TITLE ONE (SET A)

Felonies and Circumstances Which Affect Criminal Liability

CHAPTER ONE

Felonies

ARTICLE 3. Definition. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

CRIMINAL INTENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS

Dr. Frisco Malabanan vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 186329, August 2, 2017

Sereno, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo,
such as falsification. Such intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the
overt acts of a person. In cases of falsification, we have interpreted that the criminal intent
to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not benefit from
the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the government or to a third
person.

FACTS:

Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel Report, which is an official document, by
making it appear therein that on July 28, 2004, he proceeded to Davao to take a flight bound for
Manila and that he was in Manila up to July 30, 2004 to attend to the tum-over ceremony of
incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and to follow up the funds intended for the GMA Rice
Program and that on July 31, 2004, he boarded a flight back to Cotabato City, which document he

1
submitted to support his Liquidation Voucher for P10,496.00 which he cash advanced for
traveling expenses to Manila for the period July 28-31, 2004.

When in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he did not take the aforesaid official
trip to Manila for the said period of July 28 to 30, 2004 and that the turn-over ceremony between
the incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004, nor did the
accused follow up the funds for GMA projects in the said month.

Thus, accused made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he
was legally bound to disclose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alid is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

RULING:

NO. Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such
as falsification. Such intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a
person. Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral certainty, his intention to pervert the
truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we have interpreted that the
criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not benefit
from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the government or to a third person.

Even though in the falsification of public or official documents, it is unnecessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind
that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to
change the effects which it would otherwise produce, for unless that happens, there could not exist
the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by article 1 [now Article
3] of the Penal Code.

Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy his
liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice on his
part when he falsified the document.

For this reason and seeing the overall circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly
convict Alid of falsification of a commercial document under paragraph 1 of Article 172.

2
GOOD FAITH AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Fidel Anacta, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 219352, November 14, 2018

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

Good faith in the recommendation of other is not a defense if the perpetrator knew
that there is irregularity or offense to be committed.

FACTS:

Sandiganbayan found Fidel V. Anacta, Jr. (petitioner) guilty of the crime of unlawful
appointments, defined and penalized under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
appointing Atty. Reynaldo A. Alconaba (Alconaba) as a member of the Board of Directors of the
Borongan Water District, representing the professional sector. When the appointment was
referred to the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for confirmation, LWUA declared
Alconaba's appointment as void. LWUA declared that Alconaba's appointment is prohibited by
law since it was made within one year from the 2004 May elections in which Alconaba had lost in
his bid for the position of municipal councilor. In the defense of the accused, he alleged that he
merely relied good faith on the recommendation of the IBP–Eastern Samar Chapter in appointing
Alconaba as director of the Borongan Water District, and it was not proven that he knew about
Alconaba's lack of qualification at the time he made the appointment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defense of good faith of the accused is valid.

RULING:
NO, petitioner evidently knew that Alconaba was ineligible for appointment to any public
office since Alconaba lost in the May 2004 elections when he ran as councilor of Borongan under
petitioner's ticket. Petitioner knew that the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates as
provided under Section 6, Article IX-B of the Constitution and Section 94(b) of R.A. No. 7160 applied

3
to Alconaba. Thus, he cannot raise the defense of good faith in the recommendation of the IBP–
Eastern Samar Chapter in appointing Alconaba as director of the Borongan Water District.

4
GOOD FAITH AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF MALA IN SE CRIMES

Liberty Tiongco vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

Good faith can be raised as a defense in criminal prosecution for mala in se crimes.

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan found Tiongco guilty of (1) Usurpation of Official Functions, or

violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for signing
the disbursement voucher and check representing Estacio's retirement gratuity, the former
president of Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), a government-owned and controlled
corporation. His defense revolved around his good faith in signing the same considering that
Babin, the current president asked him to help him manage the office since he was still new to its
operations. Said authorization came on 24 April 2006 in the form of Special Order No. 06-
008 where Tiongco was designated as Acting Senior Vice President. He also alleged that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be appreciated by the court, however, he
only raised it during his petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused acted in good faith.

RULING:

NO, signed Estacio's disbursement voucher "under pretense of official function" is clear.
Tiongco argues that she believed she had the authority to sign and that her acts "are indicative of
good faith”.

5
 The Court, in Ruzol, recognized good faith as a defense in prosecutions for usurpation of
official functions. However, the Court also ruled that:

It bears stressing at this point that in People vs. Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good
faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The term "good faith"
is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render the
transaction unconscientious." Good faith is actually a question of intention and although something
internal, it can be ascertained by relying not on one's self-serving protestations of good faith but on
evidence of his conduct and outward acts.

Tiongco cannot claim good faith because it has been established that she had "knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put [her] upon inquiry." She admitted that she saw the notation "no
pending cases except OMB-0-00-0898 and 0-00-1697" in Estacio's request for clearance.

Tiongco also admitted that she was well aware of the provisions of OMB MC No. 10. She said
she did it because Barbin was always absent, an admission that she knew the authority was vested
in the PCIC President. She nonetheless arrogated such authority unto herself, justifying her action
with urgency of the situation bringing Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA into effect. However, even
acting under that authority was wrong, as will be discussed later.

6
CRIMINAL INTENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Office of The Ombudsman vs. Venancio G. Santidad

G.R. No. 207154, December 5, 2019

Peralta, C. J.

DOCTRINE:

Intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be
done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. In
culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional,
the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design.

FACTS:

The prosecution evidence tends to show that the late Congressman Antonio M. Abaya of
the 4th District of Isabela requested from the Office of the President for the release of funds to be
utilized for the purchase of multi cab vehicles to be distributed to and used by some 235
barangays in his district. The Pre-Bid Conference was attended by Robert T. Ngo, as the
representative of the Office of Cong. Abaya, by Santidad, as Head of PSPMS, and by the
representatives of the bidders Super Car Center, Microvan, Inc. and First Dekra Merchandising.
The investigation separately conducted by the COA and the NBI yielded a common result – that
none of the named recipients who acknowledged or signed the IRPs has actually received the
subject vans.

The defense presented Santidad who maintained that he affixed his signature on the IRPs
because the same were duly supported by pertinent documents and the beneficiaries/end-users
had already affixed their respective signatures therein. He contended that he was merely
performing a ministerial duty when he signed the IRPs considering that the procurement of the
subject vehicles was made with the approval of the higher authorities of the DOTC.

The OMB rendered its assailed Decision finding Santidad guilty of Serious Dishonesty and
meted upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from employment in the
government service. The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision absolving Santidad of
his administrative liability for Serious Dishonesty on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

7
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a failure of the prosecution to prove the negligence and
imprudence of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt amounting to falsification of documents.

RULING:

YES. In Falsification of Public Documents, the offender is considered to have taken advantage
of his official position in making the falsification when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or,
otherwise, to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the doc
which he falsifies. By "legal obligation," it means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the
truth of the facts narrated. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a
public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed.

Measured against the foregoing parameters, it is clear that the crime of Falsification of
Public Documents, by its structure, could not be committed by means of culpa. Not to be overlooked
is that this felony falls under the category of mala in se offenses that requires the attendance of
criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means of culpa. Being an intentional crime, Falsification of Public Documents is
conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. In fine, the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents could not be committed by means of reckless imprudence.

Neither can Santidad be held criminally culpable for Falsification of Public Documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts (Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code) inasmuch as the records do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of
malicious intent when he affixed his signature on the IRPs certifying the transfer of the subject
Mitsubishi Delica vans to Cong. Abaya of the 4th District of Isabela. To be criminally liable for
falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the person making the
narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts narrated by him. Here, there is dearth of
evidence to show that Santidad knew that there were no deliveries of vans to the recipients at the
time he signed the IRPs. No matter how gross the nature and gravity of the imprudence or
negligence attributable to Santidad, the same would not shatter the fine distinction between dolo
and culpa so as to consider Santidad's act as one committed with malicious intent.

8
MALA IN SE; DETERMINATION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Evangeline Patulot vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.

A person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done is different from
that which he intended.

FACTS:

As she was about to enter the house, CCC, after gathering clothes from the clothesline
outside her house, was surprised to see Patulot who was holding a casserole. Without warning,
Patulot poured the contents of the casserole – hot cooking oil – on her. AAA and BBB, both minors,
who were nearby, suddenly cried because they were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil. CCC
hurriedly brought AAA and BBB to her neighbors who volunteered to bring the children to the
hospital, for treatment. She then went to the barangay hall to report the incident.

The doctor, who examined and treated CCC and her children, testified that the injuries
suffered by AAA and BBB would heal for an average period of thirty (30) days. DDD, husband of
CCC, testified that he incurred P7,440.00 in medical expenses for his wife and children.

The RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse under R.A. 7610. The CA affirms Patulot’s
conviction. Aggrieved, Patulot elevated the case to the Supreme Court, invoking the following
arguments: She (Patulot) can only be convicted of physical injuries and not child abuse. Citing the
case of Bongalon vs. People, she submits that not every instance of laying hand on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Only when the laying of
hands is shown to be intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under
the RPC. Thus, in the absence of such intention on the part of Patulot, her true intention being to

9
pour hot oil only on CCC with AAA and BBB being merely accidentally hit, she cannot be convicted
of child abuse.

ISSUES:

1. Whether child abuse is malum in se.

2. Whether the accused can escape liability for committing a wrongful act different from
which she intended.

RULING:

1. YES. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Physical abuse of a child under RA No. 7610 is inherently
wrong; hence, criminal intent on the part of the offender must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime.

Thus, Patulot cannot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and
BBB, she cannot be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical
injuries against CCC.

2. YES. Patulot’s criminal intent is not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she intended on
pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA
and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC.
She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine that a person
incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended.

10
ARTICLE 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

REQUISITES OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Hesson Callao

G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that
its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual. The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the
crime, was explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals. It
was established that to be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender
must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to
qualify the act as an impossible crime.

FACTS:

Sario Joaquin (Sario), the lone witness, testified that while in the flea market, Hesson and
Junello discussed a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as ordered by one Enrile
Yosores (Enrile). Sario was not part of the planning and did not know why Enrile wanted to have
Fenando killed. In the evening of the same day, Hesson, Junello, Remmy and Sario left the flea
market and went to the house of Fernando. Sario tagged along because Hesson threatened to kill
him if he separated from the group. Junello, upon seeing Fernando, approached the latter and
asked for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando gave Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on
the nape with a piece of firewood. Junello then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the

11
side. Fernando lost consciousness and as he laid motionless on the ground, Hesson stabbed him
twice in the chest using a knife. Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the
latter's heart using the same knife. Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver using a bolo.
Hesson and Junello then fed Fernando's organs to a nearby pig after which they cut Fernando's
neck and sliced his body into pieces. Thereafter, the two (2) accused left the crime scene, followed
by Sario and Remmy. After the incident, Remmy was killed by Enrile during the town fiesta of
Guincalaban.

The trial court found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery. CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with modification only as to the
damages awarded. Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of committing an impossible
crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder because it was legally impossible for him to
kill Fernando as the latter was already dead when he stabbed him.

ISSUE:

Whether the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime.

RULING:

NO. Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible
crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the
act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the
means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The third element, inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the crime, was explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod vs. Court of
Appeals: To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual
impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control
prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed by
Hesson was not sufficiently established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought
Fernando was already dead after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on
the ground motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed,
Fernando was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was
arrived at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done to ascertain this, such as
checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing. More importantly, even assuming that it was

12
Junello who killed Fernando and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson,
Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy between Hesson and
Junello. As such, Junello's acts are likewise, legally, Hesson's acts.

13
ARTICLE 6. Consummated, Frustrated, and Attempted Felonies. — Consummated felonies,
as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

ATTEMPTED MURDER
People of the Philippines vs. Tirso Sibbu
G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017
Del, Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:
Appellant commenced the commission of murder through overt acts such as firing
his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance.

FACTS:
Between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, Bryan Julian, the private complainant,
was with his three-year old daughter, Trisha May Julian, his mother Ofelia Julian and his father
Warlito Julian, in the azotea of his parents' house when he saw from a distance a person in
camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head.
Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant, when the latter tried to fix his bonnet. He also
saw two men in crouching position at a distance. Bryan then shouted a warning to his family
however the appellant fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito. Thereafter, Bryan ran
inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. and told the latter about the incident.
Another witness, Eddie Bayudan, also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the house of
Warlito and Ofelia and from a distance he saw a man wearing a black bonnet and a long-sleeved
camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw another man crouching on the
ground whom he recognized as the accused Benny.

14
 Appellant denied the charges against him arguing that he never left the house of his in-
laws nor having any misunderstanding with the Julian family or knowing Bryan and Benny
personally or possessing camouflage clothing.
On trial, the trial court gave credence to Bryan's positive identification of appellant as the
person who shot at him and killed his daughter, mother and father, and convicting the appellant
guilty for the crime of murder. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court, hence this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of attempted murder.

RULING:
YES. Appellant was guilty of attempted murder when he commenced the commission of
murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than
his own spontaneous desistance.
In this case, appellant started firing shots to the Julians with the intent to kill them all which
resulted to the death of three victims. However, he failed to kill Bryan and that is because he simply
missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts of execution to kill the Julians, hence the appellant
is guilty of attempted murder.

15
INTENT TO KILL IN FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

Carlos Jay Adlawan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197645, April 18, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.

FACTS:

Private respondent Georgia Adlawan is the stepmother of herein petitioner. One day,
petitioner asked Georgia for money, to which the latter answered that it was used to pay for the
hospital bills of her husband, petitioner’s father. Thereafter, petitioner got furious and started
hacking her with a katana. Georgia was able to escape and go to a hospital for medical attention
as she sustained several injuries. Georgia’s version of the incident was corroborated by many
witnesses, including an eyewitness and the doctor who attended to her injuries after the incident.

On the other hand, petitioner denied the allegations and presented their houseboy as
witness. The houseboy testified that Georgia sustained her injuries from a fall which was in no
way related to the petitioner.

The RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide since it was convinced that the
petitioner performed all the acts of execution necessary for the commission of homicide but was
frustrated due to timely medical intervention. The RTC also appreciated the presence of
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of her age, sex, and her being the petitioner’s stepmother. The CA
affirmed the conviction with modification as to the aggravating circumstances which were not
alleged in the information against the petitioner.

This petition for review was filed because the petitioner insists that the prosecution failed
to establish intent to kill and that the injuries sustained by the private complainant were not
serious enough as to cause death.

16
ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of the petitioner for frustrated homicide was tenable.

RULING:

YES, the conviction was tenable. In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and
number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.

In this case, intent to kill was sufficiently shown not only by the testimonies of Georgia, the
victim herself, and Fred, the eyewitness, but also by the established fact that Georgia sustained
multiple deep hack wounds on her head, neck, and abdomen, among other parts of her body. The
gravity of these wounds was clearly shown by the photographs presented by the prosecution, and the
medical certificate. Dr. Kangleon even testified that Georgia could have died if no medical attention
was given to her. The medical opinion of Dr. Kangleon who is presumably an expert in this field is
clearly more convincing than the petitioner’s mere say-so.

That petitioner intended to kill Georgia, and that the injuries she sustained were fatal and
would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention, were therefore established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction for frustrated homicide was proper.

17
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

Eden Etino vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon
the victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or attempted homicide but physical
injuries only.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide assault and shoot Jessierel
Leyble with said unlicensed firearm he was then provided at the time, hitting and inflicting upon
the victim gunshot wounds on the different parts of ills body.

On their way home to Brgy. Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he was shot with a 12-gauge shotgun by
the [petitioner,] Eden Etino hitting the back portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his
body.

The complainant Leyble was brought to the Don Benito Lopez Memorial Hospital (now
known as the WVSUMC) for treatment.

To prove the injuries suffered by Leyble, the prosecution presented Sonza "in her capacity
as [the officer] in-charge of the security of all the medical records of the patients [in the WVSUMC]
for the reason that Dr. Rodney Jun Garcia, then Chief Resident, Surgery Department, [WVSUMC],
who treated [Leyble was] unable to testify as he is now based in General Santos City.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is guilty of frustrated homicide.

18
RULING:

NO. Under the RPC Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages of a felony as follows:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In Palaganas vs. People, the Court outlined the distinctions between a frustrated and an
attempted felony:

1. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted
felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.

2. In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is

some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.

Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated

parricide, murder or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are:
a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on
the part of the accused.

In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several cases that when the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the
wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the
accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be
serious, less serious or slight physical injury.

19
 However, in this case injury sustained by the complainant is doubtful without the testimony
of the person who treated or examined his injury and the intent to kill was not established.

20
CONSUMMATION OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Al Madrelejos

G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful
taking of personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond
reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the
robbery is not presented in court.

FACTS:

In the morning of January 22, 2008, Marina Rubia, Simeon Sidera Jr. and the victim Jovel
Jacaban were in a jeepney when 2 of the other passengers, 1 of which is Al Madrelejos, declared a
hold-up. Madrelejos ordered the other to get the passengers' belongings. Jovel refused to give his
bag to Madrelejos’ companion. Madrelejos then shot Jovel. Thereafter, Madrelejos and his
companion got out of the jeep, followed by the other passengers. Jovel was brought to the hospital
where he eventually died. For his part, Madrelejos denied that he robbed the passengers of the
jeepney and claimed that he shot Joven by accident. He admitted that he rode the same jeepney
with the Rubia, Sidera and Jovel on January 22, 2008. During the trip, he noticed that his enemy,
whose name was unknown to him but said person was rude to his wife, was seated in front of him.
When he was about to get off from the jeepney, his enemy pulled out a gun saying,
"Natiyempuhan din kita,” and aimed it at him. They grappled for possession of the firearm and
when Madrelejos got hold of the gun, he fired it, accidentally hitting Joven. Shocked by what
happened, he got off the jeepney and went to Bulacan.

The RTC found Madrelejos guilty of robbery with homicide. However, the CA ruled that
Madrelejos should only be held guilty of the crime of attempted robbery with homicide since
there is no proof that the taking of the passengers' belongings was consummated.

ISSUE:

21
 Whether or not the crime of robbery with homicide is consummated.

RULING:

YES, the SC ruled that the crime of robbery with homicide is indeed consummated. When the
fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is
justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. When homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same. In this case, intention to rob was revealed as soon as the robbers
announced the hold up. This was fortified when the robbers, particularly Madrelejos’ companion
started to take the passengers' belongings. It is likewise certain that Jovel was shot while he and
Madrelejos’ companion was struggling to get hold of Jovel's bag. The SC does not agree with the CA
that the fact of asportation was not proven. Evidently, while it seems unclear from the records that
the robbers were able to take Jovel's bag, it was established that the belongings of the other
passengers were taken. According to the statements of Rubia and Sidera, it is evident that Jovel was
shot while Madrelejos and his companion were robbing the passengers of a jeepney.

Hence, the RTC was correct that the crime of robbery with homicide was consummated. Even
if the SC assumes that Jovel's bag was not taken, the same does not detract from the consistent
assertion of Rubia and Sidera that the belongings of the other passengers were successfully taken
from them. It is immaterial that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, as long as
homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is deemed to have been committed.

Wherefore, Madrelejos is held guilty of robbery with homicide.

22
CONSUMMATION OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. XXX

G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019

Reyes, J. Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim’s genitalia consummates
the crime of rape. Full penile penetration that causes hymenal laceration is not necessary
for the prosecution of rape to prosper.

FACTS:

The accused-appellant herein was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
rape committed against his then 15-year-old daughter on four different occasions. The
prosecution presented the testimony of AAA, the daughter, as well as Dr. Rebueno, the medico-
legal doctor who conducted the physical examination on AAA. The defense offered the sole
testimony of the accused-appellant consisting merely of denial and alibi. The RTC convicted him
with reclusion perpetua plus damages to AAA, which was affirmed by the CA with modification
only as to the award of damages.

AAA testified that her father took advantage of her on four different occasions, against her
will and using force, threat, and intimidation with the use of a bolo. Upon examination by the
medico-legal doctor, it was found that there was an intact hymenal membrane, no laceration, no
abrasion or hematoma on AAA’s body and vaginal canal. However, Dr. Rebueno testified that the
allegation of rape is not inconsistent with such findings given that the detailed history he got from
AAA only referred to inter-labial sex. He explained that in inter-labial sex, the penis is inserted in
the vagina but only up to a point where it touches the labia without penetrating the vaginal orifice
because victim’s legs prevent the penis from doing so.

This case is an appeal by XXX, raising again his argument regarding the credibility of AAA’s
testimony as well as the fact that no laceration or abrasion was found on AAA’s body and vagina
indicating the absence of abuse and sexual intercourse.

ISSUE:

23
 Whether or not the absence of lacerations or abrasions negate the crime of rape.

RULING:

NO, the absence of lacerations or abrasions does not negate the crime of rape. As correctly
held by the courts a quo, the slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim’s genitalia
consummates the crime of rape. Full penile penetration that causes hymenal laceration is not
necessary for the prosecution of rape to prosper. It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or
fresh lacerations does not negate rape, and although medical results may not indicate physical
abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical findings or proof of injuries
are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape.

24
REQUISITES OF ATTEMPTED FELONY

Roel C. Casilac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020

Peralta, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (1) the offender
commences the commission of the felony directed by overt acts; (2) he does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony; (3) the offender’s act be not
stopped by his own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of
execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with murder of Ryn Loui Navarez and attempted murder of
Ramil Navarez. The Prosecution averred that on June 23, 2009 at about 5 o’ clock in the afternoon,
Ramil, the victim, and his younger brother, Ryn Loui were on their way home aboard a motorcycle
that upon reaching the curved portion of the road, Ramil saw his cousin, accused-appellant,
standing on the side of the road. The latter started shooting at Ramil and Ryn Loui. The former
was able run and get help from the Barangay, leaving the latter in the scene. Ryn Loui was then
discovered lifeless when the police responded to the scene.

The Defense, on the other hand, alleged that it was the brothers who shot at him first while
on board their motorcycle while he was cutting grass and that he borrowed the gun of his cousin,
Cirunay, who fled and continued to cut grass. When the two came back, he shot them first in self-
defense. He hit Ryn Loui while Ramil escaped.

The RTC found him guilty of murder of Ryn Loui Navarez, citing treachery as a qualifying
circumstance and guilty of serious physical injuries of Ramil Navarez. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
with modification, only finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder and less serios physical
injuries instead of serious physical injuries. In his appeal he argues that the CA erred in finding
him guilty of murder despite the presence of the elements of self-defense and also in considering
treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

25
ISSUE:

Whether or not the crimes committed is less serious physical injuries or attempted murder.

RULING:

This Court finds that the crime committed was attempted murder of Ramil Navarez and not
less serious physical injuries. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (1) the
offender commences the commission of the felony directed by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony; (3) the offender’s act be not stopped by his
own spontaneous desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause
or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. In the present case, the prosecution has
established the accused-appellant's intent to kill Ryn Loui. This Court also finds such intent to be
present with respect to Ramil. It is hard to reconcile that there is an intent to kill Ryn Loui while
there is none to Ramil considering that the attack was committed directly and simultaneously
against the two by shooting them both while aboard their motorcycle.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to guilty of murder and
attempted murder.

26
ARTICLE 8. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Felony. — Conspiracy and proposal to
commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially provides a
penalty therefor.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its
execution to some other person or persons.

CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO PROVE CONSPIRACY

Celerino Chua alias Suntay vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint
or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

FACTS:

The prosecution established that accused Arnold Lato and Leo Reyes, who were still at
large, broke into the private complainants’ house, assaulting and asking the complainants to give
them the “broker’s commission for the sale of the fishpond.” Thereafter, the two took the private
belongings of the complainants and loaded said belongings in a jeep, also owned by the private
complainants.

It was also established that herein accused Chua eavesdropped and listened intently when
the complainant told his compadre about the commission he received from the sale of fishpond.
That Chua referred both Arnold and Leo to one Gerry Ormesa for work. That the straw ropes
which were used in the commission of the crime were being used by Arnold and Leo in their work.
That prior to the incident, Chua resided about 20 meters from the complainants’ house and after
the incident, Chua went into hiding. That Chua told the private complainants’ to be quiet about
the incident otherwise harm would befall their family. An information was also received that the

27
jeep was brought by Chua to Pangasinan, and that Chua, claiming that the jeep belonged to him,
sold the same to one Jessie Tugas. Chua thereafter stayed at a nipa hut in Pangasinan, wherein
one Betamax unit was recovered, which was among the stolen items. Chua denied any knowledge
in the commission of the crime as well as the fact that he knows Arnold and Leo.

RTC held Chua guilty of carnapping and robbery. Chua appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision. Hence, Chua raised, in this petition, that CA erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy
between him and the two other accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy existed between Chua, Arnold and Leo.

RULING:

YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his
co-accused in committing the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for
the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt
acts, unless such passive conspirator is the mastermind. In that respect, it is not always required to
establish that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the
crime by laying down the details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.
Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated or
can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest. Clearly, the State successfully proved the
existence of a conspiracy among the three accused.

28
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN PUBLIC OFFICERS AND PRIVATE PERSONS

Aquilina Granada, Carlos Bautista, and Felipe Pancho vs. People of the Philippines

G. R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.

If there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together

with the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which is to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike
which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case which assail the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 23459, finding petitioners Venancio R. Nava, Susana B. Cabahug, Aquilina B. Granada, Carlos
Bautista, Felipe Pancho, and Jesusa Dela Cruz guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In 1993, Araceli P. Geli as State Auditor for Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) Office, submitted a Special Audit Report to the Commission on Audit Director of Davao
City which disclosed an overpriced purchase of construction materials and supplies by the DECS
Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building Program. The auditor recommended
the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal or administrative action against the
public officials who participated in the transactions. In 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao, indicted the petitioners for violating Section 3(g) and (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

In their defense, Nava testified that then Secretary of Education Isidro Carino ordered that
the construction of elementary school buildings in Davao City should be prioritized and signing
the invitations to bid but he asserted that the quotation of construction materials were not yet
indicated when he signed the invitations to bid. likewise admitted signing the disbursement
vouchers but claimed that he signed them only after De Leon certified that the expenses were

29
necessary, lawful, and incurred in her direct supervision. Bautista, as a member of the Committee,
admitted that after he received the quotations from the suppliers, he no longer verified the
accuracy of the submitted quotations. Cabahug as the Assistant Regional Director of DECS, signed
eight purchase orders and one disbursement voucher on behalf of Regional Director Nava, who
was then on official leave but asserted that before doing so, Granada and De Leon had already
affixed their signatures on the purchase orders. Granada, as Regional Administrative Officer for
DECS Region XI, stated that in preparation for the purchase of materials for the construction of
school buildings, bidding was conducted in 1991 but could no longer recall the number of
suppliers who participated. After evaluating the bids, the Committee awarded the project to
petitioner Dela Cruz of Geomiche, the bidder with the lowest submitted quotations. Pancho, as a
supply officer for the DECS, averred that he was only by De Leon to prepare payment vouchers for
the deliveries made by Geomiche. Petitioner Dela Cruz asserts that a strict construction of Section
3(g) of R.A No. 3019 covers only public officers who enter into a proscribed contract or
transaction 'on behalf of the government' and it did not impose any penalty upon a private party
with whom the public officer contracts. In 2008, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of petitioners and that there was a concerted effort to facilitate the
release of funds and make it appear that a public bidding took place.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not conspiracy was sufficiently proven by the prosecution.

2. Whether or not Dela Cruz can be held as a co-conspirator.

RULING:

1. YES, there was sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy among the petitioners and Dela Cruz.
Conspiracy happens "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it”. Furthermore, conspiracy does not have to be established by
direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken collectively. However,
it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the execution of the crime
committed through the performance of an overt act. Where the acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.

The prosecution has proved the direct interrelated participation of each of the accused were
as follows: Venancio Nava approved the Invitation to Bids, Disbursement Vouchers, Purchase Orders
and signed the checks; Aquilina Granada signed two different sets of Purchase Orders, with the same

30
contents and signed the Abstract of Quotation as Chairman; Susan Cabahug approved a
Disbursement Voucher and another set of Purchase Order for Director Nava; Carlos Bautista signed
the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as a member; Luceria M. De Leon directed the preparation of
Disbursement Vouchers and approved the same, recommended the approval of two different sets of
Purchase Orders, signed the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as member and signed the checks;
Edilberto Madria signed the Abstract of Quotation/Canvass as member and signed the checks; and
Felipe Pancho directed the preparation of the Disbursement Vouchers. In these series of
interconnected acts of the public officers, accused Dela Cruz was the beneficiary.

Clearly, conspiracy between the accused-petitioners was duly established as their collective
and individual acts demonstrated a common design, to award the contract to Geomiche without a
public bidding. Their actions then led to the purchase of overpriced construction materials to the
disadvantage of the government.

2. YES, there is sufficient basis to pierce the corporate veil, and Dela Cruz, as Geomiche's
president, to be held equally liable as her co-conspirators. Private persons may likewise be charged
with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer. If there is an
allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is to repress
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.

The prosecution, through testimonial and documentary evidence, sufficiently proved the
connivance between the public officers, who entered into and facilitated the grossly
disadvantageous transactions on behalf of the government with Dela Cruz's Geomiche as the
beneficiary. When the separate juridical personality of a corporation is used "to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons."

31
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

Napoleon O. Cedeño vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193020 & 193040-193042, November 8, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by
direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct before, during, and after the
commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence
of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one
concurs with the criminal design of another, as shown by an overt act leading to the crime
committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

A special audit team was created that would audit the purchase of graders' desks (desks)
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII, Cotabato City. The audit team
found that the Government was defrauded in the amount of P5,268,610.00 due to short delivery
of 10,487 pieces of graders' desk purchased by the DECS Regional Office XII, Cotabato City, in
violation of Section 2, PD 1445 and Republic Act 3019.

Preliminary investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao

against Director IV Diamar P. Kadon, Dir. Makil U. Pundaodaya; Financial and Management Officer
Jose T. Navera; Administrative Officer Alimot L. Arumpac; Supply Officer III Rogelio M. de los
Reyes; Administrative Officer V Jose P. Lopez. Jr.; Accountant III Daud M. Adiong; Inspector Romeo
F. Agustin; Inspector Napoleon O. Cedeño; Auditor Solaiman M. Domato; Accountant III Tomas P.
Villanueva; and Luis Dy, Michael A. de los Santos, and Lolita Sambili, the proprietors of AAA
Services Generales, Business International Wood Products (BIWP), and Niño Wood Products
(NWP).

When the case reached the Sandiganbayan, Lopez, Jr., Adiong, Domato, Delos Reyes,
Cedeno, Navera, Pundaodaya and Delos Santos were found guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 for making it appear in the Inspection Report that certain pieces of graders desks were
delivered to and received by certain recipient schools when the truth is none was actually

32
delivered to and received by the recipient schools; and Kadon and Dy were acquitted. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy.

RULING:

YES, there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the
conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, as shown by an overt
act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the crime.

It must be emphasized that Arias involved the culpability of a final approving authority on
the basis of criminal conspiracy, or where, in the performance of his official duties, the head of an
office is being held to answer for his act of relying on the acts of his subordinate. To the point of
being repetitive, Cedeño was the appointed inspector of the office and was a member of the
inspectorate team. The very name and function of his office render necessary his inspection of the
items in these transactions. Indeed, the phrase "Inspected by" before his name in the IR confirm that,
before he affixed his signature, he had personally inspected the items and had found them to be in
accordance with the specification, quality, and quantity as stated in the contract. The mandate of his
office undoubtedly required no less, i.e., that he should have personally inspected the items that were
purchased by DECS RO XII before he affixed his signature on the IR.

It is clear in these cases that there was no justification or adequate reason for Pundaodaya,
Adiong, Cedeño, and the other accused public officers to process the full payment for the desks. The
truth that Pundaodaya, Adiong, Cedeño, and their co-accused were able to have the DVs processed
through the execution of documents, i.e., IRs, MRs, and DRs, to evidence full deliveries of the desks
despite the inexistent and short deliveries, clearly prove that they had acted in bad faith in the
discharge of their duties in order to attain a common purpose, i.e., to extend undue advantage and
unwarranted benefits to the suppliers, causing great disadvantage and injury to the government.

33
POSITIVE AND CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY

Petronilo Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Settled is the rule that much like the criminal act itself, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary to establish the existence of conspiracy. It cannot be established by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

FACTS:

On September 22, 1992 at about 8:00pm, Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita arrived at
the house of the former’s balae, Jocelyn Janioso, calling out for help. When Janioso came out of her
house, she saw Salvador whose forehead was oozing with blood, and Calib Napone likewise
bloodied on the face, mud-laden, and trying to extricate himself from Salvador who held him by
the back collar of his shirt. Calib is the son of Petronilo Napone Sr. and the brother of Petronilo
Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone. When Janioso asked what happened, Salvador replied that Calib
waylaid him and struck him with an iron bar while he and Robert were on their way home from
their farm. Thereafter, Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring
Salvador and Calib to the hospital. After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further
conflict, Janioso pulled Salvador inside her house but Petronilo Sr. followed them and
immediately hacked Salvador from behind using a big bolo, hitting Salvador at the back of his
head. Salvador, in retaliation, also hacked Petronilo Sr. Meanwhile, Edgar and Petronilo Jr. also
alighted from the vehicle. Edgar threw a fist-sized stone at Salvador. Petronilo Jr. then shot
Salvador 3 times with a small firearm, hitting the latter on the chest which caused him to fall. At
the hospital, Salvador was pronounced dead.

On the other hand, the Napones alleged that they acted in self-defense and in defense of a
relative. They alleged that on the date of the incident, while Petronilo Sr., Petronilo Jr. and Edgar
were in their house, a certain Ervin Tagocon came and told them that he saw Calib bloodied and
dragged by Salvador and Robert to the house of Janioso. Upon hearing the news, Petronilo Jr.
hurriedly ran towards Janioso's house, while Edgar and Petronilo Sr. immediately followed. Before
running to Calib's aid, Petronilo Sr. got hold of his bolo because he suspected that the Espelitas
had hacked Calib. Upon arriving at Janioso's place, the Napones saw Calib bloodied and being held

34
by the Espelitas who, upon seeing them coming, dropped Calib, who was then prostrate and
unconscious. The Espelitas then went inside the fenced premises of Janioso's house. When
Petronilo Sr. attempted to lift Calib from the ground, Salvador rushed towards him and hacked
him with a bolo multiple time. Unable to retaliate because he was lifting Calib, he parried the
attacks with his left hand but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Petronilo Sr. fell to the ground and lost
consciousness. Edgar tried to defend his father from Salvador by throwing a stone at the latter.
Because of this, Salvador shifted his attention towards Edgar and chased him with a bolo.
Meanwhile, Petronilo Jr. was about to rush to his father’s aid when he was alerted that Robert was
aiming a firearm at him. He wrestled with Robert for the possession of the firearm. When he got
hold of the firearm, Robert allegedly shouted, "watch out, my firearm was taken" and ran away.
Salvador stopped chasing after Edgar, turned to Petronilo Jr., and hacked him three 3 times.
Petronilo Jr. fell to the ground facing down and while Salvador is still behind him, he crawled
away from his assailant. When he stood up and saw that Salvador was still coming after him, he
fired his gun at Salvador. Despite the first shot, Salvador kept advancing towards him; thus, he
again shot at Salvador hitting him in the chest. Thereafter, he took Petronilo Sr. and Calib to the
provincial hospital for treatment. Then, Petronilo Jr. surrendered to the authorities but the
firearm he used to shoot Salvador was never recovered.

The RTC found Petronilo Jr. and Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. It rejected the Napones’ claim of self-defense and in defense of a relative ratiocinating
that they failed to establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Salvador. It further
ruled that: a) a conspiracy among the Napones existed as shown by their successive attacks on
Salvador; and b) no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the felony. However, the RTC
ordered the dismissal of the case against Petronilo Sr. due to his death a month after he
completed his testimony.

On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTC regarding the appreciation of modifying
circumstance. While it conceded that no aggravating circumstance attended the killing of Salvador,
it opined that the RTC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It observed that the unfortunate incident occurred at the "spur of the moment" and because of
the Napones' "impulse reaction" upon seeing Calib wounded and lying on the ground. Likewise,
the CA ruled that conspiracy could not be appreciated considering that the incident happened at
"the spur of the moment." Thus, the CA reduced Edgar's liability to that of a mere accomplice
reasoning that his participation in throwing a stone at Salvador during the incident, while
showing community of criminal design, was otherwise not indispensable to the commission of
the felony.

ISSUE:

35
 Whether or not conspiracy attended the commission of the felony.

RULING:

NO, conspiracy did not attend the commission of the felony in this case. No other evidence
was presented by the prosecution to establish conspiracy aside from the circumstances that the
accused were members of the same family, that they arrived at the scene of the crime at about the
same time, and that they attacked Salvador successively. These pieces of circumstantial evidence
would not suffice to establish conspiracy. It has been held that the fact that the defendants were
relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim does not prove
conspiracy in the absence of other independent evidence positively and convincingly showing its
presence. From the foregoing, no concerted action pursuant to a common criminal design could be
attributed to the Napones. In the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only for
the consequences of his own acts.

36
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

Miguel Escobar et al. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017

Leonen J.

DOCTRINE:

There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

FACTS:

That on May 27, 2002, accused public officers Miguel Draculan Escobar and Felipe Katu
Constantino, being then the Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of the Province of
Sarangani, Margie Purisima Rudes and Eugene Lariza Alzate, Provincial Board Members, Perla
Cabilin Maglinte, Provincial Administrator, Cesar Matas Cagang, Provincial Treasurer, Vivencia
Sasam Telesforo, Management and Audit Analyst III, and Amelia Carmela Constantino Zoleta, and
Executive Assistant, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by
reason of the duties of their offices, conspiring and confederating with one another, while
committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did
then and there willfully take, convert, and misappropriate the amount of Php 300,000, in public
funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to be
falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher dated May 27, 2002 and its supporting
documents, making it appear that financial assistance had been sought by Nema Tamayo, the
alleged Team Leader of Malungon Market Vendors Association, Malungon, Sarangani, when in
truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had been requested by
Nema Tamayo and her association, nor did said Nema Tamayo and her association receive the
aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in
the amount of Php 300,000, through the encashment by the accused of Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) Check No. 282390 dated May 27, 2002, which amount they subsequently
misappropriated to their personal use and benefit, and despite demand, the said accused failed to
return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest in
the aforesaid sum.

37
ISSUE:

Whether or not the conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta
to commit the crime was also sufficiently established.

RULING:

YES, the conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta to commit the
crime was also sufficiently established. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is a conspiracy "when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it."

It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred. In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, that direct
proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the
assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the secrecy of the crime, usually
must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Thus,
the proof of conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than those
directly concerned, is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.

38
MERE PASSIVE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Estrillo Escobal y Salvacion and Melvin E. Abano

G.R. No. 206292, October 11, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not constitute conspiracy
without performing any overt acts showing the existence of such conspiracy.

FACTS:

SPO1 Fernando Gaabucayan was shot dead while walking from his house going to the
población. One of the witness stated that he saw the victim talking with accused Salvacion while
Abano is at the back when he heard gun shots which caused him to stay down. When he looked
up towards the direction of the gunshots, he saw Gaabucayan lying flat on the ground face up,
while accused-appellant Escobal was standing at the footside of Gaabucayan holding a nickel-
plated gun pointed at the latter with accused-appellant Abafio standing beside accused-appellant
Escobal facing the left shoulder of Gaabucayan in a position of pointing a gun. On the other hand,
the accused stated that a person shot them while they are walking and due to the gun shots he
retaliated and allegedly grab the pistol of Abano and returned fire causing the death of the victim.
Now the accused raised that he acted in self-defense and that there is no conspiracy established.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere presence of the accused in the crime scene constitute conspiracy.

RULING:

NO, Albano should be acquitted because the prosecution did not establish the presence of
conspiracy with the accused. Considering that the evidence shows that the Albano was urinating at
the time of the unfortunate event and that the presence of the Albano with the accused is customary

39
given the fact that they are close friends. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it; hence, the agreement
concerning the commission of the crime must be shown to precede the decision to commit it. Indeed,
the acts of Abaño adverted to did not necessarily reflect his community of purpose with Escobal in
the killing of the victim. The former's mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not
constitute proof of concerted action between him and Escobal. Moreover, Knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.

40
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Ervin Y. Mateo, et. al

G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is not essential that there
be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that
they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.

FACTS:

An Information was filed charging accused-appellant, together with Evelyn E. Mateo,

Carmelita B. Galvez, Romeo L. Esteban, Galileo J. Saporsantos and Nenita S. Saporsantos with the
crime of syndicated estafa which alleges that said accused, being officers and/or agents of Mateo
Management Group Holding Company, a corporation operating on funds solicited from the public,
conspiring and operating as a syndicate, feloniously defraud complainants by means of false
pretenses to the effect that they have the business and power accept investments from the
general public and the capacity to pay the complainants guaranteed lucrative commissions, and
induced complainants to invest and deliver the total amount of P200,000.00 as investment or
deposit and thereafter, having in their possession said amount, with intent to gain,
misappropriated the same to their own personal use to the damage and prejudice of said
complainants.

Appellant insists that no sufficient evidence was presented to prove that he actually
performed any 'false pretenses' against the private complainants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary for the prosecution to still prove that accused-appellant
himself "personally, physically and actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or 'fraudulent
representations' against the private complainants," to prove the existence of conspiracy.

41
RULING:

NO, In the instant case, it was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that accused-
appellant himself "personally, physically and actually performed any 'false pretenses' and/or
'fraudulent representations' against the private complainants," given the findings of both the RTC
and the CA of the existence of conspiracy among appellant and his co-accused. When there is
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the
conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective. In any case, appellant's direct participation in the conspiracy is evidenced by the
findings of the CA that: (1) the Articles of Partnership of MMG named appellant as the sole general
partner with a capital contribution of P49,750,000.00; (2) his signatures appear in the MOA entered
into by the complainants and facilitated by his co-accused Geraldine Alejandro; (3) his signatures
also appear in the Secretary's Certificate and Signature Cards which were submitted to Allied Bank
when the partnership opened an account; (4) the MOA are notarized and it was only on appeal that
he denied his signatures appearing therein or questioned the authenticity and due execution of the
said documents. Indeed, it cannot be denied that accused-appellant, together with the rest of his co-
accused, participated in a network of deception. The active involvement of each in the scheme of
soliciting investments was directed at one single purpose - which is to divest complainants of their
money on the pretext of guaranteed high return of investment. Without a doubt, the nature and
extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MMG show unity of
action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.

42
WHEN CONSPIRACY EXISTS

People of the Philippines vs. Segfred L. Orozco, Manuel D. Osir and Alberto B. Maturan

G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its existence may be inferred and
proved through acts that show a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of
interest.

FACTS:

Accused Orozco, Osir, Castro, and Maturan, apparently drunk, entered and occupied the
table in front of Lalona and Mata. Shortly after they ordered beer, Orozco approached Mata from
behind and stabbed him twice with a small bolo. Mata shouted that he was stabbed. Lalona
grabbed Orozco and wrestled with him, but he pushed her back. When Mata tried to run out, the
rest of the accused caught him. While Maturan and Osir held Mata's arms, Castro stabbed him in
the chest. The four (4) accused continued stabbing Mata and ran away when Lalona shouted for
help. Lalona took Mata to the Caraga Regional Hospital on a tricycle, but Mata was pronounced
dead on arrival. Immediately after, Lalona went to Mata's house and told his relatives what had
happened. Consiquently, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found them guilty of
murder by conspiring the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exist conspiracy among the accused.

RULING:

YES, Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its existence may be inferred and proved through

43
acts that show a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest.42 In this case,
the prosecution proved the common purpose of all the accused, a concert of action, and a community
of interest. This Court quotes the Court of Appeals:

“In the case at hand, the overwhelming evidence is to the effect that accused-appellants and
their co-accused acted in concert with a unity of purpose to kill Mata. After Orozco stabbed Mata in
the back, the latter mustered his remaining strength to run away from his assailants. However, Osir,
Maturan, and Castro chased and caught Mata. While Osir and Maturan held the hands of Mata,
Castro stabbed the latter's chest. This caused Mata to fall on the ground. Still not contented with the
dismal condition of the victim, all of the accused continued on stabbing the victim. Such carnage
would not have stopped if not for the shouting made by Lalona to call for help. Clearly, the acts of
the accused-appellants showed a unity of the criminal design to kill Mata”.

44
CONSPIRACY IN RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Anthony Villanueva

G.R. No. 211082, December 13, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it

being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.

FACTS:

AAA slept alone in the room she shares with Jennylyn, who is out for vacation. She was
awakened and found three men inside, Melvin, Regner and accused-appellant. Regner
approached her and covered her mouth with his palm. Meanwhile, accused-appellant poked the
right side of her body with a short bolo or pisao. While being pinned at this position, Melvin
undressed AAA and began kissing her. Melvin then undressed himself and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After Melvin satisfied his lust, accused-appellant took his turn. Accused-appellant
kicked AAA in the stomach several times and then inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter,
AAA became unconscious. AAA was awakened when she felt accused-appellant bit her arm. It was
then that Regner took his turn raping her. The three men left AAA in the room with a warning that
she would be killed should she tell anyone what happened.

AAA confided the incident to her grandmother who then accompanied her to the Tacloban
City Police Station.

RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. CA affirmed the RTC's
finding that accused-appellant is guilty of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty only of one (1) count of rape.

45
RULING:

NO. The court note that accused-appellant was in fact charged under three separate
Informations for three counts of rape, specifically stating therein that the accused-appellant,
together with his co-accused, conspired, confederated and helped each other in committing the
crime. While it is true that the RTC and the CA only found accused-appellant guilty of one count of
rape, when he appealed from the decision of the RTC and later on, the CA, he waived the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.

In People vs. Peralta, et al., the Court ruled: To establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors
shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective." Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is
convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of
a common objective pursued in concert.

Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from
the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.

Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution fully support the charge that accused-
appellant, together with his co-accused, conspired to rape AAA. The act of Regner in approaching
and covering AAA's mouth, the act of accused-appellant in poking a bolo at her side, the act of
Melvin in having sexual intercourse with AAA and then later on followed by Regner and accused-
appellant, all point to their unified and conscious design to sexually violate AAA. Accordingly,
accused-appellant should be held liable not only for the act of rape he perpetuated against AAA, but
also for the rape committed by his co-accused Regner and Melvin, or for three counts of rape in all,
conspiracy being extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the three
violations.

