{COMMITTEE PRINT] SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75 OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE, MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRO- NAUTICS, CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS, PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES UNITED STATES SENATE BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICH, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS VOLUME I Aucusr 30, 1976—Ordered to be printed Printed for the use of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ora WASHINGTON : 1976 nrLETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Tue Lisrary or Coneress, ConcresstonaL Resrarcy SERVICE, Washington, D.C., January 29, 1976. ‘Hon. Franx E. Moss, Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. Dear Senator Moss: Pursuant to your letter of request, the Con- essional Research Service with the cooperation of the Law Library has undertaken a study of the Sovict space program for the years 1971-75. The study has been divided into two volumes, of which this is the first. The purpose of the study is to bring up to date previous reports pre- pared by the Library of Congress for your committee, published in 1962, 1966, and 1971. The first volume has been completed and is herewith submitted. This volume has sought to review Soviet space resources, facilities and hardware, past and on-going programs of flights, research and applications, and projections of future plans. It should be emphasized that the report is based exclusively upon unclassified, open sources, both Soviet announcements and independ- ent checks on such data derived from U.S. observational equipment whose findings are published in this country, and from corresponding British data. A comparison of information in this report with that in classified sources has not been made. Dr, Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief of the Science Policy Research Division and Senior Specialist in Space and Transportation Tech- nology, Congressional Research Service, has been coordinator of the project. Also, he has been responsible for writing the summary, Chap- ters 1, 2, 6 and 7, plus preparing the appendices. Ms. Marcia S. Smith, Analyst in Science and Technology, Congres- sional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 3. Mr. Christopher H. Dodge, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chapter 4. Ms. Lani Hummel Raleigh, Analyst in Physical Sciences, Con- gressional Research Service, has been responsible for writing Chap- ter 5. Ms. Vikki A. Zegel, Analyst in Life Sciences, Congressional Re- search Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 3 Annex. Mr. J. Glen Moore, Analyst in Science and Technology, Congres- signal Research Service, has been responsible for writing the Chapter nex. Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, leader of the Kettering Group based in the United Kingdom, has been responsible for writing the Chapter 5 Annex and the two Chapter 6 Annexes. amyVv The study has been reviewed by appropriate individuals in more than one institution of Government in the interest of accuracy and security, although the final responsibility rests with the authors and the Congressional Research Service. Thanks are also extended to the following additional consultants and reviewers of the entire volume: Mr. Geoffrey E. Perry, Mr. David R. Woods, Mr. Charles P. Vick, and Mr. Maarten Houtman. Sincerely yours, Noratan Beckman, Acting Director. Enclosure.LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL Unrrep Srates Senate, Comaaurrmz on AzronavricaL anp Space Scrences, Washington, D.C. June 11, 1976. Hon, Frank E. Moss, Chairman, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Cuamman: Transmitted herewith is a report, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-1975, in two volumes. The report was prepared for the use of the Committee by the Congressional Research Service, with the cooperation of the Law Library, Library of Congress. This report is a follow-on to similar reports published at intervals since 1962, It is, as are its predecessors, a comprehensive and detailed study of the Soviet space program. Volume I provides an overview of the Soviet space program, its facilities and hardware, the manned and unmanned Soviet space mis- sions, Soviet bioastronautics, Soviet civilian and military applications, and projects future Soviet space plans. Volume II examines the goals and purposes of the Soviet space program, the organization of space activities in the Soviet Union, allocation of resources to Soviet space activities and Soviet attitudes towards international space cooperation. and space law. The report was prepared under the direction of Dr. Charles S. Sheldon, IT of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Con- gress. Dr. Sheldon, one of the free world’s foremost authorities on ‘oviet_ space activities, is also the major contributor to the study. Other parts of the study were prepared by other experts in the Library of Congress, and Geoffrey E Perry, consultant from the United Kingdom. Mr. Fred Doering of the Government Printing Office prepared the report for printing. In every respect this report is a remarkable accomplishment. It represents scholarship at the highest level but was done at minimum cost. I believe that this study of Soviet space programs has resulted in an important report and_will be most useful to the Committee and to other members of the Congress. Respectfully, Gutserr W. Keys, Staff Director,CONTENTS SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1971-75—VOLUME I SUMMARY I. Overview, supporting facilities and launch vehicles of the Soviet cs 2. Breakdown by categories. 3, Comparative weights of payload — B, Launch sites in the Soviet Union 1. Tyuratam. 2. Plesetsk. 3. Kapustin Yar. C. Soviet launch vehicles - 1. The standard launch vehicle series (“A’ 2. The small utility launch vehicle (“B”) 3. The flexible intermediate vehicle (‘C") ~ 4, The non-military large launch vehicle (“D”) 5, The military combat space launch vehicle (“F”) 6. The very heavy launch vehicle (G”).. D. Tracking and other ground support Communications needs, Earth orbital tracking in the U.S.8.R_ Foreign tracking stations. Sea-based support... Deep space tracking Space operations and data processing centers Space research centers ._.-----~ ouce lanufacturing and assembly centers for spacecraft and rockets... 9. Test and training centers IL, Program details of unmanned flights - a PNM gE gO C. Other recent scientific flights - 1. The Prognoz program. 2. French payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles_ 3, Indian and Swedish payloads carried by Soviet launch vehicles . 4. Soviet vertical rocket probes D, The second generation of planetary ij 1. The Mars attempts of 1971 an 2. The Venus attempts of 1975 E, The third generation of lunar flights 1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23. 2 Luna 17’and 21’. 3. Luna 19 and 227 its. 1973, wm Pare DAARHRAMO TTT RRR C9 0969.09 09.60 09.09.09 G9 NDT NRO LOADvu z 3 IIL. Program details of man-related flights . ‘A. Early years. . B. The Soyuz program 1, ‘Soyus ferry flights to Salyut space stations 2, The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. C. The Zond program of manned circumh D. ‘The Soviet manned lunar landing program. E. Unmanned biological flights. IV. The Soviet space life sciences__ Cosmonaut selection and training. Space medicine Life support systems and technology Gravitational biology and medicine Space radiation... fas atmospheres and pressures Space biology and exobiology. clusion . V. Soviet application o A. Communications satellites. 1. Molniya satellites 2. Statsionar satellites 3. International cooperation. 4. Direct broadcast - B. Meteorological satellites - 1. Meteor satellites - 2 Experimental weather satellites - C. Other civil applications. VI. Soviet military space activities A. Introduction. B, Extension of civil type space activities to military needs aia} RRRNKCEEEELSSSSSSS ccoccommarsse Navigation D. Space relat yi 12 E. Electronic ferreting or elint space missions. 12 F, Minor missions in space for the military. 1B G. Early warning saiellites ._ 13. H. Military manned space missions 13 I.” Recoverable military observation fights. 13 J, Ocean surveillance... 13 K. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites - 13 L. Military interceptor/inspector/destructor satellites 13. M. Ground based space detection and defense systems 13 N. Orbital bombs stationed in orbit... 14 ©. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component. 14 Minor military missions 14 2, Mectronie ferdet or eling 4 3. Navigation and navigation/geodetic missions 14 4. Obscure missions operating in the store/dump mo M4 5. Targets for interception and the interceptors them- selves .. 14 6. Fractional orbit bombardment satellites | 14 7. Military ocean radar surveillance 14 8, Early warning satellites. 14 9. Military observation photographic missions - 14 VII, Projections of Soviet space plans. 15 A. General technical capabilities. 15. B. Unmanned space flights 15 G Manned space flight. 16 D. Soviet philosophy tow: pace p 16 CHAPTER ONE—OVERVIEW, SUPPORTING FACILITIES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM I. Overall trends in flights. A. Gross statistics. ‘Table 1-1— 17 18 ‘orldwide record of known space launchings- 20 B. Breakdown by categories 22 Table 1-2-—Summary of Soviet space payloads by mission category (with U.S. comparisons) eet oex I. Overall trends in flights Continued 7 B. Breakdown by categories—Continued Page Table 1-3—Detailed summary of Soviet space payloads ‘by launch site, launch inclination, name or category, launch vehicle and year er Table 1-4—Summary of Soviet space payloads by name_ 29 C. Comparative preight of payload. - “ 30 Table 1-5—World table of payload weight to orbit of beyond. ee) IT. Launeh sites in the Sovi 33 f A. Tyuratam_. 33 B. Plesetsk. 35 ©. Kopustin Yar 36 ; Table 1-6—Number of successful orbit Taunches by site and by year, 33. IIT. Soviet launch vehicles__. 39 ‘Table 1-7—-Number of successful launches to Barth orbit and beyond by basic first stage by year-- 40 : Table 1-8—Soviet launch vehicle characteris 2 48 Table 1-9—Soviet launch vehicle lifting capabilities - = 46 : Table 1-10—Soviet launch vehicle upper stages and capacities. 47 A. The standard launch vehicle series (“‘A” eas 1. The original version—A. 48 . 2, Launch vehicle with lun: ar) 3. Launch vehicle with improved planetary up| AD... 50 4, The added stage version for eccentric o1 escape missions, A-2 51 5. The standard vehicle with maneuvering stage, 52 6. The standard vehicle possibly in an A~1-m configura- HOR 222 ne< omen n-ner pen enmesetgein enna n—o 52 : 7. The standard vehicle possibly in an A-2-m configura- tion. feeb B. The small utility launch vehicle (“B”) - Esa G. The fiexible intermediate launch vehicle (“C” = D. The non-military large launch vehicle (“D”) a 1. The basic vehicle without extra stages, D. S . 2: ‘The improved vehicle with an added stage, D-1-.._. 3. The improved vehicle with regular upper stage : ‘an escape stage, D-1~ 87 4, The possible use of a D-1-m version- 58 E. The military combat space launch vehicle (“F” BB 1. Use'as a weapons carrier, F—1-1 60 2, Use as a maneuvering vehicle, F- 61 F. The very heavy launch vehicle ("G")_.. 61 Table 1-11—Soviet surface-to-surface land-based stra~ tegic missile 65 . IV. Tracking and other ground support. 66 A. Communications needs, 66 B. Earth orbital tracking 66 GC. Foreign tracking stations. 67 \ D, Sea-based support... 67 1, Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov 68 2) Akademik Sergey Korole 69 3, Kosmonavt Yuriy Gagarin. 69 Table 1- acteristics of known Soviet ‘space and missile monitoring and. control ships. 71 4, Other tracking ships. 2 5. General locations of Soviet tracking ship 2 E. Deep space tracking .. 73 F. ee operations and data processing centers. 73 G. Space research centers - 76 HL Manufacturing and as: jor spacecraft and rockets. on 76 I. Test and training centers for space. 17x CHAPTER TWO—PROGRAM DETAILS OF UNMANNED FLIGHTS I. Early years... ‘A. Origins of the Soviet space program. 1, Early interest _ 2. Organization of the Soviet effort for space 3. Soviet eat planning. 4 Plans for the International Geophysical Year D. The Korabl Spates E. Beginnings of the planctary program. 1. 1960 Mars attempts. 2. 1961 Venus attempts_ 1962 Venus attempts. 11, 1972 Venus attemp' F, The second generation lunar 1. gg of technology. 2. 1963 Moon attempt 3. 1965 lunar attempts. 4. 1966 lunar attempts $f The Mektron program 1. The Proton program 01 II. The Kosmos pro; A. The nee 1. Use of the B-1 for 7 B-1 launch vehicle for scientific orbital missions. 2, Use of the C-1 for scientific flights. Table 2-3—Identifiable use of vehicle for scientific orbital missions. 