POLICE POWER CASES

CITY OF MANILA V. MALATE TOURIST [ G.R. NO. 118127, April 12, 2005 ]

…The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental
law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals.
And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of
Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not
lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

FACTS: Enacted by the City Council, on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor
on 30 March 1993, the Ordinance No. 7783, entitled An Ordinance Prohibting the establishment
or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, prescribing penalties for violation thereof, and for other
purposes, for the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Consequently, private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC), a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses
and built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition)
with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila. MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: No. The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power
legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary "we reiterate our
support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or
constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council,
cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order
their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of laws "not even under the guise of police power.

NOTES:
I. Tests of a Valid Ordinance
A. It must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law
B. it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
a. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
b. must not be unfair or oppressive;
c. must not be partial or discriminatory;
d. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
e. must be general and consistent with public policy; and
f. must not be unreasonable.
II. Exercise of Police Power, acting as Agent of Congress
A. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
B. This delegated police power is under the general welfare clause, Sec 16 of LGC
C. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies
D. The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the
law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its
exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect
and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part
of the Bill of Rights.
III. Due Process Clause
A. The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . .”
B. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
C. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life,
liberty and property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of
the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative
enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the
ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial
justice and the benefit of the general law.
D. The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private
corporations and partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as
their property is concerned.
IV. Procedural and Substantial Due Process
A. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues
are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must
provide when it takes a particular action.
B. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.
V. Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power
A. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance it must:
a. appear that the interests of the public generally; and
b. the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
B. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down
as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights -a violation of the due process clause.
VI. Requisites are not met by the assailed law
A. The object of the Ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed
for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
B. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
"allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
 promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the
alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
C. The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality.
Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can
make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human
conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and
privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
D. There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in
terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If
the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills,
it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
VII. Means employed are constitutionally infirm
Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to
consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises-be it
stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution. Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity
as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make
this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run
afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
VIII. Modality employed is unlawful taking
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the
respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The Constitution expressly provides in
Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the
Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property.
The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the
property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government
takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal
purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
IX. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
A. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.” It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection
clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
B. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating
 the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not
be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
i. It must be based on substantial distinctions
ii. It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
iii. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
iv. It must apply equally to all members of the class
C. In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are
commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for
the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant
case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance
X. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL v JAC LINER, INC. [ G.R. NO. 148339, February
23, 2005 ]

FACTS: JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction [1] against the City of Lucena
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631, An Ordinance
Granting the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., a franchise to construct, finance, establish,
operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena, and 1778,
An Ordinance Regulating the Entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-
town passenger jeepneys for this purpose, amending Ordinance 1430 and 155, as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies. These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years,
renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one
common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper,
were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused
by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted
the subject ordinances

HELD: No. The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police
power only if there is concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. The ordinances
assailed are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to
determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of
Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of
solutions to societal problems.
It is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic
congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the
streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation
of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or
help impede the flow of traffic. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to
their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not
per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance,
without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
BINAY v DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT [G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991]

“Those who have less in life, should have more in law." –President Ramon Magsaysay

FACTS: On September 27, 1988, petitioner City approved Res. No. 60 which confirms/or
ratifies the ongoing burial assistance for program initiated by the Office of the Mayor, of
extending financial assistance of P500.00 to a bereaved family, funds to be taken out of
unappropriated funds. Beneficiaries are bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income
does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. After,
the municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of P400,000.00 for the implementation of
the program. Bent on pursuing the program, the City, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming
Res. No. 60. However, the program has been stayed by COA. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was
constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision be set aside as
null and void. Res. No. 60 was referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit.
Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or
relation between the objective sought to be attained under Res No. 60 and the alleged public
safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." Apparently, COA tries to re-define the
scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of
the inhabitants of Makati." The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the
people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is occupied with affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited, but is broadened
to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people
by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's objection based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for
the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the
benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case." Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social
justice, and human dignity and respect for human rights.” The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection
clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down
to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.

