CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.
04 - 1
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Petition for Certiorari to review Sandiganbayan (SB) resolution; 1990
FACTS:
• July 29, 1987 – Republic of the Philippines (RP) thru Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed a complaint in Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos, et
al. for reconveyance, reversion, restitution & damages.
• Sept. 3, 1987 – before case against Marcos could be set for hearing, Simplicio Palanca,
in his own behalf as stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development Corporation
(BREDCO) along w/other stockholders filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying
that they be allowed to intervene in Marcos’ case since they have a legal interest in the
litigation & the properties for disposition in the said case. They claim that lands involved
in the case are not registered in the name of any of the defendants (Marcos, et al.) but in
the name of BREDCO and Marsteel Consolidated, Inc. Marsteel became involved
because BREDCO stockholders transferred their shares (about 70% of subscribed
capital) to help Marsteel finance reclamation & port development project.
• March 23, 1988 – petitioner (PCGG) filed Motion to Dismiss Answer in Intervention on
the ff.grounds: SB lacks jurisdiction & intervenors have no legal interest.
• June 6, 1988 – SB granted motion to intervene. PCGG moved for reconsideration,
denied.
• PCGG filed petition in SC complaining that by granting motion to intervene, SB violated
a national or public policy embedded in EO No. 1, 2, 4 & related issuances because:
1. Intervention is a suit/counter-suit against the RP which being a sovereign state
cannot be sued w/o its consent.
2. Cause of action of intervenors is not under SB jurisdiction (PD No. 1606 & EO No.
14). It’s under regular courts or other forums since these are claims between and/or
among Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos & their cronies.
3. Intervenors have no legal interest in matter in litigation.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON SB has jurisdiction over action for intervention. – YES
a. All PCGG cases re: funds, moneys, assets, & properties acquired or misappropriated by
Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees, whether civil or criminal, & all incidents arising from,
incidental to or related to such cases fall under SB’s exclusive & original jurisdiction.
(Sec. 2, Presidential EO No. 14, cited in PCGG vs. Pena)
b. Intervention is not an independent action. It is supplemental to Marcos’ case. Since SB
has jurisdiction over such case then it follows that the motion to intervene is also under
its jurisdiction.
2. WON remedy sought (certiorari) is proper. – NO
a. It has jurisdiction over the case thus whatever error or irregularity it might have
committed in its decision is an error of judgment correctible by appeal & not certiorari.
An appeal requests for review of errors of judgment committed by a court of competent
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari is used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can only be used
for such purposes.
b. SC can dismiss the case but because it is of public interest & a matter of public policy, it
will still review alleged errors.
3. WON Palanca & company can intervene. – YES
a. Intervention is allowed when a party has (1) a legal interest in the matter of litigation, (2)
in the success of either parties (3) interest against both parties (4) or if it will be
adversely affected by distribution or disposition of property in custody of court or other
officers. (Rules of Court, Rule 12)
b. In 1961, BREDCO was awarded by Bacolod City a contract to undertake reclamation &
port development of city. BREDCO tied-up with Marsteel in 1975, taking it in as a
contractor & allotting 65% of excess of all disbursement revenues for said company. In
1977, BREDCO stockholders transferred 70% of BREDCO capital stocks to Marsteel
Consolidated, Inc. (owner of Marsteel) to enable it to expand its base of negotiation for
loans needed in the projects. These stockholders will be entitled to 35% in excess of all
disbursement revenues. Then in Sept. 1986, PCGG sequestered all assets, properties,
records & documents of Marsteel, MCI & BREDCO. Then, case against Marcos was
filed alleging that Marcos & co-defendants amassed ill-gotten wealth among w/c are
BREDCO lots & shares of stock & prayed that such properties be reconveyed to PCGG
plus damages. BREDCO & MCI were never mentioned in the complaints.
c. Palanca, being one of the stockholders of BREDCO who transferred 70% of BREDCO
shares to MCI and is entitled to 35% of disbursement revenue excess, has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation. His co-intervenors have the same standing too.
d. Palanca and company will be adversely affected by the distribution & disposition of
property currently in Court’s custody. The lots & stocks sequestered belong to BREDCO.