46
THE LAW PRESUMES ATTENDANCE OF CONSPIRACY IN ROBBERY BY THE BAND

Ben Mananga vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218570, November 22, 2017

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

The law presumes the attendance of conspiracy in the crime of robbery by a band
such that "any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the
band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it
is shown that he attempted to prevent the same." Thus, conspiracy need not even be
proven as long as the existence of a band is clearly established.

FACTS:

On February 5, 2001 in the evening, Jolita Denna together with her daughter Jesusa Denna,
her brother-in-law Mariano Denna, and Mariano's daughter Fortunata Denna were inside their
house [in] San Vicente, Tamauini, Isabela. At around 7:30 o'clock in the evening of said date, her
husband arrived. When she and her husband were about to sleep and after [turning] off the light,
she heard somebody [call], "Uncle Ampoy, Uncle Ampoy." Ampoy, according to her, is her husband
Ocampo Denna. She responded by saying to the caller, "Please wait, I will just put on the light."
She lighted an improvised gas lamp and thereafter opened the door and saw Ben Manangan's face.
However, Ben who was in front of the door, put off the light by blowing it. Thereafter, the armed
group of about six (6), wearing masks (bonnets), instructed her to cook. She obliged. After
cooking, they ate. After eating, three (3) of the armed group went to the house of his brother-in-
law while the other three (3) remained. Then, the remaining three (3) wearing masks (bonnets)
ask[ed] for their money by saying, "Hold up, hold up, iyawa nu y kwartu" which means "Give me
your money." She and her husband replied to them, [saying] they [did] not have money. They
angrily reacted by saying, "You are lying," at the same time letting them choose "Give your money
or be killed?" Threatened and afraid, she told her husband to just give their money. Her husband
refused but [Jolita] pleaded to him to give their money because of fear. Then, she told the armed
men wearing mask[s] to wait. She went to get their money amounting to Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos of different denominations and gave it to them. Thereafter, the armed group
left. However, petitioner argues that there is no implied conspiracy between him and the other
accused. He points out that eyewitnesses Jolita and Fortunata Denna testified that petitioner did

47
not do anything that may be considered conspiratorial since he merely stood outside the house
and did not receive the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) himself. Petitioner further
alleges that his mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exist conspiracy despite the allegation of the accused that he merely
stood outside the house.

RULING:

YES, there is an existence of conspiracy, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy in the
crime of robbery by a band such that "any member of a band who is present at the commission of a
robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band,
unless it is shown that he attempted to prevent the same." Thus, conspiracy need not even be proven
as long as the existence of a band is clearly established.

48
HOLDING AN ACCUSED AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY REASON OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Billie Gher Tuballas y Faustino

G.R. No. 218572, June 19, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown

to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action
and community of interest.

FACTS:

AAA testified that, she and Arjay were invited by ZZZ and Tuballas, herein accused, to have
a drink in the house of the latter. AAA got drunk and when she became dizzy, she was taken by
Arjay and ZZZ to a room where she was told to sleep it off. She awakened when she felt somebody
touching her breast and saw that it was ZZZ. ZZZ was inside her in a pumping movement. She
tried to move but somebody was pinning her hand down. She saw Florencio standing beside the
sofa bed and accused taking a video of her and ZZZ with his mobile phone. When they noticed
that she was awake, ZZZ stopped what he was doing and stood up. He was replaced by another
man whom AAA did not know. He too had carnal knowledge with her.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not ZZZ, Florencio and the accused are guilty of rape.

2. Whether or not the accused is liable as a co-principal.

RULING:

49
 1. YES. The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

In this case, AAA was clearly in an inebriated condition when ZZZ and Florencio raped her,
since AAA consumed five shots of hard liquor which she was not used to. When a woman, especially a
minor, alleges rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped. When
the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of
what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.

2. YES. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to

have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which
indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest.

The act of the accused in preventing Arjay from coming to the aid of AAA when she was being
sexually abused by ZZZ revealed that he was acting in confederation with ZZZ. And later when he
saw that Florencio too was sexually abusing the unconscious AAA (sic) did nothing to stop him but
instead went inside the room and closed the door presumably to watch the dastardly deed being
done. This action of accused showed his concurrence in the criminal design of Florencio. Not to be
forgotten is the fact that both AAA and Mary saw him taking a video of ZZZ raping AAA.

With the finding that conspiracy exists between ZZZ, Florencio and accused, the latter is
liable as a co-principal to the two counts of rape.

50
CONSPIRACY IN KIDNAPPING

People of the Philippines vs. Edilberto Norada y Harder, Agustin Seva y Lacbanes and
Eugene Villanueva y Canales

G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them.

FACTS:

Eugene Villanueva y Cañales was convicted of the complex crime of attempted kidnapping
with murder. The antecedent facts based on the testimony of the accused, declared that he and
Agustin Seva for some time, have been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in Bacolod
City. This plan however materializes as they have no money to fund the operation. Later, in 2003,
he met Eugene Villanueva. Eugene Villanueva revealed that he is a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a
schoolteacher at the town of Valladolid. Reggie Pacil has a friend, a Canadian national named Ray
Truck. The three (3) of them, namely, himself, Agustin Seva and Eugene Villanueva, made a plan to
kidnap Ray Truc, a wealthy canadian man. On the day of the execution of the plan Accused
Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in Valladolid but only Reggie
Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The non-appearance of
Ray Truck made them change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil as they were
convinced that Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release.

In the early morning of the following day Norada said that Villanueva woke him up and
told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil but somehow, he woke up and
resisted. Norada said that he hit Pacil [on] the head with a piece of wood. Pacil was rendered
unconscious only briefly and he again struggled. Norada hit him again and this time Pacil stayed
motionless but snoring. Then Seva taped the mouth of Pacil while he and Villanueva tied his
hands and feet. They wrapped Pacil in a blanket and loaded him into the car. Not knowing that
Pacil was already dead.

During trial the accused argued that they acted on self defense. RTC finds the three guilty
of the complex crime of Attempted Kidnapping with Murder.

51
ISSUE:

Whether conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping was duly established.

RULING:

YES. As regards to the matter of conspiracy, that conspiracy in killing the victim was duly
established. "Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them."

52
CONSPIRACY IN HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Jehlson Aguirre y Arididon, Michael Arabit y Pa Camara,
Jefferson Paralejas y Pigtain and Jeffrey Roxas y Aragon Cillo

G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. Direct proof, however, is not
essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together
and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof of concerted
action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrated their unity of design and
objective is sufficient.

FACTS:

Four out of ten girls, herein referred to as private complainants AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD,
testified in Court against accused-appellants. Arabit and Aguirre convinced AAA to go swimming
and drinking with foreigners for which she would get paid. Accused-appellants induced BBB to
have sex with a man in exchange for money and shabu. CCC, who had been invited by her
classmate and Ambit's cousin, EEE, to go drinking with their high school friends, went with EEE
to Ambit's house where accused-appellants told them that they would go drinking with some
foreigners in Quezon City in exchange for money.

Private complainants and six other girls (EEE, FFF, GGG, HHH, III and JJJ) reached a two-
storey apartment in Quezon City, where they would rest after which they would proceed to a
hotel to meet the foreigners. Arabit and Aguirre then offered to the girls what appeared to be
shabu, which was payment for sex with the foreigners in addition to money. Six of the girls
accepted and they were separated from the rest. They were looking for aluminum foil for the
shabu when there was suddenly a commotion. Several people, who came running down from the
second floor of the apartment, identified themselves as the police and told the girls to sit together.
The police officers arrested accused-appellants and Roxas.

In their defense, among others, accused-appellants denied committing the offense charged,
claiming that they were themselves merely invited to join a swimming and drinking party and

53
that there was no conspiracy between them. Mainly arguing that the crime was not committed by
a syndicate (involving three or more conspirators).

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy among the accused-appellants.

RULING:

YES. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony. Direct proof, however, is not
essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof of concerted action before,
during and after the crime, which demonstrated their unity of design and objective is sufficient.

Private complainants' testimonies have established conspiracy among accused-appellants.

Accused-appellants' actions, as consistently and categorically narrated by private complainants
under oath, unmistakably reveal "a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a
conspiracy." They were manifestly aimed at recruiting and transporting the victims for the purpose
of exploiting them and offering them for prostitution.

Accused-appellants' bare denial cannot prevail over the declarations of private complainants
which have been found to be "solid," "very credible," "significantly corroborative" on material points,
and untainted by any improper motive, and which have clearly established accused-appellants' guilt.

54
EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY DESPITE ACQUITTAL OF AN ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATOR

Jesus Typoco vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must
be a common design to commit a felony. A conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow
that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.

FACTS:

Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Salary Grade 30; Noel D. Reyes, Salary Grade 22; and Aida B.
Pandeagua, Salary Grade 9, holding the position of Governor, OIC-General Service Office, and
Buyer II, respectively, all public officers, taking advantage of their public positions, acting together,
conspiring and confederating with one another and with one Angelina H. Cabrera, owner of
Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply, did then and there falsify Purchase Order No.
0628 involving the purchase of various medicine by the Provincial Government by changing its
original date from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 in order to conceal that an order has been (sic)
made with Cabrera's Drugstore and Medical Supply prior to the bidding conducted on May
18, 2005 to the damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government. Consequently, petitioners
and their co-accused Aida B. Pandeagua (Pandeagua) and Angelina H. Cabrera (Cabrera) were
charged with Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioners were found guilty as charged, but their co-accused Pandeagua
and Cabrera were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

55
 Whether or not the accused should be acquitted on the grounds that the conspiracy does
not exist considering that Pandeagua’s acquittal the one who actually made the act of alteration
negates the finding that he was a co-conspirator and broke the alleged chain of conspiracy.

RULING:

NO, conspiracy among the petitioners exists despite the acquittal of accused Pandeagua and
Cabrera. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common
design to commit a felony. A conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. The crime depends upon the
joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted
of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a
charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense. The Sandiganbayan
correctly found that there was conspiracy between petitioners as shown in their respective
participations in the alteration of the date on the PO in question. It found that it was petitioner
Reyes who instructed accused Pandeagua to alter or change the date "4/20/05" in the PO with
"5/20/05" to make it appear that it was on May 20, 2005 that the procurement covered by the PO
was approved by petitioner Typoco after the conduct of a public bidding on May 18,
2005. Consequently, accused Pandeagua and Cabrera acquittal was made by reason that they only
made the alteration upon obedience to the instruction of their superior Reyes and nothing to do with
the procurement in question except in the preparation of the procurement documents, her duties
and responsibilities being clerical in nature.

56
DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED CONSPIRACY

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy may be inferred "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole." The
conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the transaction that
furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to prove
that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no
actual meeting among them was proven.

FACTS:

In an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes,
Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder in Criminal Case No. SB-
14-CRM-0238 filed with the Sandiganbayan. In the first assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
October 16, 2015, the Petition for Bail of Napoles was denied for lack of merit.

Napoles thus filed the present petition before this Court, alleging that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail
application. She insists in the present petition that the prosecution was unable to discharge its
burden of proving that the evidence of her guilt is strong.

ISSUE:

Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s bail
application.

57
RULING:

NO. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the evidence of Napoles' guilt for the
crime of Plunder is strong. The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
Napoles' Petition for Bail. The prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that Napoles
participated in the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth.

The charge of Plunder against Napoles in this case alleges a conspiracy among former
Senator Enrile and Reyes, as public officers, and Napoles, Lim, and De Asis, as private individuals. On
this point, this Court has consistently ruled that the conspiracy among the accused to commit the
crime of Plunder is usually an agreement or connivance to secretly cooperate in doing the unlawful
act. Even Congress, in its Explanatory Note to the proposed bill criminalizing Plunder, recognized
that this crime, by its very nature, is committed through a series or combination of acts done "in
stealth and secrecy over a period of time."

Seeing as it would be difficult to provide direct evidence establishing the conspiracy among
the accused, the Sandiganbayan may infer it "from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole." It was therefore
unnecessary for the Sandiganbayan to find direct proof of any agreement among Napoles, former
Senator Enrile and Reyes. The conspiracy may be implied from the intentional participation in the
transaction that furthers the common design and purpose. As long as the prosecution was able to
prove that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, the conspiracy may be inferred even if no actual meeting among them was proven.

Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-accused was proven through various
documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards the common goal of
misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

It is clear that Napoles and her co-accused, as well as the former employees of Napoles who
were eventually admitted as State witnesses, had a common design and objective-to divert the PDAF
of former Senator Enrile from its lawful purpose and to their own personal accounts. The individuals
involved in this case performed different criminal acts, which contributed, directly or indirectly, in
the amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Consistent with the doctrine on
implied conspiracy, these actions on the part of Napoles and her co-accused are sufficient to prove
the existence of a "concurrence in sentiment," regardless of any proof that an actual agreement took
place.

Arguably, there is no documentary evidence directly linking Napoles to the NGOs used as
conduits for the PDAF-funded projects of former Senator Enrile. However, her ties to the officers of
the NGOs involved in this case reveal otherwise. Napoles' participation in the conspiracy was

58
established through testimonial evidence, not only from one of her former employees, but from four
(4) witnesses-all of whom corroborate each other on material points. More importantly, they
testified on the minute details of the scheme that only those privy to the conspiracy would be able to
provide. Notably, Napoles did not even refute their claims that they were her former employees,
relying instead on singling out inconsequential details in their testimonies.

Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply interlocking pieces
of information that when taken together, provide a complete picture of the indispensability of the
participation of Napoles in the scheme to misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select
individuals, by using the NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The
directions and instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear evidence of her
active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the conspiracy.

59
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Cyrus Villanueva and Alvin Sayson

G. R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interests. It is settled that to be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.

FACTS:

The accused-appellants Cyrus Villanueva (Villanueva) and Alvin Sayson (Sayson), with
accused, Christian Jay Valencia (Valencia), were charged of murder of Enrico Enriquez in
conspiracy with one another and with the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength.

On January 1, 2012, the accused-appellants and Valencia went looking for Enrico in
Summitville, Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Accused-appellants and Valencia saw Enrico on
the tricycle terminal and simultaneously attacked the latter. According to the witness Arnie
Bañaga (Bañaga), he saw Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the latter
at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt and then Valencia stabbed Enrico on the
left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail and was brought to the
Muntinlupa Medical Center but was declared dead on arrival. The assailants thereafter fled but
Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle and was later brought to Barangay Hall
for barangay police blotter. Sayson was later apprehended while Valencia could not be located
and remains at large.

In 2014, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of murder and held that
there was conspiracy among them and Valencia and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength considering that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked. The
accused-appellants appealed the RTC decision to the CA maintaining that RTC improperly
appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength and that there is no proof

60
of the conspiracy among them and Valencia. In 2016, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and
dismissed the instant appeal. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy among the accused-appellants and Valencia.

RULING:

YES, there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants and Valencia. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused themselves
when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests.

The evidence presented by the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellants and Valencia, through their acts, indeed agreed to kill Enrico. From the
testimony of the principal eyewitness, it is clear that the three accused were united by a single
purpose, that is, to bring about the death of the victim. They acted with a common objective to harm
and inflict fatal blows on the victim. The three accused were together looking for the victim Enrico.
When they saw Enrico, they simultaneously attacked him. While the accused-appellants respectively
boxed and hit with a stone the victim Enrico, Valencia delivered the fatal stabs. The individual acts of
the three accused, taken together, undoubtedly points to a single objective which is to harm or inflict
serious injuries to the victim, or put an end to his life. This is the very essence of conspiracy. It is
settled that to be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.

Therefore, there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants and Valencia in killing Enrico.

61
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez

G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.

FACTS:

On the evening February 18, 2007, Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish
Mae Cervantes were at Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, aboard Frank's motorcycle. When
they were about to leave the place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly
approached them, followed by a third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three
men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank. The same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and
demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit
her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and saw that the men searched
the body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident was taking place, the second man took
Frank's motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as
the look-out. They all left together riding Frank's motorcycle. According to Dr. Gene Patrick De
Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the neck area which necessitated surgery.
Frank died on March 30, 2007.

Information was filed against Jeffery Macaranas, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe for
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Macaranas testified in his defense that on that day,
he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father Erning Macaranas' house
According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day and just slept the whole day
at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June 2007, barangay officials arrested
him and claimed that they beat and mauled him in order to admit that he killed Frank, and under
coercion, he pointed to his cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator. RTC found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. He was sentenced with the penalty reclusion perpetua. While the case against

62
Richard Lalata was archived as he remained to be at large since the filing of the Information
against him.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision modifying only the amounts of the
damages he is liable for. Hence the present case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a conspiracy in the case.

RULING:

YES, Conspiracy was proven in the present case.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal
design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

In this case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused.
Accused-appellant was seen standing by the post looking at Kathlyn and the victim aboard the
motorcycle. When his co-accused approached the former, the accused-appellant followed suit and
was standing guard nearby, while his companions committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell
down, and apparently thinking Kathlyn to be unconscious, the trio left together, taking with them
the victim's motorcycle.

Therefore, the CA is correct in ruling that the acts of Jeffrey Macaranas and his two
companions indicate a joint purpose and concurrence of intentions.

63
WHEN THERE IS CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Esperanza Jesalva alias "Robert Santos”

G. R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017

Jardeleza, J.

DOCTRINE:

Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and
the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were
present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere
presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the
furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to
the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as
to its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy.

FACTS:

In September 2007, around 1:00 a.m., Arnel Ortigosa, his cousin Renato Flores and Manny
Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City. They decided to go to a store
to buy cigarettes. On their way to the store, Flores noticed accused-appellant, Roberto Esperanza
Jesalva, standing in a corner near the store and staring at them and then disappeared. Later,
Jesalva re-appeared, accompanied by Ryan Menieva and Junie Ilaw. Upon reaching Ortigosa,
Menieva uttered, "Nel, ana ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an icepick.
Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the right portion of his chest, then on his left armpit while Ilaw
pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa. Jesalva pointed at Ortigosa's group and left. Ortigosa was rushed to
East Avenue Medical Center but later on died. Jesalva denied any participation in Ortigosa's
stabbing and claimed that he was waiting for his sister on the comer of Dupax Street on the night
of the incident when he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to leave
the place.

In 2014, The RTC of Quezon City held that Jesalva conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill
Ortigosa as positively identified by the witness Flores. In 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the trial court's decision and held that Jesalva's participation before, during
and after the incident was confined to the following: (1) accompanying Menieva and Ilaw to the
store where Ortigosa and his group were; and (2) pointing at the group while Ortigosa was
stabbed. Hence, this appeal.

64
ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw.

RULING:

NO, the accused-appellant did not conspire with Menieva and Ilaw. The Court stressed that
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to
cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties
to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise,
where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance,
but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy.

In this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at the victim and his
group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any
other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy. It was emphasized that the prosecution must
establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy
must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption. In the absence of conspiracy,
accused-appellant is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. In this case, all that
accused-appellant did was to stare and point at the victim and his companions. These, however, are
not crimes.

Neither can accused-appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation nor an

accomplice in the crime of murder. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal
act intended to be executed. Thus, to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or
as an accomplice, the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation. In this case, nothing in the records shows that accused-appellant knew Menieva was
going to stab Ortigosa, thus creating a doubt as to accused-appellant's criminal intent.

Indeed, absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-
appellant, we cannot uphold the trial court's finding of guilt. Thus, the accused-appellant is hereby
acquitted.

65
MERE PRESENCE AT THE CRIME SCENE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY

Edwina Rimando y Fernando vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017

Velasco, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act,
without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

FACTS:

A confidential informant introduced Munez, Bank Officer of the Investigation Division, to a

group of counterfeiters. Romeo Rimando, accused herein, called him and offered to sell 100
pieces of USD100 counterfeit notes at P500 per piece. Munez’s office formed a team to conduct an
entrapment operation.

After the successful entrapment operation, the team arrested Romeo and Edwina Rimando,
petitioner herein. An Information was filed against Romeo Rimando y Cachero and Edwina
Rimando y Fernando charging them with violation of Article 168 of the RPC or Illegal possession
and use of false treasury or bank notes.

Notwithstanding that Edwina's participation merely to accompany her husband Romeo,

she was charged for acting in conspiracy with Romeo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edwina acted in conspiracy with Romeo.

RULING:

66
 NO. Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish conspiracy. To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than
mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. Nevertheless, mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

The fact that petitioner accompanied her husband at the restaurant and allowed her
husband to place the money inside her bag would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion that
conspiracy existed. In order to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he or
she must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of conspiracy.

The record is bereft of any hint that petitioner cooperated in the commission of the crime
under Article 168 of the RPC. Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test
of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with her husband Romeo to commit
the crime. Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction. Exoneration must then be granted as a matter of right.

Thus, petitioner shall be acquitted.

67
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSONS

Florencia Garcia-Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 193236, September 17, 2018

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases of violation of Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, , if there is an

allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public
officer.

FACTS:

Florencia Garcia-Diaz’s (Garcia-Diaz) predecessor-in-interest, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed

an application for registration of a property. The Republic of the Philippines (the Republic)
opposed Garcia's application mainly on the ground that the property sought to be registered
formed part of Fort Magsaysay per Presidential Proc. No. 237 and was thus part of the public
domain and was inalienable. Eventually, Garcia-Diaz substituted the now deceased Garcia and
chose to amicably settle with the Republic and drafted a compromise agreement.

Under the agreement, the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority
(NAMRIA) was authorized to clarify the technical description of the reservation in Proc. No. 237.
NAMRIA administrator Solis then sent a draft letter to Solicitor General Galves declaring that the
actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay did not conform with the technical description in Proc.
No. 237 and that 4,689 hectares were actually situated outside the Fort Magsaysay military
reservation.

Based on the findings in the draft letter, the Republic and Garcia-Diaz jointly filed a Motion
for Approval of Amicable Settlement. By virtue of such amicable settlement, the Republic
withdrew its opposition to the registration in the name of Garcia-Diaz of the portion with an area
of 4,689 hectares which is “outside” the Fort Magsaysay military reservation.

In the meantime, the new NAMRIA administrator Fajardo formed an Investigating

Committee to conduct an investigation regarding the alleged anomaly involving the compromise
agreement. The Investigating Committee found that the 4,689 hectares were actually within the
actual ground location of Fort Magsaysay and declared the statement of then NAMRIA

68
administrator Solis inaccurate. Solis and Garcia-Diaz were then both charged with violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Garcia-Diaz claims that she cannot be convicted under sec. 3
of the Anti-Graft Act because the first element is absent; i.e, she is not a public officer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garcia-Diaz, being a private person, may be held liable for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in conspiracy with Solis, a public officer.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner Garcia-Diaz's argument is not new. It is true that Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act speaks of corrupt practices of public officers. "However, if there is an
allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer.” The
reason that private persons may be charged with public officers under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act is "to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against
conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows, therefore,
that if a private person may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may also be convicted
jointly with them."

69
ACTS OF THE ACCUSED TO PROVE CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Golidan

G.R. No. 205307, January 11, 2018

Leonardo-De Castro, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct evidence or prior agreement

to commit the crime nor is it essential that there be proof of previous agreement to commit
a crime. Conspiracy may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances showing the
existence of a common design to commit the offense charged. It is sufficient that the
malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Due to conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Furthermore, conspiracy exists when, at the time of the commission of
the· offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their action.

FACTS:

At about 7:30 in the morning of January 20, 1995, Muriel Bantiway left her house and
walked to the house of her daughter Jennyline Aniban in order to fetch her grandson Namuel.
This was because Jennyline was then studying. She brought the baby Namuel to her residence. At
about 8:00 she went to work and left behind inside the house her two grandchildren, the baby
Namuel, Cherry Mae, and the babysitter Elizabeth Leo.

Jennyline Aniban did not however go to school but studied her lessons. At past 10:00,
Jennyline Aniban decided to proceed to her mother's house in order to breast feed her baby
Namuel. When she entered the house, she went straight to the sala and saw Cherry Mae lying on
her side facing the wall of a room. Cherry turned to her and tried to tell her something. It was
then she saw, through the transparent curtain separating the bedroom from the sala, the exposed
legs of Elizabeth Leo.

She entered the bedroom and saw Elizabeth Leo lying naked on her back. There was blood
on the heard and vagina of Elizabeth Leo and her nipples were cut. Beside Elizabeth Leo was the
baby Namuel who was lying face down. When Jennyline turned him over, she saw his exposed
brains and blood oozing from his nose. It was then that she screamed and ran out of the house to
call for her husband.

70
 She passed by the house of [appellant] Nacionales, located just 15 meters above the house
of Muriel Bantiway. She was screaming and continued running until she found her husband and
relayed what she saw. Her husband then ran towards the house of Muriel Bantiway with Jennyline
following him. Jennyline was still screaming. When they reached the house, Jennyline continued
screaming for help. Two of their neighbors whose houses were some 50 meters away arrived and
they were those who called for the police who arrived around 11:00 A.M. The responding
policemen found and recovered a bottle of coke litro and wooden ashtray from the bed where
Elizabeth Leo and the baby Namuel were found. Both were stained with blood. Human semen was
also found at the tip of the bottle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in summarily concluding that each of the
accused is guilty of all the charges where there is no proof whatsoever, direct nor circumstantial
to support the allegation of conspiracy.

RULING:

NO. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as the representative of the State on appeal,
filed a consolidated brief for the appellee. The OSG argued that there is an existence of conspiracy,
which is proven by the common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose of
the appellants. In this case, the appellants cooperated with each other in such a way as to achieve
their criminal plan. The Court of Appeals stated that for collective responsibility to be established, it
is not necessary that conspiracy be proven by direct evidence or prior agreement to commit the
crime nor is it essential that there be proof of previous agreement to commit a crime. Conspiracy
may logically be inferred from acts and circumstances showing the existence of a common design to
commit the offense charged. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective. Due to conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Furthermore, conspiracy exists
when, at the time of the commission of the· offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and were
united in their action.

71
ACTS SHOWING CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Dillatan, Sr. y Pat and Donato Garcia y Duazo

G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint
purpose, concert of action and community of interest.

FACTS:

Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob) are owners of a market stall. At around 6 o’clock in
the evening, Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded home
by riding together on a motorcycle. They were approaching the entrance of their barangay at
6:30pm, when they noticed the accused-appellants riding a motorcycle and tailing them. Accused-
appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to stop and
immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag.
Thereafter, Dillatan uttered “barilin mo na.” Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left
hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest
causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry tried to escape but Garcia also
fired at him hitting his right knee. Henry, Violeta and Homer were eventually hospitalized, but
unfortunately, Homer succumbed to his death by reason of his gunshot wound.

RTC held the two accused guilty of robbery with homicide. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy existed between Dillatan and Garcia.

RULING:

72
 YES. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint purpose, concert of
action and community of interest. In the present case, the coordinated acts and movements of
accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime point to no other
conclusion than that they have acted in conspiracy with each other.

73
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Evasco y Nugay and Ernesto Eclavia

G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.

FACTS:

The prosecution presented three witnesses, Lorna, Joan and Dr. Lim to establish the
following:

Lorna went to the house of their neighbor Armando, to fetch her husband, Wilfredo. When
Lorna arrived at Armando’s house, she saw accused Ernesto boxing Wilfredo. Thereafter, she saw
accused Jimmy hit Wilfredo’s head with a stone which caused Wilfredo to fall down with his face
up. While Wilfredo was on the ground, Jimmy continuously hit him with a stone and Ernesto was
boxing Wilfredo’s body. After mauling Wilfredo, the two accused walked away together. Wilfredo
was brought to a hospital but eventually died. Joan corroborated the testimony of Lorna. Dr. Lim
testified that the immediate cause of Wilfredo’s death was due to mauling.

RTC and CA found the two accused guilty of murder holding that treachery and abuse of
superior strength was present in the commission of the killing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy exists.

74
RULING:

YES. When it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy could be inferred although no actual
meeting among them is proved.

Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo.
Although their agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and their decision to commit it
were not established by direct evidence, the records contained clear and firm showing of their
having acted in concert to achieve a common design – that of assaulting Wilfredo.

75
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline Abella and Mae Ann Sendiong

G.R. No. 213918, June 27, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

FACTS:

On 18 January 2009, SPO1 Manuel Sanchez (SPO1 Sanchez), the PDEA team leader of
Dumaguete City, received information from a confidential informant that the accused-appellants
were engaged in selling dangerous drugs at Upper Luke Wright. Upon receipt of the information,
a surveillance with the confidential informant was conducted which confirmed that the accused-
appellants were indeed engaged in selling dangerous drugs.

On 19 January 2009 at around 11:00 A.M., SPO1 Sanchez, SPO2 Ferrer, SPO1 Germodo, SI
Tagle, PO2 Corsame, the confidential informant, and other voluntary informants planned an
entrapment. It was agreed that Tubio, a PDEA asset, would act as the poseur-buyer while the rest
of the team, who would position themselves at a distance near enough to see the whole
transaction, would act as back-up. Tubio would remove his cap as the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction had been consummated. SPO1 Germodo affixed his signature beside the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas logo on one P100.00 bill and one P200.00 bill which would be used as marked
money during the entrapment.

After the planning at the PDEA office, Tubio proceeded to Upper Luke Wright where he
met the accused-appellants while the buy-bust team members were positioned about seven
meters away. Tubio convinced the accused-appellants that he wanted to buy shabu. When Abella
agreed to sell, Tubio handed her the buy-bust money which she gave to Sendiong. At this point,
Sendiong gave a heat-sealed transparent sachet (sachet) to Abella who handed it to Tubio. The
transaction consummated, Tubio took off his cap moving the team to effect the arrest of the
accused-appellants. SPO1 Germodo informed the accused-appellants of their rights. After Tubio
handed the sachet to PO2 Corsame, he immediately left the place in order to avoid revealing his
cover as PDEA asset.

76
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. The prosecution was able to prove that it was Tubio who bought from the accused-
appellants one transparent heat-sealed sachet which, when subjected to laboratory examination,
was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride.

By statutory definition, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. From the established facts, it was
clear that each of the accused appellants performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity, i.e., both accused-appellants transacted with Tubio; Abella received the money from
Tubio and handed it to Sendiong; and Sendiong handed the heat-sealed transparent sachet to Abella
who in turn gave it to Tubio. Abella averred that in all appearances, the police officers may have
conducted a buy-bust operation but which, upon a closer look at the facts, revealed an instance of
instigation. She claimed that by Tubio's testimony, he convinced the accused-appellants of his intent
to buy shabu.

The Court is not persuaded. For a better understanding of the difference between instigation
and entrapment, the following jurisprudence is reiterated: x x x Instigation means luring the
accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. On
the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a
lawbreaker. Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from
the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would not have
committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes. In
instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the
accused, while entrapment does not bar prosecution and conviction.

77
CONSPIRACY IN THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Ronel Fernandez

G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 8 of the RPC, a conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

FACTS:

At around midnight of June 16, 2011, Reymark Salvador and Ronel Fernandez were
sleeping in their separate rooms in the warehouse of Anna Leizel Trading in Pangasinan. When
Fernandez heard someone knocking on the gate, he opened it and let Paris and his companions
enter the warehouse. Once inside, Paris and his companion went to Salvador's room and the latter
cried for help. When the 2 left the room, Fernandez could no longer hear anything from Salvador.
Then, Paris and his companions proceeded to Anna's office and later, Paris left carrying a big bag.
At around 5:00am the next day, Fernandez texted Russel Abagat, Anna's husband, informing him
that something happened to Salvador. Fernandez went to the Abagat's residence and informed
Russel and Anna that Salvador was stabbed several times. Fernandez, Russel, and Anna went to
the warehouse where they saw the lifeless body of Salvador. Russel and Anna went to the
Binmaley Police Station and reported the incident. Together with several police officers, they
went back to the warehouse wherein Anna saw that her office door's safety lock was destroyed
and the money and pieces of jewelry inside the steel cabinet were missing. Fernandez told her
that the missing money and pieces of jewelry were taken by Paris and the latter's companions.
Anna called the police officers and informed them of Fernandez's confession. The latter was then
brought to Binmaley Police Station and he confirmed his intention to confess. When asked
whether he wanted a counsel, he answered in the affirmative. Hence, the police officers went to
Binmaley City Hall to look for a lawyer wherein they found Atty. Franco C. Francisco. Atty.
Francisco informed Fernandez that he can choose another counsel, but the latter told him that he
preferred him. Fernandez and Atty. Francisco together with SPO1 Ysit went to the investigator
and made the former’s extra judicial confession. Atty. Francisco translated and explained every
question to Fernandez. When the confession was completed, Atty. Francisco read and explained

78
one by one the contents of said written confession in the Pangasinan dialect to Fernandez. The
extra-judicial confession was then freely signed by Fernandez and Atty. Francisco.

For his part, Fernandez testified that prior to the incident on June 15, 2011, he met Paris
who worked at Trio 8 Hardware, a nearby hardware store across the street. At around midnight of
June 15, 2011, someone knocked at the gate of the warehouse of Anna Liezel Trading. Thinking it
was his employer, Fernandez opened the gate, but it was Paris and his companions who were all
armed. One of Paris' companions then pushed him and poked him with a knife. Paris and his
companions then proceeded to where Salvador was sleeping, and he heard the latter screaming
but he could not have done anything since he was held by one of Paris' companions. Thereafter,
the person who held a knife against him covered Fernandez's eyes with a blindfold. Fernandez
then heard a commotion inside Anna's office. After a few minutes, Paris removed the blindfold.
The person who held him tried to stab him, but Paris prevented it. Thereafter, he saw Paris and
his companions leave in a tricycle carrying a bag. Fernandez then checked on Salvador and he saw
several stab wounds in different parts of the latter’s body. He was frightened after seeing Salvador
dead on the floor; he stayed in his room for about 3 – 4 hours. He then texted Anna's husband,
Russel, to inform him of the incident. After getting no response, Fernandez rode a bicycle and
went to Anna's house. Then, they proceeded to the warehouse. Fernandez was then apprehended
and brought to the police station without being informed of the reason for his arrest. At the police
station, Fernandez claimed that he was forced to admit his participation in the crime through the
infliction of bodily harm upon him by 3 police officers. Although he signed an extrajudicial
confession, Fernandez denied the truthfulness of the same. He claimed that he only admitted the
crime because of fear of being subjected to more physical harm while under the custody of the
police. With regard to Atty. Francisco's assistance during the investigation, Fernandez claimed
that Atty. Francisco explained only some questions in the extrajudicial confession and the latter
did not explain the part of the confession where he admitted joining the culprits in plotting the
crime nor the possibility of him being charged with Paris.

On the other hand, Paris testified that Anna reported to Paris' employer that he offended
the female employees of Anna Liezel Trading, which caused his termination from work. Paris
claimed that at the time of the incident, he was asleep in their house. The following day on June
16, 2011, he had a drinking spree in the morning and attended a birthday party thereafter. Police
officers from Binmaley arrived and invited him for a few questions concerning a child whom Paris
allegedly had ran over. When they arrived at Binmaley, Paris was then immediately detained and
was forced to admit his participation in the crime when police officers threatened to shoot him
and inflicted physical harm upon him.

The RTC found Paris and Fernandez guilty as charged. It was convinced that Fernandez's
extrajudicial confession is admissible and used it as basis to establish the conspiracy between
Paris and Fernandez to commit the crime of robbery. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's
judgment. Hence, this appeal.

79
ISSUE:

Whether or not Fernandez was guilty of robbery with homicide.

RULING:

YES, Fernandez was guilty of robbery with homicide, in conspiracy with Paris. With respect
to the admissibility of Fernandez’s extrajudicial confession, the records show that Fernandez was
assisted by Atty. Francisco only during the time he executed his extrajudicial confession. However, no
lawyer assisted him at the time he was arrested and brought to the police station to answer
questions about the robbery with homicide. Hence, Fernandez's extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Fernandez' extrajudicial confession, his conviction for

the crime of robbery with homicide can still be obtained on the basis of circumstantial evidence
which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Fernandez and Paris conspired to rob Anna
Leizel Trading, making them the authors of the crime to the exclusion of all others. The acts of
Fernandez, when taken together with the acts of Paris and his 2 unidentified companions, show
concerted action and joint purpose. It is contrary to human nature that, if Paris and his companions
were the only perpetrators of the crime charged, they would also have killed Fernandez to prevent
him from being a witness and not merely frighten him. Indeed, why would Paris and his companions
harm and kill Salvador, who was totally unaware of their activities since he was inside his room
sleeping, and leave Fernandez, who was a witness to their illegal acts, alive and unscathed? The
Court ruled that when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Thus, when homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same. In the present case, both Fernandez and Paris were co-conspirators
who are guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of CA is affirmed.

80
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Nady Magallano, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under the law, conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

FACTS:

Pineda testified that at around1:00 AM, he was at home sleeping beside his wife when loud
voices outside roused him from sleep. He then heard a woman shout, “Romy, bakit mo siya
sinasaktan, inaano ba kayo?" Pineda peeked through his window and saw two men, whom he
identified Magallano and Tapar, who was then lying on the ground. He testified that he saw
Magallano repeatedly strike Batongbakal with a “dos por dos,” while Tapar watched.

As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a woman suddenly bolted from the fray. Magallano
and Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and chased the woman. By then, a still-conscious
Batongbakal began to crawl slowly towards a gate. Magallano and Tapar returned after a few
minutes carrying several stones, each about a volleyball's size. Magallano threw the stones on
Batongbakal's head and body, while Tapar prevented him from crawling away. Pineda attested
that he wanted to help Batongbakal, but his wife stopped him out of fear. He then shouted at
Magallano and Tapar, but his wife covered his mouth to muffle his voice. However, Magallano and
Tapar still heard him, so they stopped attacking Batongbakal, loaded him into the tricycle, and
sped off towards Poblacion. He also stated that the street outside their house, where Batongbakal
was mauled, was well-lit by a streetlight, and that there was a second streetlight near his house.

For Tapar’s defense, he testified that he worked the whole day at the time of the incident
and went home directly after his shift. He rested, ate dinner, and fell asleep at about 10:00 PM.
The following day, Tapar claimed that police officers woke him up, saying a certain Cristina
accused him of killing someone. They then ordered him to come with them to the municipal hall.
There, Tapar repeatedly proclaimed his innocence, but nobody believed him, and he was beaten
up. The police officers pressed him to tell them where he threw the victim's body, but he denied
doing this, let alone killing anybody. Tapar admitted knowing Magallano since they both worked

81
at the National Food Authority but denied being with him in the early morning of October 1, 2005
since he was home at that time and the night before.

For his part, Magallano testified that he was at Tyson Plant in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan with his brother and their helper, waiting for their truck to be loaded with feeds. While
he was at Tyson Plant, Nardo, the brother of his former common-law wife Cristina, borrowed
money because he supposedly ran into an accident with Batongbakal. Magallano gave money to
Nardo, who then huriedly left for Lucena City. On July 3, 2006, while Magallano was sleeping at a
garage in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, two (2) police officers shot him on his thigh. They said that Santos
pointed to him as Batongbakal's killer. They brought him to the police station for questioning and
treated his gunshot wound. During trial, Magallano denied knowing Batongbakal, much more
killing him. He claimed that Santos falsely accused him of murder to get back at him since he had
custody of their three (3) children. However, he could not explain why Pineda would point to him
as Batongbakal's killer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the both accused conspired in killing the victim.

RULING:

YES. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two (2) or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence that show a "common design or
purpose" to commit the crime.

In the case at bar, conspiracy was manifestly shown through the concerted and overt acts of
appellants which demonstrated their actual cooperation in the pursuit of a common purpose and
design. The trial court correctly observed that conspiracy consisted the following acts of accused-
appellants: (1) while Magallano was hitting the victim with a [dos por dos], Tapar was watching
them; (2) they both chased Cristina Varilla; (3) they both returned and continued mauling the victim;
[4] Magallano threw stones at the victim while Tapar cornered the victim to prevent him from
crawling; [5] they helped each other in loading the victim into the tricycle; and [6] Magallano drove
the tricycle while Tapar stayed with the victim inside the tricycle as they fled from the crime scene.

82
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Michael Delima, Allan Delima John Doe, Paul Doe and Peter
Doe

G.R. No. 222645, June 27, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. The essence of
conspiracy is unity of action and purpose.

FACTS:

Michael and Allan, together with their co-accused, were charged with murder for the death
of Ramel Mercedes Congreso.

The prosecution presented Ramel's mother Josefina Congreso, Jose Gajudo, Jr., and
Anthony Nator, as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies provide that Anthony Nator invited
Jose Gajudo Jr. to his home to celebrate the barangay fiesta. The following day, when Jose decided
to go home, as he came out from Anthony's house, he saw five individuals ganging up on Ramel —
the scuffle was around eight meters from Anthony's house. When they saw him, three of the five
assailants scampered away while the two left continued to beat Ramel, whom they stabbed while
they held and pulled him back by his pants. Scared of what he saw, Jose rushed back inside
Anthony's house and told the latter about the stabbing incident. Jose pointed to the two persons
whom he saw holding and stabbing Ramel and asked Anthony who they were. Anthony said Allan
was the one Jose saw stab Ramel while Michael held the victim by his pants; and that after the
incident, he saw Michael and Allan just walk away from the crime scene.

The RTC found Michael and Allan guilty of murder for the stabbing of Ramel. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, the accused-appellants argue that conspiracy was not
proven because their actions do not establish that they were motivated by a common desire. They

83
assail that Allan stabbing and Michael holding Ramel were two separate and distinct actions
insufficient to prove conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between Michael and Allan in committing the crime
of murder against Ramel.

RULING:

YES. As early as the initial assault against Ramel, it is readily apparent that Allan and
Michael's concerted action was towards the common purpose of hurting Ramel after they ganged up
on him together with three other unidentified malefactors. Then, accused-appellants were mutually
motivated by the desire to kill Ramel after Allan stabbed Ramel while Michael held the latter by the
legs. Their concerted actions cannot be brushed aside as separate and distinct because Michael
continued to hold the victim while Allan stabbed him several times.

In addition, accused-appellants err in relying on People vs. Pugay because unlike the said
case, prior to their attack on Ramel, animosity existed between them and the victim. Immediately
prior to the stabbing incident, they already ganged up on the deceased and beat him up. Thus, it is
evident that accused-appellants truly wanted to inflict bodily harm on Ramel, ultimately leading to
his stabbing. Their desire to hurt Ramel progressed to a desire to kill him.

84
IN CONSPIRACY, THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL

People of the Philippines vs. Jonathan Pal, Thaniel Magbanta, Alias Dodong Mango (Ron
Aries Dagatan Cariat) and Alias Tatan Cutacte, Accused, Ron Aries Dagatan Cariat Alias
Dodong Mango

G.R. No. 223565, June 18, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is conspiracy “when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose.”

FACTS:

AAA was on her way home when her neighbors Jonathan Pal and Thaniel Magbanta invited
her to celebrate Pal’s birthday, where she joined their drinking spree. After several shots, AAA felt
dizzy and intoxicated. Thereafter, Magbanta punched AAA in the stomach and together with Pal,
Tatan Cutacte and Alias Dodong Mango, appellant, dragged her to the grassy area. There the
appellant pointed a knife against AAA and held her legs, Pal and Cutacte acted as a lookout while
Magbanta raped her.

Appellant admitted that they were on a drinking spree for the celebration of Pal’s birthday
but denied the accusations saying that when AAA excused herself to pee, she asked Magbanta to
accompany her but the latter returned without AAA. Among the four accused, only the appellant
was arrested while the three remained fugitives from justice.

The RTC ruled finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape as
the prosecution was able to establish conspiracy. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alias Dodong Mango, appellant, is guilty for conspiracy for the crime of
rape.

85
RULING:

YES. There is conspiracy "when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose."

Here, while appellant did not personally have sexual intercourse with "AAA", the acts of
appellant, Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal
knowledge of "AAA". Appellant helped Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining "AAA" and in
dragging her to a secluded grassy area. He also pointed a knife at "AAA" and held her while
Magbanta inserted his penis into "AAA's" vagina. Unmistakably, appellant concurred in the criminal
design to rape "AAA".

Since there was conspiracy among appellant, Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte, the act of one was
the act of all making them equally guilty of the crime of rape against "AAA".

86
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A FELONY

People of the Philippines vs. Dang Angeles y Guarin, et. al.

G.R. No. 224289, August 14, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

In People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Evasco, et. al., the Court emphasized the two
forms of conspiracy. The first refers to express conspiracy. It requires proof of an actual
agreement among the co-conspirators to commit the crime. The second pertains to implied
conspiracy. It exists when two or more persons are shown by their acts to have aimed
toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiments. This is
proved by the mode and manner the offense was committed, or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, indubitably pointing to a
joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest.

FACTS:

The prosecution alleged that during a celebration at Evangelista’s residence, a loud noise
from the engine and muffler of a tricycle was heard. When checked the source of the noise, it was
found to come from a parked tricycle occupied by the four accused. As Erick, Elmer, and Mark
Ryan approached them, the four accused started attacking. Appellant supposedly alighted from
the tricycle and forcefully stabbed Elmer in the right abdomen. When Erick rushed to help Elmer,
Baynosa stabbed Erick in the back. Mark Ryan was also stabbed by Santos in his right waist.
Abelardo rushed to his brothers’ aid but he was met with multiple stab wounds from the four
accused. Abelardo was pronounced dead on arrival while Elmer died in the hospital.

On the other hand, the appellant claimed to be a silent witness to the said incident was he
was outside the Evangelista’s residence. He got so scared, left, and went home. While buying
cigarettes from a nearby store, he saw Domingo Evangelista pointing him to the police as among
those who stabbed the Evangelista brothers. Appellant, Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos were
charged with murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Only the appellant got apprehended
and detained while the others remained at large.

87
 The trial court ruled that the appellant had acted in conspiracy with his co-accused. As
established by the evidence on record, these persons acted in such synchronized and coordinated
manner indicating unity of purpose and design. The CA upheld the ruling. This appeal questions
the liability of the appellant for the crimes of his co-accused as it was not proven that he, Baynosa,
Ramos, and Santos conspired to commit the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy among the four accused in the commission of the
crime.

RULING:

YES, there was conspiracy among the four accused. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts
of the accused before, during, and after the crime, indicating a common design, concerted acts, and
concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Consequently, the precise
extent or modality of participation of each conspirator becomes secondary.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses unequivocally depict one clear picture:
appellant, Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos all acted in a coordinated manner in order to consummate
their common desire, i.e. slay the Evangelista brothers. While there was no express agreement
between appellant and his co-accused, their concerted actions indicate that they did conspire with
each other for the fulfillment of such common purpose.

