Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification

Author(s): Mathieu Deflem and Fred C. Pampel
Source: Social Forces, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Sep., 1996), pp. 119-143
Published by: University of North Carolina Press
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The Myth of Postnational Identity:
Popular Support for European Uniflcation*

MATHIEUDEFLEMK KenyonCollege
FREDC. PANMEL,Universityof Colorado

Abstract

Thestudyof popularsupportfor unioiatin of Europeraisesissuesaboutthe roleof

identficationwith nationalinterestsversus supportfor postnationalidentityin
determining attitudesacrosscountries andovertime.It alsoraisesissuesabouttheroles
of traditional
cleavages in classpositionandpartisanideologicalviewsversusdifferences
in postmaterialistvalues in determiningsupportfor unification.Using datafor
individualssampledwithinmember-states of theEuropean Community in 1982,1986,
1989, and 1992, the analysesshowpersistentdifferences betweencountriesin their
supportevenafterequalizing in sociodemographic,
for nationaldifferences ideological,
and valuepriorityvariablesover the 10-yeartime spanof the study,whichfavors
theoretical
arguments for thecontinuedimportance of nationalidentity.

With the ratificationof the MaastrichtTreaty by the member-statesof the

EuropeanCommunityin 1993, the countries of Europehave moved toward
reshaping the design of Europe and, in an era of globalization,worldwide
politicaland economicaffairs.The effectiverealizationof Europe'sunification
may create an unprecedentedchallenge,for citizens and scholars of Europe
alike, to make sense of an expression that hitherto referredto a continent
composedof nation-statesthatwere geographically,economically,and to some
extentpoliticallyconnectedbut nonethelesssovereign.
Europe'sunificationbeganwith the Treatyof Romein 1957,when Belgium,
France,the former West Germany,Italy, Luxembourg,and the Netherlands
formedthe EuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)providingfor cooperationin
economic matters (see, generally,Milward 1993;Pinder 1991a;Urwin 1991).
GreatBritain,Irelandand Denmarkjoinedthe EECin 1973,foliowed by Greece

*Analyses in this article employ EurobarometerSurveys18, 25, 31a, and 37 made available by
theInter-UniversityConsortiumforPoliticaland SocialResearch. WethankEveDarian-Smith
for guidance in reviewing literature on the EuropeanUnion, and John Bendix, anonymous
reviewers,and the editorfor suggestions on previous drafts.Direct correspondenceto Mathieu
Deflem, Law and Society Program, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH 43022-9623. E-mail
deflem@kenyon.edu.

i The University of North CarolinaPress Social Forces, September1996, 75(1):119-143

120 / Social Forces 75:1, September 1996

in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986. The Single EuropeanAct of 1986
arrangedfor the creationof the EuropeanCommunity(EC),a politicalas well
as economic unification of Europe,by January1993. The frameworkof this
Europe without frontiers for the movement of people, services, goods, and
capitalwas finally stipulatedin the Treatyon EuropeanUnion, or the Maast-
richt Treaty,signed on 7 February1992 (Ross 1992a, 1992b).The Maastricht
Treaty,named after the town in the Netherlandswhere the agreementwas
signed, was ratifiedby all memberstates of the newly formedEuropeanUnion
(EU) in October1993, when the German ConstitutionalCourt approved its
country'sparticipation.1
Yet movement toward unification requires more than the treaties and
policies negotiatedby the membersof variousECcouncils,administrativeunits,
and nationalrepresentatives.The success of Europe'sunificationdependsto no
small extent on the supportit receivesfrom the citizens of the membersof the
EuropeanCommunity.As JiirgenHabermas(1975,1979)argues,the survivalof
democraticpolitical systems of advancedcapitalistsocieties rests on popular
legitimationin the culturalsphere, regardlessof their level of performancein
the realmof economicproduction.2Moreover,capitalistdemocraciesexperience
the problemof legitimationacutely:theirhigh economicperformanceproduces
high expectationsthat political systems cannot guaranteeto maintainduring
fiscalcrises.Similarprocessesof legitimationwould seem equallyimportantfor
the survivalcapacitiesof a supranationalentitysuchas theEuropeanCommuni-
ty.
Despite their importance,attitudes toward Europeanunificationare less
studied thanthe organizationand policies of the EC.Correspondingto a lackof
intereston the part of Euro-officials(Wallace& Smith1995),only a few studies
devoted attentionto the issue beforeand duringthe 1980s (e.g.,Handley1981;
Hewstone 1986;Inglehart1977).Recentresearchdescribesgeneral trends and
selecteddeterminantsof attitudes(e.g.,Eichenberg&Dalton1993;Janssen1991;
Niedermayer1991;Worcester1990), sometimes on the basis of samples from
only one or two countries (e.g., Allington & Jones 1994; Baker et al. 1995;
Men6ndez-Alarc6n1995; and articles in Fells & Niznik 1992 and Reif &
Inglehart1991). And although debate on the MaastrichtTreatyhas spurred
scholarly work on attitudes toward the EC (e.g., Eichenberg& Dalton 1993;
Franklin,Marsh&McLaren1994;Gabel&Palmer1995;Worcester&Mortimore
1994),many theoreticalquestionsremain.In this article,we examinethe sources
of individual support for European unification among citizens of the EC
countries. The sources relate to both country of citizenship and to social
characteristicsthat link citizens across differentcountries.

TheoreticalPerspectives

The extent to which Europeancitizens favor or disfavorunificationof Europe

raises two questions.One, to what extent do the sentimentsof citizens follow
from the advantagesor disadvantagesthey perceive unificationof Europeto
have for their own respective countries?Some view the national identity of
Europe'scitizens as crucialto supportfor the EC,while othersview the growth
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 121