They can’t just stand idly & see their property disposed of w/o asserting their rights.
e. Palanca & company have legal interest in the success of either of the parties involved,
thus they can intervene. There is a possibility that the judgment in this case will reconvey
their properties to PCGG thus, they have legal interest in the success of Marcos & other
defendants.
3. WON intervention amounts to a suit against the State. – NO
a. An intervenor may either join plaintiff in claiming what is sought in the complaint or the
defendant in resisting plaintiff’s claims by filing an answer in intervention. (Rules of
Court)
b. By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government in effect waived its right to non-
suability. (Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.)
c. When an intervention merely resists plaintiff’s claims w/o asking for any affirmative
relief against any party, it cannot be a suit against the State. And in the event that the
State intervenes, that is not tantamount to the State waiving its right to be sued. (Lim vs.
Brownell Jr. and Kagawa)
d. Palanca & company are merely uniting with the defendants in resisting claims against
PCGG & are not asking for any relief or damages against the PCGG. They merely pray
that their properties be excluded from the reconveyance of the alleged ill-gotten wealth
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 2
of the defendants to the plaintiff. Thus, this is not a suit or counter-suit against the RP.
They don’t appear to have any controversy w/Marcos, et al. either.
HELD: Petition dismissed.
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. [September 20, 1954]
Facts:
 February 3, 1951 Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental alleging that he
purchased from the shipping commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000 and paying
P50,000 downpayment. He executed a chattel mortgage against the vessel in favour of
the Shipping Commission. The Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel due
to non-payment of the instalment. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines
and as a result the Congress restore to him all right under his original contract with the
Shipping Commission. Pan Oriental Shipping Corporation refused to give to Froilan the
vessel.
 February 3, 1951 lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan.
 March 1, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co denied the right of Froilan and it alleged that
the action of the Cabinet was null and void.
 November 10, 1951 after obtaining the intervenor-appelle the Government of the
Philippines filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay to the
Shipping Commission the balance, interest and the advances on the insurance premium
excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel.
 November 29, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in
intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was
obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter
with option to purchase.
 November 29, 1951 Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in the amount
of P162,576.93 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration
 February 3, 1952 lower court held that the payment made by Froilan constituted a
payment and a discharge of his obligation to the Government of the Philippines.
 May 10, 1952 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co., against it on the ground that the
purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government to deliver the vessel to Pan
Oriental in the event that the Government recovers the vessel from Froilan. The motion
of Pan Oriental was dismissed. As a result of the dismissal Pan Oriental appealed the
case
Issue: WON the case should be dismissed because the State is immune from suit.
Held: No
Ratio: The Government’s action of filing its complaint in intervention had the effect of
waiving its immunity and right on nonsuability. By taking the initiative in an action against a
private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the
defendant. The US SC held that no direct suit can be maintained against the US. But when an
action is brought by the US to recover money in the hands of a party who has legal claim
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such
claim in court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress.
MALONG vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS (PNR)
Petition to review order of the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch II, Aug. 7, 1985
FACTS:
• Oct. 30, 1977 – Jaime Aquino, son of petitioners Francisco & Rosalina Malong, was on
board a PNR train. He sat near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded
w/passengers & baggage since All Saints Day was forthcoming. While the train was
between Tarlac & Capas, Jaime fell from the train resulting to his death.
• Malong spouses pray that the PNR be ordered to pay damages amounting to
P136,370.00.
• CFI dismissed complaint saying that it had no jurisdiction over the case because PNR is
a government instrumentality & any action against it is a suit against the State which is
prohibited under Sec. 16, Art. XV, Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the PNR shares the State’s immunity from suit.
HELD: No. CFI dismissal reversed & set aside. Remanded for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. Manila Railroad Company, PNR’s predecessor, was not immune from suit under its
charter, Act. No. 5440.