88
CONSPIRACY IN THE CRIME OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Ronelo Bermudo, Rommel Bermudo and Rolando Bermudo

G.R. No. 225322, July 4, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There is an implied conspiracy when two
or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are
in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment.

FACTS:

On March 7, 2012 at around 6:30pm, Ronelo Bermudo and Philip Bedrero were arguing in
front of the latter's house about George, the latter's nephew, for supposedly wrecking the
former's bike. After the argument, both parties parted ways and returned to their homes. At
around 8:30pm of the same day, Ronelo, this time armed with a bolo, stood in front of Philip's
house demanding the latter to come out so he could kill him. Philip went outside; and Gilberto
Bedrero, George's father, likewise came out of his house and tried to pacify Ronelo telling him that
they would fix his bike the next day. Suddenly, Rommel and Rolando Bermudo rushed towards
Gilberto and, without warning, Rommel struck Gilberto on the head with a small ax which made
the latter fall. As Gilberto lay prostrate, Ronelo hacked him in the stomach while Rolando beat
him with a piece of wood and stabbed him with a bolo. Philip tried to help Gilberto, but Rommel
swung his ax at him injuring his upper lip causing him to retreat to his house. Thereafter, Grace
Bedrero, the niece of Gilberto, ran towards a bloodied Gilberto and cradled him. Ronelo ordered
her to leave forcing her to step away from them. At this point, Ronelo continued to assault
Gilberto by hacking him in the chest and striking his face with a piece of wood. Rommel and
Rolando urged him to finish Gilberto. After the assailants had left, Gilberto was eventually
brought to the hospital where Philip was also being treated for his wounds. Unfortunately, the
former died after several hours of treatment. At the hospital, Philip also saw Ronelo receiving
treatment for his wounds. He notified police that the latter was one of those who attacked
Gilberto; consequently, Ronelo was brought to the police station. On the other hand, Rommel was

89
brought to the precinct after he was identified at the crime scene as one of the suspects —
Rolando eluded arrest and is still at-large.

For their part, Rommel asserted that on March 7, 2012 at around 5:00pm, he and Ipecris
Bermudo were drinking with their friends in the house of a certain Jimmy Peñalosa. At around
8:30pm, they decided to go to Rommel's house for a videoke session; Ipecris left ahead to get
some money. Along the way, Ipecris saw Ronelo challenging Philip with a bolo. When Ronelo was
hit with a stone that Philip threw at him, he retaliated by striking the latter with a bolo hitting
Philip's upper lip prompting him to retreat. At this point, Gilberto came out of his house armed
with a weapon. Ronelo hacked him and continued to do so even when he was already on the
ground. When Ronelo fled, Philip rushed out again from his house to aid Gilberto. At this time,
Rommel arrived together with his friends on the way to a videoke session. Philip then challenged
Rommel to a fight while brandishing his bolo making him run away towards his house. A few
minutes later, policemen arrived at Rommel's house and invited him to the police station. There,
he was identified as one of Gilberto's assailants.

The RTC found Rommel and Ronelo guilty of murder. It found that Rommel conspired with
his co-accused because the manner by which Gilberto was attacked demonstrated unity of
purpose and community of design. In addition, the RTC ruled that Gilberto's killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

On appeal, the CA agreed that Rommel conspired with his co-accused as manifested by
their actions. However, it disagreed that abuse of superior physical strength should be
appreciated on account of the presence of treachery. It clarified that when abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy exists in this case.

RULING:

YES. In Gilberto's death, Rommel and his co-accused are equally guilty of murder as
conspirators. While there was no express agreement between the malefactors, their concerted
actions indicate that they conspired with each other. There is an implied conspiracy when there is a
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective. In this case, Rommel and his
co-accused clearly acted with a common purpose to kill Gilberto as manifested by their coordinated
actions. Rommel initiated the assault and assisted his co-accused in accomplishing their goal. When

90
Philip tried to help Gilberto, Rommel swung an axe at him and, with a horrified Grace nearby, urged
and encouraged Ronelo to kill the victim. Thus, even if there is no direct evidence to establish who
among the culprits inflicted the mortal blow, they are all guilty of murder as conspirators because
their mutual purpose impelled them to execute their harmonized attack on Gilberto.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed.

91
ACTS SHOWING CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz

G.R. No. 225336, September 5, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or
more accused show that they were animated by the same criminal purpose and were
united in their execution.

FACTS:

At a public highway, a group of five persons, including the victim, Dave Alde (Alde), while
being asked by a barangay tanod, was confronted by another group of five persons consisting of
the accused Pilpa, a certain “JR” and three other persons. JR stabbed Alde in the chest with a knife,
while Pilpa poised to thrust Alde as well. Pilpa’s thrusts were parried by Alde’s friend, Choy.
However, Alde was able to run away. Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila
and underwent surgery. Unfortunately, twenty minutes into the operation, Alde went into cardiac
arrest and succumbed to death.

RTC found that treachery attended the killing of Alde, and thus held Pilpa guilty of murder,
being a co-conspirator of JR. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy existed between JR and Pilpa.

RULING:

YES. There is conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or
more accused show that they were animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their
execution, or where the acts of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose

92
and a concerted action. The fact that appellant was unable to actually stab Alde, not by his own
volition but due to the parry of Alde's companion Choy, does not preclude the existence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy can rightly be inferred and proven by the acts of stabbing committed by both appellant
and JR jointly and concertedly.

93
ESSENCE OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Gimpaya

G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose.

FACTS:

On September 16, 2000, according to the prosecution, there was a commotion inside the
compound where the parties are living. Prosecution witness Roosevelt testified that he saw the
victim Genelito Clete (Genelito) being hugged by accused Oscar Gimpaya (Oscar) while the other
accused Roel Gimpaya (Roel) was stabbing Genelito. When Roselyn Clete (Roselyn), wife of
Genelito check what what the commotion was all about, she saw that her husband was already
dead and was slumping on the ground. Genelito was brought to the hospital, but he was
pronounced dead due to stab wounds he obtained. On the other hand, according to the defense
witness Lea Gimpaya (Lea), wife of Oscar, that it was Genelito who started the aggression when
the latter went to the house of Oscar and Lea and called Oscar to go outside his house. When
Oscar went outside, Genelito struck Oscar with an umbrella which caused Oscar to fall down.
Genelito went to him and continuously boxed him. Lea shouted for help and so Roel arrived and
stabbed Genelito at his back. Roel then fled away and remained at large. The accused were
charged with Murder. The RTC found Oscar and Roel guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery. The
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Oscar’s guilt for the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

94
 NO. The Supreme Court does not agree with the lower courts as to the finding that conspiracy
existed between Oscar and Roel. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity
of action and purpose. Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime
— proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The RTC did not discuss its finding of conspiracy; it merely held that "both accused acted in
concert towards a common criminal goal." Conspiracy was not also discussed by the CA. On the
subject, the appellate court only said that "the Oscar and Roel acted in concert in killing the victim."
These pronouncements do not sufficiently establish that there was a conspiracy between Oscar and
Roel in the stabbing of the victim. The records are also wanting of any indication of conspiracy. To
determine if Oscar conspired with Roel, the Court must examine the overt acts of accused-appellant
before, during, and after the stabbing incident and the totality of the circumstances. The inception
and location of the stabbing incident must also be considered. Due to the conflicting testimonies of
the witness, the Court finally ruled that it was Roel who stabbed Genelito in the back and not Oscar.
As it was not Oscar who delivered the fatal blow it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish
the existence of conspiracy. The act of Oscar in merely hugging the victim does not establish
conspiracy in the intent to kill. It was not proven that he acted in concert with Roel or that he even
knew of Roel's intention to stab Genelito. It was not established that Oscar was hugging Genelito
deliberately to enable Roel to stab him as he had no knowledge of Roel's intention.

95
CONSPIRACY IN THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Hernando Bongos

G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime
of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on
the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
other from committing the rape.

FACTS:

Hernando Bongos and Ronel Dexisne were charged with the complex crime of robbery
with rape. Only Bongos was arrested, while Dexisne was at-large. When arraigned, Bongos
pleaded not guilty.

At around 7:00pm of June 8, 2010, AAA, helper of BBB and CCC, was left to tend the house.
While AAA was washing dishes, 2 male persons entered the house through the kitchen. She
identified them as her employer’s neighbors, Bongos and Dexisne. Bongos pointed a gun at her,
while Dexisne pointed his knife and they forced her to enter the room where the money of her
employer was and demanded her to open the drawer. Since it was locked, Dexisne forced it open
using steel, while Bongos remained at AAA's side poking the gun at her neck. After they took the
money, they forcibly dragged AAA outside the house until they reached a clearing on the lower
level of the yard. There, armed with a knife and gun, Bongos and Dexisne threatened and ordered
AAA to undress herself. When she refused to do so, Dexisne got violent and slashed her leg and
then hit her chest near her left breast which caused her to lose consciousness. When AAA woke
up, she no longer had her clothes on and felt pain on her private part. She was afraid so she went
to DDD, the grandfather of CCC and asked for help. DDD summoned someone to fetch CCC to come
home. Together with CCC, AAA reported the robbery incident to the authorities the following day.
However, AAA did not tell CCC of the rape incident because she was ashamed and afraid. CCC
testified that on June 12, 2010, AAA told her that she was likewise raped by the accused. They had
the incident blottered at the police station on June 14, 2010. In the Medico-Legal Report, the
genital examination upon AAA revealed that her hymen was dilated and there were deep-healed

96
lacerations at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions, which concluded that there were clear signs of
blunt vaginal penetrating trauma.

For his part, Bongos alleged that around 1:00pm of June 8, 2010, he was at the house of his
parents to fix the tricycle of his father. Those present at the house are his father, mother, and
Dexisne. He claimed that he finished fixing the tricycle at around 8:00pm and then he went
directly to his house while Dexisne was left behind. He only knew of the case against him when he
was summoned.

The RTC convicted Bongos of the complex crime of robbery with rape. It held that although
AAA did not witness the actual rape as she was unconscious when it happened, the circumstantial
evidence taken all together proved that on the occasion of robbery, she was raped by the
malefactors. Further, it ruled that there was also conspiracy between Bongos and Dexisne from
their coordinated acts from the time they gained entry into BBB and CCC's house, until they have
successfully taken the money from AAA through force and intimidation and the eventual rape of
her. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Bongos is proper.

RULING:

YES. The special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294 of the RPC
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime. In this case, there is no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC as
affirmed by the CA. Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully
taken by Bongos and Dexisne, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. The courts a quo likewise
correctly held that although AAA did not exactly witness the actual rape because she was
unconscious at that time, the circumstantial evidence surrounding the case lead to the obvious
conclusion that Bongos and Dexisne also raped AAA on the occasion of the robbery. While Bongos
asserted that at the time of the incident, both him and Dexisne were in his father's house, he was
unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime considering
that his father's house was just around 250 meters away from BBB's house.

The SC likewise affirmed the findings of the courts a quo of conspiracy between Bongos and
Dexisne. Conspiracy was shown by their coordinated acts from the time they gained entry into BBB

97
and CCC's residence, went to their room and forcibly opened the drawer of the bedroom table and
took the money inside; and thereafter forcibly dragged AAA outside of the house and raped her.
There can be no other conclusion than the successful perpetration of the crime was done through the
concerted efforts of Bongos and Dexisne. Whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery
with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Once conspiracy is established between
two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the
rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The immediately preceding condition is
absent in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, Bongos is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
robbery with rape.

98
PARTICIPATION OF THE ACCUSED IN A CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Herminio Vidal, Jr.

G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. which the offense was perpetrated or inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of
law, the act of one is the act of all.

FACTS:

The accused in this case namely, Vibal, David, Refrea, Pineda, Barqueros and Yason were
charged with 2 counts of complex crime of direct assault with murder and 1 count of direct
assault with frustrated murder. They were alleged to have attacked and killed Mayor Arcillas,
incumbent mayor of Sta. Rosa City at the time of the incident, while he is in the performance of
his duty and deliberately hitting his two security escorts, one of which survived the incident.
Refrea, one of the accuses, stepped forward and pointed out his co-conspirators in this case. PO3
Almendras, the person who survived the incident had also positively identified the culprits. Both
the RTC and Court of Appeals held that all of the accused were guilty of the commission of the
crimes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all the accused are guilty of the commission of the complex crimes of
direct assault with murder and direct assault with frustrated murder.

99
RULING:

YES. The accused were all held guilty of the commission of the crimes. The court held that
Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in the present case, all the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
way the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In this case, it has
been proven that the group were synchronized in the assault indicating a single criminal impulse.
Hence, regardless of the direction of the bullets deployed, all shall be held guilty for each offense
mentioned.

100
CONSPIRACY IN RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. XXX, Alfredo Gilles, Nino G. Monter and Constante M. Castil
alias Junjun

G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, similar to the
physical act constituting the crime itself. Evidence of actual cooperation, not only mere
cognizance, approval, or mere presence must be shown.

FACTS:

AAA lives with the family of her brother BBB and is known to be suffering from mental
deficiency and exhibits childish behaviour. AAA testified that BBB hosted a party where XXX,
Gilles, Monter and Castil, herein appellants, were visitors. During the party, the appellants invited
AAA to a karaoke bar and the seashore where they drank tuba. They continued drinking in the
seashore when the karaoke bar closed. After drinking 2 glasses, AAA felt shortness of breath and
noticed the appellants were huddled together "as if they were agreeing to do something." When
AAA felt like urinating, she asked the appellants to turn their backs and then she relieved herself.
After urinating, Castil took off her pants and underwear, which she asked to be placed beside her.
She asked him what he was doing but the latter told her to keep silent. She did not complain as
she felt very sleepy. Castil placed himself on top of her and the next thing she knew, Castil's penis
was already in her vagina. After Castil, it was followed by XXX, then by Monter and Gilles.

XXX gave his testimony saying that while they were in the middle of drinking, he went 20
meters away from the group to urinate, wherein he was followed by AAA and embraced him. He
was also forced to lie down, and AAA held his penis and inserted it to her vagina. After, he went
back to his friends and they went home not knowing the whereabouts of AAA.

ISSUE:

101
 Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of conspiracy of rape beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

NO. The elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, similar to the
physical act constituting the crime itself. Evidence of actual cooperation, not only mere cognizance,
approval, or mere presence must be shown.

In this case, the mere statement that appellants appeared to talk about "doing something to
her" should not suffice.

Hence, accused are acquitted beyond reasonable doubt.

102
CONSPIRACY IN THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, AND CARNAPPING

People of the Philippines vs. Renato Cariño and Alvin Aquino

G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018

Reyes Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in

conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such
point to a joint purpose and design.

FACTS:

On August 28, 2002, Leonardo Advincula was driving an R&E Taxi with plate number TVH
298 when he was flagged down by Renato Cariño in front of the SSS building. Cariño asked
Advincula to take him to Ortigas. Upon arriving at Ortigas, Cariño asked Advincula to stop along
the corner of Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue and while parked thereat, a silver Nissan Sentra
with plate number USD 666 arrived. Cariño alighted and approached the Nissan Sentra and upon
returning to the taxi, Cariño asked Advincula to follow the Nissan Sentra. After driving for a short
distance, the Nissan Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in Quezon City.
At around 10:39pm of August 28, 2002, Jimmy Caporado, a security guard at the Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision Gate 1, noticed the Nissan Sentra pass through Gate 1 and trailing behind it
was an R&E taxi with plate number TVH 298. Upon passing through the gate, the driver of the
Nissan Sentra, who Caporado recognized as Mirko Moeller, a resident of the said subdivision,
opened the car window to inform the former that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor.
During this time, Caporado noticed that Moeller was with Alvin Aquino. Obeying Moeller's
instructions, Caporado flagged down the taxicab to take the driver's license, and then let the taxi
pass. Caporado identified the passenger of the taxi as Cariño. Meanwhile, Advincula dropped off
Cariño and the latter asked him to wait for his payment. Moeller alighted from the Nissan Sentra
and approached the taxi to pay for Cariño's fare. Then, Advincula drove away without a passenger.
At around 7:30am of August 29, 2002, Nena Taro, the housemaid of Moeller arrived at the latter's
home. Taro noticed that the main gate and the door of the house were unlocked. Upon entering
the house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the wall beside the light switch. She walked to
the backdoor leading to the swimming pool to look for Moeller. There, she was horrified to see

103
him lying face down in front of the swimming pool. Shocked, she rushed out of the house to ask
for help. Later, the security guards and the police arrived. Months after the incident, on
September 4, 2002, SPO4 Celso Jeresano arrested Cariño and Aquino in Baguio City. During the
arrest, the police officers recovered the victim’s stolen properties, i.e., camera, video camera, and
charger from Cariño and Aquino. The police also tracked down the stolen Nissan Sentra in Isabela,
after Cariño pointed to its location. Cariño also surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra.

In their defense, Aquino claimed that on September 4, 2002, while he was waiting for a
jeepney bound for Manila, a tinted Tamaraw FX suddenly stopped in front of him and he was
forced to board the said vehicle. While inside, he was handcuffed and shown a cartographic
sketch, and was asked if the image was familiar. He said that he did know who the person in the
sketch was. Suddenly, he was hit on his right temple and on the back of his head. This caused him
to pass out. When he regained consciousness, he found himself inside an unfamiliar small house,
with his t-shirt bearing blood stains. Thereafter, he was placed inside a van, where he was
subjected to physical abuse. Later, he was brought to Camp Karingal, where he was again
physically abused by the police officers. He was later brought for inquest proceedings, where he
learned that he was being charged with Robbery with Homicide. On the other hand, Cariño
claimed that on September 19, 2002, between 6:00 and 7:00am, a group of police officers
suddenly barged inside the house where he and his girlfriend were staying. He was arrested and
brought to Isabela. He was photographed while seated in a car and was told that he stole the same.
Then, he was brought to Camp Karingal where he was accused of killing a German national.
Cariño denied knowing Aquino.

The RTC found Cariño and Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, and carnapping. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. It concluded that all the
established circumstances show that Cariño and Aquino conspired with each other to commit the
crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Cariño and Aquino is proper.

RULING:

YES. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove the existence of the following elements: a) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; b) the property taken belongs to another;
c) the taking is with intent to gain; and d) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,

104
homicide is committed. It is imperative to establish that the intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Thus, a conviction for
robbery with homicide requires that the robbery is the main purpose of the malefactor and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery. Once it has been established with certainty that a person
was killed on the occasion of the robbery, the accused may be convicted of robbery with homicide. In
this case, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of August 28, 2002, when the victim was
robbed and killed, lead to an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt the
culpability of Cariño and Aquino. Moreover, Cariño and Aquino’s unexplained possession of the
stolen articles gave rise to the presumption that they were the taker and the doer of the robbery.
They were unable to offer any satisfactory and believable explanation justifying their possession of
the subject articles; all that they did to rebut this presumption was to question the ownership of the
said articles. Likewise, Cariño and Aquino are convicted for the crime of carnapping defined and
penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539. The prosecution proved the existence of all the elements
of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. To eradicate all traces of its previous ownership, they even
changed the vehicle's plate number; however, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the police
discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen
vehicle. Further, Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity in its
taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the police.

It becomes all too apparent that all the interwoven circumstances form a chain of events that
lead to the inescapable conclusion that Cariño and Aquino robbed and killed Moeller and took his
Nissan Sentra. It is evident that they conspired and confederated with each other to commit the said
horrid crimes. It bears stressing that direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not
indispensable in conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such
point to a joint purpose and design. Undoubtedly, from the moment Cariño and Aquino met in
Ortigas, went to Moeller's home, took his valuables and car, up to the time when they were both
arrested in possession of the said valuables, lead to no other conclusion than that they hatched a
criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its
consummation. Consequently, once a conspiracy has been established, the act of one malefactor, is
the act of all.

Wherefore, Cariño and Aquino are guilty of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping.

105
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. John Carlo Salga and Ruel “Tawing” Namalata

G.R. No. 233334, July 23, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact that the accused were seen together immediately after the
commission of a felony does not necessarily prove the existence of a conspiracy between
them. The Prosecution must show that the accused performed overt acts showing
unanimity of design or concert of action; otherwise, each is liable only for the
consequences of his own acts.

FACTS:

Based on the information filed, the accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, by means of force and violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner thereof enter the house of
Josefina Zulit and once inside entered the room of Joan Camille Zulit and rob, take, and carry away
cash amounting to P34,000 from the vault and cellphone belonging to Josefina Zulit. And that on
the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away
the money above-mentioned, accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
with intent to kill, with the use of a gun, attack, assault, strike the head and shoot the caretaker of
the house, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which caused her death.

The RTC convicted Ruel and John of robbery with homicide on the basis of the testimonies
of Joan and Constancio. Joan had testified that John was one of the three persons who robbed the
victims, and pointed his gun to her head, while Constancio attested that Ruel drove off on a green
motorcycle with John and another person on board. Concluding that the four perpetrators had
conspired in committing robbery with homicide.

The CA affirmed the conviction of Ruel and John because the witnesses of the Prosecution
were credible and had no improper motives to testify falsely against the accused; that Joan's
identification of John as one of the robbers was positive; that circumstantial evidence proved
Ruel's participation in the crime; and that the trial court correctly found the existence of
conspiracy amongst the four individuals, rendering the act of one the act of all.

106
ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy exists among the accused.

RULING:

NO. The declaration of the existence of the conspiracy among Ruel, John and the two
unidentified persons lacked firm factual foundation.

The Court explained that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where the several accused were
shown to have acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and their acts indicated
that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in the execution, conspiracy is
sufficiently established. The State must show at the very least that all participants performed
specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to
commit the felony. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, therefore, the accused
must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself, or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement
the criminal plan.

The Court also stressed that the community of design to commit an offense must be a
conscious one; and that conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Hence, mere presence at the
scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.

In view of the foregoing, Ruel's mere act of driving of the motorcycle with John and the
unidentified person on board did not amount to an overt act indicating his having conspired in
committing the robbery with homicide. Consequently, he was not John's co-conspirator. He must be
acquitted, for the evidence of the Prosecution to establish his guilt for the robbery with homicide
was truly insufficient.

107
PROOF OF CONSPIRACY NEED NOT TO BE ESTABLISHED BY DIRECT EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Ludivico Patrimonio Bandojo and Kenny Joy Ileto

G.R. No. 234161, October 17, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of conspiracy are: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2)
the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony
was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it
may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a common understanding among
themselves with respect to the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Accused Ludivico and Kenny Joy were convicted by the Regional Trial Court and Court of
Appeals for violation of Sec.4 (a), in relation to Section 6(a), of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003", for trafficking AAA a minor to
provide sexual service for a consideration. The accused were arrested by the NBI during an
entrapment in a mall after confirming the transaction with the NBI agent agreeing to provide
AAA’s sexual service for a consideration. Now, the accused raised the issue that the conspiracy
between them were not established by direct evidence alleging that they only met for the first
time with AAA during that unfaithful day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need to established conspiracy through direct evidence.

RULING:

NO, the elements of conspiracy need not to be established through direct evidence, because it
may be inferred from the party’s conduct indication common understanding among themselves for
the commission of the crime. Here, the act of Ludivico on posting in social media offering sexual

108
service for a consideration and after the confirmation, Kenny Joy’s act of contacting the sexual
provider are established. More so, when they met with the NBI agent introducing AAA to the same.

109
MATERIAL EXECUTION OF THE CRIME BY STANDING GUARD CONNOTES CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Benito Lababo alias “Ben”, Wenefredo Lababo, Junior Lababo
(Al), and FFF

G.R. No. 234651, June 6, 2018

Velasco Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the
commission of the crime.

FACTS:

On October 27, 2007, BBB, his wife CCC, and their son AAA, alighted from a motorcycle in
front of Benito's house, and proceeded directly to go to their house. A few minutes later, CCC
heard a gunshot accompanied by a child's scream emanating from near Benito's house. When she
went outside to check, she saw her husband and son lying on the ground, wounded. Within close
proximity is Benito holding a 29-inch gun together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed
with bolos.

Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were charged in an Information
for the crime of Murder. On July 8, 2014, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty of murder. The
combination of the circumstantial evidence points out to accused-appellants as the perpetrators
and conspirators. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy between the accused-appellants.

RULING:

110
 YES, there is conspiracy between the accused-appellants.

While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission,
without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused
conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito,
while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature.

Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent
as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime.

Therefore, the Court is convinced that indeed, the three conspired to commit the crimes
charged. Thus, the Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the CA.

111
HOW TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Juan De Vergara Credo and Daniel De Vergara Credo

G.R. No 230779, July 22, 2019

Carandang, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Hence, conspiracy must be established, not
by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms:

1. Express conspiracy - requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime.

2. Implied conspiracy - proved through the mode and manner of the commission of
the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action
and a community of interest.

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to
have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for
without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may
only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.

FACTS:

Spouses Antonio Asistin and Evangeline Asistin operated a computer shop and a store at
their residence. Daniel assisted male customers who wanted to rent tapes. One of the unidentified
men strangled her and started stabbing her. Evangeline kicked him so he would not reach her
body. Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the
gate with several stab wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the two men
but the latter did not help her and even watched while she was being stabbed. Antonio was
carried to the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.

112
 Rufo Baguio, a neighbor, testified that he saw Juan and another person carrying a heavy
bag when the two other men arrived. Baguio noticed that Juan pointed to the direction of the
residence of Spouses Asistin. The two men proceeded to the house of Spouses Asistin, and, later
on, Juan and the other man followed. Meanwhile, Reynante Ganal testified that he was outside
Spouses Asistin's residence when he saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other in a vacant room
together with three other male companions. Juan came up to him and asked how much he was
renting his place. A few minutes later, he saw Juan walking with an unidentified person.

A follow-up operation was conducted after Daniel allegedly implicated his brother Juan to
the crime. The operation resulted to the arrest of Juan at his rented room where the police found
his bag which contained clothing, two live ammunition for shotgun and a fan knife measuring
approximately seven inches long. He was allegedly in the process of absconding when he was
apprehended.

Juan and Daniel denied the allegations against them. The RTC found Juan and Daniel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder committed against Antonio Asistin and guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder committed against Evangeline Cielos-
Asistin. Juan and Daniel argued that their presence, without executing any overt act, does not
prove conspiracy in inflicting of fatal injuries to Spouses Asistin. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused and Juan acted in concert for the commission of the crimes.

RULING:

NO. Evangeline admitted that neither Daniel nor Juan stabbed her and that she did not see
Juan during the incident. Their complicity was merely based on circumstantial evidence, having
been allegedly seen near the residence of Spouses Asistin, talking to strangers, before the incident
took place. The prosecution witnesses admitted to not knowing nor hearing what Daniel, Juan, and
the other men were discussing. They also admitted not seeing who killed Antonio.

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution - testimonies of Baguio
and Ganal claiming that they saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other moments before the crimes
were committed do not prove conspiracy. Baguio and Ganal insisted seeing three (3) unidentified
men and Juan enter the house of Spouses Asistin. However, neither of the witnesses could confirm to
the Court that these men were the same men who stabbed Spouses Asistin nor could they confirm
that they heared their conversation. Furthermore, the claim of Baguio and Ganal that three (3)

113
unidentified men entered the house of Spouses Asistin contradicts the statement of Evangeline that
only two (2) unidentified men were allowed by Daniel to enter their house, and that she did not see
Juan.

114
FACTS SHOWING CONSPIRACY

Alex Sulit y Trinidad vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 202264, October 16, 2019

J. Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Petitioner’s act of inducing the private complainants to invest further so as to

recover their “lost” investments makes him liable through conspiracy. It is sufficient that
the actions of petitioner and his cohorts were clearly directed by a premeditated joint
activity which is aimed towards a common purpose.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and the Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals. Nine complaints for the crime of estafa were filed against Santias and Sulit
anent several investment transactions with Valbury Assets Ltd., in which they served as Senior
Account Manager and Marketing Director, respectively. They allegedly defraud complainant
Caridad P. Bueno by means of false manifestation and representations to make the complainant
believe that they are connected to Valbury and that they have authority to place her money in a
foreign currency trading with the assurance of substantial return of investment; and by means of
deceit of similar import in inducing complainant to give the total amount of $7,500.00 to the
accused on the promise that she will gain profits from her investments; however, she never
received any of her investment on account of business losses. When Bueno sought the aid of NBI,
petitioner returned 50% of her investment.

On the other hand, Bonsol corroborated the testimony of Bueno that she was also swayed
by the petitioner by investing P510, 000; however, Bonsol was not able to recover the profits
promised to her upon demand. Ilot also testified that she gave her investments to Santias
amounting to P250, 000 and never received any returns.

The trial court and the CA found the accused guilty beyond proof of reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

115
 Whether or not the petitioner’s active participation in all the transactions is sanctioned in
the presence of conspiracy among him, Santias and Gan.

RULING:

YES. Under the law, once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
As in all the crimes, the existence of conspiracy must be proven by reasonable doubt. While direct
proof is necessary, the same degree of proof necessary in establishing the crime is required to
support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself.

In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and CA that conspiracy is present.
Based from the synthesis of the testimonies, it is clear that petitioner actively participated in all the
transactions. Petitioner’s acts of inducing the private complainants to invest further so as to recover
their “lost” investments make him liable through conspiracy. It must be likewise be noted that
petitioner was always present during all the meetings --- from the time when private complainants
invested their money to the time that they sought the help of the NBI to recover the same. Even more,
the petitioner received the marked money provided by the NBI, representing the additional
investment of $10,000 that petitioner, Gan and Santias asked from Bueno. Undeniably, these
circumstances are contrary to petitioner’s denial of his participation.

Truly, petitioner and his cohorts have ultimate objective, that is, to induce private
complainants to part with their money. To do so, petitioner and his cohorts misrepresented that they
are in a legitimate business of buying and selling foreign currencies; that they could invest private
complainants’ money with the guaranteed profits; and that the private complainants have the
option of withdrawing their money at any time. However, as it turned out, Valbury was not
registered with the SEC and it was not able to deliver its promises to private complainants.

Neither can this Court exclude petitioner from liability only because he did not participate in
employing fraud or deceit upon the private complainants when they initially gave their money to
Santias. At the risk of being repetitive, the finding of conspiracy necessarily implies that the act of
one is the act of all. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Thus, it
is not indispensable that petitioner engaged with private complainants from the time that they
inquired on the investment scheme offered by Valbury to the time that they parted with their money.

116
HOW TO PROVE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Dagang Pagapulaan, Jose Macajilos Batulan, Renato
Banate Fuentes and Junjun Banate Fuentes

G.R. No. 216936, July 29, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue
it. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness
and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose to bring about the death
of the victim. Once this is established, each of the conspirators is made criminally liable for
the crime actually committed by any one of them.

FACTS:

Jose Batulan and his co-accused Alvin Pagapulaan, Renato Fuentes, and Junjun Fuentes
were charged with murder for the death of Ruben Pacho.

The commission of the crime started when Pagapulaan was demanding P10.00 from
Ruben’s conductor as payment for his services as barker, which the latter refused to give.
However, to stop the altercation between the two, Ruben gave Pagapulaan P5.00. The latter, not
being satisfied, cursed Ruben and boxed the body of the jeepney, prompting the passenger to
alight Ruben grabbed a samurai stowed under his seat to keep Pagapulaan at bay. But as soon as
he alighted his jeepney, he was surrounded and attacked by Batulan, Pagapulaan, Renato, and
Junjun. Pagapulaan got hold of the samurai and sliced Rubens face and nose. Junjun stabbed
Ruben using a knife. Renato struck Ruben's nape with a stone causing the latter's head to
crack. Batulan also hacked Ruben with a samurai. Ruben’s wife, Letecia saw all four (4) accused
take turns in stabbing Ruben with a knife and hacking him with a samurai. When Ruben fell to the
ground, she alighted the jeepney and embraced her husband. Ruben died at the hospital. When
asked to identify her husband's assailants in court, she instantly recognized and pointed at
Pagapulaan, Renato, and Junjun. But she failed to immediately identify Batulan because of his new
haircut.

117
 The RTC and CA convicted Renato, Junjun and Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. It gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found
that the four (4) accused acted in concert and took advantage of their superior strength. More,
treachery attended the killing for the attack on Ruben was surreptitious and left him in no
position to defend himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused Alvin Pagapulaan, Renato Fuentes and Junjun Fuentes conspired
in the commission of the crime of murder.

RULING:

YES. Here, the following circumstances established conspiracy: (1) all four accused knew
each other as they were dispatchers or jeepney barkers in the area where the crime was committed:
(2) they were all present at the time of the killing; (3) they surrounded Ruben when he alighted his
jeepney; (4) they took turns hitting, hacking and stabbing Ruben with a stone, samurai and a knife;
(5) Ruben sustained multiple injuries and wounds from the attacks; and (6) all four accused
immediately escaped.7

The acts of appellant and his co-accused were coordinated. They were synchronized in their
attacks and were motivated by a single criminal impulse - to kill Ruben. Their spontaneous
agreement to commit the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.

Conspiracy being present, appellant is thus equally liable as his co accused regardless of who
delivered the killing blow. For where there is conspiracy, all conspirators are liable as co-principals.
The act of one is the act of all.

118
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Bernie Raguro y Balinas, Jonathan Perez y De Mateo, Eric
Raguro y Balinas, Elmer De Makiling, Teodulo Panti, Jr., and Levie* De Mesa, Bernie Raguro
y Balinas, Jonathan Perez y De Mateo, Eric Raguro y Balinas, Teodulo Panti, Jr., and Levie De
Mesa

G.R. No. 224301, July 30, 2019

Bersamin, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

To successfully impute criminal liability on the ground of conspiracy, the

Prosecution must show that each of the accused performed at least an overt act that
showed his concurrence in the criminal design. The mere presence of any accused in the
crime scene, as well as the showing of his inaction to prevent the commission of the crime,
will not make him a co conspirator because such are not of the nature of overt acts
essential to incurring criminal liability under the umbrella of a conspiracy.

FACTS:

The appellants were charged in several Informations for murder and frustrated murder.
The facts were there was a birthday celebration wherein appellant Raguro was invited, but later
asked to leave because he was drunk and hurling invectives at the other guests. However, when
the party was transferred to another location due to rain, he returned along with the other
appellants and they were all armed with bladed weapons, but there was neither evidence nor
testimony that appellant de Mesa was with them. The appellants present thereat then proceeded
to stab Avelino Morales, a guest at the birthday celebration. Nonetheless, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgement against them, including de Mesa, and this was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant de Mesa should also be charged because of conspiracy.

119
RULING:

NO. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To hold one as a co principal by reason of conspiracy,
it must be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance of or in furtherance of the conspiracy,
although the acts performed might have been distinct and separate.

The CA erred in affirming the conviction of de Mesa. His incrimination as a co-conspirator

was based on pure speculation and conjecture. There was no proof adduced to show that he had at
least lent moral support to his co-accused-appellants when they attacked Avelino and Manuel.
Conspiracy could not be deduced from his being merely present at the scene of the crime. He must be
shown at least to have committed an overt act that indicated his concurrence in the common
criminal design to kill their victims that had animated the attack by the others.

120
FACTS THAT MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVE CONSPIRACY

Excel Gurro y Maga vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224562, September 18, 2091

Reyes Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

It cannot be gainsaid that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

Their responsibility is not confined to the accomplishment of the particular purpose

of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of
their intended purpose.

Equally important, direct proof is not necessary to establish the fact of conspiracy.
Rather, conspiracy may be presumed from, and proven by the acts of, the accused pointing
to a joint purpose, design, concerted action and community of interests.

FACTS:

The accused in this case, namely Excel Gurro y Maga, Wennie Idian y Jamindang and Joel
Zosa were charged with Kidnapping for ransom with homicide. This was after they conspired in
kidnapping an 8-year-old minor and demanded ransom from his family amounting to
P3,000,000.00. The kid was killed while being unlawfully detained by his kidnappers. Before the
kidnapping was held, the kid was last seen with Wennie in their house. Wennie left her house
with the kid but when she returned home, she’s already alone. The family of the kid went
searching for the child and had received a text message from an anonymous person saying their
kid was kidnapped. The family provided ransom money amounting to P186,000.00. After the
release of the funds, they just knew that their kid was killed by his kidnappers. According to a
witness, Wennie’s acts had been suspicious since the kid went missing. She tried to cover up Joel's
contact information from Patrick, who is the witness in the case. They then found out that the
contact number of the kidnapper is the same as Joel’s number.

Wennie however denied the accusations against her. Joel admitted his guilt of the crime
but avers that Wennie and Excel is in no way involved in the crime he committed. The RTC held

121
Wennie and Joel guilty of kidnapping with homicide and declared Excel as an accomplice to the
crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Wennie and Joel is guilty for conspiring in the kidnapping of the 8-year-old
victim in this case.

RULING:

YES. Wennie and Joel are guilty for conspiring in the kidnapping of the kid and Excel is guilty
as an accessory to the crime. Under the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Once conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, thereby rendering them all equally
liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. Their responsibility is not confined
to the accomplishment of the particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of their intended purpose. In the given case, Wennie’s acts
during the crime have been very suspicious and that witness was able to testify how Wennie tried to
cover for Joel by deleting Patrick’s contact information from Joel. Aside from that, Wennie’s act of
suddenly going home to Catbalogan where the ransom money was transferred was also highly
suspicious. Moreover, the kid was last seen with her before he’s gone missing. Wennie’s alibi is not
sufficient to controvert the testimony provided. These acts elucidate her participation in the crime
and that she conspired with Joel.

122
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Solar y Dumbrique

G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows community of
criminal purpose or design.

FACTS:

An Information was filed against Mark Kenneth Solar and appellant Rolando Solar for a
crime they did against Joseph. The lone eyewitness was Ma. Theresa, the wife of Joseph, and she
testified that she was following her husband when she saw the two Solars hit him with a baseball
bat. When he fell down, they ganged up on him. He was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.
She also testified that the fatal blow was inflicted by Mark Kenneth. However, Mark Kenneth
remained at large while herein appellant pleaded not guilty.

The Regional Trial Court convicted appellant for the crime of murder done against Joseph.
He appealed because he alleged that conspiracy between him and Mark Kenneth was not firmly
established since the fatal blow was done by Mark Kenneth and not him. The Court of Appeals
still convicted him for they found that there was conspiracy, but the conviction was for the crime
of homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between Mark Kenneth and appellant.

RULING:

123
 YES. It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While it is true that the
elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt
— necessary to establish the physical acts constituting the crime itself, this is not to say that direct
proof of such conspiracy is always required. Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably shows
community of criminal purpose or design.

In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of the
assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime because
in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all. In this case, it is therefore inconsequential
whether Rolando delivered a fatal blow or not.

124
FACTS WHICH SHOW CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Anthony Palada @ Ton-Ton, and Jonalyn Logrosa @ Misa, et al.
Joel Acquiatan @ "Kain"

G.R. No. 225640, July 30, 2019

Bersamin, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Although it is not an element of the crime charged, conspiracy, whenever alleged,

must be proved with the same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the
offense, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the existence of the
conspiracy renders each accused only liable for his own specific acts.

FACTS:

A family was sleeping inside their house when they were awakened by the barking of their
dogs. The husband and wife peeked and saw the accused Misa and accused-appellant Acquiatan
standing outside of their house. When they went back to sleep, the wife heard a gunshot and saw
them again when she opened a window. She also testified when she went outside, she saw that
Acquiatan went to his parents’ house while the other accused went to another person’s house.
When she went back to their house, she saw the bloodied body of her husband who was later
declared dead.

The Regional Trial Court convicted all of the accused for murder together with the
accused-appellant Acquiatan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be convicted for murder by reason of conspiracy.

RULING:

125
 NO. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of
the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.9 In other words, conspiracy
requires the same degree of proof required to establish the elements of the crime itself—the proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

The mere presence of the accused-appellant at the scene of the crime could not justly
incriminate him considering that the identity of the shooter himself remained not reliably
established. The combination of all the circumstances did not result in a moral certainty that the
accused appellant, to the exclusion of all others, had committed the crime. Without the clear
showing of their respective overt acts, conspiracy could not be shown to exist, and each of them
could only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.

126
CONSPIRACY EXISTS IF THE PARTIES HAVE THE SAME PURPOSE AND WERE UNITED IN ITS
EXECUTION

People of the Philippines vs. Aries Reyes y Hilario, Argie Reyes y Hilario, Arthur Hilario,
and Demetrio Sahagun y Manalili, Aries Reyes y Hilario and Demetrio Sahagun y Manalili

G.R. No. 227013, June 17, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

In conspiracy, the parties need not actually come together and agree in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. It is enough that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused or assailants had the same purpose and were
united in its execution.

FACTS:

Jun, Demetrio and Aries, and Argie and Arthur were all vendors of Hidalgo Street, Quiapo,
Manila. On August 5, 2007, the police apprehended the illegal vendors in the area. An argument
then ensued between them and Jun. In the late afternoon, Jun and his wife Catherine packed up
their wares and prepared to go home. But before leaving the area, Jun went back for the shoulder
bag he left earlier.

When Aries, Demetrio, Arthur, and Argie saw Jun, they pursued him. As Jun tried to run
away, Demetrio hit him with a plastic chair in the head. Arthur and Aries then alternately hit him
with broomsticks. Jun, nonetheless, managed to get back on his feet and run toward Villalobos
Street. But when he reached the comer of Villalobos Street, Argie was there waiting. Argie
stabbed Jun in the left side of his body and was stabbed again, causing his death.

On November 28, 2007, Aries and Demetrio, together with Argie and Arthur were charged
with murder. On August 27, 2014, the trial court found appellants guilty of murder. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy between the accused.

127
RULING:

YES, there is conspiracy between the accused.

Based on the interlocking testimonies of the eyewitnesses, appellants and their co-accused
each took an active part in assaulting Jun Balmores. They in fact acted in concert toward one
common purpose: to kill Jun Balmores. This is a conspiracy. In conspiracy, the parties need not
actually come together and agree in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. It is
enough that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused or assailants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution, as in this case.

The fact that it was Argie alone who delivered the final coup de grace on the victim did not
diminish appellants' shared culpability. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

128
ESSENCE OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Eddie Verona, Efren Verona and Edwin Verona

G.R. No. 227748, June 19, 2019

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced
from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime charged,
from which it may be indicated that there is common purpose to commit the crime.

FACTS:

On October 27, 1998, Romeo Ortega (Ortega) was driving his passenger jeepney with
Manuel [Tingoy] as conductor. Dioscoro and Eddie flagged down the jeepney and Ortega stopped
to let them aboard. Suddenly Edgar, who was then standing on the left side of the jeepney, tried to
stab Ortega. However, it was the right hand of the passenger seated on the left side of Ortega that
was hit. Seeing the passenger wounded, Ortega immediately drove off.

Manuel, the conductor, was then holding on with both hands on the jeepney and was
standing on its rear step board. Suddenly, Efren and Eddie stabbed Manuel at the back, causing
the latter to fall on the ground. As Manuel lay flat on the ground, Edwin hacked Manuel on the
head and many times on the body causing his immediate death. Edgar also hacked Manuel.
Dioscoro was seen holding a bolo as he stood near Manuel.

Eddie, Efren, and Edwin were charged with the crime of murder. On February 20, 2012, the
trial court found appellants guilty of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the trial court. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy between the accused.

129
RULING:

YES, there is conspiracy between the accused.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and
purpose. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be
indicated that there is common purpose to commit the crime.

In this case, the hacking acts of Efren and Edwin, when taken together with the stabbing act
of Efren, reveal a commonality and unity of criminal design. The defense cannot aver that Dioscoro
and Eddie's mere act of carrying a weapon is not an overt act reflective of conspiracy because
clearly, such act is in line with the crime of murder. Regardless of the extent and character of
Dioscoro and Eddie's respective active participation, once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act of one is the act of all.

Thus, considering all of the foregoing, Efren and Edwin's conviction for the crime of murder
must stand.

130
HOW TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Ronald Vargas Palema, Rufel Bautista Palmea, Lyndon Quezon
Saldua and Virgo Grengia

G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." Like any other element of a crime, the existence of conspiracy must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an

overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof.

FACTS:

Ronald Vargas Palema, Rufel Bautista Palmea, Lyndon Quezon Saldua and Virgo Grengia
was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, for conspiring with the accused minor
Lester Palema Ladra, who unlawfully took and stole victim’s cellular phone and on the occasion
and by reason of the robbery, maul and stab the latter to death. On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua,
Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Marvin,
meanwhile, remained at large.

The evidence for the prosecution revealed that Enicasio, his common-law spouse, his son
Erickson Depante, and his stepdaughter Jamie Rose Baya were sitting on the benches at the
Calamba Town Plaza when three men approached Enicasio. Palmea threw a punch at Enicasio in
an attempt to grab his phone. Palema simultaneously pulled out a knife and tried to stab him in
the abdomen, but was warded off by Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he retrieved his knife,
Palema stabbed Enicasio on the right thigh, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Grengia and
Saldua arrived at the scene and joined in beating Enicasio. Erickson tried to help his father but
Ladra stopped him. When he resisted, Ladra attempted to stab him, but he was able to evade the
attack and immediately look for a weapon. Upon reaching his father, however, he saw that

131
Enicasio had already collapsed from the stab wounds. Erickson brought his father to the Calamba
Medical Center, but he later died from blood loss.

During the case's pendency, Manzanero died, hence, the RTC dismissed the case against
him. Meanwhile, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia denied the accusations against them. They
insisted that while all of them were at the Plaza during the incident, they were not there as a
group, but with different people. They maintained that the police officers mistook them for the
men who attacked Enicasio. Ladra, for his part, changed his plea to guilty. He testified that he was
with Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Marqueses, and Manzanero at the night of the incident when
Palema's girlfriend approached them and complained that a man in a red shirt had acted
indecently toward her. Believing that the man was Enicasio, the group attacked and mugged him.
When he saw Enicasio fighting back, he took Marqueses' knife and stabbed Enicasio twice. Ladra
added that Grengia was not with them and did not participate in the attack.

The RTC found Ladra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide, however the case against him was dismissed because of National Training School for
Boys’ recommendation that he be discharged to his parents. The RTC rendered another Decision
convicting Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and Grengia of the crime of robbery with homicide and that
the four men conspired in committing the crime charged. However, the men contended that it still
failed to establish the existence of conspiracy in committing the offense. They insisted that while
they allegedly attacked the victim, there was no community of interest among them.