3. Use 4 the A-1 and A-2 for scientific supplemental ayloads. - Tene ‘A-1 and A-2 launch vehicles for Kosmos scientific and supplemental payloads. F. Kosmos military flights G. Precursor flights wit H. Flight mission failures disguised as I.” Summary on Kosmos flights Table 2-5—Summary Kosmos, other name, and unacknowledged Soviet space payloads by mission category, 1957-1975xI 1. The Kosmos program—Continued interkosmos program... aa Overview of all international orbital igh Table 2-6—Summary list of Soviet orbital and escape flights’ which carried experiments of other nations.__..--.. . Interkosmos flights of the period 1968-1970. Interkosmos 5. 4. Prognoz 4. B. be vlonds carried by Soviet launch vehicles. 6. Further French experiments. ©. Indian payload carried by a Soviet launch vehicle 1, Antecedents, 2, Aryabhata. D. Swedish cooperative programs E. Soviet vertical rocket probes. 1. National fights... 2. The Vertikal international program - IV. The second generation of planetary flights. A. Soviet use of planetary windows. B. The Mars attempts of 1971 1. Launeh failures. 2. Launch of Mars 2, Mars 3, and Mariner 9 3. In-flight progress. 4 Mars 2 arrival 5. Mars 3 arrival. 7, The orbital buses and their activity. ©. The Mars attempts of 1973. 1. The launches of Mars 4, Mars 5, Mars 6 and Mars 7- 2. The flight en route 3. Arrival at Mars 4, Follow-up details of the fights D. The Venus attempts of 1975... 1, Launch of Venera 9 and Venera 10. 2. En route to Venus... 3. Landing of Venera 9 4, Landing of Venera 10- 5. The Venera 9 and 10 orbiters. ‘V’ The third generation of lunar flights A. Tuna 15__. B, Kosinos $00 and Kosinos 505- © Lune 1 mission. D. Luna 17 and ‘Lunckhod 1. 1, Flight of Luna 17.. 2, Description of Lunokhod roving vehicle...xIt V. The third generation of lunar flights—Continued D. Luna 17 ond Lunokhod 1—Continued 3. Review of operational life... ‘able 2-7—Summary record of the performance of Lunokhod 1 4. Scientific findings._ 5. Relative merits of manned versus unmanned roving lunar vehicles ___. Table 2-8—Comparison of Lunokhod 1 and ‘Apollo 15 rove E. Luna 18. F, Luna 19- G. Luna 20- 1, Flight of Luna 20. 2. Surface activity - 3, Return flight and recovery. 4, Scientific results . HL Luna 21 and Lunokhod 2 1. Flight of Luna 21 2! Operations of Lunokhod 2 Table 2-9—Summary record of the performance of Lunokhod 2 VI. Statistical tables on deep space missions_ ‘Table 2-10—Summary of lunar distance flight attempts ‘Table 2-11—Summary of planetary distance flight attempts. CHAPTER THREE—PROGRAM DETAILS OF MAN-RELATED FLIGHTS I. Early years. .-. "A. Advance preparation for manned fligh' , Sputnik 2 B. The Korabl Sputnik precursors to Vostok. 1. Korabl Sputnik 1- 2! Korabl Sputnik 2 3. Korabl Sputnik 4. Korabl Sputnik 4 5, Korabl Sputnik & ©. The Vostok program 1. Vostok 1 . Vostok 2 . Vostok 3 II. The Soyuz program. ‘A. Precursor flights to Soyuz B. Soyuz flights 1-9. Soyus 1. * Soyus 4 and 5. } Soyuz 6, 7 and 8 eee meee a g g € & rxu II. The Soyuz program—Continued C. Further tests: Kosmos 379, 382, 398 and 434. Table 3- Flight parameters of Kosmos 379, 382, 398 and. 1 Soyuz 10 and a, Salyut 1. b. Soyuz 10. c. Soyuz 11. Table 3-2—Daily log of activities on Salyut 1 during the period Soyuz 11 was docked to it. . Soyuz 14 and a. Salyut 3. 2. The spaceship _ 3. The launch vehi C. Conclusion. V. Unmanned biologie A. Kosmos 110_ B. Kosmos 605-. A. Biographies of cos 7 ‘Table 3-3—Summmary . VIL. Statistical tables on manned space flight_.. Table 3-4—U.S, and U,S.8.R. manned Table 3-5—Soviet flights related to biological payloa ‘Table 3-6—Soviet crews by program... Table 3-7—Manned spaceflight program: ‘Manned spaceflight programs summari \—Comparative time spent on space mis 0—List of deceased astronauts and cosmonixIV CHAPTER THREE ANNEX—THE APOLLO-SOYUZ TEST PROJECT (ASTP) I. Mission Summary- ‘A. ASTP crews. B. ASTP hardw: CG) ASTP experiment 1. Photography’ corona and zodiacal light ‘against the background of the night sky 2, Investigation of refraction and transparency of the ‘upper layers of the atmosphere. $. Photography of daytime and dust 4, Microorganisms growth. - 6, Fish embryonic development 6. Genetic experiments. 7. Artificial solar eclipse. ~ : Ultraviolet absorption. 9. Zone-forming fungi. 10. Microbial exchange test. . 11. Furnace system experiments. II. Historical background - ‘A. ASTP agreement. B. U,G.-Soviet cooperation C. U'S.-Soviet preliminary tal 1, Key personnel. YI. Joint preparations... ‘A. Astronaut and cosmonaut training. Simulations... -----------<-- ” (AST docking system development 1, APDS development__. _ D, Spacecraft atmosphere and pressure differences. E, Communications. TV. Political issues ‘A. Contribution B_ UWS. doubts—Senator Proxmire and the C.L.A.. G, Post-ASTP plans for future U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation i space ‘V. Summary--- CHAPTER FOUR—THE SOVIET SPACE LIFE SCIENCES I, Introduction. "A. Information resources.. ‘Figure 4-1—Soviet literature agenci tionships- Figure 4-2—Soviet literature for life sciences dig Table 4-1-—Foundations of space biology and medicine. Table 4-2—Space life sciences source journals. B. Organization of the Soviet space life sciences effo: ‘Figure 4-3—Organization of Soviet biomedical institu- tions. ‘II. Cosmonaut selection ‘A. The selection process. B. The training process 1. General protoc 2! Vestibular training. 3. Visual training. 4. Acceleration trainin; 5. Weightlessness training 6. Physical and survival training. 7, Behavioral and simulator training. Table 4-3—Soviet training devices for condi- ‘tioning the operational habits of cosmonauts. figidhad ining IIL. Space medicine ‘A. Medi ‘toring B, Medical instrumentation and biotelemetry_ a Table 4~4—Biomedical monitoring on Soviet and ‘United States spacecraft 1957-1975 -. - Table 4-5—Characteristics of biomedical monitoring systems for different manned spacecraft missions. Page 243 244 245 245 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 247 247 247 247 247 249 250 250 250 251 251 251 252 252 252 253 253 254 254 257 257 259 260 261 263 266 267 278 270 273 273 275 276 277 277 278 279 280 281 281 283 283, 284xv III. Space medicine—Continued C. Exercise and associated equipment. D. Medication and emergency drugs. B. Nutrition __ F. Work-rest cycles and biological rhythms- G. Biomedical findings. - Table 4~6—Dynamics of change in body weight cosmonauts after flight. ", Life support systems and technology A. Air regeneration and space cab: Table 4-7—Oxygen content of certs ponds of alkali metals and their capacity for ab- sorption of carbon dioxide. Water and food management. Waste management. Space nulls and clothing. ian-machine interactions. Rescue equipment and emergency measures. ‘Table 4-8—Means of cosmonaut protection and rescue in cage of rapid depressurization of spacecraft cabin. Future trends and systems. Figure 4-4—Characteristics of integrated life-support systems V. Gravitational biology and medicine ‘A. Linear accelerations. B. Weightlessness and si iz ‘able 4-9—Reactions of man and animai of weightlessness... Figure 4-5—Proposed process of adaptation to weight- lessness, Figure 4-5—Overview of current hypothesis concerning Processes involved in man’s adaptation to zero gravity - a Figure 4-7—Eiffects of the influence of weightlessness on man, Table 4-10—Means of preventing adverse effects of long-term weightlessness__ ©. Rotatory environments and vestibular factora_ D. Noise and vibration. VI. Problems of space radiation ‘A. The space radiation environment ‘able 4-11—Nature and location of electromagnetic and particulate ionizing radiations in space-..-.---- ‘Table 4-12—Average dose absorbed by the astronauts, according to thermoluminescent dosimetry data. B. Biomedical aspects of space radiation... ‘Table 4-13—-Expected short-term effects from acute wholebody radiation. ©. Radiation in combination with other spaceflight factors. D. Radioprotective compounds end shielding. E. Non-ionizing radiations and force fields. VIL. Gas atmospheres and pressures. A. Hyperoxic environments. B. Hypoxic environments... ©. Carbon dioxide, carbon as Figure 4-8—-Classifieation of COs toxie action effec relation to P co;_. Table 4-14—Toxic effects of elevated CO;, D. Pressure effects. Figure 4-9—P co, of the AGA as a function of baro- metric pressure; three zones of oxygen suppl. hypoxia, normoxia, and hyperoxia. E. Respiration and toxicology. VIII. Space and exobiology__.. A. The biosatellite program. B. Exobiology. C. The search for extraterrestrial intelligent life TX. Conclusions. nner a 308, 309 311 312 315 316 316 317 318 319 319 321 323 324 325, 325 327 329 329 330 332 332 334 334 334 339 341 343XVI CHAPTER FIVE—SOVIET APPLICATION OF SPACE TO THE ECONOMY 1. Early recognition of potential uses of applications satellites II. Communication satellites folniya syster Description o 2: Operation of Molniya 1 3. Molniya 2. 4, Molniya 3_ 5. Launch programs of Molniya 3. Table 5-1— space flights-. ‘The Orbits, ground station system_ a. Station construction. b. Orbita station locations ¢. Operation of Orbita stations. C. The synchronous communications satellites }. Kosmos 637, Molniya 1-S-1 and Kosmos 775- 2) Statsionar/Raduga. D. Broader proposals and app satellites. - 1. International lini a. Intersputnik sys b. U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperatio ¢. Washington-Moscow hot lin d. “Mars” portable ground statio 2, Joint experiments with France -_ E. Future of communications satellites—technical considerations and direct brosdcast satellites.. III. Meteorological satellites. ‘A. Early experiments. 1. Kosmos 14 and 23. 2. Kosmos 45, 65 and 92. -_- 3. Kosmos 44, 58, 100 and 118- B. The announced weather satellites of 1. Kosmos 122... ci pean . Payload appearance_ Kosmos 144. Kosmos 156. Kosmos 184. Kosmos 206 , Kosmos 226. ©. The Meteor system of weather reporting- D. The fully operational Meteor satellites- 1, The launch program of the weather-related satellites. Table 5-2—List of Soviet weather-related space flights (main sequence) - 2. Operation of the Meteor syste 3, Future of meteorological satel FE. Soviet weather rockets F. Other weather-related flights. 1, Molniya 1-3 and Molniya 1-4 2! Kosmos 149 and 320. 3, Kosmos 243 TV, Navigation satellites . Soviet references to navigation satellites. B, Actual navigation satellite flights. Y. Earth resourees satellites, ‘A. Earth resources data from the Meteor satellites. B. Manned flights gathering Earth resources data.. ©. Permanent space stations. e Soviet communications ORR ey Page 345, 345, 345, 346, 346 347 348, 348 348. 349 349 350 350 350 351 351 351 353 353, BB 354 B54 355 355, 355 357 357 357 357 357 BS 358 358 358 359 360 360 360 360 360 361 361 361 362 363 364 364 365, 365 365. 366 366 367 367 368 369 369XVII CHAPTER FIVE ANNEX—THE MOLNIYA COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES Table 5A-1—Replacement sequence of Molniya 1 satellites Table 5A-2—Replacement sequence of Molniya 2 satellites. Table 5A-3—Molniya time and longitude of ascending nodes. CHAPTER SIX—SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES I, Introduction. A. Definitional underpinnings of military space activity - B. Soviet statements on space for military purposes. II. Extension of civil type space activities to military needs. ‘A. Weather reporting. B) Regular communications. C. Geodesy and mapping. III. Navigation-_ IV. Space-related control systems ‘A. Traffic control. B. Military comma G. Other secure systems_ Y. Electronic ferreting or elint space missions. VI. Minor missions in space for the military. VIL. Early warning military satellit. VIII. Military manned space missions. IX. Recoverable military observation flights X. Ocean surveillance. XI. Fractional orbit bombardment system satellites XII. Military intereeptor/inspector/destructor satellites XII. Ground-based space detection and defense systems ‘XIV. Orbital bombs stationed in space. XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component_ A. Use of the B-1 vehicle at Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk. 1. Kapustin Yar 2! Plesetsk _ 3. Other B-1 fligi oth si ‘Table 6-1—Probable military space flights using the B-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number, apogee and perigee. _. : Table 6-2—Other space flights using the B-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number, apogee and perigee... B. Use of the C-1 vehicle at all three launch sites ‘Tyuratam developmental flights. 2) Plesetsk elint or ferret missions. 3. Plesetsk navigation missions. 4. An unidentified category at Plesetsk. . A Plesetsk series which could add gi gation. Plesetsk military communications possi mand and control. Plesetsk targets for interceptors Plesetsk minor military C-1 flights. Non-military uses of the C-1 launch vehicle Table 6-3—Probable military space flights using ‘the C-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number, apogee and perigee. Table 6-4—Other space flights using the C-1 launch vehicle by Kosmos number or name, apogee and perigee.-----.--_-_____ ©. Use of the F-1-r and F-1-m launch vehicles at Tyuratam 1, Weapons use of the F-1-r launeh vehicl: ‘Table 6-5—Probable military space fe the F-I-r or F-1-m launch vehicles by Kos- mos number if any, apogee and perigee... .