2. PNR charter, RA No. 4156 amended by RA No. 6366 & PD No. 741, provides that PNR
is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-year term
from 1964-2014. It’s under the Office of the President. Its charter likewise provides that
PNR is to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation Law,
referring to sections 81-102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporation not
reproduced in the Corporation Code. Sec. 36 of the Corporation Code and Sec. 13(2) of
the Corporation Law state that every corporation has the power to sue & be sued in its
corporate name in every court.
3. State divested itself of sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR w/c is no different
from its predecessor. It did not become immune from suit. Not all government entities
whether corporate or noncorporate are immune from suits. Immunity is determined by
the character of the objects for w/c the entity was organized. (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro & Phil. Airlines, Inc.)
4. When the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign
capacity & is to be treated like any other private corporation. (Bank of the U.S. vs.
Planters’ Bank) When the State engages in a particular business thru the instrumentality
of a corporation, it divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, subjecting the
corporation to rules of law governing private corporations. When the State acts in its
proprietary capacity, it’s bound by rules governing private individuals. When it contracts
with individuals, rules must be adjusted as if both parties are private persons so that they
may both stand on equal grounds. (People vs. Stephens)
5. PNR in this case was not performing any governmental function. It was engaged in a
private enterprise. It does not exercise sovereign functions but it exercises purely
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 3
corporate, proprietary or business functions. (National Development Co. vs. Tobias).
Unfair for Jaime’s heirs if they can’t sue negligent PNR employees.
6. Other agencies not immune from suit: SSS & PNB.
ABAD SANTOS, CONCURRING
All corporations organized by the gov’t are its instrumentalities by the very reason of their
creation but that does not automatically immune them from suit. Central Bank is an
instrumentality of the gov’t but it’s not immune from suit for it performs proprietary
functions.
*additional notes re reason for State exemption from suit:
1. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical & practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa vs.
Polyblank)
2. The public service would be hindered & public safety endangered if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen & consequently
controlled in the use & disposition of the means required for the proper administration of
the Government. (The Siren vs. U.S.)
Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991]
Facts:
 Motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Second Division decision in GR no. 61045.
The Solicitor General maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and the case of
Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers’ Union that NIA does not
perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government
tasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its
driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
 Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA. They filed a case for damages
against NIA
Issue: WON the NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary function
Held: Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from
the government. It can be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver
who was not its special agent.
Ratio:
 The irrigation districts in the US are identical with the irrigation system in the
Philippines. As such, it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American
jurisprudence.
o Irrigation district is a public quasi corporation organized however to conduct a
business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. They are
members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its
operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a
proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of
proprietary ownership.
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
o Quasi-public corporation possessed some governmental powers and exercised some
governmental functions, but held that the construction and operation of its irrigation
canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental function, and hence
the district was responsible in damages for negligent construction or operation of its
canal system.
 Constituent – exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. Ministrant –
merely the exercise of propriety function and compulsory
 Other corporations that brings public benefit and public welfare are basically proprietary
in nature (telecommunications, electricity)
 NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated unions – it was held that NAWASA is not an agency
performing governmental functions rather it performs proprietary functions. The
function of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional
functions of the government even though the service rendered caters to the community as
a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
 NIA was not created for the purpose of local government. It is essentially a service
agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such
fact does not make NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation.
NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and
administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal
and pump irrigation project.
 NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government. Also in PD 552 it was provided that NIA can sue and be sues in
court. NIA has its own assets and liabilities and it also has corporate powers to be
exercised by the BOD.
Separate Opinion: Padilla
 NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter. RA 3061 created NIA. The
charter of NIA confers upon it a separate juridical personality to exercise all the powers
of a corporation under the Corporation Law. NIA’s primary purpose is to undertake
integrated irrigation projects, by the construction of multiple-purpose water resource
projects to increase agricultural production for the financial uplifting of the people.
 NIA is maintained and operated by the government in the performance of its
governmental function of providing the Filipino people, particularly, the farmers
nationwide, improved irrigation systems to increase the country’s agricultural
production. Only the government has the capacity and facilities to successfully
undertake a project or venture of such magnitude. Fees collected are for cost of
operation, maintenance, insurance and rehabilitation of the irrigation systems.
