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ARRIBAS, Sonia. Bourgeois and citoyen.

Struggle as the mediation of their tragic conflict in


Hegel's Jena manuscripts. Hegel-Jahrbuch, vol. 1999, n. 1, p. 213-219.

1.
Apesar de seus ataques posteriores à tradição do direito natural e à doutrina dos
direitos individuais, seus escritos iniciais podem ser lidos como uma negação e
ápice de seus princípios. Negação, pois, recusa a ideia de estado de natureza que
fundamenta essas teorias. Ápice, pois, apresenta um modelo integrativo complexo
para o crescente individualismo das sociedades modernas (base da teoria do direito
natural) e uma nova relação entre individual e coletividade. Podemos encontrar essa
posição expressa através de três textos: System der Sittlichkeit; Jenauer
Systementwürfe 1 (Realphilosophie I) ou “First Philosophy of Spirit”; e Jenaer
Realphilosophie (Realphilosophie II) ou “Lectures ofn the Philosophy of Spirit”.
Nesses textos, encontramos as intuições que Hegel depois desenvolverá na
Fenomenologia. Para compreender sua ideia de lei natural e sua crítica a Rousseau,
Fichte, Kant e Hobbes podemos partir da sua concepção sobre as lutas por honra e
reconhecimento para constitutivas das dinâmicas de forças que moldam a
sociedade e a política. A conclusão ou dissolução da lei natural estaria na figura do
povo, no surgimento de uma nova dimensão da vida prática, da vida ética
(Sittlichkeit). Para Hegel, os princípios da escola do direito natural seriam melhor
realizados através da concepção da vida ética.
Para Hegel, o estado natural não é o espaço da ausência de sociabilidade
desenhado pelos teóricos do direito natural. O estado natural já seria um estado de
relações sociais e representaria as relações nascentes nas sociedades de mercado
do século XVII, pois as instituições legais e políticas de cada comunidade nasceriam
(ou seriam imanentes) às esferas de ação ligadas à satisfação imediata
(Befriedigung) das necessidades materiais (Bedürfnisse). – 213
“my interpretation differs from Axel Honneth's appropriation of Hegel's theory in that
instead of thinking of recognition as the normative foundation from which to consider
the differentiation of society, I argue that the struggles play a more important role in
the socio-political integration and differentiation of society. I interpret these struggles
as taking place on two fronts: on one hand, between the sphere of legal and abstract
rights (bourgeois ethics) and the sphere of an ethics that respects individual's
diferences (citoyen ethics), on the other hand, within both the bourgeois and the
citoyen ethics”
“Further, following the early Hegel, I interpret these struggles as having a tragic
character. By tragic I mean the fate of an endless internal conflict in the existence of
each sphere as well as a necessary external conflict in the coexistence of the two
spheres. Therefore, my aim is to show also that for society to subsist, the two
spheres have to coexist tragically in eternal conflict, and that each sphere bears its
own tragedy in itself.”- 214
2.
Hegel pega a distinção entre citoyen e burguês de Rousseau, assim como a ideia de
que há uma esfera além daquela destinada às relações de troca, a que Rousseau
dá o nome de volonté générale, através da qual os indivíduos adquirem liberdade
cívica. Em Hegel, essa é a Sittlichkeit. – 214 – Apenas a classe dos nobres em
System des Sittlichkeit possui a virtude da verdadeiro coragem, que em Rousseau
está presente em todos os invíduos, mas em RP II essa cisão parece desaparecer e
já todo citoyen político desenvolve esse ethos vinculante. Apesar dessas
semelhanças, Hegel recusa a ideia de que se chega a isso através de um contrato
social.
“At the same time Hegel believes that freedom can only be attained in society, that
society is the inevitable guarantor of the individual's freedom. On this view, the
individual's autonomy is experienced as a »necessary« crime. It is precisely because
Hegel is willing to give up neither the necessity of crime nor society as the warrant of
individual freedom that his system is tragic. Indeed, the individual's autonomy in
Hegel's system never surpasses the limits of his political society. If a conflict arises,
its solution is not to be found in an ideal or transcendent world, nor in a different
society, but rather in the same society in which it arose. In this sense, an individual
can only realize herself when she is radically situated - and in most of the cases,
divided - in the absolute life of a people.”
Enquanto que, para Kant, não há tensão entre o Estado e a ordem legal, pois a lei é
o Estado regulado pela razão, Hegel entende que o Estado é anterior à lei. A lei não
é apenas uma forma de organizar a ordem política. O Estado, em Hegel, não é um
Rechtsstaat. A ordem legal (Recht) é a esfera da ética burguesa e a ordem política,
do Estado, é a esfera da ética do citoyen. – 215
“Bearing this in mind, I believe that Hegel's distinction between a »struggle for
honor« and a »struggle for recognition« helps us clarify his similarity to and
differences from Hobbes. Whereas the struggle for honor occurs between two ethics,
the struggle for recognition takes place within each ethics. That this is so is manifest
in the fact that the struggle for honor not only damages individual honor, but also
takes the form of a »transgression,« which in turn shows that there are two different
modes of social order, namely, the legal and the political.”
“So when Hegel formulates a struggle for recognition he does so by positing the
inner essential contradiction that belongs to recognition itself or by establishing the
necessity of a life-and-death struggle. This kind of struggle takes place not only
within citoyen ethics, that is, within the sphere in which individuals see themselves
as members of the people (RP I), but also within bourgeois ethics, namely, when
individuals interact as legal »persons« (RP II). Therefore, within both bourgeois
ethics and citoyen ethics we do not relinquish the sphere in question - as Hobbes
leaves the state of nature - but instead we see the contradiction inherent in all types
of recognition” - 216
3.

Type of Significance of Outcome Degree of


Struggle the Struggle Tragedy

System of Honor Between the Undecided or Separation Low


Ethical Life Two Ethics

First Recognition Inside Citoyen Establishment of Ethical Low


Philosophy of Ethics Life
Spirit

Second Recognition Inside Establishment of the High


Philosophy of Bourgeois Legal Order via Inner
Spirit Ethics Contradiction

Second Honor Between the One Ethics necessarily High


Philosophy of Two Ethics turns into the other Ethics
Spirit

Second Recognition Inside Citoyen Establishment of the High


Philosophy of Ethics Political Order via Inner
Spirit Contradiction

“To conclude, only when the two spheres coexist in conflict in a well-differentiated
manner can the society acquire a full - though tragic - sense of justice. Integration is
obtained neither at the cost of giving up the legal and abstract order nor at the
expense of abandoning the political arena in which individuals retain their
concreteness. Each sphere develops within itself a contradiction that demands to be
complemented by the other sphere, but the relation between the spheres is tragic
since each aims to overrun the other. Tragedy is thus present inside each sphere as
well as between them, a tragedy that deserves to be called the fate of modern
societies.” - 218