PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
LAUREL V. ABROGAR Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of
FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and
using PLDT's international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) –
“a method of outing and completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the
country where the call is destined”. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using
their own equipment and caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter’s consent.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
1. There be taking of Personal Property;
2. Said Personal Property belongs to another;
3. Taking be done with Intent to Gain;
4. Taking be done without the owner’s consent;
5. No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things
Personal Property – anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in Real Property
Thus, the term “personal property” as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in the context
of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. Consequently, any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of
theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same is not included in the
enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to
appropriation.
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems “Forces of Nature” which are brought under the control of
science, as Personal Property.
The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science can be achieved
by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature,
wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to
fraudulently obtain such forces of nature.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment
or apparatus to PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities constituteSubtraction.
appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal
property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR
is an act of “subtraction” penalized under the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered
as personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have
acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and
transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such
telephone calls were taken without its consent. What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's
communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the
telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were
services and business of the offended party.
LEUNG YEE V. STRONG MACHINERY CO.
FACTS:
The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased from Strong Machinery Co. rice–cleaning
machines which CAF installed in one of its buildings. As security for the purchase price, CAF
executed a chattel mortgage on the machines and the building on which they had been installed.
When CEF failed to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed and Strong Machinery
Co. purchased the building. This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry.
Later, Strong Machinery Co. also purchased from Agricola the lot on which the building was
constructed. The sale wasn't registered in the Registry of Property BUT Strong Machinery Co. took
possession of the building and the lot. However, the same building had been previously purchased
by Leung Yee, a creditor ofAgricola, at a sheriff's sale despite his knowledge of the prior sale in
favor of Strong Machinery Co. The sale to Leung Yee was registered in the Registry of Property.
ISSUES
1. Was the property's nature changed by its registration in the Chattel Mortgage Registry?
2. Who has a better right to the property?
HELD
1. Where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the document on
record in the Chattel Mortgage Registry is a futile act.
Chattel Mortgage refers to the mortgage of Personal Property executed in the manner
and form prescribed in the statute.
Since the building is REAL PROPERTY, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property.
The mere fact that the parties decided to deal with the building as personal property does not
change its character as real property.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
Neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building.
1. Art. 1473 of the New Civil Code provides the following rules on determining ownership
of property which has been sold to different vendees:
 If Personal Property – grant ownership to person who 1st possessed it in good
faith
 If Real Property – grant ownership to person who 1st recorded it in the Registry
If no entry – grant to person who 1st possessed in good faith
If no proof of possession – grant to person who presents oldest title
Since Leung Yee purchased the property despite knowledge of the previous purchase of the same
by Strong Machinery Co., it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith.
“One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of
an interest therein. The same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which
should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him
with the defects in the title of his vendor.”
Following the rule on possessory rights provided in Art. 1473, Strong Machinery Co. has a better
right to the property since it first purchased the same ahead of Leung Yee, the latter not being a
purchaser in good faith.
PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS
FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real
estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the
lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the
building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To
secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties. The
Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later
on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was
extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The
respondent court held that the REM was null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid REM mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the belonging
to another.
HELD:
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to
another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only
mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a
building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a
mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as
immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage
on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the sales
patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is
evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was
issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act.
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS V. MERALCO
FACTS:
Meralco‘s electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna
and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the
province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage
current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers. Meralco has constructed 40 of these
steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
The QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After the
denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board
of Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay real property tax on the said steel
towers for the years 1952 to 1956. MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition
for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation
of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company constitute real property for the purposes
of real property tax.
HELD:
NO. The steel towers of an electric company do not constitute real property for the purposes of
real property tax. Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article
415 (NCC) because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. As per
description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal
frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
place to place.
PEOPLE·S BANK V DAHICAN LUMBER
FACTS
Dahican lumber company (DAMCO) obtained several loans amounting to 250,000pesos from
People·s bank (BANK) and ,together with DALCO, another loan amounting to$250,000 from
Export-Import bank secured by five promissory notes through people·s bank. Inboth loans,
DAMCO executed and registered respective mortgages with inclusion of ´after acquired
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
propertiesµ. DAMCO and DALCO failed to satisfy the fifth promissory note in favor ofExport bank
so People·s bank paid it and subsequently filed an action for the foreclosure ofthe mortgaged
properties of DAMCO including the after acquired machinery, equipmentand spare parts upon the
latter's failure to fulfill its obligation.