 The fact that the charter treats NIA as incorporated under the Corporation law and
confers upon it a separate judicial personality is not the test in determining whether it is
performing a governmental or proprietary function. It was held that were the nature of
the duties imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal that it was intended
to bring any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said agency
is deemed to be exercising a governmental function.
 The charter of NIA provides that it may sue and be sue, thus, the consent of NIA to be
sued has been given. The rule of immunity no longer applies. Is the State liable for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 4
damages? No. The State would be liable for damages when it acts through a special
agent. The Hugo Garcia was not a special agent rather he was NIA”s regular driver. For
the State to be liable Congress should enact an appropriate legislation to compensate the
petitioners and to appropriate the necessary fund for it.
SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC
Petition for Certiorari from order of dismissal of CFI Zamboanga, 1978
FACTS:
• Jan. 1971 - Ildefonso Santiago & his wife donated a land to the Bureau of Plant Industry
on the condition that lighting & water facilities will be installed and an office building &
parking lot will be built on said land which should be ready for occupancy on or before
Dec. 7, 1974.
• Bureau failed to meet the conditions thus, Santiago filed this case against the RP thru the
Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of the deed of donation.
• CFI – granted RP’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the state can’t be sued w/o its
consent.
ISSUE: WON Santiago can sue the Bureau of Plant Industry.
HELD: Yes. Petition granted. CFI ordered to proceed with case.
RATIO:
1. Admittedly, state cannot be sued w/o its consent. Government departments, bureaus,
agencies, offices or instrumentalities cannot be sued either if the suit would result in
adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in disbursements of funds/loss of
property. (Del Mar vs. Philippine Veterans Administration) This principle has been
implicit in the 1935 Constitution (Republic vs. Purisima) thus, issue of its retroactivity as
raised by the petitioner is immaterial.
2. However, it would be unfair to cloak the State with immunity when it has violated an
agreement wherein it has received gratuitously a certain property w/o fulfilling the terms
of the agreement. This is offensive to one’s sense of justice. The government should set
the example. Since the State can waive its immunity from suit impliedly, the case at bar
should prosper. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Ministerio vs. CFI Cebu). Thus when the State
commits an injustice against a citizen, it implies waiver of its immunity. Bureau of Plant
Industry’s failure to abide by the conditions under w/c the donation was given presumes
that it gave its consent to be sued. There being no money claim, it will not affect the
State’s treasury. A donor, w/ RP as donee, is entitled to go to court when there is a breach
of the conditions of such donation. The State benefited from the contract and when it
ignores its obligations, the people might lose its confidence on the State.
*additional notes:
1. The doctrine of the non-suability of the State is a corollary of the positivist concept of
law w/c according to Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state,
in itself the source of the law on w/c such a right may be predicated. It is in consideration
of the vastly expanded role of the government enabling it to engage in business pursuits
to promote general welfare. (Mobile Phil. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service).
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
2. A government-owned & controlled corporation has a personality of its own distinct &
separate from that of the government. It may sue & be sued & may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation. (National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs.
CIR).
3. An action against the government officials is essentially one against the government.
(Araneta vs. Gatmaitan)
4. Basic & fundamental principle of the law that the gov’t can’t be sued before courts of
justice w/o its consent covers with the mantle of its protection an entity such as the Angat
River Irrigation System. (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union)
5. Bureau of Cusotms acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability
of the State. The claimant’s remedy to recover the loss or damage to the goods under the
custody of such service is to file a claim w/ the Commission on Audit as contemplated in
Act No. 3803 & Commonwealth Act No. 327.
Amigable vs. Cuenca [February 29, 1972]
Appeal from a decision of the COFI of Cebu
Facts:
 Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 630 of Banilad Estate in Cebu City.
There is no annotation (appearing at the back of the certificate) in favour of the
government of any right or interest in the property in the property . Without any
expropriation proceeding the government used a portion of his property to widen the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. These two avenues were already existing since 1921.
 March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting
payment for his lot. His claim was indorsed to the Auditor Genral who disallowed it.
 February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint. The complaint was
amended in April 17, 1959. Defendants – Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highway. Amigable wanted to
recover his property from the Government.