The CA Court of Appeals dismissed the group's appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial
Court Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy between accused Palema, Palmea, Saldua and
Grengia.

RULING:

YES. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding of conspiracy.
It found that accused-appellants' acts were coordinated and complementary with each other,
demonstrating the existence of conspiracy. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that
accused-appellants came in two (2) groups. The first group—accused-appellants Palema and
Palmea, along with Manzanero—attacked Enicasio and took his cellphone. The second group—

132
accused-appellants Grengia and Saldua, along with Ladra—joined the fray when they saw Enicasio
fighting back.

Notably, while accused-appellants denied participating in the crime, they all admitted that
they were at the Calamba Town Plaza during the incident. Moreover, their claim that they did not
come as a group, but were with other people, remains a bare allegation after they failed to present
the testimonies of the individuals who were supposedly with them that night.

Accused offered no evidence that they performed an overt act neither to escape from the
company of the assailants or to prevent the assault from taking place. Their denial, therefore, is of
no value.

133
FACTS THAT MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVE CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Eric Vargas y Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina

G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019

Carpio, Acting C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy is present when there is unity in purpose and intention in the

commission of a crime — it does not require a previous plan or agreement to commit
assault as it is sufficient that at the time of such aggression, all the accused manifested by
their acts a common intent or desire to attack.

FACTS:

The accused in this case, Eric Vargas y Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina were charged with
murder aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation.
Miguel Belen, the victim in this case received mortal gunshot wounds that caused his subsequent
death days after the incident. The attack was made when Belen was traversing a road in
Camarines Sur and was on his way home, he received several gunshots particularly on his back.
Belen was rushed to the hospital after the incident and three days after he was able to give his
testimony to the investigators where he positively identified his assailants in the person of Vargas,
the driver of the motorcycle and a woman as the gunman. Later on, the gunman was identified as
Gina Bagacina. Weeks after Belen’s confinement, he passed away.

As a defense, the accused denied his presence at the crime scene and presented his alibi.
RTC found Eric Vargas y Jaguarin guilty of the crime charged which was attended by treachery
and evident premeditation. The CA affirmed the same with modification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eric Vargas Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina were guilty of the crime charged
by conspiracy.

134
RULING:

YES. Eric Vargas y Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina were held guilty of the crime murder
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, by conspiracy. Conspiracy is present when
there is unity in purpose and intention in the commission of a crime — it does not require a previous
plan or agreement to commit assault as it is sufficient that at the time of such aggression, all the
accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack. In this case, given that the
motorcycle driver was positively identified by the victim and that his gunman was riding the same
vehicle driven by Vargas, it is clear that both Vargas and the gunman had a common purpose of
killing Belen. Their acts indicated a common purpose and concurrence of sentiment.

135
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO ESTABLISH CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Rome Welbar Padal Jr., Reynan Padal, and two other John Does

G.R. No. 232070, October 2, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that, “conspiracy exists when 2 or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it”. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

FACTS:

The accused in this case were charged with murder qualified by the use of a motor vehicle.
The victim in this case named Ragnel Laguardia, who while on his way home together with some
friends was approached by 4 men onboarded by a motorcycle. They continued walking. And after
an hour, the accused ran after Ragnel and stabbed him four times. The victim’s companions was
not able to help Ragnel since they are being blocked by the other accused. The witnesses
positively identified Romeo and Reynan as two of the assailants.

The accused interposed an alibi. Romeo claims to be making sapin-sapin the whole day
when the incident transpired, while Reynan was driving his motorcycle looking for passengers.
The RTC held that the accused are guilty of committing murder. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused were guilty of murder by conspiracy.

RULING:

YES. Under the Revised Penal Code, murder is established when the following elements are
present, (1) a person was killed (2) the accused killed him (3) the killing was attended by any of the

136
qualifying circumstance mentioned in Art 248 of the RPC and (d) the killing is not parricide or
infanticide. All the elements were established in this case. Moreover, Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code states that, “conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In the
given case, it shows that the appellants conspired to one common purpose, to kill the victim. While
Romeo is kicking and stabbing the victim, Reynan and the others block the friends of the victim
attempting to kill him. Hence, given that conspiracy exist in this case, the court held all the accused
guilty of murder.

137
CONSPIRACY IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, P/Supt. Dionicio Carbonel Borromeo and
SPO1 Joey Arce Abang

G.R.No. 227899, July 10,2019

A. Reyes, Jr. J.

DOCTRINE:

There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. The
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence must be
strong enough to show the community of criminal design.

For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to

commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct
or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or
by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.

FACTS:

The Naguilian Police Station, La Union Police Provincial Office, PDEA and barangay
officials, raided the house and piggery owned by one Eusebio Tangalin. On the strength of a
search warrant issued, authorities combed the property and confirmed their initial suspicion -
that it was a clandestine shabu laboratory. Seized from the compound were truckloads of
dangerous drugs (shabu), controlled precursors, essential chemicals, equipment and
paraphernalia utilized for the manufacture of shabu. Police authorities, likewise, arrested on the
spot Dante Palaganas and Andy Tangalin, the alleged caretakers of the property.

Dante Palaganas testified that he was instructed by the private respondents P/Supt.
Borromeo to find a lot suitable for a piggery business, which turned out to be a clandestine shabu
laboratory. Joselito Artuz, as represented by Dante, leased the property from Eusebio. P/Supt.
Borromeo told Dante to omit his name from any transaction. Joselito and his Chinese associates

138
systematically transformed the bare land into a thriving hotbed of shabu. Dante stood watch as
the laboratory efficiently yielded gallons and gallons of shabu. Dante dutifully reported the day's
produce to P/Supt. Borromeo. SPO1 Abang, on the other hand, closely monitored Dante. Every
time they would meet in the RMG headquarters, SPO1 Abang always inquired about the activities
of Dante as caretaker of the Upper Bimmotobot laboratory. He once remarked to Dante that his
job was easy, and he will kill him if he does not do his job. SPO1 Abang had once visited the
laboratory himself.

During the surprise inspection on July 8, Dante, after taking some phone calls, approached
Police Chief Inspector Erwin Dayag (PC/Insp. Dayag) and SPO1 Alan S. Banana and offered them
P20,000,000.00 to instantly desist from the inspection. When PC/Insp. Dayag asked Dante to
produce a firearm the latter claimed to possess, Dante talked first with someone on the phone,
and then remarked to PC/Insp. Dayag said that he knew Colonel Borromeo. He then told the caller
that his gun was being seized from him by police officers. The police officers traced the numbers
Dante called on that day to P/Supt. Borromeo. When the police returned with a search warrant on
July 9, Dante again called P/Supt. Borromeo and asked him what he should do. P/Supt. Borromeo
advised Dante to make a run for it.

In an Information, P/Supt. Borromeo acted as protector/coddler, Dante and Andy acted as

caretakers, Goerge acted as financier and several John Does as chemists, were accused of violating
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in relation to Section 26(d), Article II of the same law. The
RTC held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the existence of conspiracy to
manufacture dangerous drugs. That P/Supt. Borromeo, as co-conspirator, played a key role based
on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As to SPO1 Abang, the trial court held him liable as
protector or coddler as he was merely acting on orders given to him by his superior, P/Supt.
Borromeo, in furtherance of the latter's role and interest in the conspiracy. When the case was
appealed to the CA, the findings of the RTC were affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused conspired with the establishment and operation of the
clandestine shabu laboratory.

RULING:

YES. Borromeo played a key role in the conspiracy. It was him who initially ordered
Palaganas to scout for a lot where a piggery could be put up. He personally checked the places found
by Palaganas and rejected those that were earlier shown by Palaganas for being near populated

139
areas. He also directed Palaganas to contact Artuz so that the latter could inspect the places that
were scouted. Artuz arrived on two separate occasions to inspect the scouted places. The first was
when the (sic) inspected the lot found by Palaganas near the cockpit arena of Naguilian in the
company of Chinese nationals which he eventually rejected because there were houses nearby. The
second when Palaganas found the lot in Upper Bimmotobot which he described as "beautiful" and
Artuz with Chinese companions arrived for an ocular inspection. The lot at Upper Bimmotobot was
finally approved by Artuz and after the execution of a Memorandum of Agreement between the
owner Eusebio Tangalin and Palaganas who represented Artuz. The lot was improved, and
constructions were introduced thereon with the money provided by Artuz. Later, the place became
the site of the Bimmotobot Clandestine Shabu Laboratory. All these activities were monitored by
Borromeo, through Palaganas who was reporting to him regularly.

When the Shabu laboratory was already operating, Palaganas regularly reported to
Borromeo about the operation. The results of the cooking sessions of the chemicals by the Chinese
men, particularly the number of containers of cooked chemicals, were reported periodically by
Palaganas to Borromeo. After each cooking session, the cooked chemicals placed inside the
containers were brought to Cesmin Beach Resort and eventually to Manila, by the men of Artuz.
Thereafter, Artuz paid Palaganas fat sums of money as reward.

When the inspection of the place was conducted by the team from the municipal government
of Naguilian, Palaganas was in contact with Borromeo through cellphone and even name dropped
him, when PCI Dayag asked him where his firearm was. Likewise, when Search Warrant No. 2008-08
was being implemented, Palaganas also talked with Borromeo through cell phone. The cell phone
conversations were registered in the simpacks of the cellphone of Palaganas which were later
transcripted (Exhibit "MMM") by PCI Lizardo and IO3 Azurin and the CIDG, which showed the
telephone number of Borromeo - 09209180208 as confirmed by the Telephone Directory of PNP PRO
1 (Exhibit "BBB" and sub-markings). Incidentally, when Borromeo testified in Court, he admitted
that the aforesaid number (09209180208) belongs to him.

On the basis of the foregoing and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, there is no iota of
doubt that Borromeo is a co-conspirator under the provisions of Section 8, in relation to Section
26(d), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

140
REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Florentino Labuguen Francisco and Romeo Zuñiga Pilarta

G.R. No. 223103, August 4, 2020

Hernando, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is conspiracy when it is shown that the malefactors acted in concert in order
to achieve their common purpose.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with robbery with homicide of Manuel Padre, Nenita
Padre, and Rhoda Padre and frustrated homicide of Rachel Padre. The Prosecution alleged that on
3 January 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, the Padre family composed of Manuel, Nenita,
Rhoda, and Rachel Padre were having dinner at their home at Villaruz, Isabela, five men suddenly
barged in. These five men were composed of the accused-appellants: Labuguen, Zuñiga,
Macalinao (who is at large), and two other assailants (who are to be identified) robbed the Padre
family of cash amounting to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000) and willfully killed Manuel,
Nenita (by stabbing them), and Rhoda Padre (by shooting her) in the process. Rachel, the lone
survivor, was able to escape despite being stabbed and strangled by Labuguen by pretending to
be dead and running to her neighbor, who helped the same, when she had the chance. On the
belief that all members of the Pedro family were dead, the group proceeded to Joel Albano’s house
where they divided the loot.

During the investigation, Rachel was able to identify Labuguen, being their longtime
neighbor, Macalinao, one of their helpers, and Zuñiga, a longtime customer, as their assailants.
Forensic evidence also corroborated Rachel’s story.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied the allegations. RTC and CA convicted them
of the charges, hence, this appeal.

The accused-appellants argue that the RTC and CA failed to consider the exempting
circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear in favor of Zuñiga as he avers that he
was compelled at gunpoint by Albano with the threat that if he did not cooperate, something bad
will happen to his family. They also argue that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.

141
ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy was present.

RULING:

YES, conspiracy was present. As pointedly noted by the RTC and CA, it was shown that the
acted in concert in order to achieve their common purpose. They met at the designated place, went
together to the victims’ house wearing bonnets and masks while armed with a gun and thereafter
went to Albano’s house to divide the loot.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is affirmed and modified to guilty of robbery with homicide.

142
REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo “Jerry” Pigar Ambayanan and Reynaldo “Lawlaw”
Pigar Codilla

G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Indeed, one who participates in the
material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual perpetrator,
especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with murder of Feliciano S. Garces with attending

aggravating and qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength. The Prosecution alleged that on August 17, 2009 at around 6 o’ clock in the
evening, Edgardo Garces, son of the victim, had an altercation with Roy Pigar, brother of one of
the accused-appellants. They were pacified by a certain Gagante. After the incident, Edgardo went
home to warn his family of a probable revenge that Roy might take as he was drunk at that time.
The former even asked his sister, who was tending to her children inside their home, to move to
their hut just across the street in fear of said probable revenge. The victim, Feliciano, was sleeping
then in the room so he was left in the said house when Edgardo went to his uncle to seek help.
Subsequently, Roy did arrive with two other people and threw stones at their house, the victim
was roused and even shouted at them. However, not long after, 10 more men arrived and
surrounded the house, including the accused-appellants “Lawlaw” and “Jerry”. The victim then
ran back to his house only to be chased after by some of the men who hacked him in bolos. In a
desperate attempt to escape, the victim ran out only to be met by the other men who also hacked
him with bolos and stabbed him with bamboo spears. At this juncture, Edgardo arrived, and a gun
shot was heard which made the suspects including the accused-appellants leave the area. The
victim then died with 17 stab wounds in his body. Only the accused-appellants were arrested and
a Buenaventura Pigar who passed away during the trial.

The Defense, on the other hand, averred that they passed by the victim’s house on August 17,
2009 when the victim suddenly hacked “Jerry” with a weapon to which the latter sustained

143
wounds. He then managed to get a hold of the victim’s weapon and used it on the latter while his
other companions helped hitting the same with pieces of wood. “Jerry” also testified that “Lawlaw”
did not perpetrate the incident which the latter corroborated.

The RTC found both accused-appellants guilty of murder with qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and one ordinary aggravating circumstance of domicile. This was
sustained by CA, hence the appeal. The accused-appellants argue that the CA erred in affirming
their conviction stating that Lawlaw did not participate in the commission of crime and that CA
and RTC were wrong for appreciating both treachery and abuse of superior strength as it is
settled that if they concur, the latter is absorbed by the former.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conspiracy was present.

RULING:

YES, conspiracy was present. As for the participation of “Lawlaw”, his mere denial will not
supersede the positive identification of the witnesses. In any case, it does not really matter whether
“Lawlaw” actually caused one or more of the fatal or not so fatal wounds sustained by the victim as
the appellants and co-accused have conspired to kill the victim. In conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent
as the actual perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime.

144
REQUISITES OF CONSPIRACY

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Solamillo Amago & Cerilo Blongaita Vendiola, Jr.

G.R. No. 227739, January 22, 2020

Peralta, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It can be proven by
evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are
indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with illegal transportation of dangerous drugs,

specifically, violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The Prosecution alleges that at around
8:30 am on September 5, 2013, PO2 Larena, on duty at the Dumaguete City Police Station, and
Pinero, a civilian contractual employee of the City of Dumaguete, were manning a police
checkpoint along the South National Highway. That at around 9:45 am on that same day, the
accused-appellants, Amago and Vendiola, were seen on board a motorcycle. However, before
reaching the checkpoint, Amago instead did a U-turn and went back to PO2 Larena’s direction
which prompted her to walk to the middle of the road while Pinero drove his to motorcycle to
block the two motorists.

However prior reaching PO2 Larena, Amago intentionally slumped down his motorcycle
which lifted his shirt and exposed a gun tucked in his waistband. This caused PO2 Larena to ask
for the necessary permit and license for the possession of the gun, which the latter did not have.
This led to his arrest. On the other hand, Pinero noticed a protruding knife from Vendiola which
also led to his arrest. Incidental to the arrest, PO2 Larena conducted search on the persons of
both accused-appellants which lead to the confiscation of drug paraphernalia and a search on the
utility box which lead to the discovery of one peppermint gum container containing six elongated
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline granules which later on was
tested positively as shabu. Both were apprised of their constitutional rights and were taken, while
all confiscated items were properly inventoried, packed, and labelled.

145
 The Defense, however, alleged that they were merely set up by the police. In their appeal
they argued that the Prosecution failed to prove presence of conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecution proved that there was conspiracy between the two
accused-appellants.

RULING:

NO. It was settled in People vs Labaho that conspiracy is said to exist where two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It can
be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative
of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.

The evidence show that the chain of circumstances necessarily leads to the conclusion that
there was concerted action between accused-appellants, with the objective of transporting illegal
drugs.

Wherefore, the accused-appellants’ conviction is sustained.

146
 CHAPTER TWO

Justifying Circumstances and Circumstances which Exempt from Criminal Liability

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives
by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next
preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are
present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage
to another, provided that the following requisites are present:
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.

147
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
Petronilo Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense and, hence,
admits to killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. The rationale for this
shift is that he accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he
satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense.

FACTS:

On September 22, 1992 at about 8:00pm, Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita arrived at
the house of the former’s balae, Jocelyn Janioso, calling out for help. When Janioso came out of her
house, she saw Salvador whose forehead was oozing with blood, and Calib Napone likewise
bloodied on the face, mud-laden, and trying to extricate himself from Salvador who held him by
the back collar of his shirt. Calib is the son of Petronilo Napone Sr. and the brother of Petronilo
Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone. When Janioso asked what happened, Salvador replied that Calib
waylaid him and struck him with an iron bar while he and Robert were on their way home from
their farm. Thereafter, Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring
Salvador and Calib to the hospital. After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further
conflict, Janioso pulled Salvador inside her house but Petronilo Sr. followed them and
immediately hacked Salvador from behind using a big bolo, hitting Salvador at the back of his
head. Salvador, in retaliation, also hacked Petronilo Sr. Meanwhile, Edgar and Petronilo Jr. also
alighted from the vehicle. Edgar threw a fist-sized stone at Salvador. Petronilo Jr. then shot
Salvador 3 times with a small firearm, hitting the latter on the chest which caused him to fall. At
the hospital, Salvador was pronounced dead.

On the other hand, the Napones alleged that they acted in self-defense and in defense of a
relative. They alleged that on the date of the incident, while Petronilo Sr., Petronilo Jr. and Edgar
were in their house, a certain Ervin Tagocon came and told them that he saw Calib bloodied and
dragged by Salvador and Robert to the house of Janioso. Upon hearing the news, Petronilo Jr.
hurriedly ran towards Janioso's house, while Edgar and Petronilo Sr. immediately followed. Before
running to Calib's aid, Petronilo Sr. got hold of his bolo because he suspected that the Espelitas
had hacked Calib. Upon arriving at Janioso's place, the Napones saw Calib bloodied and being held
by the Espelitas who, upon seeing them coming, dropped Calib, who was then prostrate and

148
unconscious. The Espelitas then went inside the fenced premises of Janioso's house. When
Petronilo Sr. attempted to lift Calib from the ground, Salvador rushed towards him and hacked
him with a bolo multiple time. Unable to retaliate because he was lifting Calib, he parried the
attacks with his left hand but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Petronilo Sr. fell to the ground and lost
consciousness. Edgar tried to defend his father from Salvador by throwing a stone at the latter.
Because of this, Salvador shifted his attention towards Edgar and chased him with a bolo.
Meanwhile, Petronilo Jr. was about to rush to his father’s aid when he was alerted that Robert was
aiming a firearm at him. He wrestled with Robert for the possession of the firearm. When he got
hold of the firearm, Robert allegedly shouted, "watch out, my firearm was taken" and ran away.
Salvador stopped chasing after Edgar, turned to Petronilo Jr., and hacked him three 3 times.
Petronilo Jr. fell to the ground facing down and while Salvador is still behind him, he crawled
away from his assailant. When he stood up and saw that Salvador was still coming after him, he
fired his gun at Salvador. Despite the first shot, Salvador kept advancing towards him; thus, he
again shot at Salvador hitting him in the chest. Thereafter, he took Petronilo Sr. and Calib to the
provincial hospital for treatment. Then, Petronilo Jr. surrendered to the authorities but the
firearm he used to shoot Salvador was never recovered.

The RTC found Petronilo Jr. and Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. It rejected the Napones’ claim of self-defense and in defense of a relative ratiocinating
that they failed to establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Salvador. It further
ruled that: a) a conspiracy among the Napones existed as shown by their successive attacks on
Salvador; and b) no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the felony. However, the RTC
ordered the dismissal of the case against Petronilo Sr. due to his death a month after he
completed his testimony.

On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTC regarding the appreciation of modifying
circumstance. While it conceded that no aggravating circumstance attended the killing of Salvador,
it opined that the RTC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It observed that the unfortunate incident occurred at the "spur of the moment" and because of
the Napones' "impulse reaction" upon seeing Calib wounded and lying on the ground. Likewise,
the CA ruled that conspiracy could not be appreciated considering that the incident happened at
"the spur of the moment." Thus, the CA reduced Edgar's liability to that of a mere accomplice
reasoning that his participation in throwing a stone at Salvador during the incident, while
showing community of criminal design, was otherwise not indispensable to the commission of
the felony.

ISSUE:

149
 Whether or not the killing of Salvador was attended by justifying circumstances of self-
defense and defense of relatives.

RULING:

NO, the killing of Salvador was not attended by justifying circumstances of self-defense and
defense of a relative. In both self-defense and defense of relatives, whether complete or incomplete, it
is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. After all, there would be
nothing to prevent or repel if such unlawful aggression is not present. For unlawful aggression to be
appreciated there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish
that the Napones, and not the Espelitas, were the actual unlawful aggressors. According to Petronilo
Sr.’s statement, he armed himself with a bolo and was ready to use it against the Espelitas making
them his specific targets because of his belief that they were his son's assailants. At this juncture, the
fact that Calib was seen lying on the ground is not the unlawful aggression required under the law. It
was established during trial that any attack on the person of Calib by the Espelitas, if there was any,
had already ceased at the time the Napones arrived. No actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life or limb of Calib, therefore, could justify Petronilo Sr.’s attack on
Salvador. With respect to the actual shooting of Salvador, the prosecution witnesses’ positive and
categorical statements that the Napones assaulted Salvador without any unlawful aggression on his
part prevail over the claim of self-defense and defense of relative which were unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing proof. Therefore, the SC sees no reason to disturb the RTC and CA’s findings that
the killing of Salvador was not attended by any justifying circumstance.

150
SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF RELATIVES: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velasquez vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense." Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the
third "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the
defense had no part therein."

FACTS:

On May 24, 2003 at about 10:00pm, spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo left their home to
sleep in their nipa house which was about 100 meters away. Upon arriving at the nipa house, they
saw Ampong and Nora having sexual intercourse. Jesus shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora,
who scampered away. Jesus decided to pursue them. He failed to catch them, so he started making
his way back. On his way back he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused.

Without provocation, Ampong and his fellow accused began hitting Jesus with a stone, a
bamboo, and even punched him on his cheek. Jesus was left on the ground, bloodied. Jesus
crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that they might return.

A doctor noted that Jesus’ injuries required medical attention for four to six weeks. Jesus
was also advised to undergo surgery. However, he was not able to do so due to shortage of funds.

ISSUE:

Are the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code applicable?

151
RULING:

NO. Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by
barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical
harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from
Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires,

petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared out
of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent and
credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious
that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no apparent reason.

152
FACTS WHICH SHOW SELF-DEFENSE

Danilo Remegio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under the law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the act committed is
in defense of his person.

FACTS:

An information charged Remegio with homicide for fatally shooting Felix Sumugat.
Remegio, a caretaker of his brother-in-law’s property, approached Sumugat to tell him to stop
cutting an ipil-ipil tree with a chainsaw, but the latter told Remegio “You have nothing to do with
this. You are only an in-law. I will kill you.” Sumugat continued to cut the tree despite Remegio’s
instruction to just cut off the branches, prompting the latter to wrest a gun from the former to
shoot him in the chest. Before dying, Sumugat swung the chainsaw, hitting petitioner in the palm
and causing the latter to throw the gun to a canal. Petitioner interposes self-defense as he had to
shoot him because Sumugat swung the chainsaw.

The RTC found him guilty as it found his act of telling the victim to stop cutting the tree
was provocation on his part. The CA affirmed the conviction, finding the element of unlawful
aggression part.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

RULING:

YES. For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements as provided under the first paragraph, Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful

153
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

There was an unlawful aggression on the part of Sumugat when the latter told Remegio he
was merely in-law and that Sumugat will kill him. Sumugat also aimed a gun at him and continued
to thrust the chainsaw at Remegio.

The means employed was reasonable, as petitioner had the gun available to him while
Sumugat continuously swung the chainsaw at him. Further, Remegio only shot Sumugat when the
latter continued to attack him with the chainsaw.

Petitioner’s act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree did not amount
to sufficient provocation.

154
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Estrillo Escobal y Salvacion and Melvin E. Abano

G.R. No. 206292, October 11, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element in self-defense.

FACTS:

SPO1 Fernando Gaabucayan was shot dead while walking from his house going to the
población. One of the witness stated that he saw the victim talking with accused Salvacion while
Abano is at the back when he heard gun shots which caused him to stay down. When he looked
up towards the direction of the gunshots, he saw Gaabucayan lying flat on the ground face up,
while accusedappellant Escobal was standing at the footside of Gaabucayan holding a nickel-
plated gun pointed at the latter with accused-appellant Abafio standing beside accused-appellant
Escobal facing the left shoulder of Gaabucayan in a position of pointing a gun. On the other hand,
the accused stated that a person shot them while they are walking and due to the gun shots he
retaliated and allegedly grab the pistol of Abano and returned fire causing the death of the victim.
Now the accused raised that he acted in self-defense and that there is no conspiracy established.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exist a justifying circumstance of self-defense.

RULING:

NO, the accused in pleading self-defense has the burden of proving the elements of self-
defense, indispensable of which is unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. The accused did
not prove that there is unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased and relied only to the fact
that the gun of the victim was shot four times. Thus, by raising the self-defense, the accused admit
the crime and has the burden to prove that the same was justified.

155
BURDEN OF PROOF IN INVOKING SELF DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Demetrio Sabida y Sadiwa

G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the accused assumed the
burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. He is
required to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence.

FACTS:

While Pimentel and Mawac were on their way to work, Sabida unexpectedly emerged from
the road and stabbed Mawac with a bolo, while Pimentel ran away. Sabida tried to chase Pimentel
but he failed to catch the latter. Pimentel reported the incident to the police station. Sabida was
arrested on the same day. Sabida admitted killing Mawac but invoked self-defense, contending
that he received accusations from Mawac that his domestic animals are destroying Mawac’s crops
to which the latter retaliated and poisoned his domestic animals. He said that on the day of the
incident, he approached Pimentel and Mawac to ask why Mawac was intending to kill him and
where his missing chickens were. He also said that Mawac tried to draw out a bolo from his waist
and Sabida merely defended himself and they struggled and fought each other.

The RTC convicted Sabida of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Upon review by
the CA, it affirmed the RTC decision. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sabida is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

156
 YES. In attempting to escape liability, Sabida invokes self-defense. Upon invoking the
justifying circumstance of self-defense, Sabida assumed the burden of proving the justification of his
act with clear and convincing evidence. Having admitted the killing, Sabida is required to rely on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, which even if it were
weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission.

Here, it is indisputable that Sabida failed to show that Mawac exhibited unlawful aggression
against him. Being the party initiating the attack and armed with a deadly weapon, Sabida cannot
successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Sabida's self-serving claim of self-defense
coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injury from his supposed attacker fails to support
any claim of unlawful aggression. The trial court aptly noted that there was no clear and credible
evidence that Mawac was the one who instigated the fight and that Sabida was merely fending off
an attack.

Thus, Sabida's conviction for the crime of murder must stand.

157
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Paul Duran

G.R. No. 215748, November 20, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. Without unlawful

aggression, self-defense cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present.

FACTS:

In 2012, the RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. During
trial, Duran invoked self-defense. However, the Court was convinced that there was no unlawful
aggression. Assuming that Grimaldo and his unidentified companion really tried to hold-up Duran,
the latter's testimony shows that the aggression had already ceased when Duran was able to
successfully take the gun from the possession of Grimaldo. Having now the possession of the gun,
there was obviously no reason for him to shoot the victim successively because the unlawful
aggression from the victim has stopped.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Duran acted in self-defense in killing Grimaldo.

RULING:

NO. An accused who pleads self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime.
The burden of proving self-defense rests on the accused. He must prove by clear and convincing
evidence the concurrence of the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or at least any provocation

158
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim's aggression.

The Court agrees with the RTC and CA that Duran was unable to prove the presence of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Even if Duran's account of an attempted robbery
against him is to be believed, his testimony also shows that Grimaldo, albeit the initial aggressor,
ceased to be the aggressor as Duran had successfully wrested the weapon from him. Thereafter,
Duran shot the gun at Grimaldo four times; three of which hit Grimaldo on vital parts of his body. At
this moment, actions of the accused were already done in retaliation and not self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression initiated by the victim had already ceased when the accused attacked him;
in self-defense, the aggression from the victim is continuing.

159
FACTS WHICH SHOW SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Gio Cosgafa, et al.

G.R. No. 218250, July 10, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to fabricate. Thus,
it must be proven by satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. The following elements must
thus be proved by clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

FACTS:

At around 6:30 P.M., brothers Ronald and Rosbill, Panfilo, a certain Joseph and Bryan were
at the victim’s house for fiesta. After dinner, they finished half a gallon of Bahalina, an aged native
coco-wine. At around 1:00 AM the following day, the group decided to go to the disco held at a
nearby school. On their way thereto, the group stopped by a sari-sari store owned by retired
police officer Lapiz to talk to a certain person who called the victim. While waiting, Rosbill, Joseph
and Panifilo proceeded to the bridge, about 7 meters away, and sat on the railings across them.
Suddenly, Gio approached Rosbill and tried to boxhim but he did not connect. Rosbill, Joseph, and
Panfilo then ran back to where they left the rest of the group and told them what happened. Upon
learning what happened, the victim proceeded to the bridge to confront Gio. When he got there,
accused-appellants took turns in holding and stabbing the victim. When the victim fell on the
ground, the accused-appellants ran away. Seeing that the accused-appellants had deadly weapons
and they had none, the victim’s group failed to come to his rescue. The victim was then brought to
the hospital but was declared dead therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gio and Jimmy may properly invoke self-defense.

160
RULING:

YES. It bears stressing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy
to fabricate. Thus, it must be proven by satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any
vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. The following elements must
thus be proved by clear and convincing evidence, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity on the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

After a careful review of this case, the Court ruled that the above-enumerated elements are
not present in this case. In this case, accused-appellants’ self-serving assertion that the victim was
the aggressor when the latter, without provocation on their part, chased them and held Jimmy’s shirt
and kicked him until he fell on the ground, cannot prevail over the positive and consistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, found credible by the RTC and the CA, as to what
transpired.

Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retailiation, the aggression that was begun by
the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense, the
aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.

From the foregoing, Gio and Jimmy’s self-defense plea necessary fails.

161
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Edilberto Norada y Harder, Agustin Seva y Lacbanes and
Eugene Villanueva y Canales

G.R. No. 218958, Dec. 13, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial

element, a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense and defense of strangers are unavailing because there would be
nothing to repel.

FACTS:

Eugene Villanueva y Cañales was convicted of the complex crime of attempted kidnapping
with murder. The antecedent facts based on the testimony of the accused, declared that he and
Agustin Seva for some time, have been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in Bacolod
City. This plan however materializes as they have no money to fund the operation. Later, in 2003,
he met Eugene Villanueva. Eugene Villanueva revealed that he is a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a
schoolteacher at the town of Valladolid. Reggie Pacil has a friend, a Canadian national named Ray
Truck. The three (3) of them, namely, himself, Agustin Seva and Eugene Villanueva, made a plan to
kidnap Ray Truc, a wealthy canadian man.On the day of the execution of the plan Accused
Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in Valladolid but only Reggie
Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The non-appearance of
Ray Truck made them change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil as they were
convinced that Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release.

In the early morning of the following day Norada said that Villanueva woke him up and
told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil but somehow, he woke up and
resisted. Norada said that he hit Pacil [on] the head with a piece of wood. Pacil was rendered
unconscious only briefly and he again struggled. Norada hit him again and this time Pacil stayed
motionless but snoring. Then Seva taped the mouth of Pacil while he and Villanueva tied his
hands and feet. They wrapped Pacil in a blanket and loaded him into the car. Not knowing that
Pacil was already dead.

162
 During trial the accused argued that they acted on self defense. RTC finds the three guilty
of the complex crime of Attempted Kidnapping with Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not self defense may be considered in the case at bar.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that before the plea of self-defense may by appreciated,
appellant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following indispensable elements: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant. "In self-defense
and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If
no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers
are unavailing because there would be nothing to repel. The courts below correctly found that
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
Both the RTC and the CA, held that his version of the event was not only uncorroborated but crude
and clumsy prevarication. The Court agreed that appellant's evidence relative to unlawful
aggression fell far short of being "clear and convincing."

163
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Augusto F. Gallanosa, Jr.

G.R. No. 219885, July 17, 2017

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming
self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and
imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense.

FACTS:

In 2014, accused Augusto Gallanosa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
murder of Nonilon and Dante. On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder despite proof of self-defense on his part. The Court of Appeals found
material inconsistencies and implausibilities in the testimonies of appellant and the defense
witnesses which render the defense not credible. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found
more credible the prosecution witnesses, whose testimonies were consistent on material points.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant was able to prove self-defense to acquit him in the two
counts of murder.

RULING:

NO. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, appellant failed to prove self-defense
in both cases. Compared with the testimonies of the defense witnesses which were marked with
inconsistencies, both the trial court and the appellate court found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses more credible, convincing, and consistent on material points. In Criminal Case No. 1631,

164
Nonilon, who was already kneeling with his hands raised, was quite helpless when appellant started
stabbing him. At that moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which
amounts to actual or imminent threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of unlawful
aggression is already lacking in this case. Appellant's claim that Nonilon tried to stab him first with
a knife was belied by the testimony of another defense witness who stated that Nonilon was armed
only with a piece of wood which he picked up while running after appellant.

In Criminal Case No. 1632, Appellant's testimony that he "accidentally stabbed" Dante is
incongruent with his claim of self-defense. Unlawful aggression, as an essential and primary element
of self-defense, must be real and imminent and not merely speculative. Other than the claim of some
of the defense witnesses that Dante was armed with a knife, which was denied by the prosecution
witnesses, the defense failed to prove that Dante tried to stab appellant and his father.

165
SELF DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

PO1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 220977, June 19, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a

statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with which he
is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged.

FACTS:

A robbery incident was reported to Police Station 9 (PS-9) of the Manila Police District.
After conducting a manhunt operation, two suspects (Martin and Leopoldo) were arrested. While
at the police station, Martin requested to remove his handcuffs to answer the call of nature. After
PO2 De Leon removed his handcuffs, Martin suddenly grabbed his service firearm. Petitioner by
helping PO2 De Leon fired his gun twice and hit Martin on the chest.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide for Martin's death before the RTC of
Manila. The prosecution presented Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot who testified that Martin had
various injuries that could have been caused by forceful contact with hard, blunt objects.

On the other hand, PO2 De Leon initially took the witness stand for his direct examination.
However, he was not able to complete his testimony prompting the RTC to order his direct
testimony to be stricken off the records.

RTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that all the elements of justifying circumstance
of defense of a stranger are present in this case. While CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction for the crime of
homicide.

166
RULING:

NO. It further noted that in his Appellant's Brief, the petitioner relied on the "defense of a
stranger" as justification for his act. Thus, the CA concluded that the petitioner admitted that he
killed the victim.

However, the fact that the petitioner may have admitted shooting Martin in the said
documents does not necessarily establish his guilt for the crime charged. An admission of fact is
starkly different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt. In People of the Philippines vs.
Buntag, the Court elucidated that:

In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but

a statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly
involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths
charged. It is an acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself,
is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the
ultimate facts of guilt. A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in
express terms, of his guilt of the crime charged.

The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila for a new trial for the purpose of
allowing Police Officer 1 Celso Tabobo III y Ebid to present evidence in his defense with directive to
the court thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed.

167
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEFENSE OF A STRANGER

Ryan Mariano y Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224102, July 26, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be

shown that there was an unlawful aggression the part of the victim, that the means
employed to repel the victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mariano was charged with Frustrated Homicide. The prosecution argued that
accused assault and stab one Frederick Natividad, inflicting upon him serious physical injuries,
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or causes due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said complainant. On the otherhand, the accused claimed that he acted in
self-defense and in defense of a relative. He alleged that when he went to his mother in law’s
house, he saw the victim hurting Yuki and Pia, and immediately told his mother-in-law and
Pamela. Pamela then confronted Natividad, who then punched Pamela on the face and shoulder.
Mariano pushed Natividad to the ground. Natividad stood back up and got a piece of wood and
kept hitting Mariano. Petitioner Mariano evaded Natividad's blows because Natividad was drunk
and staggering. Mariano picked up a knife and stabbed Natividad on his buttocks. Due to
Natividad's continuous hitting, Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time on the right side of his
body.

The RTC convicted Mariano, guilty of frustrated homicide. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court

ISSUE:

168
 Whether or not the Justifying Circumstance of defense of stranger may be appreciated in
the case.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme court ruled to grant the petition of the defendant by upholding that To
properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the victim were
reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive. Furthermore, it is significant that Natividad did not deny attacking Pamela or Pia, as he
could not remember these acts. An attack showing the aggressor's intention is enough to consider
that unlawful aggression was committed. Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered
as unlawful aggression for purposes of invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.
Finally, petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The victim himself,
Natividad, testified that he had no issues with the petitioner before the incident. Thus, all the
elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were present in this case.

169
SELF-DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Roderick Ramelo

G.R. No. 224888, November 22, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that when the accused pleads self-defense and effectively admits that he
killed the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must, therefore, rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. It
becomes incumbent upon him to prove his innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS:

At around 1:55 AM, Nelson was standing outside the basketball court which was then
being used as a venue for a dancing or disco event, when Ramelo suddenly appeared before him
and stabbed him. When the barangay tanod saw what happened, he immediately confronted the
assailant and confiscated the knife used. Ramelo, however, was able to run away. Nelson was
brought to the hospital for immediate medical treatment but unfortunately died due to the stab
that perforated his stomach which caused massive bleeding.

In his defense, Ramelo testified that while he was smoking at the store near the dancing
hall, Nelson, who appeared to be drunk, approached him, strangled him and pulled him towards
the dance area. He was then manhandled by Nelson and his three companions who rushed
towards them. The assault continued even after Ramelo fell to the ground. Nelson also tried to
smash Ramelo’s head with a stone, but the latter was able to evade it. Ramelo claims that Nelson,
who he admitted being taller and bulkier than him, sat on his abdomen and proceeded to hit him
on his face while his companions hit and kicked his legs. Fearing that they intended to kill him, he
further avers that to get his knife tucked in his right shoe, he parried Nelson's punches with his
left hand, reached for the knife with his right hand, and then stabbed Nelson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramelo may properly invoke self-defense.

170
RULING:

NO. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove that: (1) the
victim mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by the
accused to repel or prevent the aggression were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did
not offer any sufficient provocation. The most important of these elements in unlawful aggression
because without it, there could be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.

It is clear that prior to the stabbing incident, an altercation ensued between Nelson and
Ramelo. However, the confrontation ceased due to Pilapil's intervention. Ramelo even apologized to
Nelson after they were separated. Evidently, any unlawful aggression which Nelson may have
perpetrated had effectively terminated. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer
exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.

171
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Nestor M. Bugarin

G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

To prove that he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following with clear
and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on his part. One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the
name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned elements. While all
three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense
may be successfully pleaded.

FACTS:

On the evening of May 30, 2008, the spouses Esmeraldo and Maria Glen were on their way
to the house of their father, Cristito, which was likewise near the house of the Bugarins. When
they were close to the house of the Bugarins, Esmeraldo's sister, Anecita, then started throwing
gravel and sand at them. Esmeraldo asked her to stop but she refused to listen. Thereafter,
Bugarin came out of their house and suddenly shot Esmeraldo several times. Esmeraldo
sustained two gunshot wounds in the back and one in his left side, which later took his life. Maria
Glen immediately ran and hid behind a parked car to save herself. She then saw her father-in-law,
Cristito, running out of his house towards Esmeraldo's direction. Cristito raised his hands and
begged Bugarin to stop shooting. But Bugarin also shot him, causing his death.

ISSUE:

Is self-defense as a justifying circumstance present?

RULING:

172
 NO. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes
only if satisfactorily proved. Having admitted the shooting of the victims, the burden shifted to
Bugarin to prove that he indeed acted in self-defense by establishing the following with clear and
convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on his
part. Bugarin, however, miserably failed to discharge this burden. One who admits killing or fatally
injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned
elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense
may be successfully pleaded. Contrary to his claims, the evidence of the case shows that there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims.

173
SELF-DEFENSE AS A JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Raytos y Espino

G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

To exonerate oneself, the accused must establish: (1) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression
were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the
three, unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated.

FACTS:

It was just a day after their barangay fiesta. Raytos, the accused, and ten other occupying
three tables were having dance session in front of his house. At around 11:30 in the evening,
Araza arrived and was approached by Edgar, and the two danced. After some time, Araza
approached Anita, and invited her to dance, but the latter refused, after which he simply returned
dancing. After dancing, Araza approached the table where Raytos were seated and asked who was
brave enough while drawing a knife tucked in his waistband. At the sight of such, Raytos tried to
escape by moving backwards, while doing so he got hold of Araza’s right hand and was able to
twist the same. Raytos got hold of the knife and stabbed Araza three times on the chest. He ran
away immediately and surrender himself to the barangay officials.

ISSUE:

Is self-defense as a justifying circumstance applicable in the case?

RULING:

NO. To exonerate himself, the accused must establish: (1) that there was unlawful aggression
by the victim; (2i) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable;

174
and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is
the foremost requirement; absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated.

Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense easy to concoct. Testimonial evidence, to be believable,

must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible following
common experience and leading to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. Here, it
is difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of
Araza's hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick
succession. It is evident that no unlawful aggression can be deduced. Stated differently, there was
clearly no imminent danger on the person of Raytos as would justify his killing Araza.

175
SELF DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Tuardon y Rosalia

G.R. No. 225644, March 1, 2017

Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

Any person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal
liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

FACTS:

At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening, Dagunan asked Flores to accompany him to the
comfort room in the public plaza. While Flores was following Dagunan to the comfort room,
Tuardon suddenly rushed in between them. When Dagunan was standing at the main door of the
comfort room and in the act of urinating, he was shot by Tuardon, who was situated at the right
side and immediately behind the former. Dagunan was hit at the base of his head causing him to
fall to the ground. Upon witnessing what transpired, Flores said "Oh." Tuardon, upon noticing
Flores, shot him in the chest, which caused him to fall to the ground. Then, Tuardon hurriedly left
the place.

Tuardon was arrested by SPO2 Gemoto. Both victims were brought to the Gumersindo
Garcia Memorial Hospital in Kabankalan City where Dagunan was pronounced dead. Flores,
meanwhile, was transferred to Bacolod Provincial Hospital where he was confined and treated

The defense claimed that Tuardon acted in self-defense. While at the comfort room
Dagunan started to be pissed off and Tuardon drew his own gun and shot Dagunan once. Tuardon
then went out and tucked his gun. Thereafter, Flores came rushing towards him so Tuardon drew
his gun again and shot him. After shooting Flores, he found himself shocked that he had shot
someone while Dimaala denied the charges against him.

ISSUE:

176
 Whether or not Tuardon acted in self-defense.

RULING:

NO. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence
of all of its elements. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), any person who acts in
defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The most important of the three is the element of unlawful aggression because without it, there
could be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

As can be gleaned from the records, Tuardon failed to discharge this burden. The Court
concurs with the trial court's assessment that Tuardon's claim of self-defense could not be given any
credence.

177
SELF DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Daroya

G.R. No. 229502, November 22, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an

unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused
cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.

FACTS:

In the evening of October 19, 2002, Ceralde, who was then ferrying his pedicab along
Bonuan-Gueset, Dagupan City, saw Daroya suddenly appear. Ceralde noticed that Daroya’s left
hand was holding a piece of metal wrapped with a towel. Thereafter, Daroya suddenly punched
Rolando, which caused the latter to fall down. Daroya then continued to punch Rolando using his
left hand. Rolando was not able to fight back. Thereafter, Daroya immediately ran away. Rolando
then fell down facing the ground. After Daroya left, Ceralde and the other pedicab drivers brought
Rolando to the hospital where he subsequently died.

On the other hand, Daroya admitted that he punched Rolando, but claimed that he did so
in self-defense. He maintained that it was Rolando who started the fight. He claimed that on the
date of the incident, at around 8:00 PM, he was riding his pedicab waiting for passengers in the
corner of Bonuan-Gueset; that he was the first in line of about 80 pedicab drivers while Rolando
was at the end of the line. Daroya averred that when the passengers were already coming,
Rolando suddenly parked his pedicab in front of the line. Daroya and Rolando then fought on who
among them should be the first in line. Daroya alleged that he punched Rolando three or four
times and immediately went home after seeing Rolando fell on the ground.

Daroya was charged for murder on the ground that the killing was made with treachery by
the sudden punches of Daroya.

ISSUE:

178
 Whether or not Daroya may invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

RULING:

NO. By invoking self-defense, Daroya admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the
death of Rolando. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted
his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal
liability.

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-
defense as a justifying circumstance. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety
of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly,
the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (1)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (2) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at
least, imminent; and (3) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Daroya failed to establish the foregoing circumstances. There exists no evidence, other than
Daroya's self-serving assertion, that would support his claim that Rolando suddenly punched and
kicked him. What the evidence shows is that it was Daroya, with a piece of metal in his fist, who
suddenly punched Rolando repeatedly until he fell to the ground.

179
TEST TO DETERMINE THE PRESENCE OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION

Antonio A. Sombilon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 177246, September 25, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether
the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.

FACTS:
In 2005, the RTC found petitioner guilty of homicide mitigated by the circumstance of
voluntary surrender for killing Amerilla. In so ruling, the RTC doubted the petitioner's plea of
self-defense because the gun the victim had supposedly fired at him had not been recovered. It is
considered to be contrary to human experience that the petitioner should run home instead of
towards his fallen victim to find out who his assailant had been if he had really acted in self-
defense, he being the barangay chairman of the place. On appeal, the CA upheld the judgment of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner acted in self-defense in fatally shooting Amerilla.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner manifestly did not discharge his burden. He did not persuasively show that
Amerilla had committed unlawful aggression against him as to endanger his life and limb. The
petitioner's insistence that Amerilla had been the first to aim and fire his gun remained
uncorroborated. Verily, the claim of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was also weak due
mainly to the failure to recover the victim's alleged gun in the place where the shooting happened
during the ensuing investigation.