- Table 6-6—Apparent weapons-related flights of the F-1-rlauneh vehicle 2, Military interceptors for inspection and destruction - ‘Table 6-7—The Soviet military space intercep- tor program, with orbital changes. Con o 67-871—16-—2 Page 372° 373 373. 375 375 377 380: 380 B81 381 383 384 884, 385, 386 387 388. B88. 389 390 393 393. 395 395 398. 400 401 401 401 402 403. 405 406 406 406 406 407 407 408 408 408 409 410 413 414 AltXVUI XV. Analysis of Soviet flights to discover the military component—Con. C. Use of the F-I-r and F-I-m launch vehicles at ‘Tyuratam—Con. 3. itary ocean surveillance using radar_ a Table, 6-8—Military ocean surveillance flights of F-l-m_ 4. Remainder of the F-i-m program. D. Military use of the A-1 launch vehicle. _ Table 6-9—Use of the A-1 launch vehicle including probable military nonrecoverable space fights as well as others by Kosmos number or other name (excluding Elektron), spogee and perigee. E. Military uses of the A-2-e launch vehicle_ Table 6-10—Use of A-2-e launch vehicle for eccentric Earth orbit space flights including probable military Kosmos and others by name with apogee and perigee (plus Elektron A-I flights) _. F, Use of the A-I and A-2 launch vehicles for mili able observation missions_ == Table 6-11—Soviet military photographic recoverable Kosmos missions by Kosmos number and days duration. i Table 6-12—Summary of Soviet military photographic recoverable Kosmos by years and by generation and pr MOa eS eee eee eter rope = Table 6-13—Summary of Soviet military photographic recoverable Kosmos by years and by announced in- clination__ . Plight durations . Launch sites. |. Inclinations. . Altitudes of igl . Identification of variants. G. Summary of commitment of launches and payloads to military versus civil primary uses___ pow ‘Table 6-14—Approximate comparison of United States and Soviet suecessful space launchings and payloads versus presumptively mili primarily civil-oriente: tary-oriented_.. CHAPTER SIX ANNEX ONE—NAVIGATION SATELLITES I. An operational system with a 74° inclination... oe ‘able 6A1-1—List of Soviet navigation satellites at 74°, 1970— 1972__ IL. The change to 83° inclination. IIL. The radio transmissions. IV. Conclusion Table 1975__- CHAPTER SIX ANNEX TWO—RECOVERABLE KOSMOS SATELLITES FOR MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE I. Launch statistics. II. Mission profile. III. Photographic coverage IV. Radio transmissions and telemetry formats 'V! Recovery beacons. VI_ Identification of possible targets. Figure 6A2-1—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 246. Figure 6A2-2(a)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 41 Figure 6A2-2(b)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 46: Figure 6A2~3(a)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 596_ Figure 6A2-3(b)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 597- Figure 6A2-3(c)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 598. Figure 6A2-3(d)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 599_ Figure 6A2-3(e)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 600. Figure 6A2-3(f)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 60: Figure 6A2-3(g)—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 60: Figure 6A2-4—Ground-tracks of Kosmos 759 VII. Related observations of telemetry for the manned programs. ‘Page 430 430 432 433 435 436 438 440 441 445, 446 447 447 447 447 448 451 452 453, 453 454 454 455 456 457 457 458 459 462 463 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 474 475xIx CHAPTER SEVEN—PROJECTIONS OF SOVIET SPACE PLANS I. Introduction_-. D. Capabilities vs. intentions IL. General technical capability ‘A. Overall suppor 1. Industrialization and gross national product_ 2. Key industries. 3. Education and manpower. B. Supporting hardware and facilities for space. 1. Launeh sites. C. Vehicle capabilities_- 1, Existing vehicle: 2. Additions to the vehicle stable_ 3. Use of high energy fuel in rockets. 4. Nuclear and electric rockets. 5. Reusable vehicles-_. (III. A chronology of Soviet statements on future space plans- IV. Analysis of Soviet intentions in space. A. Unmanned space fli; 1. Earth orbital science_ : 2. Civil space applications. a. Communications-. b. Weather. d. Other. 3. Military applications. a. Recoverable observation b. Early warning- c. Electronic ferret d. Ocean surveillance. e. Navigation. f. Geodesy g. Mapping h. Communications i.” Minor military. j. More threatening missions 4, Lunar studies. 5. Planetary stu: B. Manned space flight 1. Soyuz, Ferry . Independent mission _ Component. Docking modes ‘Tankage. Solar panels, Work module. Heat shield Seats __ Tabie 7-1—List of Soyuz variants. Soyuz capacity and mission potentials . Further variants of Soyuz. Overall design considerati Femme ao oP 2, Saly y Salyu . Civilian Salyut Salyut as » component. |, Large conical instrument container Docking... .. International cooperation — Page 479 479 480 481 481 482 482 4382 482 483 483 483 483, 484 484 484 435, 485, 485, 486 486 487 487 487 483 488, 488, 488, 489 489 439 489 4389 490 490 490 490 490 490 491 492 492 493 493 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 495 496 497 497 499 499 499 499 500 500 500xx IV. Analysis of Soviet intentions in space—Continued 'B. Manned space flight—Continued Page 3. A long-term space station. 501 a. Single launeh_. 50k b. Muitiple launches 50t c. Other orbits 504 d. Near-term 501 e. Longer term 501 4, Reusable space shuttle 502 5. Zond - 502 junar landing 502 a, Background oz b. Requirements 503 . Assessment of Soviet capabilities 505 |. ‘Components and alternatives. 506 e. Unpublished studies... 510 . Total requirements for Soviet manned lunar landing - 513 7, Manned planetary flight 51S 8, Colonies on the Moon and planets 57 9. Interstellar travel. 518. ©. Pace and timing -___- 518 5. Soviet philosophy toward their space program 519 1. National pride. 519 2. National prestige - 520 3. The engineering logic of developing space appli- cations - 521 4, Interest in science and discovery 522 5. Willingness to subordinate immediate consumer gains. 523 6. Marxist-Leninist religion 52d. 7. Final conclusions. 524 CHAPTER SEVEN ANNEX—CHRONOLOGY OF SOVIET SPACE FORECASTS 1970-75 525 APPENDIX A—TABLE OF SOVIET SPACE LAUNCHES, 1957-75... 553: APPENDIX B—ILLUSTRATIONS OF SOVIET LAUNCH VEHICLES AND SPACECRAFT ... Se aeSUMMARY By Charles S, Sheldon II* I. Overview. Survorrine Facturries anp Launcu Venicies oF THe Sovier Space Procraw A, OVERALL TREND Statistics on space activities are only approximate and are subject to revision, but enough data are available to afford a reasonably good overview of rates of relative progress among nations, 1. Gross Statistics Although the U.S. launch pace has declined since 1966, the Soviet record shows no similar drop, and now runs about three times as high as the current U.S. level. While the U.S. record of failures in flight is fairly well known, the Soviet Union continues to hide most of its fail- ures, and these can only be estimated as probably proportional to the eee of successes in the same ratio as applies to the U.S. space record. 2. Breakdown by Categories Despite Soviet and U.S. secrecy in hiding the missions of military space flights which overall make up a majority of launches, in both cases it 1s possible from open sources to deduce these missions, The largest single component in both programs are the flights which have a recoverable payload from low Earth orbit, presumably flown for observation purposes. Examination of 27 program elements shows that both the U.S. and Soviet programs are broadly based, seeking mul- tiple goals, with the primary difference being the Soviet inclusion of fractional orbit bombardment: satellites (FOBS) and satellite in- spector/destructor flights. These flights have no U.S. counterparts and on the Soviet side have ceased after 1971. 3. Comparative Weights of Payload In the absence of published data, only estimates can be made, and the launch capacity of the rockets used have been normalized to nom- inal low Earth orbit equivalents. These show the Soviet Union cumu- latively has launched about 50 percent more tonnage than the United States, and is currently running about four-fold the U.S. level, now that the Saturn V has been withdrawn from use. B, LAUNCH SITES IN THE SOVIET UNION 1. Tyuratam This site, in Kazakhstan, is the Cape Canaveral of the Soviet Union, launching many research and development (R & D) flights, some ob- *Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, qq)2 servation flights, all manned, lunar, and planetary flights. It is offi cially called the Baykonur Cosmodrome, but it is 370 kilometers south- west of Baykonur, adjacent to the new rocket city of Leninsk. 2. Plesetsk This is the Vandenberg Air Force Base of the Soviet Union, located’ north of Moscow toward: Arkhangelsk. It is used mostly for military operational flights, most civil applications flights, and for extreme latitude scientific flights. It has never been named or pinpointed by the Russians. 8. Kapustin Yar This site on the Volga River near the Caspian Sea is equivalent to: White Sands, New Mexico and Wallops Island, Virginia. It is used" to launch vertical probes and small satellites for civilian and military’ purposes, as well as conducting missile tests. The Russians now iden- tify it as the Volgograd Station. ©. SOVIET LAUNCH VEHICLES 1. The Standard Launch Vehicle Series (“A”) This adaptation of the 1957 SS-6 Sapwood ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) is still the mainstay of the Soviet program, with a first stage thrust of about 500 metric tons. It was used for Sputnik 1 and still is used for the Soyuz and many other flights today. It has: been used more times than any other orbital launch vehicle in the- world. With improved upper stages it will put up to 7.5 metric tons of payload in orbit. It is Toamehed at Tyuratam and Plesetsk. 2. The Small Utility Launch Vehicle (“B”) This adaptation of the SS-4 Sandal MRBM (medium range ballistic: missile) is used for the smallest direct-injection Kosmos flights proba- bly with payloads ranging up to about 400 kilograms. te has been. launched to orbit from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar (first in 1962). 3. The Flewible Intermediate Vehicle (“0”) This adaptation of the SS-5 Skean IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) may be able to put as much as one metric ton into» low orbit. With a restartable upper stage, it is able to put payloads into- circular orbits at various altitudes at least up to 1,500 kilometers. It is launched from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar, and used to be launched from Tyuratam, starting in 1964. 4. The Non-Military Large Launch Vehicle (“D”) First used for the Proton scientific payloads, it is now used for deep: space flights to the Moon and planets, for 24-hour synchronous flights, and for Salyut space stations. It can put about 20 metric tons into: Earth orbit, or send up to about 5 metric tons toward a near planet a favorable window. It is launched from Tyuratam, beginning in 5. The Military Combat Space Launch Vehicle (“F”) ‘This adaptation of the SS-9 Scarp is used from Tyuratam to put w ocean surveillance radar flights, and earlier was used to loft oth FOBS (fractional orbit bombardment system) and inspector /destruc- tor flights. It has never been announced as in use for a definable scien- tific or civilian mission. Flights to orbit began in 1966.3 6. The Very Heavy Launch Vehicle (“@”) Presumably this was first launched in 1969, but through 1976, it had not made a successful flight. It may. be designed to put about 135 or more metric tons into Earth orbit, or to send over 60 metric tons toward the Moon after Earth orbit rendezvous with other elements. Estimates of first stage thrust range as high as 6,00 metric tons. D. TRACKING AND OTHER GROUND SUPPORT 1, Communications Needs Tracking and communications with spacecraft are necessary to their successful use. The early Soviet support in this regard was limited and has had to be improved. 2. Earth Orbital Tracking in the US.8.R. Soviet tracking facilities have been identified in part in connection. with the recent Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, and some very elaborate missile and space defense tracking systems are also known to exist. ‘The vast geographic extent of the U.S.S.R. provides a fairly adequate setting for such work. 3. Foreign Tracking Stations There is a scattering of relatively modest tracking stations in Africa, Cuba, and probably at Kerguelen and in Antarctica, but noth- ing corresponding to the big stations used by the United States at some overseas locations. 4. Sea-Based Support In the absence of good land-based overseas tracking stations, the Russians have put into service some fairly impressive large tracking ships both for Earth orbital support and for deep space mission support. 6. Deep Space Tracking While deep space operations are aided by tracking ships, and there may be facilities in the Far East, the main deep space station is at Yevpatoriya in the Crimea, also the main flight operations center for Earth orbital flight. 