B. Contention of the Petitioner
People·s bank asserted that the ´after acquiredµ machinery and equipment ofDAMCO are subject
to the deed of mortgage executed by DAMCO. Hence, these can beincluded in the foreclosure
proceedings.
C. Contentions of the Respondent
DALCO argued that the mortgages were void as regards the after acquired propertiesbecause
they were not registered in accordance with the chattel mortgage law. Moreover,provision of the
fourth paragraph of each of said mortgages did not automatically makesubject to such mortgages
the "after acquired properties", the only meaning thereof beingthat the mortgagor was willing to
constitute a lien over such properties.
ISSUES
Whether the ´after acquiredµ machinery and equipment of DAMCO are included as subjectof the
Real Estate mortgage, thus can be foreclosed.
RULING
Judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiff People·s bank. The after acquired machinery
andequipment are included in the executed mortgages.It is not disputed in the case at bar that
the "after acquired properties" were purchased byDALCO in connection with, and for use in the
development of its lumber concession and thatthey were purchased in addition to, or in
replacement of those already existing in the premiseson July 13, 1950. In Law, therefore, they
must be deemed to have been immobilized, with theresult that the real estate mortgages involved
herein ³ which were registered as such ³ did nothave to be registered a second time as chattel
mortgages in order to bind the "after acquiredproperties" and affect third parties.Under the fourth
paragraph of both deeds of mortgage, it is crystal clear that all propertyof every nature and
description taken in exchange or replacement, as well as all buildings,machineries, fixtures, tools,
equipments, and other property that the mortgagor may acquire,construct, install, attach; or use
in, to upon, or in connection with the premises ³ that is, itslumber concession ³ "shall immediately
be and become subject to the lien" of both mortgagesin the same manner and to the same extent
as if already included therein at the time of their execution. As the language thus used leaves no
room for doubt as to the intention of the parties,
We see no useful purpose in discussing the matter extensively. Suffice it to say that the
stipulationreferred to is common, and
We might say logical, in all cases where the properties given ascollateral are perishable or subject
to inevitable wear and tear or were intended to be sold, or tobe used ³ thus becoming subject to
the inevitable wear and tear ³ but with the understanding³ express or implied ³ that they shall be
replaced with others to be thereafter acquired by themortgagor. Such stipulation is neither
unlawful nor immoral, its obvious purpose being tomaintain, to the extent allowed by
circumstances, the original value of the properties given assecurity. Indeed, if such properties
were of the nature already referred to, it would be poor judgment on the part of the creditor who
does not see to it that a similar provision is included inthe contract.
PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST CO. V. DAHICAN LUMBER
FACTS:
On September 8, 1948, Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila, a West Virginia corporation
licensed to do business in the Philippines sold and assigned all its rights in the Dahican Lumber
concession to Dahican Lumber Company - hereinafter referred to as DALCO - for the total sum of
$500,000.00, of which only the amount of $50,000.00 was paid. Thereafter, to develop the
concession, DALCO obtained various loans from the People's Bank & Trust Company amounting,
as of July 13, 1950, to P200,000.00. In addition, DALCO obtained, through the BANK, a loan of
$250,000.00 from the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., evidenced by five promissory notes
of $50,000.00 each, maturing on different dates, executed by both DALCO and the Dahican
America Lumber Corporation, a foreign corporation and a stockholder of DALCO,
As security for the payment of the abovementioned loans, on July 13, 1950 DALCO executed in
favor of the BANK a deed of mortgage covering five parcels of land situated in the province of
Camarines Norte together with all the buildings and other improvements existing thereon and all
the personal properties of the mortgagor located in its place of business in the municipalities of
Mambulao and Capalonga, Camarines Norte. On the same date, DALCO executed a second
mortgage on the same properties in favor of ATLANTIC to secure payment of the unpaid balance
of the sale price of the lumber concession amounting to the sum of $450,000.00. Both deeds
contained a provision extending the mortgage lien to properties to be subsequently acquired by
the mortgagor.