of postnationalidentity as reducingnationalself-interestin determiningviews

of Europeanunification.Two, to what extent do traditionalideological and
political cleavages differentiateattitudes toward Europeanunification?Some
may interpretthe debate over unificationin terms of the left and right, or the
workingand middle classes.Othersmay see the gradualdeclineof class conflict
in postindustrialsocietiesas acceleratedby unificationissues thattranscendand
fragmentideological cleavagesand class categories.
First,one may interpretissues of Europeanunificationin termsof national
identity. Most mattersof economicand political importancehave historically
been framedin the contextof sovereignnation-states.Rootedin the industrial-
ization of Western societies during the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies,
sociology has been nearlysynonymouswith the study of the nation-state.Even
presentconditionsof globalization,broadlydefinedas the growinginterdepen-
denceof localitiesacrossthe world, may fail to substantiallyalterthis approach
(Cameron1992;A. Smith1990).Whilenation-stateshave undoubtedlygiven up
some of their sovereigntyto form a politicalworld system, this processhas at
the same time witnessed a strengtheningof the internal control of states
(Giddens1990) and reaffirned states as the actors in internationalpolitics (S.
Smith 1989). In this vein, it has been suggested that the constructionof the
EuropeanCommunityinvolved a limited surrenderof national sovereignty
preciselyin orderto rescue the nation-state(Kahler1987;Milward1993).3This
persistenceof the nation-statecoincideswith a persistenceof nationalidentity.
National identity is conceived here not as an objectivefixed entity but as the
subjectiverepresentationof allegiancetowardone's country(Macdonald1993).
Inferringan enduranceof nationalidentity on the basis of continuingnation-
statestrengthis theoreticallygroundedin the thesisthatpoliticalcitizenshiphas
to this day been grantedonly by nation-states(de Lange1995;Meehan1993;
Tassin 1994).To the extent that nationalidentity persists, then, the citizens of
the industrializedcountries of Europe today will favor or disfavor political
regimes,nationaland supranational,on the basis of the perceivedworth they
have for their own countries(Gabel& Palmer1995;Men6ndez-Alarc6n1995).4
On the otherhand,some see the increasingglobalizationof communication
and economicexchangeas generatinga decreaseof popularinterestin national
concerns in favor of an increasingidentificationwith issues beyond national
borders(Cerutti1992).The emergenceof a cosmopolitanor collectivepolitical
identity within the European Community (Delanty 1995; Inglehart 1990;
Schlesinger 1991) would reinforce this general trend toward postnational
identity.Such a view would highlight the growing importanceof values with
relatively universal appeal, such as human rights, the protection of civil
liberties,social rights,and individualclaims of self-determination.Thus, those
identifying most closely with such transnationalissues would most favor
unificationregardlessof countryof citizenship,and representthe forefrontof a
genuine postnationalEuropeanidentity.
Criticsof this perspectiveof a postnationalidentityrespondthat,regardless
of whetherpopularlyfavoredor opposed values and sentimentsreferto issues
thatare nation-specificor to issues thatare identifiedwith a largercommunity,
they have to be framed within nation-statesto become effective.Even issues
contendedand endorsedon the basis of universalvalues have until todayfound
122 / Social Forces 75:1,September1996

concrete expression only within the legitimate authority of nation-states

(Habermas1992b).
Second, in a related point, scholars differ on the relative importanceof
traditionalclass cleavagesfor attitudestoward Europeanunification.A class-
orientedview sees conflictbetween laborand capitalas centralto supportfor
the EC,as it remainscentralfor nearlyall otherpoliticalissues. A class analysis
suggests blue-collarand relatively poor citizens will more strongly oppose
unificationof Europebecausethey fear losing theirjobs and decreasingwages
in an all too free and competitiveEuropeanmarket.Theirjobs may migrateto
those countrieswith the lowest wages and highest unemployment.As labor
unions have not yet successfully organized and centralizedacross national
boundaries,a freer movement of capital, goods, and services can reduce the
bargainingpower of workersin wage deliberations.Thisalso appliesto citizens
who are self-employedbecausethey face a less flexibleeconomicpositionthan
theircounterpartsorganizedin largebusinessenterprises.However,given their
relatively higher income, the self-employedmay hold weaker anti-European
attitudesthanblue-collarworkers.White-collarworkers,in contrast,encounter
less of an economicthreatfromlow-wagecountriesthando blue-collarand self-
employed workers.Largebusiness owners, managers,and professionalswith
high incomefind more opportunitythanthreatin competitionwith most other
Europeancountries.Thesecrude generalizationsdo not, of course,capturethe
complexity of industrialand occupationalinterests,but they do specify one
possiblyinfluentialcleavage:higher-incomebusinessmanagersand profession-
als will support unificationof Europemore than lower-incomeself-employed
and blue-collarworkers.
Givenworking-classoppositionto unification,one mightalso expectgreater
opposition to unificationfrom the left thanfrom the right.Of course,political
orientationhas a complex relationshipto popular support for unificationof
Europe.Those on the left may have economicconcernsover the impactof free
trade on the power of labor to increasewages and benefitsand the power of
governmentsto tax business.At the same time,leftists,who traditionallyfavor
demilitarization,may welcome political unification as the expression of a
peacefulcommunity.Thoseon the rightmay also show ambivalence:they favor
free tradebut often oppose giving politicaland militarypower to supranational
agencies,particularlywhen thesepowersmay expandinterventionsin economic
activity.Still, class and relatedideologicalpositionsremaincrucial,even if not
dominant,determinantsof individualattitudestowardEuropeanunification.
In contrast,some have arguedthatrecenteconomicand socialchangeshave
transformedthe importanceof economic class power (Lange1992). Popular
protestover issues of capitalisteconomicdevelopmentandstatepoliticalpower
has declined in favor of protest over issues of new styles of life. This process
has resultedin a new politics that been referredto as a "silentrevolution"of
postmaterialism(Inglehart1986,1990),and found expressionin the emergence
of new values and social movementsof resistanceand withdrawal(Gundelach
1992; Habermas1987). Thus, value orientationsmay relate more closely to
support for European unification than the traditional left-right cleavage.
Postmaterialistsconcernedwith issues of peace,theenvironment,andinequality
may support Europeanunificationmore than materialists(Inglehart& Reif
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 123

1991). These value orientations-at across traditionalideological loyalties to

some extent,and particularlyso in more recentperiods.

Hypotheses

We first specify hypotheses in static terms and then consider their dynamic
implications.
PERSISIENTNATIONAL DIFFERENCES

Thosearguingfor the persistenceof nationalidentitieswould expectsubstantial

differencesin the amount of support each countrygives to Europeanunifica-
tion. Moreover,these nationaldifferenceswould persisteven with controlsfor
individualstatus,class, and ideologicalvariables.Thisdoes not claimthatother
individual factors fail altogether to influence attitudes toward European
unification.Sociodemographic characteristics
andideologicalcommitmentsvery
likely also shape popularsupportfor unificationof Europe.The persistenceof
nationalidentitiesimplies, however,thatindividualdifferencesdo not explain
observeddifferencesacross countries.Influencesof nationalidentity,in other
words, cannotbe attributedto differencesin sociodemographiccompositionor
ideologicalmakeupof the countries.
Fromnews reportsand survey data,we might expect citizens of Norway,
Denmark,GreatBritain,and NorthernIrelandto have more negativeattitudes
towardEurope'sunificationthancitizensof otherEuropeancountries.Because
NorwayandDenmarkhavewell-establishedandpopularsocialwelfarepolicies,
theircitizensmay fearthatEuropeanunificationwill imposea bureaucraticand
capitalistsystem that erodes the social rights guaranteedby their own nation-
states(Franklin,Marsh&Wlezien1994;Siune&Svensson1993;Siune,Svensson
& Tonsgaard1994).Citizens of GreatBritain,an economicallyand politically
strong state with a longstandingtraditionof nationalism,may fear that the
mergerof theircountryinto a unifiedEuropeimplies a loss of sovereigntythat
outweighs any possible gain. Great Britain, moreover, is geographically
separated from the Europeancontinent and has a nationalistheritage of a
markediyisolationistnature(Hewstone1991;Pinder1991b).NorthernIreland,
characterizedby an important religious divide between Protestants and
Catholics,will in part reflectattitudestoward Europeanunificationsimilarto
Britishnationals.Yet, if the Catholiccommunityof NorthernIreland,like the
citizens of (Catholic) Ireland, favors Europe's unification, it will balance
Protestantopposition.
In contrast,morepositiveattitudestowardEuropeanunificationlikelyexist
in Belgium, Luxembourg,the Netherlands,Portugal,Greece,Spain, Ireland,
Northern Ireland,Italy, France,and former West as well as East Germany.
Belgium,Luxembourg,the Netherlands,Portugal,Greece,Spain, and Ireland
lack the geographic and demographicsize and the political and economic
weight in Europeanaffairs of their larger neighbors.The citizens of these
countries perceive their respective countries' membershipin the European
Communityas an improvementin theireconomicbenefitsandpoliticalposition.
Citizensof Portugal,Greece,and Spainmay,in addition,believethatjoiningthe
124 / Social Forces 75:1, September 1996