6. Space Operations and Data Processing Centers These were relatively simple at first, but over the years, better com- puter support and graphic displays have been introduced at the launch sites, at Yevpatoriya, and now at another manned operations center at Kaliningrad near Moscow. 7. Space Research Centers Limited information is available about such space research centers. ‘Two well-known ones are the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory and the Moscow Space Research Institute. 8. Manufacturing and Assembly Centers for Spacecraft and Rockets Probably much construction is carried out in conjunction with air- craft plants, with use of rail transport to deliver modules to the assembly buildings at the launch sites for further testing.4 9. Test and Training Centers for Space Environmental chambers and other test equipment are used increas- ingly, often with the actual flight matched on Earth by an analog -exposed to as close to the same environment as can be achieved. The principal training center for manned flight is at Zvezdnyy Gorodok In the Moscow suburbs. II. Program Deraits or UNMANNED FLIGHTS A, EARLY YEARS Interest in the Soviet program for space dates back at least to the last century when Konstantin Tsiolkovskiy, now the patron saint of the space program, began publishing his ideas in this regard. Soviet space plans were announced for the International Geophysical Year in 1955, a day after the announcement of Project Vanguard, but these turned out to be about two orders of magnitude more ambitious. The first Sputnik (October 4, 1957) and Luna flights had great political impact upon the world position of the Soviet Union. Prepara- tions for manned flights and for flights to the planets followed in quick succession. During the mid-1960’s, the Soviet space program began to proliferate in many directions including work aimed at prac- tical applications ofa civilian and military character. B, THE KOSMOS PROGRAM From 1962 on, most Soviet flights were simply named Kosmos and given a number. This sweeping fabel covered & great variety of acien- tific, manned precursor, and military end uses, and also was used to dis- guise certain failures which attained Earth orbit, but did not accom- plish their probable full purpose. Even so, through study of repetitive patterns in orbits, the kind of debris associated with flights, and the timing of these flights, it has been possible to group most of these in- dividual payloads according to their mission purpose. 1. Kosmos Scientific Missions The early B-1 launched Kosmos flights were scientific, roughly equivalent to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Explorer series. These came from Kapustin Yar, and then occasionally from Plesetsk. When they carried experiments from other countries of the Soviet Bloc as well, they were generally named Interkosmos. For the last few years, virtually all Kosmos and Interkosmos scien- tifie flights have been launched by the larger C-1 class vehicle from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar. Some of the military observation flights launched by the A-1 or A-2 vehicles have carried supplemental experiments related to science, and over a period of time references to the findings have appeared in the literature, but the main mission is not mentioned. 2. Kosmos Precursor Flights About 23 flights related to the manned program have carried Kos- mos names. At least 9 flights with the Kosmos label were direct pre- cursors of the Meteor weather satellites. A miscellany of other precur- sor flights, also received the Kosmos label.5 8. Flight Mission Failures Disguised as Kosmos. At least 11 mission failures received Kosmos names. ©. OTHER RECENT SCIENTIFIC FLIGHTS 1. The Prognoz Program Four long-duration flights related to measuring solar weather phe- nomena and their interactions with Earth have been launched under the label Prognoz. 2. French Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles Oreol (Aureole) 1 and 2 have been French spacecraft used for auroral studies as a follow-on both to Soviet Bloc auroral studies and to French-Soviet conjugal point studies between Kerguelen and the Soviet arctic under the code name Arkad. MAS(SRET)-1 and 2 have been. small French engineering test satellites carried along on the same flights as Soviet Molniya commu- nications flights. Individual French experiments have been carried on other Soviet flights, including Prognoz, a biological Kosmos, and on Junar and planetary flights. 3. Indian and Swedish Payloads Carried by Soviet Launch Vehicles In 1975, the Indian payload Ariabat (Aryabhata) was launched. from Kapustin Yar on a C-1 vehicle. A much more ambitious pay- load to do Earth resources work is expected to be launched in 1977 or 1978. With little fanfare, a Swedish cooperative program also has begun,. although the first payload in 1975 with a Swedish experiment failed to attain orbit. More are to follow. 4. Soviet Vertical Rocket Probes Most major sounding rocket launchings are conducted from Kapus- tin_Yar. Both geophysical rockets and animal flights have been car- ried out. The international part of the program applies the name Vertikal to the flights. D. THE SECOND GENERATION OF PLANETARY FLIGHTS Most planetary windows to Mars and Venus have been used since 1960, with the exception of the time in the case of each planet that the launch vehicle was being upgraded from the A-2-e to the D-1-e, plus. the 1975 Mars opportunity which was skipped because of the high en- ergy requirements. 1. The Mare Attempts of 1971 and 1993 ‘The move up to the D-1-e launch vehicle permitted Mars 2 and 3 to include both orbiter and lander craft within each 4,650-kilogram pay: load. The orbiters put secondary emphasis on picture-taking, but gath- ered_a wide range of synoptic data. One lander did not make a soft landing; the other began a television transmission from the surface which was abruptly terminated before a complete picture was received. Because of higher energy requirements which cut the weight of pay- load available, tasks were further divided on the second occasion (1973). Mars 4 returned pictures but did not achieve orbit; Mars &6 did both. Mars 6 returned direct readings of the atmosphere but did not send signals from the surface; Mars 7 missed its landing, and flew by the planet, In summary, the flights fell well short of their goals, yet collectively returned valuable data. 2. The Venus Attempts of 1975 ‘The use of the D-1~e launch vehicle permitted both Venera 9 and 10 to carry orbiters and landers, and each pair worked well. The land- ers repeated previous direct readings of the atmosphere and sent back surface pictures which showed rock formations, sunlight and shadows, and a view to the horizon. The orbiters as of this writing are probably still functioning, but only limited findings have been reported to date. ¥, THE THIRD GENERATION OF LUNAR FLIGHTS Starting in 1969, Soviet unmanned lunar flights graduated to use of the D-1-e, probably able to carry as much as 5,800 kilograms to the vicinity of the Moon. Luna 15 and two Earth-orbital Kosmos rep- resented early trials which fell short of their objectives. (Luna 15 crashed on the Moon during the Apollo 11 mision.) 1. Luna 16, 18, 20, and 23 These four flights were all aimed at returning samples of lunar soil to Earth. Luna 16 and Luna 20 were both successful in making soft landings, using 2 television inspection system, then drilling for core samples which were loaded into a return vehicle which flew directly to Kazakhstan. The amounts returned were about 100 grams each, modest but enough for valuable analysis in several countries. Luna 18 landed in rough terrain (lurain) and did not survive. Luna 23 damaged its drill during the landing so was abandoned within three days. 2. Luna 1? and 21 Both spacecraft made soft landings to discharge on the surface re- motely controlled roving scientific laboratories. Lunokhod 1 operated for about 10 months, traveling over 10 kilometers, returning over 20,000 television pictures, plus mechanical and chemical tests of the soil, and doing topographic studies and some astronomy, Lunokhod 2 operated over 3 months, traveling about 37 kilometers, and return- ing over 80,000 television pictures. It also made soil tests, topographi- eal studies, and astronomical measurements, 3. Luna 19 and 22 Both spacecraft were placed in lunar orbit to do both high resolu- tion and wider area photographic survey work, plus gathering synop- tic data on orbital conditions. Each operated for something over a year. There were studies of the composition of surface rocks, circum- Tunar plasmas, solar radiation, Jupiter radio emissions, and lunar mas- cons. II. Procram Derarts or Man-Rexatep Fucus A. EARLY YEARS The Soviet program of manned. flights was preceded by many verti- eal probes from Kapustin Yar carrying dogs and other animals to al- titu 7 above the sensible atmosphere. Sputnik 2 carried the dog Layka to orbit.7 A succession of precursor craft called Korabl Sputniks made Earth orbital flights including the first successful recovery on Earth with two dogs as passengers. The flight of Yuriy Gagarin in Vostok 1 on April 12, 1961 created almost as much sensation in the world as did the flight of Sputnik 1 Jess than four years earlier. By 1963 there had been six manned flights, two pairs occurring at overlapping times, with the last flight occupied by a woman, Valentina Tereshkova. The Voskhod follow-on flights included the first three-man crew and the first EVA (extra-vehicular activity). B, THE SOYUZ PROGRAM The attempted recovery of Soyuz 1 in 1967 resulted in the first flight ‘death of a human being, although three American astronauts had been killed in a static test at Cape Canaveral three months earlier. The So- viet program back-tracked to more automated tests including the suc- cessful conduct of two sets of dockings within the Kosmos program. By 1969, a manned docking was accomplished, and two crew mem- bers transferred by EVA from Soyuz 5 to Soyuz 4 to return to Earth. A complicated group flight of three manned ships that fall did not include a successful docking. Soyuz 9 in 1970 set a duration record of 18 days. 1. Soyuz Ferry Flights to Salyut Space Stations In 1971, Soyuz 10 docked ‘with a Salyut 1 station for a combined weight, of over 25 metric tons. However, the station was not occupied. Shortly, three more men went up in Soyuz 11 to enter the station, with a total flight time of almost 24 days. A large variety of geophysical, astronomical, medical, and ship systems tests were conducted. Tragi- cally, just before reentry, a pressure equalization valve stuck open, and when the ship had landed automatically, the men were found to be dead. This was a major setback to the Soviet schedule, and required more unmanned tests. A Salyut 2 station was launched in 1973, but it failed within a mat- ter of days, and was not visited by a Soyuz. Kosmos 557 that same spring was also a Salyut station and it failed even before the Salyut name could be ap; lied, Soyuz 12 was sent to orbit in a two-man flight in 1973 as a check on improved systems for the Soyuz ferry version, returning to Earth in two days. With no Salyut station available, the year was closed out with an independent flight of Soyuz 13 doing the kind of astronomical work (but on a more limited scale) which was done with the Salyut station, In 1974, Salyut 3 was put into a low orbit, with much the same chai acteristics as the aborted Salyut 2. Tt was judged to be largely a mili- tary observation flight, capable of operating either manned or un- manned. An all-military crew in Soyuz 14 went up for about 15 days and occupied the station. A similar crew in Soyuz 15 followed, but made poor approaches in rendezvous, so came down again in two days. Salyut 3 continued to operate in automatic mode to complete six months in orbit, during the course of which a data capsule was re- turned to Earth by remote control. Salyut 4, with characteristics similar to Kosmos 557, was sent to a higher orbit late in 1974. During 1975, it was visited during a 30 day8 flight by the crew of Soyuz 17, and then during a 63 day flight by the: crew of Soyuz 18. Primary emphasis was put on astronomical work, al- though there was also study of Earth resources, medical problems, and ship systems. Late in the year ‘Soyuz 20 made an unmanned flight to Salyut 4, and remained docked to 1t in a long-duration test as the year ended, Between the flights of Soyuz 17 and 18, another Soyuz was: launched on April 5, 1975, which ran into difficulties during the launch phase, and an ‘automatic abort put the crew down about 1,600 kilome- ters away from the launch site 20 minutes later. They were rescued. 