Both mortgages were registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte. In
addition thereto DALCO and DAMCO pledged to the BANK 7,296 shares of stock of DALCO and
9,286 shares of DAMCO to secure the same obligation.
Upon DALCO's and DAMCO's failure to pay the fifth promissory note upon its maturity, the BANK
paid the same to the Export-Import Bank of Washington D.C., and the latter assigned to the
former its credit and the first mortgage securing it. Subsequently, the BANK gave DALCO and
DAMCO up to April 1, 1953 to pay the overdue promissory note.c
After July 13, 1950 - the date of execution of the mortgages mentioned above - DALCO purchased
various machineries, equipment, spare parts and supplies in addition to, or in replacement of
some of those already owned and used by it on the date aforesaid. Pursuant to the provision of
the mortgage deeds quoted theretofore regarding "after acquired properties," the BANK requested
DALCO to submit complete lists of said properties but the latter failed to do so. In connection with
these purchases, there appeared in the books of DALCO as due to Connell Bros. Company
(Philippines) - a domestic corporation who was acting as the general purchasing agent of DALCO
-the sum of P452,860.55 and to DAMCO, the sum of P2,151,678.34.chan
On December 16, 1952, the Board of Directors of DALCO, in a special meeting called for the
purpose, passed a resolution agreeing to rescind the alleged sales of equipment, spare parts and
supplies by CONNELL and DAMCO to it.
On January 13, 1953, the BANK, in its own behalf and that of ATLANTIC, demanded that said
agreements be cancelled but CONNELL and DAMCO refused to do so. As a result, on February 12,
1953; ATLANTIC and the BANK, commenced foreclosure proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte against DALCO and DAMCO. Upon motion of the parties the Court, on
September 30, 1953, issued an order transferring the venue of the action to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
On August 30, 1958, upon motion of all the parties, the Court ordered the sale of all the
machineries, equipment and supplies of DALCO, and the same were subsequently sold for a total
consideration of P175,000.00 which was deposited in court pending final determination of the
action. By a similar agreement one-half (P87,500.00) of this amount was considered as
representing the proceeds obtained from the sale of the "undebated properties" (those not
claimed by DAMCO and CONNELL), and the other half as representing those obtained from the
sale of the "after acquired properties".
ISSUE:
WON the "after acquired properties" were subject to the deeds of mortgage mentioned heretofore.
Assuming that they are subject thereto. WON the mortgages are valid and binding on the
properties aforesaid inspite of the fact that they were not registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
RULING:
Under the fourth paragraph of both deeds of mortgage, it is crystal clear that all property of every
nature and description taken in exchange or replacement, as well as all buildings, machineries,
fixtures, tools, equipments, and other property that the mortgagor may acquire, construct, install,
attach; or use in, to upon, or in connection with the premises - that is, its lumber concession -
"shall immediately be and become subject to the lien" of both mortgages in the same manner and
to the same extent as if already included therein at the time of their execution. Such stipulation
is neither unlawful nor immoral, its obvious purpose being to maintain, to the extent allowed by
circumstances, the original value of the properties given as security.
Article 415 does not define real property but enumerates what are considered as such, among
them being machinery, receptacles, instruments or replacements intended by owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land,
and shall tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. On the strength of the
above-quoted legal provisions, the lower court held that inasmuch as "the chattels were placed in
the real properties mortgaged to plaintiffs, they came within the operation of Art. 415, paragraph
5 and Art. 2127 of the New Civil Code". In the present case, the characterization of the "after
acquired properties" as real property was made not only by one but by both interested parties.
There is, therefore, more reason to hold that such consensus impresses upon the properties the
character determined by the parties who must now be held in estoppel to question it.
HEIRS OF VENCILAO V. CA
Petitioners – Heirs of Vencilao
Respondents – Gepalagos
FACTS:
1. Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao Sr. filed with the RTC Bohol a complaint for the
quieting of title, recovery of possession with prayer for the issuance of
writs of injunction against Spouses Gepalago.