EuropeanCommunitywill improvethe relativelypoor economicconditionsin

their countries(Sidjanski1991).Citizensof Irelandmay be more pro-European
because they wish to affirm their identity over and against (anti-European)
GreatBritain.BecauseItaly is characterizedby a markedeconomicinequality
within its borders (between, for instance, the northern and the southern
regions),and becauseof the many scandalsinvolvingItalianpoliticians,Italian
citizens may be expected to express less nationalistand more pro-European
sentiments.Franceand formerWest Germany,two of the dominantpolitical
and economic forces in Europe, may also have citizens who are more pro-
European. Like Great Britain, these countries have sustained traditions of
nationalism and may receive minimal economic gains from joining the EC.
However, the nationalist ideologies as well as the economic and political
policies of Franceand formerWestGermanyarenot isolationist.Nationalismin
Franceand former West Germany,therefore,may translateinto favoring a
strong position within, not apart from, unified Europe.Insteadof the British
quest for affirmationoutside of Europe,citizens of Franceand formerWest
Germanymay exhibitsentimentsfor participationin Europe.Citizensof former
East Germany,finally, can be expected to be more pro-Europeanbecause of
their desire, afterthe fall of the Communistregime,to strengthenties with the
richerand more democraticWesternworld.
INDWIDUAL-LEVELDETERMINANIS

A competingperspectivewould predict,when takento the extreme,thatcross-

nationaldifferencesin supportof Europeanunificationstem from the differenc-
es in individualcharacteristicsof the citizensin each country.If some countries
show more higherlevels of averagesupportthanothers,these averagenational
differenceswould disappearwith controlsfor individual-levelcharacteristics.
Several individual-level variables may influence support for European
unificationand may accountfor differencesacross countries.Of most impor-
tance,the sociodemographicfactorsof occupationand incomeand the ideologi-
cal factorsof political orientation(fromleft to right)and value priorities(from
materialistto postmaterialist)relate to popularattitudestoward unificationof
Europeas discussed above.Theseindividualvariables,in particular,may vary
sufficientlyacross countries to explain patternsof support for the European
Community.
Other individual-levelvariables- age, sex, and education - may prove
relevantas well. Becauseyoungerpeople have morecosmopolitanorientations,
age could relatenegativelyto attitudestowardunificationof Europe.Cosmopol-
itan concernsover environmentalmatters,to which the EuropeanCommunity
has devoted much attention,might lead younger people to expressmore pro-
Europeanviews. Older people may support a united Europebecause of their
higher sense of responsibilityfor matters involving a broad community of
people,but theirsocializationduringmorenationalistichistoricalperiodsmight
predisposethemto objectto radicalpoliticalchangeand the uncertaintiesit will
bring, particularlywhen it involves collaborationwith countrieswhom they
once knew as enemies in war.
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 125

Gendermay have some influence- albeitnot large - on attitudestoward

Europeanunification.Withoutexaggeratingthe gendergap in politicalideology,
women may tend to oppose militarismand support internationalpeace and
cooperationmore than men. Such attitudesmay spill over into support for a
political union among former combatants.Large differenceswithin genders,
however, likely minimize the impact of gender on attitudesand its ability to
explain cross-nationaldifferences.
Education likely relates positively to popular support for European
unification.Educationexposes people to a broadrange of ideas and to people
of diverse ideological and national backgrounds.Therefore,it increases the
likelihood that individuals will accept the establishmentof a supranational
entity and will view a community wider than their own country with less
prejudice.In addition, the associationof educationmay mediate the effect of
age. Since the democratizationof educationhas occurredrecently,the younger
generationmay develop a more cosmopolitanorientationand more strongly
favor a united Europebecauseof theirlargeropportunitiesfor tertiaryschool-
ing.
In summary, sociodemographicand ideological variables may relate to
attitudes toward Europeanunificationin the directionwe have specified. In
addition,however,differencesbetweencountriesin theirsupportof unification
may stem fromthe socioeconomicand ideologicalcharacteristicsof individuals
withineachcountry.A straightforwardcompositionalhypothesiswould predict
that socioeconomic and ideological differences would completely explain
nationaldifferences:those countriesmost supportiveof unifiedEuropehave the
most educated populace, the largest numberof nonmanualprofessionalsand
managers,the largest proportionof high-incomehouseholds,and the greatest
support for postmaterialistvalue priorities.
SOURCESOF AT1lUTIJDINAL
DIFFERENCES

Independent of whether most country differences transcend individual

socioeconomic and ideological characteristics,we can consider the relative
importance of the individual differences.We need not further discuss the
arguments,but we can summarizetheircompetingpredictions.In staticterms,
class-basedargumentspredictthattheprimarydeterminantsof attitudestoward
Europeanunificationwill stem from occupationor class characteristicsand
traditional leftist/rightist ideology. In contrast, postmaterialistarguments
specify the primacyof differencesin value prioritiesand relatedcharacteristics
of education,age, and gender.
DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS

All the theoreticalargumentshave dynamicas well as staticimplications.At a

descriptivelevel, we assume that Europeanunificationcan generallycount on
support from most citizens in Europe. This support, moreover, may have
increasedsomewhatfrom 1982 to 1992,confirminga trendset since the second
half of the 1970s (Handley1981;Inglehart1977,1990;Riffault1991;Worcester
1990). In addition, however, one can make predictionsabout changes in the
126 / Social Forces 75:1,September1996

effects of the independentvariableson the dependentvariable.Argumentsfor

the importanceof postnationalidentity would claim that nationalcitizenship
will continue to influence Europeanattitudes but will decline over time as
forces of globalizationpromote postnationalidentity over national identity.
Argumentsfor nationalidentitypredictthatif changeoccurs,it will involve the
risingimportanceof nationalidentityas the realityof the EuropeanCommunity
draws closerand the potentialfor economicand politicalconflictwithin the EC
increases.Hence,debatesovernationalismandpostnationalismpredictdifferent
trends in the effect of country of citizenship on support for the European
Community.
Similarly, postmaterialist viewpoints do not discount altogether the
importanceof traditionalclassand class-basedideologicalpositions,butthey do
arguethat theirimportanceas determinantsof attitudeswill declinerelativeto
those for postmaterialism.Those favoring the importanceof class suggest no
such decline.In both cases, then, the theoriespredictnot only a greaterrelative
role in determiniingattitudesfor one set of variablesthan the other,they also
predict the continuedimportanceover time of one set relativeto the other.