NOTES:
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum
non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of
Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power,
there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as
a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as
empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety
of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are
as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their
delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional
fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such
powers. (Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as
governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable
them to perform their governmental functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public
necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only does the State effectuate its purposes through the
exercise of the police power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant
thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and
such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of
property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And under Section 7 of BP 337,
"every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote
health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the
local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al.
vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the
citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private
and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it has been said to be the very foundation
on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow
circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC,supra).
LOZANO v MARTINEZ [G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986]

FACTS: These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute.
The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions
were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No.
75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law is constitutional

HELD: Yes. The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Neither does it have substance in
the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory.
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the
alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which
states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist
that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of
the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather
than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing
it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt
under the threat of penal sanction. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated
by the imposition of penal sanctions. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.
In relation to the equal protection clause, it is contended that the payee is just as
responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This
argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the
clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals,
who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
unreasonable or arbitrary.

NOTES:
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30
days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than
double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail
to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank. 
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of
the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates
a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the
drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check.  To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the
statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt
of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by
the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that
the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal
to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall
constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment
to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to
present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
DECS v SAN DIEGO [G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989]
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education
by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not
because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

FACTS: Private respondent is a graduate of the UE with a degree in Zoology. The petitioner
claims that he took and flunked the NMAT three times. When he applied again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of
Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first
invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of
the parties, respondent was allowed to take the NMAT, subject to the outcome of his petition. In
an amended petition filed with leave of court, he challenged the constitutionality the rule. The
additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. After hearing, the respondent
judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting
the petition. Judge Capulong held that he had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not NMAT is constitutional

HELD: Yes. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives
and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of other callings in which the public interest is
involved. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are not dissipated or not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The
contention that the rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not
have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution. There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between
medical students and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk
rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation
and promise. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute
incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better,
not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
 EMINENT DOMAIN CASES

MASIKIP vs CITY OF PASIG [G.R. No. 136349]

FACTS:  Petitioner Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City. In January 6, 1994, respondent City of  Pasig, notified petitioner of its
intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the “sports development and
recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan, pursuant to Ordinance No. 42,
Series of 1993 enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Again, on March 23, 1994,
respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly “in line with
the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.” On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the
intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of
her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community.” In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of
the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational facilities to its
poor residents.” Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation.   Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be appointed
for the purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on
the report of the commissioners. On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property
for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies
the condemnation of petitioner’s property

HELD:  No. Respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner’s property.  Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued
by the Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan.  It can be gleaned that the said Association are desirous of having their own private
playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available.   The
purpose is not clearly and categorically public.  The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men.  It is
so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law
prevails.  Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one’s property is
clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their
private property.  Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity
which the Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the
purpose for the taking of private property be specified.  The genuine necessity for the taking,
which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.

NOTES:
In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of eminent domain as “the right
of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor.”  It has also been described as the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and
inherent in government.
          The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government.   It
delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations,[9] subject only to Constitutional limitations.   Local governments have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. [10]  
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays
down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
          “SEC. 19.  Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further,
That, the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property.”
          Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern:  (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the
public use character of the purpose of the taking.[11] 
          The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from “the
necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity.   In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.  Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the
land.   In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College,[13] we ruled that “necessity within the rule that
the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but
only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property
owner consistent with such benefit.” 
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUYAN v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [G.R. No. 72126
January 29, 1988]

FACTS: In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879 to enable the
storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products and parts for low
cost housing. Subsequently, the Municipality passed Res No. 258 manifesting the intention to
expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with the Office of the Provincial
Governor which created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On
March 10, 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan
disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity to
expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the
Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Res No. 238 disapproving and annulling Res No. 258 of
Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the
approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On October 21, 1983, however, the
Municipality passed Res No. 21 for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land.
The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879 has the existence of a genuine
necessity

HELD: No. The petitioner's purpose in expropriating the respondent's property is to convert the
same into a public road which would provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and
Bulac Road in Valenzuela, Bulacan and thereby ease the traffic in the area of vehicles coming
from MacArthur Highway. The records, however, reveals that there are other connecting links
between the aforementioned roads. The petitioner itself admits that there are four such cross
roads in existence. The respondent court stated that with the proposed road, there would be
seven.
The petitioner objects to the appellate court's findings contending that they were based
on facts obtaining long before the present action to expropriate took place. However, there is no
evidence on record which shows a change in the factual circumstances of the case. There is no
showing that some of the six other available cross roads have been closed or that the private
roads in the subdivision may not be used for municipal purposes. What is more likely is that
these roads have already been turned over to the government. The petitioner alleges that surely
the environmental progress during the span of seven years between the first and second
attempts to expropriate has brought about a change in the facts of the case. This allegation
does not merit consideration absent a showing of concrete evidence attesting to it.
As early as City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) this Court held
that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified
only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character.
Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefore.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) vs LOZADA,

FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner
was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
respondent Lozada acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for the Republic
and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However, the projected
improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued. The
plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of
ownership the subject lot. On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal
of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to
reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed
for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property
notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-
respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the
petitioners argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional,
giving title in fee simple to the Republic.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted, and as such, the respondents are
entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property which was not used for a public purpose
 
HELD: Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: “If an absolute conveyance of property is made in
order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by
virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it
becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.”
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when
they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may
not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest.
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustee’s
sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of
course, the “wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive
trust must himself do equity.” Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what
acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree
and has the obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as
the plaintiff-beneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment
of the court, the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his
services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit
from his acts.
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this
case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190
of the Civil Code, “When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an
obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other
what they have received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the
provisions which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be
applied to the party who is bound to return x x x.
NOTES:

Expropriation;  private use.  It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is
for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed,
failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon
the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to
the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of
the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case,
the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required
factual justification.
CITY OF MANILA v CHINESE COMMUNITY [G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919]

FACTS: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of
the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement.
The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] alleged in its answer that
it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine
Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the
City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2
of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be
expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of
communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were
available, which would fully satisfy the City's purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that
the lands in question had been used by the Chinese Community for cemetery purposes; that a
great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into
effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large
sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the
purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the
erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the
Chinese Community and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and
monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the City was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the
expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting,
answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said
expropriation was not a public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband,
Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and
Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the
expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants (Chinese
Community, Tambunting, spouses Delgado, et. al.) from all liability under the complaint, without
any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

ISSUE: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated for
the construction of a public improvement.

HELD: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city
(Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of Manila,
however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190
provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides
that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of
any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to
condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by
Section 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon
it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is
public (a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to
have been established under governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an
order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part
of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. To disturb the mortal
remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but,
except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting
place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be
invoked for that object. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the
dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still
devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would
adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY V DULAY [GR L-59603, 29 April 1987]

FACTS: On 15 January 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811,
reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island
of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among
others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered
in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to
purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an
agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land
pursuant to PD 66, as amended, which empowers EPZA to acquire by condemnation
proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
Proclamation 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. On 21
October 1980, Judge Ceferino E. Dulay issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to take
immediate possession of the premises. At the pre-trial conference on 13 February 1981, the
judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is
the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the
hearing on the merits is set on 2 April 1981. On 17 February 1981, the judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring EPZA as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be
condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated. On 19 June 1981, the three commissioners submitted their
consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. On 29 July 1981, EPZA filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the order of 19 February 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report
on the grounds that PD 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation
must not exceed the maximum amount set by PD 1533. On 14 November 1981, the trial court
denied EPZA's motion for reconsideration. On 9 February 1982, EPZA filed the petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from
enforcing the order dated 17 February 1981 and from further proceeding with the hearing of the
expropriation case.

ISSUE/S: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
Presidential Decree1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by
provincial assessors be the value of just compensation.

HELD: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of
private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and
fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by
the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just
compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis
shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."
Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when
private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly,
Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for private property
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed
the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property
or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is
lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire
the property." The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as
the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitute impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter
which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree
may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but
it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how
to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific
properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually
uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of
the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on
such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often
land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in
terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often
inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute
substitutes for just compensation.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs TUAZON [G.R. No. 193023, June 22, 2011] 

FACTS: The respondents are co-owners of a 136,736-square-meter coconut land in Barangay

Sta. Cruz, Tarangnan, Samar. The land has been declared for tax purposes in the name of the
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, the late Mr. Pascual Tuazon. Sometime in 1996,
NAPOCOR installed transmission lines on a portion of the land for its 350 KV Leyte-Luzon
HVDC Power TL Project.  In the process, several improvements on the land were destroyed.
Instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, however, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right-
of-way agreement with Mr. Tuazon for the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT and 21/100 PESOS (P26,978.21). The amount represents
payments for “damaged improvements” (P23,970.00), “easement and tower occupancy fees”
(P1,808.21), and “additional damaged improvements” (P1,200.00). In 2002, the respondents
filed a complaint against NAPOCOR for just compensation and damages, claiming that no
expropriation proceedings were made and that they only allowed NAPOCOR entry into the land
after being told that the fair market value would be paid. They also stated that lots similarly
located in Catbalogan, Samar, likewise utilized by NAPOCOR for the similar projects, were paid
just compensation in sums ranging from P2,000.00 toP2,200.00 per square meter, pursuant to
the determination made by different branches of the RTC in Samar. The herein petitioner filed an
ordinary appeal with the CA. In its Appellee’s Brief, NAPOCOR denied that expropriation had
occurred. Instead, it claimed to have lawfully established a right-of-way easement on the land
per its agreement with Mr. Tuazon, which agreement is in accord with its charter, Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 6395. NAPOCOR maintained that Section 3-A(b) of R.A. 6395 gave it the right to acquire
a right-of-way easement upon payment of “just compensation” equivalent to not more than 10%
of the market value of a private lot traversed by transmission lines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right-of-way easement instead of just compensation on the private
land taken for the installation of transmission lines is valid

