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“For the mission you’ve been given, you
Staying the Course have the right strategy,” he told me. “But
AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN WARS
T
he cigarette glowed red as he took And in December 2009, U.S. President
a drag, and the smoke rose rapidly Barack Obama had announced a commit
as he exhaled. It had been a long ment to begin reducing the United States’
afternoon. It had been a long war. role in 18 months. The clock was ticking.
It was February 2010, and after months Still, the president had also decided to
establishing a relationship, Pakistan’s reinforce the U.S. effort so that it would
chief of army staff, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, comprise 150,000 U.S. and coalition forces
and one of us, Stan McChrystal, were and include an ongoing effort to train,
having the kind of conversation senior equip, and advise 350,000 Afghan forces.
military commanders are supposed to If ever the United States had a realistic
have, discussing the role of the nato-led shot of success in its post-9/11 involve
coalition’s efforts in Afghanistan and ment in Afghanistan, it was then.
northwestern Pakistan. We’d spent hours That was seven years of hope, effort,
alone, each laying out in detail a strategy blood, and frustration ago. Today, any
for the conflict. While not quite my second thing that feels like success looks more
home, the Pakistani army’s headquarters distant than ever. The U.S.-backed gov
in Rawalpindi was now familiar ground, ernment in Kabul remains plagued by
and Kayani, a colleague with whom I political infighting and corruption, and
spoke easily. Nothing, however, could the Afghan security forces cannot control
soften the blow of his message to me. significant parts of the country. The
Taliban, while no longer the idealistic
KOSH SADAT is a former Lieutenant Colonel young fighters that swept north in 1994
in the Afghan Special Operations Forces. From and not particularly popular with the
2009 to 2011, he served as Aide-de-Camp to
the Commander of the International Security
Afghan people, have leveraged Kabul’s
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. weaknesses to make gains in recent years.
STAN M C CHRYSTAL is a retired U.S. Army Against this backdrop, U.S. President
General. He first served in Afghanistan in 2002 Donald Trump has outlined a new strat
as Chief of Staff of Combined Joint Task Force egy. As he detailed in a speech in August,
180, and from 2009 to 2010, he served as
Commander of the International Security the United States will continue its
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. commitment in Afghanistan, modestly
2 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
Staying the Course in Afghanistan
haven it was before 9/11, and drastically ground, plus the distraction of the war
ramping up the U.S. presence would be in Iraq, sidetracked the effort, and the
a political nonstarter. That leaves some Taliban’s presence expanded. When
thing resembling the current approach Obama came into office, in 2009, he
as the only real option. Stuck with doing took a hard look at the Afghan campaign
more of the same, Washington must try and announced a surge of U.S. troops
to do it better. and a reinvigorated counterinsurgency
November/December 2017 3
Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal
strategy. But by the middle of 2015, the Compounding the challenges, the
troop surge was complete, and a subse Afghan legal system struggles to deal with
quent drawdown left only 9,800 coali corruption and criminality. Knowing little
tion troops in the country, most of about the law and the rights of citizenship,
whom were focused on training and Afghan security forces often make critical
advising the Afghans. Progress had mistakes, for instance, detaining innocent
been made, but it was limited. civilians. By contrast, Taliban fighters—
Today, Afghanistan is struggling to especially those in the lethal Haqqani
survive. Although the Taliban have de network, an offshoot of the Taliban based
facto control over only limited areas of in Pakistan—often have a thorough
the country, their presence and influ understanding of the law. When captured,
ence are likely at their highest levels they have proved adept at minimizing their
since the group lost power in 2001. sentences or avoiding conviction altogether.
Remnants of the al Qaeda network and In Kabul, meanwhile, politics have
one of its branches, al Qaeda in the reached a standstill. Despite its name, the
Indian Subcontinent, are also active, National Unity Government—a power-
having been pushed out of Pakistan’s sharing deal brokered by the United
tribal areas in late 2014 by the Pakistani States in 2014 that made Ashraf Ghani
military. The Islamic State in Khorasan, president and Abdullah Abdullah chief
as the branch of isis in Afghanistan and executive—is deeply divided.
Pakistan is known, enjoys free rein on Whatever progress the United States
both sides of the two countries’ border. has made after 16 years, it is inarguably
Although each of these groups has its incomplete. To some Americans, the
own transnational agenda, all have made effort has succeeded in building a shaky
common cause with the Taliban to over foundation on which more can and should
throw the Afghan government. be constructed. To others, it represents a
The fragility of Afghanistan’s security fruitless waste of blood and treasure. For
sector is making their job easier. The the ordinary Afghan, however, the U.S.