 They were the absolute owners of a parcel of land in Bohol with an area of
3,625 square meters having inherited the same from their father who
during his lifetime was in peaceful, open, notorious and uninterrupted
possession of the property in the concept of an owner.
 Tax declarations and real estate taxes
 After his death, his heirs continued to possess and enjoy the property
2. Spouses Gepalago denied all the allegations
 They are the registered owners of a 5,970 square meter in Bohol, covered
with a TCT.
 The property was previously a portion of a 1,410,560 land originally owned
by Pedro Luspo – mortgaged by Pedro to PNB as security for a loan. Failed
to pay, and the mortgage was foreclosed, where PNB was the highest
bidder in the auction sale.
 PNB conveyed the whole property to 65 vendees among whom were
spouses Gepalago.
 Since then, they had been the owner and possessor of the land until they
donated the same to their son Domiciano Gepalago.
3. The complaint of the heirs was subsequently amended to include an action
for reconveyance and the cancellation of title and to implead defendant
Domiciano Gepalago.
4. Trial court appointed a commissioner to survey the litigated property and
determine the areas claimed by both parties.
 Reported that the area claimed by the heirs of Vencilao was included in the
titled property of the Gepalagos.
RULING OF THE RTC:
 Ruled in favor of the Vencilaos – they had been in possession, cultivation
and enjoyment of the property for more than 30 years and the
improvements therein were introduced by them long before any title was
ever issued to the Gepalagos.
 Gepalagos knew when they bought the property from PNB that the
Vencilaos were possession and enjoying the land in the concept of owners.
 While under ordinary circumstances, a certificate of title is indefeasible, it is
not so when a person with prior knowledge of the ownership and
possession of the land by another obtains title to it.
Additional info:
 The property claimed by the Gepalagos – 5,970 square meters
 While that of the Vencilaos covered an area – 22, 41.58 square meters
 Vencilaos owned the excess area of 16,431.58 square meters which was
clearly outside the area claimed by the Gepalagos
 The lot in question is titled to spouses Gepalago and subsequently to his
son, Domiciano, by virtue of a deed of donation
 If the titled lot of Domiciano is plotted in accordance with the technical
description appearing in the title, it will be relocated to more than 219
kilometres eastward away from its supposed actual location. THIS
AMOUNTS TO ITS NON-EXISTSENCE.
5. Gepalagos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
CA REVERSED RTC’S DECISION:
 Declared Gepalagos owners of the property for they were purchasers in
good faith and for value.
 Even assuming that they had knowledge of the possession of the Vencilaos
of the land, it was PNB which was the registered owner at that time.
 Thus, where the COT is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the COT.
They are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the
Torrens COT.
 Gepalagos claim of ownership was evidenced by a Torrens certificate of title
– best evidence of ownership of a registered land.
6. Vencilaos filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
instant petition.
ISSUES:
Between two sets of claimants of real property, who has a better right?
1. Those claiming ownership by acquisitive prescription or
2. Those asserting ownership on the basis of a deed of sale recorded in the COT of the
vendor as mortgagee and highest bidder in a foreclosure sale.
RULING:
1. Trial Court erroneously found that petitioners had been in possession and enjoyment of
the property for more than 30 years. Prescription does not run against registered land
(PD1529). A title, once registered, cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
notorious possession.
2. Neither can the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by the Vencilaos prevail
over Gepalaos’ incontrovertible Torrens COT. They do not by themselves conclusively
prove title to the land. Tax declarations and receipts are only prima facie evidence of
ownership or possession.
3. Even assuming that petitioners had acquired the land by prescription, there likewise
exists a serious doubt on the precise identity of the disputed property.
 Vencilaos – land in Cambansag, San Isidro, Bohol 3,625 sqm
 Gepalagos – land in Candungao Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol 5,970 sqm (even
the commissioner’s report failed to clarify the difference in the area and
location of the property claimed)
Take note: The person who claims he has a better right to it must prove
NOT ONLY his ownership BUT ALSO satisfactorily prove the identity
thereof.