HELD: No. NAPOCOR is liable to pay respondents herein just compensation and not only
easement fee. Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. True, an easement of a right
of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of
the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the
limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal
use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation,
which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
            Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word
“just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the
owner of a condemned property is entitled is generally the market value. Market value is “that
sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.”
 TAXATION CASES

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v CITYTRUST INVESTMENT PHILS., INC., [GR

No. 86785, November 21, 1991]

FACTS:  Respondent corporation Citytrust filed a refund of overpaid taxes with the BIR by
which the latter denied on the ground of prescription. Citytrust filed a petition for review before
the CTA. The case was submitted for decision based solely on the pleadings and evidence
submitted by the respondent because the CIR could not present any evidence by reason of the
repeated failure of the Tax Credit/Refud Division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case,
as well as the investigation report thereon, to the Solicitor General. CTA rendered the decision
ordering BIR to grant the respondent's request for tax refund amounting to P 13.3 million.

ISSUE/S:  Whether or not CIR failed to present evidence to support the case of the government,
Whether or not respondent's claim should be granted

HELD: Not yet. It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the
errors committed by its agents.  In the performance of its governmental functions, the State
cannot be estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers. Although the Government may
generally be estopped through the affirmative acts of public officers acting within their authority,
their neglect or omission of public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should not
produce that effect. Nowhere is the aforestated rule more true than in the field of taxation. It is
axiomatic that the Government cannot and must not be estopped particularly in matters
involving taxes. Taxes are the lifeblood of the nation through which the government agencies
continue to operate and with which the State effects its functions for the welfare of its
constituents. The errors of certain administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize
the Government's financial position, especially in the case at bar where the amount involves
millions of pesos the collection whereof, if justified, stands to be prejudiced just because of
bureaucratic lethargy. Thus, it is proper that the case be remanded back to the CTA for further
proceedings and reception of evidence.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO vs JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO [G.R. No. 163583, August
20, 2008]
 
DOCTRINE: A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal and uniform
in its operation. The uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of taxation.

FACTS: To implement RA 8240, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue
Regulations No. 1-97, 2 which classified the existing brands of cigarettes as those duly
registered or active brands prior to January 1, 1997. New brands, or those registered after
January 1, 1997, shall be initially assessed at their suggested retail price until such time that the
appropriate survey to determine their current net retail price is conducted. In June 2001 British
American Tobacco introduced into the market Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights and Lucky
Strike Menthol Lights cigarettes, with a suggested retail price of P9.90 per pack. 3 Pursuant to
Sec. 145 (c) quoted above, the Lucky Strike brands were initially assessed the excise tax at
P8.96 per pack. On February 17, 2003, Revenue Regulations No. 9-2003, amended Revenue
Regulations No. 1-97 by providing, among others, a periodic review every two years or earlier of
the current net retail price of new brands and variants thereof for the purpose of establishing
and updating their tax classification. Pursuant thereto, Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-
2003 5 was issued on March 11, 2003, prescribing the guidelines and procedures in
establishing current net retail prices of new brands of cigarettes and alcohol products.
Subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 22-2003 6 was issued on August 8, 2003 to
implement the revised tax classification of certain new brands introduced in the market
after January 1, 1997, based on the survey of their current net retail price. The survey revealed
that Lucky Strike Filter, Lucky Strike Lights, and Lucky Strike Menthol Lights, are sold at the
current net retail price of P22.54, P22.61 and P21.23, per pack, respectively. Respondent
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue thus recommended the applicable tax rate
of P13.44 per pack inasmuch as Lucky Strike's average net retail price is above P10.00 per
pack. Thus filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 61, a petition for
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1032. Said petition sought to enjoin the
implementation of Section 145 of the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003
and Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003 on the ground that they discriminate against new
brands of cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and uniformity provisions of the
Constitution. The trial court rendered a decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 145 of
the NIRC, Revenue Regulations Nos. 1-97, 9-2003, 22-2003 and Revenue Memorandum Order
No. 6-2003