Methods
DATA

To addressthe suggestedhypotheses,we examineEurobarometer surveysheld

in 1982, 1986, 1989, and 1992 (Eurobarometers 18, 25, 31a, and 37). The four
surveys contain several common questions on attitudes toward European
unificationand on standardsociodemographicand ideologicalvariables.The
four cover the years leading up to and immediatelyafter the signing of the
MaastrichtTreaty.Thesurveys includeprobabilitysamplesof persons15 years
old and over for all member-statesof the EuropeanCommunity.The survey
samples thus changeas the ECgrows. For1982we have data on Denmark,the
United Kingdom,Ireland,Greece,the formerWest Germany,France,Italy,the
Netherlands,Belgium, and Luxembourg.The surveys furtherseparateU.K.
respondentsin Northem Irelandfrom those in GreatBritain.Thesurveyssince
1986includeSpainand Portugal,and the 1992surveyincludesunitedGermany,
separatelyreportedfor formerEastand West Germany,and Norway, the only
countryin the survey that does not belong to the EC.
With data on four years and on 11 to 15 countries(or politicalunits within
the United Kingdomand Germany),and excludingcases with missing values,
the sampleincludes5,371respondentsin 1982,6,235in 1986,6,097in 1989,and
8,034 in 1992. Three countries,Belgium,the Netherlands,and Denmark,use
national,multistageprobabilitysampling,while theothersuse stratifiednational
quota samples. However, the Eurobarometerdata documentationnotes that
"takinginto accountregion and the size of localities,respondentsare chosen
within selected samplingpoints to provide a regionallyrepresentativesample
with respectto the criteriaof sex, age and occupation."
When analyzing all the informationavailable,including that for Spain,
Portugal,East Germany,and Norway added after our first year of 1982, the
countrycompositionof the samplechanges.Otherwise,keepingthe same set of
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 127

countriesrequiresdeleting cases on Spain and Portugalfor three time points

and Norway and East Germanyfor one. Therefore,we report results for all
countries, but to account for the influence of the changing composition of
countriesin the sample,we replicateall runs for a commonsubset and report
any differences.
Thedataareanalyzedwithoutweights,but we have replicatedall runswith
two types of weighting schemes.One set of weights adjustsfor oversampling
within several of the countries,the other for differencesin sample size across
countriesand years. The formerweights do not change the size of the country
samplesbut accuratelyrepresentthe proportionof sampledgroupswithin the
countries. The latter weights, by equalizing the number of cases for each
country-yearwhile maintainingthe same overallN, ensure that no countryor
year gets undue influencebecauseof its large sample size.5For the descriptive
statistics,neither weighting scheme changes the results:the reportedfigures
differby no more than 1%when using weights. For regression,Winship and
Radbill(1994)recommendgenerallynot using weights becausethey reducethe
efficiencyof the estimates(exceptwhen the weighted and unweightedresults
differsignificantlyandindicatemisspecification).In ourcase,thewithin-country
weights do not result in any statisticallysignificantchangein the coefficients,
and the between-countryweights only serve to increasethe effectsof dummy
variablesfor NorthernIrelandand Luxembourg,the two unitswith the smallest
number of unweighted cases. Thus, the tables present results based on the
unweighted data.
MEASURES

The sociodemographicvariables age, family income (classified in quartiles

within each country),and education(yearsof schoolingsince the age of five)
aremeasuredand analyzedas continuousvariables.Forthevariablegender,the
male respondentsarecoded as 1. Thevariableoccupationhas thefollowingfour
categories:blue-collar,self-employed,white-collar,and not employed.The last
categoxyis omitted in the regression equations.The need to use only four
occupationalcategoriescomesfromchangesin measuringthesecategoriesin the
differentEurobarometers. Forexample,new categoriessuch as middlemanage-
ment used after 1986 might belong in either the white-collar or executive
categoriesused in the earlieryears.Ourinitialsolutionsimply groups themall
into the same nonmanualcategory.However,given the possibleimportanceof
occupationaldistributionto differencesacrossnations,we also discuss results
using the more detailed measures. The ideological variables of political
orientationand value prioritiesare measuredin termsof, respectively,a self-
placement-scalewith scores rangingfrom 1 (extremeleft-wing)to 10 (extreme
right-wing) and an index with the scores 1 (materialist),2 (mixed), and 3
(postmaterialist).7
The dependentvariableis based on threevariablesthatin slightlydifferent
ways measure attitudes toward European unification. First, the variable
European unification attitude, measured on the basis of the question "In
general,areyou for or againsteffortsbeing madeto unifywesternEurope?"has
fourcategories(verymuchfor,for, against,and very muchagainst).Second,EC
128 / Social Forces 75:1, September1996

membership attitude is a three-categoryvariable based on the question

"Generallyspeaking, do you think that (your country's)membershipin the
EuropeanCommunity(commonmarket)is a good thing,neithergood nor bad,
or a bad thing?"Third,EC scrappedattitudeis based on the question"If you
were told tomorrowthatthe EuropeanCommunity(commonmarket)had been
scrapped,would you be sorryabout it, indifferent,or relieved?"All dependent
variablesare recoded and analyzed in a pro-Europeandirection.
Factor analysis revealed that in all four surveys these three variables
measureonly one underlyingfactor(see Appendix).The varianceexplainedin
all variablesassociatedwith the extractedfactoris about 70%in each survey.
The factor loadings are in all surveys highest for the variables measuring
attitudes toward membershipin, and scrappingof, the EC. For analysis, the
dependentvariableis representedby a scale, with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviationof 1, based on the scores of the factorfor all cases.