4. The Vencilaos’ unsual silence estopped them from denying the title of the present
owner. There were at least 3 transactions on record involving the property. (1) contract
of mortgage, (2) foreclosure of mortgage, (3) sale at public auction. Each of these
transactions was registered. Yet in all these, the Vencilaos never instituted any action
contesting the same.
PANG ODEN V. LEONEN
Re: Boundary dispute between petitioners and respondents, both claiming ownership of a strip of
land consisting of 1,336.5 sqm.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners and respondents are the owners of 2 adjoining parcels of land
located in La Union.
 Petitioners – eastern portion; Respondents – western portion
 The two properties have a common boundary – a creek which ran from south
to north
 Petitioners’ property – bounded by said creek on the west
 Respondents’ property – bounded by the same creek on the east
2. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) diverted the course of the creek
so rain water will not go directly to the irrigation canal (Due to constant heavy
rains and floods, water from the creek overflowed and destroyed the irrigation canal in
the north of the property in dispute)
 As a result, the course of the creek was not diverted to run from south to
northwest, passing through the middle portion of respondents’ property and
resulting to the formation of a new creek.
3. NIA asked the permission of Manuel Leone (respondent) to allow it to use
the new creek as an irrigation canal, to which Manuel consented.
4. The portion segregated by the new creek, consisting of 1336.5 sqm is the
land subject of this controversy.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Respondents (Leonens)
 Property in question forms part of a bigger parcel of land declared in the
name of their father and predecessor-in-interest, Dionisio Leonen under a
Tax Declaration.
 Quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession for more than 50 years
 Manuel Leonen discovered that petitioners encroached on the 1,336.5 sqm
portion and had in fact occupied the same.
 After repeated demands to vacate remained unheeded, respondents filed a
complaint for recovery of possession based on ownership against spouses
Pang O-den.
Petitioners (Spouses Pang-Oden)
 The property was part of a bigger property originally owned by the husband’s mother
under a Tax Declaration.
 Around 1950 when Manuel Leonen started cultivating the subject land and planted crops
thereon, but only upon mere tolerance of the husband’s mother.
RTC’s DECISION
Declared the Leonens to be the lawful and exclusive owners of the property and ordered spouses
Pang-Oden to vacate the property.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
ISSUE: Who, between the petitioners and respondents, own the strip of land subject of the suit.
Petitioners’ contentions:
 No new creek was created. The present creek is the same creek which bounds their
property on the west, thus making them owners of the property in question.
 The testimonies of the witnesses are replete with inconsistencies and contradictions
which render said testimonies unworthy of belief.
RULING:
1. The testimonies of the witnesses were supported by the report and sketch plan
prepared by the court-appointed commissioner which revealed the existence of an old
creek, and the creation of a new creek.
2. Art 434 CC – In an action to recover, the property must be identified and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
It is indispensable that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove both his ownership
of the property and its identity.
 Respondents were able to fully establish that the property rightfully belongs to
them. (TCT of their predecessor-in-interest and a verification survey)
 Identity of the land was likewise proven in a conclusive manner
 Location corresponds with those given by the witnesses and record of ocular
inspection
 Cadastral survey property identifies and delineates the extent of the land
3. In sum, it was clearly established that there used to be an old creek originally running
from south to north and separating the property of petitioners from that of the
respondents. Due to the necessity of protecting the irrigation canal in the area, the
court of the creek was subsequently diverted to run from south to northwest, cutting
through the property of the respondents. Hence, the portion segregated (subject
property) from respondents’ land as a result of the diversion of the creek’s course
continues to be their property and they shall retain ownership of the same.
HEIRS OF FABELA V. CA
Disputed property is lot 868
FACTS
1. 1924 – A parcel of land containing lots 868 and 870 became the subject of
litigation between Carmelino Neri and Simeona Balhon & heirs of Anastacio
Fabela
 Parties entered into an agreement embodied in an “Escritura de
transaccion”, a notarized document which provided that Neri as vendee-a-
retro had been entrusted with the possession of a parcel of land for a
period of 14 years and upon expiration, Neri was to restore the possession
of the property to Simeona Balhon and her children-heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, without need of redemption.