ISSUE: Whether or not the classification freeze provision violates the equal protection and
uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution

HELD: In the instant case, there is no question that the classification freeze provision meets the
geographical uniformity requirement because the assailed law applies to all cigarette brands in
the Philippines. And, for reasons already adverted to in our August 20, 2008 Decision, the four-
fold test has been met in the present case. As held in the assailed Decision, the instant case
neither involves a suspect classification nor impinges on a fundamental right. Consequently, the
rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the assailed law in the
face of an equal protection challenge. It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Under the
rational basis test, it is sufficient that the legislative classification is rationally related to achieving
some legitimate State interest. Petitioner's reliance on Ormoc Sugar Co. is misplaced. In said
case, the controverted municipal ordinance specifically named and taxed only the Ormoc Sugar
Company, and excluded any subsequently established sugar central from its coverage. Thus,
the ordinance was found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because its terms do not
apply to future conditions as well. This is not the case here. The classification freeze provision
uniformly applies to all cigarette brands whether existing or to be introduced in the market at
some future time. It does not purport to exempt any brand from its operation nor single out a
brand for the purpose of imposition of excise taxes
 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CASES

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO [ L-19550; June 19, 1967 ]

FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates, a total of 2 search warrants against
petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace
officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and
proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the
warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to thection with this
constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not corporations are protected by Section 2, Article III; and whether or not
failing to specify the offense committed invalidates a warrant

HELD: Yes. The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them
in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Yes. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [ G.R. NO. 109633; July 20, 1994]

FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms
and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the
issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined
quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia‘s, an entrapment was planned that led to
the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia‘s and of a .22 caliber
pistol with 3 live ammunition.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper

HELD: No. Sec 2, Art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that
the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia‘s therein. The seizure
of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore, the decision is reversed and the accused is
acquittal.

NOTES:
SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID WARRANT. —
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot
validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26,
1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the
fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: ‘It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of
greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal
security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge
must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A
liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."
RP vs. DANILO SIMBAHON [G.R. No. 132371  April 9, 2003]

FACTS: Police operatives, together with the barangay chairman of the place and a member of
media, served Search Warrant No. 95-100 upon Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito
Mangulabnan at their residence. After, the team began a search of all the rooms in accordance
with the search warrant and found under the bed a brick of dried flowering tops suspected to be
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, a black bullet pouch containing six (6) live ammunitions,
and sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. After the search, an
inventory receipt of the items seized from the house of the suspects was prepared an affidavit of
orderly search was signed by Danilo Simbahon. Simbahon was charged for violation of RA
6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and PD 1866, penalizing the illegal
possession of firearms. The Court found him guilty of the crime charged against himthereby
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and to pay the cost. However, appellant contended that the
court erred in convicting him because the search warrant served was invalid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was invalid.

HELD: Yes. The record shows serious defects in the search warrant itself which render the
same null and void. The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant show that it was issued
for more than one offense — for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866. In Tambasen
v. People, et al., it was held that:
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws:
P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A.
No. 1700, the Anti-Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a “scatter-
shot warrant” and totally null and void.
Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The
rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The constitutional requirement
is a description which particularly points to a definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all
others. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to appellant’s residence as
“premises”, without specifying its address. The absence of a particular description in the search
warrant renders the same void. Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search
warrant issued for the search of appellant’s house. The seizure by the police officers conducting
the search of articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their
authority under the search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made and that abuses may not be committed. 20 Neither can the admissibility of such seized
items be justified under the plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were
found not inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous search under
the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a plastic bag.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASUNCION [GR 122092,
19 May 1999]