180
 Moreover, that the petitioner allegedly retaliated in his defense by firing his own gun after
the victim had supposedly fired at him once was rendered improbable by his immediately running
away from the scene of the shooting and fleeing towards his house instead of going towards the
victim whom he professed not to have then recognized. The improbability rested on his being the
incumbent barangay chairman of the place, and, as such, had the heavy responsibility of keeping the
peace and maintaining order thereat. More telling was the established fact that even before
Amerilla came around the petitioner had already been firing his gun in order to scare Andres. The
very reason for Amerilla's going to the house of Andres was to try to pacify the troublemaking of the
petitioner. The belligerent conduct of the petitioner manifested a predisposition for aggressiveness
on his part instead of on the part of the victim.

181
CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR UPHOLDING SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Yolando B. Panerio alias John “Yolly” Labor and Alex (Jojo) F.
Orteza

G.R. No. 205440, January 15, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Most important among the requisites of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is

the condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as justifying circumstance.

FACTS:

On February 18, 1991, Panerio and Orteza attacked Ung by stabbing him on the different
parts of his body with the use of a fan knife (balisong) and ice pick, thereby inflicting upon the
Ung mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

On 23 February 1991, Panerio and Orteza were charged with the crime of murder. In its
decision, dated 4 February 2009, the RTC found Panerio and Orteza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the 4 February
2009 RTC decision. The appellate court concurred with the trial court that Panerio failed to
sufficiently show that he acted in self-defense. Panerio interposed, during trial, that Ung boxed
him. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Panerio acted in self-defense.

RULING:

NO, Panerio did not act in self-defense.

182
 To bring about a result favorable to the accused in the form of exculpation from criminal
liability, jurisprudence teaches that the accused must establish the essential requisites of self-defense,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
used to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.

Most important among the requisites of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the
condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as justifying circumstance. Unless the victim
commits unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense would have no factual
and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.

Panerio's uncorroborated testimony regarding the incident is unclear and unconvincing. His
assertion that Ung, then drunk, boxed him and attempted to stab him is unsubstantiated by any
convincing proof. Moreover, Panerio's account on how many times he stabbed the victim is miserably
inconsistent with the post-mortem findings on the deceased.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the CA.

183
THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION IN THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Gerry Agramon

G.R. No. 212156, June 20, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful aggression refers to “an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict
real imminent injury, upon a person.” Without unlawful aggression, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

FACTS:

On December 24, 2005 at about 6:00pm, Roger Agramon was inside his dwelling with
Pelita Aboganda, his common-law wife, when his brother Gerry Agramon, who appeared to be
drunk, came to their dwelling yelling "I will kill you all." Gerry entered the house armed with an
unsheathed bladed weapon and delivered a stab thrust against Roger, who was able to hold the
weapon with his hand causing him to sustain 4 wounds. Pelita, who was then 2 months pregnant,
tried to cover Roger in order not to be hit again. Pelita was stabbed by Gerry on her left breast.
When Roger was about to run, Gerry stabbed him, and the weapon got stuck at his back. Gerry
searched for another weapon inside the house and when the former saw the long bolo, he chased
Roger who ran towards the barangay hall. Upon reaching the barangay hall, Roger sought help
from the barangay officials who were then celebrating their Christmas party. Gerry arrived at the
barangay hall brandishing his weapon and roaming around the area. The barangay officials were
not able to pacify him, so they asked help from the police officials. When the police arrived, they
arrested Gerry. Pelita died while Roger was taken to the hospital for treatment.

For his part, Gerry interposed self-defense. He asserted that in the morning of December
24, 2005, he was all alone gathering tuba as his primary job. While he was on his way to work, he
was chased by Roger who was then holding a long bolo. Roger was allegedly mad at him because
his 3 pigs destroyed Roger's plants the previous day. When he saw his brother chasing him, Gerry
ran towards the direction of his house and rested there for a while before going back to work.
After work, as Gerry was on his way home at around 6:00pm, Roger accosted him and
immediately delivered a hacking blow at him. Gerry was not hit as he was able to jump to a tree.
He then stabbed Roger with the scythe he was carrying for work. He tried to stab Roger again, but

184
he was unable to hit him as Pelita came to his defense and used her body as a shield to protect
Roger. Gerry then stepped back and was not able to go near the victims as his uncle held him and
brought him to their residence.

The RTC found Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It held that
the number and nature of the wounds inflicted upon the victim disproves Gerry's claim of self-
defense. The number and location of the wounds of the victims as compared to the unscathed
accused was indicative of the treacherous execution of the crime, with the victims having no
opportunity to defend themselves. It also declared that evident premeditation was apparent from
the fact that the accused was armed with 2 scythes at the time of the incident and several hours
had already lapsed from morning to 6:00pm for him to reflect on his intentions to commit the
crime. On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The CA agreed that Gerry failed to prove
self-defense because the element of unlawful aggression is explicitly wanting. However, as
regards the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA found that
only evident premeditation was clearly established. It held that treachery cannot be appreciated
because the attack on Pelita was not sudden and unexpected as Roger and Pelita were aware of
the imminent danger to their lives. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Gerry failed to prove self-defense

RULING:

YES, the SC ruled that Gerry failed to prove self-defense. An accused who pleads self-defense
admits to the commission of the crime charged. He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
As aptly noted by the CA, Gerry's claim of self-defense is highly improbable because no unlawful
aggression can be attributed to Pelita nor to Roger. The unlawful aggression did not originate from
the victim or her husband but from Gerry himself. Even if Gerry's narration of events is to be believed,
it still defies logic why he had to stab Roger twice, and eventually hit Pelita; if his claim of self-
defense was true, 1 stab would be enough to defend himself from the alleged and unproven unlawful
aggression. He could have just run away after 1 thrust. Hence, no self-defense can be appreciated to
justify his acts.

185
 With the removal of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
the crime committed by Gerry is homicide and not murder.

186
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Siega

G.R. No. 213273, June 27, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

An accused, who pleads self-defense, has the burden of proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is most
important and indispensable.

FACTS:

Leonardo Siega was charged with the crime of murder. He pleaded not guilty and alleged
the defense of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He averred that on October 16, 2005, at
around 4:00pm, he was about to enter his house when he heard a sound coming from the feeder
road facing his residence. When he turned to the source of the noise, he saw Pacenciano Bitoy
rushing towards him and shouting at him to get out of his house so that they could end their
grudge against each other. As Bitoy was nearing him, Siega saw the former attempting to draw the
bolo that was wrapped on his waist. Scared by Bitoy's actions, Siega immediately grabbed unto
the bolo that was then beside him and hacked Bitoy. Siega inflicted several injuries on Bitoy,
before the latter retreated and ran away. Siega then went inside his house, changed his clothes
and surrendered to the authorities.

On the other hand, the friend of Bitoy named Melicio Alingasa, alleged that at about
4:30pm of October 16, 2005, they were walking along the feeder road on their way home. As they
were nearing the house of Siega, the latter armed with a bolo suddenly approached them and
asked “kinsay mopalag” or “who would dare challenge me.” Bitoy replied that no one would dare
challenge him. Bitoy then intimated to Alingasa that it was a good thing that he had nothing on
Siega then. Suddenly, Siega turned back, asked Bitoy whether he was the tough guy of Jagna, and
stabbed the latter with a long bolo on the left part of his chest. Surprised by the incident, Bitoy
tried to flee but Siega ran after him and continued his assault. Alingasa saw Siega continue to

187
hack Bitoy even if the latter was already lying on the ground. Alingasa ran away. Due to the
severity of his wounds, Bitoy died that afternoon.

The RTC found Siega guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It held that
Siega failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. Siega's claim that Bitoy tried to draw a
weapon from his waist was belied by the fact that no such weapon was recovered from the victim
or at the scene of the incident; and Alingasa's credible testimony verified that Bitoy was not
carrying any weapon at the time of the incident. The RTC found the testimony of Alingasa to be
credible, straightforward, positive and direct to the point. Moreover, the RTC found that the killing
of Bitoy was attended by treachery because as testified by Alingasa, Siega suddenly stabbed Bitoy,
who was unsuspecting and unarmed. However, the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation was not appreciated because there was no proof on how Siega planned and
prepared in the killing of Bitoy and on the lapse of time for Siega to reflect and cling to his
determination to execute the crime. Finally, the RTC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and imposed the lower penalty.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of Bitoy and that the numerous inflicted wounds on the victim belie any claim of self-defense
but illuminate the determined effort of Siega to kill the victim. It further ruled that Siega's act of
getting close to the weaponless victim, asking him a question and swiftly and unexpectedly
hacking him is nothing short of treachery, as it ensured the commission of the crime without any
risk to himself. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding Siega's conviction for the crime of murder.

RULING:

NO, CA did not err in upholding Siega's conviction for the crime of murder. Unlawful
aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg
to stand on and cannot be appreciated. In this case, records disclose that Siega failed to establish
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Bitoy. Thus, his claim of self-defense must necessarily
fail. As duly pointed out by the RTC and CA, Siega's account of events is belied by the straightforward
and credible testimony of Alingasa that Bitoy did not carry any weapon at that time. This was
corroborated by the fact that no weapon was recovered from the victim. Moreover, even if the Court
were to believe Siega's version of the events, still, no unlawful aggression can be deduced, because

188
there was clearly no imminent danger on the person of Siega as would justify his killing of Bitoy.
Unlawful aggression is predicated on an actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not
merely a threatening or intimidating action. Bitoy's supposed act of holding a weapon from his
waist does not pose any actual, sudden or imminent danger to the life and limb of Siega.

On the matter of treachery as a qualifying circumstance of murder, the courts a quo correctly
ruled that treachery attended the killing of Bitoy. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack against an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, who has no chance of defending
himself. Here, a credible eyewitness testified that Siega, armed with a bolo, stabbed Bitoy on the
chest several times, while the latter was merely conversing with Alingasa. That the attack was
frontal does not rule out the existence of treachery; because it was so sudden and unexpected that
Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself, was felled down by Siega's repeated hacking
blows.

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn the concurring findings
of the RTC and the CA. Siega is therefore found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

189
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Juanillo Manzano, et. al.

G.R. No. 217974, March 5, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

To invoke self-defense effectually, there must have been an unlawful and

unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

FACTS:

Manzano and his brother were charged with murder for stabbing one Lucio Silava with
knives, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous
death. In his defense, accused raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Accused-
appellant contends that he merely repelled the unlawful aggression of Lucio, viz: when Lucio
threw a stone at him that hit his knee; and when Lucio rushed towards him to stab him.
Additionally, accused-appellant avers that his testimony was credible that he alone inflicted the
stab wounds on Lucio. The Regional Trial Court found Manzano guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of murder, giving no merit on his defense. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
which noted that the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Lucio made the claim of self-
defense unavailable. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense could be appreciated in this

case.

RULING:

190
 NO. To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.

The evidence before the Court palpably lend negative credence to the presence of unlawful
aggression. Primarily, when compared to Victoria's testimony which withstood the crucible of
intense cross-examination by the defense and the clarificatory questioning by the trial court,
accused-appellant's testimony was not only incongruous with the evidence on record but also
improbable. Also, accused-appellant's plea of self-defense is controverted by the nature, number, and
location of the wounds inflicted on the victim, since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a
determined effort to kill and not just to defend.

191
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE DEFENSE OF RELATIVES

People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Advincula y Mondano

G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essential elements of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, viz: (1)
unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (1) actual or material unlawful aggression; and
(2) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack
with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent
of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the
victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered,
accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

FACTS:

Rodolfo Advincula y Mondano, the accused in this case admitted that he killed the victim in
the name of Reggie Tan y Aranes using a knife. Reggie Tan y Aranes as proven by the medigo legal
report, received a couple of mortal stab wounds as a result of Mondano’s actuations.

Advincula invoked that the killing was triggered when the Reggie suddenly entered his
house, armed with a kitchen knife, and threatened to stab his siblings. When Reggie saw his
presence, Reggie scampered away and went to a nearby store. The accused followed him with the
intention to hurt Reggie, they grappled for the knife and after he successfully got hold of the knife,
he inflicted stab wounds to the victim’s body resulting to his death. Both the RTC and Court of
Appeals found him guilty for committing murder. The accused invokes that the incident was due
to his intention to defend his relatives.

192
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke defense of relatives as a justifying circumstance.

RULING:

NO. the court held that the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives is untenable in this
case. According to the court, in order to appreciate the justifying circumstance, the following
elements must be present: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.

The accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
(1) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (2) the attack or assault must be actual,
or, at least, imminent; and (3) the attack or assault must be unlawful. The accused failed to prove
that there has been an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Considering that there has
been an unlawful aggression on the part of Reggie, it had ceased when he scampered away and went
to a nearby store. Given that unlawful aggression must me actual or imminent in nature, Advincula
failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression upon the commission of the crime. Hence, the
accused is deemed guilty of the crime murder and cannot invoke such justifying circumstance.

193
FACTS WHICH SHOW SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Gonzales y Con and Rene Gonzales y Con

G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of self-defense are: (1) that there was unlawful aggression by the
victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable;
and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.

FACTS:

Ricky and Rene were charged with murder. The prosecution presented Leo Garcia (Leo) as
its eyewitness.

Leo testified that he was awakened by a commotion outside of his house. He discovered
that the commotion was caused by Bobby Solomon (Bobby) and Rene, who were taunting each
other. The confrontation led to Rene punching Bobby who failed to retaliate. Ricky then emerged
and, without warning, stabbed Bobby three times. When people started arriving, Ricky and Rene
escaped together. Eventually, Bobby was brought to a hospital but unfortunately succumbed to his
death during surgery. Dr. Quinto testified that the victim was hit at his left forearm, middle of his
chest and at his stomach.

On the other hand, Ricky admitted that he stabbed and killed the victim, but only because
it was necessary to defend himself. He testified that as he passed the house of Bobby, he observed
that Bobby was staring at him in a bad way. Ricky claimed that he saw Bobby was about to strike
him with a knife, but he was fortunate enough to stab him first. When someone fired a warning
shot to stop them, he ran away but later voluntarily surrendered himself to their barangay
captain upon knowing that Bobby died.

RTC found Ricky guilty of Murder, holding that treachery was present in the killing. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

194
 Whether or not there is a valid self-defense.

RULING:

NO. One of the elements of self-defense is unlawful aggression by the victim.

The records of the case indubitably show that Ricky failed to establish that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of Bobby. Ricky’s claim was self-serving, without any corroborating
evidence. He did not even give any explanation on why Bobby allegedly attacked him with a knife.
The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence and is in itself extremely doubtful.

In fact, the evidence is more in accord with the prosecution's version of the events. Leo
positively stated that Ricky was not coming to his brother's aid at the time of the stabbing, as the
victim did not retaliate after receiving a blow from Rene.

195
REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Godofredo Macaraig y Gonzales

G.R. No. 219848, June 7, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

To prove self defense, the following must be present (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting
to self-defense.

FACTS:

Challenged in this appeal is the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals, finding
Macaraig guilty of the crime of Murder.

The prosecution states that, on 31 May 2011, at around 12:00 in the morning, Francis
Losano (Francis), together with the victim Joven Celeste (Joven), and three other friends were at
the basketball court of their barangay attending a dance party as it was the last day of the Sta.
Cruzan They decided to go home. While going home, Joven was stabbed at the back. Francis was
able to run.

The version of the defense established “self defense”: In the evening of May 30, 2011,
Joven was throwing stones in the window of Crobalde's house. When Macaraig told Joven to stop
throwing stones, the latter left the place.

At around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 2011, after a dinking (sic) spree at the
basketball court in Barangay Salvacion-Baybay, he was about to go to the house of Crobalde when
two (2) unidentified men followed him and another man was waiting for him. One of the two men
poked something at him, held him in the shoulder and boxed him. He was able to evade the blow.
After which another person, armed with balisong, tried to stab him. but as he was able to evade
the blow again, another person got stabbed.

ISSUE:

196
 Whether or not Macaraig’s act is considered as self defense.

RULING:

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the criminal act.

It is well to note that by invoking self-defense, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted to

the commission of the acts for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven,
would have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the accused-
appellant to show that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to
self-defense. “In this case, however, the accused-appellant stated that it was not him who stabbed the
victim, but the victim’s companion or somebody else. From this observation alone, the trial court
correctly struck down accused-appellant's (plea) self-defense. As correctly stated by the State in its
Comment, this assertion negates accused-appellant’s defense.”

Appeal was dismissed.

197
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Glen Abina y Latorre and Jesus Latorre y Deraya

G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the accused invokes self-defense, he or she has the burden to prove such
justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. In claiming self-defense, one
admits of his/her participation in the crime only that it was done in self-defense.

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellants were charged for murder for the killing of Anthony Asadon and
Rodolfo Mabag. The parties were in a party having a drinking spree when Anthony and his wife
asked permission to leave to which accused-appellant Glen disapproved. When Anthony and his
wife proceeded to leave, Glen suddenly took his gun and shot Anthony, hitting his right eye. When
Anthony fell to the ground, accused-appellant Jesus stabbed him with a bolo. Rodolfo went to his
Anthony’s aid, but he was also hacked and stabbed by the accused-appellants. Both Anthony and
Rodolfo died.

For his defense, Jesus claimed that it was Roberto Jongaya and Glen who killed the victims.
He said that he saw Roberto with a gun directed at the victims. While he tried to stop him,
Roberto shot the victims then immediately stabbed them with the help of Glen. Afterwards, Jesus
collected the weapons and surrendered it to the barangay captain. Later that evening, he was
arrested by some barangay tanod and members of the Philippine Army. He was interrogated but
he said his only contribution to the crime was the surrendering of weapons to the barangay
captain. However, during cross-examination, Jesus admitted that he and Glen killed Anthony and
Rodolfo but only to defend himself.

The RTC convicted Glen and Jesus of murder for the death of Anthony, and homicide for
the death of Rodolfo. It ruled that there was treachery in the killing of Anthony but none in
Rodolfo. The claim of self-defense was not appreciated because their denial of their involvement
in the killing was inconsistent with their claim of self-defense. The CA concurred with the RTC’s
ruling, hence this appeal.

198
ISSUE:

Whether or not Glen was able to prove his claim for self-defense.

RULING:

NO, Glen was not able to prove his claim of self-defense. When the accused invokes self-
defense, he or she has the burden to prove such justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, the defense miserably failed to discharge its burden to prove self-defense. Its defenses
of denial and self-defense were diametrically opposed to each other. In denial, one disavows any
involvement in the crime. In contrast, in claiming self-defense, one admits of his/her participation in
the crime only that it was done in self-defense. Moreover, no specific details on the claim of self-
defense was advanced which, incidentally, was belatedly asserted only during the cross-examination
of Jesus. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to establish self-defense, the same cannot be
appreciated in favor of Glen. In view of the admission on the part of the defense of having killed the
victims and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses categorically and positively identifying Glen
as the author of the crime, we entertain no doubt as to his culpability.

199
SELF-DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Japag and Alvin Liporada

G.R. No. 223155, July 23, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof

is shifted from the prosecution to the defense, and it becomes incumbent upon the accused
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of the following requisites of self-
defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.

The most important requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the

condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In other
words, unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the accused, "self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential elements [thereof] would
have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel."

Unlawful aggression "contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or

imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The
person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with
actual use of [a] weapon."

FACTS:

On March 16, 2009, Ramil Parrocho (Ramil), the victim's twin brother saw the appellant
blocking the way of the victim who was then about to the enter the school gate. Liporada punch
his brother while being held in place by Macalalag. Suddenly, the appellant, who was positioned
behind the victim, drew a bladed weapon from his pocket and stabbed the latter at the back.
Appellant, Liporada and Macalalag immediately fled towards the direction of the highway. The
victim was rushed to the hospital but was later on declared dead on arrival.

200
 The appellant raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense stating that it was the
victim who attacked them by hitting and stabbing him using a bladed weapon. And that he was
just fortunate for being able to get the knife from the victim.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC found no merit in appellant's contention that he
had acted in self-defense which resulted in the victim's killing. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the
victim's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as the suddenness of
appellant's attack on the victim from behind rendered the latter defenseless and unable to flee or
escape.

The CA affirmed the assailed RTC Decision with modification. Like the RTC, the CA also
rejected appellant's claim of self-defense in the absence of proof of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether appellant was able to sufficiently prove the justifying circumstance of self-
defense.

RULING:

NO. The court found that the appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
unlawful aggression had originated from the victim. First, it is undisputed that appellant boarded a
motorcycle and fled the situs criminis immediately after stabbing the victim at the back. "Flight is a
veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense." Second, the location, nature and
seriousness of the wound sustained by the victim is inconsistent with self-defense; rather, these
factors indicate a determined effort to kill. And third, both the RTC and the CA found the testimony
of Ramil (the victim's twin brother) to be clear and convincing in its vital points, i.e., on his detailed
narration of the stabbing incident and his positive identification of appellant as one of his brother's
assailants.

201
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful

aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing for there is
nothing to repel. Verily, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person invoking it as a
justifying circumstance.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real

imminent injury, upon a person. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression is
whether the victim's aggression placed in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself. The danger must not be an imagined or imaginary threat.
Accordingly, the confluence of these elements of unlawful aggression must be established
by the accused, to wit: (1) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (2) the
attack or assault must be actual, or at least imminent; and (3) the attack or assault must be
unlawful.

As the second element of unlawful aggression will show, it is of two kinds: (1) actual
or material unlawful aggression; and (2) imminent unlawful aggression Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act
that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent
unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it
must not consist in a mere threatening or intimidating attitude, nor must it be merely
imaginary, but must be offensive, menacing and positively strong, manifestly showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or
opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). There must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof: which puts the accused's life in real peril.

FACTS:

202
 The accused in the name of, Enrique Reyes was charged with murder for killing the now
deceased Danilo Sanchez. Some witnesses testified that the killing happened one morning while
Danilo was walking home. When the victim was just three steps away from his residence, the
accused suddenly fired at his back using an armalite rifle. Just when the witnesses attempted to
aid the victim, the accused threatened them and ordered them not to touch the body. RTC and CA
both held that the accused is guilty for homicide. The accused invokes self defense. To his version
of the facts, someone overhead the conversation of the victim with some of other men talking
about their plan to kill him. Upon knowing this, he called the police to seek for help and prepared
his armalite rifle. When he heard from a shout that the police are already in the area, he went out.
A witness corroborated with this testimony narrating that he saw a man holding a gun in the act
of shooting the accused. Then and there the accused fired at Danilo and killed him. Upon the
arrival of the police in the area, he surrendered and let go of his armalite and the gun he got from
the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke the justifying circumstance of self defense in the
given case.

RULING:

NO. The court cannot invoke self defense in the given circumstances. In order to invoke self
defense, the following circumstances must concur: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person invoking self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the
indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing for there is nothing to repel. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression is whether the victim's aggression placed in real peril the life or personal safety
of the person defending himself. The danger must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. In the
given case, there is no proof that Enrique’s life was in peril when he attacked Danilo. To the
statement of the witnesses, Danilo was just three steps away from his house, even assuming for the
sake of arguendo that he is holding a gun, it does not indicate that he is putting the life of the
accused in great peril. A threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to
be attacked, is not sufficient to prove unlawful aggression. Hence, the court held that the accused is
guilty of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and cannot invoke self-defense.
However, since the accused voluntarily surrendered, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender was appreciated in this case. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary
surrender must be spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to

203
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to
save them the trouble and expense that will be incurred in his -search and capture. The facts show
that when the police arrived in the crime scene, Enrique went out to surrender himself and gave the
weapon used for committing the crime.

204
FACTS TO BE PROVEN TO INVOKE SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Arsenio Endaya, Jr.

G.R. No. 225745, February 28, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

For unlawful aggression to be appreciated there must be an actual, sudden and

unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude.

FACTS:

Endaya was charged with the crimes of Parricide and Murder committed against Jocelyn
Quita-Endaya (Jocelyn), Endaya's wife, and her mother Marietta Bukal-Quita (Marietta). The
crimes were allegedly committed by inflicting upon them stab wounds using a bladed weapon,
which directly caused their instantaneous death. The defense presented Endaya himself as
witness who admitted the killings but claimed that he had acted in self-defense. According to him,
De Torres suddenly arrived and hacked Endaya with a bolo several times. In order to defend
himself, Endaya got hold of a knife and tried to stab De Torres with it more than once.
Unfortunately, because it was dark at that time, he stabbed Jocelyn instead. Thereafter, Endaya
attempted to leave but De Torres and Marietta blocked his path. Again, due to the darkness,
Endaya mistakenly stabbed Marietta.

The Regional Trial Court found Endaya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification as to the civil
indemnity. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not self-defense can be appreciated in this case.

RULING:

205
 NO. It is elementary that unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial
consideration in self-defense. Absent this element, there could be no self-defense, whether complete
or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated there must be an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.

Endaya miserably failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or the
victims. Aside from their absurdity, Endaya's claims are unsubstantiated by any physical evidence.
Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or any
of the two victims, the defense failed to sufficiently explain how the victims ended up with four (4)
stab wounds each, nor to establish that the means employed by Endaya to repel the alleged unlawful
aggression was reasonable and necessary.

206
SELF-DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Nestor “Tony” Caliao

G.R. No. 226392, July 23, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must prove the following: (1)

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense.

FACTS:

A day before the incident, the victim and the accused had confrontation over a garbage
placed by the accused beside the stall of the victim.

At three in the morning of the next day, accused called out to the victim and challenged
him to a fistfight, but the victim’s wife did not allow her husband to go out. In the afternoon of the
same day, the victim and his son were preparing puso when the victim told his son that he was
going to use the comfort room. As the victim approached their stall, the victim’s son saw the
accused suddenly appear and stab his father.

When the victim went inside the store, the accused followed and attempted to stab him
again, but the victim got hold of an electric fan that he used to fond off accused and to push him
outside the store. Accused kept shouting, "I will kill you!" The witness together with other stall
owner approached the accused and took the knife from him. They then brought the accused to
the police station.

In defense, the accused said that the victim went to his stall and poured kerosene over his
puso. He also said that victim bring a pipe into accused-appellant's store and repeatedly strike
accused-appellant with it, prompting the latter to strike back with a knife.

ISSUE:

207
 Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in favor of appellant.

RULING:

NO. The court said that in order to successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must prove
the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Among these three elements, the condition sine qua non
for the justifying circumstance of self-defense is unlawful aggression. Without said aggression
coming from the victim, there can be no self-defense.

As found by both the CA and the RTC, it was accused-appellant who attacked the victim when
the former suddenly appeared at the latter's store and stabbed him. Both courts found accused-
appellant's version of the events improbable, given that he failed to offer any explanation as to why
the victim would suddenly pour kerosene on his puso; or why, if such was the case, accused-appellant
did not attempt to stop the victim and merely waited to see what the victim would do next, which he
claimed was to strike accused-appellant with an iron pipe. On the other hand, the CA and the RTC
gave credence to the evidence of the prosecution. Both courts found that the prosecution was able to
give a more credible account of the event, having ably established the root cause of accused-
appellant's attack on the victim.

Thus, since it is duly established that it was accused-appellant who attacked the victim, then
no unlawful aggression could be attributed to the victim. Consequently, his claim of self-defense
must fail.

208
SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF A STRANGER AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES TO
MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Olarbe y Balihango

G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The accused who shows by clear and convincing evidence that the death of the
victim arose from the need for self-preservation in the face of the victim's deadly unlawful
aggression, and there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the same, is entitled to acquittal on the ground of self-defense in the absence of any
indication of his having provoked such unlawful aggression.

In self-defense and defense of stranger, the circumstances as the accused perceived

them at the time of the incident, not as others perceived them, should be the bases for
determining the merits of the plea.

FACTS:

Olarbe and his wife Juliet were sleeping in their house when they were awakened by the
sound of a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be drunk. Arca was holding a rifle
and shouted "mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo." Arca forcibly entered their house and
aimed the gun at them. OLARBE immediately grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its
possession. OLARBE managed to wrest the gun away from Arca. In a jiff, OLARBE shot Arca
causing the latter to lean sideward ("napahilig"). Nevertheless, Arca managed to get his bolo from
his waist and continued to attack them. OLARBE grabbed the bolo and in their struggle for its
possession, they reached the outer portion of the house. OLARBE was able to wrestle the bolo and
instantly, he hacked Arca. After the killing incident, OLARBE voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities. He invoked self-defense and defense of a stranger.

The RTC rejected the pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger and pronounced him
guilty of murder. The court said that the initial unlawful aggression by Arca had ceased when
Olarbe shot him in the head and caused him to "lean sideward." It disbelieved Olarbe's insistence
that Arca had still been able to grab his bolo and assault Olarbe's common-law spouse therewith
for being implausible considering that Arca had by then been hit in the head. It held that Olarbe's

209
testimony that he had wrested the bolo from Arca after grappling for its control, and had then
hacked him with it was improbable and pot in accord with the natural order of things because the
injury in the head had already weakened and subdued Arca; and that the killing was treacherous
because Olarbe had hacked the then unarmed and weakened victim.

The CA affirmed the conviction of Olarbe because the factual findings of the RTC were
consistent with the evidence on record and accorded with human experience; and because
treachery had attended the killing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused clearly and convincingly establish the justifying circumstances
invoked.

RULING:

YES. The court found Arca to have committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression
against Olarbe and his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the
house and brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Such
armed assault was not a mere threatening act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-
law spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca who had just fired his gun in anger outside
their home. The imminent threat to life was strong enough to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel
the unlawful and unprovoked aggression.

The Court also held that the remaining elements of the justifying circumstances were likewise
established. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not
mean absolute necessity. In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts
may also look at and consider the number of wounds inflicted. More wounds to the victim could
indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the victim. Here, however, although
Arca sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations whose nature and
extent were not explained. The lack of explanations has denied us the means to fairly adjudge the
reasonableness of the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Arca's unlawful aggression.
Lastly, the absence of any showing that Olarbe had provoked Arca, or that he had been induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive has been equally palpable. We deem to be established,
therefore, that the third elements of the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of
stranger were present.

210
 With Olarbe being entitled to the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a
stranger, his acquittal follows.

211
SELF DEFENSE AS JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Randy Gajila y Salazar

G.R. No. 227502, July 23, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The most important requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the

condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In simpler
terms, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the victim committed
unlawful aggression against him; otherwise, "self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential elements [thereof] would
have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel."

FACTS:

Ross Dizon (victim) was a distributor of pork supplied by his uncle. The victim, Gerry
Alcantara, was his co-worker who was employed by Ross’ uncle as a butcher. On the same day,
Ross saw appellant arrive at the market, apparently drunk because of the way he walks. Appellant
worked as a butcher across the stalls of Ross' uncle. Seeing his condition, Ross told him to just lie
down on a bench near their stall.

Moments later, appellant stood up and approached the victim from behind. At the time, the
victim was busy weighing sliced pork meat for distribution to the stalls at the market. Appellant
then used his left hand to hold the victim in place by the neck and he suddenly stabbed the victim
at the back. The victim turned around, but he was stabbed for the second time. The appellant was
about to stab the victim for the third time, but it was prevented by Ross’ uncle. Appellant
immediately fled the scene, still carrying with him the butcher's knife that was stained with the
victim's blood. The appellant was later on subdued by civilians and barangay tanods at the
market. The victim died at the hospital the following day. Based on medical report, the cause of
death was the stab wound sustained by the victim at the back. The accused said that he just acted
in self-defense when the victim approached and boxed him.

212
ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant was able to sufficiently prove the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.

RULING:

NO. The Court cited the case of People vs. Nugas. In this case, the court held that the test for
the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the
victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not
be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (1) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault; (2) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (3) the attack or assault
must be unlawful.

After a thorough review of the records, the court finds that the appellant failed to discharge
the burden of proving that the unlawful aggression had originated from the victim. Due to the
following reasons: (1) the appellant tried to flee the situs criminis immediately after the stabbing
incident. It was only through the concerted efforts of the civilians and barangay tanods at the
market that appellant's escape attempt was thwarted. "Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and
negates the plea of self-defense.” The court find no merit in appellant's contention that he "ran after
the stabbing incident because he intended to voluntarily surrender himself at the barangay." He
could have easily surrendered to Milagros Reyes, one of the barangay tanods chasing after him, but
he kept on running away until he was eventually subdued by Edgardo Reyes; (2) the location, nature
and seriousness of the wounds sustained by the victim are inconsistent with a plea of self-defense;
rather, these factors indicate a determined effort to kill. On this point, Dr. Salen testified that the
stabbing wound sustained by the victim at the back portion of his body can be characterized as fatal,
as it penetrated the intestines, mesentery and right lobe of the victim's liver; and (3) appellant's own
account of the stabbing incident is simply inconsistent with the evidence on record. Appellant
testified that he stabbed the victim just once on the left side, right below the armpit, while he was
underneath the victim on the ground. Under these circumstances, the direction of the stab wound
should have been a downward thrust. However, based on Dr. Salen's post-mortem examination of the
victim's body, the victim sustained two stab wounds, and the direction of the stab wound at the
victim's back was an upward, not downward, thrust.

213
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Rodel Magbuhos y Diola Alias "Bodil"

G.R. No. 227865, November 7, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg

to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

FACTS:

Accused Rodel Magbuhos, was charge with the crime of murder of Enrique Castillo. The
prosecution contends that based on the testimony of several witnesses that, the accused armed
with a fan knife (balisong), with intent to kill, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, attack, assault and stab with the said fan
knife, suddenly and without warning the victim Enrique Castillo.

Rodel, on the other hand, raised self-defense, He argued that the victim Enrique being
under the influence of alcohol stood up and boxed him. Enrique then drew a fan knife but was
pacified by the people inside the billiard hall. While Enrique was uttering invectives, Rodel told
the latter not to utter those words at him. Rodel then noticed that Enrique drew his fan knife and
attempted to attack. Somebody from behind handed Rodel a fan knife but Rodel did not notice
who gave it to him because there were many people inside the billiard hall, and he was too drunk
at that time. As soon as he got hold of the knife, and while Enrique was approaching him, Rodel
was able to stab Enrique once in the chest.

The RTC charged Rodel with Murder, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.
However the RTC did not discuss the presence of the qualifying circumstances and yet found
Rodel guilty of the crime of Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether self defense may be appreciated in the case.

214
RULING:

NO, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused failed to prove self-defense. In this case, Rodel
admits to stabbing Enrique but claims that his action was necessary to defend himself. An accused
who pleads self defense has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing
was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. All three, including
unlawful aggression, are important and indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person."Without unlawful
aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be
appreciated. Rodel failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Enrique committed
unlawful aggression by hurling invectives at him and attempting to stab him.

215
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Ronillo Lopez, Jr. y Mantalaba @ "Dodong”

G.R. No. 232247, April 23, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The justifying circumstance of self-defense must be established with certainty

through satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the persons invoking it. Self-defense cannot be appreciated
where it was uncorroborated by competent evidence or is patently doubtful.

FACTS:

This is an appeal assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of RTC for finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide.
According to the Prosecution, on March 16, 2014 Martita Lopez was at her house in
Sambayanihan, Las Piñas City, when she heard her grandson, appellant herein, shout "Lola! Lola!
Tulungan mo po ako." When she asked what happened, appellant told her that "nasaksak ko si
papa." They immediately went to the house located at 2461 Panay Street, Timog CAA, Las Piñas
City, where she found her son, Ronillo Lopez, Sr. lying on the ground. Saturnino Madroño, who
also heard appellant's admission and cry for help went with Martita and appellant to the house at
Panay Street, checked the victim's pulse and determined that he was already dead.

The medico-legal examination conducted on the victim revealed that he suffered multiple
physical injuries including abrasions and contusions. The cause of death was the stab wound to
his chest. Appellant fled from the scene after the incident but was later arrested at his brother-in-
law's house in Dela Rama St., BF Homes, and Parañaque City, based on a tip by a certain Samuel
Lopez.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the accused he was with his father,
Lopez, Sr., and his cousins and uncles at an uncle's home having a drinking spree. He, thereafter,
went home ahead, in a drunken state during the time of the incident. Nevertheless, both the RTC
and the CA found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

216
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not appreciating the accused-appellant's
claim of self-defense despite the fact that all the elements thereof are present in this case.

RULING:

NO. Self-defense is appreciated as a justifying circumstance only if the following requisites

were present, namely: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the person acting in self-defense; (2) there was reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense, or, at least, any provocation
executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the
victim's aggression.

There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim committed unlawful
aggression against the accused. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of
self-defense will have no factual and legal bases. Ronillo's plea of self-defense was belied by the
physical evidence in the case at bench tending to show that Lopez, Sr. did not commit unlawful
aggression against said appellant. Indeed, had Lopez, Sr. mauled and attacked Ronillo; the latter
would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any
kind or gravity was found on the person of Ronillo when he was brought to the Las Piñas City Health
Center by his arresting officer for medical examination. The superficiality of the injuries was not an
indication that appellant's life and limb were in actual peril as detected by Dr. Manapsal.

In stark contrast, Lopez, Sr. suffered multiple injuries as shown in the medical report.
Prosecution witness testified that she examined the cadaver of Lopez, Sr. and noted that the cause of
his death was the single stab wound on the victim's chest. Even if it were to be granted that Lopez, Sr.
was the initial aggressor, the nature of the wound and the weapon used showed that the means
employed by Ronillo was not reasonable and commensurate to the alleged unlawful aggression of
the victim. It became even more apparent from the fact, as duly admitted by appellant himself, that
the victim had obviously been inebriated at the time of the aggression. Verily, it was far from a
reasonably necessary means to repel the supposed aggression of Lopez, Sr. Appellant thereby fails in
satisfying the second requisite of self-defense.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed and accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

217
SELF-DEFENSE IN AN INDESPENSABLE REQUIREMENT IN SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Armando Bagabay y Macaraeg

G.R. No. 236297, October 17, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The following are elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.

FACTS:

The victim named Guevarra while unloading his passenger and giving their change was
stab by the accused thrice by the accuse, one of which was made while the victim is running away
from the accused. The accused on the other hand assailed that he acted on self-defense when
Guevarra cursed him and pulled out a knife and pointed at him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused acted on self-defense.

RULING:

NO, the accused did not acted on self-defense, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused has
the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three, unlawful aggression is indispensable.
Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon a person. Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has
no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated. Here there is no unlawful aggression on the part of

218
the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal safety.
Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of the three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (1) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (2) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (3) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None
of the elements of unlawful aggression was proven by the defense. Guevarra's act of pointing or
cursing at Armando, not followed by other acts, is insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression.
Thus, the CA is correct in ruling that there was no evidence proving the gravity of the utterances and
the actuations allegedly made by Guevarra that would have indicated his wrongful intent to harm
Armando. Consequently, in the absence of unlawful aggression, the second and third element could
not have been present.

219
FACTS SHOWING SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Don Vega y Ramil

G.R. No. 216018, March 27, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg

to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

FACTS:

In the evening of Jan. 18, 2009, Manuel Padilla Isip, was at Malate, Manila because his
friend, Venus, was celebrating his birthday. Among his drinking buddies was Aldrin Roldan
Fernandez. They were around fifteen at that time including the celebrator. While drinking,
chatting, and listening to music, they spotted accused Don Vega who was about four arms' length
away sniffing rugby from a bottle. After a few hours, Don Vega approached them. He smashed
several items. Victim Manuel Isip tried to pacify the accused saying, "pre, huwag naman dito, kasi
may nagkakasiyahan dito" but accused harshly replied, "huwag kang makialam dito, baka ikaw
ang samain." Victim Manuel Isip did not comment and merely turned his back to avert a bigger
trouble. While the victim's back was turned on him, accused suddenly grabbed the victim from
behind, wrapped his left arm around victim's neck and using his right hand, plunged a knife to
Manuel's chest. Victim Manuel Isip was rushed to the Ospital ng Maynila but was declared "dead
on arrival."

The accused claimed that he requested victim Manuel Isip to play his theme song. The
victim asked him to wait because there were many who made similar requests. He then
approached the victim, but the latter punched him. He went back to his table and picked up a
bladed weapon. Victim Manuel Isip suddenly charged towards him, so he stabbed him. He then
dashed to his house because people were ganging up on him. He was apprehended inside his
abode and he voluntarily surrendered to those who arrested him. The victim was unarmed.

The RTC convicted Don of the crime of Murder. It also ruled that the defense was not able
to establish all the elements of self-defense. Lastly, the RTC ruled that treachery is present since
Don grabbed Manuel from behind and suddenly attacked the unarmed victim with a bladed
weapon. The CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC with modifications. The CA likewise held that

220
the elements of self-defense are lacking. The CA ruled that the killing of the victim was attended
by treachery qualifying the crime to Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused failed to prove self-defense.

RULING:

YES. The accused failed to prove self-defense. An accused who pleads self-defense admits to
the commission of the crime charged. He has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Of these three,
unlawful aggression is indispensable. Unlawful aggression refers to "an actual physical assault, or at
least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." Without unlawful aggression, the
justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to stand on and cannot be appreciated.

First, for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be real danger to life or personal
safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of the three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (1) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (2) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (3) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None
of the elements of unlawful aggression was proven by the defense. Aside from Don's self-serving
statement that it was Manuel who punched and attacked him, not one of the persons present at the
incident corroborated his account. Neither did he present any medical record showing that he
sustained any injuries as the result of the attack by Manuel.

Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second requisite
of self-defense could not have been present. Even assuming that there was unlawful aggression, the
means employed by Don in repelling the alleged attack by Manuel was not reasonably necessary.
Manuel was unarmed and had his back turned while Don used a bladed weapon to "repel the attack"
and stab Manuel repeatedly.

Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless.
He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. In this case,
Don was not entirely blameless as the reason why Manuel scolded him was because he was breaking
things and making unnecessary disturbance. It was also Don who suddenly rushed to the victim and

221
stabbed the latter several times in the chest. In addition, there was no sufficient provocation on the
part of Manuel.

222
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Gayon y Ferreras

G.R No. 230221, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated, it must be proven

by clear and convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following
circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.

FACTS:

On July 19, 2004 at around 9:40 in the evening, Leyden Gayon was in their house in
Sulangan, Matnog, Sorsogon. While Leyden was having a conversation with Leonora Givera, she
saw accused-appellant Edgar, entered their house. Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly
stabbed Leonora several times, leaving the knife in her right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged
Leonora inside the house and heard Edgar told his father, Rodolfo "Papay we have no more
problem because I killed your sister. "

The RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo. The RTC held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly proven due to the suddenness of the attack by
accused-appellant Edgar without giving the victim a chance to defend herself. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. The Court of Appeals agreed that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house and talking to Leyden, was very sudden.
Further, the CA ruled that the nature and the number of wounds sustained by the victim logically
indicate that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined aggression on the
part of accused-appellant Edgar.

Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

223
 Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense can be appreciated.

RULING:

NO. Self-defense cannot be appreciated in this case.

For the claim of self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance of self-defense has no leg to
stand on and cannot be appreciated.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, the nature and number of wounds suffered by the victim
"logically indicated that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
aggression on the part of the accused-appellant." The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence and is in itself extremely
doubtful.

224
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE

Isidro Miranda vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 231122, January 16, 2019

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

To appreciate self-defense, the accused must show that the aggression caused by the
victim in fact put his life or personal safety in real and grave peril.

FACTS:

In the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Pilo and his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left
after attending the party of his niece. While on their way home, they passed by the house of Isidro
Miranda and threw stones at the latter’s home. Miranda went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo’s right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his
left arm. In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso
grabbed possession of the bolo.

In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice but claimed that
his acts were done in self-defense. He narrated that he was at home with his wife and daughter
when he heard a thud at their door, followed by several other thuds and stones hurled at their
house. Miranda peeped through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that he
heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other. According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms
downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo’s arm with his
bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo’s oncoming attack. At this instance, Damaso arrived and
grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter’s bolo. Because of this, Damaso likewise
sustained injuries.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense.

225
RULING:

NO. In order to invoke self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the attack was accompanied by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense. The most important element of self-defense is unlawful aggression, thus, the accused must
likewise establish the occurrence of its three elements: (1) there must have been a physical or
material attack or assault; (2) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (3)
the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all too apparent that the
evidence on record does not support Miranda’s contention that Pilo employed unlawful aggression
against him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the house of Miranda.
Miranda’s life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed against Miranda. More than
this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with him. Moreover, the Court cannot
lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the latter was completely defenseless.
This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel
the private complainant’s attack—and is certainly unjustified.

226
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVE

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Lumahang

G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In defense of a relative, the presence of unlawful aggression - is said to be the most

essential and primary, without which any defense is not possible or justified.

FACTS:

Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Novaliches,
Quezon City. Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook
motion with a knife in his left hand. Pornelos was hit on the buttocks. Without warning, appellant
then turned his ire on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body which
caused him death. Examining physician of Pornelos, found a stab wound on the latter's right
buttocks, which to be a non-fatal wound that required treatment for around seven days.

The accused contended that five bystanders, one of which is Pornelos, approached him
and LL. Suddenly, two of them touched the hands, shoulders and breasts of LL. One of them
punched the accused while another pulled out a knife. He was hit on his left thigh and they
grappled with the knife. When he saw a chance to run away, he ran towards the direction of his
aunt's house with the bystanders running after him. He had also sustained injuries from being
punched in the head and had a stab wound on his left thigh. Due to these injuries, he was confined
in a clinic in Novaliches. When he voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities, no knife was
recovered from him.

RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The
CA affirmed with modifications the RTC's conviction of Lumahang. The CA likewise upheld the
RTC finding that the attacks were attended with treachery. The CA also upheld the RTC's finding
that Lumahang was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he
surrendered to the barangay at the night of the incident after having been convinced by his aunt,
Virginia Lumahang. The CA convicted Lumahang of only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos
needed only seven days of confinement in the hospital to recover from the injury.

227
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke a justifying circumstance of defense of a relative.

RULING:

NO. The Court cannot also give credence to Lumahang's claim of defense of relative, as none
of the elements to successfully invoke the same was sufficiently proven in this case.

The justifying circumstance of defense of relative may be invoked by proving the following
elements:

1. unlawful aggression;

2. reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or and repel it;

3. in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had
no part therein.