2. The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project As a result of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, agreement was reached to- conduct a joint flight which would include the use of a new universal or androgynous docking system, together with the conduct of other experiments. On the Russian side, there were several unmanned pre- enrsor flights under the Kosmos label, and then Soyuz 16 in December 1974 was & complete analog for the flight to come, even to the test of a docking ring which it carried to orbit and then docked to several times. On July 15, 1975, the joint flights occurred on time. Soyuz 19 was followed to orbit 7.5 hours later by an Apollo, and the two crews were united after Apollo conducted the active rendezvous and docking. Not only did the flight require development of the new docking system, but for the first time detailed engineering exchanges of information on hardware and procedures. The crews and their back-ups had to learn each other’s languages. There were repeated trips between Houston and Zvezdnyy Gorodok, and eventually visits to both launch sites. For the first time the Soviet launch and recovery were shown live on worldwide television. For the most part, the flights went according to- plan. . THE ZOND PROGRAM OF MANNED CIRCUMLUNAR PRECURSORS Although Western observers had expected the Russians to be the first to send men around the Moon, a variety of delays and troubles beset this part of their program. Zond 4 through Zond 8 made un- manned flights testing various aspects of the operation which was to carry men as soon as the systems were man-rated. All those planned to pass near the Moon and return to Earth did so and were recovered. Kost return approaches were over Antarctica toward the Indian Ocean. Zond 5 landed in that ocean. Zond 6 and 7 made a skip reentr, over that ocean and flew on to Kazakhstan, thereby cutting the G load. Zond 8 approached Earth from the north, and landed in the Indian Ocean. But time and events had obsoleted the program, and no further developments have been noted since 1970. D. THE SOVIET MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM For a long time the Russians were sufficiently confident they would pe the first to land men on the Moon that they made a number of predictions to this effect. Apollo eventually ended that hope. But if ‘Apollo 11 had failed and lost the crew, and if the several Soviet. re- quired elements of technical systems for manned lunar landing opera- trons had been more successful, they might have pursued their work9 ‘to be first. There is not much doubt that one by one they were develop- ing the components needed for such lunar operations, and were learn- ing the techniques of rendezvous, assembly, landing, and Earth return from lunar distances. The program’ was set aside for the present shortly after the first G-1-e vehicle failed in launch, and the Apollo 11 flight was successfully completed. E. UNMANNED BIOLOGICAL FLIGHTS Five payloads have been dedicated to Soviet biological experiments starting with Kosmos 110 in 1966, and continued with Kosmos 605, 690, 782, and Soyuz 20. These have carried a variety of animals, insects, plant life, and microorganisms, Kosmos 782 in the fall of 1975 has carried additionally experiments of the United States, France, Czechoslovakia and Romania. IV. Tue Sovrer Space Lire Sctences The Soviet space life sciences effort is the most comprehensive in the world, and information about this effort is surprisingly available to scientists in other countries. Subtle differences exist between the US. and Soviet approaches. A. COSMONAUT SELECTION AND TRAINING The cosmonaut. selection and training process is evolving from a program of rigorous physical conditioning to one that is more special- ized and task-oriented. More accurate quantitative methods are being developed to predict cosmonaut behavior and performance. More elab- orate new training facilities and spaceship analogs have been con- structed. The program encompasses preparation for orbital, lunar, and -even interplanetary flight. B. SPACE MEDICINE, The technology of medical monitoring, diagnosis, and treatment of disorders arising during progressively longer spaesflights hee been significantly improved. Equipment has been developed to counteract the undesirable effects of spaceflight, mainly weightlessness, The foods available have been expanded and upgraded. ©. LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY While the basic Soviet life support systems remain the same, many modifications and improvements have been made in these systems, including better recycling of water and air. The ultimate goal is an almost totally closed ecological system able to perform reliably for months or years. Already ground tests of closed ecological systems have been operated up to one year, with lower plants, higher plants, and men. D, GRAVITATIONAL BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE These studies have received considerable attention, particularly in combination with other spaceflight factors. These include high gravity,10 weightlessness, and rotatory accelerations to determine effects and. human tolerances, and steps to overcome problems through physical conditioning and drugs. E, SPACE RADIATION Experiments in radiobiology are extensive, including study of pre- ventive measures through use of drugs, shielding devices, and force fields. These studies extend to the conditions to be found on manned. interplanetary flights. F, GAS ATMOSPHERES AND PRESSURES The Russians are making considerable study of the effects on the crews of different gases and atmospheres in life support systems. They are also studying the effects of altered atmospheric pressures, par- ticularly sudden decompression phenomena, to learn limits of human. tolerance and the prevention and treatment of related disorders. In general, they still favor spacecraft atmospheres as close to Earth’s as. possible. They are working on management of toxic substances that. may be found in atmospheres. G. SPACE BIOLOGY AND EXOBIOLOGY, Their unmanned biological satellites in recent years have grown in technological quality in their automated management and handling of large numbers of animals and plants in order to meet their metabolic requirements. They are studying with suitable parallel controls the: effects separately and synoptically of weightlessness, radiation, and rotatory accelerations on their experimental subjects. Study of exobiology includes the possible life forms that might exist. on other planets, the detection of extraterrestrial life, and the search for intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, H. CONCLUSION Every sign points toward a continued commitment to manned flight. even to the planets and beyond. The successes in the life sciences are already reflected in the operations of their orbiting stations. The space- life sciences seem assured of continuing support at a high level. V. Sovier Arprication or Space to rae Economy A. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES 1. Molniya Satellites ‘The principal part of the Soviet communications satellite program has revolved around repetitive use of the Molniya classes of payloads, put up by the A-2-e vehicle into an eccentric orbit ranging from around 500 kilometers in the southern hemisphere to about 40,000 kilometers in the northern hemisphere, and inclined at about 63 degrees to the Equator. Three satellites of the Molniya 1, 2, and 3 class variants: are in the same plane in four groups 90 degrees apart for a total of 12 active at any one time, to meet military, international, and domestic television and civilian message traffic requirements. These satellites-i connect with about 60 Earth terminals of the Orbita system. The use of the Molniya inclined, eccentric orbit has made it possible to put up heavier payloads of greater power to cut ground terminal costs, and to give good service to northern latitudes. 2. Statsionar Satellites Starting in 1974, several years later than expected, the Russians have begun experimental flights to equatorial 24-hour synchronous orbits, fixed relative to a point on the surface of the Earth, by using the larger D-1-¢ launch vehicle. Late in 1975, the first Statsionar of 10 projected for the next five years was placed in orbit and given the new name Raduga. 3. International Cooperation The Russians have moved at a deliberate pace to set up their own Intersputnik Soviet Bloc cooperative communications system in competition with the Intelsat consortium used by most of the rest of the world. However, they also have an Earth terminal near Lvov to link into the Intelsat system. The Washington-Moscow “hot line” uses both American satellites and Soviet Molniya satellites to link the two capitals, 4, Divect Broadcast For the future, the Russians may overcome their own objections to direct, broadcast satellites which could penetrate their censorship, and may create their own direct broadcast system. But their ambivalence shows in their proposal to permit action against program material offensive to the receiving nation through jamming or even satellite destruction. B, METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITES 1. Meteor Satellites Several years of expanding experimental service was carried on be- fore the Meteor system was declared operational, and by the end of 1975, 24 satellites of that name had been placed in orbit. They are three-axis stabilized, and are launched by the A-1 vehicle. They carry television cameras with a resolution of about 1,200 meters, with two cameras each covering a slightly overlapping path about 1,000 kilom- eters wide. A separate infrared (IR) sensor system returns night pictures to supplement the day pictures. More recent flights have added APT (automatic picture transmission) for realtime coverage. Soviet weather satellites not only give cloud cover pictures, but Te- port on ocean ice, snow cover on land, and have even given some geo- logical information of value. 2. Experimental weather satellites Weather cameras have also been carried on a few of the Molniya. communications satellites. Advanced sensors related to passive micro- wave to determine ocean currents, ice fields under cloud cover, and soil moisture have been tested in Kosmos flights starting with Kosmos 248. An experimental Meteor 2 was orbited in 1975, ©. OTHER CIVIL APPLICATIONS In time, Soviet navigation satellite use is likely to spread from purely naval to the merchant marine.12 There are not. yet any comprehensive Soviet Barth resources satel- lites of the unmanned variety. Techniques of Barth resources survey are under development. largely within the manned program, supple- mented by individual experiments in unmanned satellites. Finally, the Russians also speak of versatile future cities in space serving many economic and human purposes, but these are not yet discussed in terms specific enough to be considered actual hardware programs. VI. Sovmer Murrary Space Acrivrrmes A. INTRODUCTION The Soviet Union claims each individual space flight to be seientific in character, and in the early years many Soviet charges of aggressive military intent were made against the United States space program. As Soviet military space capabilities have grown in quantity, variety, and operational effectiveness, such charges against the United States have largely been muted, and a certain accommodation between. the nations has been tacitly developed in this regard, B. EXTENSION OF CIVEL TYPE SPACE ACTIVITIES TO MILITARY NEEDS Weather reporting is generally an open activity, and military clients of such a system are not identifiable from the fact of such flights, but of necessity exist. By now, it is suspected that the Molniya 1 satellites have moved from handling civilian television and telephone traffic to government and military uses. This is because this series is maintained actively while the newer Molniya 2 and 8 flights have taken on the tasks originally assigned to Molniya 1, Geodesy and mapping could be either civil or military functions. ‘The absence of identification of such flights by mission suggests that in the Soviet setting, they are still considered to be military. ©. NAVIGATION The Russians have claimed a navigation satellite system for many years, but never have identified a specific payload as assigned to this use. They probably have gone the same technical route as the Ameri- cans in building a system which leaves the using submarines or sur. face ships passive, manipulating the signals heard in an onboard ship computer to establish the ship location in reference to the known position of the satellite, D. SPACE RELATED CONTROL SYSTEMs There is no sign the Russians yet operate a spaceborne traffic control system. They probably do use space links both for military command and control, and to maintain clandestine channels of communication. E, ELECTRONIO FERRETING OR ELINT SPACE MISSIONS Russian concern with all kinds of electronic intelligence is so well noted in their literature that one must assume many flights eather such intelligence, whether in the form of message traflic or of radar charac- teristics,13 ¥. MINOR MISSIONS IN SPACE FOR THE MILITARY A miscellany of minor missions such as environmental monitoring, testing of new components, and radar calibration are not viewed as especially