class
in the school he legally attends."
2. Board of Education of Central School
District No. 1 brought suit in the New York
courts against James Allen because Allen
would remove the members of the Board
from office if they fail to lend books to
parochial school students. The members of
the Board contend that the law was invalid.
3. The trial court held the law
unconstitutional. The NY Court of Appeals
held that 701 was not in violation of either
the State or the Federal Constitution. The
CA said that the law's purpose was to
benefit all school children, regardless of the
type of school they attended, and that only
textbooks approved by public school
authorities could be loaned. It considered
701 "completely neutral with respect to
religion, merely making available secular
textbooks at the request of the individual
student and asking no question about what
school he attends." Board of Education
brought the case to the US SC.
ISSUE:
WoN the statute is a "law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1st and
14th Amendments to the Constitution, because it
authorizes the loan of textbooks to students
attending parochial schools.
DECISION:
The law is not in violation of
Constitution.
RATIO:
1. The language of 701 does not authorize the
loan of religious books, and the State claims
no right to distribute religious literature.
Although the books loaned are those required
by the parochial school for use in specific
courses, each book loaned must be approved
by the public school authorities; only secular
books may receive approval.
2. The express purpose of 701 was stated by the
New York Legislature to be furtherance of the
Batch 2008A.
educational opportunities available to the young.
Appellants have shown us nothing about the
necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to
its stated purpose. The law merely makes available
to all children the benefits of a general program to
lend school books free of charge. Books are
furnished at the request of the pupil and
ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to
parents and children, not to schools.
3. The record contains no suggestion that religious
books have been loaned. Absent evidence, the SC
cannot assume that school authorities are unable
to distinguish between secular and religious books
or that they will not honestly discharge their
duties under the law. In judging the validity of the
statute on this record the Court must proceed on
the assumption that books loaned to students are
books that are not unsuitable for use in the public
schools because of religious content.
4. Everson v. Board of Education. The test for
distinguishing between forbidden involvements of
the state with religion: what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power
as circumscribed by the Constitution. To
withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.
5. The Court has long recognized that religious
schools pursue two goals, religious instruction
and secular education. The State's interest in
education would be served sufficiently by reliance
on the secular teaching that accompanied
religious training in the schools maintained by a
religious order (Pierce v Society of Siters). A
substantial body of case law has confirmed the
power of the States to insist that if the State must
satisfy its interest in secular education through
the instrument of private schools, it has a proper
interest in the manner in which those schools
perform their secular educational function.
the
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU
& LYNCH vs. DONELLY
FACTS:
This concerns the constitutionality of 2 recurring holiday
displays located on public property in downtown
Pittsburgh.
5
 • The first, a crèche depicting the Christian
Nativity scene, was placed on the Grand
Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c
is the main, most beautiful, and most public
part of the courthouse. The crèche was
donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman
Catholic group, and bore a sign to that
effect.
• The second was an 18-foot Chanukah
menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed
just outside the City County building next to
the city’s 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot
of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor’s
name & containing text declaring the city’s
salute to liberty. The menorah is owned by
Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored,
erected, and removed each year by the city.
• Respondents (the Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking
permanently to enjoin the county from
displaying the menorah on the ground that
the displays violated the Establishment
Clause of the 1st Amendment.
• The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each
display violates the Establishment Clause
because each has the impermissible effect of
endorsing religion.
ISSUE:
1. WON display of crèche violates
Establishment clause. YES
2. WON display of menorah violates
Establishment clause. NO
RATIO:
The Establishment Clause
• The Establishment Clause: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof..”
• Lemon v Kurtzman provides 3 tests for
determining whether a gov’t practice violates
the Clause. A statute or practice w/c
touches upon religion, if it is to be
permissible under the Clause must 1) have a
secular purpose; 2) neither advance nor
inhibit religion in its principal or primary
effect; 3) not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.
• The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt
from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from
“making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person’s standing in the
political community.”
LYNCH V DONNELLY
• ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had
violated the Establishment Clause by
including a creche in its annual Christmas
Batch 2008A.
display, located in a private park w/n downtown
shopping district.
• By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of the
crèche in the display, holding that it didn’t have
the effect of advancing or promoting religion.
• J. O’CONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides
framework for evaluating govt’l use of religious
symbols: 1) O’Connor recognizes any
endorsement of religion as invalid because it
sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community; 2) She
provides a method for determining whether the
govt’s use of an object with religious meaning
has the effect of endorsing religion. The effect of
the display depends upon the message that the
govt’s practice communicates: the question is
what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display. That inquiry turns upon
the context in which the contested object
appears.
• The concurrence concluded that both because
the crèche is a “traditional symbol” of
Christmas, a holiday with strong secular
elements, and because the crèche was
“displayed along with purely secular symbols”
(i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santa
distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/
“Season’s Greetings”, etc), the creche’s setting
changes what viewers may fairly understand to
be the purpose of the display and negates any
message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs
represented by the crèche.
• The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agree
that: 1) govt’s use of religious symbolism is
unconstitutional if it has the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs; 2) effect of the
govt’s use of religious symbolism depends
upon its context.
1. ON CRECHE
• There is no doubt that the crèche itself is
capable of communicating a religious message.
The angel in the crèche endorses a patently
Christian message: “Glory to God in the
Highest”
• Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crèche
display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in
Lynch, nothing in the context of the display
detracts from the creche’s religious message.
The Lynch display comprised a series of figures
and objects, each group of which had its own
focal point. Here, in contrast, the crèche stands
alone: it is the single element of the display
on the Grand Staircase.
• Further, by permitting the display of the crèche
in the main & most beautiful part of the
building, the county sends an unmistakable
message that it supports and promotes the
Christian praise to God.
• The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing
its ownership by a Roman Catholic group
demonstrates that the govt is endorsing the
6
 religious message of that organization,
rather than communicating a message of its
own. The Clause prohibits what occurred
here: the govt’s lending its support to the
communication of a religious’ organization’s
religious message.
• Govt may acknowledge Christmas as a
cultural phenomenon, but under the 1st
Amendment, it may not observe it as a
Christian holy day by suggesting that people
praise God for the birth of Jesus.
• Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate Xmas
in some manner and form, but not in a way
that endorses Christian doctrine as the
Allegheny County did in displaying the
crèche.
On Justice Kennedy’s opinion upholding the
display of the crèche as permissible under the
Clause
• Kennedy says the display of the crèche is
consistent with the Establishment Clause.
He argues that this follows from the Marsh v
Chambers decision, which sustained the
constitutionality of a legislative prayer. He
also asserts that the crèche, even in this
setting, poses no realistic risk of
representing an effort to proselytize, having
repudiated the Court’s endorsement
inquiry in favor of a proselytization
approach. Court’s analysis of the crèche
reflects an unjustified hostility toward
religion.
• Court answered that history cannot
legitimate practices like the crèche display
that demonstrate the govt’s allegiance to a
particular sect or creed.
• The proselytization test preferred by
Kennedy is much the same as the
endorsement inquiry except to the extent
that the former requires an obvious
allegiance between the government and the
favored sect.
• *Endorsement inquiry: WON the practice
demonstrates the govt’s support, promotion
or endorsement of the particular creed of a
particular sect
• *Proselytization test: WON the practice
would place the govt’s weight behind an
obvious effort to proselytize for a particular
religion
• Court said that Kennedy misperceived a
respect for religious pluralism as hostility or
indifference to religion.
• The Constitution mandates that the
government remain secular, rather than
affiliating itself with religious beliefs or
institutions, precisely in order to avoid
discriminating against citizens on the basis
of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim that
prohibiting government from celebrating
Christmas as a religious holiday
discriminates against Christians in favor of
nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts
Batch 2008A.
the fundamental premise of the Establishment
Clause itself. In contrast, confining the
government's own Christmas celebration to the
holiday's secular aspects does not favor the
religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of
Christians, but simply permits the government
to acknowledge the holiday without expressing
an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs.
2. ON MENORAH
• The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol.
But its message is not exclusively religious. It is
the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like
Christmas, has both religious and secular
dimensions.
• Its display doesn’t have the prohibited effect of
endorsing religion given its particular physical
setting. Its combined display with a Christmas
tree & a sign saluting liberty does not
impermissibly endorse both the Christian and
Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally
infirm than the endorsement of Christianity
alone), but simply recognizes that both
Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same
winter-holiday season, which has attained a
secular status in our society. The widely
accepted view of the Christmas tree as the
preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas
season emphasizes this point.
• The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant
element in the city’s display by virtue of its size
and central position. The placement of the
menorah beside it is readily understood as a
recognition that Christmas is not the only
traditional way of celebrating the season.
• Similarly, the presence of the mayor’s sign
confirms that in the particular context the govt’s
association with a religious symbol does not
represent sponsorship of religious beliefs but
simply a recognition of cultural diversity.
LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY
FACTS:
The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas
display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and
located in the heart of the city's shopping district. The
display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa
Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads
"SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene,
which has been part of this annual display for 40 years
or more. Respondents brought an action in Federal
District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche in
the display on the ground that it violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court upheld the challenge and
permanently enjoined the city from including the creche
in the display. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON display of crèche violates Establishment Clause.
HELD:
7
Notwithstanding the religious significance of the
creche, Pawtucket has not violated the
Establishment Clause
RATIO:
• The concept of a "wall" of separation
between church and state is a useful
metaphor but is not an accurate description
of the practical aspects of the relationship
that in fact exists. The Constitution does not
require complete separation of church and
state; it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions, and forbids hostility toward any.
• This Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause comports with the
contemporaneous understanding of the
Framers' intent. That neither the draftsmen
of the Constitution, nor the First Congress
itself, saw any establishment problem in
employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in
the Congress is a striking example of the
accommodation of religious beliefs intended
by the Framers.
• Our history is pervaded by official
acknowledgment of the role of religion in
American life, and equally pervasive is
evidence of accommodation of all faiths and
all forms of religious expression and hostility
toward none.
• Rather than taking an absolutist approach
in applying the Establishment Clause and
mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or
give special recognition to religion in general
or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized
challenged conduct or legislation to
determine whether, in reality, it establishes a
religion or religious faith or tends to do so. In
the line-drawing process called for in each
case, it has often been found useful to
inquire whether the challenged law or
conduct has a secular purpose, whether its
principal or primary effect is to advance or
inhibit religion, and whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with
religion. But this Court has been unwilling
to be confined to any single test or criterion
in this sensitive area.
• Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on
the creche in the context of the Christmas
season. Focus exclusively on the religious
component of any activity would inevitably
lead to its invalidation under the
Establishment Clause.
• Based on the record in this case, the city
has a secular purpose for including the
creche in its Christmas display and has not
impermissibly advanced religion or
created an excessive entanglement
between religion and government. The
display is sponsored by the city to celebrate
the Holiday recognized by Congress and
national tradition and to depict the origins of
that Holiday; these are legitimate secular
Batch 2008A.
purposes. Whatever benefit to one faith or
religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche
in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and
incidental, and is no more an advancement or
endorsement of religion than the congressional
and executive recognition of the origins of
Christmas, or the exhibition of religious
paintings in governmentally supported
museums.
• As to administrative entanglement, there is no
evidence of contact with church authorities
concerning the content or design of the
exhibition prior to or since the city's purchase of
the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of
the creche have been necessary, and, since the
city owns the crèche (worth $200), the tangible
material it contributes is de minimis. Political
divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate
otherwise permissible conduct, and, in any
event, apart from the instant litigation, there is
no evidence of political friction or divisiveness
over the creche in the 40-year history of the
city's Christmas celebration.
• It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche
in the display, as part of a celebration of an
event acknowledged in the Western World for 20
centuries, and in this country by the people, the
Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for
2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibition as to
render it violative of the Establishment Clause.
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol
while hymns and carols are sung and played in
public places including schools, and while
Congress and state legislatures open public
sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction
contrary to this Nation's history and this Court's
holdings.
EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS
J.Fortas
FACTS:
Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rock school
system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at
Central High School. Until 1964 the official textbook
furnished for the high school biology course did not have
a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the
academic year 1965--1966, the school administration,
on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the
school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which
contained a chapter setting forth 'the theory about the
origin * * * of man from a lower form of animal.'
The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any
state-supported school or university 'to teach the theory
or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a
lower order of animals,' or 'to adopt or use in any such
institution a textbook that teaches' this theory. Violation
is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal
from his position. The Arkansas statute was an adaption
of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law' which that State
adopted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee
8
law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
the celebrated Scopes case in 1927.
Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma because
she was supposed to use the new textbook for
classroom instruction and presumably to teach the
statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so would
be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the
'anti-evolution' statute which the State of Arkansas
adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public
schools and universities of the theory that man
evolved from other species of life.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not the statute violates the constitutional
provisions respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting its free exercise (1st Amendment), and
free speech ( 14th Amendment) . YES
RATIO:
Government in our democracy, state and national,
must be neutral in matters of religious theory,
doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any
religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious
theory against another or even against the militant
opposite. The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and non-religion.
There is and can be no doubt that the First
Amendment does not permit the State to require that
teaching and learning must be tailored to the
principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the
curriculum for its public schools does not carry with
it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty,
the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where
that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate
the First Amendment.
In the present case, there can be no doubt that
Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from
discussing the theory of evolution because it is
contrary to the belief of some that the Book of
Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as
to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made
that Arkansas' law may be justified by
considerations of state policy other than the
religious views of some of its citizens. It is clear that
fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the
law's reason for existence.
Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of
religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise
from the curricula of its schools and universities all
discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was
confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory
because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical
account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to
Batch 2008A.
the mandate of the First, and in violation of the
Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution.
SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP
Justice CLARK
FACTS:
Applicable Amendments:
1. First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
- No. 142 – The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
requires that at least ten verses from the Holy
Bible shall be read without comment, at the
opening of each Public school on each school
day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible
reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon
the request of his parent or guardian. The
exercises are broadcast into each room in the
building through an intercom system. This is
followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.
Participation in the open exercises was
considered voluntary. The student reading the
bible must select the passages and read any
form or version he chases. (King James version,
Douay or the Revised Standard versions as well
as the Jewish Holy Scriptures)
- The constitutionality of the said statute was
assailed by Edward Schempp, a member of the
Unitarian faith who, along with his wife and
children, questioned the validity of the statute,
contending that his rights have been violated,
under the 14th of table and to the Constitution of
the United States.
- The children study in Abington Senior High
School
- Schempp testified that he at first refused to
exercise his prerogative of excusing his children
from the morning exercises upon fear that his
children would be labeled as odd balls. Their
classmates would be liable for lumping religious
differences and objections as atheism with
immoral and un-patriotic overtones.
- Doctor Solomon Grayzel (witness for the
appellees): The reading of such verses without
explanation may be psychologically harmful to
the children and may cause a divisive force in
the social media of the school.
- Doctor Luther A. Weigle (witness for the
defense): The Bible is a non-sectarian piece of
literature within among the Christian faiths. The
exclusion of the New Testament would be in
itself a sectarian practice.
- The trial court struck down the practices and
the statute requiring them after making the
specific findings of fact that attendance to
Abington and undergoing the practices were
compulsory. The court further found that the
reading of the verses without comment would
constitute in effect a religious observance.
9
- The court rejected the defense’s argument that
the children were allowed to excuse themselves
via their parents’ request, saying that it did not
mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony.
This was still in violation of the establishment
clause in that it threatens religious liberty by
putting a premium upon belief as opposed to
non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect
the beliefs, ideals, and even morality of the
petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
is unconstitutional under the violation of the
Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
I. It is true that religion has been closely
identified with American history and
government. This background is evidence
today in our public life through the
continuance in our oaths of office from the
Presidency to the Alderman of the final
supplication, “So held me God.” Indeed, only
last year, an official survey of the country
indicated that 64% of our people have
church membership while 3% profess no IV.
faith at all. This is not to say, however that
religion has been so identified with our
history and government that religious
freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded
in out public and private life. Nothing but
the most telling of personal experiences in
religious persecution could have implanted
such belief.
II. Minor v. Board of Education of
Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the
court has decisively settled the First
Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof’ has been made wholly applicable to
the States under the 14th amendment.
Second, this Court has rejected
unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only
governmental preference of one religion over
the other.
Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson
and Burton: The First
Amendment’s purpose was to
create a complete and
permanent separation of the
spheres of religious activity and
civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding any
form of public aid or support for
religion.
III. Interrelationship between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses:
Batch 2008A.
The former forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom to
choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The
latter protects the freedom to exercise the
chosen form of religion. This it embraces two
concepts: Freedom to believe and Freedom to
Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut)
- Public Schools are organized on the premise
that secular education can be isolated from all
religious teaching so that the school can
inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and
also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to
religion.
- McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendment
did not simply bar a congressional enactment
establishing a church; it forbade all laws
respecting an establishment of religion.
- Engel v. Vitale: The establishment and free
exercise clauses in certain instances overlap.
The former does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those
laws directly operate to coerce non-observing
individuals or not. The former works also on
the belief that a union of government and
religion tends to destroy government and
degrade religion.
The neutrality of which the Court’s cases
speak thus stem from the recognition from
history of the tendency of religious sects to
fuse governmental and religious functions or
cause a concert of dependence of one upon the
other placing State support behind the tenets
of one or all orthodoxies.
Test for Establishment Clause:
1. Existence of a secular legislative purpose
2. The primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion.
Test for Free Exercise Clause:
1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactment
as it operates against anyone in the practice
of religion.
- We agree with the trial court’ finding as to the
religious character of the exercises and are
thus in violation of the establishment clause.
- It is also insisted that unless religious
exercises are permitted a ‘religion of
secularism’ is established in schools. We agree
that a religion of secularism cannot be
established in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus
preferring belief over non-belief.
- While the Free Exercise clause clearly
prohibits the use of state action to deny the
rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never
meant that a majority could use the
machinery of the state to practice beliefs.
10

ENGEL vs. VITALE
04/03/62
Black, J.
FACTS:
Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School
District 9, acting under New York State law,
composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start
of each class that went: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our Country."
The program was supported by the NY State Board
of Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this
action in a New York State Court insisting that use
of this official prayer in the public schools was
contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious
practices of both themselves and their children. NY
CA sustained an order of the lower state courts
which had upheld the power of New York to use the
Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of
its public schools so long as the schools did not
compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his
parents' objection. petitioners appealed.
petitoners: prayer violates the non-establishment of
religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the State's use
of the Regents' prayer in its public school system
breaches the constitutional wall of separation
between Church and State.)
respondents: prayer is "non-denominational"; the
program, as modified and approved by state courts,
does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but
permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or
be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution
in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an
establishment of religious services in public schools
is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward
prayer.
ISSUE:
WON the prayer is a religious exercise, the
establishment of which is prohibited by the 1st
amendment
HELD:
YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is a
religious exercise; the State of New York has adopted
a practice wholly inconsistent with the Non-
Establishment Clause. the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion
must at least mean that in this country it is no part
of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government. In an effort to explain the clause, the
court looked at the history of the separation of
church and state saying that " it is a matter of
history that this very practice of establishing
governmentally composed prayers for religious
services was one of the reasons which caused many
of our early colonists to leave England and seek
religious freedom in America" In England where
Batch 2008A.
there was a state religion, many people who held
contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history
shows that there was a widespread awareness among
many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church
and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter
personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to
the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way
lay in the Government's placing its official stamp of
approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one
particular form of religious services.
The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this
danger by leaving the government of this country in the
hands of the people rather than in the hands of any
monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our
Founders were no more willing to let the content of their
prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they
pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to
let these vital matters of personal conscience depend
upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment
was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee
that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
Government would be used to control, support or
influence the kinds of prayer the American people can
say -- that the people's religions must not be subjected
to the pressures of government for change each time a
new political administration is elected to office. Under
that Amendment's prohibition against governmental
establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this
country, be it state or federal, is without power to
prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is
to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any
program of governmentally sponsored religious activity.
The history of governmentally established religion, both
in England and in this country, showed that whenever
government had allied itself with one particular form of
religion, the inevitable result had been that it had
incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the
Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the
historical fact that governmentally established religions
and religious persecutions go hand in hand.
re: respondents first argument
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally
neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
students is voluntary can serve to free it from the
limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from
the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both
of which are operative against the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
re: respondents second argument
It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that
each separate government in this country should stay
out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
prayers and leave that purely religious function to the
people themselves and to those the people choose to look
to for religious guidance.
Reversed and remanded.
11
 ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS
FACTS:
Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program gives
educational choices to families in any Ohio school
district that is under state control pursuant to a
federal-court order. The program provides tuition aid
for certain students in the Cleveland City School
District, the only covered district, to attend
participating public or private schools of their
parent's choosing and tutorial aid for students who
choose to remain enrolled in public school. Both
religious and nonreligious schools in the district may
participate, as may public schools in adjacent school
districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parents
according to financial need, and where the aid is
spent depends solely upon where parents choose to
enroll their children. The number of tutorial
assistance grants provided to students remaining in
public school must equal the number of tuition aid
scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of
the participating private schools had a religious
affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools
participated, and 96% of the students participating
in the scholarship program were enrolled in
religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the
students were from families at or below the poverty
line. Cleveland schoolchildren also have the option of
enrolling in community schools, which are funded
under state law but run by their own school boards
and receive twice the per-student funding as
participating private schools, or magnet schools,
which are public schools emphasizing a particular
subject area, teaching method, or service, and for
which the school district receives the same amount
per student as it does for a student enrolled at a
traditional public school. Respondents, Ohio
taxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on the
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause.
The Federal District Court granted them summary
judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the program offends the Establishment
Clause. NO.
RATIO:
(a) A government aid program is not readily subject
to challenge under the Establishment Clause if it is
neutral with respect to religion and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who,
in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice. Under such a program,
government aid reaches religious institutions only by
way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
aid recipients not the government, whose role ends
with the disbursement of benefits.
(b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, and
is part of Ohio's general and multifaceted
Batch 2008A.
undertaking to provide educational opportunities to
children in a failed school district. It confers educational
assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined
without reference to religion and permits participation of
all district schools--religious or nonreligious--and
adjacent public schools. The only preference in the
program is for low-income families, who receive greater
assistance and have priority for admission. Rather than
creating financial incentives that skew it towards
religious schools, the program creates financial
disincentives: Private schools receive only half the
government assistance given to community schools and
one-third that given to magnet schools, and adjacent
public schools would receive two to three times that
given to private schools. Families too have a financial
disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private
school tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet,
or traditional public school. No reasonable observer
would think that such a neutral private choice program
carries with it the imprimatur of government
endorsement. Nor is there evidence that the program
fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland
parents to select secular educational options: Their
children may remain in public school as before, remain
in public school with funded tutoring aid, obtain a
scholarship and choose to attend a religious school,
obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a nonreligious
private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in
a magnet school. The Establishment Clause question
whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their
children to religious schools must be answered by
evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland
schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a
scholarship and then choose a religious school.
Cleveland's preponderance of religiously affiliated
schools did not result from the program, but is a
phenomenon common to many American cities. Eighty-
two percent of Cleveland's private schools are religious,
as are 81% of Ohio's private schools. To attribute
constitutional significance to the 82% figure would lead
to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice
program might be permissible in parts of Ohio where the
percentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where Ohio
has deemed such programs most sorely needed.
Likewise, an identical private choice program might be
constitutional only in States with a lower percentage of
religious private schools.
TILTON vs. RICHARDSON
FACTS:
• The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed
in 1963 in response to a strong nationwide
demand for the expansion of college and
university facilities to meet the sharply rising
number of young people demanding higher
education. The Act authorizes federal grants and
loans to "institutions of higher education" for the
construction of a wide variety of "academic
facilities." But expressly excludes
"any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship, or
12
 . . . any facility which . . . is used or to be
used primarily in connection with any part
of the program of a school or department of
divinity . . . ."
• no part of the project may be used for
sectarian instruction, religious worship, or
the programs of a divinity school.
• If, during this period (a period of 20 years),
the recipient violates the statutory
conditions, the United States is entitled to
recover an amount equal to the proportion of
its present value that the federal grant bore
to the original cost of the facility.
• Four church-related colleges and
universities in Connecticut receiving federal
construction grants under Title I were
named as defendants. Federal funds were
used for five projects at these four
institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred
Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and
arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a
science building at Fairfield University; (4) a
library building at Fairfield; and (5) a
language laboratory at Albertus Magnus
College.
• Appellants attempted to show that the four
recipient institutions were "sectarian" by
introducing evidence of their relations with
religious authorities, the content of their
curricula, and other indicia of their religious
character.
• Appellee colleges introduced testimony that
they had fully complied with the statutory
conditions and that their religious affiliation
in no way interfered with the performance of
their secular educational functions.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON Act authorized grants to church-
related schools  yes
2. WON religion clauses of the consti have been
impaired  in part, yes but the entire act is
not unconsti
* Vacated and remanded.
RATIO:
1. We are satisfied that Congress intended the
Act to include all colleges and universities
regardless of any affiliation with or
sponsorship by a religious body. The Act
makes no reference to religious affiliation or
nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances
"institutions of higher education" must be
taken to include church-related colleges and
universities.
2. Court have noted the internal tension in the
First Amendment between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. the Establishment Clause sought to
protect: "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in
Batch 2008A.
religious activity." Every analysis must begin
with the candid acknowledgment that there is no
single constitutional caliper that can be used to
measure the precise degree to which these three
factors are present or absent. There is only a
cumulative criteria which is this:
Against this background we consider four questions:
a) does the Act reflect a secular legislative
purpose? Yes
~> United States require that the youth be assured
ample opportunity for the fullest development of their
intellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimate
secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental
action. The crucial question is not whether some benefit
accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the
legislative program, but whether its principal or primary
effect advances religion. The Act itself was carefully
drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities
would be devoted to the secular and not the religious
function of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants
and loans only for academic facilities that will be used
for defined secular purposes and expressly prohibits
their use for religious instruction, training, or worship.
None of the four church-related institutions in this case
has violated the statutory restrictions. There had been
no religious services or worship in the federally financed
facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them;
used solely for nonreligious purposes. There is no
evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these
facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of
academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination.
b) is the primary effect of the Act to
advance or inhibit religion? Yes, in effect
will help advance religion. This part held
unconstitutional.
~> We note that an institution applying for a federal
grant is only required to provide assurances that the
facility will not be used for sectarian instruction or
religious worship "during at least the period of the
Federal interest therein(20 years). This obviously opens
the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that
period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for
example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to
promote religious interests, the original federal grant will
in part have the effect of advancing religion. So this part
was held unconstitutional.
c) does the administration of the Act foster
an excessive government entanglement
with religion? No. the entanglement is
very much lessened for three reasons.
(application of strict scrutiny)
~> these four schools subscribe to a well-established set
of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this
record shows that these principles are not in fact
followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with
admittedly religious functions but whose predominant
higher education mission is to provide their students
with a secular education. Their purpose is not religious
13
indoctrination so there is less likelihood than in
primary and secondary schools that religion will
permeate the area of secular education. This reduces
the risk that government aid will in fact serve to
support religious activities.
~> The entanglement between church and state is
also lessened here by the nonideological character of
the aid that the Government provides. Neutral, or
non-ideological services, facilities, or materials are
supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation
of the school that they attend. Facilities are
religiously neutral.
~> Government aid here is a one-time, single-
purpose construction grant. There are no continuing
financial relationships or dependencies.
*these three taken together shape a narrow and
limited relationship bet church and govt to become
in danger of realizing the substantive evils against
which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect.
d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibit
the free exercise of religion in violation of the 1st
amendment? No. except of course that part of 20-
year limitation…
~> Appellants, however, are unable to identify any
coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their
religious beliefs.
VELARDE vs. SOCIETY for SOCIAL JUSTICE
J. PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
• A case was brought by respondent Social
Justice Society (SJS) against petitioner Mike
Velarde, together with Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin, Erano Manalo, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva & Eli Soriano in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for the rresolution of "whether
or not the act of a religious leader like any of
herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy
of a candidate for elective office or in urging or
requiring the members of his flock to vote for a
specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions”.
• The trial court opined that the "endorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public
office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."
• However, the trial court failed to include a
dispositive portion in its assailed Decision after
its essay on the legal issue.
• Thus, petitioners filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration on the assailed decision
questioning whether or not the decision of the
lower court was proper & valid in lieu of
procedural deficiencies & substantive issues
Batch 2008A.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action?
Did respondent have any legal standing to file the
Petition for Declaratory Relief?
2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution, the law and
the Rules of Court?
3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike
Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for
public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from
campaigning against said candidates?"
HELD & RATIO:
1. NO. SJS miserably failed to allege an existing
controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the
respondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently
state what specific legal right of the SJS was violated by
the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which it relies on its pleading for its claim. SJS
merely speculated or anticipated without factual
moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below
had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or
candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men
to public office who would in turn be forever beholden to
their leaders, enabling them to control the government"
& "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion
of the people’s faith in the electoral process; &
reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine
the ultimate result of elections," which would then be
violative of the separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely
theoretical. The Petition does not even allege any
indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the
petitioners to champion an electoral candidate, or to
urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a
particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer
speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.
There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being
subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable
violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts
to settle actual controversies involving rights that are
legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised
when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal
right.
Even if the court relaxed the requirements of locus
standi in view of its transcendental importance, counsels
for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS --
made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that
would supply the deficiencies discussed. Hence, even if
the Court would exempt this case from the stringent
locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be
futile because the transcendental issue cannot be
resolved anyway.
14
2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the
basis therefor." Elementary due process demands
that the parties to a litigation be given information
on how the case was decided, as well as an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led
to the conclusions of the court. The significance of
factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a
precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any
of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate
court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of
law with which he disagrees. More than that, the
requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in
reaching judgment, the judge did so through the
processes of legal reasoning.
Essential Parts of a Good decision:
1. Statement of the case
2. Statement of the facts
3. Issues
4. Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a
rule, separately considered and resolved
5. Dispositive portion
The assailed decision did not include a resolutory or
dispositive portion. It is merely an answer to a
hypothetical legal question and just a part of the
opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively
declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the
Petition. Failure to comply with the constitutional
injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders
issued in careless disregard of the constitutional
mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck
down as void.
3. Religious Leaders’ Endorsement of
Candidates for Public Office
The Court deems this constitutional issue to be of
paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it
concerns the governance of our country and its
people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural
transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this
Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to
leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the
merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to
convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. It
failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied
upon for its claim. Neither were there factual
findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS
merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical
question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory
opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the
court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Batch 2008A.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear
violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void
and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is
nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even
just modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take
up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a
constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that
"the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed
upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned."
MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA
FACTS:
o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit
religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through
its Philippines agency established in November
of 1898
o the defendant appellee is a municipal
corporation with powers that are to be
excercised in conformity with the provisions of
R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the
city of manila
o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and gospel porionms thereof
throughout the Philippines
o the acting city treasurer nformed plaintiff that it
was conducting business of general
merchandise, without providing itself with the
necessary mayors permit and municipal license,
in violation of various ordinances, and asked the
plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the
corresponding license and fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the
sum of Php 5,821
o plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the license
fees but at the same time filed a complaint to the
courts
o plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt
from real estate taxes; and that it was never
required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee
before the war, nor does the American bible
society in the U.S pay license fee or sales tax for
the sale of the bible.
o however a witness for the appellees was able to
prove that the American bibler society in fact
does profit from the sale of the Bible.
ISSUES:
15