 Defendant denied the allegations on the following grounds:
o Action was premature because the claim was not filed with the Office of the Auditor
General
o Right of action for recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any,
had already prescribed
o Suit against the government and the government has not given its consent for the
suit
o It was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the
Construction of Mango Avenue.
 Court’s decision: no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action and that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. The government in this case did not give
its consent for the suit. Also, the claim for moral damages gas already prescribed.
Issue: WON the Victoria Amable may properly sue the government?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 5
 Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu – Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process
of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of immunity from suit
without its consent. If the constitutional mandate that the owner is compensated for
property taken for public use is to be respected. The doctrine of governmental immunity
from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. When
the government takes any property for public use which is conditioned upon the payment
of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits
jurisdiction of a court.
 As registered owner she could bring an action to recover possession of the property in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
 The property cannot be recovered by Amigable. The only relief that is available is for
the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago.
 With regards to damages she is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the
time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. Government
should also pay for attorney’s fees.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US
Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in
Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG
headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed,
where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the
parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she
needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to
protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on
that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of
Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed
to leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she
was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not
searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya
can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part.
She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager.
She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue
embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any
other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our
national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages
of P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an
answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1)
this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and
(2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official
functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases,
necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use
facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US
personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of
purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect &
safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of
NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford
was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to
defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1)
search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-
discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since
her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act
was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts;
(4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON
Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and
later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present
evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor
of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against
Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages,
P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for
Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing
governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still
not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority.
She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone
is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because
act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall
under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 6
does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into
the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court
(something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it
should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is
deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to
have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to
dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule
16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so
that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of
denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already
brought this petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This
immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an
affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a
case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all
encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated
by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will
not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private &
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted
w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA)
Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts
done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US
in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus,
it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953
Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals[February 23, 2000]
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was allegedly awarded a “verbal contract of
lease” in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). NPDC is a
government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks including
Rizal Park. There was no document or instrument in record to show the grantor of the
verbal license to GABI.
 GABI was given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks.
GABI was to remit to NPDC, 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. (No
written proof for this)
 February 29, 1988 Lansang (Chairman of NPDC) terminated the verbal agreement with
GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately
within the public park. GABI was given until March 8, 1988 to vacate the area. The
notice was signed by the president of GABI – Iglesias (totally blind and he claims that he
was deceived when he signed the document)
 March 8, 1988 GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC and the court
issued a TRO. The TRO expired on March 28, 1988 and the following day GABO was
evicted.
 The RTC dismissed the claim for damages by because the complaint was actually
directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. GABI cannot
claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since it was a mere
accommodation concessionaire. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial
Court. The CA ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in
his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority. The CA observed that the eviction of GABI came
at the heels of 2 significant incidents. (1) Iglesias extended monetary support to striking
workers of NPDC (2) Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987,
denouncing alleged graft and corruption in NPDC.
Issues:
 WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents’ complaint against petitioner,
as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued without
its consent.
 WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner’s act of terminating respondent GABI’s
concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty.
Held:
(1) NO
 The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regarded
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 7
as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the
satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the
damages awarded to the plaintiff.
 The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not
exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
It also does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
 Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity.
This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued
allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal
Park.
(2) NO
There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. Public streets,
Public parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man
and, thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and
kiosk space in the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang
may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be
ejected from the park when necessary.
SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA
FACTS:
• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and
being a qualified dependent locally available.
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal
employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian
personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by
reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
• Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a
180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically
selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released
but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer.
During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs.
Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position.
She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the
appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this
allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance
of with the applicable regulation.
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
• Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages +
20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense
that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of
their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it
was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA
reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not
a suit against the US government w/c would require consent.
• Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule
allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is
applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed
Forces
HELD: Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as
moral damages, P20K for atty’s fees.
RATIO: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its
acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in
indemnifying petitioner Shauf.
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it
only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law
& injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or
violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official &
such suit will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications
vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is
being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an
interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept
the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension
of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her
highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service
Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that
discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations.
