JAVIER v OSMENA → April 1960: Judgment rendered ordering petitioner to pay the sum w/ interest,
atty’s fees and costs.
Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who inherited from her parents 2
parcels of land. To perfect her ownership, she acquiored from her father’s second
wife the usufructuary right on properties for 3thou.
Florentino, who succeeded Petrona’s father as a commission merchant in their
family business in Manila, acquired the debt of Petrona’s father and became
indebted to Tomas Osmena (one of the chief clients) in sum of four or five thou.
Unable to pay, judgement was rendered in favor of debtor Osmena. The sheriff
despite the protests of Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of
Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmena was the successful bidder.
Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to recover her property. The
defendant Osmena contended that even though land was separate property of
Petrona, the usurfructuary right belonhgs to the CP since it was purchased using CP
dunds. Defendant prayed that the revenues from both properties, being CP, should
be made liable for the debt.
WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue of the parcels of land which
belong to Wife exclusively
Yes.
There is a natural presumption of fact that whatever Collanted contributed towards
defrayment of the family expenses was contributed by him out of what he earned by
commission paid him for services rendered to his clients as commission merchant.
Thus, the debts also incurred will be presumed conjugal. It is conclusive that the
debt must be paid out of CP since it is contracted by H during M and in exercise of
the industry or profession by which, moreover, he contributes towards the support
of his family. These debts are not personal or private debts at all.
A1409 of CC: CP should be made liable for debts and obliges (no.1) contracted
during M by H and (no.5) for the support of family.
To be more clear, the fruits of the exclusive property belong to CP, right? As such,
they are liable for the apyment of M expenses. Thus, it only follows that the creditor
of the H may bring suit against the fruits and revenues of the private property of W.
As to whether the defendant’s prayer for an appointment of a receiver is to be
granted, A1984 says that the W has the right to manage her paraphernal property
and (A1412) says that H is the administrator of the CCP. Therefore, appointment of
a receiver shall deprove W and H of these rights. No need!
Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin,
Ricardo Hermoso & City Sheriff of Manila (1968)
Original Petition in the SC. Ceriorari w/ preliminary injunction.
FACTS:
→ Feb 1959: respondent Hermoso filed civil case against petitioner Damaso Perez
& one Gregorio Subong for recovery of principal sum PhP17,309.44 as unpaid
purchases of leather materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of
Perez.
→ June 1960:Appeal to CA by Perez & Subong dismissed for it was filed beyond
the reglementary pd.
→ Aug 1961: Writ of execution was issued after the case was remanded to the
court of origin.
→ 1st notice: Sept 1961, respondent Sheriff of Mla scheduled auction sale of levied
3,573 shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso Perez w/
Republic Bank. Judge suspended such sale on the ground that it was highly
excessive & unjust, debt was only PhP17,309.44 while value of shares was
PhP357,300.
→ 2nd notice: Oct 1961, cancelled by CA pending hearing of Perez’ motion for
mandamus & certiorari w/ prelim injunction
→ 3rd notice: Jan 1963, sale was lowered to 210 shares of stock. But was later
enjoined by the ff complaint.
→ New twist: in the same month, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, W of Damaso, filed
a complaint against respondents wherein she contended that the levied shares
are conjugal assets w/c are not answerable for the judgment debt of her H, it
being a personal nature of obligation and contracted not for the benefit/
interest of their conjugal partnership. Case was later dismissed upon the motion
of W herself.
→ 4th notice: Oct 1963, auction sale of 220 shares of stock scheduled by Sheriff
but was suspended due to Mrs Cobb-Perez filing a 3 rd party claim over the
shares of stocks.
→ 5th notice: Nov ’63 but was later suspended by Mr Perez’s offer of his alleged
cash dividends in same bank worth PhP19,985. His motion/offer denied.
→ 6th notice: Jan ’65: auction sale of 240 shares of stock. Sheriff enjoined for
petitioners posted a bond of PhP10,000 for writ of preliminary injunction prayed
ISSUE:
1) WON judgment debt is H’s exclusive & private debt
HELD: Petition dismissed. Preliminary injunction dissolved.
RATIO:
1) No, debts contracted by H, as head of the family and administrator of the
conjugal partnership, in the exercise of an industry or profession by w/c he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be his exclusive debts. The said
debt was contracted in the purchase of leather used in the shoe manufacturing
business of the H and said business is an ordinary commercial enterprise for
gain, in the pursuit of w/c Damaso Perez had the right to embark the
partnership.
Moreover, the presumption that all property of the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership under Art 160 CC must be accompanied by proof of
acquisition of property. Since there is no evidence as to when the shares of
stock were acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the H
alone is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to him.
NOTES:
In the case, the Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain motion to quash the writ
of execution for none of the ff grounds were present. It can only do so when: (1)
writ has been improvidently issued, (2) it has been issued against the wrong party,
(3) it is defective in substance, (4) judgment debt has been paid, (5) writ has been
issued w/o authority, (6) there has been a change in the situation of the parties w/c
makes execution inequitable, or (7) controversy has never been submitted to court
and therefore no judgment has been rendered.
DBP vs. Adil
Petition for Certiorari to Review CFI Iloilo decision
Facts:
• Feb. 10, 1940 – sps Patricio Confesor & Jovita Villafuerte obtained agricultural
loan from Agricultural & Industrial Bank (AIB w/c is now DBP). Amount is P2k
evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal yearly amortizations
• After 10 years (literal! Hehe), they were still not able to pay
• April 11, 1961 – Confesor, now a member of Congress, issued a 2nd promissory
note acknowledging the loan & promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961. He
further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if & when he fails to pay.