(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of
Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028
and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!!
(2) whether said ordinances are inapplicable,
invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged
business of distribution and sale of bibles to the
people of the Philippines by a religious corporation
like the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YES
invalid!
HELD:
*The only essential difference that We find
between these two provisions that may have any
bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection
(m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any
dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under
subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one
or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be
in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding
section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409,
does not contain any limitation as to the amount of
tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per
annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of
the authorities above referred to that maintain that
"all rights and liabilities which have accrued under
the original statute are preserved and may be
enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the
repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without
interruption", We hold that the questioned
ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and
effect.
*The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee
herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature.
*The constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can
only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and
Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee
herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature.
*(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one
thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The
tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license
tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise
Batch 2008A.
of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress
its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance.
Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all
'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious
beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus
be denied the needy. . . .
*It may be true that in the case at bar the price
asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost
of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that
the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so
it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
*Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But
as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as
amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated
before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of
the plaintiff.
Reversed and Remanded
GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION
(1959)
Montemayor J
FACTS:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony
compulsory for schools. The implementing rules
(Department Order 8)says that the anthem must be
played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone
must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while
the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to
recite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan).
Petitioners children attending the Buenavista
Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute
the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did
not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's
Witnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not
make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth
beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They
consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because
of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.
16
Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their
children be exempt from the law and just be allowed
to remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd
denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was
petitioned and issued.
ISSUE:
WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order
non-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional
RATIONALE:
The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but
it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then
the former must yield.
What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain
that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol
of Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious
symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious
ceremony. The determination whether a ceremony is
religious or not is left to the courts not to any
religious group.
Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand
during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag
during boy scout activities. Their objection then
rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of
pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely
secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag
or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It
talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting
to force, military service, or duty to defend the
country.
There was no compulsion involved in the
enforcement of the flag salute. They were not
criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they
chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely
lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave
it.
Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were
members of Methodist Episcopal Church who
believed that war and preparations for war are gainst
God's wishes. They did not take required military
service training which was requirement to graduate.
Court said that they were not being drafted to attend
university. University did not violate due process
when it required the mil service.
Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs
Witness children were expelled from school for
refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation
of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due
process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs.
Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided
court.
Batch 2008A.
This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special
circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the
students although attendance in schools is mandatory
turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories.
Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment
here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and
exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't
attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to
attend school.
Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society and
community life he becomes a member and must give up
some of his rights for the general welfare just like
everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to
reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the
state.
Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah
Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the
Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religious
pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of
parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoes
not include liberty to expose child to ill health. This case
was decided after Barnette, supra.
SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flag
salute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
regulation applicable to members of all religions. State
carried out duty to supervise educational institutions
and teach civic duty.
Petitioners do not question the right of the school to
conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the
attempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the
petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the greater student population.
There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an
understanding that anti-war religious believers will not
be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat
ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the
courts.
DISPOSITION:
decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary
injunction dissolved. No costs.
ERBALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
March 1, 1993
Ponente: Griño-Aquino, J:
FACTS:
All the petitioners in these two cases are school
children who are members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who
were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by DECS
Department Order No. 8 (July 21, 1955) which makes
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
17
ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are
members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public
and private) for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony.
RATIO:
It has been held previously in the case of
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a
system of complete separation between church and
state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance and therefore saluting it is not a
religious ceremony. The requirement of the flag
ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the
flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to students and
teachers regardless of their religion.
While the necessity to develop such respect
for the flag and respect for the country still persists
until today, there is recognition that religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to
the highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in
German vs. Barangan)
Two-fold aspect of religious profession:
 Freedom to believe – absolute as long as
confined to the realm of thought
 Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts affecting the public welfare
Petitioners contend that while they did not
participate in the flag ceremony, they did not engage
in any disruptive behavior that would offend those
who choose to participate but rather they just
quietly stood at attention during the flag ceremony
to show respect to their countrymen. Therefore, in
the absence of a grave and present danger which
is the sole justification for a prior restraint on
the exercise of religious freedom, according to
Teehankee in his dissent in German vs. Barangan,
there is no warrant to justify their expulsion.
What petitioners seek is only exemption
from the flag ceremony and therefore the virtues (e.g.
patriotism, respect for human rights, love of country,
etc.) they are supposed to imbibe from their
participation in the flag ceremony, they can get in
their study of the Constitution, the democaratic way
of life and form of government, the history and
culture of the Philippines, the life of our heroes, etc.
To force a small religious group through the
iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for duly
constituted authorities which are precisely the
values the court in Gerona feared will be lost by
exempting some members of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses to participate in the flag ceremonies.
 let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even
to the country… is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)
Batch 2008A.
 expulsion of the members will violated their right as
citizens under the Constitution to receive free education
which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education and to make
such education applicable to all.
 in closing, the court hopes that it will not take
another foreign invasion of our country for our
countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag
as what happened during WWII.
NEWDOW vs. U.S. CONGRESS
FACTS:
1. Newdow is an atheist whose daughter attends
public elementary school in the Elk Grove
Unified School District ("EGUSD") in California.
In accordance with state law and a school
district rule, EGUSD teachers begin each school
day by leading their students in a recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance ("the Pledge").
2. The California Education Code requires that
public schools begin each school day with
"appropriate patriotic exercises" and that "the
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of
the United States of America shall satisfy" this
requirement.
3. To implement the California statute, the school
district that Newdow's daughter attends has
promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent
part: "Each elementary school class recite the
pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day."
(students are led by teachers)
4. Newdow does not allege that his daughter's
teacher or school district requires his daughter
to participate in reciting the Pledge. Rather, he
claims that his daughter is injured when she is
compelled to "watch and listen as her state
employed teacher in her state-run school leads
her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there
is a God, and that ours is 'one nation under
God.'
5. He challenges the constitutionality of the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
Flag. Newdow argues that the addition of these
words by a 1954 federal statute to the previous
version of the Pledge of Allegiance (which made
no reference to God) and the daily recitation in
the classroom of the Pledge of Allegiance, with
the added words included, by his daughter's
public school teacher are violations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
ISSUES:
WON the added phrase “under God” constitutes a
violation of the U.S. Consti?
HELD:
18
Yes. Case remanded for further proceedings
consistent with our holding. Plaintiff to recover costs
on his appeal.
RATIO: Court used three tests to determine the
validity of the added words.
Lemon test
- To survive the "Lemon test," the government
conduct in question (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) must have a principal or
primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with
religion.
- Historically, the primary purpose of the
1954 Act was to advance religion, in conflict
with the first prong of the Lemon test. The
federal defendants "do not dispute that the
words 'under God' were intended" "to
recognize a Supreme Being," at a time when
the government was publicly inveighing
against atheistic communism.
o the federal defendants argue that
the Pledge must be considered as a
whole when assessing whether it
has a secular purpose. They claim
that the Pledge has the secular
purpose of "solemnizing public
occasions, expressing confidence in
the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society."
o Court said: As was the case with the
amendment to the Alabama statute
in Wallace, the legislative history of
the 1954 Act reveals that the Act's
sole purpose was to advance
religion, in order to differentiate the
United States from nations under
communist rule. "The First
Amendment requires that a statute
must be invalidated if it is entirely
motivated by a purpose to advance
religion."
- Defendants: The phrase 'under God'
recognizes only the guidance of God in our
national affairs. Court: This alleged
distinction is irrelevant for constitutional
purposes. The Act's affirmation of "a belief in
the sovereignty of God" and its recognition of
"the guidance of God" are endorsements by
the government of religious beliefs. The
Establishment Clause is not limited to
"religion as an institution"; this is clear from
cases such as Santa Fe, where the Court
struck down student-initiated and student-
led prayer at high school football games..
The Establishment Clause guards not only
against the establishment of "religion as an
institution," but also against the
endorsement of religious ideology by the
government. Because the Act fails the
purpose prong of Lemon, we need not
examine the other prongs.
Batch 2008A.
- Similarly, the school district policy also fails the
Lemon test. Although it survives the first prong
of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes,
the school district had the secular purpose of
fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the
policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon
prong asks whether the challenged government
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as
an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a
disapproval, of their individual religious
choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Given the
age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as
discussed above, particularly within the
confined environment of the classroom, the
policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible
message of endorsement to some and
disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding
the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore
the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and
fails the Lemon test
Justice O’ Connor’s “endorsement test”
- In the context of the Pledge, the statement that
the United States is a nation "under God" is an
endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a
religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. .
To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United
States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the
values for which the flag stands: unity,
indivisibility, liberty, justice, and -- since 1954 --
monotheism. The text of the official Pledge,
codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a
position with respect to the purely religious
question of the existence and identity of God.
- Furthermore, the school district's practice of
teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aims to
inculcate in students a respect for the ideals set
forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state
endorsement of these ideals. Although students
cannot be forced to participate in recitation of
the Pledge, the school district is nonetheless
conveying a message of state endorsement of a
religious belief when it requires public school
teachers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the
current form of the Pledge.
“Coercion test”
- on the principle that "at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a
way which establishes a state religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so."
- Although the defendants argue that the religious
content of "one nation under God" is minimal, to
an atheist or a believer in certain non-Judeo-
Christian religions or philosophies, it may
reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a
"religious orthodoxy" of monotheism, and is
therefore impermissible. The coercive effect of
this policy is particularly pronounced in the
school setting given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, and their
understanding that they are required to adhere
to the norms set by their school, their teacher
and their fellow students.
19
 2) The constitutionality of RA 3350 was
(Reversed and Remanded) attacked the Union and struck down by the
Court of Industrial Relations on the
following grounds:
ANUCENSION vs. NLU A) it abridges the freedom of workers to
form associations
FACTS: B) it impairs the obligation of contracts
C) it discriminates in favor of the
In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between religious sect Inglesia ni Cristo in
Hacienda Luisita and the United Luisita Workers’ violation of the constitutional
Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for provision prohibiting legislation for
those who were members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the the support of any religious sect
time of the agreement, all employees would be D) it denies equal protection
required to join the Union and must stay in the
Union to be able to retain employment in the
Hacienda. A) On the first claim, the Court said
that both the Consti and RA 875
In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni (the original Industrial Peace Act,
Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant later amended by RA 3350)
to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting recognized freedom of association.
any of their members from joining any outside RA 875 provides for the forming,
association or organization. Members of Inglesia joining or assisting of labor
were told that they would not lose their jobs organizations for the purpose of
pursuant to RA 3350, that says that members of collective bargaining. The court also
religious sects that prohibit affiliation may not be said that this right to join also
laid off simply on grounds of their non-affiliation includes the right not to join or to
with any worker’s union. abstain from joining any union. The
court explains, however, the idea of
Later this number went down to 115 due to 2 of a closed shop, wherein an
them having already been deceased and 27 not agreement of this nature binds
having been in the Union to begin with. The Union employees to the union bargained
then infomed the Hacienda that the 115 members with. “Hence, the right of said
have resigned and demanded for their immediate employee not to join the labor union
lay-off due to the stipulations of the CBA. The Union is curtailed and withdrawn”.
even proceeded to go on strike until the 115 workers However, RA 3350 included the
were laid off. exception with regards to religious
sects that prohibit affiliation. Here,
Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of the members are not being
RA 3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations prohibited as they may still join,
struck down the statute. Petitioners here have neither are they being coerced to
appealed to the Supreme Court. join. Therefore, there is no
curtailment of the freedom of
ISSUES: association.
B) With regards to impairing the
1) WON the Court of Industrial Relations had obligation of contracts, the Court
jurisdiction. said that legislation impairing the
2) WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional. obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the
HELD: people, and when the means
adopted to secure that end are
1) No it did not. The Court of Agricultural reasonable. Here the purpose is to
Relations had jurisdiction. insure freedom of religion, prevent
2) No, RA 3350 is not unconstitutional. discrimination, and protect the
members of those religious sects.
RATIO: Also stated by the Court is that the
free exercise of religious profession
1) Petitioners claim that the Court of or belief is superior to contract
Agricultural Relations should have had rights.
jurisdiction as the Hacienda is of an C) The Court cited Aglipay v. Ruiz
agricultural nature, not an industrial where they stated that the
one. Here the Court says that the government should not be precluded
agricultural nature of the Hacienda is from pursuing valid objectives
unquestionable. As such it is clear that secular in character even if the
the Court of Agricultural Relations incidental result would be favorable
should have had jurisdiction. to a religion or sect. The purpose of
RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and

Batch 2008A. 20
 temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It
was intended to serve the
secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion.
D) The Court here discussed on
equal protection, not being a
guaranty of equality. It allows
classification. Here we see that
the classification is based on
real and important differences,
as religious beliefs are not mere
beliefs or ideas, bit are motives
of certain rules of human
conduct. Such classification is
therefore valid.
IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA
1996
Ponente: Puno
FACTS:
1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) has a television
program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired
on 2 TV channels. The program presents
and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs,
doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions.
2. Sometime in 1992, INC submitted to the
BRMPT (Board) the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128.
The Board classified the series as “X” or not
for public viewing on the ground that they
“offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited
by law.”
3. Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action
against the Board. First, it appealed to the
Office of the President the classification of
its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its
appeal and the Office of the Pres. reversed
the decision of the Board. Second,
petitioner filed a civil case against the Board
with the RTC Quezon City.
4. INC alleged that the Board acted w/o
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in requiring INC to submit the VTR tapes of
its program and x-rating them. The Board
invoked its power under P.D. 1986 in
relation to Art. 201 of the RPC. The RTC
ordered the Board to grant the INC the
permit for all the series of the “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” program.
5. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals
after its motion for reconsideration was
denied. The CA reversed the trial court’s
decision. It ruled that: (1) the respondent
board has jurisdiction and power to review
Batch 2008A.
the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2)
the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another
religion. It also found the series “indecent,
contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Board has the power to review
petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,”
2. Assuming it has the power, whether or not
the Board gravely abused its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and
121, for the reason that they constitute an
attack against other religions and that they
are indecent, contrary to law and good
customs.
DECISION:
The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of
the Board to review the TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo,” is AFFIRMED.
Its decision sustaining the action of the Board x-
rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and
121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
Issue 1.
• The law gives the Board the power to screen, review
and examine all “television programs.” the Board
has the power to “approve, delete x x x and/or
prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x The law
also directs the Board to apply “contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard” to determine
those which are objectionable for being “immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or
of a wrong or crime.”
• The SC rejects INC’s postulate that its religious
program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
and ears of children.
• The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long
as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the
21
 belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare. Where the
individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of
the State (Isagani Cruz)
• (Cruz) It is error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will
stalemate the State and render it impotent
in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society.
And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and
not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the
law.
Issue No. 2
• The evidence shows that the Board x-rated
petitioners TV series for “attacking” other
religions, especially the Catholic church. An
examination of the evidence will show that the
so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of
some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of
other religions. The videotapes were not
viewed by the CA as they were not presented
as evidence. Yet they were considered by the
CA as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom
of speech and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion.
• The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the
State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to
preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment
clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State
from leaning towards any religion
• The Board cannot squelch the speech of
petitioner INC simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. The
bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury
of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more
speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the
heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers
of truth.
• The respondents cannot also rely on the ground
Batch 2008A.
“attacks against another religion” in x-rating the
religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986
will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify
an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program. The ground “attack against
another religion” was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules.iThis rule is void for it
runs smack against the doctrine that administrative
rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and
spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover,
Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code
should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It
cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of
speech.
• Respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. The records show that the decision of
the Board is completely bereft of findings of facts
to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.
• It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the
clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech
and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The contention
overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their
speech content is known and not an X quantity.
Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board,
with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur
will bring about the substantive evil feared by the
law. vs. TELERON
PAMIL
MCDANIEL vs. PATY
(April 19, 1978)
22
Ponente: CJ Burger
FACTS:
McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church
in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for
delegate to the constitutional convention. An
opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued
in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment
that McDaniel was isqualified from serving as a
delegate by a Tennessee statutory provision
establishing the qualifications of constitutional
convention delegates to be the same as those for
membership in the State House of Representatives,
thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision
barring ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any
denomination whatever."
That court held that the statutory provision violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. and for a
judgment striking his name from the ballot.
Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that 4
of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution and
declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate.
Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on the
ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by
a vote almost equal to that of three opposing
candidates.
After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the
disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon
"religious belief" and restricted "religious action . . .
[only] in the lawmaking process of government -
where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the
establishment clause . . . ."The state interests in
preventing the establishment of religion and in
avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel
political activity along religious lines, resulting from
clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed
by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the
disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of
the Free Exercise Clause.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of
the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever
from serving as delegates to the State's limited
constitutional convention deprived appellant of the
right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by
the First Amendment. YES
RATIO:
The disqualification of ministers from legislative
office was a practice carried from England by seven
of the original States; later six new States similarly
excluded clergymen from some political offices. The
purpose of the several States in providing for
disqualification was primarily to assure the success
of a new political experiment, the separation of
church and state. Prior to 1776, most of the 13
Colonies had some form of an established, or
Batch 2008A.
government-sponsored, church. In light of this history
and a widespread awareness during that period of undue
and often dominant clerical influence in public and
political affairs here, in England, and on the Continent,
it is not surprising that strong views were held by some
that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep
clergymen out of public office. As the value of the
disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of the 13
States disqualifying the clergy from some types of public
office gradually abandoned that limitation. The essence
of this aspect of our national history is that in all but a
few States the selection or rejection of clergymen for
public office soon came to be viewed as something safely
left to the good sense and desires of the people.
The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably
encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform
other similar religious functions. Tennessee also
acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to
seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the
state constitutional convention. Yet under the clergy-
disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both
rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned
the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. The
Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily, not at
religious belief, but at the status, acts, and conduct of
the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute
prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to
believe" is inapposite here.
The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee
restriction on ministers is that if elected to public office
they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence
to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the
interests of another, thus pitting one against the others,
contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its
command of neutrality. However widely that view may
have been held in the 18th century by many, including
enlightened statesmen of that day, the American
experience provides no persuasive support for the fear
that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-
establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of
civil office than their unordained counterparts.
The challenged provision violates appellant's First
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion
because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his
religion on the surrender of his right to seek office.
Though justification is asserted under the Establishment
Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that if
elected to public office members of the clergy will
necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart
those of another contrary to the anti-establishment
principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to
demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy
participation in the political process have not lost
whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.
GERMAN vs. BARANGAN
(March 27, 1985)
Ponente: J. Escolin
23