sensitive military activities, but are not specifically identified by the Russians, They almost certainly make such flights. G. EARLY WARNING SATELLITES In an age of short time spans between initiation of missile launch and arrival of warheads at targets, early warning systems are a natural concern of military planners. It should be assumed that Soviet space flights include provision for early warning sensors. HH, MILITARY MANNED SPACE MISSIONS In the Soviet case, military manned missions, beyond the use of military cosmonauts; is not admitted to, and must be inferred from the performance of some missions. I. RECOVERABLE MILITARY OBSERVATION FLIGHTS The Soviet Union only obliquely admits to use of military observa- tion photographic flights in space, but the characteristics of their pro- grams and the obvious need in both strategic and tactical applications are so great that their use must be probably the highest priority mili- tary mission under active application. J. OCEAN SURVEILLANCE Because naval vessels may operate under radio silence and maneuver to maintain positions under cloud cover where possible, an obvious ap- plication of space technology is an ocean surveillance system, using radar to penetrate the clouds. Such a Soviet system is now flying. K. FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM SATELLITES While the United States has not considered fractional orbit bom- barcinent satellites as cost effective, considering the alternative uses of limited funds, the Russians at least for some years held a different view, and worked vigorously to bring to operational level such.a sys- tem. ‘These satellites have not been flown since 1971. L, MILITARY INTERCEPTOR/INSPECTOR/DESTRUCTOR SATELLITES The United States abandoned its one-time commitment to develop- ment of a satellite co-orbit inspection system. The Russians pushed such a system vigorously, demonstrating intercepts at many altitudes, and exploding the inspectors after making close approaches. M. GROUND BASED SPACE DETECTION AND DEFENSE SYSTEMS Because the Russians have an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, one is not-rash to assume they have at least a limited capability to in- tercept and destroy satellites with these same weapons. 678717634 N. ORBITAL BOMBS STATIONED IN SPACE There is no evidence the Russians have placed weapons of mass destruction in sustained orbit, and both major space powers are sig- natories of a treaty prohibiting such action. 0. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FLIGHTS TO DISCOVER THE MILITARY COMPONENT It is possible to match the characteristics various military space sys- tems should have to be effective against the characteristics of actual Soviet flights which have not been specifically identified by the Rus- sians as to purpose. The repetitive patterns of most of these flights make their mission identification fairly easy to a reasonable degree of cortainty, although some judgments may have to be altered with time. Categories found include: 1, Minor Military Missions These are launched by the B-1 or the C-1 from Plesetsk and less often today from Kapustin Yar. 2. Electronic Ferret or Elint Missions These are launched by the C-1 or the A-1 from Plesetsk. 3. Navigation and Navigation/ Geodetic Missions ‘These are launched by the C-1 from Plesetsk. 4. Obscure Missions Operating in the Store-dump Mode Whether launched from Plesetsk singly by the C-1 to about an 800 kilometer altitude, or eight at a time by the C-1 to about a 1,500 Kilometer altitude, these flights probably serve communications pur- poses related to command and control or tactical communications, or for other clandestine purposes. 5. Largets for Interception and the Interceptors Themselves The C-i from Plesetsk has been used to put up targets, and the F-1-m from Tyuratam has put up both targets and the maneuverable interceptors themselves. 6. Fractional Orbit Bombardment Satellites For a period of six years, the F-1-r was used at Tyuratam to fly simulated bombs about 95 percent or so of the distance around the Earth back to home territory, but this was suspended in 1971. 7, Military Ocean Radar Surveillance ‘The F-1-m maneuverable satellite is being used increasingly for ocean surveillance, and at the end of the mission, the “hot” radioactive power source is being moved to a higher orbit from which it will not decay for many centuries. 8. Early Warning Satellites ‘The A-2- is used to But early warning satellites into 12-hour orbits from Plesetsk, most likely for this Purpose. It is possible the first simi- jar use has been made of the D-1-e at Tyuratam to put such a payload into a 24-hour orbit. 9. Military Observation Photographic Missions The largest single element of the entire Soviet space program is15 made up of recoverable missions which stay in low circular orbit for riods up to 14 days and then return to Kazakhstan. They are launched both at Plesetsk and at Tyuratam, using the A-2 launch vehicle. Analysis, particularly in the public domain by the Kettering Group of the United Kingdom, sorts these flights into various subsets by maneuvering capabilities, and telemetry and beacon formats. These have made it possible to estimate the categories of camera resolutions and often to identify the specific Earth ar which they watch. Overall, the ratio of military uses to civil uses of space launches by the Soviet Union is two to one. VII. Prosecrions or Sovter Space Prans Soviet space plans for the future are commented upon extensively by Russian. Siokeainea: but usually without specific timetables. So much is predicted that one realizes not all the goals can be attained in the near term. Hence, the task is to estimate intentions rather than just their broad technical capabilities. Such coming trends may be estimated both from the clues of precursor flights and subsystems development and from a careful reading of how they make their public predictions. The best estimates of the future may fail to materialize if external events intervene, or if their policies are changed. A. GENERAL TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES They have now built up a complex of industry, experience, and human talent which is capable of supporting indefinitely their present. high level of space flight, and there is no reason to assume there are presently any plans for retrenchment. Further growth may come, but at a slower rate, unless they put into service a reusable space shuttle, which could provide a “quantum jump” in what they do. The lon; awaited very large lift vehicle, the G class, will probably appear, an: ermit some direct launches of large payloads without the necessity ‘or orbital assembly to the same degree otherwise required. B. UNMANNED SPACE FLIGHTS Their existing activities in science, weather reporting, and com- munications should continue to grow in operational effectiveness, One can expect further flights to the Moon of sample retrievers, roving vehicles, and orbiters. Both Mars and Venus will continue to receive attention when the windows for launch are favorable. Later, there will be Soviet flights inward to Mercury, outward to the giant planets, a new missions to comets, planctoide, and out of the plane of the ecliptic. ilitary uses are already so large » part of the total that they will continue to expand. upon and perfect the great variety of activities cur- rently being pursued. The question of more threatening missions is one that turns both on the issues of arms controls and of the possible appearance of new technologies which could change prevailing as- sumptions as to what is now “reasonable”,16 (. MANNED SPACE FLIGHT Several more years of flights using the evolving Salyut station and the Soyuz ferry eraft should be expected. These operations will develop toward longer and longer life stations with resupply and refurbishment. Manned lunar landing seems to have been delayed longer than was expected five years ago, but has not been written out of the realm of possibilities, All the hardware ingredients which were being rushed To readiness in the late 1960's and shortly thereafter are still in exist- ence with active production lines. When the Russians are confident. their systems will work reliably, they will visit the Moon, probably using a combination of Earth’ orbit rendezvous and lunar orbit rendezvous. ‘Manned interplanetary flight is not only an announced goal in speeches, but a strong likelihood in terms of the work being done on Space medicine and life support systems. An operational Soviet space Shuttle would move plans for such work from the merely technically possible to the economically possible. For the more distant future, human sottlements on other celestial bodies and study of interstellar travel are of interest to the Russians, but not yet in the form of conerete plans. D. SOVIET PIILOSOPITY TOWARD THEIR SPACE PROGRAM ‘The Russians have taken pride in their space accomplishments, and have not been loath to exploit the prestige associated with their suc- cesses. Space technicians seem to have convinced the political leader- ship, which often has an engineering background, of the economic necessity and benefit of pursuing an expanding program of explora- tion and application. They have not neglected science and discovery for its own sake, If this has involved any delay in improving the lot of the consuming public, it is part and parcel of a broader philosophy of sacrificing the present for Communist “pie in the sky”, For a system which flaunts its atheism, there is a certain element of secular religion in the official attitude that Soviet. man through his mastery of science and technology can control his destiny for the good of his system of society and government. Overall, their space program is pursued consistently, in orderly fashion, seeking multiple goals; and the investment in support of these ends is substantial, and probably in real terms is in excess of the U.S. program at its previous peak.CHAPTER ONE OVERVIEW, SUPPORTING FACILITIES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM By Charles S, Sheldon 1I* I. Overate Trenps in Frieuts The purpose of this section is to provide a perspective on the trends of development of the Soviet space program, including data on its general composition before turning in detail to particular components. To this end, statistical tables have been developed which will cover the entire period of flight operations even beyond the years on which this report is concentrated. It may be noted by the discerning reader that over a period of time some numbers in historical tables are modified from those previously published. This is because even at this late date, there are some new disclosures and also fresh interpretations of old data based upon more recent events which permit a refinement and more meaningful interpretation of what was even less perfectly under- stood earlier. In one sense, there never will be final figures for many tables. Not only do governments maintain policies of secrecy, but many numbers are based upon arbitrary definitions which are only occasion- ally spelled out in sufficient detail to be able to understand why two tables which purport to cover the same events come up with different numbers. For the most part, Soviet official numbers show fewer varia- tions than do their U.S. counterparts. This may be because when an early estimate is made and published, the Soviet authorities continue to use those data, even if their own computers later could make avail- able slightly different refined figures. While this study does not present a complete comparison of Soviet space data with that of other nations because it was not called for in our terms of reference, some of the tables which follow do include ue coverage in order to provide a perspective on the Soviet effort. The basic data come from national announcements such as TASS bulletins and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) press releases, plus the compilations of several national agen- cies. Most of the basic worldwide record maintained by the United States is compiled by Norad (North American Air Defense Com- mand), a joint U.S.