Another stipulation is that if he secures certificate of indebtedness from gov’t
for his back pay, he’ll be allowed to pay amount out of it.
• They were still not able to pay on the assigned date.
• Sept. 11, 1970 – DBP filed complaint against sps. City Court decided in favor of
DBP & thus ordered sps to pay debt + interests.
• CFI Iloilo reversed the decision & dismissed complaint against sps. MFR denied.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON rt of prescription may be waived or renounced. - YES
a. CC Art. 1112 – Rt to prescription may be tacitly renounced resulting from
acts w/c imply abandonment of such rt.
b.True that prescription has set in as to the 1 promissory note. However, 2
st nd
promissory note, acknowledged such debt & even promised to pay the
same thereby, rt to prescription was effectively & expressly renounced.
c. Villaroel vs. Estrada – Debt barred by prescription can’t be enforced by
creditor. But a new contract recognizing & assuming prescribed debt would
be valid & enforceable.
d. Remember, prescription only bars the remedy, that is the payment of the
debt, but not the debt itself. The new promise made by Confesor
constitutes a new cause of action.
2. WON 2nd promissory note is binding on the conjugal partnership. - YES
a. CFI claims it’s not binding pursuant to new CC Art. 166: unless wife is
spendthrift, serving civ interdiction or confined in leprosarium, husband
can’t alienate/encumber real prop of CP w/o her consent. Court may
compel her to give such if she refuses to do so.
b. But CC Art. 165 provides that husband is administrator of CP & thus, all
debts & oblig he contracts for the benefit of the CP are chargeable to the
CP. He signed 2nd promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is
liable for obligation.
Held: CFI decision reversed & set aside. City Court decision reinstated.
CUATICO v. MORELOS
61 OG 869 (1964)
Facts: Romeo Morelos secured a loan from the plaintiff Lorenzo Cuatico by a
promissory note. Romeo was unable to pay so Lorenzo instituted a complaint
against Romeo and his wife Amada for the collection of the sum of P5K plus interest.
The Manila CFI declared Romeo default (and Amada who was also impleaded was
relieved as she did not sign the promissory note) and ordered the garnishment of
Romeo’s salary from the Mapua Institute of Technology where Romeo worked.
Romeo moved for the dissolution of the garnishment but was denied. Hence this
petition.
Issues:
1. WON his salary is exempt from execution
NO. Romeo was obviously misleading the court as to his testimonies regarding
his salaries and expenditures. The truth was his total monthly expenses amount
to P507.82 and his monthly income totals P680.80 and thus the earnings exceed
the sum necessary for the support of the family by P172.98. Consequently, he is
not exempt.
2. WON the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
garnishee (Mapua) to deduct from Romeo’s monthly salary to pay his
debt.
NO. The relevant provision in such a case is Rule 39(38) of the ROC which
provides that if, upon investigation of his current income and expenses, it
appears that the earning of the judgment debtor are more than what is
necessary for the support of his family, the judge may order him to pay the
judgment debt in fixed monthly installments, as how the judge in the CFI had
ordered.
3. RELEVANT ISSUE: WON the garnishment on Romeo’s salary was
proper, considering that the salaries of the spouses are conjugal
partnership property, and further that the conjugal partnership
property cannot be made liable for the personal obligations of one of
the spouses.
NO. Indeed, art. 153(2) of the new CC provides that those which is obtained by
the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them shall be
conjugal partnership property. Thus, Romeo’s earnings in the form of salaries
constitute part of the conjugal partnership property which may answer only for
the liabilities enumerated in art. 161. And from a reading of this article, it is
found that the personal liability of the spouses cannot bind the conjugal
partnership unless it was incurred for the benefit of the family. In the case
at bar, it appears that the promissory note was executed and signed by Romeo
alone. Furthermore, the promissory note does not in any way divulge whether or
not the loan secured by the promissory note was for the benefit of the family.
Since Romeo has not proved that the loan was for the benefit of said conjugal
partnership, the inevitable conclusion is that the loan was the exclusive personal
indebtedness of the husband for which the conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable.
On the contention that since the indebtedness was contracted during the
marriage with his present wide, the law presumed that the loan was contracted
for the benefit of his family. It will not be sustained, however, given the ruling in
 De la Cruz v. De Gula that before granting a loan to the husband, one should
first make inquiry and satisfy himself that the loan applied for will be for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and if such purpose is not stated in detail in
the document of loan which should be signed preferably by both husband and
wife, the loan may be a personal obligation of the husband, for which the
conjugal property is not answerable, except in case it redounded to the benefit
of the family.
On another contention that at least one half of the conjugal partnership
belongs to the husband, and therefore, could be validly levied upon to satisfy
the money judgment against the husband it must be remembered that only
when the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated, and there is a net
remainder, may the same be divided equally between the spouses. In the
meantime, the interest of each in the conjugal partnership is inchoate and a
mere expectancy. Thus, any levy on the conjugal partnership property to satisfy
such money judgment against the husband is null and void.
Held: Romeo’s liability is his personal responsibility and the conjugal partnership
cannot therefore be held liable. Consequently, the garnishment on his salary is null
and void.
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. De Garcia [October 31, 1969]
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Ladislao Chavez (principal) and petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc. executed
a surety bond in favour of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to Ladislao
Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, Ladislao Chavez and Ramon
B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they
hound themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc. against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties,