FACTS:
On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees and
who were members of the August Twenty-One
Movement (ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street,
Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St.
Jude Chapel, which adjoins the Malacañang
grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow t-
shirts, they marched down said street with raised
clenched fists and shouts of anti-government
invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred
by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of
his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacañang security area. When their efforts to
enter the church became apparently futile, they
opted to stay outside, kneeling on the sidewalk in
front of the barricades and prayed the Holy Rosary.
Afterwards, they sang Bayan ko with clenched fists
of protest against the violation of their rights and
thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because of the
alleged warning given them by respondent Major
Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to
enter the church in the future would likewise be
prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.
ISSUE  HELD:
1. WON petitioners’ constitutionally protected
freedom to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the
1973 Consti) was violated  NO
2. WON petitioners’ freedom of locomotion was
violated (Sec 5, Art IV of the 1973 Consti)  NO
RATIO:
1.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P.
Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents
assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person
or persons from entering and worshipping at said
church. They maintain, however, that petitioners'
intention was not really to perform an act of
religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to
the very residence and offices of the President of
the Republic. Respondents further lament
petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive
with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy
Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow t-
shirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised
clenched fists, and chants of anti-government
slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents
allegation.
These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on
the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious
worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate
that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and
of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be
done in good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code
Batch 2008A.
admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties… observe
honesty and good faith."
Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise
of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents
reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be
characterized as violative of the freedom of religious
worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators
crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its
perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel
Street and the streets approaching it have been
restricted. While travel to and from the affected
thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited,
passers-by have been subjected to courteous,
unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this
restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is
considered that the same is designed to protect the lives
of the President and his family, as well as other
government officials, diplomats and foreign guests
transacting business with Malacañang. The restriction is
also intended to secure the several executive offices
within the Malacañang grounds from possible external
attacks and disturbances. These offices include
communications facilities that link the central
government to all places in the land. Unquestionably,
the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the
smooth functioning of the executive branch of the
government, which petitioners' mass action would
certainly disrupt.
Cantwell v Connecticut: The constitutional inhibition on
legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment
embraces two concepts –freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.
In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this
Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said
exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
24
2.
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the
use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and
reasonableness of which have already been
discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law,
the same having been established in the interest of
national security.
Petition dismissed.
Teehankee, dissenting:
I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the
right of free worship and movement is a preferred
right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not
subject to prior restraint except where there exists
the clear and present danger of a substantive evil
sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly
no such danger in this case.
1. The right to freely exercise one's religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights.
Freedom of worship, alongside freedom of expression
and speech and peaceable assembly, along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary—even more
so than on the other departments—rests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for
and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,
dispense with what has been so felicitously termed
by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy."
2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there
is to be no prior restraint although there may be
subsequent punishment of any illegal acts
committed during the exercise of such basic rights.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.
3. The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify prior restraint
and bar a group of persons from entering the church
of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the
military or police officials who would so physically
restrain them. Indeed, there is no precedent in this
time and age where churchgoers whose right of free
exercise of their religion is recognized have been
physically prevented from entering their church on
grounds of national security. On the other hand, it
does not lie within the competence or authority of
such officials to demand of churchgoers that they
show and establish their "sincerity and good faith…
in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of religious worship and of locomotion" as a pre-
condition, as seems to be the thrust of the majority
decision.
Batch 2008A.
Respondents themselves in the Solicitor General's
comment admit that "true, there were only about 80
persons in petitioners' group on October 2 and this
number could hardly pose the danger feared," but
expressed the fear that petitioners' ranks could within
hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful
dispersal becomes impossible as in recent
demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full
control and there is no question as to the capability
of the security forces to ward off and stop any
untoward move. They had placed an advance
checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and
could stop the flow of people in the church if they
deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear
and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or
the security of Malacañang.
CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT
COMMONWEALTH vs. TWITCHELL
(1993)
WILKINS, J.
FACTS:
David and Ginger Twitchell appeal from their convictions
of involuntary manslaughter death of their 2 1/2 year
old son Robyn. Robyn died of the consequences of
peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel which
had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly known as
Meckel's diverticulum. There was evidence that the
condition could be corrected by surgery with a high
success rate.
The defendants are practicing Christian Scientists [CS]
who grew up in CS families. They believe in healing by
spiritual treatment. During Robyn's five-day illness they
retained Nathan Talbot. As a result of that consultation,
David Twitchell read a church publication concerning
the legal rights and obligations of CS in Mass. That
publication quoted a portion of General Laws Sec. 1, as
then amended, which accepted remedial treatment by
spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental
obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with
physical care.
HELD:
• Parents have a duty to seek medical attention for a
child in Robyn's circumstances, the violation of
which, if their conduct was wanton or reckless,
could support a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter and that the spiritual treatment
provision [STP] did not bar a prosecution for
manslaughter. However, special circumstances in
this case would justify a finding that the Twitchells
reasonably believed that they could rely on spiritual
treatment without fear of criminal prosecution. But
since this defense has not been presented to the
jury, the judgement must be reversed and
remanded.
25
ISSUES:
WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to
provide medical services to a child. - YES
• The duty to provide sufficient support for a child
is legally enforceable in a civil proceeding
against a parent. A breach of that duty is a
misdemeanor. Where necessary to protect a
child's well-being, the Commonwealth may
intervene, over the parents' objections, to assure
that needed services are provided. Parental duty
of care has been recognized in the common law
of homicide in this Commonwealth. There is
also a common law duty to provide medical
services for a child, the breach of which can be
the basis, in the appropriate circumstances, for
the conviction of a parent for involuntary
manslaughter.
WON the STP bars any involuntary manslaughter
charge against a parent who relies on spiritual
treatment, and who does not seek medical attention
for his or her child (even if the parent's failure to
seek such care would otherwise be wanton or
reckless conduct). - NO
• STP provides no complete protection to a parent
against a charge of involuntary manslaughter
that is based on the parent's wanton or reckless
failure to provide medical services to a child.
Sec.1 concerns child support and care in a
chapter that deals with the Commonwealth's
interest that persons within its territory should
not be killed by the wanton and reckless
conduct of others. It is unlikely that the
Legislature placed the STP in Sec. 1 to provide a
defense to common law homicide. The act that
added the STP was entitled "An Act defining the
term 'proper physical care' under the law relative
to care of children by a parent." The
amendment's concern seems focused on the
subject matter of sec.1 and certainly not
directed toward changing the common law of
homicide.
• Sec.1 reads:
"xxxx any parent of a minor child xxxxx who
willfully fails to provide necessary and proper
physical, educational or moral care and
guidance xxxxx or who fails to provide proper
attention for said child, shall be punished
xxxx.
A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or
lack proper physical care for the sole reason
that he is being provided remedial treatment
by spiritual means alone in accordance with
the tenets and practice of a recognized
church or religious denomination by a duly
accredited practitioner thereof."
• A predecessor of sec. 1, enacted in 1882,
provided that "whoever unreasonably
neglects to provide for the support of his
minor child shall be punished by fine or
by imprisonment." Statute was
rewritten in 1909 to impose a duty of
physical care of children on parents. In
1954, sec. 1 was amended to state that
"any parent of a minor child who wilfully
fails to provide necessary and proper
Batch 2008A.
physical, educational or moral care and
guidance shall be punished." The STP was
added in 1971.
• Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1
any reference to willful failure to provide
necessary and proper physical care and
limited any violation to matters of failure to
support. Nevertheless, the STP was
retained. Because of the 1986 amendment,
the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside
of sec. 1 that it did not have before.
• The STP refers to neglect and willful failure to
provide proper physical care as bases for
punishment. These concepts do not underlie
involuntary manslaughter. Wanton or reckless
conduct is not a form of negligence. Wanton or
reckless conduct does not involve a willful intention
to cause the resulting harm. Involuntary
manslaughter does not require willfulness. Thus,
the STP in sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary
manslaughter.
WON the failure to extend the protection of the STP to
them would be a denial of due process because they
lacked "fair warning" because they were officially misled
by an opinion of the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth. - YES
• Atty Gen, who is statutorily empowered to give his
opinion upon questions of law, gave an opinion
which answers a general question "whether parents
who fail to provide medical services to children on
the basis of religious beliefs will be subject to
prosecution for such failure." An average person
might read the Atty Gen’s comments as being a
negative answer. It is true that the answer comes to
focus on negligent failures of parents, and we know
that wanton or reckless failures are different.
• Atty Gen: “The Massachusetts child abuse reporting
law does not specifically address itself to the
relationship between the religious beliefs of the
parent and failure to provide medical care. Sec. 1 is
a criminal statute and it expressly precludes
imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent
for failure to provide medical care because of
religious beliefs. However, the intent of Chap 119 is
to require that children of such parents be provided
services whenever the need arises. Under Chapter
119, children may receive services notwithstanding
the inability to prosecute the parents.”
• Although the Twitchells read a CS publication called
"Legal Rights and Obligations of CS in Mass" which
relied on the above opinion. That opinion was
arguably misleading because of what it did not say
concerning criminal liability for manslaughter
• Although it has long been held that "ignorance of the
law is no defense", there is justification for treating
as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation
of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an
official statement in an official interpretation of the
public official who is charged with the responsibility
for the interpretation or enforcement of the law. (
aka "entrapment by estoppel." )
• There is special merit to such a rule if
religious beliefs are involved and if the
defendant was attempting to comply with
26
 the law while adhering to his religious
beliefs and practices.
CASE REMANDED because some ‘Questions
of Fact’ need be answered:
o Whether a person would reasonably
conclude that the Attorney General had
ruled that sec. 1 provided protection against
a manslaughter charge.
o Whether the defendants reasonably relied on
the church's publication and on the advice
of the Committee on Publication.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
WISCONSIN vs. YODER
FACTS:
Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish
religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite
Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a
child's school attendance until age 16) by declining
to send their children to public or private school
after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The
evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing
informal vocational education to their children
designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish
community (children ages 14 and 15). The evidence
also showed that respondents sincerely believed that
high school attendance was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life and that they would
endanger their own salvation and that of their
children by complying with the law.
ISSUE:
WON the compulsory-attendance law violated their
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC
upheld their decision naman)
• their children's attendance at high school,
public or private, was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life. It poses danger of
the censure of the church community and
endanger their own salvation and that of
their children. These religious belief were
held to be sincere. Expert witnesses
(scholars on religion) testified that this
concept of life aloof from the world and its
values is central to their faith. Amish
objection to formal education beyond the
eighth grade is firmly grounded in these
central religious concepts.
• Formal high school education beyond the
eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs
because it takes them away from their
Batch 2008A.
community, physically and emotionally. During
this period, the children must acquire skills
needed to perform the adult role of an Amish
farmer or housewife. And, at this time in life, the
Amish child must also grow in his faith and his
relationship to the Amish community.
(eto US SC ratio na)
1. The State's interest in universal education is
not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
In applying strict scrutiny, it was not shown that
there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause. Fundamental
right to religion is protected, sometimes even at
the expense of other interests of admittedly high
social importance. Only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion.
2. Respondents have amply supported their
claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal
education requirement after the eighth grade
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of their religious beliefs. It was
necessary for the court to determine whether the
Amish religious faith and their mode of life are,
as they claim, inseparable and interdependent
not merely philosophical nor personal. In this
case, the Old Order Amish daily life and
religious practice stem from their faith is shown
by the fact that it is in response to their literal
interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the
Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not
conformed to this world . . . ." This command is
fundamental to the Amish faith. This virtually
determines their entire way of life. Values and
programs of the modern secondary school are in
sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life
mandated by the Amish religion. Wisconsin law
contravenes the basic religious tenets and
practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent
and the child. Furthermore, Wisconsin law
affirmatively compels them, under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs. The compulsory-attendance law carries
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to
the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.
3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an
identifiable religious sect and a long history as a
successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society, the Amish have demonstrated
the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life,
the vital role that belief and daily conduct play
in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish
communities, and the hazards presented by the
State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the
difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy
27
of their alternative mode of continuing
informal vocational education in terms of the
overall interests that the State relies on in
support of its program of compulsory high
school education. In light of this showing,
and weighing the minimal difference
between what the State would require and
what the Amish already accept, it was
incumbent on the State to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong
interest in compulsory education would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption
to the Amish.
It is true that activities of individuals, even
when religiously based, are often subject to
regulation by the States in the exercise of
police power but religiously grounded
conduct is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the 1st Amendment.
Re discrimination: A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the constitutional requirement for
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens
the free exercise of religion.
Some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if
we are to preserve freedom and
independence. However, the evidence
adduced by the Amish in this case is
persuasively to the effect that an additional
one or two years of formal high school for
Amish children in place of their long-
established program of informal vocational
education would do little to serve those
interests. Separated agrarian community is
the keystone of the Amish faith. That they
would become burden to society should they
leave the community and join the
mainstream world with educational
shortcomings is highly speculative.
4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as
parens patriae, to extend the benefit of
secondary education to children regardless
of the wishes of their parents cannot be
sustained against a free exercise claim of the
nature revealed by this record, for the Amish
have introduced convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious objections by
forgoing one or two additional years of
compulsory education will not impair the
physical or mental health of the child, or
result in an inability to be self-supporting or
to discharge the duties and responsibilities
of citizenship, or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society.
The dissent argues that a child who
expresses a desire to attend public high
school in conflict with the wishes of his
parents should not be prevented from doing
so. There is no reason for the Court to
consider that point since it is not an issue in
the case. The State has at no point tried this
case on the theory that respondents were
preventing their children from attending
school against their expressed desires.
Parents have a right to direct the religious
Batch 2008A.
up-bringing of their children which may be
subject to limitation ] if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of
the child, or have a potential for significant
social burdens. But in this case, the Amish have
introduced persuasive evidence undermining the
arguments the State has advanced to support its
claims in terms of the welfare of the child and
society as a whole. we cannot accept a parens
patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope
and with such sweeping potential for broad and
unforeseeable application as that urged by the
State. (overinclusive)
affirmed.
U.S. vs. BALLARD
FACTS:
- Respondents, Edna W. Ballard and Donald
Ballard were convicted of using and conspiring
to use the mails to defraud.
- The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged
a scheme to defraud by organizing and
promoting the I Am movement through the use
of the mails. The charge was that certain
designated corporations were formed, literature
distributed and sold, funds solicited, and
memberships in the I Am movement sought 'by
means of false and fraudulent representations,
pretenses and promises'
- Misrepresentations:
o That the words of 'ascended masters'
and the words of the alleged divine
entity, Saint Germain, would be
transmitted to mankind through the
medium of the said Guy W. Ballard,
Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard
through their high spiritual attainment
and righteous conduct.
o That the respondent were able to cure
hundreds of people of diseases classified
either curable or incurable.
- Each of them, well knew that all of said
aforementioned representations were false and
untrue and were made with the intention on the
part of the defendants, and each of them, to
cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to
be defrauded, and to obtain from persons
intended to be defrauded by the defendants,
money, property, and other things of value and
to convert the same to the use and the benefit of
the defendants, and each of them.
- Defense: There was a demurrer and a motion to
quash each of which asserted among other
things that the indictment attacked the religious
beliefs of respondents and sought to restrict the
free exercise of their religion in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.
28
- Lower Court: Did not want to rule on the
truth or validity of the religious claims made
by the respondents but rather limited the
scope of the case to this issue: “WON these
defendants honestly and in good faith
believe those things? If they did, they
should be acquitted. I cannot make it any
clearer than that”
o 'If these defendants did not believe
those things, they did not believe
that Jesus came down and dictated,
the jury should find them guilty.
- The Lower court convicted the respondents.
The latter, initially acquiesced to the verdict
but soon filed for a motion for retrial since
the withdrawal of the issue of truth and
verity would run contrary to the nature of
the indictment itself. “'it was necessary to
prove that they schemed to make some,
at least, of the (eighteen) representations
* * * and that some, at least, of the
representations which they schemed to
make were false”
- Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
granted a new trial, with one judge
dissenting.
ISSUE:
WON the 1st Amendment precluded the court
from judging upon the truth, verity, and
validity of the beliefs of the respondent.
Yes, decision of the Court of Appeals
reversed.
- Misrepresentations ascertained by the
Supreme Court:
o (1) A portion of the scheme as to
healing which we have already
quoted and which alleged that
respondents 'had in fact cured
either by the activity of one, either,
or all of said persons, hundreds of
persons afflicted with diseases and
ailments';
o (2) The portion of the scheme
relating to certain religious
experiences described in certain
books (Unveiled Mysteries and The
Magic Presence) and concerning
which the indictment alleged 'that
the defendants represented that
Guy W. Ballard, Edna W. Ballard,
and Donald Ballard actually
encountered the experiences
pertaining to each of their said
names as related and set forth in
said books, whereas in truth and in
fact none of said persons did
encounter the experiences';
Batch 2008A.
o (3) The part of the scheme concerning
phonograph records sold by respondents
on representations that they would
bestow on purchasers 'great blessings
and rewards in their aim to achieve
salvation' whereas respondents 'well
knew that said * * * records were
manmade and had no ability to aid in
achieving salvation.'
- The United States contends that respondents
acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of
the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs
and that their consent bars them from insisting
on a different course once that one turned out to
be unsuccessful
o Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. That case
stands for the proposition that, apart
from situations involving an unfair trial,
an appellate court will not grant a new
trial to a defendant on the ground of
improper introduction of evidence or
improper comment by the prosecutor,
where the defendant acquiesced in that
course and made no objection to it. In
fairness to respondents that principle
cannot be applied here
- Supreme court: Ruled that Johnson v. United
States cannot be applied in the case at bar. The
real objection of respondents is not that the
truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs
should have been submitted to the jury. Their
demurrer and motion to quash made clear their
position that that issue should be withheld from
the jury on the basis of the First Amendment.
o We do not agree that the truth or verity
of respondents' religious doctrines or
beliefs should have been submitted to
the jury. Whatever this particular
indictment might require, the First
Amendment precludes such a course, as
the United States seems to concede.
o The First Amendment has a dual aspect.
It not only 'forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship' but also
'safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion.' Cantwell v.
State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303,
60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352.
o 'Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts,--freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second
cannot be.' Freedom of thought, which
includes freedom of religious belief, is
basic in a society of free men
29
 o The First Amendment does not
select any one group or any one type
of religion for preferred treatment. It
puts them all in that position.
U.S. vs. SEEGER
FACTS:
Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York of having refused to
submit to induction in the armed forces.
He first claimed exemption as a conscientious
objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of
his student classification. Although he did not adopt
verbatim the printed Selective Service System form,
he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form by reason of his
'religious' belief; that he preferred to leave the
question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open,
'rather than answer 'yes' or 'no"; that his 'skepticism
or disbelief in the existence of God' did 'not
necessarily mean lack of faith in anything
whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a
religious faith in a purely ethical creed.
He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the
section distinguished 'between internally derived and
externally compelled beliefs' and was, therefore, an
'impermissible classification' under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern
District of New York on a charge of refusing to
submit to induction. On his appeal the Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his
claim may have rested on the factual finding,
erroneously made, that he did not believe in a
Supreme Being as required
He explained that his religious *168 and social
thinking had developed after much meditation and
thought. He had concluded that man must be 'partly
spiritual' and, therefore, 'partly akin to the Supreme
Reality'; and that his 'most important religious law'
was that 'no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice
another man's life as a means to any other end
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim
came within the requirements of s 6(j). Because it
could not determine whether the Appeal Board had
found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within
the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded
that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the
indictment.
Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern
District of California on a charge of refusing to
Batch 2008A.
submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form
he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or
organization; he failed to execute section VII of the
questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing
opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred
In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in
a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the
definition and he appended a statement that he felt it a
violation of his moral code to take human life and that
he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the
state.
Conscientious Objector
'personal scruples against war'
Individual belief--rather than membership in a church or
sect--determined the duties that God imposed upon a
person in his everyday conduct; and that 'there is a
higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to
God.' Thus, while shifting the test from membership in
such a church to one's individual belief the Congress
nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing
from armed service those who believed that they owed an
obligation, superior to that due the state, of not
participating in war in any form.
”religious training and belief”
'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.' In
assigning meaning to this statutory language we may
narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples
expressly excepted from the definition. The section
excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief,
decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or
economic considerations that war is wrong and that they
will have no part of it. These judgments have historically
been reserved for the Government, and in matters which
can be said to fall within these areas the conviction of
the individual has never been permitted to override that
of the state.
'The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation.'
By comparing the statutory definition with those words,
however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress
deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase
'Supreme Being' for the appellation 'God.' And in so
doing it is also significant that Congress did not
elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority
which it chose to designate as 'Supreme Being.' By so
refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of
the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that
even the word 'God' had myriad meanings for men of
faith:
'(P)utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions
of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for
an innate conviction of paramount duty.
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the
statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs,
exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord
with the well-established congressional policy of equal
treatment for those whose opposition to service is
grounded in their religious tenets.
30
The test is simple of application. It is essentially
an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief
occupy the same place in the life of the objector
as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of
one clearly qualified for exemption?
ISSUES:
W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them
from induction in U.S military training?
HELD:
Seager
Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.'
He did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a
Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic
order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.'
He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man
must pay for his willingness to destroy human life.
In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity
with which he held them, we think the Board, had it
applied the test we propose today, would have
granted him the exemption. We think it clear that
the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the
same place in his life as the belief in a traditional
deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.
We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for
you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life,
of the source of your being, or your ultimate
concern, of what you take seriously without any
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must
forget everything traditional that you have learned
about God * * *'. Tillich, The Shaking of the
Foundations.
It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate
what his beliefs were with regard to the usual
understanding of the term 'Supreme Being.' But as
we have said Congress did not intend that to be the
test. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Peter
It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged 'some
power manifest in nature * * * the supreme
expression' that helps man in ordering his life. As to
whether he would call that belief in a Supreme
Being, he replied, 'you could call that a belief in the
Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to
be the words I use.' We think that under the test we
establish here the Board would grant the exemption
to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in
No. 29
Jakobson
The Court of Appeals found that the registrant
demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war
was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm
that judgment.
CASSIUS CLAY (MUHAMMAD ALI) vs. U.S
Batch 2008A.
(1971)
Per curiam
FACTS:
Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War.
To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a
‘conscientious objector’. The local draft board turned
down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still
classified him as eligible for unrestricted service then
passed it on to Justice Dep’t. FBI made an inquiry.
Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a
conscientious objector because of testimony from
‘inquiry’ of petitioner, parents, attorney and religious
minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless
Justice Dep’t advised denial of request. Appeal Board
denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim.
Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIONALE:
In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a
registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show
1) that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form;
2) that this opposition is based upon religious training
and belief;
3) and that this objection is sincere.
In applying the test, the Selective Service System must
be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not
with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious
sect, if any, to which he may belong.
Justice Dep’t believed that Clay did not satisfy any
requirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any
form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces.
He objects to certain types of war in certain
circumstances, rather than a general scruple against
participation in war in any form. 2) Clays religion did not
preclude fighting for the US because of political and
racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to
participate in war in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious
objector only surfaced when drafting was imminent. He
has not shown ‘overt manifestation’ of his opposition.
However, in this Court, the gov’t has conceded that
petitioners belief are based on religious training. His
beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on
the tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands
them. The gov’t also conceded that it no longer questions
the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer who
decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from
FBI inquiry was convinced of his sincerity and
recommended his classification as a conscientious
objector. Justice dep’t was wrong to disregard such a
finding.
Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying
Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not
pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is
clear that the dep’t was wrong.
31
This case then falls in Sicurella vs US. There, the
Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice
letter prepared by the Justice Dep’t did not require
reversal of a criminal conviction because there was a
ground on which the Appeal Board might properly
have denied a conscientious objector classification.
This Court refused because in cases where it is
impossible to determine exactly which grounds the
Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the Selective
Service System demands, at least, that the gov’t not
recommend illegal grounds. (in other words: the
grounds must be clearly legitimate from the first and
finding a clearly legitimate ground afterwards won’t
work.)
DISPOSITION:
Judgment reversed. Ali is free!
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Douglas, concurs:
Sicurella vs US: Congress couldn’t possibly mean
conscientious objector must go to ‘participation in
war in any form’.
Negre v Larsen: Petitioners church did not oppose
war in Vietnam but provided guidelines for unjust
wars. His conscience did not allow him to go to
Vietnam. Court said screw his conscience, go and
fight!
Clay is different. As a Muslim he follows Koran.
Koran proclaims jihad by believers against non-
believers. All other wars are unjust. Clays believes
only in war sanctioned by the Koran. Therefore, it
becomes a matter of belief, of conscience, of religious
principle.
Harlan, concurs in the result:
Justice dep’t gives bad advice. Not all conscientious
objectors are weasels trying to get out of fighting in
Vietnam.
Academic Freedom
ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and
shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
Batch 2008A.
BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL
CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT
J. Peter Byrne
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment protects academic freedom but
there has been no adequate analysis of what academic
freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it.
Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine
floats in the law.
Author’s definition of academic freedom: non-legal term
referring to the liberties claimed by professors through
professional channels against administrative or political
interference with research, teaching and governance.
Of constitutional academic freedom: essence is the
insulation of scholarship and liberal education from
extramural political interference  insulate the
university in core academic affairs from state
interference
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS
Concern is only with the substantive protection of
academic freedom by the 1st Amendment isolating which
has been difficult because 1) courts have used legal
doctrines not based on academic freedom to protect
liberties of professors and students; 2) courts have
declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many
forms of classroom speech that seem at first blush to
implicate general principles of free expression.
Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give a
university the authority to hire and fire without
government interference those very individuals
apparently granted a personal right to write and teach
without institutional hindrance.
 Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither
collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits
from the tension between the independence of a
scholar's judgment and the university's
evaluation of her professional competence.
A. Academic Speech
Students and junior professors (considered neophytes in
the field) suffer real punishment for speech deemed
inadequate by the masters. Compared to general civil
society where the 1st Amendment opposes prior and
subsequent restraint based on determination if the
speech is valuable or not.
The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on
its commitment to truth (however partially understood
by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness, its
richness of meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its
invitation to criticism.  society ought to strive towards
speech that is truthful.
32