Of these three requisites, the first element - the presence of unlawful aggression - is said to be
the most essential and primary, without which any defense is not possible or justified. This must be
so, because "if there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel."

In this case, the CA correctly held that Lumahang failed to prove that there was unlawful
aggression. As the RTC aptly noted: At any rate, accused owned up to being present during the
stabbing incident as he stated that they grappled for the possession of the knife but he could not
recall how the victim Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were stabbed which is highly incredible
to be believed by the court. Further if indeed it is true that he was with his cousin when Rodel
Velitario, Alberto Porazo and Augusto Pornelos molested his cousin "LL", why did LL did not file
charges against them? Or even then, why did his cousin did not testify to corroborate his testimony?

With regard to the stab wound on his thigh, this, by itself and without any medical
examination conducted on the same, only proves that he had a stab wound. As the CA stated, "it does
not show how and when he sustained such injury or who inflicted it and under what circumstances."
Thus, the claim of defense of relative must necessarily fail for the failure of the defense to establish
the element of unlawful aggression.

228
REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Rico Dela Peña

G.R. No. 238120, February 12, 2020

Inting, J.

DOCTRINE:

By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is on the

accused-appellant to establish with clear and convincing proof, that (1) there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants was charged with Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. The Prosecution alleged that in the afternoon of
December 14, 2006, Ernie D. Amahit, son of the victim Olipio G. Amahit, went to their nipa hut
after tending to their carabaos. He was a few meters away when he saw the accused-appellant
stabbed his father in the back with a bolo while the latter was sleeping. He heard his father shout
while he watched the accused-appellant stab the former several times. Accused-appellant then
threatened to kill Ernie causing the latter to run home and tell his mother the incident.

The Defense, however, averred that there was an altercation between the victim and the
accused-appellant on the same date at around 5:30 AM, and that the victim confronted the latter
while he was walking to tell him that the banana plants were uprooted to which the latter
inquired into only to be answered by the victim that he should not be angry or else he would kill
him. When the accused-appellant answered no, the victim then pulled out his bolo and thrusted it
against him, which caused the former to wrestle with the latter for the bolo. When the accused-
appellant got a hold of the bolo, he stabbed the victim first in the stomach and then in the other
parts of the body.

RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of Murder with the attending circumstance of
treachery. The CA affirmed the same. Hence, this appeal.

229
ISSUE:

Whether or not self-defense was present.

RULING:

NO, self-defense was not present. By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the
burden of proof is on the accused-appellant to establish with clear and convincing proof, that (1)
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. The testimony of Ernie, who personally witnessed the crime, corroborated by the
Post-Mortem Examination, belies the accused-appellant’s claim that the victim attacked him and
that he was attacking in self-defense.

230
REQUISITES OF SELF-DEFENSE

Roel C. Casilac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020

Peralta, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. To successfully invoke self-defense, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict
severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with murder of Ryn Loui Navarez and attempted murder of
Ramil Navarez. The Prosecution averred that on June 23, 2009 at about 5 o’ clock in the afternoon,
Ramil, the victim, and his younger brother, Ryn Loui were on their way home aboard a motorcycle
that upon reaching the curved portion of the road, Ramil saw his cousin, accused-appellant,
standing on the side of the road. The latter started shooting at Ramil and Ryn Loui. The former
was able run and get help from the Barangay, leaving the latter in the scene. Ryn Loui was then
discovered lifeless when the police responded to the scene.

The Defense, on the other hand, alleged that it was the brothers who shot at him first while
on board their motorcycle while he was cutting grass and that he borrowed the gun of his cousin,
Cirunay, who fled and continued to cut grass. When the two came back, he shot them first in self-
defense. He hit Ryn Loui while Ramil escaped.

The RTC found him guilty of murder of Ryn Loui Navarez, citing treachery as a qualifying
circumstance and guilty of serious physical injuries of Ramil Navarez. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
with modification, only finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder and less serios physical
injuries instead of serious physical injuries. In his appeal he argues that the CA erred in finding
him guilty of murder despite the presence of the elements of self-defense and also in considering
treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

231
ISSUE:

Whether or not self-defense was present.

RULING:

NO, self-defense was not present. Considering the accused-appellant’s argument that his acts
were of self-defense, the essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. To
successfully invoke self-defense, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that
endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant
by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. These elements are not present in the instant
case. The accused-appellant’s claim was not proven by competent evidence, he failed to prove the
presence of unlawful aggression.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to guilty of murder and
attempted murder.

232
ARTICLE 12. Circumstances Which Exempt from Criminal Liability. — The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines
as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under fifteen (15) years of age.
3. A person over fifteen (15) years of age and under eighteen (18), unless he has acted
with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of article 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in
conformity with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit
him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance
and education; otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or
person mentioned in said article 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.

Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause.

233
ACCIDENT AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Armando Delector

G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of this exempting circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (1) is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causes injury to another by mere accident;
and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

FACTS:

The late Vicente Delector was talking with his brother, Antolin, when the accused, another
brother, shot him twice. Vicente's son, Amel attested that the accused had fired his gun at his
father from their mother's house and had hit his father who was then talking with Antolin. Hence,
the accused was charged with murder.

In his defense, the accused insisted that the shooting of Vicente had been by accident
when Vicente followed him to their mother's house and dared him to come out, compelling
Antolin to intervene and attempt to pacify Vicente. Instead, Vicente attacked Antolin, which
forced the accused to go out of their mother's house. Seeing Vicente to be carrying his gun, he
tried to wrest the gun from Vicente, and they then grappled with each other for control of the gun.
At that point, the gun accidentally fired, and Vicente was hit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exempting circumstance of accident is present.

RULING:

NO, the accident could not be appreciated in favor of the accused. Article 12, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability provided that the elements of this exempting

234
circumstance are, present: (1) that the accused is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3)
causes injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply because the
accused grappled with the victim for control of the gun which is utterly inconsistent with the
ordinary and normal behavior of one who is facing imminent danger to one's life. The assertion of
accident could have been accorded greater credence had there been only a single shot fired, for such
a happenstance could have been attributed to the unintentional pulling of the hammer during the
forceful grappling for control of the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which we think eliminated the
accident.

235
ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Wilson Cacho

G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of
insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence;
and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.

FACTS:

On January 2, 2004, PO2 Emelito Salen and SPO4 Onofre Tavas received a report from a
certain Willy Cacho (Willy) about a fire in Sitio Catmon in Rodriguez, Rizal. Upon arriving in Sitio
Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house and therein discovered a dead body. The house
was later identified to be owned by Mario Balbao (Mario). Willy informed the police officers that
it was his brother, herein accused, who killed Mario. Accused’s wife likewise told the police
officers that her husband was a patient of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) and has
a recurring mental illness. Thereafter, the police officers went to the house of the accused. Upon
introducing themselves as police officers, the accused acted strangely and exhibited signs of
mental illness. SPO4 Tavas stated that the accused admitted killing Mario and burning his house
but did not say why he did it.

On trial, accused alleged that he was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis in
1996 for which he was admitted to NCMH for 2 months. Thereafter, he was discharged when
there was no longer any symptom that was observed. Then on January 7, 2004, he was again
admitted to the NCMH and it was discovered that his Major Depression with Psychosis had
already progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia. Thus, he further alleged, that his defense of insanity
was sufficiently proved by his medical record with NCMH and the expert testimony of one Dr.
Sagun.

RTC only resolved the issue of insanity and found the accused was not insane and found
him guilty of murder and destructive arson since he admitted committing the same. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

236
ISSUE:

Whether or not accused sufficiently proved his defense of insanity.

RULING:

NO. In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity,
he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such
complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the
commission of the offense.

Here, while Dr. Sagun testified that accused was confined in 1996 and that accused-appellant
was diagnosed with Major Depression with Psychosis which progressed to Chronic Schizophrenia, no
other evidence was presented to show that accused was insane immediately prior to or at the very
moment that the crime was committed. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not
automatically exonerate the accused from criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing
that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason immediately prior or at the time of the
commission of the crime. If at all, there is no evidence showing that the mental illness of the accused,
as narrated by Dr. Sagun, constitutes insanity, in that, there is complete deprivation of his
intelligence in committing the act.

237
INSANITY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Loreto Dagsil y Caritero

G.R. No. 218945, December 13, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Insanity is the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article
800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence.

FACTS:

The accused Loreto Dagsil was charged with murder for the killing of Amean Banzuela a
14-year-old minor girl. Evidence for the prosecution showed that he stabbed the victim which
caused her eventual death. The defense on the other hand contends that the accused was in a
state of insanity at the time of the killing. He claimed that he was confused, lost his mind, and
could not remember the events that transpired. The RTC convicted the accused, and the CA
affirmed this ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can avail the exempting circumstance of insanity.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that Insanity is
the exception rather than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the
presumption is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. In order for insanity to be an
acceptable defense to exempt an accused from criminal liability, the same must have been proven
with clear and convincing evidence. In the instant case, as aptly observed by the RTC, the accused-

238
appellant failed to present any corroborative medical evidence to support his claim. What he
presented were mere statements that he was 'confused' when he committed the horrible act which
are, at best, self-serving and devoid of credence. As such, the accused-appellant failed to overthrow
the presumption that he was sane during the commission of the offense.

239
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY

People of The Philippines vs. Jonas Pantoja y Astorga

G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that
defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding,
the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Prior to the commission of the crime, the accused had already exhibited signs of mental
illness which started manifesting after he was mauled by several persons in an altercation when
he was twenty-one (21) years old. Because of the incident, he sustained head injuries, which
required stitches. No further physical examination was conducted on him, because they did not
have the funds to pay for additional checkups. Cederina, mother of the accused, observed that his
personality had changed, and he had a hard time sleeping. There was a time when he did not
sleep at all for one week, prompting Cederina to bring the accused-appellant to the psychiatric
department of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). There, the attending physician diagnosed
him with schizophrenia.

On July 14, 2010 at 7:45 in the evening, the accused was able to escape from the hospital
and arrived at their house the day after. Cederina asked herein accused how he was able to find
his way home, the accused responded that he roamed around until he remembered the track
towards their way home. Cederina reported to PGH that he has custody of his son, the latter
advised that she return his son but was not able to do so because they could not afford the
transportation expenses. On 22 July 2010, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Cederina and
the accused-appellant were inside their house. Eventually, she noticed that accused-appellant was
gone. She went outside to look for him and noticed that the front door of the house where six-
year-old AAA resided was open. She then saw accused-appellant holding a knife and the victim
sprawled on the floor, bloodied.

240
 The RTC then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of insanity to
exempt him from criminal liability.

RULING:

NO, the Supreme saw no reason to overturn the decision of the CA. A scrutiny of the evidence
presented by accused-appellant unfortunately fails to establish that he was completely bereft of
reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally stabbed the victim. For the defense of
insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a
complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at
the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. In the case, Cederina tends to
show that accused-appellant exhibited signs of mental illness only after being injured in an
altercation in 2003; that she observed changes in his personality and knew he had difficulty sleeping
since then; that accused-appellant was confined in the hospital a few times over the years for his
mental issues; and that he was confined at the NCMH on 8 July 2010 from where he subsequently
escaped. Nothing in her testimony pointed to any behavior of the accused-appellant at the time of
the incident in question, or in the days and hours before the incident, which could establish that he
was insane when he committed the offense.

241
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Pulgo

G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.

FACTS:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal was
charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack, assault, and use personal violence
upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a
fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exempting circumstance of insanity is present in the case at bar.

RULING:

242
 NO. An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he
shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment
until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright
release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental
institution. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity,
he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence.
And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution.

243
INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Mejaro Roa

G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017

Velasco, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a

successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. Anyone
who pleads insanity as an exempting circumstance bears the burden of proving it with
clear and convincing evidence. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate
to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense
with which he is charged.

FACTS:

Accused Roa is known to have suffered mental disorder which was associated to an
incident where he was reportedly struck in the head by some teenagers. While others have
recalled that the said condition is associated to his use of illegal drugs. It was in the submitted
records that the accused was actually gone on for a medical treatment in the years 2001 to 2005.
However, the said medical treatment were not completed faithfully due to financial constraints.

On March 16, 2007, accused was unusually silent, refused to take a bath, and even
quarreled with his mother. On the same day, at around 3 in the afternoon, Eliseo was walking with
Edgar on the street. The accused was also seen sitting on the sidecar of a trimobile parked nearby.
When Eliseo passed by the trimobile, the accused approached from behind then suddenly
stabbed Eliseo on the lower left back with a bolo. The accused immediately fled and took refuge
inside his uncle’s house. SPO1 Hermilando went to the said house, who called on accused to
surrender. The accused voluntarily surrendered and handed over the bolo.

ISSUE:

Is insanity as exempting circumstance applicable to the case?

244
RULING:

NO. In the instant case, the defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-
appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence
on record of his mental condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far
away from the date of the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility
that accused-appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this
Court cannot sweepingly conclude that accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-
year period from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007. It
was the defense's duty to fill in the gap in accused-appellant's state of mind between the 2001
diagnosis and the 2012 diagnosis, and unfortunately, it failed to introduce evidence to paint a full
picture of accused-appellant's mental condition when he committed the crime in 2007. With that,
the Court has no other option but to adhere to the presumption of sanity and conclude that when
accused-appellant attacked the victim, he was conscious of what he was doing, and was not
suffering from an insanity.

245
FACTS WHICH SHOW INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Carpio Marzan y Lutan

G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

For insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must be complete

deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason
or there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.

FACTS:

Carpio, herein accused, entered the house of his bedridden brother, Apolonio who was
seen by Erlinda (Apolonio’s daughter). Erlinda heard her father screaming and thereafter saw the
accused emerge from her father’s house wearing a blood-stained shirt and holding a bladed
instrument dripping with blood. Apolonio eventually succumbed to his death.

After the incident, Lolita, the mother of herein accused and victim, came running towards
the house of Apolonio where she embraced the accused and fell down on the ground. The victim
helped his mother get up and let her sit in front of the house.

By way of defense, the wife of the accused testified that her husband was insane alleging
that her husband would often appear to be nervous and tulala. As regards the stabbing incident,
she recounted that, on that day, she saw her husband going back and forth mumbling something.
According to her, after the incident, the accused just sat down and remained tulala until the police
arrived and handcuffed him. Based on the accused’s psychological report, he was suffering from
Schizophrenia, which was temporary and occurs only intermittently.

Both RTC and CA found herein accused guilty of murder holding that treachery was
present. CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plea of insanity may be appreciated.

246
RULING:

NO. For insanity to be appreciated in favor of the accused, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason or there is
a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Clearly, schizophrenia does not fall within the
stringent standard contemplated by law as an exempting circumstance as it was merely temporary
and occurs only intermittently. In addition, accused's abnormal behavior immediately prior to the
stabbing incident and at the time of the incident while suggestive of an aberrant behavior, cannot be
equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. On the contrary,
accused was even sane enough to help his mother stand up after falling on the ground and seated
her in front of a house

247
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Roland Miraña y Alcaraz

G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

An accused invoking the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of

proving it with clear and convincing evidence because every person is presumed sane. For
the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely
deprived of intelligence, which must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged. Since the state of
a person’s mind can only be judged by his behavior, establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted
with the accused, or who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based
on the witness’ own perception of the accused, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist.

FACTS:

The victim here was a 73-year-old widow who was found trembling and praying after
being chased by the accused-appellant with a bolo. The following morning, her neighbor heard a
loud cry and found the victim lying on the ground. The accused-appellant and his father were
present at the scene, too. When asked by the police officers who responded to the scene, the
accused-appellant admitted to killing the victim. He pointed to a bolo which he said he used to
hack the victim. He was brought to the police station and thereafter admitted to a mental hospital.

The family of the accused-appellant invoked insanity as a defense for the latter. Prior to the
death of the victim, the accused-appellant has been observed to be exhibiting odd behavior. He
would smile even when alone, call a chicken late at night, and claim that the victim was a witch.

The RTC and the CA agreed that accused-appellant failed to overcome the presumption of
sanity; and his bizarre acts prior to the incident cannot be considered insanity for the purpose of
exonerating him because not every aberration of the mind constitutes insanity. The aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was also appreciated to qualify the crime to murder,

248
in consideration of the fact that the victim was a 73-year-old unarmed woman as against a male
assailant in his early twenties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not insanity could be appreciated to exculpate the victim from criminal
liability.

RULING:

NO, the defense failed to prove accused-appellant’s insanity at the time of the commission of
the crime. Unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not
proof of a complete absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity. In order to be exempt from criminal liability, the accused must be so
insane as to be incapable of criminal intent.

249
INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Sr. y Masayang

G.R. No. 223566, June 27, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

He who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence; thus,
for accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1)
that defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding,
the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Five Informations involving the crime of murder were filed against appellant Salvador, Sr.
and he was charged in all of them. Appellant argued that sixteen months after the crime was
committed, he saw Dr. Dinglasan and was given medicine for depression and later for psychosis.
Nonetheless, he said that he can remember his victims, but he cannot remember the crime he
committed against them, the circumstances before the crime, or his whereabouts on the day of
the crime. He also said that he was never confined in a mental hospital either before or after the
incident.

The Regional Trial Court stated that he failed to prove his insanity and thus rendered
judgement against him. This judgement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant was mentally insane at the time he killed the victims.

RULING:

250
 NO. Insanity as an exempting circumstance is provided for in Art. 12, paragraph (par.) 1 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC):

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.

Where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished.

For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot support a
finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason,
discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed. In the Philippines, the courts have
established a clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempted as it is required that
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.

It cannot be ascertained that accused-appellant's disorder existed at the time of or

immediately preceding the commission of the crime. Appellant's claim that he allegedly failed to
remember what had happened on the day of the commission of the crime, neither qualifies him as
insane nor negates the truth that he was fully aware that he had killed his victims.

251
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY AS EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE TO STATUTORY RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Dionesio Roy y Peralta

G.R. No. 225604, July 23, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or

insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval. "[It]
requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e. that the accused
be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that
there be complete absence of the power to discern." The law presumes that every person is
sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden to
prove that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged.
Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the time immediately preceding
or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. "

FACTS:

AAA testified that when she was strolling in Intramuros, she was dragged by the accused
into the opening. AAA called for help, but her mouth was covered by the accused. The accused
undressed her and made her sit on his lap with her legs spread apart trying to insert his organ to
her. There was no full penetration; she testified that he only 'dipped' his penis into her organ. The
accused sensed that someone saw them, and he stood up and put on his clothes. A security guard
then arrived and handcuffed the appellant.

Based on the medical report, the examining physician summarized her findings, which
concluded that 'congenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.

The defense, on the other hand, gave conflicting answers to the questions propounded.
The accused was then examined to determine his mental status and level of comprehension. After
undergoing battery of tests, the results showed that the accused is suffering from imbecility, or
moderate mental retardation. However, attending physician of the accused clarified that the
finding of imbecility only covered the mental status of the appellant at the time he underwent
mental evaluation, and not necessarily at the time of the offense.

252
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of
insanity in favor of appellant.

RULING:

NO. The court held that the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. As correctly
observed by the CA, Dr. Domingo's report could not positively and certainly conclude that appellant's
state of imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped AAA. Moreover, we agree with the CA's
observation, affirming the findings of the trial court, that the actions of appellant negated complete
destruction of intelligence at the time the rape was committed. The CA wrote:

Dr. Domingo's Report is likewise inconclusive as to the state of appellant's mental

faculties at the time of the rape. While the report extensively discussed his condition
in early 2013, it does not conclude that he was afflicted with imbecility, or that he was
unaware of what he was doing, at the time he raped AAA. The report only concluded
that 'at present, the patient is deemed INCOMPETENT to stand the rigors of court
trial! Unfortunately, such incompetence merely means that appellant's mental state is
not fit for trial. It does not mean that he was completely deprived of reason and
freedom of will at the time he committed the crime.

Furthermore, we agree with the RTC that appellant's actions at the moment of the
rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was committing, and that what he
was doing was wrong. Appellant, as convincingly testified to by AAA, and
corroborated by [Bartulay], dragged AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating
himself and AAA to facilitate the commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for
help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring that they would not be disturbed. Such
precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was in such a state that he
could not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely deprived of
intelligence or will.

In view of the foregoing, the court affirm the conviction of appellant for the crime of
statutory rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court, thus, correctly imposed
upon appellant, as affirmed by the CA, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

253
FACTS WHICH SHOW INSANITY

People of the Philippines vs. Jessie Haloc y Codon

G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only

of the will, in committing the criminal act.

FACTS:

On June 2003, accused stormed in the house of the victims and attempted to strike
Ambrosio dela Cruz with a 24-inch bolo and hacking the latter’s two children, Allan and Amel, on
the arm and on the neck respectively, which resulted to Amel’s death.

Haloc’s sister testified that the accused recognized her and surrendered to her the bolo
after his deadly assault. Dr. Escuadra, a psychiatrist, testified that the accused was brought to Don
Susano Memorial Mental Hospital on August 2003 and on July 2007 and that the medications
previously prescribed to him were medicines administered to a patient suffering psychosis. The
accused invoked by way of defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.

RTC found the accused guilty of the crimes of murder and attempted murder. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision. Hence, the case was elevated to SC with the accused still invoking insanity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was suffering from insanity.

RULING:

NO. Insanity, to be exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of
the will, in committing the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude

254
imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He
must be deprived of reason and must be shown to have acted without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

Based on the foregoing, there was no showing that the accused-appellant’s actions
manifested his insanity immediately after the hacking incidents. His own sister declared that he had
recognized her and had surrendered the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been
totally deprived of the capacity of cognition. In addition, although Dr. Escuadra testified that the
medications previously prescribed to him were medicines administered to a patient suffering
psychosis, she did not categorically state that he had been psychotic. Nonetheless, even if we were to
deduce from her testimony that he had been suffering some form of psychosis, there was still no
testimony to the effect that such psychosis had totally deprived him of intelligence or reason.

255
INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Renato Bacolot y Idlisan

G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade

criminal liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is
charged.

FACTS:

An Information involving the crime of murder were filed against accused-appellant Renato
Bacolot. Upon arraignment, Renato's counsel manifested that Renato was suffering from mental
disorder and requested for his examination at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center
(EVRMC), Psychiatric Department, Tacloban City, which the RTC granted. He pleaded insanity as
his defense. His lone witness, Dr. Genotiva, testified that she had previously examined Renato in
the year 2005 prior to his arrest. That was when Renato tried to burn himself and had to be
admitted for his suicidal tendencies. Dr. Genotiva diagnosed Renato then as having "auditory
hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate effect," and was "able to converse, but he was not
oriented to time and place, he had poor memory recall of the incidents, and he had blank stares."

The Regional Trial Court stated that he failed to prove his insanity and thus rendered
judgement against him. This judgement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant’s defense of insanity was proven.

RULING:

256
 NO. for the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as a circumstance to evade criminal
liability, it is necessary that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous
with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. In short, in order for the
accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must successfully show
that: (1) he was completely deprived of intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of
intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.

Having invoked the defense of insanity, accused-appellant is deemed to have admitted the
commission of the crime. Accordingly, he has the onus to establish with certainty that he was
completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness.

257
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINOR ACTING WITH DISCERNMENT

CICL XXX vs. People of the Philippines and Glenn Redoquerio

G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

When a minor above fifteen but below eighteen years old is charged with a crime, it
cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the
prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL XXX
committed the alleged crime with discernment.

The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal

liability of a minor who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the vert
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and even during the trial.

FACTS:

While buying iced tea powder on a nearby store, private complainant Redoquerio was
attacked by CICL XXX, Puyo, and Narag. CICL XXX aimed a gun six inches away from private
complainant’s face. He pulled the trigger several times, but it did not fire which made him hit the
victim the temple and head of the victim using the gun instead. The victim lost consciousness
after he was boxed by CICL XXX while his arms were held by the two others. He was in a coma for
7 days while he was confined at the hospital.

CICL XXX denies the allegation, claiming that he and his family were celebrating the new
year at home. They heard a commotion outside and saw Redoquerio and De los Santos mauling
Narag. De los Santos ran away while Narag boxed Redoquerio who fell on his back. CICL XXX went
back inside their house and had no idea what happened next. He and his family were surprised
then when he was implicated in the mauling accident. He alleged that he was implicated because
Redoquerio did not really know who mauled him.

258
 The witnesses presented by the prosecution established CICL XXX’s intent and supposed
participation in the mauling of Redoquerio. CICL XXX now counters that because he was only 17
years old at the time, he supposedly committed the crime, then he is presumed to have acted
without discernment, and that it was the burden of the prosecution to prove otherwise.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in convicting CICL XXX despite the prosecution’s failure to
show that he acted with discernment.

RULING:

YES, the CA erred in the conviction as there was a failure to show that CICL XXX acted with
discernment. When a minor above fifteen but below eighteen years old is charged with a crime, it
cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the prosecution must
specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL XXX committed the alleged crime with
discernment. The pieces of evidence only established CICL XXX’s participation, instead of his having
acted without discernment. Furthermore, even if he was a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his
part by virtue of his age.

259
REQUISITES OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE

People of the Philippines vs. Florentino Labuguen Francisco and Romeo Zuñiga Pilarta

G.R. No. 223103, August 4, 2020

Hernando, J.

DOCTRINE:

To avail of the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable

fear of an equal or greater injury, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is
insufficient. The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the
accused to escape.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with robbery with homicide of Manuel Padre, Nenita
Padre, and Rhoda Padre and frustrated homicide of Rachel Padre. The Prosecution alleged that on
3 January 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, the Padre family composed of Manuel, Nenita,
Rhoda, and Rachel Padre were having dinner at their home at Villaruz, Isabela, five men suddenly
barged in. These five men were composed of the accused-appellants: Labuguen, Zuñiga,
Macalinao (who is at large), and two other assailants (who are to be identified) robbed the Padre
family of cash amounting to FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000) and willfully killed
Manuel, Nenita (by stabbing them), and Rhoda Padre (by shooting her) in the process. Rachel, the
lone survivor, was able to escape despite being stabbed and strangled by Labuguen by pretending
to be dead and running to her neighbor, who helped the same, when she had the chance. On the
belief that all members of the Pedro family were dead, the group proceeded to Joel Albano’s house
where they divided the loot.

During the investigation, Rachel was able to identify Labuguen, being their longtime
neighbor, Macalinao, one of their helpers, and Zuñiga, a longtime customer, as their assailants.
Forensic evidence also corroborated Rachel’s story.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied the allegations. RTC and CA convicted them
of the charges, hence, this appeal.

260
 The accused-appellants argue that the RTC and CA failed to consider the exempting
circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear in favor of Zuñiga as he avers that he
was compelled at gunpoint by Albano with the threat that if he did not cooperate, something bad
will happen to his family. They also argue that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not irresistible force was present.

RULING:

NO, irresistible force was not present. To avail of the exempting circumstance of irresistible
force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, the evidence must establish: (1) the
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of
an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient.
The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.
Prosecution successfully proved that Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail of the crime but
likewise actively participated therein. He did not perform any over act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit felony and prevent the commission thereof.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED and MODIFIED to guilty of robbery with
homicide.

261
 CHAPTER THREE

Circumstances Which Mitigate Criminal Liability

ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to
justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not
attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen years of age or over seventy years. In the case of
the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of article
80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or
his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical
defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those
above mentioned.

262
FACTS WHICH SHOW MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VINDICATION FOR A GRAVE OFFENSE

Petronilo Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense to be credited, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) that there be a grave offense done to the one
committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees; and (2) that the felony
is committed in vindication of such grave offense.

FACTS:

On September 22, 1992 at about 8:00pm, Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita arrived at
the house of the former’s balae, Jocelyn Janioso, calling out for help. When Janioso came out of her
house, she saw Salvador whose forehead was oozing with blood, and Calib Napone likewise
bloodied on the face, mud-laden, and trying to extricate himself from Salvador who held him by
the back collar of his shirt. Calib is the son of Petronilo Napone Sr. and the brother of Petronilo
Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone. When Janioso asked what happened, Salvador replied that Calib
waylaid him and struck him with an iron bar while he and Robert were on their way home from
their farm. Thereafter, Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring
Salvador and Calib to the hospital. After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further
conflict, Janioso pulled Salvador inside her house but Petronilo Sr. followed them and
immediately hacked Salvador from behind using a big bolo, hitting Salvador at the back of his
head. Salvador, in retaliation, also hacked Petronilo Sr. Meanwhile, Edgar and Petronilo Jr. also
alighted from the vehicle. Edgar threw a fist-sized stone at Salvador. Petronilo Jr. then shot
Salvador 3 times with a small firearm, hitting the latter on the chest which caused him to fall. At
the hospital, Salvador was pronounced dead.

On the other hand, the Napones alleged that they acted in self-defense and in defense of a
relative. They alleged that on the date of the incident, while Petronilo Sr., Petronilo Jr. and Edgar
were in their house, a certain Ervin Tagocon came and told them that he saw Calib bloodied and
dragged by Salvador and Robert to the house of Janioso. Upon hearing the news, Petronilo Jr.
hurriedly ran towards Janioso's house, while Edgar and Petronilo Sr. immediately followed. Before

263
running to Calib's aid, Petronilo Sr. got hold of his bolo because he suspected that the Espelitas
had hacked Calib. Upon arriving at Janioso's place, the Napones saw Calib bloodied and being held
by the Espelitas who, upon seeing them coming, dropped Calib, who was then prostrate and
unconscious. The Espelitas then went inside the fenced premises of Janioso's house. When
Petronilo Sr. attempted to lift Calib from the ground, Salvador rushed towards him and hacked
him with a bolo multiple time. Unable to retaliate because he was lifting Calib, he parried the
attacks with his left hand but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Petronilo Sr. fell to the ground and lost
consciousness. Edgar tried to defend his father from Salvador by throwing a stone at the latter.
Because of this, Salvador shifted his attention towards Edgar and chased him with a bolo.
Meanwhile, Petronilo Jr. was about to rush to his father’s aid when he was alerted that Robert was
aiming a firearm at him. He wrestled with Robert for the possession of the firearm. When he got
hold of the firearm, Robert allegedly shouted, "watch out, my firearm was taken" and ran
away. Salvador stopped chasing after Edgar, turned to Petronilo Jr., and hacked him three 3 times.
Petronilo Jr. fell to the ground facing down and while Salvador is still behind him, he crawled
away from his assailant. When he stood up and saw that Salvador was still coming after him, he
fired his gun at Salvador. Despite the first shot, Salvador kept advancing towards him; thus, he
again shot at Salvador hitting him in the chest. Thereafter, he took Petronilo Sr. and Calib to the
provincial hospital for treatment. Then, Petronilo Jr. surrendered to the authorities but the
firearm he used to shoot Salvador was never recovered.

The RTC found Petronilo Jr. and Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. It rejected the Napones’ claim of self-defense and in defense of a relative ratiocinating
that they failed to establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Salvador. It further
ruled that: a) a conspiracy among the Napones existed as shown by their successive attacks on
Salvador; and b) no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the felony. However, the RTC
ordered the dismissal of the case against Petronilo Sr. due to his death a month after he
completed his testimony.

On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTC regarding the appreciation of modifying
circumstance. While it conceded that no aggravating circumstance attended the killing of Salvador,
it opined that the RTC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It observed that the unfortunate incident occurred at the "spur of the moment" and because of
the Napones' "impulse reaction" upon seeing Calib wounded and lying on the ground. Likewise,
the CA ruled that conspiracy could not be appreciated considering that the incident happened at
"the spur of the moment." Thus, the CA reduced Edgar's liability to that of a mere accomplice
reasoning that his participation in throwing a stone at Salvador during the incident, while
showing community of criminal design, was otherwise not indispensable to the commission of
the felony.

264
ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a mitigating circumstance in this case.

RULING:

YES, there are mitigating circumstances in this case. However, the SC ruled that the CA erred
when it credited passion or obfuscation in favor of the Napones. To avail of the such mitigating
circumstance, it is necessary to show that the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments
and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. The acts of the Napones after they were informed
that Calib was dragged by the Espelitas were more consistently driven by revenge rather than mere
impulsive reaction. Petronilo Sr. even got hold of his weapon first before going to the place where his
son was reportedly harmed. Thus, the extenuating circumstance of passion or obfuscation could not
be appreciated in petitioners' favor. Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate
incident merit the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense.
Although it was not witnessed by the Napones, the attack on Calib which put his life at risk must
have infuriated them. The belief that the Espelitas were responsible for the grave injuries sustained
by a member of their family created rage in their minds which clouded their judgment. Upon seeing
Calib bloody, prostrate on the ground and possibly clinging for dear life, the Napones were filled
with resentment that resulted in the assault on Salvador. Their acts, therefore, were committed in
vindication of a grave offense. Further, the CA also erred when it failed to appreciate voluntary
surrender in favor of Petronilo Jr.

In fine, the SC finds Petronilo Jr. liable as principal for the crime of homicide with the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal. However, considering that the two mitigating
circumstances could be credited in his favor, and no aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is prision mayor, lower than reclusion temporal, and
within which the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken. With respect to Edgar,
he is held liable as an accomplice to the attempted homicide and, thus, should be meted a penalty
three 3 degrees lower than that prescribed by the code for homicide. Further, the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense shall be credited in his favor.

265
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INTOXICATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

Marlon Bacerra y Tabones vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of

the accused must neither be "habitual [n]or subsequent to the plan to commit [a] felony."
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were
impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his or her acts

Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of

spontaneity. The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled
by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the authorities the trouble and
expense that may be incurred for his [or her] search and capture."

FACTS:

In the Information dated January 12, 2006, Bacerra was charged with violation of Section
1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613: That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 15,
2005, at Brgy. San Pedro Ili, Alcala, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to cause damage to another, did then and there is [sic],
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the rest house of Alfredo Melegrito y Galamay.

In the Decision dated October 6, 2009, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in Villasis,
Pangasinan found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Petitioner argues that the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary

surrender should have been appreciated by the lower tribunals in computing the imposable
penalty. Petitioner was drunk at the time of the alleged incident. In addition, he voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities despite the absence of an arrest warrant. Lastly, petitioner asserts

266
that temperate damages should not have been awarded because private complainant could have
proven actual damages during trial.

Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's decision.
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that it is not
habitual. The state of drunkenness of the accused must be of such nature as to affect his or her
mental faculties. Voluntary surrender cannot likewise be considered as a mitigating circumstance
because there is no showing of spontaneity on the part of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender may

properly be appreciated in this case to reduce the imposable penalty.

RULING:

NO. For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the

accused must neither be "habitual [n]or subsequent to the plan to commit [a] felony." Moreover, it
must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a way
that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts. The
bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is insufficient. There
must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of intoxication on the accused.

There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was intoxicated at
the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount of time had lapsed from petitioner's
drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which he could have regained control of his
actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in this case.

Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. Voluntary

surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity. The accused's act of
surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire
to "save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his [or her] search and
capture." Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's act of submitting his
person to the authorities was motivated by an acknowledgment of his guilt.

267
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND VOLUNTARY PLEA OF
GUILT

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Pulgo

G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
of the Philippines to apply, three requisites must be present: a) provocation must be
sufficient; b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and c) it must originate
from the offended party.

"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to

commit the crime and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. "Immediate" on the
other hand means that there is no interval of time between the provocation and the
commission of the crime.

The voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one that is made by the accused in
cognizance of the grievous wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of
repentance and respect for the law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition
in the accused favorable to his reform.

FACTS:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal was
charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack, assault, and use personal violence
upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a
fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died.

268
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is entitled to any of the mitigating circumstances.

RULING:

NO. For sufficient provocation under Article 13, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines to apply, three requisites must be present:

a) provocation must be sufficient;

b) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime; and

c) it must originate from the offended party.

"Sufficient" according to jurisprudence means adequate to excite a person to commit the

crime and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.] "Immediate" on the other hand means
that there is no interval of time between the provocation and the commission of the crime. Per
admission of the defense witnesses, the taunting done by the victim occurred days before the
stabbing incident hence the immediacy required by law was absent. The lapse of time would have
given the accused [chance] to contemplate and to recover his serenity enough to refrain from
pushing through with his evil plan.

The second mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilt claimed by the accused could
likewise not be considered The voluntary plea of guilt entered by the accused is not spontaneous
because it was made after his arraignment and only to support his claim of the exempting
circumstance of insanity. The voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one that is made by the
accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of
repentance and respect for the law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the
accused favorable to his reform. It may be recalled that the accused in the case at bar did not change
his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty".

269
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Roderick Ramelo

G.R. No. 224888, November 22, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following
requisites must be established: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the
accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the
surrender is voluntary.

FACTS:

At around 1:55 AM, Nelson was standing outside the basketball court which was then
being used as a venue for a dancing or disco event, when Ramelo suddenly appeared before him
and stabbed him. When the barangay tanod saw what happened, he immediately confronted the
assailant and confiscated the knife used. Ramelo, however, was able to run away. Nelson was
brought to the hospital for immediate medical treatment but unfortunately died due to the stab
that perforated his stomach which caused massive bleeding.

In his defense, Ramelo testified that while he was smoking at the store near the dancing
hall, Nelson, who appeared to be drunk, approached him, strangled him and pulled him towards
the dance area. He was then manhandled by Nelson and his three companions who rushed
towards them. The assault continued even after Ramelo fell to the ground. Nelson also tried to
smash Ramelo’s head with a stone, but the latter was able to evade it. Ramelo claims that Nelson,
who he admitted being taller and bulkier than him, sat on his abdomen and proceeded to hit him
on his face while his companions hit and kicked his legs. Fearing that they intended to kill him, he
further avers that to get his knife tucked in his right shoe, he parried Nelson's punches with his
left hand, reached for the knife with his right hand, and then stabbed Nelson.

ISSUE:

270
 Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be availed of by
the accused.

RULING:

YES. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following
requisites must be established: first, the accused has not been actually arrested; second, the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and third, the surrender is
voluntary.

Immediately after stabbing Nelson, Ramelo voluntarily yielded the knife he used to Pilapil,
who turned it over to Vega. Moreover, approximately nine (9) hours after the stabbing incident,
Ramelo voluntarily surrendered himself to the police authorities. It must be noted that the surrender
preceded the actual death of Nelson and the filing of the Information. There is every indication that
the surrender was spontaneous indicating Ramelo's intent to unconditionally submit himself to the
authorities, either because he acknowledged his guilt, or he wished to save the government the
trouble and the expenses necessary for his search and capture.

271
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN CRIMES PUNISHABLE WITH INDIVISIBLE PENALTY

People of the Philippines vs. Carpio Marzan y Lutan

G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The consideration of any mitigating circumstance in cases where the imposable

penalty is indivisible would be superfluous. An indivisible penalty could not be graduated
in consideration of any modifying circumstance.

FACTS:

Carpio, herein accused, entered the house of his bedridden brother, Apolonio who was
seen by Erlinda (Apolonio’s daughter). Erlinda heard her father screaming and thereafter saw the
accused emerge from her father’s house wearing a blood-stained shirt and holding a bladed
instrument dripping with blood. Apolonio eventually succumbed to his death.

After the incident, Lolita, the mother of herein accused and victim, came running towards
the house of Apolonio where she embraced the accused and fell down on the ground. The victim
helped his mother get up and let her sit in front of the house.

By way of defense, the wife of the accused testified that her husband was insane alleging
that her husband would often appear to be nervous and tulala. As regards the stabbing incident,
she recounted that, on that day, she saw her husband going back and forth mumbling something.
According to her, after the incident, the accused just sat down and remained tulala until the police
arrived and handcuffed him. Based on the accused’s psychological report, he was suffering from
Schizophrenia, which was temporary and occurs only intermittently.

Both RTC and CA found herein accused guilty of murder holding that treachery was
present. CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not voluntary surrender was properly appreciated.

272
RULING:

NO. There was no showing that accused-appellant unconditionally and voluntarily

surrendered himself to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he
wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for and capturing him. Moreover, the
consideration of any mitigating circumstance in accused's favor would be superfluous because,
although the imposable penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death, the prohibition to impose
the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 rendered reclusion perpetua as the only
penalty for murder, which penalty, being indivisible, could not be graduated in consideration of any
modifying circumstances.

273
FACTS THAT MUST BE PROVED TO INVOKE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

People of the Philippines vs. PFC Enrique Reyes

G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender must be

spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to
save them the trouble and expense that will be incurred in his search and capture.

FACTS:

The accused in the name of, Enrique Reyes was charged with murder for killing the now
deceased Danilo Sanchez. Some witnesses testified that the killing happened one morning while
Danilo was walking home. When the victim was just three steps away from his residence, the
accused suddenly fired at his back using an armalite rifle. Just when the witnesses attempted to
aid the victim, the accused threatened them and ordered them not to touch the body. RTC and CA
both held that the accused is guilty for homicide. The accused invokes self defense. To his version
of the facts, someone overhead the conversation of the victim with some of other men talking
about their plan to kill him. Upon knowing this, he called the police to seek for help and prepared
his armalite rifle. When he heard from a shout that the police is already in the area, he went out. A
witness corroborated with this testimony narrating that he saw a man holding a gun in the act of
shooting the accused. Then and there the accused fired at Danilo and killed him. Upon the arrival
of the police in the area, he surrendered and let go of his armalite and the gun he got from the
victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
in the given case.

274
RULING:

YES. Since the accused voluntarily surrendered, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender was appreciated in this case. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary
surrender must be spontaneous and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to
save them the trouble and expense that will be incurred in his search and capture. The facts show
that when the police arrived in the crime scene, Enrique went out to surrender himself and gave the
weapon used for committing the crime.

275
NON-RESISTANCE TO ARREST DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY AMOUNTS AS VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER

People of the Philippines vs. Patrick John Anticla

G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

For voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements must be
present: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to
be voluntary must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submit oneself to
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them
the trouble and expenses in capturing him.

FACTS:

The accused was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals for the crime
of murder when he using a baseball bat attacked his aunt and her live in partner, and set on fire
the house of the victim causing injury to them and consequently, their deaths. However, the Court
of Appeals changed the imposed penalty by the Regional Trial Court to two separate penalties for
the death of the victims. The accused challenged the said decision assailing that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the lower court failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not voluntary surrender is present in the case.

RULING:

NO. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not present in the case even if the
accused did not resist his arrest. In order for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is
properly appreciated the following requisites must concur (1) the offender has not actually been

276
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender must
be voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to
submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses in capturing him. Here the fact of non-resistance of the accused is not
voluntary.

Moreover, the court ruled that the proper imposable penalty is one which provided by the
Regional Trial Court when it imposed a penalty proper for a complex crime which is double murder
and not separate counts of murder as provided by the Court of Appeals. In a complex crime, although
two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as
well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission
of a complex crime. Here, the act of the accused in burning the house of the victims which resulted to
two deaths is a complex crime.

277
FACTS WHICH SHOW THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

Liberty Tiongco vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

The availment of mitigating circumstance must not be raised for the first time in the
Supreme Court in order to consider it.

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan found Tiongco guilty of (1) Usurpation of Official Functions, or

violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for signing
the disbursement voucher and check representing Estacio's retirement gratuity, the former
president of Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), a government-owned and controlled
corporation. His defense revolved around his good faith in signing the same considering that
Babin, the current president asked him to help him manage the office since he was still new to its
operations. Said authorization came on 24 April 2006 in the form of Special-Order No. 06-
008 where Tiongco was designated as Acting Senior Vice President. He also alleged that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be appreciated by the court, however, he
only raised it during his petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender can be appreciated.

RULING:

NO, Tiongco's plea to consider her voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance must be
set aside. Tiongco is raising this issue for the first time in this petition for review. Records show that
Tiongco never raised this argument during the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Likewise,

278
Tiongco failed to file her Memorandum where she should have argued for the consideration of this
mitigating circumstance. Lastly, Tiongco could have advanced her cause when she filed her motion
for reconsideration but lost her chance when she still failed to raise this issue then.

279
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AS THAT
COMMITTED

People of the Philippines vs. Salve Gonzales y Torno

G.R. No. 217022, June 3, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

An evil intent to ruthlessly beat up the helpless little boy and not by the honest
desire to discipline him for his honest mistake makes it evident that there was an intent to
commit the crime committed. Hence, the mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed cannot be appreciated in the accused’s favor.

FACTS:

On September 16, 2009, around 7 o'clock in the evening, Rhey Gonzales and Ronald
Gonzales, the victim, got home from school. Appellant also got home from work around the same
time. Shortly after, she discovered they had no current in the house because Ronald sold the
bronze wire connected to the electric meter. Then, appellant's co-workers came to fetch her.
When she came back home, she was drunk. Using a hanger, she hit Ronald several times until the
hanger snapped. Still, she did not stop. She got hold of the broom and using its wooden handle, hit
Ronald's head and body.

At around 6 o'clock the next morning, Ronald's vomited in his bed and his jogging pants
were wet with urine. Ronald could not eat and looked very weak. Herein accused then again took
hold of the broom and inserted its handle into Ronald's mouth.

Later in the evening, Glena Gonzales, appellant’s sister-in-law, brought Ronald to the East
Avenue Medical Center. Herein appellant argued that Ronald was just pretending and remained in
the house instead. Together with his uncle Teody Gonzales, Rhey went to the hospital to check
Ronald's condition. Ronald died around 10 o'clock in the evening of September 17, 2009.

The trial court found that the elements of parricide were all present in the case. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence this appeal. She is arguing that the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong must be appreciated in her favor,
and hence must be acquitted.

280
ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a

wrong can be appreciated in favor of the accused.

RULING:

NO. Undoubtedly, appellant was motivated not by art honest desire to discipline Ronald for
his mistake but by an evil intent to ruthlessly beat up the helpless little boy.

Appellant was sufficiently shown to have used brute force on Ronald so much so that the
hanger she initially used snapped. Even then, appellant did not stop; she got hold of the broom and
using its wooden handle hit Ronald in the head and all over his body. The following morning,
appellant saw Ronald's critical condition. There was vomit on his bed and on the floor. His jogging
pants were wet with urine. He was so weak he could neither get up, nor hold a spoon. He later fell to
the ground. But appellant still did not take pity on her young child. Once more, she got the broom
and pushed its yantok handle inside Ronald's mouth.

She kept beating him up despite seeing him already so weak and frail. Worse, appellant never
showed any sign of remorse, much less, love for her visibly dying child. She even refused to bring him
to the hospital, saying he was just pretending.