2. Around 1978, Bureau of Lands conduced a cadastral survey on the land
when a road was constructed across the land dividing it into separate lots
which are now known as lot 868 and 870
 Roque Neri declared these two parcels of land in his name with the Bureau
of Lands and the Assessors Office
3. 1980, Phil Veterans Industrial Development Corporation, negotiated with
Roque Neri for the purchase of lot 870.
 Heirs of Anastacio Fabela protested.
 Roque Neri then executed a waiver of rights over a portion of lot 870,
stating that 8,000 sqm thereof was erroneously included in his name
 With respect to lot 868, however, Roque Neri continued to ignore plaintiffs’
demand for the return of the said lot.
4. 1985 – Heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint for reconveyance against
heirs of Roque Neri involving subject lot 868.
RTC RULING
Ruled in favor of heirs of Fabela – the Escritura de Transaccion obliged Carelino Neri to restore
the property to the heirs of Fabela.
CA RULING
Reversed the decision – heirs of Fabela had not successfully adduced the required
preponderance of evidence on their claim of absolute ownership over lot 868.
Art 434 CC – in an action to recover, the property must be identified and the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claims. The possessor of
the property has the presumption of title in his favor.
 The records of the Bureau of lands and the survey plan indicate Roque Neri as the
registered claimant of both lots
 The original of the Escritura de Transaccion on which the heirs of Fabela heavily relied
was not presented in court
 Lot 868 was not explicitly referred to as the property being entrusted to the vendee-a-
retro.
 The waiver of rights by Roque refer only to a portion of Lot 870 and not to lot 868
Roque Neri on the other hand registered his claim or interest on the land and declared it for
taxation purposes.
 While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet
when coupled with proof of actual possession, they are strong evidence of ownership.
ISSUE: Who has better right over lot 868?
RULING: Roque Neri has better right over lot 868.
1. In an action to recover ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to
the property must prove not only his ownership of the property but also the identity
thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land by describing
the location, area and boundaries thereof.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
 Petitioners’ complaint contained no allegations of the metes and bounds of
the subject lot. Nowhere in the trial court’s narration of facts were the
boundaries of the parcel of land indicated with particularity, nor the parcel of
land referring to lot 869. What really defines a piece of land is not the area
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating the limits.
2. Burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by preponderance of evidence.
If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness
of that of his opponent.
REPUBLIC V. CARRASCO
FACTS
1. Oct 1996 – Respondent Carrasco filed an application for registration of title
over a land in Rizal.
 Alleged that he is the owner
 Said land is alienable and disposable and not within military or an kind of
reservation
 Land has never been mortgaged to the best of his knowledge
 Land is declared for taxation purposes in his name
 Affidavit of ownership – took possession of the land in 1990 from his
predecessor Mingao, who has occupied the land for the last 25 years.
 Mingao’s deed of waiver – waiving his claim over the land in favor of
respondent
 Testified in support of his application
 Likewise adduced the testimony of one Tesito Avesado
2. Petitioner, Republic, thru the OSG filed an opposition to the application.
3. Trial court ordered the registration under Carrasco’s name, upon finding that
he has sufficiently established his ownership of the land.
4. CA held that subject land is alienable in view of the certification from the
DENR. On the issue of whether respondent was qualified – YES, occupation
for more than 30 years vests title on such applicant.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent was able to sufficiently prove his possession in the concept of
an owner so as to entitle him to the registration thereof in his name.
RULING
On the issue of possession
NO. Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that:
1. He has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier (this is the
problem)
2. Land subject of application is alienable and disposable land of public domain. (no
problem with this)
Respondent failed to prove that Mingao from whom he allegedly derived his title was the owner
of the subject land and hence can transmit rights over the same in his favor. The Deed of Waiver
did not even state when Mingao’s possession started. Respondent must present proof of specific
acts of ownership to substantiate his claim and cannot just offer general statements.
Moreso, there is no proof that Mingao declared the land in his name for taxation purpose or paid
taxes due threon. True, a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.
Nevertheless, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Therefore, since Mingao’s possession
and ownership were not sufficiently proven, he cannot validly transmit his rights over the land in
respondent’s favor.