Academic freedom resembles other free expression
values insofar as it protects the individual scholar's
point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects those
structures that permit the individual scholar to
engage with others in collective scholarship
B. Student Speech and Extracurricular Political
Activity
The term "academic freedom" should be reserved for
those rights necessary for the preservation of the
unique functions of the university, particularly the
goals of disinterested scholarship and teaching.
First Amendment rights w/c should not properly be
a part of constitutional academic freedom:
1) no recognized student rights of free speech
are properly part of constitutional academic
freedom, because none of them has anything
to do with scholarship or systematic
learning (e.g. wearing of armbands,
demonstrations, etc.)
 while the Constitution affords students at
public institutions extensive civil rights, it
affords them no rights of academic freedom
at all.
2) the right of a professor to participate in
political activity off campus and on her own
time without institutional reprisal should
not be viewed as a matter of constitutional
academic freedom
 academic freedom should be understood to
include only rights unique or necessary to the
functions of higher education; exist as a necessary
incident to university's commitment to the pursuit of
truth and the controvertibility of dogma.
C. Tenure
Tenure is not equal to academic freedom but it
promotes academic freedom since it requires public
airing of explicit and categorically neutral reasons
for dismissal.  does not protect academic freedom
of untenured since they will direct their scholarship
to those likely to be accepted by the tenured.
III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Early History and Structure
The structural elements that would give shape to
academic freedom were established early: legal
control by non-academic trustees; effective
governance by administrators set apart from the
faculty by political allegiance and professional
orientation; dependent and insecure faculty.
B. The Rise of the Scientific Research Value
Higher education began to be seen as scientific
training for practical jobs rather than moral training
Batch 2008A.
of gentlemen for elite professions.  The change is
usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement
from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious
faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by
scientific endeavor.
Changes in the structure enlarged the status of the
faculty – now highly-trained professionals. Yet low salary
and uncertain tenure remained  They were no longer
dependent on the will of clergymen but answerable to
businessmen. Academic freedom became rallying cry for
professors seeking more control over their professional
lives.
C. Development of the Concept of Academic
Freedom
Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees
or regents. Professors demanded that no ideological test
be applied and evaluation done by professional peers.
The American concept of academic freedom emerged
from this ideological and practical conflict between
academic social scientists and their lay employers.
American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP) insisted
on a clear distinction between speech that was academic
and that which was merely political or sectarian.
AAUP’s vision of academic freedom:
1) noble vision of the academic calling;
2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control over
universities;
3) concept of peer review according to professional
standards.
D. The Challenge of other Academic Values
Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideas
that aren’t scientifically demonstrable and that students
must receive a coherent education in the traditions of
civilized thought, writing and art.
The democratic value in higher education reflects the
demands placed on our colleges and universities by the
society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social
mobility and general prosperity.
E. Professional Competence as a Regulatory
Standard
The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good
faith of the professorate and on its collective ability to
distinguish between scholars who disagree with accepted
findings and those who do not understand them.  what
defines competence? When this question arises trouble
develops.
Without agreement about basic paradigms, competence
loses much of the neutrality that might ordinarily be
assumed, as there may be no shared criterion for
evaluation.
33
 IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL
SCHOLAR
Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in
Sweezy: university freedom for teaching and
scholarship without interference from government is
a positive right and that the state here had failed to
provide a compelling justification for questioning an
academic about the content of a lecture
 the four essential freedoms" of a university--to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study
Three significant oddities about the plurality and
concurring opinions in Sweezy:
1) never before had the Court suggested that
academic freedom was protected by the 1st
Amendment.
2) Frankfurter’s decision looks solely to non-
legal sources to describe the contents of
acad. freedom
3) Although the content of acad. freedom was
drawn from non-legal sources, they praised
acad freedom by stressing the social utility
of free universities.
Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of
academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant
rhetoric but also with an ambiguous description of
the relationship between academic custom and
positive legal right. The Court's decision not to
ground its ruling on a positive right of academic
freedom, moreover, presaged the Court's refusal to
give this right the practical force that its rhetorical
enthusiasms promised.
Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, the
Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of
academic freedom increases the ambiguity already
created by basing the case's holding upon
vagueness. However, despite their analytical
shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed
substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts
by non-academic government officials to prescribe
political orthodoxy in university teaching and
research.
Constitutional Academic Freedom and the
State Action Doctrine: An Aside
Faculty and students at state universities enjoy
extensive substantive and procedural constitutional
rights against their institutions while faculty and
students at private institutions enjoy none. Thus,
the state action doctrine mandates judicial
enforcement of constitutional liberties against
institutional infringements for half the nation's
academics and denies it to the other half for
reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far
removed from the realities of academic life
Batch 2008A.
The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention
Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve these
disputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of a
candidate denied tenure by faculty vote, a court would
need to determine what, in fact, are the requirements for
tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements,
and whether the faculty rejected the candidate for some
non-academic reason. Such an inquiry, backed by the
coercive power of the state, would put the department or
school into intellectual receivership, with the court
determining the appropriate paradigms of thought.
 Courts then should only ascertain if the
administrators can establish that they in good faith
rejected the candidate on academic grounds.
The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role to
excluding non-academics from imposing ideological
criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to
impose substantive limits on academic administrators
who in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND THE PROTECTION OF
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
While the right to institutional academic freedom has
arisen at the time in our history when universities have
been most subject to federal regulation, no federal
regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in
Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic
freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in
holdings and rules
A. The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic
Freedom
Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a
limitation on the grounds or procedures by which
academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a
university."
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v.
Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgment
that universities must and should distinguish among
speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and
a pioneering inquiry into which university administrative
decisions the First Amendment should protect.
Thus, core academic administrative decisions--
determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study--
cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without
impairing the unique virtues of academic speech.
When judges are asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they
should show great respect for the faculty's professional
judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.
34

Academic Abstention
It describes the traditional refusal of courts to
extend common law rules of liability to colleges
where doing so would interfere with the college
administration's good faith performance of its core
functions. The recognition of authority over internal
affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go
hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree
of common law autonomy.
Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as
academic abstention raised to constitutional status,
so that judges can consider whether statutes or
regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the
special needs or prerogatives of the academic
community.
State Constitutional Law
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state
universities seems to have contributed to the
development of the federal right of institutional
academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the
persistence of the view, inherent in academic
abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the
special needs and values of universities, even when
erected and supported by the state.
Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best
be seen as a principle that regulation should not
proceed so far as to deprive the university of control
over its academic destiny. This principle has been
fashioned by courts, explaining why they restrain
themselves from imposing farreaching constitutional
or common law duties on the university. As such, it
represents academic abstention raised to a
constitutional level.
Institutional Academic Freedom and the
First Amendment
And what are the indigenous values served by
universities?
1) the university is the preeminent institution
in our society where knowledge and
understanding are pursued with detachment
or disinterestedness.
2) The disinterested search for knowledge
fosters a manner of discourse that, at its
best, is careful, critical, and ambitious
3) The university aspires to instill in those
entering adulthood a capacity for mature
and independent judgment.
Preserving the fundamental academic values of
disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical
discourse, and liberal education justifies a
constitutional right of academic freedom. These
goals give intellectual and educational expression to
the vision of human reason implicit in the
Constitution.
Batch 2008A.
Who are do be protected by constitutional academic
freedom?
Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of
professors (understood as the core of the doctrine
developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual
freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought
not to be afforded institutional autonomy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy
has come to be understood as the four freedoms offered
by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study. The four freedoms adequately express the degree
of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal
studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they
recognize that liberal studies involve more than the
simple act of speaking--that they require "'that
atmosphere which is most *340 conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. This requires
security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the
hiring of competent people, and the reward of excellence.
Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility
that academics might attain the goals of learning and
scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.
SWEEZY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 15, 1957
Ponente: Warren, CJ:
FACTS:
 Defendant, Paul Sweezy, was convicted of
contempt for failure to answer questions asked
by the Attorney General of New Hampshire
 In 1951 a statute was passed by the New
Hampshire legislature to regulate subversive
acts. In 1953, legislature adopted a joint
resolution authorizing the attorney general to
make full and complete investigations with
respect to violations of the subversive activities
act of 1951 which includes among others
authorizing him “to act upon his own motion
and upon such information as in his judgment
may be reasonable or reliable.”
o Statute defines a person to be
subversive if he, by any means, aids in
the commission of any act intended to
assist in the alteration of the
constitutional form of gov’t by force or
violence.
 Sweezy was summoned to appear on two
separate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of
subversion in connection with the membership
of his wife in the Progressive Party, an article he
wrote wherein he affirmed that “he styled
himself as a ‘classical Marxist’ and a ‘socialist’”,
35
 and a lecture he delivered on March 22,
1954 for a humanities course at the
university.
 Petitioner answered most of the questions
but declined to answer certain questions
about his knowledge regarding the
Progressive Party in his 1st appearance and
about the lecture he delivered and his
opinions or beliefs in his 2nd appearance
stating only that he hat never been a
member of the Communist Party. Because of
his continuous decline to answer he was
cited in contempt.
ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of
due process of law under the 14th Amendment
HELD: Yes.
 It is recognized that the right to lecture or
associate are civil liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution but they are not absolute
rights.
o In this case, it is believed that there
was an unquestionable invasion of
the petitioner’s liberties in the areas
of academic freedom and political
expression – areas in which the
government should be extremely
reticent to tread.
 To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and
universities would imperil
the future of our Nation.
 In this case, the record does no reveal what
reasonable or reliable information led the
Attorney General to question petitioner (no
showing of probable cause) therefore, if the
interrogation of the Attorney General was in
fact entirely unrelated to the object of the
legislature in authorizing such inquiry, the
Due Process Clause would preclude the
endangering of constitutional liberties and
can be treated as an absence of authority to
conduct the inquiry. Because of this there
can be no showing of a sufficient state
interest to infringe the constitutional rights
of the petitioner.
Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
 Whether the Attorney General of New
Hampshire acted within the scope of the
authority given him by the state legislature
is not for the US SC to determine but is a
matter for the decision of the courts of that
State.
 Petitioner as mentioned answered most of
the questions asked of him, making it
known that he had never been a
Communist, never taught the violent
Batch 2008A.
overthrow of the Government, never knowingly
associated with Communists in the State, but
was a socialist believer in peaceful change…
 He refused to answer questions regarding: 1) a
lecture given by him at the University of New
Hampshire, 2) activities of himself and others in
the Progressive political organizations, and 3)
“opinions and beliefs,” invoking the
constitutional guarantees of free speech
 SC stated that: For society’s good – if
understanding be essential need of society—
inquiries and speculations into the natural
sciences, into anthropology, economics, law, etc.
must be left as unfettered as possible except for
reasons that are exigent and obviously
compelling.  exclusion of governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university.
 Cites a quote from the Open Universities in
South Africa:
“In a university knowledge is its own end, not
merely a means to an end… A university is
characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, it ideal
being the ideal of Socrates – ‘to follow the
argument where it leads.’ This implies the right
to examine, question, modify or reject traditional
ideas and beliefs… Freedom to reason and
freedom for disputation on the basis of
observation and experiment are the necessary
conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge… It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which prevail
‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university –
to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”
 The inviolability of privacy belonging to a
citizen’s political loyalties has so overwhelming
an importance to the well-being of our kind
of society that it cannot be constitutionally
encroached upon on the basis of so meager a
countervailing interest of the State as may be
argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy
threat to the security of New Hampshire
allegedly presented in the origins and
contributing elements of the Progressive Party
and the petitioner’s relations to these.
GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE
Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. The Faculty
Admission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino
1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted
Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology;
2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to
enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-
36
76, Respondent told her about the letter he had
written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to
bar her from re-admission in their school;
reason in the letter: Pet.’s frequent questions
and difficulties had the effect of slowing
down the progress of the class although she
ahd the requisite intellectual capability
3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May
19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for
expulsion, for they neither present any violation of
any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative
of gross misconduct;
4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much
time and effort in said school for the purpose of
arriving at a compromise that would not duly
inconvenience the professors and still allow her to
enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the
school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact
told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that
the compromises she was offering were
unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it
were better for her to seek for admission at the UST
Graduate School;
5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in
said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing
her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and
she was informed that she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to
fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in
Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology — which would entail about four to five
years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola
School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully
refused readmission, it would entail only about two
years more;
6. Considering that time was of the essence in her
case, and not wanting to be deprived of an
opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her
life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not
thereby be credited with any academic units for the
subject she would take;
7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the
President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with
the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor
with the Secretary of Education, since this is his
busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the
last day for registration; ... "
8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the
purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current
semester
Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had
authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue
studying or not?
Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution
(seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit
Ratio:
1. Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to
admit her into further studies since the
respondent had no clear duty to admit the pet.
-That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino,
S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology
thru its Faculty Admission Committee,
necessarily has discretion as to whether to
Batch 2008A.
admit and/or to continue admitting in the said
school any particular student, considering not
only academic or intellectual standards but also
other considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other
students as well as considering the nature of
Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
- technical aspect of admissions:
the Chairman of the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which
is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights,
Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo
de Manila University, the Loyola School of
Theology allows some lay students to attend its
classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School
of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained
from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de
Manila University and not by the Loyola School of
Theology; For the reason above given, lay students
admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take
up courses for credit therein have to be officially
admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate
School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order
for them to be considered as admitted to a degree
program
Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was
admitted by respondent to take some courses for
credit but said admission was not an admission to
a degree program because only the Assistant Dean
of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can
make such admission; That in the case of
petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of
the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given,
so that she was not accepted to a degree program
but was merely allowed to take some courses for
credit during the summer of 1975;
Being admitted to the school is a privilege and
not a right.
-There are standards that must be met. There are
policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of
the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She
cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty
imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a
rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner,
who unfortunately did not have counsel, an
attempt was made to dispute the contention of
respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain
her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It
is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay
person rather than a practitioner that was evident.
While she pressed her points with vigor, she was
unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear
legal right that must exist to justify the grant of
this writ.
37
2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions
of higher learning enjoying academic freedom.
-It is more often identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that
his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishments
- For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher
and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within
or beyond the institution
- philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his
version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is
the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as
they see it in the field of their competence. It is
subject to no control or authority except the control
or authority of the rational methods by which truths
or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines
3. Court further discusses “academic freedom” that
its reference is to the "institutions of higher learning"
as the recipients of this boon.
- Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the
University of the Philippines, in his Philippine
Political Law, is similarly of the view that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to
the university as an institution as distinguished
from the academic freedom of a university
professor."
- Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the
University of Dijon, France, "It is a well-established
fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be
obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom,
that the collective liberty of an organization is by no
means the same thing as the freedom of the
individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds
of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In
considering the problems of academic freedom one
must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy
of the university, as a corporate body, and the
freedom of the individual university teacher." (2
types)
- "the four essential freedoms" of a
university — to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way
reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner.
Batch 2008A.
There was on the part of respondent due
acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for
reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was
deemed best, considering the interest of the school as
well as of the other students and her own welfare, that
she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was
nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances
deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature
reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer
to some other institution would redound to the benefit of
all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the
legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this
decision.
ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP
J. Vitug
FACTS:
Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student in Perpetual
Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PRO and acting
Secretary of the student council, he was asked to sign
Resolution No. 105, which would increase tuition
payments by 20%. He refused to sign and asked for a 2-
week period to talk it over with his fellow officers. After
they met on the matter, the council presented a 9-point
proposal. With an assurance that the request of the
student council would be considered favorably, the
petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105. PHCR then
announced that its application to increase school fees
was approved by DECS. The student council then filed a
motion for consideration. DECS then put the
implementation on hold pending talks on the matter.
In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of
students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelo
being on the list. As such, he was expelled and not
allowed to enroll for the next semester on the following
grounds:
* Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS
Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S.
1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
* No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology
course;
* Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
* Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and
22) which are docketed in the registration card.
Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent
a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued
Order No. 9 which stated:
. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due
process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito
Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending
resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students
to continue attending their classes to protect their
interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined.
38