Results

Beforewe examinethe variablesthat may determineattitudestowardunifica-

tion of Europe,we brieflydiscuss the level and evolutionof popularsupportfor
Europeanunificationfor all respondentsin the surveys.As shown in Table1,
unificationof Europe generallyreceives overwhelmingpopular support. The
frequencydistributionson all three dependentvariablesconsideredindicate
this. In each survey, about 80%of respondentsare for or very much for efforts
made to unify Europe,with only some 8%to 17%of the respondentsfeeling
relieved if the ECwould be scrappedor judgingtheircountry'smembershipin
the EC a bad thing.
In terms of the evolution of supportfor unificationfrom one survey to the
next, the results do not indicateany spectacularchanges,althoughthe pattem
does point to increasedsupport in the considereddecade. Between1982 and
1986,in particular,an increasein popularsupportfor unificationappears,but
after 1986, levels remained fairly constant. The two variables with three
categorieshave witnesseda shift in theirdistributionsfromthe middlecategory
to the category indicating pro-Europeanattitudes. For the third variable,
Europeanunificationattitude, the pull to extremitiesis less pronounced:the
frequencyof the pro-Europeancategoryremainsin all surveys higher than the
frequencyof the very pro-Europeanone. Nonetheless, the latter has over the
decade increased,whereas the former has declined, with slightly declining
frequenciesfor the anti-Europeancategories.
Does the changing country composition of the sample influence the
evolution in the overall level of support? Anticipatingsome of the results
discussed in more detail below, part of the change from 1982 to 1986 indeed
comes from adding Spain and Portugalto the sample both countriesthat
exhibit above-averagesupport for the EC. Yet percentages without these
countries continue to reveal rising support. The addition to the sample of
Norway, which shows lower support for integrationthan all other countries,
affects the results in the opposite direction.With Norway included, Table 1
shows little in the way of change before and after Maastricht.With Norway
 Popular Support for European Unification / 129

TABLE 1: Frequency Distributions (in Percentages) of Three Measures of

Popular Support for European Unification: 1982, 1986, 1989,
and 1992

1982 1986 1989 1992

Europeanuniication
Very much against 7.0 5.4 4.1 5.4
Against 13.0 9.7 9.5 11.8
For 50.7 47.3 52.5 48.7
Very much for 29.3 37.6 34.0 34.2

EC membership
Bad 17.0 10.8 8.5 10.4
Neither 28.7 21.9 21.8 19.7
Good 54.3 67.2 69.7 70.0

EC scrapped
Relieved 16.5 10.3 8.1 9.4
Indifferent 43.6 42.5 42.7 38.6
Sorry 39.9 47.2 49.1 51.9

(and, less important, East Germany) excluded, the results show a general
increase in support. Thus, pro-European attitudes continue to grow in most
countries.

CROSS-SECTIONALANALYSIS,1992

Because we consider the signing of the Maastricht Treaty essential, we first

examine the results of the 1992 survey. Conforming to the suggested hypothe-
ses, we report the results of three separate models of analysis, each estimated
with ordinary least squares. The first model examines the country differences in
popular support for European unification. The second and third models
successively measure the influences of the sociodemographic and the ideological
variables and indicate the extent to which the initial differences between
countries in their support of European unification stem from the socio-
demographic and ideological characteristics of their citizens.

NAnION-SrATE DIFFERENCES

The first regression model examines country differences (represented by 14

dummy variables) on the dependent variable (Table2). The average score on the
dependent variable for the omitted category of Belgian citizens is .014, which
confirms our hypothesis that Belgians are only slightly more pro-European than
all Europeans on average. The results of the regression model, explaining 10.1%
of the variance, show that the following countries have statistically significant
130 / Social Forces 75:1, September 1996

TABLE2: Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Popular Support for

European Unification on Country, Sociodemographics,and Ideology,
1992

Model 1 Model2 Model3

Countries
Norway -.736*** -.783*** -.776
Denmark -.485*** -.527*** -.548*
GreatBritain -.320*** -.292*** -.290
NorthernIreland -.232* -.182 -.177
France -.127* -.111 -.094
West Germany -.079 -.044 -.049
EastGermany .085 .113* .141
Luxembourg .147 .106 .106
The Netherlands .172** .160** .159*
Spain .198** .254*** .304***
Ireland .202** .246*** .241*
Italy .324*** .329*** .372**
Greece .344*** .370*** .366***
Portugal .377*** .443*** .467**

variables
Sociodemographic
Age -.000 -.000
(-.002) (-.000)
Gender (male) .122*** .120**
(.060) (.057)
Education .038*** .037***
(.105) (.103)
Blue collar -.187*** -.175**
(-.064) (-.060)
Self-employed -.093* -.100o
(-.027) (-.029)
White collar - -.009 -.003
(-.004) (-.001)
Family income - .077*** .071W
(.085) (.078)

variables
Ideological
Political orientation - - .040*
(.080)
Value priorities - - .061***
(.039)
Intercept .014 -.380 -.706
Varianceexplained .101 .131 .137
Degreesof freedom 8,019 8,012 8,010

a
Numbersin parentheses coefficients.
arestandardized
* p <.05 **p <.01 ***p < .001
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 131

higherscores than Belgium:the Netherlands,Spain,Ireland,Italy,Greece,and

Portugal.These results are consistentwith our hypothesesexceptfor the score
of Spain,which we expectedto lie closer to the scores of Portugaland Greece.
Confirmingour hypotheses,the coefficientsfor GreatBritain,Denmarkand
Norway are significantlynegative.The resultsalso indicatethatanti-European
sentiments emerge most strongly in the two Scandinaviancountries. The
coefficientsfor Franceand NorthernIrelandshow less supportfor unification
than in the Beneluxcountriesbut more than in GreatBritainand Scandinavia.
SOCIODEMOGRAPHICVARIABLES

Thesecondregressionequation,whichincludesthesociodemographicvariables,
explains 13.1%of the variance,or 3.0%more than the model with country
variables only. Considering the influences of the added sociodemographic
variables,the resultsindicatethatage has no significantrelationshipto popular
supportfor Europeanunification.Yetothervariablesprove more important.A
differenceof .122standarddeviationunits exists between the male and female
respondents. While small, the difference reaches statistical significance.
Unexpectedly,the coefficientindicates that male respondentsare somewhat
more pro-Europeanthan female respondents.
Consistentwith our hypothesis, education relates positively to popular
support.Theresultsfor the variablesoccupationandfamilyincomealso confirm
our predictions: blue-collar and self-employed workers oppose European
unificationmore than do white-collarworkers.Thereis no differencebetween
white-collarworkers and the unemployed,but both groups favor unification
more than blue-collarand self-employedworkers. Of the sociodemographic
variables,educationand family income have the strongestimpact.
The scores for the different countries net of controls for the socio-
demographic variables fail to exhibit noteworthy changes from the gross
countryscores. In fact, the net coefficientsof the countriesin most cases prove
more pronouncedin the directionpredictedby the hypothesesthan the gross
coefficients.Thisconfirmsthatthe influencesof thesociodemographicfactorsdo
not accountfor the countrydifferences.
Wouldmoredetailedoccupationalcategoriesimprovethepredictivepower
of the sociodemographicvariables?Althoughnot comparableto occupational
measures for earlier years, the 1992 survey allows use of 14 occupational
categories.When added to the equation,dummy variablesfor each category
Oessone) do little to changethe results.The varianceexplainedrises by .00346
or, with 10 additionalvariables,by .000346per variable.Also, the moredetailed
measuresfail to furtherexplain country differencesor add much insight not
availablefrom the cruder categories.Thus, to maintaincomparabilityacross
years, we continueto reportthe simple occupationalcategories.
IDEOLOGICALVARIABLES