180,000 soldiers of the Afghan National campaign has led to frightening uncer
Army, trained and equipped largely by tainty about the future.
the United States, are employed primar-
ily at static checkpoints around the WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
country that are vulnerable to Taliban In 1902, Vladimir Lenin published a now
attacks. The Afghan National Police, famous pamphlet titled What Is to Be
which is riddled with corruption and Done?, in which he prescribed a strategy
poor leadership, is used more for the for what later became the Bolsheviks’
protection of members of parliament successful takeover of Russia’s 1917
and other officials than for its intended revolution. Lenin argued that Russia’s
purpose of enforcing law and order. working classes required the leadership
Afghanistan’s premier intelligence agency, of dedicated cadres before they would
the National Directorate of Security, is become sufficiently politicized to demand
increasingly involved in military opera change in tsarist Russia. It was a clear-
tions against terrorist groups instead of eyed assessment of reality. The same is
providing essential intelligence. needed for Afghanistan now.
4 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
Staying the Course in Afghanistan
The United States has three basic support for a major increase in U.S. troop
options in Afghanistan: do less, continue levels and a renewed commitment of many
on the current path, or do more. There years is even more unlikely. Unless condi
is material for endless debates about the tions on the ground changed drastically,
merits of each, but it helps to begin by it would be unrealistic to propose such a
remembering what the United States’ strategy. Besides, Afghans across the
objectives in Afghanistan were and still nation appreciate that a stepped-up U.S.
are. As Obama said in his 2009 West presence would not be politically sustain
Point speech about Afghanistan, “We able for long, thus increasing their concerns
must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We about what would happen after the
must reverse the Taliban’s momentum Americans left.
and deny it the ability to overthrow the That leaves the current approach as
government. And we must strengthen the only viable option. Under this strategy,
the capacity of Afghanistan’s security Washington would have to lower its
forces and government, so that they ambitions in Afghanistan, with the goal
can take lead responsibility for being merely a long-term relationship
Afghanistan’s future.” with and a limited military presence in a
If those objectives, or anything close to troubled but functioning country. As they
them, remain valid, it is hard to view doing shed some of the loftier goals of the past,
less as an acceptable course of action. policymakers will have to make it clear
Although the government of Afghan that the United States is unequivocally
President Mohammad Najibullah survived committed to its core goals. It would still
for three years after the Soviets withdrew, promote regional stability, encourage
before falling to opposition forces, it took modest but steady economic develop
muscular logistical support and infighting ment, and maintain a platform from
among the opposition warlords to keep it which to collect intelligence and carry out
in the fight for so long. Many observers counterterrorism operations. Although
believe that absent at least the current level this strategy would indeed come at a cost,
of support, Ghani’s government could its advantages—namely, ensuring the
last only a small fraction of that time. survival of a non-Taliban government—
As for the doing-more option, why would be worth the price.
couldn’t the United States consider a Critics may charge that following this
version of the 2009 troop surge again? course would meet the definition of
That strategy, while flawed due to ambi insanity—which, as that old adage has
tious timelines and the failure to execute it, is doing the same thing over and over
a truly whole-of-government approach, again and expecting a different result.
could have succeeded had Washington But as with everything in Afghanistan,
demonstrated the necessary patience and the truth is more complicated. The United
commitment. But executing a counter States has no better choice at hand, and
insurgency campaign over an extended in fact, this one is not all that bad. What’s
period, always difficult for the American more, within the confines of this strategy,
psyche, was a particularly tall order after there is room for improvement—in terms
the recent experience in Iraq. Today, of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan,
gathering the popular and political dealing with them and their allies in
November/December 2017 5
Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal
6 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
Staying the Course in Afghanistan
assume full responsibility for maintaining through the Torkham border crossing, in
their sovereignty and preventing the the famous Khyber Pass, using legitimate
reemergence of terrorist sanctuaries. documents. Specially selected and trained
inside Pakistan, they conduct meticu
FOLLOW THE ENEMY lously planned and rehearsed lethal
There is a common Afghan saying that attacks against foreign embassies, Afghan
roughly translates as “If water is mud government offices, and U.S. and nato
died downstream, don’t waste your time military installations.