In this connection, it is hereby directed that the
above-named students be re-admitted to classes and
be allowed to take all examinations that they have
missed pending final resolution of this case/issue.
PHCR did not comply with the directive.
Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not
being admitted was due to his being against the
increase on tuition payments. Respondent school
invokes academic freedom in the expulsion of
Isabelo.
ISSUE:
WON Isabelo’s expulsion was within the school’s
academic freedom.
HELD:
NO
RATIO:
Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, which upheld the rule that admission to
an institution of higher learning is discretionary
upon the school and that such an admission is a
mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the
student. Like any other right, however, academic
freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged
license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative
duty to exercise it responsibly.
With regards to contracts, the court said that the
contract between student and school is not one that
is only on a semestral basis, but the student has a
right to be enrolled for the entire period in order to
complete his course.
Finally the court says that the punishment of
expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to
his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course.
There is, however, an administrative determination
to be made whether petitioner does indeed deserve to
be a senior in PHCR.
Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings.
REYES vs. COURT of APPEALS
(Ponente: Medialdea, 1991)
FACTS:
Respondent-students as then applicants to the
University of the Philippines College of Medicine
(UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in
the NMAT which was the cutoff score prescribed for
academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in
its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the
University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.
Batch 2008A.
However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile
cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its
meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year
1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med
students, the BOR in its 996th resolution reverted to the
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile.
The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus
with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for their admission.
After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction,
the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of
fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination
required in any college of the University is within the
authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding
the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved
finally by the University Council of the autonomous
campus."
In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned before
the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, which
was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the
UPCM and passed three years in the college.
Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students,
upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with
"three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the
College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a
letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that
they never intended to question the Faculty's right to
academic freedom; that they believed the issue was
simply on the question of observance of the proper
procedure in implementing admission requirements; that
they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue
the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the
determination of humanitarian consideration of their
case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and
that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in
the college.”
The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and
attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC
dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this
development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency
meeting where it denied the appeal of the students by a
vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for
admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC
a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The RTC
issued an order for the admission of the students to the
college.
The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the
admission of the students in the interest of justice and
equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the
CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to
follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President
issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against
them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive
Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the
39
petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before
the SC.
ISSUE:
WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the
petitioners. –
NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to
admit the students to the college of medicine.
RATIO:
1. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC
by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear:
to the BOR belongs the governance and the
general powers of administration of the
university and to the UC the power to fix the
admission requirements to any college in the
university. The University Code grants to the
College Faculty the power to determine the
entrance requirements of the college subject
to the approval of the autonomous UC.
2. Any entrance requirement that may be
imposed by the College Faculty must bear
the UC's approval. Otherwise, the same
becomes unenforceable.
3. At the time the students took the NMAT, the
new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off
score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S
and University President’s approval.
4. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix
admission requirements is vested in the
University Council of the autonomous
campus which is composed of the President
of the University of the Philippines and of all
instructors holding the rank of professor,
associate professor or assistant professor
(Section 9, Act 1870).
5. The UC has the final say in admission
requirements provided the same conforms
with law, rules and regulations of the
university. In the event the power is abused
or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR,
being the highest governing body in the
university, to step in and to correct the
anomaly.
6. The questioned order of the Board of
Regents in upholding the admission
requirement approved by the University
Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the
University Council to fix or approve
admission requirements, against the UPCM
faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the
University Council without following the
prescribed rules and procedures of the
University.
7. We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners'
arguments that the BOR's 1031st is
contrary to justice and equity because the
students themselves judicially confessed
that they have no right to admission. In
their letter to the Faculty, The student's
aforesaid feeling does not amount to a
Batch 2008A.
categorical admission of the absence of a legal
right. Considering such antagonistic conditions,
We can empathize with the students' mental
anxiety and emotional strain in their three years
in college in the company of some professors
who looked down on them as academic
pretenders. Furthermore, the students were
pressed for time as they have only one more year
before graduation. These circumstances
combined with the advice of the U.P. President
unduly influenced the students to write this
reconciling letter.
U.P. vs. COURT of APPEALS
Ponente: J. Romero
FACTS:
Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review on
certiorari the Order of the lower court denying the motion
to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of
its professors for alleged derogatory statement uttered
concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwelling inhabitants
of the rain forest of Mindanao.
August 15-17, 1986: The "International Conference on
the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent
Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine
Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. Jerome
Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP)
Dept of Anthropology was the designated conference
chairman. He presented therein the "Tasaday Folio," a
collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading
anthropologists who disputed the authenticity of the
Tasaday find and suggested that the "discovery" in 1971
by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on
National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde,
Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication made possible
by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to pose as
primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers.
In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus
Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of
the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. He
likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television
documentary showing interviews with natives claiming to
have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays.
Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent
Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the
12th Int’l Congress of Anthropological and
Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen
reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax.
Their allegations were widely publicized in several
dailies.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of
action:
1. defendants' conduct and statements that the
Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprived them
of their peace of mind and defiled the Tasadays'
“dignity and personality”
40
2. defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the
Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory
and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and
publicity-seeking persons, thereby besmirching
their reputation and causing them serious
anxiety
3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny
plaintiff Tasadays' personality and their
existence as a distinct ethnic community within
the forest area reserved under the Proclamation
(No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud
their rights thereunder
4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign
to vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of
"false and perjured 'evidence' to debase and
malign" them, caused them to incur attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and
pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages
at the "amount equivalent to defendants' combined
salaries for two (2) months, estimated at
P32,000.00."
Procedural crap:
Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint for
damages and declaratory relief against the UP
professors stating the above causes of action. UP
filed a motion to intervene, stating that the UP profs
were under their supervision. Salazar and Bailen
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. With
the MFR denied in the lower court, they filed a
petition for certiorari for gadalej, which was
dismissed by the SC. Meanwhile, UP filed a motion
to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck off
the record. In the CA, everything else was denied,
because petitioners’ allegations were not stated in
the complaint. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE  HELD:
1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of
the UP profs’ petition for certiorari  NO
2. WON the UP professors are covered by the
protective mantle of Academic Freedom  YES,
but UP should have defended its profs in the
course of the trial case, instead of trying to
terminate the proceedings prematurely
Hence, the CA’s denial of the profs’ motion to
dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded.
RATIO:
1. Super daming procedural crap… nakakahilo.
While it is true that the instant petition and the
previous case revolve around the issue of WON the
lower court correctly denied the motion to of the UP
profs, there is an aspect of the case which takes it
out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent
litigation involving the same cause of action). The
said principle applies when there is, among others,
identity of parties and subject matter in two cases.
Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here
while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in the
previous case is not a hindrance to the application of
res judicata because the situation is akin to the
adding of other parties to a case which had been
Batch 2008A.
finally resolved in a previous one. UP was not an original
party-defendant in the original suit, but it intervened
and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in
alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to
hold inviolate academic freedom, both individual and
institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial
identity of parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and
Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the
same interests in the two petitions.
However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the
two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the
subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss
the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be
noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same
complaint were filed in this case and they were
separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen
and Salazar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by
UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it
off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to
herein facts would be stretching to its limits the
requirement of identity of subject matter.
2. Academic Freedom
UP has no cause of action because there are insufficient
allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the
same allegations in its original complaint because that
has been previously struck off the record by the lower
court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not
allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is
affected by the complaint simply because it was not an
original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower
court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner
authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a study on the
Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to
Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned
or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the
motion to dismiss the complaint against Salazar and
Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which
amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a
ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the
allegations of the complaint.
On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and
Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts
and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of
the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged
a fraud.
This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was
improper. Coming to the defense of its faculty members,
it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and
utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by
the constitutionally-protected principle of academic
freedom. However, it should have championed the
cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial
of the case. It erred in trying to abort the
proceedings at its inception through the device of
filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse,
notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been
inflicted on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still
invoke and prove the special defense of institutional
academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Paño and in
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology.
41
Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby
forfeited their right to notice of subsequent
proceedings and to participate in the trial,
petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge
in determining whether issues have been joined.
With respect to the prayer of the complaint for
"judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a
distinct ethnic community within the territory
defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995"
the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to
a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship which may not be granted in a petition
for declaratory relief.
The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed on
plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they
maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to
present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors
collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with
and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not
within the province of the court to make
pronouncements on for these are matters beyond its
expertise.
DECS vs. SAN DIEGO
J. Cruz
The basic issue of the case is whether or not a
person who failed the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) thrice, in violation of the ‘three-flunk
rule’, is entitled to take it again.
FACTS:
Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of
the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE
times and flunked all of them [Court found that he
actually failed FOUR times – a ‘misplaced
persistence’ like a ‘hopeless love’]. When he applied
for the FIFTH time, the DECS and the Director of
Center for Educational Measurement rejected his
application on the basis of the ‘three-flunk rule’:
MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports]
Order No. 12, Series of 1972:
‘A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to
take the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, a
student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for
the fourth time.’
San Diego went to the RTC to compel his
admission to the test. Through a petition for
mandamus, he invoked his rights to academic
freedom and quality education. He also raised the
issues of due process and equal protection. By
agreement of the parties, he was allowed to take the
NMAT.
Batch 2008A.
RTC declared the Order invalid because it
deprived San Diego’s of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
‘Angles’ of the Case :
1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the ‘three-flunk rule’
is a valid exercise of police power.
- In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admission
to medical schools to those that initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical school,
Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point:
- The test is the reasonable relation between the lawful
method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR
as condition for admission to medical schools, and the
lawful subject – the securing of the health and safety of
the general community.
- The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
- The power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes also covers the admission to the
practice.
- For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the lawful subject
is the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools by upgrading
through selectivity in the process of admission like
limiting admission to those who passed the NMAT
(lawful method).
- Furthermore, the use of admission tests is widely used
in the United States (Medical College Admission Test)
and in other countries with more educational resources
than that of the Philippines.
- Ultimately, the measure contributes to the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate the
medical profession.
- Test for the valid exercise police power involves the
concurrence between:
a. the interest of the of public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State;
b. the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
2. Right to quality education is not absolute
- While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor,
he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor… A
person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients. If one who want to be a lawyer
42
may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised
and advised.
- San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that
there are other people who are more prepared than
him, considering the crowded medical schools that
we have today.
3. The order does not violate the equal
protection clause
- A law does not have to operate with equal force on
all persons or things. There are substantial
distinctions between medical students and other
students who are not required to take the NMAT and
not subjected to the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession have a delicate responsibility towards
society that warrants a different treatment towards
them.
Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of
police power. Court said that San Diego’s intellectual
capacity is not ‘depreciated’, rather, he may be
meant for another calling. The rule is intended to
avoid a nation of misfits – square pegs trying to fit
into round holds.
The decision of the RTC declaring MECS
Order No. 12 invalid is reversed.
TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ
J. Feliciano
FACTS:
Teresita Tablarin and other students, in
their behalf and in behalf of other applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges who have not
taken or taken but failed the NMAT during 1987-88
and for the future years to come, wants to be
admitted into schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, Tablarin and company either
did not take or failed the NMAT which is required by
the Board of Medical Education (Board) and
conducted by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
The petitioners sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the CEM from:
a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
4224 and 5946, known as the ‘Medical Act of
1959’ provides that one of its objectives the
Batch 2008A.
standardization and regulation of the medical
education. It created the Board of Medical Education
composed by representatives from education
government institutions, private medical specialty
societies, association of medical schools and dean of
the UP College of Medicine. The one of the
administrative functions of the Board is to prescribe
requirements for admission with necessary rules and
regulations for proper implementation.
The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the
minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility
given by the Board.
b. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985
provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT
as an additional requirement for the issuance of
the certificate of eligibility.
c. proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMA, and
d. administering the NMAT.
The petition was denied by the RTC and the
NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted
that the petitioners were not able to present a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality.
‘Angles’ of the case:
1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as
amended [Medical Act of 1959], and MECS Order No.
52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the
1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners.
- The petitioners cited ‘State Policies’ which include
Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human
person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the
vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II,
Section 17 on the priority to education. They also cited
Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase
‘right of ALL citizens to quality education.’ Furthermore,
the NMAT requirement is challenged as a violation of the
‘fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements’ stated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3).
- Court said that the petitioners did not demonstrated
how the measures provided by the Board collide with
these relatively specific State policies. In short, they
were not able to present a prima facie case with regards
to the State Policies angle.
- About the ‘right of all citizens to quality education’, this
phrase should not be construed as compelling to State to
make quality education available across the board.
Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so
far that the citizens were able to quality under ‘fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.’
43
2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 ,
as amended [Medical Act of 1959], is not an
undue delegation of legislative power.
- The general principle of non-delegation of
powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati
potestas non potest delegare – a delegated power may
not be further delegated by the person to whom such
power is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule
of the separation of and allocation of powers among
the three great departments of government.
However, this rule was made to adapt to the
complexities of the modern government referred
to by Justice Laurel in Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service
Commission. This is known as the principle of
subordinate legislation.
- Standards for subordinate legislation may be
expressed or implied. The body of the statute and
the goal to standardize and regulate the medical
profession satisfy the necessary standards required.
3. The NMAT is not an “unfair, unreasonable and
inequitable requirement” which results in a
denial of due process.
- The petitioners did not specify what factors in the
NMAT support their claim. If they are questioning
the burden imposed by the NMAT, which would
pertain to the utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then
these are matters that should be addressed by the
administrative and legislative bodies – not by the
Court.
4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
- Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable
power of the sovereign to promote the important
interests and needs – the general order of the
general community.
- The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of
police power: concurrence test between lawful
subject and lawful method.
5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed
by the Board after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges does
not violate the equal protection clause.
- The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a
flexible measure that takes into consideration
changes of different factors that would merit a
commensurate change in the cut-off score like:
number of students who reached the cut-off score in
the previous year, available slots, average scores,
level of difficulty of the examination. Setting a
permanent cut-off scores would result to
unreasonable rigidity.
HOLDING:
Batch 2008A.
Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass
successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical
schools are not unconstitutional impositions.
Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES
FACTS:
• Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not
allowed to re-enroll because they participated in
student mass actions against their school the
preceding sem
• On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of
classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued
their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not
to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
scheduled classes and depriving a great majority
of students of their right to be present in their
classes
• Together with the abovementioned fact, the
lower court considered that in signing their
enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be
re-enrolled. “The Mabini College reserves the
right to deny admission of students xxx whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the
efficient operation of the college xxx”
• In addition the students signed pledges saying
they respect their alma matter, that they will
conduct themselves in a manner that would not
put the college in a bad light.
• Judge Dames’ decision considering these facts
said that what the students assert is a mere
privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not to admit the
petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it
allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment
of students on the ground of termination of contract
should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of
students on the ground of termination of contract should
be reversed. YES
RATIO:
• In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a
written contract for one semester and contracts
are respected as the law between the contracting
parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is
deemed terminated.
• However, this case is not a simple case about a
school refusing re-admission. The refusal to
readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided
upon and implemented by school authorities as
a reaction to student mass actions
44
• This is a case that focuses on the right to
speech and assembly as exercised by
students vis-à-vis the right of school officials
to discipline them.
• The student does not shed his constitutionally
protected rights at the schoolgate. In
protesting grievances disorder is more or
less expected because emotions run high.
That the protection to the cognate rights of
speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Consti is similarly available to students is
well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to
discipline cannot override constitutional
safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the
court reiterated that the exercise of the
freedom of assembly could not be a basis for
barring students from enrolling. Under
academic freedom, students my be barred
from re-enrollment based on academic
deficiencies.
• Permissible limitations on student exercise of
constitutional rights within the school.
Constitutional freedom of free speech and
assembly also not absolute. However,
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires
observance of procedural due process and
penalty imposed must be proportionate to
the offense committed. (procedural due
process: right to be informed in writing,
right to ans the charges, right to be informed
of the charges against them, right to adduce
evidence, and for this evidence to be duly
considered)
• The nature of contract between a school and
its students is not an ordinary contract but is
imbued with public interest. The Consti
allows the State supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions. [see
art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107
and 137 of the respondent school’s manual,
a student is enrolled not just for one sem
but for the entire period necessary for the
student to complete his/her course. BP blg
232 gives the students the right to continue
their course up to graduation.
• Academic freedom not a ground for denying
students’ rights. In Villar, the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their
constitutional rights to speech and
assembly, for otherwise there will be a
violation of their right to equal protection.
• School said most of them had failing grades
anyway. In answer students say they are
graduating students and if there are any
deficiencies these do not warrant non-
readmission. Also there are more students
with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted.
And some of the petitioners had no failing
marks.
• The court held that the students were
denied due process in that there was no due
investigation. In fact it would appear from
the pleadings that the decision to refuse
Batch 2008A.
them re-enrollment because of failing grades was
a mere afterthought.
• Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be
commensurate to the offense committed with
due process.
• But penalty, if any is deserved should not
anymore be enforced. Moot and academic.
They’ve already suffered enough.
ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
Justice Paras:
FACTS:
• Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and
barricaded the school because they wanted to
admin to hear their grievances with regards to
“not being able to participate in the policy-
making of the school”, despite the regulations
set by the admin with regards to protest actions
• During the regular enrollment period, petitioners
and other students similarly situated were allegedly
blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of school year 1986-1987.
• court ordered the school authorities to create a
special investigating committee to conduct an
investigation, who made recommendations which
the school adopted
• a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents
filing and answering the complaints
• petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due
process when they were barred from re-enrollment
and for intervenors teachers whose services have
been terminated as faculty members, on account of
their participation in the demonstration or protest
charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a
violation of their constitutional rights of expression
and assembly.
• Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of
procedural due process which requires that there be
due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due
process which requires that the person or body to
conduct the investigation be competent to act and
decide free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of
due process ?
B. WON there was contempt of Court by the
respondents
HELD:
A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.
1. There is no existing contract between the two parties.
Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
states that when a college student registers in a school,
it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the
"written contracts" required for college teachers are for
45
'one semester. after the close of the first semester,
the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the intervening
teachers. It is a time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties The contract having been
terminated, there is no more contract to speak
of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into
another contract with said students and
teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court
or the appellate court, have no power to make
contracts for the parties."
2. The Court has stressed, that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts
of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are:
a. the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
b. they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired:
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against
them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf and
e.the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C.
were distributed at the beginning of each school
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in
nature and upon admission to the School, the
Student is deemed to have agreed to bind
himself to all rules/regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be
required to withdraw from the School at any
time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious
by the School Administration.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the
school with regard to the protest actions. Necessary
action was taken by the school when the court
issued a temporary mandatory injunction to accept
the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an
investigating body.
4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both
to the students and teachers on the one hand and
the school on the other, ordered an investigation to
be conducted by the school authorities, in the
resolution of November 12, 1986.
Findings of the investigating committee:
1. students disrupted classes
Batch 2008A.
2. petitioners involved were found to be
academically deficient & the teachers are found
to have committed various acts of misconduct.
5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by
this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's
refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs
as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students.
The opposite view would do violence to the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
Constitution.
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals, unless :
1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;
3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings
is irregular;
4. when palpable errors are committed; or
5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive
and adequate.
.B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors
to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise
untenable.
1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz
respondent school explained that the intervenors were
actually reinstated as such faculty members after the
issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.
2. respondent school has fully complied with its
duties under the temporary mandatory injunction
The school manifested that while the investigation was
going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching
and it was only after the investigation, that the
recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the
school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case
for having become moot and academic
A. Non- impairment of Obligations
of Contracts
Art III sec 10. No law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
Civil Code Art 1306 The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem
46
convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy.
PADILLA ARTICLE: A CIVIL LAW
Article 1306 (Civil Code)- The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
The article was taken from Article 1255 of the
Spanish Civil Code. The old provision stipulated that
an agreement between contracting parties was the
law between them, and such an agreement must be
complied with in good faith. Under the old article,
limitations to the freedom of contract included those
against law, morals or public order. Article 1306
adds those contrary to good customs and public
policy to these limitations.
The freedom to contract is protected under the
constitutional clause that “ no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.” The author explains that Liberty
includes the freedom to contract. He illustrates this
through the case of People vs. Pomar, where the
Court held that “The right to enter into lawful
contracts constitutes one of the liberties of the
people of the state… A citizen cannot be compelled
to give employment to another citizen, nor can any
one be compelled to be employed against his will.
Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to
refuse to labor, and consequently, the right to refuse
to make such contracts… To enter into legal
contacts freely and without restraint, is one of the
liberties guaranteed to the people of the state.” Also,
freedom of contract is both a constitutional and
statutory right. Parties to a contract are free to
stipulate terms and conditions. However, freedom of
contract is not absolute, and is subject to several
limitations.
The limitations to the freedom of contract are those
against:
a) Law (The parties cannot stipulate against
the law, because the law is supreme and is
always deemed to be an integral part of
every contract. It may be possible to
compromise a liability coming from a civil
case, but this is not possible with a liability
arising from a criminal case.)
b) Morals
c) Good Customs
d) Public Order
e) Public Policy
Valid Stipulations include those onerous
stipulations in leonine contracts, stipulations in
bond that surety’s liability is solidary and primary,
stipulations limiting liability on bond, etc.
Batch 2008A.
HOME BUILDERS & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL
01/08/34
Hughes, C.J.
FACTS:
Minnesota passed a moratorium law providing that in a
time of emergency, parties may seek judicial relief with
respect tp the foreclosure of mortgages & execution sales
of real estate, in that sales may be postponed and
periods may be extended. The statute leaves it to the
court's discretion as to the length of time that it will give
an applicant "as it will deem just & equitable." The Act is
to remain in effect "only during the continuance of the
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935." No
extension of the period for redemption and no
postponement of sale is to be allowed which would have
the effect of extending the period of redemption beyond
that date.The section also provides that the time for
redemption from foreclosure sales theretofore made,
which otherwise would expire less than thirty days after
the approval of the Act shall be extended to a date thirty
days after its approval, and application may be made to
the court within that time for a further extension as
provided in the section. By another provision of the Act,
no action, prior to May 1, 1935, may be maintained for a
deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as
allowed by existing law or as extended under the
provisions of the Act has expired. Prior to the expiration
of the extended period of redemption, the court may
revise or alter the terms of the extension as changed
circumstances may require. Blaisdell, under the statute,
applied for an order extending the period of redemption
from a foreclosure sale. Their petition stated that they
owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to
appellant; that the mortgage contained a valid power of
sale by advertisement and that, by reason of their
default, the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to
appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3,700.98; that appellant
was the holder of the sheriff's certificate of sale; that,
because of the economic depression appellees had been
unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that,
unless the period of redemption were extended, the
property would be irretrievably lost, and that the
reasonable value of the property greatly exceeded the
amount due on the mortgage, including all liens, costs
and expenses. Though initially denied by the district
court, upon appeal the extension was granted by the
state supreme court, The state court upheld the statute
as an emergency measure. Although conceding that the
obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the
court decided that what it thus described as an
impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the
State as that power was called into exercise by the
public economic emergency which the legislature had
found to exist.
PETITIONERS:
the moratorium law is contrary to the contract clause
(Art 1, S 10) and the due process and equal protection
clauses (14th Amd).
ISSUE-HELD:
47