The third regressionmodel includes the ideologicalfactorsin addition to the

citizenship and the sociodemographicvariables. A multiple regression of
popular support for Europeanunificationon all these independentvariables
132 / Social Forces 75:1, September1996

reveals a coefficient of determination of 13.7, only a slight increase (but

nonetheless statistically significant) compared to the previous equation. The
results show that, controlling for the other independent variables, political
orientation relates positively to popular support for European unification. This
indicates that the favorable attitudes toward free trade of (pro-European)
rightists, or the economic concerns of (anti-European) leftists outweigh
countering influences of the anti-European right and the pro-European left.
Postmaterialist value priorities, as expected, relate positively to attitudes toward
European unification but have a weaker effect than political orientation (the
standardized coefficients equal .080 and .039, respectively).9 As before, the
country differences change little with controls for the ideological variables and
reveal persistent and important differences between countries in their support
of the EC.10

LONGrTUDINALCOMPARISONS,1982-92

To examine the determinants of the evolution of popular support for European

unification, we undertake similar analyses for the Eurobarometer surveys of
1982, 1986, and 1989 (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). We first discuss the results of the
sociodemographic and ideological variables, then we turn to the country
differences."1
The effects of the sociodemographic variables remain fairly stable over the
decade. Only age, gender, and education change significantly over time.
Contradicting our expectation, age relates positively to popular support for
European unification before 1992 but falls to zero in the last year. The effect of
education remains positive in all years but becomes significantly smaller
beginning in 1986. Relative to 1982, the support of males rises significantly in
1986 and 1989.
Turning to the ideological variables, the results continue to show that
political orientation contributes more to variation in the dependent variable than
do value priorities. We do see, however, that the influence of political orienta-
tion diminishes significantly between 1986 and 1989; the effect of value priorities
increases, but not significantly. This result, then, offers limited support for a
thesis of the gradual, but not yet accomplished, formation of a posttraditional
identity Uanssen 1991).
Comparing the relative position of the countries over time shows general
stability in rankings,12 but with movement of nations at the extremes toward the
middle. Several nations relatively less supportive in 1982 - Denmark, Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Greece - become significantly more
supportive by 1992. Several nations relatively more supportive in 1982 - West
Germany, France, and Luxembourg - become significantly less supportive. This
indicates some evidence of convergence in attitudes during the 1980s but
nonetheless leaves a substantial gap between the pro-unity and anti-unity
nations.
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 133

TABLE 3: Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Popular Support for

European Unification on Country, Sociodemographics, and Ideology,
1982

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Countries
Denmark -.778*** -.736*** -.724
Northem Ireland -.714*** -.654*** -.691**
Great Britain -.665*** -.599*** -.599***
Ireland -.210*** -.184** -.212
Greece -.146* -.103 -.032
West Germany .075 .142* .167*
France .176** .190*** .247**
Italy .257*** .294*** .384***
The Netherlands .257*** .247*** .270***
Luxembourg .312*** .335*** .336***

variables
Sociodemographic
Age Q005*** *004***
(.083) (.063)
Gender (male) .043 .057*
(.021) (.028)
Education - .052*** .051*
(.132) (.130)
Blue collar - -.154*** -.139
(-.059) (-.054)
Self-employed - -.022 -.054
(-.007) (-.016)
White collar - -.040 -.028
(-.017) (-.012)
Family income .090*** .079***
(.098) (.086)

Ideologicalvariables
Political orientation - .070***
(.153)
Value priorities - - .027
(.018)
Intercept .102 -.546 -.930
Variance explained .137 .173 .194
Degrees of freedom 5,360 5,353 5,351

a Standardizedcoefficientsare in parentheses.

* p <.05 **p <.01 ***p < .001

134 / Social Forces 75:1, September 1996

TABLE 4: Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Popular Support for

European Unification on Country, Sociodemographics, and Ideology,
1986a

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Countries
Denmark -.852*** -.817*** -.815**
Great Britain -.757*** -.712*** -.714
Northern Ireland -.649*** -.610*** -.627**
Greece -.348*** -.319** -.296*
Ireland -.297*** -.255** -.288**
France .093 .120* .157**
Portugal .095 .192** .206***
Italy .159** .213*** .294***
West Germany .176** .214*** .225
The Netherlands .209*** .223*** .245***
Spain .266*** .302*** .380**
Luxembourg .289*** .299*** .298**

variables
Sociodemographic
Age - .003*** .003***
(.060) (.045)
Gender (male) - .128*** .137**
(.063) (.068)
Education - .032*** .034***
(.084) (.088)
Blue collar - -.122*** -.096**
(-.047) (-.037)
Self-employed - .048 .040
(.014) (.012)
White collar - .015 .022
(.006) (.009)
Family income - .090*** .072***
(.100) (.081)

Ideologicalvariables
Political orientation - .074***
(.156)
Value priorities - - .024
(.015)
Intercept .125 -.466 -.864
Variance explained .148 .178 .200
Degrees of freedom 6,222 6,215 6,213
a Standardizedcoefficientsare in parentheses.
* p <.05 **p <.01 ***p < .001
 Popular Support for European Unification / 135

TABLE 5: Unstandardized Coefficients for Regression of Popular Support for

European Unification on Country, Sociodemographics, and Ideology,
1989a

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Countries
Denmark -.639*** -.625*** -.665**
GreatBritain -.125* -.110 -.139*
Northem Ireland .043 .075 .067
West Germany .050 .094 .075
Luxembourg .227* .231* .213*
France .227* .241*** .242*
The Netherlands .249*** .223*** .207**
Ireland .364*** .386*** .345***
Italy .408* .446*** .480*
Portugal .436*** .511*** .524*
Spain .442 .499*** .558*
Greece .444* .465*** .465

variables
Sociodemographic
Age - .004*** .004
(.071) (.071)
Gender (male) - .135** .132*
(.066) (.065)
Education - .034*** .031W
(.092) (.084)
Blue collar - -.205*** -.180*
(-.071) (-.062)
Self-employed - -.032 -.050
(-.010) (-.015)
White collar - -.052 -.045
(-.023) (-.020)
Family income - .068*** .061**
(.073) (.065)

Ideologicalvariables
Political orientation - - .041
(.089)
Value priorities - - .082
(.053)
Intercept -.147 -.693 -1.03
Varianceexplained .087 .114 .122
Degrees of freedom 6,084 6,077 6,075

a Standardized coefficients are in parentheses.