On the issue of acquisitive prescription
Prescription cannot be availed of to acquire ownership because respondent failed to comply with
the required period. Respondent cannot tack his possession to that of Mingao’s since there is no
privity between them, the transmission of rights not having been proven. Respondent’s possession
must be reckoned only from the time of his actual possession in 1990. But still, even if Mingao’s
possession is counted, it still falls short of 5 years (since Mingao’s alleged possession started only
in 1950)
RAMOS-BALALIO V. RAMOS
FACTS
1. Petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander are children of Spouses Susana
and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying lot 204 in 1938.
 Abundio died in 1944.
 Susana met her second husband, Eusebio Ramos (respondent), with whom
she had 5 children, one of whom is Rolando (respondent)
2. Susana, after discovering that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales patent
over the subject parcel of land, opposed the application.
 By reason of the objected, the sales application of Domino was rejected.
 The area was allocated to Susana, who however shall file an appropriate
application.
3. Susana subsequently sold the land to her daughter, Zenaida (petitioner).
 Petitioner partitioned it among herself, Alexander and Rolando.
 Partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in favor or
Rolando and Alexander.
4. Petitioner mortgaged her share, however, she knew that respondents
Eusebio and Rolando usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of
possession over the land.
 Hence, she filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages.
5. Trial court had the land surveyed. The results are the following:
 Petitioner has no possession, occupation and cultivation whatsoever
 Rolando and Eusebio Ramos is in possession and cultivation of the lot
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez
 Possessed and cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His
occupation is very much less than the 2 hectares sold to him by Alexander.
TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
 Petitioner was deprived of her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot
204
 Ordering Eusebio to vacate the lot and surrender it to Evangelisto Garciia
 Evangelito Garcia is adjudicated the first 2 hectares as he validly bought the same from
Alexander.
CA REVERSED THE DECISION
 Neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the homestead application requirements
in order to acquire superior vested right.
 The contract dividing the property among Zenaida, Rolando and Alexander cannot be
enforced because neither of the parties can claim any vested right over the subject
parcel land which is still part of the public domain. Neither of the intervenors could
likewise claim any right.
ISSUE: Whether the transactions were valid (sale and partition); Whether petitioner is entitled
for the return of the possession of the land
RULING
On the issue of the validity of the transactions
Petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed
by her parents (Susana and Abundio). The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed
Zenaida’s family’s right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation
thereof. Nonetheless, it ordered the filing of an appropriate application for registration – WHICH
THEY FAILED TO DO.
Hence, the sale between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect nor can it be a source
of right for Zenaida because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her.
The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to the
State.
On the issue of possession
However, possession of the land is different from ownership. Petitioner argues that her petition
may be treated as an accion publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance.
In this case, the issue is whether petitioner, ma be considered as having any right to the land
occupied which may entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the possession thereof.
YES. Zenaida has proven prior possession of the land, antedating the filing of the homestead
application. She presented tax declarations both in her name. Although tax declarations or realty
tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Zenaida’s uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled with her open and
notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed.
REPUBLIC V. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS
1. Respondents spouses Enriquez filed their verified petition for confirmation
and registration of title to 2 parcels of land in Camarines Norte.
 Lot 1 – 455 sqm
 Lot 2 – 297 sqm
2. Petitioner, Director of Lands, filed an opposition.
 Ground: respondents have not been in continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or prior, and their evidence
is not competent to establish the claim, and the land is a portion of the public
domain.
3. RTC granted the application – confirmed and registered the same in the name
of spouses Enriquez.
4. Director of Lands appealed the decision insisting that there exists a material
discrepancy in the area of parcel 2.
ISSUE: Whether respondents are qualified to have their titles confirmed and registered.
RULING
On Lot 2 (Psu-05-006497-D)
NO. Before one can registered his title over a parcel of land, applicant must show that: (1) he has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945
or earlier, and (2) land is alienable and disposable land of public domain.
One of the mandatory requirements is the submission of the original tracing cloth duly approved
by the Bureau of Lands to establish the true identity of the land and to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land already covered by a previous land registration. Failure to comply is fatal
to the application for registration.