FACTS: On 25 January 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City, stating "(1) that the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G.
Santiago, is in possession or has in its control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense,
and which are being kept and concealed in the premises herein described; (2) that a Search
Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties: 'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56,
ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203
Grenade Launcher[s] cal 40mm., ten (10) cal. 45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s], two (2)
ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten
(10) handgrenades.'" The joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario
Enad and Felipe Moreno were attached to the application. After propounding several questions
to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On 4 February
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized various
firearms and ammunition. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable,
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, Evaristo M. Narvaez Jr., Ricardo G. Santiago,
Roberto A. Dormendo, Reydande D. Azucena, Niceforo V. Avila, Florentino M. Mula, Felix O.
Baito, Harold B. Celestial, Elmedencio C. Calixtro, Carlito S. Legacion, Albino T. Lubang,
Jeremias I. Abad and Herminio V. Villamil filed a "Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion
to Suppress Evidence." On 23 March 1995, the RTC issued the Order which denied PICOP, et.
al.'s motions. On 3 August 1995, the trial court rendered its Order denying their Motion for
Reconsideration. PICOP, et. al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the fact that the warrant identifies only one place, i.e. the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur," satisfies the requirements of the particularity of the place to be search, and
thus render the warrant valid.

HELD: No. The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In view of the
manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution
and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. Thus, this
Court has held that "this constitutional right is the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional protection against the
long reach of government no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent procedural
safeguards." Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause
requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description
will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the
described items are to be found in a particular place. Herein, the search warrant is invalid
because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other
deponents: (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the
search warrant, had no personal knowledge that PICOP, et. al. were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. As to the
particularity of the place to be searched, the assailed search warrant failed to described the
place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did
not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/buildings, 15
plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service
outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which spread out over some one hundred
fifty-five hectares." Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal
authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. Because the search
warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms,
explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
PENDON vs CA [GR 84873, November 16, 1990.]

FACTS: The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City and supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses,
Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo
Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City, quoted as follows:

"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly sworn to,
testify as follows:

1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?

ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an employee of NAPOCOR and
presently residing at Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO ABAJA, CIS,
regular member of the CO/INP CIS Command, Bacolod City.

2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal

Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?
ANSWER: Yes, Sir.

3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may be
found in the said premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession and control the
following property, to wit: NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly,
aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.

4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept in
said premises/house?
ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to purchase some of these
items.”

On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued Search
Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described in the warrant. It is the
contention of petitioner that the application for the search warrant and the joint deposition of the
witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the
rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not failing to comply with the requisites of searching questions and answers
by a judge invalidates a search warrnat

HELD: Yes. We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge
must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself
was not asked any searching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only
part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge
Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant
had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the
possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be
issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing
the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the
applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain,
among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was
not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the examination must be
probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application."cralaw virtua1aw
library

NOTES:
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
1) the judge (or) officer must examine the the witnesses personally;
2) the examination must be under oath; and
3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers
(Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 647). These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE [G.R. No. 81756; October 21, 1991]

FACTS: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an
"application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva
and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued
Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous
Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama
Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant
authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama
Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets,
cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers
seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion
to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of
mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by
searching questions and answers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid, and whether or not the officers abused
their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.

HELD: Search Warrant 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the
form of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are
answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to fill in
their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he
rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking return of her money.
The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when
they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but
only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes, etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void.

NOTE:
Sec 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court
Examination of the complainant, record—the judge before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.
RP vs CHUA [GR 149878, July 1, 2003]

FACTS: For violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, an application to search
the unit supposedly owned by “Timothy Tiu” was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch
35 of the RTC of Manila on October 9. Armed with the warrant, the police proceeded to the
place and learned that Tiu Won was not inside the building. They waited outside but Tiu Won
did not come. After several stakeouts, they were able to implement the warrant on October 12.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons inside the apartment,
namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and a housemaid. The search was conducted on
the sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the master's
bedroom, one (1) big pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found inside a black leather
man's handbag supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu
weighing 20.3673 grams were found inside a lady's handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling.
Also contained in the inventory were the following items: an improvised tooter, a weighing scale,
an improvised burner and one rolled tissue paper.[5] The authorities also searched a Honda
Civic car bearing Plate No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered in the name
of the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing 6.2243 grams of shabu, which
were likewise confiscated. A gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made
subject of a separate criminal case. The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling.
They denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same person. They presented
papers and documents to prove that appellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated
in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of the
search warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864
Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling.

ISSUE: Whether or not a mistake of name of the person to be search invalidates a warrant.