* p < .05 ** p < .01 ***p < .001
136 / Social Forces 75:1, September 1996

Discussion and Conclusion

Our results show that country differencesin popular support for European
unificationemergeas moreimportantthanindividual- sociodemographicand
ideological- characteristics. Whilesociodemographicandideologicalvariables
also shape attitudes toward unification of Europe, they do not account for
country differences.The within-countryinfluence of the sociodemographic
variablesshows in the strongersupport of more highly educated and richer
citizens and the lower supportof blue-collarworkersfor Europeanunification.
More unexpectedresults emergefor the effectsof age and gender on attitudes
towardEuropeanunification.Thepositivecoefficientsforage indicatethatolder
people's sense of responsibility toward a wider community outweighs the
cosmopolitanorientationof young people.Moreover,thefindingscouldindicate
thatmost older citizens,especiallythosein countriesthatarelongtimemembers
of the EC, view Europeanunificationas a given, ratherthan a new, political
reality. The results of the influence of gender indicate that male respondents
favor unificationof Europemore than females.
The influencesof the ideologicalvariablesof politicalorientationand value
prioritiesshow some ambiguity.Postmaterialistvalueprioritiesrelatepositively
to popular support for Europeanunification,but the influence of political
orientationproves stronger than the effect of value priorities.The more pro-
Europeanattitudes of postmaterialistand right-wing oriented people an
unusual combination- reflectthe importanceof cross-cuttingconcernsin this
area. The cosmopolitan orientation of postmaterialistscontrasts with the
nationalismof materialists,but the pro-free-market orientationof rightwingers
surpasses the anticapitalistsentiments of leftists. Although still early in the
process, the potentialgradualformationof a posttraditionalidentitymanifests
itself in the decliningeffect of politicalorientationand the increasingor stable
effect of value prioritiesover the decade.
The sudden decreaseof popularsupportfor unificationin the formerWest
Germanyand Francein 1992followed the heatedcontroversyin thesecountries
at the time of the signing of the MaastrichtTreaty(Menendez-Alarc6n 1995).In
France, the left-wing political parties opposed European unification and
mobilized forces against the EC.In Germany,the 1992survey, which followed
the reunificationof Germany,reflected the polarizationof attitudes toward
Europein the Eastand West.In formerEastGermany,unificationstrengthened
the questfor democracyand an orientationto the West,whereasin formerWest
Germany it led to a revival of anti-Europeannationalism. Conditions of
uncertaintyin Franceand Germanythus refurbishednationalisttraditionsin a
moreisolationist,anti-Europeanmanner.Indeed,bothcountriesexperiencedthe
success of extreme-rightpoliticalpartiesand outbreaksof xenophobicviolence.
We suggested that citizens of Greece would exhibit more pro-European
attitudes but did not predict the anti-Europeansentimentsof Greek citizens
before1989.Perhapsthe prevalenceof anti-Westernsentimentsdissipatedafter
Greece came to enjoy economic benefits from its EC membershipand the
popular Socialist PanhellicMovementhad'reversedits anti-Europeanstance
(Dimitras1992).If so, it would confirmInglehartand Rabier's(1978)theses that
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 137

increasein a country'seconomicbenefitsfrom ECmembershipleads to greater

support for unification and that length of membership in the EC relates
positively to approvalof a unifiedEurope.Theformerthesis could also explain
the slight increase in support in Portugal and the latter thesis the relative
decline in anti-Europeanismin GreatBritainand Denmarkfrom 1982 to 1992.
The persistence of country differences under conditions of control of
selected variablesindicates a continued commitmenton the part of Europe's
citizens toward interestspertainingto their own countries.13It is importantto
note that persistence of national identity does not imply that Europe lacks
popular legitimation because, as some suggest, structuralpressures bolster
patriotic pride and the EC's political frameworkentails a democraticdeficit
(Dahl 1994; Neunreither1994). To be sure, the issue of democraticdeficit,
specificallyin the form of the relativeimpotenceof the EuropeanParliament,
will affect the future of unified Europe.Yet an exclusive focus on political
power structuresfails to ascertainthe extent to which conditions of popular
legitimationenhanceor impairsuccessof Europeanunificationregardlessof the
EC's organizationaldimensions. Results of our analysis show that an over-
whelming majoritysupport Europeanunification,even in those countriesthat
are less supportive. However, it appears that, given the country differences,
nationalidentificationexplainspro-Europeanas well as anti-European attitudes.
Theoretically, our conclusion relies on the proposition that political
citizenshiphas not been guaranteedon any level beyond nation-states.In the
Europeancontext, in particular,it should be noted that while a European
citizenship is formally specified in the MaastrichtTreaty ("Citizensof the
Union"),it is primarilya legallysanctionedeconomiccategory,a free-movement
"marketcitizenship,"not a full-fledgedcitizenshipof equal participation(de
Lange1995).
Moreover, recent events in Europe indicate an important variety of
coexistingpush and pull factorswith respectto Europeanizationand national-
ization. Ambivalentcurrentsarise not only at the level of ministerialsummits
and politicalprocesses,wherenationaland Europeaninitiativesmeet to conflict
and/or harmonize,but also in Europe'schangingpublic sphere,conceived as
the institutionalized communicative structures beyond state and market
(Habermas1992c).For example,in Germanyand France,attemptsto establish
a strong position within Europe have coincided with spasms of far-right
extremism and concerns over German reunificationand French nationalist
culturalpolicies.In Belgium,the celebrationof Brusselsas the capitalof Europe
and the resulting"bureaucratic invasion"have not overruledtensionsover the
aspired pacification of Walloon/Flemish antagonisms with the country's
political federalization.Or, in Great Britain,one of the more anti-European
countries, opposition to a common Europeancurrencyhas coincided with
remaining internal nationalist struggles (Parman 1993) and the country's
resistanceto, and factualparticipationin, the ECas it recentlymaterializedin
the controversyover the ChannelTunnel (Darian-Smith1995).Affectingall of
Europe's countries, though in differentways, the internal easing of border
controlswithin the EChas been accompaniedby continuedethnic dissensions
and a closing of Europe'soutside borders,amplifyingdebateover asylum and
138 / Social Forces 75:1,September1996

immigration(Habermas1994b;Soysal1994)andpolice andsecurityin "Fortress

Europe"(Bunyan1993;Waeveret al. 1993).
Thesetrendsindicatethatconditionsof confusionover sourcesof authority
and decision-makingmay facilitatea continuedidentificationwith individual
countries.In the absenceof a developed Europeanpublic sphere,particularly
with respectto the media (Gerhards1993),politicallyrelevantidentitiesremain
mediated through familiar forms of association rooted in diverse national
histories and cultures.Therefore,a crucialpolitical paradoxin contemporary
Europeis not the simultaneousresurgenceof nationalismand internationalism
(Adam1990),but the coexistenceof differentexpressionsof multiple forms of
nationalism,fissiparousand unificationist(Calhoun1993).
The importanceof countryof citizenshipas a centralfactorin explaining
popularsupportfor Europeanunificationhas crucialand paradoxicalimplica-
tions. It suggests that both favorableand unfavorableorientationstowardthe
supranationalEuropeanCommunityemanatefrom national concerns.Thus,
assessing whether the EuropeanCommunitywill face a legitimation crisis
requires scholars to take into account citizens' perceptions of their own
countries'likelihoodto benefitfromthe ECand the mannerin whichconflicting
structural trends affect these perceptions. This perspective goes beyond
descriptiveanalysesof the level of popularsupportthe EuropeanCommunity
enjoys.Forinstance,the relativelyhigh level of anti-Europeanattitudesin Great
Britainand Denmarkis well known (Inglehart& Rabier1979;Worcester1990).
Butless knownis thatpro-Europeancitizens,too, may supporta unifiedEurope
not for Europe,but for the benefitsthey perceiveunificationwill have for their
own countries.
The Europeandilemma, then, lies in the fact that Europeanunification,
despite the high level of support it receives, does not rely on postnational
citizens with a united self-consciousnessor Euro-citizenship(Bryant1991;
Hodgson 1993), but on a plurality of nationals with "rival and contrasting
'Europeanidentities"' (Shore 1993:791).The legitimation of the EC is not
secured,not only becauseanti-Europeancitizensdo not supportunification,but
also becausepro-Europeansdo so out of concernsrelatedto theirown countries.
Both anti-Europeansand pro-Europeansare nationals,not Europeans.