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities
regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi &
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 8
Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to
life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be
paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She
never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed.
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts.
The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to
file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the
initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been
decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise
prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
Republic vs. Sandoval [March 19, 1993]
Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9
Facts:
 This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly known
as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the heirs of
these people are seeking for retribution. (Girls d ko naisasama ang details ng massacre…
the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian reforms and
the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting and no one
knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.)
 Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages.
 President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission
and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that
the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the
government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for
damages by the petitioners.
 February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has
waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to
both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.
Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit
Held: No
Ratio
 Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based
on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests
on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government.
 Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
AO 11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and
casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause
of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim
 Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent
was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was
merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.
 The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit against
the State is proper are
o When the Republic is sued by name
o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
 The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the
investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of
jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited
act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers
 The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.
PNB vs. PABALAN
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Mandamus w/ Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
• Dec. 17, 1970 – writ of execution was issued w/ a notice of garnishment for the sum of
P12,724.66. Said amount belongs to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration &
deposited with PNB’s La Union branch.
• Execution of writ & garnishment was delayed since PNB objected to the garnishment &
questioned WON Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration really had funds deposited w/
PNB La Union.
• Jan. 25, 1971 – execution of writs & garnishment. It ordered that Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration Funds deposited w/ PNB shall be garnished & delivered to
plaintiff immediately to satisfy Writ of Execution for ½ of the amount awarded in the
decision of Nov. 16, 1970.
• PNB claims that since funds are public in character, a prohibition must be issued against
Pabalan’s orders based on the doctrine of the non-suability of the state.
ISSUE: WON funds of public corporations w/c can sue & be sued are exempt from
garnishment.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity & is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States vs.
Planters’ Bank) By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations (Manila Hotel
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 9
Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company). Thus, the doctrine of non-suability
cannot bar or impede a notice of garnishment.
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge. Several cases have ruled
that funds of government-owned entities are not exempt from garnishment (PNB vs.
CIR, National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR).
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals [October 1, 1990]
Petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals
Facts
 Off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by the petitioner Municipal of Makati
against Admiral Finance Creditor Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and Arceli P. Jo.
 June 4, 1987 – The RTC judge fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666
and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160
which was earlier received. The decision became final and executory.
 A notice of garnishment was served upon the PNB Buendia branch but the sheriff was
informed that a hold code was placed on the account of the petitioner
 The City of Makati filed a motion to lift the garnishment on the ground that the manner
of payment should be done in instalment. Also the City of Makati filed a Manifestation
that the private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject
property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of
Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.
 PSB and the private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they
agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation
proceedings.
 Trial judge issued an order approving the compromise agreement, ordered PNB Buendia
Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 and ordered PSB and
private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property
in favour of the petitioner
 PNB Buendia branch failed to comply with the order of the court because according to
the branch manager he was still waiting for proper authorization from PNB Head Office.
Issue: WON the account of the City of Makati with PNB can be levied for a money
judgement against the City.
Held: No
Ratio:
 The petitioner alleges for the first time that they have 2 accounts with PNB. Account no.
265-537154-3 for expropriation of the property with a balance of P99,743.94 and
Account no. 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes with a balance of
P170,098,421.72
 Petitioner contends that amount involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the fund
garnished by the sheriff over P99,743.94 are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government’s other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the
proper appropriation required by law.
PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ
 Account no. 263-530850-7 are public funds and are not subject to levy and execution
unless otherwise provided for by the statute. The properties of a municipality whether
real or personal cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money
judgement against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and
market fee, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution.
 There was no Municipal Ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision. No levy under execution may
be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account no. 263-
530850-7. The remedy for the respondents is a petition for mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds.
Jose Nessia v. Jesus Fermin
Petition for review of the decision of CA, 1993
FACTS:
• 1993: Respondent Mayor Fermin of Victorias, Negros Occidental, ignored deliberately
and refused incessantly to reimburse travel expenses incurred by petitioner Nessia, then
Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. Hence, the latter filed this complaint to recover
damages and reimbursement of expenses. Petitioner further asserts that vouchers were
ignored because he defied the Mayor’s request to register and vote in Victorias in the
1980 local elections.