Appellant's cruelty toward her young child wickedly defies human nature especially the
mother's protective instinct toward her own. Plainly, appellant's brutish acts sufficiently produced,
and did actually produce, her son's death. Appellant, therefore, cannot be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.

281
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

PROPER PENALTY IN THE ATTENDANCE OF A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Romero Aseniero

G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the
following requisites must be established: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested;
(b), the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c)
the surrender is voluntary.

2. Pursuant to Article 64 (2), when only a mitigating circumstance attended the

commission of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period.

FACTS:

On August 23, 2003, at about 2:00 in the morning, Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn
Gomez and Mira Pagay were occupying one table at the dance hall. The accused, Romeo Aseniero,
was occupying a different table. At about 5:00 in the morning, Roel Pilo left the dancing hall
together with the group of Dominador Ranes. Loreto Gomez Papa also left the dance hall, together
with his two cousins and the accused, Romeo. On their way home, the group of Dominador passed
by a road in Brgy. Imelda, Bato, Leyte and were walking ahead of Loreto’s group at a distance of
about 10 arms-length. Since the road was too narrow, Dominador’s group did not walk side by
side. Mira Pagay trailed first, followed by Mario Pelago, then Roel Pilo, and behind him were
Dominador Ranes and Analyn Gomez.

According to Loreto, Analyn Gomez and the accused were still sweethearts and have not
broken up yet, but they were quarreling at that time. When the accused saw Analyn, he tried to go
after her and her companion. When the accused approached Analyn, he was kicked by Dominador.
Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in tum, unsheathed his bolo.

Suddenly, Dominador shouted "Aray" (Ouch!). At that instant, Dominador run past Roel
followed by the accused Romeo Aseniero, who was carrying a long bolo. More or less four (4)

282
meters from where he was, Dominador stumbled, with his back on the ground. The accused
caught up with the victim and hacked him multiple times.

The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim and was thus guilty of
murder. It also held that although the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities,
such mitigating circumstance cannot be applied to lower an indivisible penalty. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC but has mentioned that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance can be applied in lowering the imposition of
his penalty.

RULING:

YES. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following
requisites must be established: first, the accused has not been arrested; second, the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and third, the surrender is
voluntary. The said requisites were sufficiently proven by the defense. Given that Romeo voluntarily
surrendered, Article 64(2) states that when only a mitigating circumstance attended the commission
of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Thus, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, while the
minimum penalty shall be prision mayor in any of its periods.

283
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Noel Lita and Romulo Malinis

G.R. No. 227755, August 14, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

In People vs. Garcia:

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of

the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search
and capture.

FACTS:

This case is an appeal to the decision of the RTC and CA finding the accused-appellants
guilty for the crime of murder. Lita and Malinis, along with several others, were charged with the
murder of Hipolito Rementilla. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave credence to the testimony of
Nonilon Rementilla for being a straightforward and categorical eyewitness account of what
transpired which established the elements of murder. In his testimony, he stated that Lita and
Malinis were nearby, holding their guns, seemingly acting as lookouts. Hipolito’s dying
declaration identifying Lita as one of the perpetrators of the crime supported the testimony of
Nonilon.

Both the accused-appellants denied the accusation. Malinis testified that at the time of the
incident, he was at home, sleeping, when police officers came to their house looking for his
brother Lita and one Onyok. When he located them the following day, the three of them went to
the municipal hall. On the other hand, Lita alleged that on the same night, he was at the Christmas
Party at the barangay plaza with Onyok and a few others. Later on, they decided to have a
drinking session which lasted until 3:00 am. He claimed that he only learned about Hipolito’s
death on the morning thereafter from his brother Malinis.

Lita and Malinis appealed their conviction, alleging that their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. They raised several questions on the presence of the elements of murder.

284
However, assuming that the convictions were valid, they argued that the trial court failed to
consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, pointing out that they had
voluntarily appeared at the municipal hall the day after the incident.

The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the accused-appellants failed to establish
the elements of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. It asserted that, even if
voluntary surrender could mitigate the penalty imposed, the existence of evident premeditation
and treachery would cancel this out.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts failed to afford the accused-appellants with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

RULING:

NO, there is no merit to accused-appellants' allegations that the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender should apply to their case. In People vs. Garcia:

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the

accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.

Here, after accused-appellant Malinis had been informed that accused-appellant Lita was a
suspect in Hipolito's killing, both appeared at the municipal hall and were later detained. Upon
arraignment, they both pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder and continue to maintain their
innocence. Thus, it cannot be said that they surrendered themselves as an acknowledgment of guilt.
Without this element, the surrender cannot be deemed spontaneous and, thus, falls short of
establishing their supposed voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

285
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

Floro T. Tadena vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 228610, March 20, 2019

J. Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is to
give oneself up and submit to the authorities either because he/she acknowledges his/her
guilt or he/she wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be
incurred for his/her search and capture.

FACTS:

The accused Tadena, then the Municipal Mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, requested the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan for the creation of the position of a Municipal Administrator.
The Sangguniang Bayan adopted the First Version but Tadena vetoed it. Hence, he returned the
First Version unacted upon. Sangguniang Bayan deliberated on the request and passed the
Second Version. Sangguniang Bayan's Secretary, Tagorda, transmitted a copy of the Second
Version to Tadena for his approval. The Office of the Municipal Mayor returned the copy of the
Second Version with the Tadena's signature, but the first page thereof was substituted with an
apparent change in paragraph. The said Office returned said copies of Municipal Ordinance for
suppose transmittal to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary,
however, it was observed that page one of such was substituted and the provisions contained
thereof was changed. The Sangguniang Bayan enacted the Final Version except the alleged
falsified details.

Sangguniang Bayan Secretary Tagorda filed a complaint for Falsification of Public

Document against Tadena with the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
filed an Information against Tadena and charged him of falsification of public document under
Article 171 or the RPC.

286
ISSUE:

Whether or not the voluntary surrender of Tadena should be appreciated as a mitigating

circumstance.

RULING:

NO. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1)
the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is give oneself up and submit to the
authorities either because he/she acknowledges his/her guilt or he/she wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his/her search and capture. Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of
arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.

Here, the records disclose that a warrant of arrest had been issued before Tadena posted bail.
He also admitted in this petition that upon learning of the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
him, he surrendered to the First Division Clerk of Court. With Tadena's arrest being inevitable, his
surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary or spontaneous. Therefore, his claim of mitigating
circumstance does not deserve merit.

287
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

Isidro Miranda vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 231122, January 16, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper

conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which
is accordingly proportionate in gravity.

FACTS:

In the evening of August 14, 2011, victim Pilo and his friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left
after attending the party of his niece. While on their way home, they passed by the house of Isidro
Miranda and threw stones at the latter’s home. Miranda went outside and started hacking Pilo. He
hit Pilo’s right forehead. Again, Miranda tried to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his
left arm. In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso
grabbed possession of the bolo.

In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice but claimed that
his acts were done in self-defense. He narrated that he was at home with his wife and daughter
when he heard a thud at their door, followed by several other thuds and stones hurled at their
house. Miranda peeped through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that he
heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other. According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms
downwards to pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo’s arm with his
bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo’s oncoming attack. At this instance, Damaso, arrived
and grappled with Miranda to get a hold of the latter’s bolo. Because of this, Damaso likewise
sustained injuries.

ISSUE:

288
 Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.

RULING:

YES, Miranda is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.

While an act cannot be considered an unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the
same act may be regarded as sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. As a
mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the
victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in
gravity. The victim must have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused. Likewise,
in order to be mitigating, the provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.

Pilo’s act of hurling stones was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda into anger.
The fact that Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable considering that his wife and
daughter were at his home and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the stones.

289
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION OR OBFUSCATION, VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
PRAETER INTENTIONEM

People of the Philippines vs. William Sabalberino y Abulencia

G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is passion and obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.

FACTS:

William Sabalberino and Delia Fernandez Sabalberino were husband and wife. William
was employed as a painter, while Delia worked as a laundrywoman. They have five (5) children.
Around one 1:00am, two of their children were roused from their sleep when they heard their
parents shouting at each other. They were prompted to get out of bed and, thereafter, stood by the
door of their room while witnessing their parents argue with each other. While in the middle of
their quarrel, William punched Delia hitting her face. The children then rushed to their mother
and embraced her. Thereafter, William went to the kitchen to get a knife and proceeded to stab
Delia hitting her chest below the armpit while the latter was holding her children. Delia, on the
other hand, managed to stand and walk towards the door of their house. However, before
reaching the door, she decided to walk back towards the bed but before she could make it to the
bed she collapsed. William then went to her aid, embraced her and cried. He asked his children to
call for help, but Delia died soon thereafter. William argued that he was aroused when he saw his
wife half naked with a completely naked man on top of her. He then took a knife and he tried to
stab the man but, unfortunately, he accidentally hit his wife.

The RTC convicted William of Parricide. This was affirmed by the CA. William filed a notice
of appeal and cites Article 247 of the RPC as an absolutory and exempting circumstance. The
accused also interposed the presence of mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation,
voluntary surrender and praeter intentionem.

290
ISSUE:

Was the conviction of William for the crime of Parricide proper?

RULING:

YES. There is parricide when the following elements are present: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. These elements are proved in this case.

As to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, the Court ruled that there is
passion and obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. The turmoil and unreasonableness which naturally result from a quarrel or fight
should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended
to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement which is inherent in
all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation. In the present case, the
crime was precipitated by a quarrel between accused-appellant and the victim. However, such kind
of argument, no matter how heated or serious it was, is not the kind that would cause the passion or
obfuscation contemplated under the law.

As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court ruled that the same can
be appreciated if the accused satisfactorily complies with three requisites: (1) he has not been
actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3)
the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to
spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. In the instant case, there was no
showing of spontaneity on the part of accused-appellant as it was not he who asked for the police to
go to their house.

As to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that

committed, this circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular
moment when such offender executes or commits the criminal act. In the instant case, the
undeniable fact is that when accused-appellant attacked the victim, the former used a deadly
weapon and inflicted a mortal wound on the latter. While intent to kill is purely a mental process, it
may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained by the offended party and
the circumstances of the aggression, as well as the fact that the accused performed all the acts that
should have resulted in the death of the victim. Indeed, the location and nature of Delia's stab wound
belie accused-appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against the victim.

291
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Lumahang

G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for
his search and capture.

FACTS:

Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Novaliches,
Quezon City. Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook
motion with a knife in his left hand. Pornelos was hit on the buttocks. Without warning, appellant
then turned his ire on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body which
caused him death. Examining physician of Pornelos, found a stab wound on the latter's right
buttocks, which to be a non-fatal wound that required treatment for around seven days.

The accused contended that five bystanders, one of which is Pornelos, approached him
and LL. Suddenly, two of them touched the hands, shoulders and breasts of LL. One of them
punched the accused while another pulled out a knife. He was hit on his left thigh and they
grappled with the knife. When he saw a chance to run away, he ran towards the direction of his
aunt's house with the bystanders running after him. He had also sustained injuries from being
punched in the head and had a stab wound on his left thigh. Due to these injuries, he was confined
in a clinic in Novaliches. When he voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities, no knife was
recovered from him.

RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The
CA affirmed with modifications the RTC's conviction of Lumahang. The CA likewise upheld the
RTC finding that the attacks were attended with treachery. The CA also upheld the RTC's finding
that Lumahang was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he
surrendered to the barangay at the night of the incident after having been convinced by his aunt,

292
Virginia Lumahang. The CA convicted Lumahang of only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos
needed only seven days of confinement in the hospital to recover from the injury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender.

RULING:

YES. With regard to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Lumahang is entitled to the same. In De Vera vs. De
Vera, the Court held that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should
be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of
voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these
elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and
the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.

In the present case, Lumahang voluntarily surrendered to the barangay officers on the same
night the incident happened because he was convinced to do so by his aunt. This satisfies all the
aforementioned three requisites, thus entitling Lumahang to claim the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender.

293
 CHAPTER FOUR

Circumstances Which Aggravate Criminal Liability

ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.

2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his presence,
or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a
place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited place, or by a
band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title
of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a
lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or
by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation.
14. That craft, fraud, or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the
defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly

294
 and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for
the purpose.
19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be
broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by
means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means.
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.

TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Macaspac y Isip

G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

2. The qualifying circumstance of premeditation can be satisfactorily established

only if it could be proved that the defendant had ample and sufficient time to allow his
conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation
and reflection, following his plan to commit the crime.

FACTS:

295
 At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks with Ricardo
Surban, Dionisio Barcomo, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan, when an argument ensued between
Macaspac and Jebulan. The accused then left and returned after around three minutes with a
knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, when suddenly he stabbed him on the lower right area
of his chest and ran away, while the others witnessed the incident. The victim was rushed to the
hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the
possession of the knife, and when he took control of it, he had then stabbed the latter. However,
he later on claimed that the persons with whom Jebulan had argument were Barcomo and one
Danny. According to him, he tried to pacify their argument, but his efforts angered Jebulan, who
draw out the knife and tried to stab him. He fortunately evaded the stab thrust and struck Jebulan
with a wooden chair to defend himself. The blow caused Jebulan to fall on the knife, puncturing
his chest.

On trial, the Court finds that the killing of Robert Jebulan is qualified by treachery. On
appeal, the same was affirmed by the appellate court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery.

2. Whether or not the killing of the victim was qualified by evident premeditation.

RULING:

1. NO. Two conditions must concur in order for treachery to be appreciated: one, the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and two, said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.

In this case, Macaspac and Jebulan were out drinking along with others when they had an
argument that soon became heated causing for the former to leave the group and punctuating his
leaving with the warning. He did not mount the attack with surprise because the heated argument
between him and the victim and his angry threat of going back “to sweep them” had sufficiently
forewarned the latter of the impending lethal assault. The attack, even if it was sudden, did not
constitute treachery.

296
 2. NO. The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time
between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

In this case, the first and second requisites of evident premeditation were established. When
Macaspac left the group punctuating his leaving with a threat of an impending attack, such
circumstance indicated the time of his resolve to commit the crime. Moreover, his returning to the
group with a knife manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. However,
by quickly returning to the group with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to
reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. Herein, the execution immediately followed
the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the third requisite which states that the execution of the
criminal act should be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment, was absent.

Accordingly, without having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident
premeditation, Macaspac was only guilty of homicide for the killing of Jebulan.

297
USE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER; SYNDICATE
AS A SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ARSON

People of the Philippines vs. Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli

G.R. No. 203121, November 29, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. The circumstance of use of superior strength cannot serve to qualify or aggravate

the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

2. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling, while Section 4 thereof states that the maximum of the penalty shall be imposed
if arson was attended by the following special aggravating circumstances:

a. If committed with intent to gain;

b. If committed for the benefit of another;

c. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the

owner or occupant of the property burned;

d. If committed by a syndicate.

The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or carried out by a group of

three (3) or more persons.

FACTS:

This resolves the appeal of Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli from the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed, but modified as to the penalty and damages, the Joint 9 of the Regional
Trial Court, in Criminal Case Nos. L-00355 and L-00356, finding them guilty of Murder and Arson.

Sota and Gadjadli were charged before the RTC with murder and arson. Based on the
accusations, the accused attack, assault, shoot and stab Artemio Eba, thereby inflicting upon him

298
multiple gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds on different vital parts of his body, which
caused his instantaneous death; that the accused set on fire the Residential house of the victim,
causing to be totally burned including his belongings.

Sota and Gadjadli, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges against them;
hence, joint trial proceeded. The RTC found both accused guilty of the crime of murder and arson.
The CA affirms the Decision of the RTC with some modifications as to the penalties imposed to
the accused.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not aggravating circumstance of use of superior strength attended the

commission of murder.

2. Whether or not an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of arson.

RULING:

1. NO. The Court held that the circumstance of use of superior strength cannot serve to
qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
latter.

2. YES. The Court held that the special aggravating circumstance that arson was committed
by a syndicate should have been appreciated in this case.

The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a syndicate was confirmed
by the fact that the accused-appellants and three other unidentified persons carried a torch and
assembled outside Artemio' s house making threats to burn it. The well-coordinated movements of
the group fortified their joint purpose and design, and community of interest in burning Artemio's
house. The group started to bum the house of Artemio when he refused to open his door in order to
hand them food. It was fortunate that Artemio was able to put out the fire from the torch; but after
the group had fired on the house of Artemio, they set fire to his house and thereafter ran after him to
shoot him. Noteworthy, in their respective decisions, both the RTC and the CA ruled that there were
five persons who killed Artemio and burned his house down.

299
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Jerson Dasmarinas y Gonzales

G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The failure of the information supposedly charging murder to aver the factual basis
for the attendant circumstance of treachery forbids the appreciation of the circumstance
as qualifying the killing. To merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is
not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of
law.

FACTS:

Accused-Appellant Dasmarinas filed an appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals

which affirmed with modification the judgement of conviction of the Regional Trial Court. The
RTC convicted Dasmarinas of Murder. The CA, however, upgraded the conviction to Murder
without eligibility of parole.

PO2 Marlon Anoya was in front of a beerhouse drunk at around 2:00 in the morning, two
men came from his back and shot him twice at the back of the head and on the right side of his
face. The incident was seen by Aries Perias, a sign art vendor, from a distance of two (2) meters.
Perias recognized one of the men as accused Dasmarinas following the cartographic sketch and
out-of-court identification. The other person was wearing a cap. An information was filed against
Dasmarinas and Nino Polo.

RTC convicted Dasmarinas guilty of Murder sentencing him to penalty of reclusion

perpetua plus penalties. Meanwhile, Polo was acquitted.

The CA affirmed the conviction of Dasmarinas, but the penalty was modified to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility of parole plus penalties.

ISSUE:

300
 Was the conviction of Dasmarinas for the crime of Murder proper?

RULING:

NO. Dasmarinas is only guilty of Homicide. Treachery, which both the CA and RTC ruled to be
attendant, has basic constitutive elements. Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code states
that "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which offended party might
make." For treachery to be appreciated, therefore, two elements must be alleged and proved, namely:
(1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted,
that is, the means, methods or forms of execution must be shown to be deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender.

The information herein did not make any factual averment on how Dasmariñas had
deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act - setting forth such means,
methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense was intended to be charged - that tended directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. To merely state in
the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because the usage of such term is not a
factual averment but a conclusion of law.

301
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ROBBERY IN BAND

Ramon Amparo y Ibañez vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to
another by use of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5) in relation to
Article 295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when
four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members are punished as
principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused
took steps to prevent the commission of the crime. Even if the crime is committed by
several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is still classified as
robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage, It is highway robbery only when it
can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of
committing that crime.

FACTS:

Information was filed against Ahmed Alcubar y Sabiron (Alcubar), Roberto Guarino y
Capnao (Guarino), Juanito Salmeo y Jacob (Salmeo), and Ramon Amparo y Ibañez (Amparo) for
robbery. The alleged event happened on April 26, 2007, at the City of Manila, according to the
information filed. It said that all the accused conspired and confederated together and helped one
another armed with deadly bladed weapons and therefore in band, with intent of gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by boarding a passenger jeepney. They poked
said arms upon Raymond Ignacio, and announced the hold-up, robbed and carried away his Nokia
6680 worth P14,000.00. The accused were arraigned, and they pleaded "not guilty." Ignacio
identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who announced
the hold-up. He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat beside
the driver. He admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of
the incident. However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when
the police fired the warning shot. Amparo, on the other hand, testified that on April 26, 2007, he
was in Carriedo, Quiapo, Manila, working as a parking attendant when a person he did not know

302
arrived and arrested him. Later, he was brought to the Philippine National Police Anti-Carnapping
Unit where he saw Ignacio for the first time.

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 rendered a Decision, finding the accused guilty
of robbery in band. All the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. Amparo, in particular,
argued that he and Salmeo should be acquitted since the witnesses for the prosecution did not
testify that they performed any act in furtherance of the robbery. the Court of Appeals rendered
its Decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with band.

RULING:

NO, the Trial Court is correct in finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with band.

Robbery is the taking, with the intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by
use of force, violence or intimidation. Under Article 294 (5) in relation to Article 295, and Article 296
of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take
part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band,
unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime. Even if
the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is
still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage, It is highway robbery only
when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of
committing that crime.

In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
was guilty of robbery in band. Although Ignacio did not see what petitioner was doing at the time of
the incident since petitioner and his co-accused Salmeo were seated beside the driver. His failure to
see what petitioner was doing during the robbery is justified considering that the configuration of a
jeepney bench makes it hard to see precisely what passengers seated in the front seat are doing.
Ignacio was also able to testify that he saw both Salmeo and petitioner place their knives on the
jeepney bench when the police fired a warning shot. Petitioner initially offered a defense of alibi
before the trial court. He abandoned this defense on appeal after the trial court concluded that
petitioner's alibi was not enough to overcome Ignacio's positive identification. argued before the

303
Court of Appeals that while Ignacio might have seen him at the scene of the crime, there was no
evidence of petitioner's exact involvement. His changing defenses, however, only show the weakness
of his arguments.

304
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Ambrosio Ohayas, Roberto Owas, Florencio Rapana, Cerelo
Baluro, Eddie Yaguno, Rupo Yaguno and Jerry Yaguno

G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

FACTS:

Armando, Jr., 12 years old, Lou, 18 years old and Sany, 15 years old, were hanging out
under a tree along the national road of Sitio Bonbon, Cebu. Lou noticed Ambrosio had a shotgun
on his hand and his companions, Roberto, Florencio, Cerelo. Eddie, Rupo and Jerry, were carrying
torches. When Ambrosio and his companions were near the three, Ambrosio suddenly shot
Armando, Jr in the abdomen and continued to shoot Lou and Sany who were able to flee to their
houses to seek refuge. Armando, Jr. managed to call his father who was nearby. Armando, Jr. died
on the vehicle on the way to the hospital. Ambrosio fled the day after the incident and hid for
three (3) years, until he was apprehended

Ambrosio on his defense stated that he was fishing on the day of the incident and upon
hearing from SP03 Bancog that he is being blamed for the incident and in fear of retaliation, he
decided to take refuge at the house of his neighbor and several months after the incident, he
transferred to Basak.

RTC finds Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abrosio is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

305
RULING:

YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

Here, the alevosia or treachery attended the killing of the victim was apparent from the
suddenness of the attack. Armando, Jr., the 12-year old victim, who was merely talking to his friends,
was suddenly shot by Ambrosio. The shooting in this case was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying
the victim the opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed and unaware of the harm
about to happen to him.

Thus, the court finds the accused guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

306
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Demetrio Sabida y Sadiwa

G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the
imminent peril to his life.

FACTS:

While Pimentel and Mawac were on their way to work, Sabida unexpectedly emerged from
the road and stabbed Mawac with a bolo, while Pimentel ran away. Sabida tried to chase Pimentel
but he failed to catch the latter. Pimentel reported the incident to the police station. Sabida was
arrested on the same day. Sabida admitted killing Mawac but invoked self-defense, contending
that he received accusations from Mawac that his domestic animals are destroying Mawac’s crops
to which the latter retaliated and poisoned his domestic animals. He said that on the day of the
incident, he approached Pimentel and Mawac to ask why Mawac was intending to kill him and
where his missing chickens were. He also said that Mawac tried to draw out a bolo from his waist
and Sabida merely defended himself and they struggled and fought each other.

The RTC convicted Sabida of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Upon review by
the CA, it affirmed the RTC decision. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sabida is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. The qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated. In this
case, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the imminent

307
peril to his life. Mawac was obviously caught off-guard, unprepared for the sudden, unexpected and
unprovoked attack on his person when Sabida surprisingly emerged from the road and hacked him
with a bolo. The sudden and unexpected attack adopted by Sabida deprived the victim of any chance
to defend himself or to retaliate. He had no foreboding of any danger, threat or harm upon his life at
the said time, place and occasion. There was treachery not only because of the suddenness of the
attack but also because of the absence of an opportunity on the victim's part to repel the attack.
Without a doubt, the killing was attended by treachery.

Thus, Sabida's conviction for the crime of murder must stand.

308
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES - MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE PERPETRATOR

People of the Philippines vs. Pablo Luad Armodia

G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:
The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the
perpetrator, both of which must concur and must be alleged in the information. It is
immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically
pleaded for in the information.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Pablo Luad Armodia (accused-appellant) and his wife, BBB, had three
(3) children, the oldest of whom was AAA. They have a makeshift room beside the piggery they
own located in Cambanay, Danao City, Cebu which served as the venue for the material incidents
in this case. The first incident happened in the last week of March 2003 at about 8:00am, she was
then only 16 years old. The second incident happened in the same place on April 4, 2003 at
around 3:00am. The next day, on April 5, 2003, AAA finally revealed everything to her mother,
BBB. On April 6, 2003, AAA and BBB reported the incident to their punong barangay, who
thereafter informed the police. She was brought to Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, then
Southern Island Hospital, for examination. Dr. Elvie Austria (Dr. Austria) examined AAA and
issued a Medical Certificate which stated "Tanner IV, redundant.” and "medical evaluation is
suggestive of abuse." Accused-appellant was arrested on the same day and charged with two (2)
counts of rape of a minor under two (2) separate Informations.

Accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the rape charges. On October
21, 2003, the State moved for leave to amend the information and add the phrase, "being the
father of the victim." The Regional Trial Court denied the State's motion, ruling that the requested
amendment was substantial and prejudicial to accused-appellant's right to be informed of the
charges against him. The criminal cases were tried jointly. The State presented three (3)
witnesses: pediatrician Dr. Naomi Poca (Dr. Poca), BBB, and AAA. Defense presented the accused-
appellant as its sole witness. He admitted that AAA was his daughter but denied the rape charges
against him. According to him, the criminal cases were filed in retaliation for his strict upbringing

309
of his children. Accused-appellant added that he was physically incapable of having sexual
intercourse as two (2) years before the first alleged rape, he sustained a gunshot wound on the
right portion of his body. Thus, whenever he had sex, "his wastes would go out of his intestines."

The Regional Trial Court convicted accused-appellant of two (2) counts of simple rape. It
cited People vs. Ilao that “accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape, because of the
prosecution's failure to include the relationship in the information.” The trial court did not give
credence to his defense of physical incapacity, as "his wife BBB testified that they had sexual
congress many times."

Accused-appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that "the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Regional Trial Court's Decision, adding the payment of six percent (6%) legal
interest in the award for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant committed simple rape, not qualified rape.

RULING:

YES, Accused-appellant committed two (2) counts of simple rape, not qualified rape.

The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the perpetrator, both of which
must concur and must be alleged in the information. It is immaterial whether the relationship was
proven during trial if that was not specifically pleaded for in the information. Simple rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found that the accused-appellant's
relationship with AAA was not duly alleged in the informations filed. Thus, his relationship with the
victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise would deprive him of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

310
TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Rene Boy Dimapilit

G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, 2 elements should be proven:
(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity
to defend themselves or retaliate; and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.

2. There is abuse of superior strength whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous
to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime.

FACTS:

On February 11, 2007, victim Diego Garcia informed his live-in partner Magdalena Apasan
that he would go to Pastor Dimapilit's house as Pastor wanted to rent his tricycle. He said that he
would be back immediately because he would be sending off his brother, Simeon Garcia, who was
visiting from Mindoro at that time. When 20 minutes passed and Diego was still not home,
Magdalena became worried since Pastor and his sons were reputed troublemakers in their place.
Thus, Magdalena and Simeon decided to go to Pastor's house. As they approached Pastor's house,
Magdalena saw 1 of Pastor's sons, Junnel, box Diego's face. Diego tried to escape but Junnel
caught him. Pastor hit Diego's head with a piece of wood, rendering Diego unconscious. Rene Boy,
another son of Pastor, hit Diego's face with a crowbar. Pastor and his sons Junnel and Joel kept on
boxing Diego, prompting Simeon to shout at them to stop. Rene Boy then responded, "Putang-ina
mo, ikaw na ang susunod na mapapatay." For fear that the assailants might pursue her, Magdalena
hid behind a mango tree. Simeon ran for help. When Pastor and his sons left, Magdalena went to
Diego's aid, whose face was unrecognizable. The police officers then arrived at the crime scene

311
where they saw Diego lying on the ground, drenched in blood, with his tricycle 20 meters away.
Magdalena told the police that Pastor, Junnel, Rene Boy, and Joel killed Diego.

Rene Boy, Pastor, Junnel, and Joel were charged with murder. Only Rene Boy was arraigned
as Pastor and Junnel escaped from detention. Rene Boy pleaded not guilty to the charge. He
denied all the accusations against him. He testified that on February 10, 2007, he and his wife
slept at his parents' house to attend his cousin's birthday the next day. He said that they hurriedly
left around 9:00am the next day as they were invited by his brother Junnel to have lunch at the
house of Junnel's parents-in-law. Together with Junnel and his wife, they rode a tricycle and
reached their destination at around 10:00am. After lunch, Rene Boy claimed that he and his wife
immediately went home to check on the charcoal he was making. It was only when he was
arrested on October 6, 2007 that he discovered that he was 1 of the suspects for Diego's death. He
averred not to know anything about the incident, his father being a suspect, or his father's and
brother Junnel's arrest just a few days after the incident. However, he later admitted that he
learned about Junnel's apprehension but not his father's. During trial, Rene Boy gave inconsistent
answers on the actual time of Junnel's invitation to leave.

The RTC found that Diego was killed by the 4 accused. It gave more credence to
Magdalena's positive identification of Rene Boy as the offender. Similarly, Magdalena's statements
were substantiated by the medico-legal report. Furthermore, the RTC found that there was
treachery, qualifying the killing to murder. Despite Diego's helpless condition, the accused
repeatedly hacked him to ensure his death. However, evident premeditation could not be
appreciated as there was no showing that the collective acts of the accused were preceded by a
reflection that led to a determined plan to kill Diego after sufficient time had passed from the
hatching of the plan.

In his appeal, Rene Boy insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as
Magdalena's testimony was allegedly tainted with material and substantial inconsistencies.
However, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It ruled that Rene Boy failed to substantiate his defense
of denial. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rene Boy's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

312
 YES, Rene Boy's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, Diego went to
Pastor's house, believing in good faith that Pastor would just borrow his tricycle. Diego was never
forewarned that danger awaits his destination; he even assured Magdalena that he would
immediately return since he would be sending off his brother to Mindoro. Not expecting any peril for
his life, he proceeded to Pastor's house unarmed and alone. The 4 accused took turns in beating and
hitting him. Trapped and obviously outnumbered, Diego was undoubtedly put in a position where he
was helpless and unable to protect himself. When Junnel beat Diego, he tried to escape but Joel
grabbed him. Joel then punched him on the face. Consequently, Pastor hit him with a piece of wood
rendering him unconscious. Despite this, however, Rene Boy still proceeded to hit him with a crowbar.
With these, the 4 accused succeeded in killing him without risk to themselves. Collectively, these are
indicative of treachery. Hence, the means employed by the assailants were knowingly sought to
ensure Diego's death.

As to evident premeditation, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that the
acts of the assailants were preceded by a reflection that led to a determined plan to kill Diego after
sufficient time had passed from the inception of the plan. In the absence of clear and positive
evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and
probable, are insufficient.

With regard to abuse of superior strength, the same attended Diego's killing. Abuse of
superior strength means "to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked." Thus, in considering this aggravating circumstance, this
Court looks into the age, size and strength of the parties. Here, Diego was 72 years old when he was
killed. His assailants, Pastor, Rene Boy, and Junnel were respectively 50, 27, and 18 years old. Given
the disparity in their ages, the assailants were physically stronger than the victim. Additionally, the
manner by which the assailants killed Diego reflects how they took advantage of their superior
strength to weaken the defense and guarantee execution of the offense. It is, therefore, apparent that
the victim was besieged by their concerted acts.

When treachery and abuse of superior strength coincides, abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery. Hence, the SC affirms the conviction of the accused; Rene Boy Dimapilit is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

313
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Segfred L. Orozco, Manuel D. Osir and Alberto B. Maturan

G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves
or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

FACTS:

Accused Orozco, Osir, Castro, and Maturan, apparently drunk, entered and occupied the
table in front of Lalona and Mata. Shortly after they ordered beer, Orozco approached Mata from
behind and stabbed him twice with a small bolo. Mata shouted that he was stabbed. Lalona
grabbed Orozco and wrestled with him, but he pushed her back. When Mata tried to run out, the
rest of the accused caught him. While Maturan and Osir held Mata's arms, Castro stabbed him in
the chest. The four (4) accused continued stabbing Mata and ran away when Lalona shouted for
help. Lalona took Mata to the Caraga Regional Hospital on a tricycle, but Mata was pronounced
dead on arrival. Immediately after, Lalona went to Mata's house and told his relatives what had
happened. Consiquently, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found them guilty of
murder by conspiring the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exist treachery in the commission of the crime.

RULING:

YES, treachery exist in the commission of the said crime. Contrary to accused-appellant's
contention, the finding of treachery was not based only on Orozco's act of swiftly stabbing Mata

314
from behind. As observed by the Court of Appeals, Mata was helpless against a group of persons with
knives, who ganged up on him and held his hands while stabbing him.

315
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR STATUTORY RAPE CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Entrampas

G.R. No. 212161, March 29, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code states that: Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) Through force, threat, or
intimidation; (2) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
(3) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. Also, under Article 266-B (1) of the Revised
Penal Code: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a ... guardian ... or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

FACTS:

Juanita Entrampas (Entrampas) and BBB were common-law spouses. AAA, BBB's daughter
from a previous relationship, lived with them. She looked up to Entrampas as her adoptive father.
Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived from school. Entrampas asked her to
go to the room upstairs. The 11-year old girl obeyed. Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the
floor. She was warned by accused-appellant that if she shouted he would kill her and her mother
if she told the latter. He then took advantage of her. As he consummated the act, she noticed a
knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful. After satisfying himself, he again
warned the child that he would kill her arid her mother if she informed anyone about the incident.
She was left in the room sobbing. BBB asked AAA why she was crying. Fearful of Entrampas'
threats, AAA did not tell her mother. The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003.
Over the following months, Entrampas repeatedly raped AAA, who, out of fear, remained silent. In
July 2003, BBB observed some changes in her daughter's body. AAA's breasts had swollen, she
had lost her appetite, and she was always sleeping. By September 2003, AAA's belly had become
noticeably bigger. She was brought to the dispensary where her urine test was submitted for

316
analysis. AAA's pregnancy test yielded positive. Fearing for her life, AAA refused to reveal the
identity of the father of her child. BBB asked Entrampas, who, according to BBB, admitted that he
was the father of AAA's child. Entrampas and BBB went to BBB's brother, CCC, "to confess the
crime he had committed against AAA." Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful and told CCC to kill
him to avenge AAA. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police. On November 3, 2003,
AAA gave birth to a baby boy.

Entrampas was charged with two (2) counts of qualified rape. Entrampas claimed that he
could not have raped AAA as he was often in the rice field.

The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of statutory rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

two (2) counts of statutory rape.

RULING:

YES. Statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code states that: Rape is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances: a.) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b.) When the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c.) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and d.) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. Also, under Article
266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: When the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a ... guardian ... or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

The circumstances qualifying rape, the prosecution established that the victim was less than
12 years old when the incident happened in February 2003, and that the offender was her guardian.
AAA's Certificate of Live Birth proved her minority. AAA was the accused-appellant's foster daughter.
AAA and her mother, who was accused-appellant's former live-in partner, resided with accused-
appellant in his house. AAA gave birth on November 3, 2003, within nine (9) months from the date of
the first rape in February 2003.

317
 Thus, accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of statutory rape by the Supreme Court.

318
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION OF THE VICTIM IN RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Deniega y Espinosa

G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age
below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. Stating an excerpt from the case People vs.
Quintos, “...a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to
an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental
age.”

FACTS:

AAA was a young lass suffering from mental retardation. Around 7 o'clock in the evening
of May 2, 2007, AAA who, was then sixteen years old but with a mental capacity of a six (6)-year-
old child, went out of their house with some neighbors to watch a basketball game in a nearby
basketball court. Upon returning home at approximately 11 o'clock in the evening of the same
date, BBB, AAA's mother noticed that the latter's pants were wet. When BBB asked AAA, what
caused the wetting of her pants, the latter simply dismissed her mother's query and said that it
was nothing (wala lang). Prompted by suspicion, BBB asked AAA to remove her pants, thereupon,
she smelled her underwear which emitted the scent of semen. When quizzed by her mother, AAA
eventually admitted that herein accused-appellant, whom she calls Dodong, and who was known
to them as a delivery boy in their neighborhood, invited her to go to another basketball court
where they could talk with each other but, instead, upon arriving at the said place, he undressed
her and made her lie down. BBB put AAA's underwear in a plastic bag and immediately reported
the incident to the barangay authorities. At the time of his apprehension, accused-appellant was
very drunk. Upon questioning by the authorities, accused-appellant admitted in front of his
employer and BBB that he had sex with AAA and that he loves AAA and he offered to marry her.
He also requested BBB and the barangay authorities not to file a case against him. BBB, however,
refused. Instead, she brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination. Subsequently, a criminal
complaint for rape was filed against accused-appellant. In his defense, accused-appellant denied
the allegations of the prosecution and also raised the defense of alibi. Pre-trial was conducted on
September 12, 2007.

319
 RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty as charged and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The CA promulgated its
assailed Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant should be convicted with Statutory Rape.

RULING:

YES, the accused-appellant should be convicted with Statutory Rape.

Statutory rape is committed when: (1) the offended party is under twelve years of age; and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done
through fraud or grave abuse of authority. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence
of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman
who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. In
People vs. Quintos, this Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person
whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph
l(d) and not paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A of the RPC. In holding as such, this Court differentiated
the term "mentally-retarded" or "intellectually disabled" from the terms "deprived of reason" and
"demented" as used under Article 266-A, paragraphs 1(b) and 1(d) of the RPC. Stating an excerpt
from the case People vs. Quintos, “...a person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to
express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or
her mental age.”

In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim, at the time of the commission of
the crime, was 16 years old but with a mental age of a 6-year-old child. The prosecution was able to
establish these facts through AAA's Birth Certificate, Clinical Abstract prepared by a medical doctor
who is a psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health, as well as the testimonies of the
said doctor and the victim's mother, BBB.

320
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Roque Dayaday y Dagooc

G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as
when the accused attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and
unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any
event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring
the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.

FACTS:

Alex and his father, Basilio Gallenero were walking on the way home after attending a
wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo Dayaday when Roque Dayaday successively shot
Basilio in the back four (4) times. Alex was able to recognize Roque since he was only a few
meters away. For fear of his life, Alex ran away and reported the incident to the police officers.

Roque raised his alibi by testimonies of Reynald Dayaday and Dennis Blancada that Roque
was at the kitchen the whole time since they altogether were tasked to prepare the food for the
wedding celebration.

RTC found Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal the CA
ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation,
and it is treachery that is present in the case, enough to convict the accused of the crime murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roque is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

321
 YES. There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without warning, as when
the accused attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden and unexpected and
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any event, so sudden and
unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring the execution of the criminal
act without risk to the assailant.

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from
behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to
his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to
kill Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable
of retaliation.

Hence, treachery was evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.

322
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER; DWELLING AND DISGUISE AS
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Tirso Sibbu

G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017

Del, Castillo, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

2. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although

the triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this
circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually
entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was
attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without.

FACTS:

Between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6, 2004, Bryan Julian, the private complainant,
was with his three-year old daughter, Trisha May Julian, his mother Ofelia Julian and his father
Warlito Julian, in the azotea of his parents' house when he saw from a distance a person in
camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his head.
Bryan recognized the armed man as the appellant, when the latter tried to fix his bonnet. He also
saw two men in crouching position at a distance. Bryan then shouted a warning to his family
however the appellant fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito. Thereafter, Bryan ran
inside the house where he saw his brother, Warlito Julian, Jr. and told the latter about the incident.
Another witness, Eddie Bayudan, also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the house of
Warlito and Ofelia and from a distance he saw a man wearing a black bonnet and a long-sleeved
camouflage uniform and holding a long firearm. He also saw another man crouching on the
ground whom he recognized as the accused Benny.

323
 Appellant denied the charges against him arguing that he never left the house of his in-
laws nor having any misunderstanding with the Julian family or knowing Bryan and Benny
personally or possessing camouflage clothing.

On trial, the trial court gave credence to Bryan's positive identification of appellant as the
person who shot at him and killed his daughter, mother and father, and convicting the appellant
guilty for the crime of murder. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decisions of the trial
court, hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the accused was guilty of murder attended by qualifying circumstance
of treachery.

2. Whether or not the accused was guilty of murder attended by aggravating

circumstances of dwelling and disguise.

RULING:

1. YES. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

In this case, at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha, and Bryan were at
the porch of their house, unarmed and totally unaware of the impending attack, thus unable to
prepare for a defense. On the other hand, appellant and his cohorts were armed while
surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. They also wore camouflage uniform to avoid
detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his family about the imminent attack, it was too late for
the victims to run for safety or to defend themselves. In fine, appellant employed deliberate means to
ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims with minimal risk to his safety.

2. YES. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the
triggerman fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be
considered it is not necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the
victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the assault from without.

324
 In this case, Tirso Sibbu was outside the house of the victims and the latter were at the azotea
in their house when the former fired shots at them. Under these circumstances, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated.

The use of disguise was likewise properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this
case. Bryan testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident.
There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal
his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with
each other.

Accordingly, the accused was guilty of three counts of murder attended by qualifying
circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Further, the commission of the crime
of murder was attended by aggravating circumstances of dwelling and disguise.

325
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF STATUTORY RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Jose Descartin, Jr. y Mercader

G.R. No. 215195, June 7, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation
or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the
absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At
that age, the law presumes that the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable
of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of
statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of proving: (1) the age of the
complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual intercourse between the
accused and the complainant.To raise the crime of rape to qualified rape under Article
266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must concur.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Jose Descartin, Jr. y Mercader was accused of the crime of Qualified
Rape. In the Information, it was alleged therein that on or about July 19, 2003, in Davao City,
Descartin had a carnal knowledge of his 11-year-old minor biological daughter, herein referred as
AAA. The relationship of consanguinity was alleged as a qualifying circumstance in the accusatory
portion of the Information.

On his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty of the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court
convicted him of the crime of Qualified Rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision. Modifying the part that the accused-
appellant should pay AAA the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages and 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus 6% interest per annum on the total monetary award from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.

326
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the appellant of the offense of
qualified rape notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

NO, the RTC and CA is not wrong in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Qualified
Rape.

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent
is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. At that age, the law presumes that
the victim does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual
act. Thus, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden of
proving: (1) the age of the complainant; (2) the identity of the accused; and (3) the sexual
intercourse between the accused and the complainant. To raise the crime of rape to qualified rape
under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and
her relationship to the offender must concur.

The elements of minority of AAA and the relationship of the accused-appellant with AAA
were alleged in the Information and sufficiently proven by the prosecution during the trial, That
AAA was 11 years old during the commission of the rape and that accused-appellant is AAA's father
were established by AAA's Certificate of Live Birth.

Therefore, the Supreme Court agrees with the CA that the accused-appellant is guilty of
statutory rape under Article 266-A paragraph 1(d), as qualified under Article 266-B of the RPC.

327
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Ludigario Belen y Marasigan

G.R. No. 215331, January 23, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially

in sensitive cases of rape, as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not
to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in

the Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The victim's
minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself.

FACTS:

Belen is charged in two separate information with Qualified Rape against AAA, an eight (8)
year-old minor. It was aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and dwelling. Belen, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to each
charge. The defense presented AAA, Police Senior Inspector Cabrera, the medico-legal officer, and
BBB, AAA’s mother. Belen denied the charges and AAA is BBB’s daughter.

The Regional Trial Court decided finding Belen to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape. Appellant filed his appeal with the CA.

CA rendered its Decision which denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Belen is guilty of two counts of Simple Rape and not of Qualified Rape.

328
RULING:

YES, Belen is guilty of two counts of Simple Rape and not of Qualified Rape.

Rape is qualified when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Well-settled is the rule that qualifying
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal certainty
as the crime itself. The victim's minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime
itself.

The information alleged that AAA is eight years old and appellant is the common law
husband of AAA's mother. The relationship of AAA with appellant was admitted by the latter but
AAA's age was not sufficiently proved during trial. The prosecution presented a copy of AAA's birth
certificate but the same was not authenticated, hence, could not be given any probative value. While
attached to the records is AAA's baptismal certificate which showed that she was born on July 27,
1991, which the defense admitted being a faithful reproduction of the original, however, the same
was not offered in evidence.

Thus, RTC and CA is correct in ruling that the crime is of Simple Rape and not Qualified Rape.

329
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Paul Duran

G.R. No. 215748, November 20, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on

the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself.

FACTS:

In 2012, the RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. During
trial, Duran invoked self-defense. However, the Court was convinced that there was no unlawful
aggression. Assuming that Grimaldo and his unidentified companion really tried to hold-up Duran,
the latter's testimony shows that the aggression had already ceased when Duran was able to
successfully take the gun from the possession of Grimaldo. Having now the possession of the gun,
there was obviously no reason for him to shoot the victim successively because the unlawful
aggression from the victim has stopped.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Duran's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

NO. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to

330
defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. The prosecution did not
prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him. The confrontation
between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance encounter. It was also not proven that
Duran deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo could not defend himself.

With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is Homicide and not
Murder. The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal. In the absence
of any modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.

331
TREACHERY, DWELLING AND OLD AGE AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CRIME
OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Marlon Soriano y Narag

G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

1. While a victim may have been warned of possible danger to his person, there is
treachery nonetheless when the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it
impossible for the victim to retaliate.

2. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside
his house.

FACTS:

Marlon Narag, nephew of the Spouses Ederlina and Perfecto Narag, went to the house of
the Spouses Narag with a bladed weapon asking Ederlina where Perfecto was. Perfecto was then
71 years old. Upon seeing the weapon, Ederlina shouted, informing Perfecto to close the door to
his room. Before Perfecto could close the door, Marlon stabbed Perfecto. Despite the Spouses plea
to stop, Marlon continued stabbing Perfecto which resulted in his death. Villamor, a tricycle driver
in their employ, heard the screams of Ederlina to which he tried to stop Marlon but failed. When
Marlon tried to stab Villamor, he ran out of the house to where he met Martin, brother of Marlon,
who threatened Villamor not to report the incident to the police. But Villamor nevertheless
reported the same. When the police officers went to the scene of the crime to investigate, they
found a lifeless Perfecto lying in a pool of blood in his room.