Notes

1. Several other European countries have fornally applied for membershipin the EC/EU:
Turkey in 1987, Austria in 1989, Cyprus and Malta in 1990, Sweden in 1991, and Finland,
Switzerland,and Norway in 1992. Since then, referendaled Sweden, Finland,and Austria to
join the EU and Norway to decline. Announcementsof the intentionor considerationto apply
for membershiphave been made by other countries, such as Liechtenstein,the Czech and
Slovakrepublics,Poland,Hungaxy,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania,Bulgaria,Romania,and Albania.
2. Fromthe perspectiveof the sociology of democracy,Habermas'sapproachcriticizestheories
that exclusively emphasize the efficacy of the economic system and the polity (e.g., Upset
1994), asserting that a civil society, permittingpopular participationand legitimation,is an
importantcodeterminantof democraticsurvival (Habermas1992a, 1994a; see also Calhoun
1993;Dahl 1992;Gerhards1993).
3. This correspondsto Hailer's (1990)thesis that comparativeresearchon the "macrocontext'
of Europe should not exclude an account of the internal differentiationsbetween Europe's
countries (see also the discussion between Hamm 1991 and Hailer 1991).
 PopularSupportfor EuropeanUnification/ 139

APPENDIX: Results of Factor Analysis for Three Variables Measuring Popular

Support for European Unificationa

1982 1986 1989 1992

(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)

Europeanunification .73 .53 .74 .55 .82 .67 .82 .68
EC membership .89 .79 .87 .75 .85 .72 .86 .74
EC scrapped .89 .80 .87 .76 .86 .73 .86 .73
Varianceexplained by factor 70.5 68.7 70.9 71.6

a (1) Factorloading
(2) Communality

World War II, and proximity to other countriesin the EuropeanCommunityshow high rates
of support.We attempt to evaluate in more detail the premise behind their analysis.
5. If we desired to generalize to the EuropeanCommunityas a single entity, we could also
weight each countryin the sample so that it correspondsto its representationin the communi-
ty. However, given our theoreticalattentionto nationalidentityand concernwith nation-states
as meaningfulunits, the virtual discountingof the results for smallercountriesrelative to the
largercountriesbroughtabout by this procedurehas little justification.
6. Differencesin educationalsystems make it difficult to measure degree completedmeaning-
fully across countries.
7. For a review of the conceptuallogic, details of construction,and methodologicalevaluation
of the postmaterialistvalue prioritiesscale, see Inglehart(1990).The scale comes from answers
to questions of what respondents think are the two most importantgoals for their country.
Originallyofferinga choice of twelve materialistand postmaterialistgoals, Inglehartlater was
able to reduce the choice to four goals with little loss of reliability. Those who choose
maintainingorderand fighting rising prices are classified as materialist,and those who choose
protecting freedom of speech and giving people more say in government are classified as
postmaterialist.Those who choose one from each set are classified as mixed.
To checkfor nonlinearity,we also treatedpostmaterialismas two dummy variablesrather
than as a single linearscale. However, adding the extravariableto allow for nonlinearityraises
the proportionof variance explained by less than .0003. The single indicatorthus appears to
adequately depict the effects of postmaterialistvalues in our models.
8. Because the 1989 election for the EuropeanParliamentmay also have generatedinterest in
and support for unification, the figures for that year may be somewhat inflated (Gabel &
Palmer1995).
9. Perhaps the modest effects of the ideological variables result from their overlap with the
sociodemographic controls for age, education, occupation, and income. Yet the bivariate
correlationsof Europeansupport with political orientationand postmaterialismare actually
slightly smaller than the partial standardizedcoefficients.
10. Replicatingthe 1992 results for the eleven countriesavailablefor all years does not change
these conclusions. As a means of identifying substantially important changes, we simply
comparedcoefficientsfor the model for both sets of countries.None of the coefficientsfor the
subsample differed nontrivially from those reported in Table 2. Although the composition
affects the overall level of support in Table1 and the constantin the regressionequation,it has
no influenceon the variablecoefficients.Thisfinding indicatesthat the relationshipsin the four
new countries do not differ from those in the original eleven. Furthertests for differencesin
effects across the originaleleven countriesmight also be appropriate.However, the formidable
140 / Social Forces 75:1,September1996

problemsof developing theoreticalspecificationsof the expected differences,adding numerous

statistical tests, and interpretingseparatemodels by countryas well as by year led us to limit
such efforts in this article.
11. In the following discussion, we refer to significantchanges in the coefficientson the basis
of tests for two groups of countries.One group of all countries,even those added afterthe 1982
survey, makes it difficult to isolate changes in the coefficients from differences due to the
changing country composition of the sample. The other group of countries with data for all
years allows direct tests for changes in the coefficients without concern over the countries
included. The same variables emerged as having changed significantly for both groups of
countries, and we can therefore attribute the changes to something more than sample
composition.To test for changes over time, we include product terms of dummy variablesfor
1986, 1989, and 1992 by each of the other independent variables (leaving the effects of the
variablesin 1982 as the base from which the effects for the lateryears vary).Forthe full sample
of nations,the additionalsixty-five producttermsraise the varianceexplainedwith an additive
model by 2% (.160 versus .140, significant at the .001 level). Examiningthe significance and
direction of the product terms forms the basis of our discussion.
12. Since the dependent variable has been standardizedwithin each of the years, we look for
changes only in the rankingsof the countries over time. While the descriptiveresults in Table
1 show increasedsupport for unificationover time, the coefficientsin Tables3-5 show shifts in
relative positions of countries within the more general trend. We can allow the mean of the
dependent variable to vaxy across years by standardizingwithin the total sample ratherthan
within years. Except to increase the effects of the dummy variables for time, this form of
scaling does not change significantlyany of the other additive or interactiveeffects.
13. Perhapsour measureof popular support cannotidentify citizens who favor a unificationof
Europe in idealized terms, but not the unificationas it really exists. Factoranalysis, however,
does not support the view that respondentsmake this distinction:despite a differentemphasis,
the item on Europeanunificationattitude loads similarly on the underlyingfactor to the two
other items (see Appendix).

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