-Canadian activity at Colorado Springs. Norad data are passed to the Goddard Space Flight Center which selects a part of these data and may add 2 few items of NASA origin which are then issued every other month. There is a corresponding activity in the United Kingdom. The Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farn- borough, Hants, has a satellite analysis group headed by Desmond “Dr. Sheldon is chief of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, (7)18 G. King-Hele which once a month issues a limited circulation tabuia- tion combining data from many sources to provide more data than the basic U.S. public lists show. These preliminary monthly lists are cumulated and corrected from time to time. In addition to the above official sources, similar unofficial lists, often with additional details, are carried semi-annually in Flight International in London, bi- monthly in Spaceview in Amsterdam, and monthly in Spaceflight in London. A. GROSS STATISTICS Table 1-1 which follows is a world summary by years of launches and payloads to Earth orbit or beyond, successes and failures to the extent known or estimatable for each country. As such, it reveals something about trends, but nothing about: the size, the effectiveness, or the utility and significance of each flight. According to the table, the Soviet Union reached a peak in number of successful launches in 1975. This contrasts with the U.S. peak of 1966 from which declines have brought this country down by about 62 percent. The flights of all other nations aro minor by comparison with the two space leaders. The record on payloads to Earth orbit is somewhat more erratic because the count includes a scattering of flights in which a consider- able number of payloads were sent up together. Even so, approxi- mately the same trends are reflected as for launches. For the so-called escape payloads, those sent to the vicinity of the Moon, the planets, or around the Sun, the number of payloads is much smaller. In this case there is no single Soviet peak, and the U.S. peak was in 1967. One can be reasonably sure that the record of successful launches is complete, The number of payloads may be nearly right, although there is always a chance of a pickaback which for some reason was not announced, or a piece of debris was thought to be a useful payload in the absence of information to the contrary. On the other hand, the record of failures is very problematical overall. The U.S. count on launch failures is probably accurate despite the reluctance of our Government to give prominence to these failures. The number of U.S. payloads lost through failure to reach orbit is more suspect because there is no legal obligation to report how many payloads a launch vehicle may have contained. The counts for all other non-Communist nations and their international agencies are probably accurate. There is no reliable public record of possible Soviet or Chinese launch fail- ures. Only two Soviet launch failures have been acknowledged by that nation. (‘These were the Soyuz launch of April 5, 1975 and a launch on June 3, 1975 which included a Swedish experiment.) In addition two Soviet launch failures were officially publicized by the U.S. Government. (These were the Mars attempts of October 10 and Octo- ber 14, 1960.) However, because of the Soviet use of the orbital launch platform technique for sending payloads either to deep space or to eccentric Earth orbit, a strong inferential case based upon time of launch and behavior of debris can be made that 22 payloads intended for escape missions fell short of that objective, and count as “failures” even though they were in most cases Earth orbital “successes”, In some of these cases, the Soviet Government did not even acknowledge the fact of launch. For the purposes of this table, judgments on success or failure of launches and payloads are based exclusively on whether19 hardware attained Earth orbit or “escape”, not on whether the pay- loads functioned and returned data. There is no public basis for classi- fying by operational effectiveness the payloads of most of the Soviet flights and those of the U.S. Department of Defense. ‘There were two choices open to the analyst in estimating the unre- ported and unmeasurable Soviet or Chinese failures. One was to com- pile a list of rumors (as has been done by J. A. Pilkington in the United Kingdom) ; the other was to argue that development of a com- mon technology has probably moved at a somewhat similar pace in different countries, and therefore the known failure rate of the United States could afford order of magnitude ratios to apply to the records of those countries which do not admit to failure. The latter course has been followed. Neither the rumor approach nor the common ratio approach can be counted upon to be accurate, What would not be satis- fying would be to accept uncritically the oft-repeated early Soviet claim that their program unlike the American has no failures. In the 1970’s the Russians issued a feature length motion picture, “The Tam- ing of the Fire”, which was a fictionalized account of the life of rocket- eer Sergey Korolev, and this included footage of one spectacular near launch site failure after another, to reflect the problems of the days Korolev was developing the standard launch vehicle. The pictures appeared to be genuine, and in any case represented a shift in policy by acknowledging that all space programs Vrave their difiiculties. The directly measurable Soviet failure rate for their deep space program runs higher than a simple ratio comparison with the United States would suggest, but this may have something to do with their use of the orbital launch platform technique, and poorer worldwide support facilities for this phase of their flights.TABLE 1-1-—WORLDWIDE RECORD OF KNOWN SPACE LAUNCHINGS—SUCCESSES Launches Payloads to Earth orbit Escape payloads to Moon, beyond United Ha United “United = United United Year Slates USS.R France Japan Maly China Australia Kingdom States U.S.S.R, France Japan Italy China Australia Kingdom States U.S.S.R. 4 Adcitionally, the United States sent 1 piece of debris from an Earth orbital payload to escape. i 1 a a 4 7 0 3 3 3 8 8 3 i 4 8FAILURES Launches. Escape payloads Payloads to Earth orbit ‘to Moon, beyond United United Year States USSR, France Japan China Kindgom = ELDO United United United Slates USSR, France Japan China Kingdom = ELDO-—Stales USS.R. 7 8 7 7 4 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 100134? 2 é a 1 4 125 (1697 3 6 Wt 1 4 1 224? NOTES 1 The, mos glaring omission fom the tale is the yat-by-rear cout of Soviet spac tallures (and pertiaps Chinese spece failures) caused by secrecy inthis regard. Only 2 Soviet failures have teen announced by the United States and 2 Sovet failures announced by that government. The total tires sto forthe USSR. and China carry questanmurks cause they ar only estimates prox portional to US. losses. 2, Soviet faluies in escape missions to the toon and planets are more nearly correct because that portion of such hat least achieved Earth orbit lft tell-tale traces of debris. Such payloads Counted as “successes” along with their Earth orbital launch platforms even though they were also fisted as escape felures. There are probably additional es:ape mission failures which did not make ‘even Earth oreit and hence understate the filure record, ‘S vihile Chinese failures have also been estimated, the success record is too small to give much validity to any count, ’4 it should be noted that the number of spacecraft listed exceeds the number of launches because some launches have carried multiple payloads, 5. The Soviet count of payloads includes their heavy sputnik orbital aunch platforms called eithor ‘Tyazhelly Sputnik or Nositel Sputnik. Some 136 of these have accompanied escape missions and high orbit missions such as those of the Molniya communications satellites. - Payloads which Rave flown as far from Earth as iunar orbit are counted in the escape category rativer than vith Earth satolites, : 7. Two U.S, payloads intonced to fly as far as the Moon or beyond stayed in Earth orbit and hence are counted as Earl orbital successes and escape failures. '. The suceess or fllure test applied for purposes of tis table Is solely that of whether orbit or escape was attined when so intanded. Whether the orbit was useful or whether the instrumentation Worked ig not measured because nct enough information is supplied by most launching counties Io draw consistent conclusions. NASA publishes Its own mission successes and failures by ts own more stringent citria than could be applied here, ‘ 9. payloads aro delnad eb Turtioal objet, isually emitting signals, bul used czaionaly as specially designed passive calibration devices, with thase objasts counted a3 separate payloads itthey wore intended to operate independently whether in fact they did or did not separate ia every Inston 10, included among the payload successes and failures, the latter in parens, put up by the United States and credited to that Nation are: Intelsat—20(2), NATO—2, ‘Bio 3d), ESA—-I, France/ Sermang2 Cana, United MatoriSlyGarmany-—t renos— Atala supplements, Tair? wetherands--, Span supplemental OF U.S, ounce, & vere perermed by Tay Ga 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1975), One additional Italian launch was for the United Kingdom. One French taunt fo Franc ang Gomanye he Soviet Uon fas gaa Tt Iterkoamas lanes forte Sonat Blo 8 rene including @supotennta, and titan, Bath the United Sues and the USS. Ravecariod may indidual xpettnentso ater counties SOURCES: The success data are derived from the Goddard Satelite Situation Report and the cor responding repotor the Royal Aircraft Establtstment (RAE), US. failure data are from the President's nual reports to Congress on azrosauties and space activities. Other falures are based upon either press releases of the governments concerned or upon Interpretations ofthe Goddard and RAE source mates fferenced above Estimated flr tolls ae cried tom simple rae compared wits ve U.S. record.22 B, BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORIES Table 1-2 which follows analyzes Soviet payload statistics by the probable mission categories, including some tentative comparisons with the United States. For a large number of Soviet flights such data are not published, and a variety of analytical techniques have had to be applied to come up with this approximation of the probable missions. Each of these categories will be discussed in some detail further into this section, Some flights can be tagged because those of a particular series have been given a specialized name and usually described in fair detail. But most have been thrown under the catchall! label “IKosmos”— which means Space. The press release issued at many of these launches references the release in 1962 which accompanied Kosmos 1 which listed so many potential missions as to account for almost anything. In the instance of the Kosmos flights, they must be studied for all known characteristics of time and place of launch, of orbital elements, of total time in orbit until decay, and of measurable behavior in orbit. Some of these flights later have their results published in articles in the Soviet scientific journals. Then inferences can be made about others of similar characteristics. For example, years before the United States announced that it had been operating previously unannounced mili- tary weather satellite program, it was evident to close observers that, when a succession of payloads were put into 960 kilometer circular orbits, just retrograde enough to be Sun-synchronous, this would al- most have to be for the purpose of taking low resolution pictures such as those used for weather reporting purposes. Likewise, when the Soviet Union puts up heavy satellites about 30 times a year and calls them down from low circular orbit after just a few days in orbit, one has to think of high resolution pictures recorded on film which will be analyzed in laboratories on Earth. Similar assessments based on logic and ‘inference give a fair basis for defining the missions of most spacecraft. There are inevitably some arbitrary classification problems. For example, should the first flight in a new series only later defined and made fully functional be classed with that series, or listed under “ve- hicle tests”? In general, the decision has been to list them with the emerging program. Then there are flights which may serve at least two major purposes. Here somewhat arbitrary choices have been made based upon the best estimate of the dominant purpose.TABLE 1-2—SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE PAYLOADS BY MISSION CATEGORY (WITH U.S. COMPARISONS) Soviet US. Mission Category. 1957 1858 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total Total Earth Orbital Science. ul 158 Earth Orbital Engineering. _. 2 53 Communications... 4 107 = i Earth Resaites 2 Lunar Man-Related or 16 i ea 5 Moon (Uamanr 23 Venus, Mercury 3 Interplanetary Mediur 6 PRIMARILY MILITARY Minor ‘Miltary: Environmental” Monitoring, Radar Calibration, Electronic Feret?. Bint, Fert Navigation and Geodesy Military Communications, Sioté-Dump Eany Warning Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems Ocean Sureliancs Inspection Targets Inspector Desttuctors. Subtotal. Orbital Launch Fi 7 M8 108 97 114 103 123-4, 082 8 8 2 wo on Be ES. Total 375 82 7585 BY 103140) 29s, NOTES 1, This table was derived by using analytical techniques described in the main body of the report ‘especially Chapter Two, in order to classify Soviet payloads by probable principal mission to the extent 4 feasonable assignment could be made. 2. The subdivisions of missions selected for use in this table were chesen to reflect categories sca in the teat As he text notes, many payloads have more than one purpose, and to avald double counting the listing for a given fight had fo assume a principal purpose. This is not always easy In such cases 3s geodesy and navigation, early warning and geophysical reporting, and vehicle tests and precursor flights for specific applications, i 3. Deciding which missions were primarily civilian in character and which military was also dficut and samevialabitary. For exam, al olny con unicatons payloads were counted ax cian sven though probably much military trafic is carried; but Kosmos flights also believed to be serving communications purposes (probably store-dump, from their relatively Low altitude) were counted as rllitary, Geodetic Mights could be civilian as many are in the United States, but because they ha ‘ot been acknowledged by individual fight, they were counted in the Soviet caso as all military. 