WON the moratorium law is constitutional-YES
RATIO:
At the outset the court made it very clear that except
for the time factor, no other aspect of the mortgage
relation was altered. The indebtness remains; in
fact, the mortgagor still has the right to the rentals
for the time when the period is suspended.
The court then discussed the historical backgorund
of the contracts clause vis-a-vis the concept of
emergency powers. Emergency does not create
power. Emergency does not increase granted power
or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon
power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of
power to the Federal Government and its limitations
of the power of the States were determined in the
light of emergency, and they are not altered by
emergency. While emergency does not create power,
emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise
of power.
Although an emergency may not call into life a power
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may
afford a reason for the exertion of a living power
already enjoyed. In Wilson v. New, the constitutional
question presented in the light of an emergency is
whether the power possessed embraces the
particular exercise of it in response to particular
conditions. In other words, there must be a
compelling state interest coupled with a narrowly-
tailored means to achieve it.
The "non-impairment of contracts" clause came to
life because at the time the Constitution was being
drafted, the drafters were mindful of the fact that
there have been an ignoble array of legislative
schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion
of contractual obligations. Legislative interferences
had been so numerous and extreme that the
confidence essential to prosperous trade had been
undermined and the utter destruction of credit was
threatened.But as J. Johnson wrote in Ogden v
Saunders, to give such a sweeping protection to the
sanctity of contracts could not have been the intent
of the Constitution, given the fact that law has over
a hundred examples wherein a contract may be
vioded.Societies exercise a positive control as well
over the inception, construction and fulfillment of
contracts as over the form and measure of the
remedy to enforce them.
Therefore there is a need to determine: what is a
contract? What are the obligations of contracts?
What constitutes impairment of these obligations?
What residuum of power is there still in the States in
relation to the operation of contracts, to protect the
vital interests of the community? The obligation of a
contract is "the law which binds the parties to
perform their agreement." Sturges v. Crowninshield.
The laws which subsist at the time and place of the
making of a contract, and where it is to be
performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they
were expressly referred to or incorporated in its
Batch 2008A.
terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect
its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement.
Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the
means of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy
are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation,
which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
invasion.Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. But there is a
distinction betwwen an obligation & a remedy as pointed
out in Sturges: The distinction between the obligation of
a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to
enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and
exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be
modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. It is
competent for the States to change the form of the
remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit,
provided no substantial right secured by the contract is
thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix
definitely the line between alterations of the remedy,
which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which,
under the form of modifying the remedy, impair
substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon
its own circumstances.
The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be
thus stated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce
the contract, the legislature has the control, and may
enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a
remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions
as seriously to impair the value of the right. Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile — a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. Into all contracts, whether
made between States and individuals, or between
individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not
out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are
superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of
the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to
which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and
must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all,
are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be
carried into express stipulation, for this could add
nothing to their force. Every contract is made in
subordination to them, and must yield to their control,
as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a
necessity for their execution shall occur. Thus, the
economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of
its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts. The
interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of
contracts does not prevent the State from exercising
such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal, or are necessary for the general good of
the public, though contracts previously entered into
between individuals may thereby be affected. Sa
madaling sabi, police power measure ang nasabing
batas.
Taking all of this into account, the court concludes:
1)that there was an "emergency" in Minnesota that
warranted the enactment of the moratorium law; 2)the
48
statute addressed a legitimate need, the protection of
a basic interest of society (here the protection of the
economic system and the justness of giving debtors
time; 3)the conditions are not unreasonable; 4)the
legislation is temporary in operation.
Petition dismissed, judgment of Minn SC
affirmed.
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN
Bautista Angelo, j.:
FACTS:
August 20, 1941 Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of
land situated in the city of Manila for P9,600. P4,800
paid outright, P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942,
and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with
interest at the rate of 7%.
To secure the payment of the balance of P4,800, a
1st mortgage over the parcels of land has been
constituted in favor of the plaintiff. New title was
issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage
duly annotated on the back thereof.
Esteban failed to pay. On Aug 2, 1949, Rutter
instituted this action in the CFI to recover the
balance, interest, and the attorney's fees. The
complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the
properties mortgaged.
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint,
but set up a defense the moratorium clause
embodied in RA 342. He claims that this is a prewar
obligation contracted on Aug 20, 1941; that he is a
war sufferer, having filed his claim with the
Philippine War Damage Commission [PWDC] for the
losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last
war; and that under sec 2 of RA 342, payment of his
obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of
8 years from the settlement of his claim by the
PWDC, and this period has not yet expired.
ISSUE:
WON RA 342, approved by Congress on July 26,
1948, if declared applicable to the present case is
unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional
provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation
of contracts  YES, unreasonable period (see sub-
issue).
RATIO:
RA 342
o Sec 2: all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941 shall not
due and demandable for a period of 8 years from
and after settlement of the war damage claim of
the debtor by the PWDC;
o sec 3: should the provision of section 2 be
declared void and unenforceable, then as
regards the obligation affected thereby, the
Batch 2008A.
provisions of EO 25 dated November 18, 1944, as
amended by EO 32, dated March 10, 1945, shall
continue to be in force and effect
Moratorium (def’n) - is postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of
the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the
application of the sovereign power"
The test of the constitutionality of the moratorium
statute: It is required that the period of a suspension of
the remedy be definite and reasonable.
Impairs the obligation of contracts?
Yes, but it is justified as a valid exercise of police power.
Chief Justice Hughes says:
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts. The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government to
secure the peace and good order of society. State
power must be consistent with the fair intent of the
constitutional limitation of that power. The
constitutional prohibition should not be construed
as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions
with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made
necessary by great public calamity.
Blaisdell case has its limitations:
o impairment should only refer to the remedy and not
to a substantive right. The State may postpone the
enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it
by making the remedy futile.
o propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the
alteration or change that the new legislation desires
to write into an existing contract must not be
burdened with restrictions and conditions that
would make the remedy hardly pursuing
Blaisdell summary: Police power may only be invoked
and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and
can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in
order that it may not infringe the constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts
SUB-ISSUE:
WON the period of 8 years which RA 342 grants to
debtors is unreasonable under the present
circumstances.  YES
RATIO:
The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar.
Case at bar: These obligations had been pending since
1945 as a result of the issuance of EOs 25 and 32 and at
present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the
enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the 8-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means
that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. And the
49
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the
debtor is not even required to pay interest during the 1.
operation of the relief.
Reconstruction and rehabilitation has swept the
country since liberation. it can now be safely stated
that the financial condition of our country and the
people have returned to normal. This is so not only
as far as observation and knowledge are capable to
take note but also because of the official
pronouncements made by the Chief Executive.
ORTIGAS vs. FEATI
J. Santos (1979) 2.
FACTS:
• March 4, 1952 – Ortigas & Co., a partnership
involved in real estate particularly the Highway
Hills Subd. along EDSA in Mandaluyong,
entered into a contract of sale on installments
over 2 parcels of land with Augusto and
Natividad Angeles who later transferred their
rights and interests to a certain Emma Chavez
• Under the agreement, it was stipulated among
others that:
xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential
purposes xxx
• Eventually, defendant Feati Bank and Trust
company acquired the lots and started the
construction of a building on the said lot devoted
to banking purposes
• Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain & enjoin the defendant
from continuing with the construction of the
commercial bank in violation of the restrictions
set in the contract of sale that was imposed by
the plaintiff as part oif its general building
scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subd
• Defendant maintains that the area in question
has been declared as a commercial and
industrial zone by the Zoning Regualtion of
RESOLUTION no. 27 on Feb 4, 1980 of the
Municipal Councilk of Mandaluyong, Rizal
• Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant bank
Feati holding that the restrictions set by plaintiff
Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal
Resolution 27 because of the municipal’s valid
exercise of police power. It stressed that the
private interest should “bow down to general
interest & welfare.”
• Plaintiff appealed till it finally reached the SC
ISSUES:
1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of
police power
2. WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede
the contractual obligations assumed by defendants
HELD & RATIO:
Batch 2008A.
Yes. Although the validity of the resolution was
never questioned in the past proceedings, its validity
was at least impliedly admitted from the facts. Sec 3
of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a
Municipal Council “to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It
gives more power to local governments in promoting
the economic conditions, social welfare and material
progress of the community. The only exceptions are
existing vested rights arising out of a contract
between "a province, city or municipality on one
hand and a third party on the other," in which case
the original terms and provisions of the contract
should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply
in the case.
Yes, the resolution as an exercise of police power by
the municipality can supersede contractual
obligations assumed by the defendants. While non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to
be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police
power.
Police power is the most essential, insistent &
illimitable of powers, the greatest & most illimitable
of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. Its
exercise may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee.
Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of
Davao . police power "is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions; it is not,
confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow
the legal progress of a democratic way of life."
Dobbins v. Los Angeles - 'the right to exercise the
police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful today may in the future, because of changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare,
and be required to yield to the public good.
Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian
Relations - "We do not see why public welfare when
clashing with the individual right to property should
not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of
its police power.
The state, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort health and
prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim
of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated.
Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor
General - the laws and reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts
agreed upon by the parties. Thus not only are
50
 existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the
maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile – a
government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society.
Dolan vs. Brown - "A grantor may lawfully
insert in his deed conditions or restrictions
which are not against public policy and do not
materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the
estate.
Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part
of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power
to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace,
good order and general welfare of the people in the
locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the
conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the
place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the
Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of
traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health,
safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations,
the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its
Municipal council, was reasonably justified under
the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
JUAREZ vs. CA
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Lot 502 (hereafter known as The Lot) was leased in
early 1900s to Serviliano Ocampo who built a house
therein and lived there w/ his parents and sister
Angela. When he died in March 1956, Angela took
over the lease and stayed there with her children
(including Virginia). In 1976, she moved to Virginia’s
house and leased the lot to Roberto Capuchino.
Meantime, Aranetas sold it to Susanna Realty. Inc.
which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Dev’t Corp. After
acquiring it, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment
against petitioner on the ground that she violated
BP877 by subleasing The Lot w/o its consent.
Respondents:
CA ruled that BP 877 (effective on June 12, 1985)
was applicable because the orig’l contract of lease
didn’t specify a fixed term and payment of the rental
was made on a monthly basis. Contract was deemed
terminated from month to month. Hence, when it
Batch 2008A.
was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877,
which had come into effect on June 12, 1985.
Petitioner:
BP 877 should not be given retroactive application
because it would violate the impairment clause and the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. Relying on Art.
16501, she also claims that sublease was not prohibited
when it was concluded in 1976 and since it was valid at
that time, it should continue to be valid even now. Also,
she says her mom is the proper party defendant since
her mom was the one who inherited the leasehold right
from Servillano, the original lessee.
ISSUE:
WON the ejectment of lessee Virginia Suarez be allowed?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner can no longer retain the leased lot since
she is making a profitable business of subleasing it w/o
the written consent of the landlord.
RATIO
According to Art.16872, if the period for lease has not
been fixed, it is understood to be from month to month if
the rent agreed is from month to month. As the original
contract of lease didn’t prescribe a fixed period and the
rentals were paid monthly, the same should be
considered renewable from month to month. When the
sublease was renewed by Capuchino in July 1985, it
became invalid under BP877, w/c already became
effective. The law then, operated prospectively upon the
new or renewed contract of sublease, w/c to be valid
needed the written consent of the lessor. Moreover,
BP877 provides that “all residential units (The Lot comes
under this) the total monthly rental of w/c doesn’t
exceed P480.00 as of the effectivity of this Act shall be
covered.”
Impairment clause (IC)3 is now no longer inviolate. More
and more, interests of the public have become involved
in what are supposed to be still private agreements,
which have as a result been removed from the protection
of the IC. As long as the contract affects public welfare
one way or another so as to require the interference opf
the State, then must the police power be asserted and
prevail, over the IC.
1
When in the contract of lease of thing there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
subject the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for
the performance of the contract toward the lessor.
2
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year,
if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However,
even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over
one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after
the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts
may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one
month.
3
Impairment of obligation – any enactment of legislative character is said to “impair”
the obligation of a contract w/c attempts to tgake from a party a right to w/c he is
entitled by its terms, or w/c deproves him of the means of enforcing such a right.
51
PVB Employees Union v. PVB – Contract is
protected by guaranty only if it doesn’t affect public
interest.
Housing is one of the most serious social problems
of the country. The regulation of rentals has long
been the concern of the gov’t to prevent the lessor
from imposing arbitrary conditions on the lessee
while at the same time deterring the lessee from
abusing the statutory benefits accorded to him.
Purpose of BP877 is to protect both landlord and
tenant from their mutual impositions that can only
cause detriment to society as a whole.
Here, rental on The Lot is only P69.70/mo. while the
petitioner charges Capuchino a monthly rental of
P400. While it is true that P400 covers the lot and
building, the point is that she isn’t paying the lessor
enough for the use of the lot in light of the total
rental she is charging Capuchino for the use of
building and lot. She has taken undue advantage of
the rental laws by holding on to the leased premises
although they no longer need them for their own
residence or administering them to the prejudice of
the landlord.
- BP877 is not an ex post facto law. It’s not
penal in nature. Virginia is not being
prosecuted under the said penal provisions
as well.
- Angela is 92 yrs. Old and is now under the
care of Virginia. Thus, it is Virginia who is
proper party defendant. She has been
receiving the rent from Capuchino and
paying rent on the lot to Cetus. She has
taken over the leasehold right for all intents
and purposes.
CALEON vs. AGUS DEVELOPMENT
FACTS:
• Private respondent Agus Development is the
private owner of lot 39 block 28 situated in
Lealtad Sampaloc when it leased the
property to Rita Calleon for a monthly rental
of Php 180.00. Petitioner constructed on the
lot leased a 4-door apartment building.
• Without the consent of the owner of the lot,
the petitioner sub-leased two of the 4-door
apartment building for a monthly rental of
Php 350.00 each.
• After learning of the sublease private
respondent filed a complaint for ejectment,
citing as ground thereof the provisions of
Batas Pambansa blg. 25, section 5, which is
the unauthorized subleasing of part of the
leased premises to third persons without
securing the consent of the lessor within the
required 60 day period from the
promulgation of the new law.
Batch 2008A.
• After the trial the court rendered its decision
ordering petitioner and all persons claiming
possession over her to vacte the premises
alluded to the complaint and to remove whatever
improvement she introduced to the property.
• Rita moved for procedural appeals and of course
the decision of the trial court was affirmed hence
its elevation to the supreme court.
ISSUE:
1. W/o the lease of an apartment includes a
sublease of the lot on which it is
constructed? YES
2. W/o B.P 25 is contrary to the promotion of
social justice policy of the new constitution?
NO
HELD:
1. The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of
Duellome vs. Gotico where this court ruled that the lease
of a building naturally leases the lot therein, and the
rentals of the building includes those of the lot.
2. The objective of B.P 25 is to remedy the plight of the
lessees, but such objective is not subject to the
exploitation of lessees for whose benefit the law was
enacted. Thus the prohibition provided for in the law
against the sublease of the premises without the consent
of the owner.
It must be remembered that the social
justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
the property owner, who under our constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated in our constitution was not
intended to take away the rights from a person to
give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
B. Involuntary Servitude
Sec18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any
form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted.
RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD
[‘If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence.’ – main opinion by
Justice Malcolm]
[‘They (Manguianes) are citizens of the Philippine
Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all
the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this
country.’ – dissenting opinion of Justice Moir]
Malcolm, J.:
FACTS:
Under Section 2145, Revised Administrative Code,
with prior approval of the Department Head, the
52
governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when he deems
it necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
non-Christian inhabitants to make permanent
settlements on unoccupied public land – to be
selected by the provincial governor and approved by
the provincial board.
In February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro
adopted Resolution No. 25 which was presented by
Provincial Governor of Mindoro Juan Morente Jr.
The resolution presents that since several attempts
and schemes of the past for the advancement of the
‘non-Christian’ people of Mindoro have failed, it is
‘deemed necessary’ to oblige the Manguianes to live
in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement. The reasons for the resolution are:
[1] failure of former attempts for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of Mindoro
[2] the only successful method is to oblige them to
live in a permanent settlement
[3] protection of the Manguianes
[2] protection of public forests
[3] introduce civilized customs
Governor Morente Jr. chose the sitio of Tigbao on
Lake Naujan, containing 800 hectares of public land
for approximately 15,000 Manguianes. The
resolution was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.
Executive Order No. 2 was then issued by the
governor directing all the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola,
Dulangan and Calapan [Rubi’s place] to take their
habitation in the site not later than December 31,
1917. Section 2759¸Revised Administrative Code
provides for an imprisonment not exceeding 60 days
for those who refuse to obey the order.
Rubi and his companions did not fix their dwelling
within the reservation and they were punished with
imprisonment. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos
was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro because he
escaped from the reservation.
Rubi and the rest of the Manguianes sued out a writ
of habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived of
their liberty. They are also questioning the validity of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
Exposition of the Court (Baka magtanong si
Dean)
II. History [Court wants to say that the
‘reservation approach’ is not new and in fact
‘accepted’ in the past. In short, Court is saying
that they deserve it.]
A. Before acquisition of the Philippines by the
United States
During the Spanish period, the ‘Indios” were already
‘reduced’ [‘reducciones’] into ‘poblaciones’
[communities]. The purpose is to instruct them in
the Catholic faith so that the Indios will forget the
‘blunders’ of their ancient rights and ceremonies –
eventually allowing them to live in a ‘civilized
Batch 2008A.
manner’. The crown offered tax exemptions for those
who obeyed.
Pueblos and reducciones were provided with basic
facilities for survival. Lands previously owned by the
Indios were not confiscated. Each town contained
around 80 Indios supervised by an Indio mayor.
Later, the Governor General issued a decree in 1881,
saying that it is the ‘duty to conscience and humanity for
all governments to civilize those backward races’.
Provincial authorities should help the priests in their
mission to civilize. To attain their mission, the Spaniards
adopted the policy of ‘bringing under the bell’
[establish homes of Indios within the reach of the sound
of the bell]. Incentives in terms of tax and labor
reductions were offered.
B. After the Acquisition of the Philipines by the
United States
President MacKinley’s Instructions was ratified by the
Philippine Bill and the Act of Congress of 1902. In
essence, these laws provide that the reservation
approach was the same course used by US Congress in
dealing with ‘tribes of North American Indians’. The
approach was deemed a wise and firm regulation to
‘prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
customs’.
Jones Law was later passed empowering the Philippine
Legislature. The law established the Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes that recognized the dividing line
between the territory occupied by Christians and that of
non-Christians. The distinction is latter recognized by
special laws.
C.D. Terminology and Meaning
‘Non-Christian tribes’ was common term used. Religious
signification of the term was removed. The whole intent
of the term is to denote the civilization or lack of
civilization of the inhabitants. It relates to degree of
civilization rather than religious denomination.
In United States v. Tubban, the term was used for an
‘uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence,
uncultured and uneducated’. It was held that mere
baptism in the Christian faith will not changed one’s
degree of civilization.
E. Manguianes
They are placed in the ‘third class’ in the ‘four-stage’
classification approaching civilization used by the
Philippine census. In local dialect, “Manguianes’ means
‘ancient’, ‘savage’ etc.
III. Comparative – The American Indians [Court is
saying that the ‘reservation approach’ was used also
for the American Indians – which was perfectly ok.]
The treatment for the Manguianes is no different form
the methods used by the US Government in dealing with
the Indian tribes. Their relationship is one ‘in a state of
pupilage’ – between a guardian and a ward. Congress
had plenary authority in this guardianship.
53
The Indians were not treated as having a state or
nation. They are treated as a ‘separate people’.
Thus, the US Government is there to protect the
Indians form the people of the State that harbor ill-
feelings against them.
These laws were deemed political in nature not
subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts.
In United States v. Crook, a group of Indians led by
Standing Bear who fled from their reservation to
avoid disease and starvation were issued habeas
corpus after they were detained.
Using this case, Rubi was then declared as a citizen
of the Philippines, a ‘person’ within the Habeas
Corpus Act.
ISSUES:
1. WON there was Section 2145 involved an
undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial board of Mindoro.
- NO. Judge Ranney declared that “the true
distinction therefore is between the [1] delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.’ Section 2145 was issued under the
second mode of delegation.
- Section 2145 falls under the exception to the
general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The
central legislative body is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro.
- The reason is that provincial officers are better
fitted to select sites for reservations.
2. WON there was religions discrimination
against ‘non-Christian tribes’ under Section
2145.
- NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that
‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to ‘natives’ of ‘low grade
of civilization’ and does not discriminate on account
of religious differences.
3. WON the protection afforded by President
MacKinley’s Instructions, the Philippine Bill and
the Jones Law providing that no person ‘shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law’ extends to members of non-
Christian tribes.
- NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that
measure of freedom which may be enjoyed ‘in a
civilized community.’ It is a legal and refined idea,
the offspring of high civilization. Considering the
that the Manguianes do not have a civilized
conception of liberty, they cannot claim the they
were deprived of it. Furthermore, Section 2145 is
applicable to all of a class. The classification based
on degree of civilization is not arbitrary.
Batch 2008A.
- Due process means that:
[1] there is a law prescribed in harmony with the general
powers of the legislature
[2] that law is reasonable in its application
[3] it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure
[4] it is applicable to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class
- Liberty as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is liberty regulated by law. It is not
unrestricted license. It is only freedom from restraint. It
is not an absolute right. However, it is not limited to
freedom from physical restraint.
- Chief elements of the civil liberty are right to
contract, right to chose one’s employment, right to labor
and right of locomotion.
4. WON bringing the Manguianes into the
reservation amounts to slavery and involuntary
servitude.
- NO. Slavery and involuntary servitude denote a
condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to
another. In the reservation, the Manguianes are working
for no other but for themselves.
- If the Manguianes are not in the reservation, there
are vulnerable subjects to involuntary servitude of
civilized communities who may take advantage of their
ignorance. They are being protection from involuntary
servitude and abuse. They are, through Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes, slowly ‘fused’ with the civilized world –
‘bringing them under the bells’.
5. WON Section 2145 is a valid exercise of police
power.
- YES. Without attempting to define police power, it
is the power co-extensive with self-protection. It is the
inherent and plenary power to prohibit all things hurtful
to the welfare of society. Thus, the law protects the
forests from the illegal caingins [slash and burn
agriculture in forested areas]. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the
Philippines.
- The ‘whole tendency’ therefore of the Court is
toward ‘non-interference’ on the political ideas of the
legislature.
- In fact, the Manguianes ‘liked the plan’. There were
‘encouraging reactions’ from the children who attended
the schools. They were ‘eager’ to be receiving benefits of
civilization in the reservations.
HOLDING:
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is valid. Their
confinement in the reservation does not amount to
slavery and involuntary servitude. Habeas corpus cannot
issue.
Carson, J. concurring:
- I agree that ‘non-Christian tribes’ denote a ‘low grade of
civilization’. The test for civilizations has been:
[1] mode of life
[2] degree of advancement in civilization
54
[3] connection or lack of connection with some
civilized community
- Degree of civilization can only increase by
withdrawal of permanent allegiance or adherence to
non-Christian tribes.
Johnson, J., dissenting:
- They were deprived of their liberty without a
hearing. All persons in the Philippines are entitled to
a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their
liberty.
Moir., with Araullo and Street, dissenting:
- The case of the Indian nations in the US cannot
apply to this case because the Indian nations were
considered a separate nations where the US dealt
with them using treaties. Also, the reservations
given to them were very large – about thousand of
square miles.
- In this case, the Manguianes are not a separate
state. There are not treaties. They are Filipinos,
legally speaking. They are entitled to all the rights
and privileges of any other citizen of this country.
- The caingin argument will not lie because the fires
never spread to the tropical undergrowth. These
burnings are isolated – these are not great abuses
meriting their ‘incarceration’.
- The Manguianes have never been a burden to the
State. They have not committed any crimes. In fact,
they were described as ‘peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic’. When there are in reservations, there
are more vulnerable to involuntary servitude. The
needs for survival in an enclosed community like
food and clothing would be tempting incentives for
the Manguianes, who do not have the means to
produce these things, to trade their freedom to
involuntary servitude.
- The majority claim that Section 2145 is
substantially the same as Act, No. 547 of the
Philippine Commission. However, the
constitutionality of this earlier Act was not passed
upon by the Court.
- If the rationale of the Court is applied, then
decapitation en masse will result. It will be an
open air jail for all natives – even those who have
proven their progress measured against standards of
the civilized world like the Ifugaos and Tinguianes.
- Like the case of Standing Bear in the US, I think
that the Court should rule that the Manguianes were
deprived of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness.
KAISAHAN vs. GOTAMCO
(1948)
ponente: Hilado J
FACTS:
Kaisahan staged a strike which paralyzed Gotamco.
The two parties were brought to the Court of
Industrial Relations. A compromise was made:
kaisahan returns to work if Gotamco raises wages by
P2 w/o meal plus the right to bring back little pieces
of firewood front gotamco, until the final
Batch 2008A.
determination of the case. Court issued the compromise
in their return to work order together with injunction
'company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss
any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor
suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and
the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or
strike during the pendency of the hearing.'
Afterwards gotamco filed another case w/ CIR because
Kaisahan resumed the strike. Kaisahan filed a counter-
petition saying that gotamco violated the terms first by
certain discriminations, by not hearing grievances, by
employing four new chinese laborers w/o authority of
the court and in violation of sec 19 of Commonwealth
Act 103 and by firing a certain Naximino Millan.
CIR held that there was a violation of the court order by
kaisahan, that there was no clear proof that gotamco
employed 4 new chinese laborers and that Millan was a
troublemaker and his petition for reinstatement was
denied.
Petitioner now contends that court order and sec 19 CA
103 is unconstitutional because it amounts to
involuntary servitude.
ISSUE:
WON sec 19 CA 103 creates involuntary servitude
HELD:
It can't be involuntary servitude if a person voluntarily
contracts employment and impliedly voluntarily puts
himself under the province of sec 19 CA 103.
RATIONALE:
CIR: This section is presumed to be constitutional.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the
human rights of individuals were "subjected to
regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its
paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103
were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it
the concern of the State to promote social justice to
insure the well being and economic security of all the
people. ...
Section 19 complements the power of the Court to settle
industrial disputes and renders effective such powers
which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of
the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1
and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the
Court to enable it to settle all questions matters,
controversies or disputes arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees", "to prevent non-
pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
agricultural disputes"
Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine
Labor Union: the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is
to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power
to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power
to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the
second place considering that the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely
incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously
acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the
power to execute its orders under section 19 is also
the same power that it possesses under section 4.
55
Sec 19 CA 103 does not offend against the
constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary
servitude. Whenever an employee enters into a
contract of employment, under the said law he also
voluntarily accepts those comditions prescribed in
sec 19, among which is the "implied condition that
when any dispute between the employer or landlord
and the employee, tenant or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for
settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions
of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the
employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk
out of his employment when so joined by the court
after hearing and when public interest so requires,
and if he has already done so, that he shall
forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which
shall be issued only after
Hearing when public interest so requires or when
the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly
decided or settled ...". The employee has a free
choice between entering into a contract of
employment or not. Such an implied condition,
negates the possibility of involuntary servitude
ensuing. The court is satisfied that there were formal
hearings before the order was issued. As to public
interest requiring that the court return the striking
laborers, the economic and social rehabilitation of
the country urgently demands reconstruction work
from the late war that the government is striving to
accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
The court construes the provision to mean that the
very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of
the dispute confers upon the court the power to
issue the order for the reason that the public has an
interest in preventing undue stoppage or
paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well
stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947,
this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement
was a fact which was borne out by the entire record
of the case and did not need express statement in
the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the
findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial
Relations
DISPOSITION:
Affirm CIR decision. Kaisahan in contempt of court
with costs.
C. Imprisonment for Non-
Payment of Debt
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ
December 18, 1986
Yap, J:
Batch 2008A.
FACTS:
• The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979,
is the sole issue presented by the petitions for
decision.
o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is
knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It
creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge when the check is dishonored by the
bank if presented within 90 days from the date on
the check.
• BP 22 is aimed at stopping or curbing the practice of
issuing worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
rejected or dishonored for payment.
• Before the enactment of said statute, issueing
worthless checks was punished under the provisions
on estafa in the RPC but because of the reliance by
the Court on the concept underlying the felony of
estafa through false pretenses or deceit (i.e. the
deceit or false pretense must be prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud),checks as payments for pre-existing debts
were not covered.
o Statistics have shown that a greater bulk of
dishonored checks consisted of those issued in
payment of pre-existing debts.
o BP 22 addressed the problem frontally and directly
making the act of issuing a worthless check
malum prohibitum.
Constitutional Challenges to B.P. 22:
1. offends the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt;
2. impairs freedom of contract;
3. contravenes equal protection clause
4. unduly delegates legislative and executive
powers
5. enactment is flawed since Interim Batasan
violated consti provision prohibiting
amendments on third reading.
RATIO:
Most serious of these challenges is that the statute runs
counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights saying, “No
person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.”
• Petitioners claim that the statute is nothing more
than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt
under the threat of penal sanction.
• Prohibition in the Bill of Rights was intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for
liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was
never meant to include damages arising in actions
ex delicto.
• In answering whether BP 22 violates the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt, it is necessary to examine what the statute
prohibits and punishes as an offense.
• The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
56
 which the law punishes. The law is not
intended to coerce a debtor to pay his debt
but is to prohibit under pain penal sanction
the making of worthless checks and putting
them into circulation because of the
deleterious effects it has on the public
interest.
o An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but
because of the harm that inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise
of the state’s police power.
o The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied
a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
• It is not for the judiciary to question the wisdom
behind the statute. It is sufficient that there
exists a nexus between means and ends.
HELD:
We find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise
of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment
for debt.
Regarding violation of freedom to contract:
freedom to contract which is protected is freedom to
enter into lawful contracts. Besides, checks are
commercial instruments and cannot be categorized
as mere contracts.
Regarding violation of equal protection:
contended that is just as responsible for the crime
as the drawer of the check and should also be
punished since without his indispensable
participation there is not crime. Unacceptable since
it is tantamount to saying that swindled should be
punished alongside the swindler.
Regarding undue delegation: What cannot be
delegated is the power to make laws which is the
power to define the offense sough to be punished
and to prescribe the penalty, it does not cover the
contention that the offense is not completed by the
sole act of the drawer but depends on the will of the
payee in presenting the check to the bank for
payment.
Regarding violation of prohibition against
amendments in 3rd reading: text approved by the
body is the text approved on second reading.
D. Right Against Self
Incrimination
U.S vs. NAVARRO
FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged
Batch 2008A.
with the crime of illegal detention. The said defendants,
together with other persons unknown armed with
revolvers and daggers, went one night about the middle
of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan,
situated in Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo,
Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence took the
said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this
information, having given any information as to his
whereabouts or having proven that they set him at
liberty.
The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
The court below rendered judgment condemning each
one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life
imprisonment and payment of the costs of prosecution.
Against this judgment the defendants appealed.
Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private
person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any
way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the
penalty of prision mayor.
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one
who illegally detains another and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with
cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life
imprisonment.
ISSUE:
WON article 143 has the effect of forcing a defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much
severer punishment ?
HELD:
Yes. Judgment reversed. Defendants are found guilty of
the crime defined and punished in by article 482 of the
Penal Code, with AC of nocturnity with legal accessory
penalties and payment of costs.
RATIO:
-This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a
defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to
take a much severer punishment. The burden is put
upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the
penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for
the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or
the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts
to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained
the person.
And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of
article 483 it is necessary to examine that system of
procedure.
In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation and
Jurisprudence:
criminal prosecution is divided into two principal
parts or sections which are, first, the summary,
and second, the penalty stages. The principal
purpose of the summary trial is to inquire
whether a criminal act has been committed and
to determine by whom the act has been
committed — that is to say, the object is to get
57
 together all the date possible for the purpose
of proving that an act falling within the
sanction of the penal law has been
committed by such and such persons. In the
plenary stage the purpose is a contradictory
discussion of the question of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, and the
rendition of a judgment of conviction or
acquittal. It may well be that although it
appears in the summary stage of the
proceeding that the act has been performed
by the accused, still in the plenary stage it
may be shown that the act was not really
criminal or that there was a lawful excuse
for its commission.
The record of the summary proceeding
should contain evidence of the commission
of a punishable act, all possible data tending
to point out the delinquent, a record of all
proceedings connected with his arrest and
imprisonment, the answers of the accused to
the interrogatories put to him as to any other
witness to obtain from him a statement of all
he knows concerning the crime and those
guilty of it.
Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to
the case in question, supposing that the crime had
been committed prior to the passage of the
Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58. The
judicial authorities having reason to believe that
someone has been illegally detained or kidnapped
proceed to make a secret investigation of the case,
arrest the suspected culprit, and demand of him
that he give any information he may have concerning
the act under investigation and to state whatever
may have been his own participation therein. The
evidence shows that someone has been taken away
from home and has not been heard of again, and the
facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive
criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the
matter. If he does so, and proves that the person
detained was liberated by him, or that such person
is living in such and such a place, then the
prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a
charge under the first or following sections of article
481, according to whether the facts elicited by the
preliminary or summary investigation show only a
detention in general, or for the specific periods of
time indicated in the latter part of the section. But if
the prisoner fails to prove the whereabouts of the
person whom he is accused of making away with, or
that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney
has a case falling within the last paragraph of article
483.
It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old
law that no prosecution under this article would
have ever been possible without a concomitant
provision of the procedural law which made it the
duty of the accused to testify and permitted the
prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from
his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483
was composed of three elements:
(a) The illegal detention of a person by the
accused.
Batch 2008A.
(b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the
summary investigation that this person had
recovered his liberty.
(c) A failure on the part of the accused in the
course of the summary proceeding to prove that
he had liberated the person detained, or to give
information at that time of his whereabouts, or a
refusal to give any evidence at all which left him
in the same position as would an unsuccessful
attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and
which were necessary to overcome the prima
facie case made out by the proof of the first two
elements
Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must
exists before an information can be filed for a
prosecution under this article. The real trial was the
plenary and was very similar to out regular trial after
arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and
inquisitorial methods, was vastly different from our
preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken
away to question the accused and compel him to testify,
then element (c) above indicated, would have always
been lacking. And that right has been taken from the
prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and by the
guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the
case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be
committed, because the possibility of adding to the
element (a) arising from the act of the accused the other
two elements equally essential to the offense has been
forever swept away by the extension to these Islands of
the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial
investigation of crime.
- this case the prosecuting attorney charges the
accused with kidnapping some person and with
not having given any information of the
whereabouts of that person, of having proved
that he — the accused — has set him at liberty.
To make out a case the Government must show
that the prisoner has been guilty of every act or
omission necessary to constitute the crime of
which he is charged, and it will not be disputed
that the exercise of an absolute right can not
form part of a crime. In this case the
Government has proved that the defendant was
guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the
rights of others by showing that he, with others,
carried a certain individual away from his house
against his will, the accused not being vested
with authority to restrain his fellow-citizens of
liberty. It is impossible for the Government to
prove the other elements of the crime, because
the acts necessary to constitute them must be
anterior in point of time to the trial, and must
constitute some breach of duty under an
existing law. It has been demonstrated that the
omission which, under the former law
constituted the two remaining elements, is no
longer penalized but is nothing more than the
exercise of one of the most essential rights
pertaining to an accused person.
- The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself
is older than the Government of the United States. At an
early day it became a part of the common law of
England.
58
- It was established on the grounds of public policy
and humanity — of policy, because if the party were
required to testify, it would place the witness under
the strongest temptation to commit the crime of
perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent
the extorting of confessions by duress.
- It had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused
person, which had long obtained in the continental
system. (Jones's Law of Evidence, sec. 887; Black's
Constitutional Law, 575.)
Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar.
If the defendant does not do certain things, if he
does not make certain statements or proofs, he is
severely punished.
It may be said that the defendant is only required to
speak on one point in the case, that the prosecution
must prove the illegal detention, and that the
burden of showing the whereabouts only is put upon
the defendant.
- it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to
testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that, the
illegal detention only being proved by the
prosecution, if he does not make certain proof, if he
remains mute, then not only the presumption but
the fact of guilt follows as a consequence of his
silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted
under American law.
- It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict
one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not
be called upon either by express words or acts to
assist in the production of such evidence; nor should
his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a
right to rely on the presumption of innocence until
the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of
the crime with which he is charged.
-In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd
case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting the
party's oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is
contrary to the principles of free government; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may
suit the purposes to despotic power but it can not
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom."
VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS
J. Malcolm
FACTS:
Petitioner Emeteria Villaflor here was charged with
adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical
examination to determine if she was pregnant or not.
She refused to obey and challenged the order on the
ground of being in violation of the constitutional
provision relating to self incrimination.
Batch 2008A.
ISSUE:
WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
HELD:
No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for is
denied.
RATIO:
The court here acknowledged that there are a number of
authorities that deal with the subject, though many are
conflicting.
Cited was the case of People v. McCoy, a case dealing in
infanticide, where the court deemed it a violation of the
Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body
to examination, being a violation of the right against self-
incrimination.
In State v. Height, J. McClain recommended that the
general rule should be that “a defendant can be
compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which
are not usually covered”.
The court in this case, however, looks to more
progressive decisions.
Cited was the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where
he said “based upon what he termed "an extravagant
extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when
it may be material."
The Philippine SC also seemed to limit the protection,
stating that the limitation was to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of
his guilt.
While the court agrees with the latter two
interpretations, it does not attempt to draw any dividing
line, as this would be too difficult to determine. This
case, however, is seen as one of the most extreme cases
which could be imagined.
Quote: “For the nonce we would prefer to forget them
entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the
agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather
desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of
reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence
to tradition and precedent.”
Going into the history of the law, it is seen that it was
made as a deterrent to “odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort
unwilling confessions with the ever-present temptation
to commit the crime of perjury.”
DUE PROCESS
59