• Respondent claims that he never received any vouchers indicating expenses. And even if
he did, they wouldn’t be approved for payment because they were submitted late and was
in excess of the budgetary appropriations. Municipality of Victorias sided with Fermin.
• Nessia filed a complaint against Fermin & Municipality of Victorias. Trial court ruled in
favor of Nessia. According to the RTC, Fermin’s secretary received the vouchers & even
if he did not actually receive them, he would still be liable because he should have made
inquiries upon receipt of Nessia’s follow-up letters.
• Municipality of Victorias did not appeal while Fermin & Nessia appealed to the CA.
Nessia prayed for an increase in the award of moral & exemplary damages while Fermin
sought to be absolved from liability. CA dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action. According to the CA, Fermin acted on the vouchers as proven by his
denial/refusal of Nessia’s claims. No proof that he actually received the vouchers and
even if he did, he could have not acted on them because they were submitted late & not
supported by an appropriation.
ISSUE: WON respondent’s inaction on Nessia’s claim is punishable
HELD: Petition granted. Trial court’s decision granted and reaffirmed.
RATIO: Yes, respondent Mayor may be held liable for damages under Art.27 for malicious
and unjust inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. This is in lieu of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act which penalizes neglecting or refusing, after due demand or
request, w/ o sufficient justification, to act w/in a reasonable time on any matter pending
before him for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party. Public officials are
called upon to act expeditiously on matters pending before them. Even if he could have not
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I – 08.16.04 - 10
possibly paid for the claims due to lack of appropriation, he should have done something  RULE: All government funds deposited in PNB or any other official depositary of the
about it. Philippine Government remains government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
CA did not exactly absolve the Municipality of Victorias. It should be noted that a non- Based on consideration of Public Policy. State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
appellant cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief. Its exoneration was a mere disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
consequence of the dismissal of the case. Besides, this is immaterial at this point due to the appropriated by law. EXCEPTION: When there is a corresponding appropriation as
SC’s decision. required by law. In such a case monetary judgement may be legally enforced by judicial
process.
City of Caloocan vs. Allarde [September 10, 2003]  Pasay City Government vs. CFI of Manila – government funds deposited in the PNB are
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has
Facts: already been enacted for the payment of the City’s obligation.
 In 1972 Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City  Ordinance no. 0143 was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The sum
Administrator and 17 other positions via the ordinace no. 1749. The affected employees that was indicated in the ordinance was deemed automatically segregated from other
assailed the legality of the abolition and in 1973 the CFI declared that it was illegal and budgetary allocation of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s
ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back monetary obligation to her. A valid appropriation lifts its exemption from execution.
salaries and other emoluments. The City government appealed the decision but it was The appropriation was duly signed and approved by the council and the mayor.
also dismissed.
 During 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages. 2. WON the levy and sale at public auction of 3 motor vehicles owned by the City
Remaining balance = P530,761.91 The others were paid in full. cannot be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgement against
 In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget the City of Caloocan. – MOOT CASE
#3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan were Judge Allarde already the levy on the three vehicles thereby formally discharging them from
arguing that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. the jurisdiction of this court.
 On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at a public auction one of the motor
vehicles of the City Government for 100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The 3. WON the auction of the vehicle was valid. YES
City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle maintaining that the Sheriff complied with the rules on public auction and the administrative complaint
properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the acknowledges that fact. Petitioner cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles. sale.
 October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed ordinance no. 0134 which included
the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. Judge
Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City Treasurer
can’t release it because the Mayor refuses to sign the check.
 May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the
City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
garnishment was forwarded to PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB
that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages
which may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB decided to follow
the order of Judge Allarde.
Issues and Ratio
1. WON the garnishment of the funds of the City if Caloocan still needed authority of
the Mayor to be released – NO
 Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks
to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a 3 rd person., or money
owed by such 3rd person or garnishee to the defendant.

PASCUAL, SOLIDON, SOLIVAS, VELASQUEZ