4: A fow headings were selected to make easier compaisons with the United States, 5, Because the U.S. Department of Defense does not define many of the missions for its own flights, the column of comparisons does not retlect an official U.S. position, but rather a grouping of Nights by their external characteristics, using essentially the same techniques as were applied to Soviet Agus nt deine bythe Soviet goverment SOURCES: This table drew upon the bas ‘and as grouped by launch site, launch roupings for flights, . ‘The column of U.S. data was drawn primarily from source data contained in the annual reports of the President to Congress on aeronautical and space activities, ing ofall Soviet space Tights contsined in Appencx A, ‘and inclination in Table I~3 in order to find appropriate24 Table 1-8 in effect provides some of the back-up for Table 2 by list- ing all Soviet flights by years, by launch site, by flight inclination, by launch vehicle, and by class of name, Table 1-4 is a simpler array of the same number of flight totals by year, but groups them by the names if any assigned by the Soviet Government itself.TABLE 1-3.—DETAILED SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE PAYLOADS BY LAUNCH SITE, LAUNCH INCLINATION AND LAUNCH VEHICLE Incline Launch Payload ation” vehicle 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1979 1974 1875 Total KAPUSTIN YAR Kosmes—Weath B41 2 Interkosmos-—Scieies B41 7 BI al ita 489 Bt ig Kosmos—Military Communications. 49 BT 2 Kosmos—Science. ToL C1 1 Interkosmos—Scl B01 Gr 1 Aryabhata—Science.. D501 1 Total a TYURATAM Kosmos-Communications, Early Warning. 0 2 Molniya 1-S—Communications 0 1 Raduge—Communications 4 1 Unacknowledged—FOBS Related. 2 50 2 Kosmos—FOBS _ 50 iS 50 1 501 1 512 5 512 % 312 B 2 3 2 a ‘Soyuz—Manned Ship, or Ui 5L2 20 Kosmos-—Manned Precursor. S12 3 Proton—Science 512 1 mos—Salyut. 2 1 Salyut—Space Stalin. 512 4 smos—Zond Precursor... 512 2 ‘Zond—Circumiunar Mansied Precursor. Be 5 Kosmos—Manned Precursor....-. bre 1 Unacknowledged—Tyazheliy Spit 512 B Unacknowledged—Tyazheliy Sputnik. 512 32 Kosmos—Eccentrc Orbit. i: 512 1 Kosmos—Escape Failure 512 5 Kosmos—Escape Failure. 512 3 Luna. 52 7 ta 512 9 Ver 5-1 7 1 2 seTABLE 1-3.—DETAILED Payload tars. Unackiowisiged—Suppiamental Escape Inteskosmos ~Sci ‘Tyazheliy Sputnik.. Unacknowledged-—yately Sita na. put Vostok—Manned Ship. Kosmos-—Voskhod Pr Yoskhod—-Manned Ship. Kosmos—Test Kosmos—Weat Kosmos—Military Recoverabie Observation Kosmos—Military Recoverable Observation ‘Kosmos—Military Improved Recoverable Unacknowledged—Pickaback. Kosmos—Military Recoverable Observation Kosmos—Military Improved Recoverable. Uashnovedeed—Fekaback wn Total SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE PAYLOADS BY LAUNCH SITE, LAUNCH INCLINATION AND LAUNCH VEHICLE—Continued Launeh Launch i957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1969 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total ns ar : me i 58 cl a a i 61 Ad 4 62-6 F-l-m T 65 F-l-m ww Ee i a7 wR i He : B45 AA 16 ie ; aes i a He 65 A ee g 8 i i 4 i i i i i i i i 1 3 3 8 © #8 68 39 4 47PLESETSK Molniya 1—Communications. Molniya 2—Communications Kosmos—carly Warning. Unacknowiedged 1 yazhliy Spat Kosmas Biological Science. Kosmos—Miltaty Improved Recoveiable UnacknowiedgedPrekaback MAS—French Technology Te Molniya 1~Communteatons. Malniya 2— Communication Unacknowiedget Tyazhely MAS~Freneh Technology Test. Kosmos—Interception Target Kosmos—Scienee Kosmos—Nilitary Recoverable Gbsewvation Kosmos—Miltary Recovereble Observation Kosmos—Miliary Improved Recoverable. Unacknowledged-—Piekaback. Kosmos-—Miliary Improved Recoverabl. Interkosmos— Science . Kosmos Science. Kosmos—Minor Miliary : Kosmos—Military Recoversbie Observation Kosmos-—Milltary Recoverable Observation. Kosmos Military Improved Recoverable Unacknowledged—Pickaback: Kosmos-—Fertet in Low Orbit Kosmos—Navigation in Low al Kosmas Miltary Communications: cr osmos—Navigation in High Orbit. a Kosmes— Navigation, Gecdasy in Hi C1 Kosmes—Miltary Communication, Matt ci Kosmos—Science.. mo Greol—French Science a ot Interkosmas Science m4 Kosmas—military m C4 Kosmos. Weather. a AL Meteor 1—Weather a Ad Meteor 2--Weather Ad osmos—Ferret.. a Kosmos—Miltary Nécoverable Obssivation. "> gt AZ Kesmos—Miltary Improved Recoverable a AD Unacknowledged—Pickaback, an eS aetinwretelenwo So wRSRELE. corso 1BTABLE 1-3.—DETAILED SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE PAYLOADS BY LAUNCH SITE, LAUNCH INCLINATION AND LAUNCH VEHICLE—Continued inal Launeh Payload ration vehicle 1857 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1869. 1964 1865 1986 1967 1968 1969 1870 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Tota wf BA L. 1 Kosmos Miner Mila # Bt u Kosmes Navigation in Rigi Orit & Ct 0 ction, Geodesy in Highest ~~ 1 2 Kosmes-—Miitar 1 i i : i $6 0 9 © 2 0 % e103 m3 Tec y cm craseee Oe -aeateede eae eaty aca 2 2 7 8 Ro Fe at ob sO 6% 3 7 % 2 8 3 B10 B89 z 1 3 3 8 % 2 99 1% 8 75 85 8 103 ii8 We We tle Is U7 Notes all cases it has been rounded to the nearest whole degrea, with variation indicated by hyphenated 7 ‘umbers of deprees. 1. Boraus tho greatest part of the Soviet space progar is blanketed under the cover name of "5" the launch veicl has been datermined by matching announced and pictured vehicles at iven segamgs, i's necessary to make an analysis of all lights by thelr orbital characteristics a8 a frst.steD sites and with known missions to others flown atte same ncinations and behacine in ral sta {toward determining ther approximate missions 1 3 {hrouh the analytical steps which can then taka each collection ofights by their choractarsies 9 recat secant determin her ors he misions, This table ony goes oa a fo lok ataunch sl, launch velo, nd bescon Sinas acted ad coulca do tre Rekeaan sea oe ee aaa See teat Mane ene Sl @ These estimates ae aided by the work published by the RAE, based on optical or radar data on spent the sorting out of tha several Kindsut upper stages, and by te telemetry ‘and inclination. ‘The full analysis requires further looks at apogee, perigee, orbital behavior and §, Such a teble may require futher subdivision or renvgarizaton as later dscoveties about carlior t orbital life, Gr 7 2 The tolls by year in ths and ober tables on paytonds ll build tothe same numbers, ees usdeed nn ‘name (or noting the absence of a name). a 4" Tho inclination listed is that announced by the Soviet 7ASS agency that given by the Royal Aireraft Establishment (RAE) or tho Goddard & elite Shaan’ Repent is, By the RAE the Reeing roup o the Goddard Satelite Shuster vest sia ue ges Iu Sal ecsues or though Wesar ania. Often rectors he ; are not understood until later operational missions give fresh insights Info what was earlior uncloar, faling he sence oa emo eoeM ER possible mission as wel as isting the SouRces- ata summarize stings from the chronologial log contained n Apeendie A bares ny ‘Soviet TASS bulletins, lus the additional fights or changes in orbital elements detected and revealedTABLE 1-4—SUMMARY OF SOVIET SPACE PAYLOADS BY NAME Name 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Total Radvga-Staisionar. Subtotal. y 6 HOT? a a Implicit Tyazheliy Sputai 304 Ht 8 8 8 8 oS Total 2m 39 75 SHSM, NOTES nowledgndin many cass by the Russians. In ation tothase Earth orbital pickabocks which separate during fight from the main payload, certain lights carry other separate functional objects which count A. This is a straight-forward fisting of Soviet payloads ty the names announced by the Soviet as payloads. These include the counts that come from missions which have both an orbital or fly-by TASS agency (plus those unannounced and hence nameless) in the order of appearance ofthe names. bus which continues to function as well as a functional planetary lander: also there are the 2. The unannounced payloads have been included so that totals in the tabla will match other ales, and these are flights either discovered by Western sensors, or inferred from the nature of the fights, 3. The orbital launch platforms used for escape missions and more extreme Earth orbits when ist used were named Tyazhely Sputnik 4 and, Aer that tie, this hardware techriqu hes bean rele ‘renced by the TASS bulletins, but not assigned formal namis, 4. Some fights carty pickaback payloads which have nol been identified as such by TASS, but the ‘objects have been found in orbit by Western Sensors, and the experiments have ultimately been ac- fanders which continue to function and which also launch a return rocket toward Earth carrying a lunar sample, 8, Objects known and inferred to have been intended to function separately are counted whether in fact they did (for example, a payload which reached Earth orbit but which failed to separate from its erbital launch platform, when intended to continue to the Moon or planets). SOURCES: TASS bulletins, primarily, plus U.S. and British disclosures, all as carried in Appendix A 6G30 C, COMPARATIVE WEIGHTS OF PAYLOAD There is no certain way of finding out the exact weights of payload carried to orbit by each nation as only selectively is stich information released by the governments concerned. Further, the actual weights of payload, announced or estimated, suffer from two statistical problems. ‘There is no universal definition of what constitutes payload, and the significance of a given payload weight is modified by the velocity im- parted to it. «A payload may be defined by some reports as the total weight sent to orbit, and by other reports as the weight above the accompanying rocket casing. Still others narrow the definition to the specific weight of instrumentation carried in a space vehicle, [ustrative is the variety of numbers associated with an Apollo Moon flight. The typical range of numbers are 136,000 kilograms in Earth orbit, 45,400 kilograms to the vicinity of the Moon, 5,440 kilograms returned to Earth, for a crew, some rocks, and film with an approximate weight of perhaps 400 kilograms, The amount of payload carried by ® given rocket is subject to divi- sion of weight carrying capacity between fuel to attain a given velocity in order to reach certain altitudes or inclinations, and the useful pay- load of the vehicle structure and its instrumentation or passengers. A given rocket will place the largest amount of weight in orbit by being fired due east from an equatorial launch site, because the rotational speed of the Earth is added to the rocket speed. All launches from sites closer to the poles or at higher inclinations if posigrade put up less payload. The use of retrograde orbits at any inclination exacts a car- rying penalty by working against the rotation of the Earth. Being mindful of these several qualifications, perhaps the most use- ful kind of comparison is to estimate the weights of payload which could be put into a low circular orbit, which reflects in a sense the potential payload capacity of each launch, even if in a particular case payload was traded for more fuel to send the lighter payload to higher orbit or to escape. We are handicapped in compiling such statistics related to total weight by other problems. For some vehicles, we do not. have definitive information on their lifting capabilities (see the dis- cussion which follows on each Soviet vehicle). Further, even when we know something about vehicles, such as those of the United States, there are constant technical changes being made and the precise charac. teristics of even the seemingly known vehicles may not really be known to the outsider. Most striking are the kinds of changes which have oc- curred in the Thor Delta family whose capacity ranged from a few hundred kilograms in the early days to a spread today up to thousands of kilograms, depending upon the length of main tank, and the number of solid-fuel strap-ons, Table 1-5 which follows is offered with some resitation because it is So approximate, but it probably is generally indicative of trends. It as- sumes an approximate average capacity for cach launch vehicle used, and applies this to the number of launches each year from each coun. try. The table has not been further refined to convert the comparisons to a uniform eastward equatorial launch; rather, it accepts as the aver- age the site of Tyuratam as the best Soviet site at about 45.6 degrees north latitude, and Cape Canaveral as the best U.S. site at about 28.5