In this case, spouses Enriquez did not submit the original tracing cloth of lots 1 and 2. Although
in some cases the SC ruled that there is already substantial compliance with the rule if blueprint
copies of the properties are submitted in lieu of the original tracing cloth, there exists a material
discrepancy in the area of lot 2, such that the exception to the rule cannot be applied.
 1994 Deed of Absolute sale between Oloya and spouses Enriquez, parcel 2
was described as containing an area of 250 sqm more or less.
 Meanwhile, in the 1996 blueprint copy of the survey plan and the technical
description of the Land Management Services, parcel 2 already contained an
area of 297 sqm.
 RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN THE REASON FOR
THE DIFFERENCE IN THE AREA.
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PROPERTY CASE DIGESTS | By: Tanya Ibanez

A person who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove the claim by
clear and convincing evidence and is duty bound to identity sufficiently the property.
On Lot 1 (1711 Pls-488-D)
YES. Predecessor-in-interest of respondents already declared the said land for taxation purposes
and paid realty taxes. While they are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nevertheless
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
SPOUSES AZANA V. LUMBO
FACTS
1. Respondents filed an action for quieting of title in RTC Aklan over lot 64
located in Boracay Island.
 Alleged that they were the owners
 Lot 64 was originally part of the 8.0588-hectare land bought in a public
auction by their parents which the inherited evidenced by a bill of sale. If lots
63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of the resulting lot coincided with
the boundaries of the lot purchased under the final bill of sale.
 In a deed of absolute in Dec 1, 1996 – spouses Gregorio sold Lot 64 to
petitioners. THIS CAST A CLOUD OVER THEIR TITLE.
2. Petitioners, spouses Azana denied all material allegations
 They purchased Lot 64 from spouses Gregorio in good faith
 Spouses Gregorio became lawful owners of Lot 64 by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by Ignacio Bandiola.
ISSUES:
1. Whether res judicata applies
2. Who has better right over lot 64
3. Whether petitioners’ failure to have lot 64 declared for tax purposes is fatal.
RULING
1. NO. the first requisite is absent. The court’s resolution denying the spouses Gregorio’s
petition is not a final judgment because Azana’s appeal was still pending. Final judgment
entails a decision which perpetually settles the controversy and lays to rest all questions
raised.
2. The allegations of petitioners as to the boundary of the lots owned by Ignacio as well
as that of lot 64 were belied by the tax declarations they presented. None of the tax
declarations reflected the southern and/or eastern boundaries similar to those of lot 64.
 In the deed of sale to the petitioners, the north and east boundaries of lot 64
was described to be the Visayan Sea, but in all the tax declarations, each of
Ignacio’s lots was bound in the east by a land mass.
Petitioners failed to establish by preponderance of evidence the exact
perimeters of the land which they claim as their own.
3. NO. Tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of properties. At best,
they are only an indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. However, non-
declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate
ownership. The fact that both tax declarations in the names of respondents covered
lot 63 did not necessarily mean that they did not own lot 64 as they were able to present
a document evidencing ownership of both properties – the final bill of sale.

3. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and upheld the validity of Lot 64 to them. Since petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio Bandiola could not have
Respondents failed to establish the identity of the lot sold under the final bill owned the disputed lot, the subsequent conveyances of Lot 64 to spouses
of sale. Gregorio and thereafter to petitioners, were null and void.
 It is not clear that the land acquired by respondents’ parents at an auction
sale includes Lot 64.

4. CA reversed the decision.

 Declared respondents as the owners of Lot 64.
 Lot 64 was part of the 8.0488-hectare property described in the final bill of
sale.
 Areas of lot 63 and 64 combined, was equivalent to 8.000 hectares more or
less (total area claimed by respondents)

5. Both spouses Gregorio and spouses Azana filed separate petitions for review
on certiorari. – DENIED.

6. Both filed their respective motions for reconsideration.

 Denied the MR of spouses Gregorio
 Granted the MR of spouses Azana.

7. Respondents opposed the petition on the ground that it is already barred by

prior judgment (Dismissal of Gregorio’s petition) and that the failure of
petitioners to have lot 64 declared for tax purposes is fatal.
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