Under the due process of law, every person has a
natural and inherent right to the possession and
control of his own body. However, superior to the
complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the
inherent which the public has in the orderly
administration of justice. Between a sacrifice of the
ascertainment of truth to personal considerations,
between a disregard of the public welfare for refined
notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL (in
case he wants to discuss this)
The object of having criminal laws is to purge the
community of persons who violate the laws to the
great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal
procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional
provisions, are then provided, not to protect the
guilty but to protect the innocent. No evidence of
physical facts can for any substantial reason be held
to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as
the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty
person.
PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO
(2002, per curiam)
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of
Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are
the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.
FACTS:
1. Accused Vallejo was charged with the crime
of rape with homicide for the rape-slaying of
Batch 2008A.
a 9 year-old girl. The RTC convicted him and
sentenced him with the penalty of death.
2. Vallejo questions the validity of the oral and
written confessions presented as evidence
against him. He alleges that the oral confessions
were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay,
while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained
through force and intimidation.
3. According to him, the police forced him to admit
that he had raped and killed the girl and that he
admitted having committed the crime to stop
them from beating him up. He also claimed the
police even burned his penis with a lighted
cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
4. He further claims that, although he admitted to
Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission
of the crime, this was because the police had
maltreated him. He did not tell the mayor or
Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because
the policemen were around and he was afraid of
them. Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not
also present when he gave his confession to the
police and signed the same. He claims that
although the extrajudicial confession was in his
own handwriting, he merely copied the contents
thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.
ISSUE:
WoN the extrajudicial confessions of the
accused are admissible as evidence as these were
allegedly obtained through force and intimidation
and without the aid of a lawyer.
HELD:
YES, these are admissible. The accused failed
to support his contention that these were obtained
through fraud and intimidation and that he was not
assisted by proper counsel.
RATIO:
• Vallejo cannot now claim that he was not apprised
of the consequences of the statements he was to
make as well as the written confessions he was to
execute. Neither can he question the qualifications
of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel
during the investigation.
• To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to
his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying
anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead
the accused to admit something false. Indeed,
counsel should not prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.
60
• Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of
discouraged" the former from making
statements as anything he said could be used
against him. But, as accused-appellant was
willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he
advised him to tell the truth
• Vallejo admitted that he was first asked
whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva
before the latter acted as his defense counsel.
And counsel who is provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where the latter never raised any
objection against the former's appointment
during the course of the investigation but,
on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to
the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.
• In previous cases decided by the SC, the
accused made extrajudicial confessions to the
municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all
of them, the extrajudicial confessions were
held admissible in evidence, being the
spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions
of the guilt of the accused. We note further
that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never
objected to by the defense. In this case, the
mayor's questions to accused-appellant were
not in the nature of an interrogation, but
rather an act of benevolence by a leader
seeking to help one of his constituents.
• The bare assertions of maltreatment by the
police authorities in extracting confessions
from the accused are not sufficient. The
standing rule is that "where the defendants
did not present evidence of compulsion, or
duress nor violence on their person; where
they failed to complain to the officer who
administered their oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative
action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be
no marks of violence on their bodies; and
where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim," all these will be
considered as indicating voluntariness.
• Accused testified that he was made to stay in
the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the
morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July
10, 1999, during which time he was boxed,
tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by
policemen to make him admit to the crime.
However, accused was physically examined by
Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in
the evening of the same day. While the results
show that accused-appellant did sustain
injuries, the same are incompatible with his
claim of torture.
Batch 2008A.
OBITER: At all events, even if accused-appellant was
truthful and his assailed confessions are
inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already
shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses
presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out
the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of
some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been
shown to have been motivated by ill will against
accused-appellant.
BELTRAN vs. SAMSON
Ponente: J. Romualdez (1929)
FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered
him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The
order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents
contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy
applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the
provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below,
and against which the instance action was brought, is
based on the provisions of section 1687 of the
Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in
case law
The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative
Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal,
may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation
of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be
exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights
of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to
perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the
constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and
incorporated in General Orders, No. 58.
The said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of
the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le
obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso
criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal
Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4)
and section 56. As to the extent of this privilege, it
should be noted first of all, that the English text of the
Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows:
"Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is
not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all
giving or furnishing of evidence.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not writing from the fiscal's dictation by the
petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, violates the
petitioner’s right against self-incrimination. YES
61
RATIO: Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and
other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must
testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain be understood to have waived their constitutional
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on privilege, as they could certainly do.
cross-examination but compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury may be able to compare "The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence,
his handwriting with the one in question. It was so while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one
held in the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse entitled to invoke it."
vs. Com. However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com.,
the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case CABAL vs. KAPUNAN
particularly because the court there gave
prominence to the defendant's right to decline to
FACTS:
write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In
this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for
Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint
it does not appear that any information was filed
charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with
against the petitioner for the supposed falsification,
“graft and corrupt practices, unexplained wealth,
and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial
conduct unbecoming…dictatorial tendencies, giving false
testifying and under cross-examination. This is only
statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the
an investigation prior to the information and with a
President created a committee (3 former justices, 2
view to filing it.
generals) to investigate the administrative charge and
submit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal
Writing is something more than moving the body, or
was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right
mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar
against self-incriminatn.
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions.
Except that it is more serious, we believe the present
Cabal still refused. Committee referred matter to City
case is similar to that of producing documents of
Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal
chattels in one's possession. For the purposes of the
of contempt under section 580 of RAC. Respondent
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause.
one who is compelled to produce a document, and
Instead petitioner tried to have charges against him
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
quashed.
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself.
Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to
answer incriminatory ?s and take the witness stand.
And we say that the present case is more serious
Thus, the issue is:
than that of compelling the production of documents
or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to
ISSUE:
write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may
WON the proceedings before the committee is civil or
identify him as the falsifier.
criminal, determining won Cabal may invoke right
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
against self-incrimination
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
HELD
unpunished.
Yes. Although technically a civil proceeding, as a
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a
municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it
penalty, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
deemed criminal in substance and effect. Hence,
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be
even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen
witnesses against himself is proper.
or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of herein, that is not reason for
RATIO:
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases
The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
property of a public officer or employee which is out of
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
proportion of his salary and other lawful income. Such
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a
innocent persons.
divestiture of property w/o compensation, imposed by
way of punishment by the lawmaking power to insure a
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court
prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the
and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
commission of an offense, the effect of which is to
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48

Batch 2008A. 62
transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to
the sovereign power.
Moreover, where the position of the witness is is
virtually that of an accused on trial, as in the case at
bar, he may invoke the right against self-
incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to
answer any and all questions.
BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
(20 November 1991)
Ponente: J. Padilla
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with
Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case.
PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants
(petitioners therein) Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of
former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Filipino people. Among these
stratagems are (1) obtained control of some
bigbusiness enterprises such as MERALCO,
Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the
formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable
and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more
that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers
(petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in
concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the
purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in
misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25
million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of
corporate entity.
On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged
take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa
(who died during the pendency of this case) and
called upon the senate to look into possible violation
of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA
3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC)
started its investigation through a hearing on 23
May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify.
The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon’s plea and
voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims
that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and
testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
YES.
2. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative
purpose. NO.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez
corporations is a purely private transaction
which is beyond the power of the SBRC to
inquire into. YES.
Batch 2008A.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due
process. NO.
RATIO:
1. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the departments of the government, and it is
the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine
the scope, nature and extent of such powers.
2 and 3. Sec 21, Art VI of the Consti provides:
“The Senate… may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be
respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of
Rights, particularly the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA
3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa
Group. There appears no intended legislation
involved.
The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 2124 (SR 212), as the committee alleges.
The inquiry under SR 212 is to look into the charges
against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum in connection with the implementation of
Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution. Mr. Lopa
and the petitioners are not connected with the
government and did their acts as private citizens; hence,
such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the
jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. In fact,
the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue
before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent
committee into the same justiciable controversy already
before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.
4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti to an
individual is the right against self-incrimination. This
right construed as the right to remain completely silent
may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but
it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions
are asked of them (Chavez v CA). This extends also to
respondents in administrative investigation but only if
they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This
is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held
that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the
petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.
4
Senate Resolution wherein the activities of PCGG be investigated on
the ground, among others, that the Sandiganbayan has ordered the
PCGG to answered charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental
Petroleum that it has adopted a “get-rich quick” scheme.
63