HELD: No. A mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant,
especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related
activities of the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it
contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. We have
also held that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the
warrant provided the place to be searched is properly described. Thus, even if the search
warrant used by the police authorities did not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name
of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was described
properly. Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation before
obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be
searched although they may not have specifically known the names of the accused. Armed with
the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B was conducted.
We also note that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of
criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession
of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
 WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

PEOPLE v TUDTUD [G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003]

“It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available
evidence should be used.   It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be
obtained.   If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may
not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to
protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will
pay for the fruits.   We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.” – Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v US

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao
City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly
responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald
Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the
Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood
in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and
would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big-
bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed
of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of
Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. Allwore civilian clothes. About 8:00
p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked “King
Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed
that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1
Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of
illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied
that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box.
Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked
on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the
packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police
thus arrested
Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police
station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the
confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200
grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud
and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both
accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of
their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud,
denying the charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence
beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in
evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right”
when the police officers requested that the box be opened) is considered a waiver.

HELD: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the
first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded
the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.
The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest
Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of
consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is
insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud
was in possession of marijuana be described as “personal,” having learned the same only from
their informant Solier.
Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and
the friends of Tudtud. Solier’s information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant,
the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own “surveillance.” This “surveillance,” it
turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal
trade, but of a mere “gathering of information from the assets there.” The police officers who
conducted such “surveillance” did not identify who these “assets” were or the basis of the latter’s
information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures
only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear that the rights exist; (2) The
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish
the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers introduced
themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box
supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said “it was alright.” He did not resist and opened
the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack
of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or
a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box
does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana
leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than
the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et.
al. cannot be sustained.
PEOPLE v DORIA & GADAO [G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999]

FACTS: In November 1995, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-
bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and
"Jun" was scheduled on 5 December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City. On 5
December 1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation.
The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team
leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as
members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as
his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security.
Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom,
gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set
aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills — as money for
the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3
Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter.
The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area. At 7:20 a.m., "Jun" appeared and the
CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana.
PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the
marijuana from his associate. An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object
wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as
SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on
him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal. The team found
the door of "Neneth's" house open and at woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate. SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining
table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped
in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold"
to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold
of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from "Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun,"
together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator
at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado
while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from
"Jun" plus the 10 bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The bricks were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling
7,641.08 grams. On 7 December 1995, Doria and Gadda were charged with violation of Section
4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted Dorria and Gaddao. The trial court found the existence
of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of
P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally permissible.
HELD: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to
outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The
type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction"
of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where,
however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the
accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another. xxx" Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted,
a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our
Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however,
not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under
any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be justified under the
second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief
or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged
identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that
the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of
her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
PEOPLE v BINAD SY CHUA [G.R. No.136066-67; February 4, 2003]

FACTS: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations. SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a
report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that
night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of
operatives. The group positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai
Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their back up. Afterwards, their informer
pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of
the hotel.
After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2
Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As
accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline
substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body
search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained
a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the
Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by
accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the scene
brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp
Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a
different version of the incident. Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his
wife to follow her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along
McArthur Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes
and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his
car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber
gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a
policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him
to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his
car. At this time, the police officer‘s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud,
who just arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others
searched his car. Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom
for about fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In
the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to
hold the box while pictures were being taken. The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal
Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of
shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and whether or not the
search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were
conducted in a lawful and valid manner

HELD: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer
had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid
being akin to a ―stop and frisk. The trial court confused the concepts of a ―stop-and-frisk‖ and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
 These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be
arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not
act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime. ―Reliable information alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
With regard to the concept of ―stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a ―stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer‘s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a ―stop-and-frisk‖ serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be
emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.
The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-
appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in
his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into
accused-appellant‘s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was
carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had
custody of accused-appellant. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the ―stop
and frisk principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and
seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ v PEOPLE [G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007]

FACTS: On March 17 2003, Bautista (tanod) was conducting the routine patrol along
the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas
and Ordoño when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus.
The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking
for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain
Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to
open his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of
eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that
petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s sole witness, he testified that at
around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy, Santol, La
Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to
drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, prosecution
witness Ordoño, a cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he
was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly
requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista
and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he
was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the
bag until they reached their destination. Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag
was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper,
which later turned out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed
to have been threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited
drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner
declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense. Although
petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friend’s
house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house and that it was
only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time.
Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although to the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search the followed was likewise
contrary to law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of warrant supporting the
arrest and the search