filtering it; better to go upstream.” Like A purely defensive strategy against
wise, no U.S. military campaign in these threats will never be sufficient;
Afghanistan can succeed if the enemy highly focused offensive operations,
enjoys a safe haven in Pakistan. The primarily in Afghanistan but, when
United States must therefore refine necessary, also inside Pakistan, are
and focus its operations there. required. To be sure, the United States
Filtering the water upstream, so to has conducted such operations since the
speak, has proved politically difficult war in Afghanistan began, but it can do
across national borders. The U.S. more. To maximize their effectiveness, the
military’s 1916–17 incursion into Mexico United States should assemble an inte
to hunt the guerilla leader Pancho Villa grated task force with Afghanistan that
was famously controversial, as were its allows the two countries’ intelligence
campaigns against North Vietnamese communities, law enforcement agencies,
sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos during and militaries to collaborate. (Washington
the Vietnam War. British forces acting should also break down its own organiza
on behalf of Malaysia conducted cross- tional silos that inhibit coordination and
border operations in Indonesia in the intelligence sharing when it comes to
1960s; the Soviets threatened to attack threats in Afghanistan.) In the best-case
mujahideen safe havens in Pakistan in scenario, Pakistan would willingly partici
the 1980s; and during the Iraq war, U.S. pate in these joint efforts, but in the event
Special Forces reached into Syria in that it does not show such unprecedented
pursuit of al Qaeda in Iraq operatives. cooperation, they should go on regardless.
In each case, the complexities were huge.
Still, it would be a mistake to rule out A MORE CAPABLE KABUL
U.S. operations in Pakistan. Like the The final element of the United States’
mujahideen in the 1980s, the Taliban strategy in Afghanistan should involve
today are organized around three main convincing the Afghan government to
hubs in the country—the province of press forward with reforms. Absent a
Baluchistan, the Waziristan region of the concerted and effective campaign to
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, and reduce corruption and increase the
the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. effectiveness of key institutions, legiti
From all three places, the Taliban launch macy with the Afghan people will remain
attacks across the border into Afghanistan elusive. Over the past 16 years, Washington
with impunity. Teams of Haqqani net has spent billions of dollars on training
work operatives sent to conduct high- and equipping Afghan forces and building
profile attacks have even managed to pass Afghanistan’s infrastructure, yet the
November/December 2017 7
Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal
country still has few properly functioning regime and few would benefit from the
institutions. The handful of ones that do Taliban’s return to power. Furthermore,
work owe their success to investments in the United States and its allies in post-9/11
developing leadership. Afghanistan have largely avoided being cast
Driving reform in the Afghan govern as colonialists. To be sure, Afghans have
ment will require continuous coordination expressed their frustrations—from outrage
with the Afghans themselves, and many over civilian casualties to disappointment
more than three cups of tea. Improving about the lack of economic progress—but
Afghanistan’s institutions will take the more of them wish for a better-executed
long-term work of building human capital effort than wish for abandonment.
and changing officials’ behavior, rather Other skeptics may argue that even a
than short-term infrastructure or other limited effort could fail, and if it does,
projects. Accordingly, the United States Washington could be forced into the
needs to work closely with Afghanistan hellish position of reluctantly increasing its
to select, train, mentor, and support the commitment to an unworthy client state.
right caliber of leaders. Putting in place The prospect brings to mind memories of
a “civilian surge” of large numbers of the gradual, and ultimately unsuccessful,
nonmilitary experts, as some have called escalation in Vietnam. This is indeed a
for, is impractical. Creating and fielding risk, but it is manageable, if Washington
such a group has proved difficult in the carefully identifies its objectives, and
past, and the American public has little worth accepting in light of the alternatives.
appetite for such an effort. But the United As satisfying as it might be to declare
States could find purchase in supporting a “game over” and move on, a post-American
smaller network of U.S. and interna Afghanistan is not a pretty picture. Even
tional civilian advisers who would stay though too great a Western presence in
in Afghanistan for longer tours of duty. the Muslim world generates resentment,
Driving change in any society is difficult, it is also true that a total absence reinforces
but Afghanistan’s complex environment is the narrative that the United States
no place for well-intentioned neophytes or doesn’t care about the non-Christian
dilettantes. For the greatest probability of parts of the world. Without resurrecting
long-term success, the United States will the domino theory from the Cold War,
need to create across multiple organiza one can still say that an American retreat
tions a cadre of dedicated professionals who from Afghanistan is unlikely to return
are steeped in the language, culture, and the country to the tranquil place that
political realities of Afghanistan and who served as the exotic setting for James
are connected by a coordinated strategy. Michener’s 1963 novel Caravans. More
probable is a repressive and ideological
PRESSING ON regime that supports transnational
It’s tempting to view any further effort in terrorist groups. Among a range of
Afghanistan as the ultimate example of unpalatable choices, the best option is
stupidity or stubbornness. In the so-called to pursue some version of the current
graveyard of empires, failure may seem policy. The United States might as well
inevitable. But such pessimism ignores that do that as well as it can.∂
a majority of Afghans oppose a Taliban
8 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s