Policy Brief January 2011

Sudan
Problem Recommendations & Actions
The 2005 The U.S. Government should maintain robust engagement with Sudan in 2011. The referenda
Comprehensive Peace and their outcomes, and the deteriorating situation in Darfur, will place major demands on
Agreement (CPA) sought U.S. diplomatic and development capacities. Regardless of the secession decision, there will
to end decades of war be significant issues to be resolved between North and South; and the South will need major
in south Sudan, but its assistance to rebuild a functioning society. In Darfur, the peace process will need support
implementation has and the war-ravaged population will continue to face enormous basic needs. Note that the
been extremely slow publication of this document coincides the January 2011 referenda, after which InterAction’s
and will expire in early Sudan Working Group will make further recommendations. However, at this time, U.S. policy-
2011 with the referenda makers should take the following actions to advance peace and recovery across Sudan:
on Southern secession • Continue to focus robust financial and staff resources on the Sudanese peace process.
and the status of the The presence of a full-time special envoy with ample staff support has significantly
disputed Abyei region. improved the scope and coherence of U.S. engagement with Sudan. And the surge of
Southern Sudan and diplomatic staff across Southern Sudan will provide critical capacity during the post-ref-
Abyei will face major erendum period. This enhanced diplomatic posture should be maintained through 2011.
challenges regardless • Respond to humanitarian needs and build the capacity of Southern Sudanese institutions,
of the outcome of the while expanding their focus beyond the center and out to the state and county levels.
referenda. Meanwhile, • In Darfur, continue to pursue a viable peace agreement while working with stakeholders
the peace process in to improve security and engage civil society in the peace process.
Darfur continues to • Protect the citizens of Darfur by strongly supporting humanitarian access and ensuring
founder as security in that internally displaced persons (IDPs) can make free and voluntary choices about their
the region declines; and movements and personal security.
the peace agreement in • In the Three Areas, support the peaceful implementation of the CPA provisions on final
eastern Sudan remains status, support a developmental peace dividend, mitigate potential flashpoints and
fragile. This puts address structural drivers of conflict.
Sudan on a tenuous • Ensure peacekeeping missions in Dafur and the South (UNAMID/UNMIS) receive the
footing in 2011, with support and resources needed to properly execute their mandates, and press UNAMID
multiple prospects of to prioritize protecting humanitarian actors.
serious violence and • Adequately fund the UN Humanitarian Air Service, which provides essential transport for
humanitarian crises. aid workers in Sudan.
• Pressure the Government of Sudan to increase humanitarian access to the East and
increase humanitarian and development funding for this area.

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Results
The steps outlined above will ensure that existing efforts address the root
causes of conflict and provide civilians with the protection and humanitarian
assistance they need. These steps will also provide support to prevent the col-
lapse of the CPA and move towards a viable peace agreement in Darfur.
Background
Sudan, Africa’s largest country, has been wracked by vio-
lent conflict for much of its independent history, with related
problems of poor governance, chronic poverty and weak
infrastructure. The unequal distribution of its oil wealth and
violent competition over increasingly scarce land, grazing
and water resources fuel much of Sudan’s conflicts.
The 22-year civil war in the south killed 2 million people
and left over 4 million displaced. In 2005, the Government
of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Move-
ment/Army signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The CPA will expire in 2011 with the referenda on South-
ern secession and the status of the disputed, oil-rich Abyei
region both of which are scheduled for January 9. The
parties to the CPA have managed to maintain the peace
without implementing many portions of it, including critical
preparatory steps for the referenda and the formulation of a
permanent agreement on sharing of oil revenue. While the
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) deployed a peacekeeping
force to support the implementation of the CPA, the May
2008 flare-up in Abyei demonstrated their weak capacity
to protect civilians. In January 2011, the eyes of the world
will be on Sudan as the outcome of the referenda is likely to
be highly contested and the likelihood of violence is high.
An estimated 2 million southern Sudanese have returned
home since 2004, but only a fraction have access to basic
services, such as clean water, primary health care, edu-
cation and the creation of livelihoods. Failure to address
reintegration and recovery needs throughout Sudan—both
because of weak governance and ineffective international
assistance mechanisms—has generated frustration and
exacerbated communal tensions. This, in turn, has con-
tributed to fears that even if the referenda are carried out
peacefully in January 2011, there could be an outbreak of
violence among southern Sudanese in the aftermath.
The Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) ended fight-
ing between the government and the Eastern Front in 2006
but remains fragile. While the eastern region is among the
most marginalized regions in Sudan with morbidity rates
as high as those found in Darfur, few international NGOs
work there and little information on humanitarian conditions
exists. Increased humanitarian and development funding is
needed for this neglected region’s recovery.
Six years into the crisis in Darfur, protection, assistance
and sustainable peace remain out of reach for Darfur’s peo-
ple. More than 4.5 million are affected by the conflict and
receive humanitarian assistance. Conditions for aid work-
ers have deteriorated in recent years, culminating in the
unprecedented expulsion of 16 international and national
aid agencies in March 2009. Humanitarian access has dra-
matically decreased due to violence by various parties to
the conflict, incendiary language by government officials
and bureaucratic impediments imposed by the Govern-
ment of Sudan.
The dire situation continues despite the world’s largest
humanitarian operation on the ground and unparalleled
grassroots mobilization, particularly in the United States.
The best model for reconciliation in Darfur is the best model
for the country as a whole: the CPA. It is crucial that this
landmark agreement be vigorously supported for the cred-
ibility and legitimacy of any political negotiation going for-
ward with the Government of Sudan. After the failure of
numerous ceasefire agreements, the world responded to
the crisis in Darfur by sending peacekeeping forces to pro-
tect civilians and facilitate humanitarian assistance; first the
African Union in 2004, and now the United Nations-African
Union hybrid mission (UNAMID). Yet almost a year and a
half into its deployment and with 68 percent of its military
personnel in country, UNAMID has struggled to provide
adequate protection to the people of Darfur. The force
lacks critical equipment, personnel and training resources:
leaving the people of Darfur, humanitarian agencies and
even its own peacekeepers vulnerable to ongoing attacks
and extreme violence.
While not the only cause, the continuation of the Darfur
crisis is linked to the past failure of the U.S. and others to
treat the challenges in Sudan as interconnected. Sustain-
able peace in Darfur hinges on implementation of the CPA
and ESPA. The CPA and ESPA include power sharing,
wealth sharing and security provisions that, if implemented,
could contribute to the decentralization and democratization
of Sudan and therefore address some of the root causes
of Darfur’s crisis. Conversely, failure to implement these
agreements could result in a return to numerous localized
conflicts or even large-scale conflict across Sudan. Recov-
ery and reconstruction assistance for the transitional areas
along Sudan’s contentious north-south border and for East-
ern Sudan has not met community needs or expectations.
As a result, peace in the south and east remains fragile.