HELD: The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision of the lower courts. The accused was
acquitted by reasonable doubt.
To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on
which a person may be arrested without a warrant. It is obvious that based on the testimonies of
the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was obtaining at the time
petitioner was arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an
offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest. 
 For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Here,
petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his
way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him
is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in
fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption
from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that
petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. 
The supposed acts of petitioner, even if they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as
sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at all,
the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case
was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry
v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should
be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the
marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. As we pronounced
in People v. Bacla-an, “A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.”
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Therefore, it cannot be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a
lawful arrest. Furthermore, it is apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control
of the public officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was
asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged
"consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked to see
its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no
consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As a result, petitioner’s
lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
PEOPLE v LACERNA [G.R. No. 109250, September 8, 1997]

FACTS: On September 12, 1992, PO3 Carlito P. Valenzuela was assigned to man the
checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the sidestreets of Radial Road near Moriones
Street. At about 2:00 p.m., appellant and co-accused, who were aboard a taxicab, passed by
PO3 Valenzuela's place of assignment looking suspicious.
Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was seated at the back
seat. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the occupants of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads
and slouched, refusing to look at him. Feeling that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and
his companion stopped the vehicle, signaling the driver to park by the side of the road. PO3
Valenzuela and his co-police officer asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants
readily agreed, the police officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle which
consisted of a knapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the
contents of the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that the bag
contained his vomit. Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards the
contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and peeped inside. He
found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of marijuana emanating from
it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one of the boxes and saw dried marijuana leaves. He told appellant
and co-accused that the contents of the bag were marijuana, which co-accused readily affirmed.
According to both Lacernas, the bag was a "padala" of their uncle. Specifically, they claimed
that the bag was sent by their uncle, who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo.
After checking, the policemen told them its "positive". The accused were (asked) to alight and
go to the patrol car. Appellant and co-accused, and the plastic bag containing blocks of
marijuana were brought by PO3 Valenzuela and PO3 Camero to the WPD Headquarters on UN
Avenue, Manila. The defense argues that the bricks of marijuana were inadmissible in evidence
as they were obtained through illegal search and seizure. Appellant alleges that at the time of
the search and seizure, he and his co-accused were not committing any crime as they were
merely riding a taxicab on the way to Pier 15, North Harbor in Manila. Hence, the precipitate
arrest and seizure violated their constitutional right and the marijuana seized constituted "fruits
of the poisonous tree."

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant's right against warrantless arrest and seizure was violated

HELD: In the case at bar, the taxicab occupied by appellant was validly stopped at the police
checkpoint by PO3 Valenzuela. It should be stressed as a caveat that the search which is
normally permissible in this instance is limited to routine checks visual inspection or flashing a
light inside the car, without the occupants being subjected to physical or body searches. A
search of the luggage inside the vehicle would require the existence of probable cause.
However, in the case at hand, probable cause is not evident. First, the radio communication
from General Nazareno, which the arresting officers received and which they were
implementing at that time, concerned possible cases of robbery and holdups in their area.
Second, Noriel Lacerna's suspicious reactions of hiding his face and slouching in his seat when
PO3 Valenzuela's car passed alongside the taxicab might have annoyed the latter, or any other
law enforcer, and might have caused him to suspect that something was amiss. But these bare
acts do not constitute probable cause to justify the search and seizure of appellant's person and
baggage. Furthermore, the Claudio ruling cannot be applied to this case because the marijuana
was securely packed inside an airtight plastic bag and no evidence, e.g., a distinctive marijuana
odor, was offered by the prosecution.
Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not
because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search.
True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on mere suspicion not
probable cause that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise. But Valenzuela expressly
sought appellant's permission for the search. Only after appellant agreed to have his person
and baggage checked did the actual search commence. It was his consent which validated the
search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.
We are aware that this Court in Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an
implied acquiescence, because such acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty, but was merely passive conformity to the search given under
intimidating and coercive circumstances. In the case before us, however, appellant himself who
was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search
as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. In his brief, appellant explicitly,
even if awkwardly, reiterated this: "Confident that they [the accused] have not done anything
wrong, they allowed to be searched." This declaration of appellant is a confirmation of his
intelligent and voluntary acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore,
obtained legally through a valid search and seizure. They were admissible in evidence; there
was no poisonous tree to speak of.

NOTES:

Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have also been
judicially formulated as follows:
(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
(2) search of moving vehicles, **
(3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs searches, and
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

**Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases, however, the
search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Military or
police checkpoints have also been declared to be not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely visual.

Inter alia, court held that there was probable cause in the following instances:
(a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the
accused;
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been acting
suspiciously;
(c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen;
(d) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen
who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity
of marijuana;
(e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information
and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy one who participated in the drug
smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged that said accused were
bringing prohibited drugs into the country.