Held: Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined
from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to
testify before it and produce evidence at the said
inquiry.
GALMAN vs. PAMARAN
Cuevas, J. 08/30/85
FACTS:
After the death of Ninoy, Marcos issued PD 1886,
creating the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to
investigate on the tragedy. The statute gave the
board broad powers, among them :
Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and impose
appropriate penalties.
A person guilty...including...refusal to be
sworn or to answeras a witness or to
subscribe to an affidavit or disposition when
lawfully required to do so may be
summarily adjudged in direct contempt by
the Board.
Sec. 5 No person shall be excused from
attending and testifying...on the ground that
his testimony or evidence required of him
may to incriminate him...but his testimony
or any evidence produced by him shall not
be used against him in connection with any
transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having invoked
his privilege against self-incrimination, to
testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual son testifying shall not be exempt
from prosecution and punishment fro
perjury committed in so testifying...
Sec 12. The findings...shall be made public.
Should it warrant the prosecution of any
person, the Board may initiate the filing of
the proper complaint with the appropriate
gov't agency.
Among those who were called in by the Board were
private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen.
Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of
the Agrava Board and both were presented to
Marcos; the majority report by board chair Justice
Agrava and the minority report authored by 4
others. They were turned over to the Tanodbayan,
who filed two informations for murder (for the death
of Ninoy, another for Rolando Galman, the other
dead person on the tarmac who was supposedly a
Communist hitman) with the Sandiganbayan against
private respondents herein charged as accesories,
with several principals & 1 accomplice.
In the course of the trial, the prosecuting
Tanodbayan marked and offered as part of their
evidence the individual testimonies of the private
Batch 2008A.
respondents before the Agrava board, to which the
respondents objected. The Sandiganbayan resolved to
admit all the evidences offered by the prosecution except
the testimonies in view of he immunity given by PD
1886.
Petitioners: (Saturnina & Reynaldo Galman,
Tanodbayan)
1. said testimonies are admissible because the
respondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the
immunity granted by PD1886
2. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver.
3. right against self-incrimination functions only
criminal cases
Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al)
1. evidences cannot be used against them as mandated
by Sec 5 PD1886
2. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause
of Sec 5, the legal compulsion imposed by the 1st clause
of the same Sec would be unconstitutional for being
violative of the right against self incrimination.
ISSUE/HELD:
w/n the testimonies of the respondents before the Board
are admissible as evidence - NO
RATIO:
Though designated as a fact-finding commission, the
Agrava board was for all intents and purposes an entity
charged with the determination of the person/s
criminally responsible so that they may be brought
before the bar of justice. In the course of the
investigation it is but natural that those who are
suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called
in. And when suspects are summoned & called to testify,
they are not merely "sheding light' on the incident, they
are in fact undergoing investigation (the crim law
definition, which in this case can be analogized to a
prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed to be
read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to
afford themselves the full protection of the law, which
includes the right against self incrimination.
In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents
to testify on pain of contempt, that option has effectively
been eliminated. However, the rights of the accused,
being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act
of continuing to testify before the board cannot be
accepted as a valid waiver of the right to remain silent,
because in the first place they had no option to do so.
The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of
compulsion. Lefkowitz v NJ. The right against self-
incrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not
the character of the suit involved but the nature of te
proceedings that controls. Cabal v Kapunan.
The Court continues to rule that the private respondents
were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but
more broadly the right to due process. While it is true
that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of immunity,
analyzed closely, it will be shown that it is a form of "use
immunity" (prohibiting the use of the witness' compelled
testimony & its fruits in any manner in connection with
the criminal prosecution of the witness) but it grants
merely immunity from use of any statement given before
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason
or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
64
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of
the right against self-incrimination. This the Court
said is contrary to due process, as they were not
appraised of their rights and also because such a
"confession/testimony" is inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti.
In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality,
the Court held that in view of the potent sanction
found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the
compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec
5 of the same.
Petition dismissed.
Makasiar, C.J. concurring: There can be no implied
waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also,
because of the nature of the proceedings, the
invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board
are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature
of a criminal proceeding. the respondents were
under the impression it was not, thus they were not
fully appraised of their rights.
(Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a
similar view)
Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used
in any subsequent proceeding.
(Plana holds a similar view)
Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally
and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh
private respondents. The right against self-
incrimination in proceedings other than criminal is
considered an option of refusal to answer, not a
prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at
the proper time (according to him, the proper time
was during the testimony to the board); a person
summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor
can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for a
criminating answer is asked. Gonzales v Sec of
Labor. Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial,
they were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness
before the Board could not invoke the right to silence
and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right &
privilege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso
jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntary or by
subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to
answer as and when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to
invoke this personal privilege automatically results
in loss ipso facto.
E. Unlawful Search & Seizure
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
PARTIES:
Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John
Brooks, Karl Beck
Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec
of Justice), Jose Lukban (Acting Director, NBI),
Special Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal, and
Asst. Fiscal Maneses Reyes
Batch 2008A.
Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag,
Mencias, Jimenez
FACTS:
Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several
judges issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants
against petitioners and/or the corporations of which
they were officers to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing
all business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of
the offense in violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.”
Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null &
void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court
(ROC) because:
1. they do not describe w/ particularity the
documents, books, and things to be seized
2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were
actually seized
3. they were issued to fish evidence against the
petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them
4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal
manner
5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts
that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with the law
Respondents-prosecutors alleged:
1. the search warrants are valid & issued in
accordance with the law
2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners’
consent
3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence
against herein petitioners regardless of the
alleged illegality of the searches and seizures
The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for.
However, it was partially lifted insofar as the papers,
documents, and things seized from the offices of the
corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards those seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be
split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the
offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the
residences of petitioners.
ON FIRST GROUP
Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason
that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality
of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
65
corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity.
(Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…)
ISSUES:
1. WON the search warrants in question, and
the searches and seizures are valid. NO
2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and
things may be used in evidence against
petitioners. NO
RATIO:
Art III, Sec 1, par 3:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to
be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
ISSUE #1
Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these has been complied with in the
contested warrants. They were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons named had committed a “violation of CB
Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue
Code, and RPC.” In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments
with respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party
against who it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question
would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental Const’l rights, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general
warrants.
The grave violation of the Consti made in the
application for the search warrants was
compounded by the description made of the effects
to be searched for and seized. The warrants
authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the
Batch 2008A.
things to be seized be particularly described – as well as
tending to defeat its major objective, the elimination of
general warrants.
ISSUE #2
The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by
respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers
and things are admissible in evidence must be
abandoned. This ruling is in line with American
common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free just “because the constable has blundered”
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected
by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against
searching officer).
Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same
authority, inadmissible.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
A. Citizenship & Alienage
Art IV– CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
66
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be
lost or reacquired in the manner provided
by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission, they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced
it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law.
BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA
FACTS:
July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen
following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that
he has 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee,
namely: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and
Benjamin.
June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, then a twelve-
year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They
had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the
signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria
and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William
and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
July 6, 1961: After investigation, the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino
citizens. As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No.
16135 by the immigration authorities.
January 24, 1962: the then Secretary of Justice
issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the
Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review
motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special
Batch 2008A.
Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry was
allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine
citizen. Among those cases was that of William and
others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after
a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the
latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was
issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of
Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory.”
Sometime in 1973: respondent Gatchalian, as well as the
others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
assigned.
March 14, 1973: the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein.
March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him.
June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investigation wrote
the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent
Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged
with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known
as the Immigration Act of 1940.
August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent
William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00
cash bond.
August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of
Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa.
September 4, 1990: petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the case, alleging that respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the
Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge
dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7,
1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
September 6, 1990: respondent Gatchalian's wife and
minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela,
presided by respondent judge Capulong for injunction
with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint
67
alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of
deportation proceedings against William. On the
same day, respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining
petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.
Argument of the Petitioners:
1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the
subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction
being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals;
2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction,
they acted with grave abuse of discretion in
preempting petitioners in the exercise of the
authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and
in the process determine also his citizenship;
3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his
discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the
deportation proceedings are beyond the competence
and jurisdiction of petitioners; and
4) respondent judge Capulong should have
dismissed the case in Valenzuela for forum-
shopping.
Argument of the Respondents:
1) assuming that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen,
petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the
deportation case until the courts shall have finally
resolved the question of his citizenship;
2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly
resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in
the deportation case because of their bias, pre-
judgment and prejudice against him; and
3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported
has already prescribed
On Appellate Jurisdiction
Petitioners: under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the
Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of
quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions,
such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board
of Special Inquiry
Respondent: petitioners are not quasi-judicial
agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional
Trial Courts.
Supreme Court: There are quasi-judicial agencies,
as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose
decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is
only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434,
provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions
to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration
Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and others, that the said
commissions or boards may be considered co-equal
with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are
logically beyond the control of the latter. However,
the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among
those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals. Hence, B.P. Blg.
Batch 2008A.
129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to
the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As
the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the
RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by,
the RTC.
On the Bureau of Immigration’s jurisdiction to hear
cases against alleged aliens and determine their
citizenship
Petitioners: Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.
Supreme Court: the Petitioners contention admits of an
exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Judicial intervention, should be granted in
cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be
allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in
a proper proceeding. It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial
intervention should be allowed. The competent court
which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings
instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless
be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.
Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the
parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to
decide the controversy right at this instance.
On Arrest as Necessary Consequence of Warrant of
Exclusion
Petitioners: the arrest of respondent follows as a matter
of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued
on July 6, 1962.
Supreme Court: From a perusal of Sec. 37 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise
known as the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clear that in
matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, is null and void for being
unconstitutional. It is not indispensable that the alleged
alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the
purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to
determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges
can issue the same.
Moreover, respondent Gatchalian, along with others
previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special
68
Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. The Board of
Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion
for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the
then Acting Commissioner recommending the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners which reversed the
July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of
arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum
inferred that the "very basis of the Board of
Commissioners in reversing the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged
cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, .
. ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate
in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special
Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only
led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity
which took the place of a passport for their
authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even
if the applicants could have entered illegally, the
mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines
entitles them to remain in the country.” On March
15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued
an Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino
citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest
and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The
order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is
the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually
exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the
present. Consequently, the presumption of
citizenship lies in favor of respondent William
Gatchalian..
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (procedural)
Supreme Court: There should be no question that
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact,
in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which
reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino.
In said order it was found that the applicants therein
have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a
Filipino was reiterated where advertence is made to
the "applicants being the descendants of one
Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino.” In the sworn
statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the
Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961, he
reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was
born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was
issued Philippine Passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January
23, Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for
cancellation of his alien registry which was granted
on February 18, 1960; and that on July 20, 1960, he
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a
Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
Batch 2008A.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the
fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises." The petitioners'
alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of
arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after.
It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly
enforced by petitioners against respondent William
Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated
on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant
of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are
not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss
of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after
the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the
penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a
certain time. Thus, in the case at bar, it took petitioners
28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6,
1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion
proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in
1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive
and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be
instituted after ten (10) years.
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive)
Respondent’s arguments on his citizenship: he has
continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting
Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4)
minor children. The marriage contract shows that said
respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino. He is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in
the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer.
Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides
livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of
Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as
such until petitioners initiated the deportation
proceedings against him.
Petitioner’s arguments on respondents alienage:
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what
the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
country, it should have been shown that they were valid
by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
69
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence,
Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed
the citizenship of their mother, having been born
outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of
the Francisco's marriage not having been
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case
at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating
to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is
the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof
of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on
Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old
minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was
not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to
prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having
been content with the testimony of Santiago that the
Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of China. Neither was
Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the
same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian
and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine
consular and immigration authorities regarding their
marriages, birth and relationship to each other are
not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as
statements or declarations regarding family
reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid
where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see Art. 26 of
the Family Code). Thus, he who asserts that the
marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden
of proof to present the foreign law. Having declared
the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the
latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being
the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the
latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
Moreover, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to
the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides:
“Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution…” This
forecloses any further question about the Philippine
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED
for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is
declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the
deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-
523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil
Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending
before respondent judges are likewise
DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Batch 2008A.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
On Appellate Jurisdiction
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts
in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration
therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the
process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the
petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of
Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter
referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of
William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon
the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion
that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the
citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the
case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these
benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch
the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary
rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact
or circumstance exists to justify the application of the
exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the
contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the
unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
On Respondent’s forum shopping
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping
in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-
petition, he is now before this Court in an active
offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to
bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation
and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction
thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he
did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately
chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court,
evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards,
which they accomplished when the two judges separately
issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing
or continuing with any of the proceedings which would
lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case
No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation
charges against William Gatchalian.
On respondent’s citizenship
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even
show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William
Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very
serious doubts surround such a claim from the
beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines was
made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as
Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged
cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then
on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners
promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-
2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena,
Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and
Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July
1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian
and the others as aliens not properly documented.
70
Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6
July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners
commanding the deportation officer to exclude
William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their
removal from the country on the first available
transportation in accordance with law to the port of
the country of which they were nationals.
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his
reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin,
that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible
reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in
which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of
Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit
to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence
to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the
legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These
are among the presumptions which the ponencia
precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners'
claim that Santiago failed to establish his claimed
marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of
William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of
which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find
any valid justification why these presumptions
should be liberally applied in favor of claimed
marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to
purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of
Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did
not mention him in his testimony before the
Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William
was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume
that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was
principally for the benefit of his alleged children and
grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved,
intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry
into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven
months after he obtained a favorable decision from
the Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged
children and grandchildren entered the country. On
25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena,
Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and
Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his
alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his
alleged children William and Johnson also arrived
from Hongkong.
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines
since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1,
1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a
Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided
and exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in
business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a
director/officer of the International Polymer Corp.
and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and
that the companies he runs and in which he has a
controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000
employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he
is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the
status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioning Boards
initiated the deportation proceedings against him,
Batch 2008A.
are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they
neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino
citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and
void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda
of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid
ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Neither can
such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that
tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision.
On prescription
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that
the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion
because it is already barred by prescription considering
that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises. Note that the five-
year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. Mr. Gatchalian is
covered by clause (2), which reads: “Any alien who enters
the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who
was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.”
Moreover, the warrant for his exclusion was issued
within a period of five years following his entry.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT
the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the
questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela
Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having
been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the
DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August
1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts,
however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of
arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded,
may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo
for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid
Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of
Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion
remain valid and effective and enforceable against
respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for
that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held
that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William
Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any
mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for
entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any
act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, 1 the Supreme Court
upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962
Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not
only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian
who was taken into custody by immigration authorities
71
in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants,
which include respondent William Gatchalian. The
validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by
Pedro Gatchalian, as a supposed descendant of
Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the
1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC,
and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in
Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and
legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the
Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their
claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect
ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not
Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality
might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once
more the claim to Philippine citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed
examination of the facts, including the supposed
status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born
Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to
Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven by
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian
does not claim to have been naturalized as a
Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not
a Philippine citizen.
5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh
to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies
not with this Court which is charged with the
application of the law as it is in fact written, but with
the political branches of the Government. It is those
departments of Government which must consider
the desirability and wisdom of enacting legislation
providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of
aliens who may be in the same situation as
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23,
and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary
Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990
issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of
respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September
1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to RE-
AFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is
not a Philippine citizen.
QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD
FACTS:
• In May 1952 petitioners were charged before
the Deportation Board with having
purchased US Dollars in the total sum of
$130, 000 without the necessary license
from the Central Bank of the Philippines and
having remitted the money to Hong Kong
and to themselves.
• Warrants were issued but upon filing for a
surety and cash bond they were released.
Batch 2008A.
• Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation
by the president to the Deportation Board of his
power to conduct investigations for the purpose
of determining whether the stay of an alien in
this country would be injurious to the security,
welfare and interest of the State.
• Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held
to be essential to and complement the power to
deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin
code
ISSUE (PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD:
• WON the President has the power to deport
aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398
of Pres Quirino which authorized the
Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of
aliens during investigation (on the ground that
such power is vested in the legislature and that
there must be a legislation authorizing the same)
~> The Pres has the power to carry out order of
deportation but may not order arrest during
investigation. And no, power may not be delegated.
RATIO:
• Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign
power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to
his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than these days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses."
• While it did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable
aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the
fact that such a procedure was provided for
before the President can deport an alien is a
clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of
the existence of such power in the Executive.
• Under the present and existing laws, therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No.
613.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and
supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry
of aliens into the Philippines, and their
exclusion, deportation, and repatriation
72
 therefrom, with the exception of section
sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven which shall continue in
force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
• Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to
investigate- does it include authority to
arrest? May it be delegated? Here’s the
history…
• Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided
for filing of a bond to secure appearance of
alien under investigation
• Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951
reorganized the deportation board to issue
the warrant of arrest of the alien complained
of and to hold him under detention during
the investigation unless he files a bond for
his provisional release <this is incompatible
with….>
3. The right of the People to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights,
Philippine Constitution).
• Justice Laurel said that this consti provision
is not among the rights of the accused.
Under our Constitution, the same is
declared a popular right of the people and,
of course, indisputably it equally applies to
both citizens and foreigners in this country.
This requirement — "to be determined by
the judge" — do not specify who will
determine the existence of a probable cause.
Hence, under their provisions, any public
officer may be authorized by the Legislature
to make such determination, and thereafter
issue the warrant of arrest.
• The contention of the Solicitor General that
the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry
into effect the power of deportation is valid
only when, as already stated, there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out
the order of deportation, the President
obviously has the power to order the arrest
of the deportee. But, certainly, during the
investigation.
• The extent of the curtailment of liberty
dependent upon conditions determined by
the discretion of the person issuing a
warrant. In other words, the discretion of
whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or
not is personal to the one upon whom the
authority devolves.
• an implied grant of power, considering that
no express authority was granted by the law
on the matter under discussion, that would
Batch 2008A.
serve the curtailment or limitation on the
fundamental right of a person, such as his
security to life and liberty, must be viewed with
caution.
• The guarantees of human rights and freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on such a
shaky foundation.
WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951,
insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue
warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges
against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe
the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest
issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order
of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing
modification, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO
FACTS:
• The case stems from the apprehension of
petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their
respective residences by agents of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the
CID. Petiioners are presently detained at the CID
Dentention Center.
• Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22)
suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three motnhs of close surveillance by CID
agents in Pagsanjan, Lahuna.
• Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29
February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two
(22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and
have left the country.
• On March 7 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued
by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• On March 14 1988, petitioners filec an Urgent
Petiion for Release Under Bond alleging that their
health was being seriously affected by their
continuous detention. Upon recommendation of
the Board of Commissioners for their provisional
release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to
examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners
were healthy.
• On April 4 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners
availes of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
ISSUES:
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on
the following grounds:
1. There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration
Act og 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised
73
Administrative Code, which legally clothes the
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of the
existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
2. Repondent violated Sevtion 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures since the CID agents were not
clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and
seizure as required by the said provision.
3. Mere confidential information made to the COD
agents and their suspicion of the activities of
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with
their association with other suspected pedophiles,
are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and
detention unless they are caught in the act. They
further alleged that being a pedophile is not
punishable by any Philippines Law nor is it a crime
to be a pedophile.
HELD:
1. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576,
July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of
warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and
before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts
with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the
COnstistution” (referring to the 1935 Constituion) is
not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner’s
warrant of Arrest is issued on 7 March 1988 did not
order petitioners to appear and show cause why they
should not be deported. They were issued
specifically “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of
the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Cede.” Before that, deportation
proceedings had been commenced against them as
undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest
was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
• The denial be respondent Commisioner of
petitioner’s release on bail, also challenged by
them, was in order because in deportation
proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter
of right but a matter of discretion on thepart of
the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation.
• The use of the word “may” in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely
permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the Commissioner. The exercise of the power
is wholly discretionary
• Section 37 (a) is not constitutionally
proscribed . The specific constraints in both
the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are
substantially identical, contemplate
prosecutions essentially criminal in nature.
Deportation proceedings, on the other hand,
are administrative in character. An order of
deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal
process. It need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary Court proceedings.
2. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance
for three (3) months during which period their
activities were monitored. The existence of probable
Batch 2008A.
cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
• Those articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure).
• But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal deportation charges have
been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on
March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued
against them on March 7, 1988 “for violation of
Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Administrative Code. The
restraint against their persons, therefore, has
become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The
process of the law is being followed.
3. The petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John
Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the
COID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defines as
“psycho-sexual perversion involving children”.
“Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children
are the preferred sexual object”.
• While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it
is behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the State to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social
well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution).
• Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measureaginst
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
YU vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO
1989
FACTS
In 1971 Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport,
valid for 5yrs. He renewed it for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
officer. On Feb 19, 1978, he was naturalized as a Phil.
Citizen. On July 21, 1981 applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport by the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. Sometime in April 1980, he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed like the Companies Registry in Hongkong.
Commission on Immigration and Deportation are holding
him and are about to deport him. He petitions for habeas
corpus, seeking release from detention.
ISSUE:
74
WON he should still be considered a citizen of the
Philippines despite acquisition and use of a
Portuguese passport
HELD:
No
RATIO:
The foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner’s Phil citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to interference or implication.
Yu, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Phil citizen 1) resumed and
reacquired his prior status as Portuguese citizen, 2)
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
3) represented himself as such in official documents
after he had become a naturalized citizen of the
Phils. Such is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Phil citizenship.
Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was
given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil
citizenship and has failed. As such, while normally
the ? of WON a person has renounced his Phil
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of
law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as the SC, no less, upon insistence of
petitioner, looked into the facts and satisfied itself on
WON petitioner’s claim to continued Phil citizenship
is meritorious.
Phil citizenship is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
Fernan and Gutierrez, dissent:
Citizenship shouldn’t be held to have been lost in a
summary proceeding such as this.
Gutierrez and Cortes, dissent:
Evidence was too informal.Mere use of foreign
passport is not ipso facto express renunciation. One
may get a foreign passport for convenience,
employment, avoidance of discriminatory visa
requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Full
day in court must be given to petitioner.
Disposition:
Denied petition. Lifting of TRO on deportation
procedure.
LABO vs. COMELEC
August 1, 1989
Ponente: Cruz, J:
FACTS:
Batch 2008A.
Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on
January 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed
by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on January
26, 1988 seeking to disqualify the petitioner on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee
was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation.
The petitioner says that he allegation that he is a
foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether
or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct
any inquiry into this matter, considering that the
petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on
time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon
payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten
day reglementary period provided for under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out
of time since when he first filed his petition for quo
warranto it was treated as a pre-proclamation
controversy and it was only on February 8, 1988 decided
to treat his case as solely for quo warranto. The Court
has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time.
Considering that the sole issue raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against
him, this matter should normally end here. However, as
his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
considering the necessity for an early resolution of
that more important question clearly and urgently
affecting the public interest, we shall address it now
in the same action.
There are two administrative decisions on the question of
the petitioner’s citizenship:
1. rendered by COMELEC on May 12, 1982 –
petitioner found to be a citizen of the Phils.
• no direct proof was presented that
petitioner had been formally naturalized
as an Australian citizen.
• this conjecture, which was eventually
rejected, was merely inferred from the
fact that he had married an Australian
citizen, obtained an Australian passport,
and registered as an alien with the CID
upon his return to this country in 1980.
2. rendered by Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on Sept. 13, 1988 – petitioner found
to be an Australian citizen.
• took into account the official statement
of the Australian Government dated
August 12, 1984, through its Consul in
the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that date
by reason of his naturalization on July
28, 1976.
• That prior to 17 July 1986, a
candidate for Australian citizenship
had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance which carries a
75
 renunciation of "all other
allegiance.
The petitioner also categorically declared that he was
a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn
statements voluntarily made by him and. even
sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay
court on the ground that he was a foreigner. The
COMELEC in 1982 said that these mistakes did not
divest the petitioner of his citizenship. This is
rejected by the Court. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified
in his case because he was married to an
Australian citizen. As a condition for such
naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance.
Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as
an Australian citizen maed him only a dual national
and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
Such an argument cannot stand against the clear
provisions of CA no. 63 which enumerates the
modes by which Phil. Citizenship may be lost: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of
which are applicable to the petitioner.
The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to an
Australian was bigamous does not concern us here
since that is a matter him and his adopted country.
The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of
the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of
the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified
voter under the Constitution itself because of his
alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section
42 of the Local Government Code providing in
material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective
local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three
years of age on election day…
The petitioner claims that a mere technicality like
citizenship should not be allowed to frustrate the will
of the electorate. In any event, even unanimously,
the people of that locality cannot change the
Batch 2008A.
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution.
The fact that petitioner has been disqualified does not by
default make private respondent, the person who
obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor
of Baguio City. The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos
states that, “…The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office…”
On the importance of Phil. Citizenship:
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can
be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
restored only after the returning renegade makes a
formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured
and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
AZNAR vs. COMELEC
Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the
Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America. On January 27, he submitted a Certificate by
then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that
Osmeña is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the
votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc
ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation.
Petitioner’s evidence to show Osmeña is a US
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of
the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration
Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
76
Osmeña: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio
D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President
Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued
on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not
gone out of the country for more than six months;
and that he has been a registered voter in the
Philippines since 1965.
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest
number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First
Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: W/N Osmeña is a US citizen. NO
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy on Nov. 19,
1987 and that the petitioner filed for his
disqualification only on Jan. 22, 1988 which was
beyond the 25 day period as required under Sec. 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. However, it is a
matter of public interest to ascertain the
respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the
public office to which he has been proclaimed
elected. There is enough basis for us (SC) to rule
directly on the merits of the case.
• There is lack of substantial and convincing
evidence to support the assertion that
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen
and therefore is disqualified from running.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the
petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. From the evidence, it is clear that private
respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been
naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that
private respondent was issued alien certificate of
registration and was given clearance and permit to
re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed
that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an
American and "being an American", private
Batch 2008A.
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of
Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws."
Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered
as an American under US laws do not concern us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both
cases the evidence, as well as by their own admissions,
shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian
citizens respectively and therefre no longer owe any
allegiance to the Philippines.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently
denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus,
private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,
the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the
second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as
having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To
Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Also the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. In any case it shall be dealt with by a
future law which has not yet been enacted.
B. Juridical Persons
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra)
CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE
FACTS:
1. the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization,
Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the
Organization — is a registered non-stock
corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated
February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and
implement savings and thrift among its
members, and to extend financial assistance in
the form of loans," to them. The Organization
has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a)
founder members — who originally joined the
77
 organization and have signed the pre-
incorporation papers — with the exclusive
right to vote and be voted for ; (b)
participating members — with "no right to
vote or be voted for" — to which category all
other members belong; except (c) honorary
members, so made by the board of trustees,
— "at the exclusive discretion" thereof — due
to "assistance, honor, prestige or help
extended in the propagation" of the
objectives of the Organization — without any
pecuniary expenses on the part of said
honorary members.
2. On February 14, 1962, the legal department
of the Central Bank of the Philippines —
hereinafter referred to as the Bank —
rendered an opinion to the effect that the
Organization and others of similar nature
are banking institutions, falling within the
purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on
April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be
published in the newspapers the following:
Announcement: xxx operations similar in nature to
said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN
AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT
DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO
ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO
PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION
IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General
Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they
engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the
public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of
bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without
authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities
and operations are not supervised by the
Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing with
such institutions do so at their risk.
3. April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank
directed the coordination of "the
investigation and gathering of evidence on
the activities of the savings and loan
associations which are operating contrary to
law
4. on May 18, 1962, a member of the
intelligence division of the Bank filed with
the Municipal Court of Manila a verified
application for a search warrant against the
Organization
5. Upon the filing of said application, on May
18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of
the said municipal court, issued the warrant
commanding the search of the aforesaid
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,
and the seizure of the foregoing articles,
there being "good and sufficient reasons to
believe" upon examination, under oath, of a
detective of the Manila Police Department
and said intelligence officer of the Bank
Batch 2008A.
6. Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an
original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with
writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the
Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to
annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon
the ground that, in issuing the same, the
municipal court had acted "with GADALEJ"
because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving
commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the
use of the word 'and others' in the search
warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search
and seizure of documents which have no relation
whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and
(c) "no court in the Philippines has any
jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a
corporation . . ."
- pending hearing of the case on the
merits, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued ex parte restraining the
aforementioned search and seizure, or,
in the alternative, if the acts complained
of have been partially performed, that a
writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction be forthwith issued ex parte,
ordering the preservation of the status
quo of the parties, as well as the
immediate return to the Organization of
the documents and papers so far seized
under, the search warrant in question.
After due hearing, Judge Morfe issued.
7. Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which
was denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the
Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the
present action, against Judge Morfe and the
Organization, alleging that respondent Judge
had acted with GADALEJ in issuing the order in
question.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it
unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ?
HELD:
No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
Judge Morfe annulled. Writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the SC made permanent with costs against
the organization.
RATIO:
- it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or
imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much
the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations.
- Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not
clear from the order complained of whether
respondent Judge opined that the above
78
 mentioned statement of the deponent — to
the effect that the Organization was engaged
in the transactions mentioned in his
deposition — deserved of credence or not.
Obviously, however, a mere disagreement
with Judge Cancino, who issued the
warrant, on the credibility of said statement,
would not justify the conclusion that said
municipal Judge had committed a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
- Again, the aforementioned order would seem
to assume that an illegal banking
transaction, of the kind contemplated in the
contested action of the officers of the Bank,
must always connote the existence of a
"victim." If this term is used to denote a
party whose interests have been actually
injured, then the assumption is not
necessarily justified. The law requiring
compliance with certain requirements before
anybody can engage in banking obviously
seeks to protect the public against actual, as
well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not
aware of any rule limiting the use of
warrants to papers or effects which cannot
be secured otherwise.
- The deposition of a member of the
Intelligence Division of the Central Bank,
that after close observation and
investigation, the office of a savings and loan
association, illegally engaged in banking
activities, is being unlawfully used, is
sufficient for the issuance of a search
warrant. The failure of the deponent to
mention particular individuals does not
necessarily prove that the had no personal
knowledge of specific illegal transactions of
the savings and loans association, for the
witness might be acquainted with specific
transactions even if the names of the
individuals are unknown to him.
- The line of reasoning of respondent Judge
might, perhaps, be justified if the acts
imputed to the Organization consisted of
isolated transactions, distinct and different
from the type of business in which it is
generally engaged. In such case, it may be
necessary to specify or identify the parties
involved in said isolated transactions, so
that the search and seizure be limited to the
records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is
not the situation confronting us. The records
suggest clearly that the transactions
objected to by the Bank constitute the
general pattern of the business of the
Organization. Indeed, the main purpose
thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to
extend financial assistance, in the form of
loans, to its members," with funds deposited
by them.
Batch 2008A.
- It is true, that such funds are referred to — in
the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws —
as their "savings." and that the depositors
thereof are designated as "members," but, even a
cursory examination of said documents will
readily show that anybody can be a depositor
and thus be a "participating member." In other
words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the
"public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so
raised may be lent by the Organization.
Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds
is placed under the exclusive authority of the
"founder members," and "participating members"
are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted
for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being
limited to those which the board of trustees
may, in its discretion, determine from time to
time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the
"participating members" is purely nominal in
nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with
the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No.
337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance
with the requirements of said Act, before the
transactions in question could be undertaken.
- It is interesting to note, also, that the
Organization does not seriously contest the main
facts, upon which the action of the Bank is
based. The principal issue raised by the
Organization is predicated upon the theory that
the aforementioned transactions of the
Organization do not amount to " banking," as
the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are
satisfied, however, in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in this case, that the
Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion in finding that there was probable
cause that the Organization had violated
Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in
issuing the warrant in question, and that,
accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of
First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and
seizure complained of have not been proven to
be unreasonable.
C. State Action Requirement (who
are subject to constitutional
prohibitions)
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
J. Bidin: January 18, 1991
FACTS:
Appeal from a conviction under RA 6425, aka the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant Andre Marti and his common-low wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders”
with 4 giftwrapped packages. Proprietress Anita Reyes
attended to them and they presented the packages to be
sent to a friend, Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland.
79
When Anita asked if she could examine and inspect
the packages, appellant refused saying that the
packages merely contained books, cigars and gloves.
The boxes were then packaged for shipment.
Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs,
Job Reyes, husband of Anita, opened the boxes for
final inspection (SOP). He smelled a peculiar odor
and felt dried leaves inside one of the packages. He
opened one of the packages and took several grams
of the contents and sent a letter to the NBI
requesting a lab exam of what he had found.
NBI and Job Reyes went to the latter’s office and
proceeded to open the packages, finding dry
marijuana leaves. The NBI then took custody of the
contents of the packages. Appellant could not be
contacted, but was later “invited” by the NBI when
he was claiming mail at the Central Post Office. On
that same day, a forensic chemist in the NBI
certified the contents of the packages as being
marijuana leaves.
ISSUE:
WON the opening and seizure of the contents of
appellant’s packages warranted an unreasonable
search and seizure.
HELD:
No it did not.
RATIO:
Illegal search and seizure
Sections 2 and 3 of Art. III provide for the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. These
provisions were taken from the 4th amendment of the
US constitution.
In deciding WON the case at bar was an instance of
an unreasonable search and seizure, the Court said
that it was not, for the main reason that it was done
by a private individual, namely Job Reyes. What the
law contemplates is a protection against actions of
the state against individuals, not those between
individuals.
Cases cited:
Villanueva v. Querubin: “This constitutional
right...refers to the immunity...from interference by
the government...”
Burdeau v. McDowell: “...its protection applies to
governmental action...it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority...”
State v. Bryan: A parking attendant searched an
automobile and found marijuana without aid of
authorities. Marijuana was deemed admissible.
Batch 2008A.
Walker v. State: “...search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals...”
Bernas v. US: “...the amendment only proscribes
governmental action.”
Presence of NBI
The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI
did not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere
observation is not a search. The search was conducted
merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins:
“where the search was initially made by the owner there
is no unreasonable search and seizure...”
The Court here again stressed that “the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals” and this is seen in the intention of the
framers as Bernas states that they are a protection
against the State.
In this case we see that the search and seizure was done
by Job Reyes, a private individual. As such, the
Constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked by the
appellant.
Other issues
1) Informed of rights – Court here said that he was
informed of his constitutional rights by the NBI,
and even availed of their Constitutional right not
to give a written statement.
2) Not being the owner of the packages – untenable
as he gave his name as the owner. Also
unbelievable that he would send a package for
someone who he merely met in a bar. Moreover,
appellant was also convicted of possession of
hashish by the Kleve Court in Germany.
PRUNEYARD vs. SHOPPING CENTER supra
BORJAL vs. COURT of APPEALS
Justice Bellosillo, 1999
FACTS:
1. Between May and July 1989, a series of articles
written by petitioner Borjal was published on
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles
dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an
"organizer of a conference" without naming or
identifying private respondent Wenceslao. Neither
did it refer to the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) as the conference therein
mentioned.
2. Wenceslao reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to
The Philippine Star insisting that he was the
80
 "organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's
columns. In a subsequent letter to The
Philippine Star, he refuted the matters contained
in Borjal's columns.
3. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National 3.
Press Club (NPC) Borjal for unethical conduct.
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column
as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his
public relations firm. In turn, Borjal published a
rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent
not only to protect his name and honor but also
to refute the claim that he was using his column
for character assassination.
4. Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel
against petitioners Borjal and Soliven
(publisher). The Prosecutor handling the case
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of 4.
evidence. He instituted against petitioners a
civil action for damages based on libel subject
of the instant case. The RTC decided in favor
of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered
petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify
private respondent P1M for actual and
compensatory damages, in addition to P200K
for moral damages, P100K for exemplary
damages, P200K for attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs of suit.
5.
5. The CA affirmed the decision but reduced the
amount of the monetary award. The CA ruled
that private respondent was sufficiently
identifiable, although not named, in the
questioned articles; that private respondent
was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by
describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed
hero," "a conference organizer associated with
shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked
inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person
with dubious ways;" that petitioner's claim of
privilege communication was unavailing since
the privileged character of the articles was lost
by their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. 6.
6. The petitioners brought the action to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was
guilty of libel. – NO.
RATIO:
1. In action for libel, the victim shall be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named.
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not 7.
identify Wenceslao as the organizer of the
conference. There were millions of "heroes" of the
EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be
"self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars
and conferences.
2. Borjal wrote about the so-called First National
Conference on Land Transportation whose
principal organizers are not specified. Neither
did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity
Batch 2008A.
of the conference organizer since these contained
only an enumeration of names where Wenceslao was
described as Executive Director and Spokesman and
not as a conference organizer.
It is also not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed. It must be shown that at least a third
person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. Wenceslao himself entertained
doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's
columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal
to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to
in the subject articles. Identification is grossly
inadequate when even the alleged offended party is
himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal
attack.
Publications which are privileged for reasons of
public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. A privileged
communication may be either absolutely privileged
or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have
been made without good intention justifiable motive.
Borjal's questioned writings are not within the
exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for
they are neither private communications nor fair and
true report without any comments or remarks.
However this does not necessarily mean that they
are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354
is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
the press. The concept of privileged communications
is implicit in the freedom of the press.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable.
The SC applied the Sullivan v NY Ties doctrine in
considering the respondent as a public figure. The
FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public
interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the
government and the private sector, and organized by
top government officials and prominent
businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the
conference itself but to the personalities behind as
well. As its Executive Director and spokesman,
81
 Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a
public figure.

8. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press

prohibit a public official or public figure from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with actual malice,
i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

9. To be considered malicious, the libelous

statements must be shown to have been written
or published with the knowledge that they are
false or in reckless disregard of whether they are
false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false
or not" means that the defendant entertains
serious doubt as to the truth of the publication,
or that he possesses a high degree of awareness
of their probable falsity. The articles subject of
the instant case can hardly be said to have been
written with knowledge that these are false or in
reckless disregard of what is false or not

10. SC declares Borjal to have acted in good faith.

Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by
his responsibility as a newspaperman, he
proceeded to expose and denounce what he
perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we
cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has
the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has
violated that right in this case nor abused his
press freedom.

11. Freedom of expression is man's birthright

-constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and
that it has become the singular role of the press
to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic
society such as ours. But it is also worth
keeping in mind that the press is the servant,
not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom
does not carry with it an restricted hunting
license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

Batch 2008A. 82
i