charges and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur.
 April 27, 1956 PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and Luzon
Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in interest, attorney’s fees,
and costs of the suit.
 August 8, 1957 – third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Rmon
Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon Surety.
 July 30, 1960 a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction
of the claim of petitioner in the sum of P8,839.97. August 9, 1960 a wit of
garnishment was issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the
Garcias.
 The Garcias filed a suit for injuction and the trial court ruled in their favour.
Issue: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be
held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a
3rd party in favour of a surety agreement.
Held: No, said agreement did not benefit the family so the CPG is not liable
Ratio:
 Article 161 of the civil code provides:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose,
in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a
charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the
separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be
charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both
husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other
course. (1408a)
 The husband is the administrator of the conjugal property however, only
obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the
conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the
benefit of the family
 Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement is not
an act that would benefit the conjugal partnership
 Argument of Luzon Surety that acting as a guarantor and making good of
his guaranty, Mr. Garcia acquires the capacity of being trusted, add to his
reputation or esteem, enhances his standing as a citizen in the community
in which he lives, and earns the confidence of the business community. He
can thus secure money with which to carry on the purposes of their
conjugal partnership. This argument is too remote and fanciful
 To make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain
to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being
of the family as a unit.
Ayala Investment v Ching
PBM onbtained a loan of 50, 300, 000 from Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Ching, the Executive Vice-Pres of PBM signed a surety to the
loan. Upon PBM’s failure to pay the loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of
money from PBM and Ching.
The writ of execution covered 3 of the C properties of Ching and his wife so Ching
asked that the auction sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are part
of the CPG and couldn’t be held liable to answer for a loan that didn’t redound to
the benefit of his family.
Auction still took place and AIDC being the only bidder acquired the properties. As
such, Ching instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null and void. The LC
and CoA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal effect since the loan they
properties were being made to pay didn’t benefit the CP.
WON the CPG is liable for obligation entered into by the H as a surety in a loan
extended to corporation?
SubWON Did obligation redound to benefit of CPG
SubWON Was act of H, in securing the loan, part of his industry,
business or career from which he supports his family
HELD CPG is not liable.
SubWON1 Inasmuch as loan contracted by Ching was a corporate loan, it
was not made for the benefit of the CPG.
A161(1), CC and A121 (2) FC are clear in requiring that the loan
obtained should be for the benefit of the partnership or should
redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to be held
liable.
Burden of proof of showing that it does lies in creditor-party
litigant and the AIDC presented no such proof.
Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG and it’s not
enough that the transaction be one that would normally produce
benefit for the partnership. It must do so, in fact where such
benefits directly result from the loan; such are what is
contemplated by the law.
→ W admitted securing a loan together w/ H but claimed that loan was payable on
a staggered basis. H claimed that sum was not a loan but his share of income
on contracts in reviving the petitioner’s construction business
→ RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos
→ CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for insufficiency of evidence
ISSUES:
1) WON USD25K or its equivalent PhP625K was in the nature of a loan
2) If so, WON loan is liability of both sps
HELD: Petition granted, judgment modified.
RATIO:
1) Yes, for petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a preponderance of
evidence in providing the check he issued, the acknowledgement of the W of
their accountability, and the petitioner’s demand letter sent and received by
respondent.
H’s claim that it is his rightful share as income, profit or salary is untenable
because there is no showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an agent
of the corporation.
2) Yes, because acknowledgement of the loan made by the defendant-W binds the
conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the h&lot w/c became their conjugal home.
Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2&3, even w/ the alleged lack of consent of
respondent-H, defendant-H & W are jointly and severally liable in the payment
of the loan.

SubWON2 Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession

of Ching. Neither it is an embarking in a business or an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.

Honorario Carlos v. Manuel Abelardo (2002)

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA

FACTS:
→ Oct 1989: resp & his W Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and
requested him to advance USD 25K for the purchase of h&lot in Parañaque.
→ Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the seller of the property to
enable and assist the sps conduct their married life independently and on their
own
→ July 1991: petitioner inquired about the status of the loan. The sps
acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet ready to
settle it. Respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries by
making various threats against the petitioner.
→ Aug ’94: formal demand was made by Carlos but sps failed yet again to comply
→ Oct ’94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the sum & damages against
sps in RTC of Valenzuela
→ Sps, having been separated in fact for more than a yr prior to filing of
complaint, submitted separate answers.