Marlon on his defense claimed that there was bad blood between his family and Perfecto’s.
That the latter went to the store near where he was living and yelled asking him to step outside.
When he stepped outside, Perfecto swung his knife which injured his knee. He then ran inside to
grab a chisel and before Perfecto could hurt him again, he stabbed him first. He also said that he
surrendered himself to Brgy. Councilman Lucas who brought him to the police and was
investigated. When Ederlina filed a criminal case against Marlon, he pleaded guilty.

332
 The RTC found Perfecto guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder and found
one (1) qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two (2) generic aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and disrespect to the victim who is already old. RTC also accepted the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon appeal, CA sustained the RTC’s decision finding Marlon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marlon is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. The totality of the circumstances leads to the inevitable conclusion that the victim was
caught unaware and unable to defend himself and the accused deliberately chose a manner of
attack that insured the attainment of his violent intention with no risk to himself.

Here, the fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not
rule out the presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of
possible danger to his person, [there is treachery nonetheless when] the attack was executed in such
a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. The case at bar typifies this doctrine
for the victim had no opportunity to defend himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be
the subject of an attack right inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put
up a defense. It must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could have
been worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward off
the attack.

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Dwelling is
considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy [that] the law accords to [the]
human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere.

Here. the victim was killed not merely in his house but in his own room. The accused could
have killed him elsewhere, but he decided to commit the crime at the victim's home; thus the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the accused.

The Court is also convinced that the offense was committed in disregard of the respect due to
the age of the victim. The accused knew fully well that the victim was already old because he is his

333
uncle. The accused perpetrated the act against his ageing uncle knowing that by himself, the victim's
physical condition due to old age would not allow him to sufficiently defend himself anymore.

334
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IN THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Tito Amoc

G.R. No. 216937, June 5, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

The circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the

Informations and proved during trial to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.

FACTS:

Tito Amoc was charged in the two Informations with two counts of rape against his 13
years old stepdaughter. During arraignment, Amoc pleaded not guilty. Victim AAA narrated that
on April 2009 at around 6:00am, Amoc brought her into their bedroom, took off all her clothes,
tied her legs with a rope, undressed himself, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her.
Amoc covered AAA's mouth to prevent her from asking help, pointed a knife at her and tried to
stab her. AAA could not tell her mother what happened because Amoc was always tailing her. AAA
also testified that the second sexual abuse happened on July 12, 2009. Amoc even warned AAA
not to say anything about the incident. AAA's mother, BBB, noticed that AAA's stomach had a
slight bulge and conducted a pregnancy test, which yielded a positive result. AAA later divulged
that Amoc had been raping her and that he is the father of her baby. AAA gave birth to a baby girl
sometime in December 2009.

Amoc admitted that he had sexual congress with AAA but argued that the same was
consensual. Amoc claimed that it was an accepted practice among the Ata-Manobo; an indigenous
cultural group, to take one's daughter as a second wife.

The RTC found Amoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, this appeal. Amoc argues that: (1) the prosecution failed to
prove the element of force and intimidation; and (2) his admission of carnal knowledge of AAA
does not amount to rape.

ISSUE:

335
 Whether or not the conviction of Amoc is proper.

RULING:

YES. The findings of fact of the courts a quo sufficiently support the conviction of Amoc for
the crime of rape against AAA. For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC to prosper, the
following elements must be present: (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) he
accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation. The first element in this case is present
because Amoc admits that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. As regards the second element, the
record sufficiently established that Amoc employed force, intimidation and threat in carrying out his
sexual advances on AAA – he tied AAA's legs with a rope, climbed on top of her, and covered her
mouth to prevent her from asking for help. He also threatened AAA when he pointed a knife at her
and tried to stab her. And even assuming that AAA failed to resist, the same does not amount to
consent to Amoc's criminal acts. It is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; as
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. Considering that Amoc
was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, and as such, he was exercising parental authority over
AAA. Indeed, moral ascendancy is substituted for force and intimidation.

Lastly, the Informations alleged that Amoc was the stepfather of AAA. However, the evidence
shows that he was merely the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, BBB. There was no evidence
adduced to prove that he was legally married to BBB. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that it was
proven during trial that he was the common-law spouse of AAA's mother, the same cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged in the Informations. The
circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the Informations and proved
during trial to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape. Therefore, the SC find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA for the conviction of Amoc for two counts of simple rape
as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is affirmed. Amoc is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of rape.

336
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Pulgo

G.R. No. 218205, July 5, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2)
that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. These
elements have been established in this case.

FACTS:

In an Information dated October 24, 2007, accused-appellant was charged with murder
committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of July 2007 at about 5:00 in the afternoon, at Barangay
Lorega, San Miguel, Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab one ROMEO S. LAMBO,
with the use of a bladed weapon, hitting the latter on his abdomen, which caused his death
thereafter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the case at bar.

RULING:

337
 YES. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. To establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means of attack employed. These elements have been established in this case.

Romeo had approached Aurelio in Lorega to ask to be accompanied to a certain place, and
they were standing side by side when the accused-appellant approached them and suddenly pulled
out a knife and stabbed Romeo. Clearly, neither Aurelio nor Romeo was aware of the impending
assault from the accused-appellant. Both Aurelio and Romeo were also unarmed. This made them all
the more vulnerable and defenseless in the face of the accused-appellant's sudden attack. In fact,
having been stabbed by accused-appellant, Romeo was unable to retaliate and had to run away
from accused-appellant to escape any further assault, but accused-appellant still gave chase. Aurelio
also testified that because of the suddenness of accused-appellant's attack, he was unable to make
any move to defend his cousin the moment the latter was stabbed.

338
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES - ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

Manny Ramos et. al. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, Murder is punishable by

reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present (except for abuse of superior strength which was used to qualify the killing to
Murder), accused-appellants must be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-
appellants of the crime of Murder Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. (RA)
8294.

It was alleged by the prosecution that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of
Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon accused-appellants having an altercation with the victim,
Rolando Necesito (Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell, "Okinam
patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually
surround Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding.
Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat
tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed
Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached Rolando
and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene.

The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to
conduct an investigation from which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a
piece of bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando
purportedly had a previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the same was
settled before the barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the
time of the incident. An autopsy was likewise conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there

339
were four (4) incised wounds on his left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and five (5) gunshot
wounds on his body; that based on the nature and sizes of his wounds, it was possible that the
firearm used was of the same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been inflicted by a
single person.

The RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of
parole, and ordered to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the amounts of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. RTC gave
credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of Reynaldo
positively identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of the crime, further
noting that Reynaldo had no ill-motive to falsely testify against them and the defense testimonies
to be untenable, as they were riddled with various inconsistencies and contradictions. RTC found
the presence of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to
Murder, considering that the accused-appellants took advantage of their combined strength and
their several weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their felonious
design.

The CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to P75,000.00 each and imposing legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from finality of the judgment until fully paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants should be held liable for simple Murder, and not
Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.

RULING:

YES, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm.

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is
not parricide or infanticide.

340
 Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence
of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not
have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of
establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, Murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for abuse
of superior strength which was used to qualify the killing to Murder), accused-appellants must be
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led
to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to
recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was
recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions of the
courts a quo were silent regarding this matter.

The Court hereby modifies accused-appellants conviction to simple Murder.

341
RELATIONSHIP AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Raul Macapagal y Manalo

G.R. No. 218574, November 22, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Alternative circumstance of relationship alleged in the Information and proven

during trial, should be considered as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of
increasing the period of the imposable penalty.

FACTS:

Three separate informations were filed against Raul Macapagal y Manalo in violation of
Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and RA No. 7610. Based on the
accusations, the accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the private offended
party, by means of force and intimidation did, then and there, with lewd designs, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in committing sexual assault and sexual intercourse on
separate incidents to his own daughter who is a minor, against her will and without her consent

The appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to all rape charges. During pre-trial,
the parties stipulated on the identities of the parties, the fact that the birth certificate shows that
BBB is the daughter of appellant and a minor at the time of the alleged rape incidents. Joint trial
of the cases followed. The Appellant denied all the rape charges against him.

The RTC found the accused guilty of one count of sexual assault and two counts of rape.
The RTC found victim's testimony credible as she was able to narrate clearly and unwaveringly
how each of the rape incidents was done to her by appellant, her very own father, despite rigid
cross-examinations conducted by the defense. The RTC noted that the genital examination
conducted on BBB, showing the presence of old hymenal lacerations, is consistent with the
finding of previous sexual intercourse.

The CA affirmed the decision of RTC with some modifications on the damages award. The
CA agreed with the RTC that BBB's testimony is credible, as she was firm and unwavering in her
narration of her traumatic experience during the rape incidents perpetrated by her own father.
The CA also ruled that the medical report and the testimony of the medico-legal officer on BBB's

342
deep and healed hymenal lacerations are consistent with BBB' s allegations of rape against
appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not aggravating circumstance attended the felony.

RULING:

YES. The Court said that since the perpetrator of the offense is the father of the victim, and
such alternative circumstance of relationship was alleged in the Information and proven during trial,
the same should be considered as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of increasing the
period of the imposable penalty. There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the said
alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period.

343
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Edilberto Norada y Harder, Agustin Seva y Lacbanes and
Eugene Villanueva y Canales

G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be
a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.

2. Abuse of superior strength is present if the accused purposely uses excessive

force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there
is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength.

FACTS:

Eugene Villanueva y Cañales was convicted of the complex crime of attempted kidnapping
with murder. The antecedent facts based on the testimony of the accused, declared that he and
Agustin Seva for some time, have been hatching to organize a kidnap for ransom group in Bacolod
City. This plan however materializes as they have no money to fund the operation. Later, in 2003,
he met Eugene Villanueva. Eugene Villanueva revealed that he is a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a
schoolteacher at the town of Valladolid. Reggie Pacil has a friend, a Canadian national named Ray
Truck. The three (3) of them, namely, himself, Agustin Seva and Eugene Villanueva, made a plan to
kidnap Ray Truc, a wealthy canadian man.On the day of the execution of the plan Accused
Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in Valladolid but only Reggie
Pacil came. Ray Truck remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid. The non-appearance of
Ray Truck made them change their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil as they were
convinced that Rey Truck will pay ransom for his release.

In the early morning of the following day Norada said that Villanueva woke him up and
told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil but somehow, he woke up and
resisted. Norada said that he hit Pacil [on] the head with a piece of wood. Pacil was rendered
unconscious only briefly and he again struggled. Norada hit him again and this time Pacil stayed
motionless but snoring. Then Seva taped the mouth of Pacil while he and Villanueva tied his

344
hands and feet. They wrapped Pacil in a blanket and loaded him into the car. Not knowing that
Pacil was already dead.

During trial the accused argued that they acted on self defense. RTC finds the three guilty
of the complex crime of Attempted Kidnapping with Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery and abuse of superior strength
may be appreciated in the case at bar.

RULING:

NO. Indeed, the victim was struck on the head by Norada with a piece of wood which resulted
in his death. However, the records is bereft of any evidence that appellant and his co-accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to
make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself. the Supreme court cited the case
of People vs. Antonio, wherein it was held that "it is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing
into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific
purpose."

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is "present if the accused

purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the
latter takes advantage of superior strength." However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how
the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case.

345
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Augusto F. Gallanosa, Jr.

G.R. No. 219885, July 17, 2017

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming
self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and
imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means
employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting

victim who is deprived of any chance to defend himself, without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim.

FACTS:

In 2014, accused Augusto Gallanosa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
murder of Nonilon and Dante. On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in
convicting him of murder despite proof of self-defense on his part. The Court of Appeals found
material inconsistencies and implausibilities in the testimonies of appellant and the defense
witnesses which render the defense not credible. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found
more credible the prosecution witnesses, whose testimonies were consistent on material points.

ISSUE:

Whether treachery is present to qualify the crime to murder.

RULING:

346
 NO. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim
who is deprived of any chance to defend himself, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim. In this case, the prosecution witnesses merely testified that appellant arrived at the crime
scene and stabbed Dante. No other details regarding the manner of stabbing were offered in the
testimonies which would clearly indicate treachery in the attack. Thus, appellant should only be
liable for homicide for killing Dante.

347
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Layug

G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The aggravating circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime of robbery

with homicide only as to the killing but not as to the robbery. Treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide if the victim of homicide
is killed treacherously.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting

victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend
himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the

crime of robbery with homicide because the elements of which are already inherent in the
crime. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property.

FACTS:

The following information was filed against the appellants Wilfredo and Noel, and accused
Reynaldo:

That on or about June 1, 2001 in Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and intent to kill, with treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, that is by stabbing Victorino L.
Paule with bladed weapons on the different parts of his body, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away a necklace, wristwatch and wallet
containing cash money [sic] amounting to P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to Victorino Paule,
and as a result or on occasion of the said robbery, the said victim sustained mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said Victorino Paule.

348
ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation

present in the case at bar.

RULING:

YES. Again, robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless,
treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed
treacherously. Thus, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime of
robbery with homicide only as to the killing but not as to the robbery. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving
the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.

The RTC was correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. Treachery
was established through Analiza's testimony that upon reaching the secluded place, Victorino was
asked to alight from the tricycle and without any provocation on his part, was repeatedly stabbed
and kicked by the accused-appellants. Here, Victorino was caught by surprise when he was
immediately stabbed by Buan a few steps after they alighted from the tricycle. It shows that the
victim was caught completely off-guard, which supports the existence of the first element of
treachery, i.e., a sudden attack giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The
second element is likewise present as the accused-appellants consciously and deliberately stabbed
the victim as evidenced by the fact that all of them had knives in their possession when the stabbing
incident happened.

Evident premeditation, on the other hand, cannot be appreciated as an aggravating

circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide because the elements of which are already
inherent in the crime. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property.

349
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Norieto Monroyo y Mahaguay

G.R. No. 223708, June 28, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: xxx 1.) When the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

FACTS:

On October 13, 2004, four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Monroyo
of the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness against AAA and Qualified Rape against her sister, BBB.
Monroyo is the husband of AAA and BBB’s mother's half-sister.

The Acts of Lasciviousness by accused were allegedly committed for several times against
AAA on August 24, 2003, October 13, 2003, and October 15, 2003, and the alleged Rape against
BBB happened on the night of November 18, 2003. BBB was then subjected to a medical
examination administered by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Ma. Virginia R. Valdez, who found
healed hymenal lacerations that could have been caused by a hard object, like an erect penis.
Monroyo denied the accusations against him and testified that on October 15, 2003, AAA and BBB
asked for money from him to buy junk food while he was buying cigarettes from a store. When he
refused to give them money, they grabbed the belt bag tied around his belt. Monroyo tried to
retrieve the bag by tickling them on the side of their bodies but the bag was ripped in the process.
Monroyo slapped AAA and BBB for destroying the bag and then he went home. He claimed that he
does not know why the cases were filed against him by complainants but speculated that it was
probably because of a familial tiff with the latter's father regarding the house that he and his wife
were residing in.

The RTC found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer in each case the penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period, as minimum to four (4) years and

350
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum, and ordered him to pay
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, as well as P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. It similarly
found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and accordingly, imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay BBB P100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC however, did not
consider the special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority because these were
not purportedly alleged in the Information.

Monroyo elevated his case to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, observing that the
trial court's findings as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserve the
highest respect absent any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied material
facts or circumstances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused should have been charged with Qualified Rape due to the
presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

RULING:

YES, Accused’s conviction is modified from Rape to Qualified Rape.

According to “Article 266-A (1) (a), in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA
8353, defines and penalizes the crime of Rape, including the circumstances which qualify the penalty
to be imposed. Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed- x x x x 1) By a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: x x x x
a) Through force, threat or intimidation. Also, Under Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. x x x x The death
penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x x 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.”

The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are: (a) the victim is a female over
twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either
through force, threat, or intimidation.

351
 It should be clarified that, contrary to the RTC's observation, the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship were sufficiently alleged in the Information. A perusal of the records
reveals that all these elements are present.

Based on the foregoing, Monroyo's conviction is modified from Rape to Qualified Rape, which,
based on Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, is penalized with death.

352
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Ariel S. Mendoza

G.R. No. 224295, March 22, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the RPC, as amended,
are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Then, to raise the crime of simple
rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the RPC, as amended, the twin
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur.

FACTS:

Mendoza was charged with the crime of rape against hisdaughter AAA, aged five as alleged
in the information filed. The said rape happened between 2008 and 2009, in Brgy. Luna,
Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales. Upon the arraignment, Mendoza pleaded not
guilty. He admitted that AAA is his daughter and so is the existence and due execution of her birth
certificate. The prosecution presented the following evidence: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of AAA;
(2) Sinumpaang Salaysay of EEE; (3) Joint Affidavit of Arrest of Police Officer (PO) 1 Walter
Primero and PO3 John Lazaro; (4) Certificate of live birth of AAA; and (5) Initial Medico-Legal
Report. The accused-appellant claimed innocence and denied the charge. He testified that it was
his compadre Rolex Labre who committed the crime when the latter was still living with them in
2008. He asseverated that the filing of the case against him was instigated by his live-in partner,
EEE, who wanted him jailed so that she could freely cohabitate with her new flame who lives in
Bulacan. the RTC rendered a Decision, finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC in its Decision. The
CA found no reason to doubt AAA's credibility and accorded great weight and respect to the
observation of the RTC that her testimony was consistent, candid and straightforward throughout
the proceedings.

353
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC and CA are correct deciding to raise the crime from single rape to
qualified rape.

RULING:

YES. Mendoza’s appeal lacks merit.

The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the RPC, as amended, are: (1)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished
through force, threat, or intimidation. Then, to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under
Article 266-B, paragraph (1) of the RPC, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender must concur.

There is no question that all of the foregoing elements were duly established by the
prosecution in the instant case. AAA consistently and categorically stated during the trial that the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will. The elements of minority and
relationship were also duly established during the trial by the admission of the parties and the
presentation of AAA's certificate of live birth, where the accused-appellant was identified as the
father and also verified that the victim was only 5 years old at the time of the incident. As to the
manner by which the crime was committed, i.e., by force, threat or intimidation, such is dismissible in
view of the relationship between the parties.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed.

354
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Michael Palanay y Minister

G.R. No. 224583, February 1, 2017

Velasco Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

A conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove all the elements thereof,
which are: (1) sexual congress (2) with a woman; (3) done by force, threat, or intimidation
without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape against AAA, a minor, 16 years of
age. According to the Prosecution, on the evening of August 30, 2010, Accused-appellant had a
carnal knowledge of his niece, AAA against her will and consent. After Accused-appellant has
satisfied himself, AAA put her clothes on, went to the comfort room and cried silently. She went to
her sister BBB early the next morning, who in turn relayed the story to her sister CCC. CCC
blottered the incident and filed the complaint against Palanay. According to the defense on the
other hand, he was at his friend’s house drinking until 3:00am. At around 7pm he went to his
brother’s house. He testified that AAA’s house was adjacent to his brother’s house, but he did not
notice her. He said that the complaint was motivated by the quarrel he had with AAA’s mother.

RTC ruled that Palanay is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Court of Appeals
affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
qualified rape.

355
RULING:

YES, RTC and CA is correct in ruling that Accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape.

According to Article 266-A and 266-B, in a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must
prove all the elements thereof, which are: (1) sexual congress (2) with a woman; (3) done by force,
threat, or intimidation without consent; (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of
the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the victim, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

In the present case, all the foregoing elements of qualified rape are present. AAA
categorically asserted that Palanay, her uncle, had carnal knowledge of her. She was steadfast in her
testimony that, in the early morning of August 31, 2010, Palanay undressed her and touched her
breast against her will. He then forced himself on her and inserted his penis into her vagina. At the
time of the incident, AAA was just sixteen (16) years old.

Therefore, the Court found Palanay guilty of qualified rape.

356
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Pulgo

G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of

the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a
swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.

FACTS:

In an Information filed by the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office on August 15, 2006, Racal was
charged with the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads, thus:

That on or about the 19th day of April 2006, at about 4:20 A.M., more or less, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed
with a knife, with deliberate intent, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to
kill, did then and there, suddenly and unexpectedly, attack, assault, and use personal violence
upon the person of one Jose "Joe" Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a
fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the case at bar.

RULING:

357
 The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. These
elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To
emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant attacked him.

As testified to by a prosecution witness, Francisco was then holding a plastic container

containing bread and was eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack
was carried out gave the victim no chance at all to evade when the appellant thrust the knife to his
torso. Thus, there is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim,
and the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidence of treachery. Also, the fact that
appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter is of no consequence. Even a frontal
attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no
position to repel the attack or avoid it, as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly
held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

358
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Roderick Ramelo

G.R. No. 224888, November 22, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby
ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim.

FACTS:

At around 1:55 AM, Nelson was standing outside the basketball court which was then
being used as a venue for a dancing or disco event, when Ramelo suddenly appeared before him
and stabbed him. When the barangay tanod saw what happened, he immediately confronted the
assailant and confiscated the knife used. Ramelo, however, was able to run away. Nelson was
brought to the hospital for immediate medical treatment but unfortunately died due to the stab
that perforated his stomach which caused massive bleeding.

In his defense, Ramelo testified that while he was smoking at the store near the dancing
hall, Nelson, who appeared to be drunk, approached him, strangled him and pulled him towards
the dance area. He was then manhandled by Nelson and his three companions who rushed
towards them. The assault continued even after Ramelo fell to the ground. Nelson also tried to
smash Ramelo’s head with a stone, but the latter was able to evade it. Ramelo claims that Nelson,
who he admitted being taller and bulkier than him, sat on his abdomen and proceeded to hit him
on his face while his companions hit and kicked his legs. Fearing that they intended to kill him, he
further avers that to get his knife tucked in his right shoe, he parried Nelson's punches with his
left hand, reached for the knife with his right hand, and then stabbed Nelson.

ISSUE:

Whether or not attendance of treachery is present.

359
RULING:

NO. For treachery to be appreciated, two concurring conditions must be established: first, the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and second, the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

There was no showing that Ramelo consciously and deliberately adopted the means and
manner employed by him in stabbing and killing Nelson. Besides, the barangay tanod testified that
the attack employed was frontal, which indicates that the victim was not totally without opportunity
to defend himself.

360
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo Raytos y Espino

G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery or alevosia, is present when the offender adopts means, methods, or

forms in the execution of the felony that ensure its commission without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Alevosia is characterized
by a deliberate, sudden and unexpected assault from behind, without warning and without
giving the victim a chance to defend himself or repel the assault and without risk to the
assailant.

FACTS:

It was just a day after their barangay fiesta. Raytos, the accused, and ten other occupying
three tables were having dance session in front of his house. At around 11:30 in the evening,
Araza arrived and was approached by Edgar, and the two danced. After some time, Araza
approached Anita, and invited her to dance, but the latter refused, after which he simply returned
dancing. After dancing, Araza approached the table where Raytos were seated and asked who was
brave enough while drawing a knife tucked in his waistband. At the sight of such, Raytos tried to
escaped by moving backwards, while doing so he got hold of Araza’s right hand and was able to
twist the same. Raytos got hold of the knife and stabbed Araza three times on the chest. He ran
away immediately and surrender himself to the barangay officials.

ISSUE:

Is treachery as a qualifying circumstance present?

RULING:

361
 YES. The victim was dancing when he was attacked. There was no confrontation. No
forewarning. His dancing partner was even misled into believing that accused only wanted to dance
with the victim. But of course, it was just an excuse, so that it would be easier for the accused to
attain his purpose. It was so sudden that even the others were unprepared to do anything to prevent
the attack or at least minimize the injuries. It was an unexpected occurrence right in the middle of a
celebration which was intended to be a joyous one.

The medico legal report shows the following wounds:

(+) stab wound, scapular area, (R) 2 cm.

(+) stab wound, posterior axillary line (R), 3 cm.

(+) stab wound, (R) flank area, 3.5 cm.

(+) stab wound, infrascapular area, (L)

These wounds clearly disprove the claim of accused that he was suddenly able to stab the
victim because he wrestled with him, because actually, there was no fight that preceded the attack.
There was plainly, murder.

362
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

The People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Tuardon y Rosalia

G.R. No. 225644, March 1, 2017

Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

FACTS:

At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening, Dagunan asked Flores to accompany him to the
comfort room in the public plaza. While Flores was following Dagunan to the comfort room,
Tuardon suddenly rushed in between them. When Dagunan was standing at the main door of the
comfort room and in the act of urinating, he was shot by Tuardon, who was situated at the right
side and immediately behind the former. Dagunan was hit at the base of his head causing him to
fall to the ground. Upon witnessing what transpired, Flores said "Oh." Tuardon, upon noticing
Flores, shot him in the chest, which caused him to fall to the ground. Then, Tuardon hurriedly left
the place.

Tuardon was arrested by SPO2 Gemoto. Both victims were brought to the Gumersindo
Garcia Memorial Hospital in Kabankalan City where Dagunan was pronounced dead. Flores,
meanwhile, was transferred to Bacolod Provincial Hospital where he was confined and treated

The defense claimed that Tuardon acted in self-defense. While at the comfort room
Dagunan started to be pissed him off and Tuardon drew his own gun and shot Dagunan once.
Tuardon then went out and tucked his gun. Thereafter, Flores came rushing towards him so
Tuardon drew his gun again and shot him. After shooting Flores, he found himself shocked that he
had shot someone while Dimaala denied the charges against him.

ISSUE:

363
 Whether treachery attended the killing of Dagunan.

RULING:

YES. Treachery indeed attended the killing of Dagunan.

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make." The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thus ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Tuardon's attack on Dagunan was
attended by treachery.

364
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Campit y Cristo and Emilio Macawili

G.R. No. 225794, December 6, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of superior strength.

For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be shown that the aggressors
combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.

FACTS:

An Information dated 16 September 2008, Campit and accused Emilio Macawili (Emilio)
charged for the murder of Leon Capanzana, Jr. Cresencio was arrested in Camarines Norte, while
Emilio remained at-large. Cresencio, with the assistance of his counsel de officio, was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, establishing
from their testimonies that on 27 July 2008, Leonisa and Kristine were tending to their store
when Leon arrived and told them that Cresencio was asking to borrow money. Leon was engaged
in the business of buying copra and owned a bodega adjacent to Leonisa's store. After a while,
Cresencio and Emilio, who were apparently drunk, passed by the store. Emilio stayed on the other
side of the road, while Cresencio approached Leon, who was then in his bodega arranging
documents and was about to leave. Cresencio pressed Leon to lend him money but the latter did
not heed his request. Suddenly, Cresencio pulled out a knife from his waist and repeatedly
stabbed Leon five (5) times, more or less. Leon tried to parry the thrusts with his hand, but he
was eventually stabbed on his stomach. Leon turned away from Cresencio and attempted to
escape, but he was met by Emilio who grabbed his left shoulder and stabbed him on his chest.
Leon fell on his back in front of the bodega, while Cresencio and Emilio ran away and fled. The
post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Mercado revealed that Leon sustained four (4) stab
wounds on his body and an incised wound on his right-hand small finger. Dr. Mercado further
testified that the proximate cause of Leon's death is the multiple stab wounds he sustained.

The defense presented Cresencio as its lone witness. According to him, on 27 July 2008, at
around 3:00 p.m., Cresencio was buying rice at the store of one Myrna Argamosa (Argamosa) in
Barangay Silang, Lopez, Quezon, when he saw Leon handing P1,000.00 to Argamosa. Cresencio
then uttered "daming pera po ah" and asked P200.00 from Leon as part of the payment for the

365
charcoal he delivered to the latter. Leon, who apparently did not appreciate the remark, got mad
at Cresencio, grabbed his shirt, and punched him on the face. Cresencio did not fight back and
simply told Leon "huwag po, hindi ako lalaban." Leon then left and proceeded towards his bodega
located about 60 meters from Argamosa's store. After about 15 minutes, Cresencio left for home.
Leon approached Cresencio after noticing the latter. However, Cresencio backed away after
sensing Leon's hostile behavior. At this moment, Emilio suddenly appeared and stabbed Leon.
Cresencio pleaded with Emilio to stop, but the latter merely told him "wala kang pakialam." After
the incident, Emilio fled while Cresencio went home.

RTC found Cresencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder.

RULING:

NO, accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide, not
murder.

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of

force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission
of the crime. It must be stressed that superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of
superior strength. For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be shown that the
aggressors combined forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.
Differently stated, it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased.
Furthermore, the evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or
that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior
strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution established that only Cresencio
approached Leon while the latter was in his bodega. Thereafter, Cresencio, following an argument,
stabbed Leon multiple times. It was only when Leon escaped from Cresencio that Emilio appeared
and stabbed the victim on his chest. Considering that the perpetrators attacked the victim

366
alternatively and did not combine their superior strength to overwhelm the victim, they could not be
said to have taken advantage of their superior strength.

From the foregoing, it is clear that abuse of superior strength did not attend the commission
of the felony. Therefore, accused-appellant Cresencio Campit y Cristo is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

367
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Romeo D. Calinawan

G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017

Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court convicting the accused-appellant Romeo D. Calinawan of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), for killing Janice Silang.

At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silang who is the daughter of the
victim saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter, the accused fled quickly.
Jonathan Nevado, Janice’s brother and neighbor was awakened by shouts coming from his sister’s
house and immediately rushed to them. After helping the children, he went looking for Janice
which he saw bloodied and pleading for help. He then asked who stabbed her, and she answered
it was Calinawan who did it. At the hospital, she was also asked by her husband, Darwin, about
the person who did it and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three days, Janice died in
spite of the medical treatment in the hospital. On the other hand, when the police asked the
accused, the latter claimed that he knew nothing about the incident.

On trial, the trial court noted that Marigor positively and categorically identified Calinawan
as the perpetrator. Further, it was held that the killing of Janice was attended by treachery, as it
was carried out during nighttime when Janice was defenseless. On appeal, the appellate court
agreed that the killing was attended with treachery, and the conviction was sustained but the
award of damages was modified.

368
ISSUE:

Whether or not Calinawan was guilty of murder qualified by treachery.

RULING:

NO, the accused was only guilty of homicide.

The following elements must be established before the existence of treachery may be
appreciated: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b)
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. The suddenness or unexpectedness alone, however, of the attack is insufficient to
support the finding of treachery.

In the case at bench, both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals convicted Calinawan
of murder because they were of the view that the killing was qualified by treachery considering that
the attack on Janice was so sudden that it rendered her defenseless. However, Marigor's testimony
on how the killing was perpetrated was lacking in detail; and other than Marigor's first-hand
account, no other witness actually saw the stabbing incident. Provided that her testimony did not
present the whole scenario to establish the exact manner on how the crime was perpetrated, it is
thus, insufficient to conclude that it was attended with treachery.

Further, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be factored in because there was
no showing that Calinawan especially sought the same or took advantage of it, or that it had
facilitated the commission of the crime by insuring his immunity from identification or capture.

Therefore, the accused was only guilty of homicide.

369
TREACHERY PRESENT IN KILLING OF DEFENSELESS CHILD

People of the Philippines vs. Liberato Pentecostes y Cronico

G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery or alevosia is present in the killing of children who, by reason of their

tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.

FACTS:

On March 24, 2005, Liberato was having a drinking spree at the house of Angel Vargas
(Angel), the father of the victim, Vivian Vargas (Vivian). The drinking spree ended at around 2:00
in the afternoon. At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring Rabal,
which was about two hundred (200) meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed. Vivian
would never return. Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon. At around 3:30 to
4:30 p.m., Antonio Vargas (Antonio), the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre
(Jason), encountered Liberato at Antonio's corn plantation. During the encounter, Liberato was
seen carrying Vivian on his back and appeared to be headed towards a nearby body of water.
Jason greeted Liberato, who then merely looked back at them angrily.

Later that day, with Vivian still missing, Angel began searching for Vivian with the help of
some relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail. The following morning, however, on March 25,
2005, Vivian's lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the father of Jason.
Immediately thereafter, the policemen summoned and investigated all those present at the
drinking spree in Angel's house. However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came, he ran away.
An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by submersion" or drowning as
the cause of death by Dr. Raoul Alcantara.

In the Decision dated December 28, 2012, the RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery. In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction
with modification only as to the damages awarded. Hence, this Appeal.

370
ISSUE:

Whether accused is guilty of the crime charged.

RULING:

YES. The circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves Liberato's guilt beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Murder. Also, the Court concurs with the RTC and CA in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in this case. Treachery or alevosia is present in the killing of children who,
by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. In People vs. Diaz, the Court
held that the killing of an eleven (11)-year old was deemed ipso facto qualified by treachery by
reason of the child's "inherent defenselessness." The Court therefore relies on the Diaz ruling in this
case, especially considering that Vivian was murdered at the tender age of six (6) years old. Thus,
after thorough examination of the records of this case, the Court is fully convinced that the evidence
presented by the prosecution constitutes proof of Liberato's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

371
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Cyrus Villanueva and Alvin Sayson

G. R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous
to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and
strength of the parties. However, mere superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate
an abuse of superior strength.

FACTS:

The accused-appellants Cyrus Villanueva (Villanueva) and Alvin Sayson (Sayson), with
accused, Christian Jay Valencia (Valencia), were charged of murder of Enrico Enriquez in
conspiracy with one another and with the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength.

On January 1, 2012, the accused-appellants and Valencia went looking for Enrico in
Summitville, Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Accused-appellants and Valencia saw Enrico on
the tricycle terminal and simultaneously attacked the latter. According to the witness Arnie
Bañaga (Bañaga), he saw Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the latter
at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt and then Valencia stabbed Enrico on the
left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail and was brought to the
Muntinlupa Medical Center but was declared dead on arrival. The assailants thereafter fled but
Villanueva was caught by men aboard a pursuing tricycle and was later brought to Barangay Hall
for barangay police blotter. Sayson was later apprehended while Valencia could not be located
and remains at large.

In 2014, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of murder and held that
there was conspiracy among them and Valencia and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of

372
abuse of superior strength considering that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked. The
accused-appellants appealed the RTC decision to the CA maintaining that RTC improperly
appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength and that there is no proof
of the conspiracy among them and Valencia. In 2016, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and
dismissed the instant appeal. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualifies
the killing of the victim to murder was improperly appreciated.

RULING:

YES, according to the Court, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per
se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of
the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in
age, size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed with a
knife, attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, is not per
se indicative of abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the
presence of this circumstance. Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely from the victim's possibly
weaker physical constitution. Thus, the accused-appellants' guilt is limited to the crime of homicide.

373
DWELLING AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Hermin Romobio y Pauler

G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC, was

proven during the trial. Therefore, it should have been appreciated in order to impose a
higher penalty, civil liability and damages.

FACTS:

Based on the information filed, the accused (Hermin), armed with a deadly weapon, steals
personal belongings of AAA and that by reason of robbery, the victim was tied and boxed by the
accused causing injury to the former. Also, it was alleged in the information that the accused,
armed with a bladed weapon, succeeded in having sexual intercourse inside the house of the
victim.

Hermin pleaded not guilty in his arraignment. Trial ensued while he was under detention.
The witnesses for the prosecution were AAA, Dr. Vito C. Borja II, and P02 Alexander Sierra Lapid.
The defense presented Hermin, his mother Rosita Romobio, his brother Henry Romobio, and his
wife Annaliza Delos Reyes Romobio.

The RTC found the accused guilty of a special complex crime of Robbery with rape as
defined and penalized under Article 294, in relation to Article 266-A and B of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
damages.

Hermin elevated the case to the CA, however, it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the felony.

374
RULING:

YES. The Court said that the Prosecution should have alleged in the Information that the
crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Dwelling, which is an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC, was proven during the trial. Therefore, it should have been
appreciated in order to impose a higher penalty, civil liability and damages. The prosecuting arm of
the Government is thus reminded that prudence should be exercised as to what should be alleged in
the Information, as the latter is the battleground of all criminal cases.

375
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Perdito Ordona

G.R. No. 227863, September 20, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is "the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on his part." Two (2) requisites must be established by
the prosecution, namely: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him.

FACTS:

In an Information, Ordona was charged of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the Information read:

That on or about the 1st day of January, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of
superior strength, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person IRENEO A. HUBAY, by then and there stabbing him on the trunk with a
bladed weapon thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Ireneo A. Hubay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery is present in the case at bar.

RULING:

376
 YES. The essence of treachery, as stated in Abadies, is "the swift and unexpected attack on the
unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Two (2) requisites must be established
by the prosecution, namely: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him [or her]." Both elements are present in this case. Hubay,
who was then unarmed, was casually outside of his residence when the accused-appellant suddenly
stabbed him. There was no opportunity for Hubay to retaliate or to parry the accused-appellant's
attack.

The facts also establish that the accused appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the
mode of attack. Accused appellant lurked outside Hubay's residence and waited for him to appear.
When Hubay emerged from the house, the accused-appellant called him "Pare" while walking
towards him with a bladed weapon and immediately stabbed him.

377
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Geraldo Santillan and Eugene Borromeo

G.R. No. 227878, August 9, 2017

DOCTRINE:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime. The fact that there were 2 persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence
must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.

FACTS:

Geraldo Santillan, Eugene, Ramil Santillan, Julious Esmena and Andres Cartnueva were
charged with the crime of murder. Geraldo and Eugene were arraigned and pleaded "not guilty."
However, Ramil, Julious and Andres remained at large. According to the Prosecution’s witnesses,
on March 23, 2004 at about 7:30pm, Andres invited Ernesto, who was then watching television in
his living room, to go out. Ernesto agreed and they went to the end portion of an alley. Minutes
later, Michael (Ernesto's son), was tending their store when he saw his father running towards
their gate while being chased by Ramil and Geraldo (also known in their place as Dodong
Santillan). Then, Ramil stabbed Ernesto at the back. Geraldo, who was also armed, tried to stab
Ernesto but missed. Ernesto ran towards their gate and embraced Michael. Michael then called
out his sister, Julie Ann, who came to help her father while Michael sought assistance from their
uncle. Julie Ann asked Ernesto who his assailants were, and the latter answered Dodong, Eugene,
Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." Ernesto vomited blood and fell to the ground. Michael returned on
board a tricycle and they tried to bring Ernesto to the hospital, but their father was already dead.

On the other hand, Geraldo testified that on March 28, 2004 at about 7:45pm, he was
already asleep in their house but was awakened when he felt something cold was pointed at his
side. He was surprised to see that it was a gun and policemen were inside his house, handcuffed

378
him and informed him that he was responsible for Ernesto's death. Geraldo further attested that
Ernesto earlier filed a complaint against him for allegedly throwing stones at Ernesto's house, but
the barangay investigation showed that he was not responsible for such. He and Ernesto shook
hands and the latter's children even asked for an apology. Soon after, Ernesto hacked him on the
head and he filed a case for frustrated murder, but the case did not pursue because Ernesto died.
For his part, Eugene deposed that on March 28, 2004 at about 7:45pm, he was in Camarin, Zapote,
Caloocan City. He arrived therein at about 4:30pm because his mother instructed him to collect
payment from her kumadre. He left Zapote at about 7:00pm but did not go home and instead
played video carrera for more than 30 minutes. Afterwards, he went home; he was surprised to
see a lot of people in their place and then he learned of Ernesto's death. He alleged that he never
had a misunderstanding with Ernesto; and that he was present during the time that Ernesto
attacked Geraldo with a bolo. On November 23, 2005, he discovered that a case for murder was
filed against him when he secured a clearance.

The RTC found Geraldo and Eugene guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of murder. The
trial court was convinced that the dying declaration of Ernesto to Julie Ann, coupled with the
testimony of Michael, had established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Geraldo and Eugene.
Moreover, the RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In so
ruling, it stressed that Ernesto was unarmed and was trying to flee from his attackers. The RTC
took into account the fact that there were 4 assailants, 2 of whom were seen chasing Ernesto with
a bolo on hand. Hence, it concluded that the crime committed was murder, qualified by abuse of
superior strength.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Geraldo and Eugene. It held that Ernesto's
dying declaration could be admitted as part of the res gestae because when Ernesto gave the
identities of those who stabbed him to Julie Ann, he was referring to a startling occurrence; he
was wounded and blood was oozing from his chest, thus, he had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. The CA explained that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength must be appreciated because the assailants enjoyed superiority in number and
were armed with weapons, while Ernesto had no means with which to defend himself. It declared
that the medico-legal report supported the inequality of forces between the victim and the
assailants in terms of number and weapons. Hence, this appeal. The accused argued that the
prosecution failed to prove that they took advantage of their physical strength to ensure
commission of the crime for even if it was true that Michael saw Ramil and Geraldo chasing
Ernesto, such circumstance did not prove that they took advantage of their physical strength by
simultaneously attacking the victim.

ISSUE:

379
 Whether or not the abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.

RULING:

The SC ruled that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was improperly
appreciated; thus, Geraldo and Eugene could only be convicted of the crime of homicide. Although
the Court entertains no doubt that Geraldo and Eugene are responsible for Ernesto's death, the
lower tribunals erred when it appreciated abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder.
They commonly concluded that the assailants' number and weapons gave them significant
advantage in ensuring the death of Ernesto. Such reasoning, however, is incorrect.

In this case, only the fact that there were 2 persons chasing Ernesto, Ramil and Geraldo, can
be ascertained from Michael's testimony. The sole fact that there were 2 persons who attacked the
victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength.
Moreover, as can be gleaned from Michael's testimony, the respective attacks thrown by Ramil and
Geraldo occurred alternately, one after the other. It is settled that when the attack was made on the
victim alternately, there is no abuse of superior strength. Besides, the SC notes that Eugene was not
even a participant in the chase Michael witnessed. Neither will Ernesto's dying declaration suffice to
establish abuse of superior strength. The ante mortem statement as relayed to Julie Ann, revolved
solely on the identification of the assailants Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka." There
was no account on how the assault transpired or a narration to the effect that the aggressors
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of their combined strength to perpetrate the crime
with impunity. Aside from naming his assailants, Ernesto's ante mortem statement is bereft of any
indicia that will convince the Court that the perpetrators espoused a deliberate design to utilize the
advantage of number and weapons. Thus, the dearth in the prosecution's evidence impels a
downgrading of the nature of the offense committed from murder to homicide.

380
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RAPE & SECTION 5(B) OF RA 7610

People of the Philippines vs. Dominador Udtohan

G.R. No. 228887, August 2, 2017

Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation
or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the
absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12.
Moreover, under Article 266-B of the RPC, there is qualified rape when the victim is below
18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

Section 5 Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that when the victim is under 12 years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but the penalty shall be that
provided in R.A. No. 7610.19 Lascivious conduct is defined as "the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

FACTS:

In April 2011, 11-year old AAA went to the YYY Camp, Sitio XXX, to buy some bananas with
her paternal uncle, accused-appellant CCC. Accused-appellant pushed AAA to the grassy portion,
raped her and threatened her not to relate the incident to anybody, otherwise, he would evict her
family and he would kill her.

In September 2011, at the house of the accused-appellant, around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, he molested AAA by touching and caressing her genitals. On the following day, AAA
revealed her ordeal to her teacher who was then suspicious of her odd behavior and the accused-

381
appellant's live-in-partner disclosed to BBB, AAA’s mother, that she saw him insert his finger into
AAA's vagina.

The incident was reported to the police station and later on, two informations were filed
against the accused-appellant charging him of Statutory Rape and violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610.

The RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and violation of Section 5(b)
of RA 7610 and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of Statutory Rape.

2. Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

RULING:

1. YES, the accused-appellant is guilty of Statutory Rape. Statutory rape is committed by

sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to
the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of
statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the
victim is below the age of 12. Moreover, under Article 266-B of the RPC, there is qualified rape when
the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

The crime committed by the accused-appellant must be qualified under Article 266-B of the
RPC. It was indicated in the Informations that the accused-appellant was the paternal uncle of AAA.
Also, during trial, AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as her uncle, and she established
that it was her uncle who raped her. Accused-appellant, the paternal uncle of AAA, was a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. Hence, the crime of qualified rape was committed by
accused-appellant.

2. YES, the accused-appellant is guilty of violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Section 5

Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under the RPC, but the penalty shall be that provided in R.A. No. 7610.19
Lascivious conduct is defined as "the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the

382
genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In this case, the conduct of accused-appellant in intentionally touching and caressing the
genitals of AAA constituted an act of lasciviousness. He must be punished under the prescribed
penalty of R.A. No. 7610 as AAA was below 12 years of age at the time of the incident. The
aggravating circumstance of relationship must also be taken into consideration.

The crime committed was acts of lasciviousness. As the victim was below 12 years of age, the
penalty provided under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, reclusion temporal in its medium period, must
be imposed. Further, the aggravating circumstance of relationship between the accused-appellant
and AAA is present.

383
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE FOR MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Daroya

G.R. No. 229502, November 22, 2017

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery cannot be presumed from the mere suddenness of an attack; the

suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of aleviosa, even if
the purpose was to kill. It must be shown that the accused consciously adopted such a
mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.

FACTS:

In the evening of October 19, 2002, Ceralde, who was then ferrying his pedicab along
Bonuan-Gueset, Dagupan City, saw Daroya suddenly appear. Ceralde noticed that Daroya’s left
hand was holding a piece of metal wrapped with a towel. Thereafter, Daroya suddenly punched
Rolando, which caused the latter to fall down. Daroya then continued to punch Rolando using his
left hand. Rolando was not able to fight back. Thereafter, Daroya immediately ran away. Rolando
then fell down facing the ground. After Daroya left, Ceralde and the other pedicab drivers brought
Rolando to the hospital where he subsequently died.

On the other hand, Daroya admitted that he punched Rolando, but claimed that he did so
in self-defense. He maintained that it was Rolando who started the fight. He claimed that on the
date of the incident, at around 8:00 PM, he was riding his pedicab waiting for passengers in the
corner of Bonuan-Gueset; that he was the first in line of about 80 pedicab drivers while Rolando
was at the end of the line. Daroya averred that when the passengers were already coming,
Rolando suddenly parked his pedicab in front of the line. Daroya and Rolando then fought on who
among them should be the first in line. Daroya alleged that he punched Rolando three or four
times and immediately went home after seeing Rolando fell on the ground.

Daroya was charged for murder on the ground that the killing was made with treachery by
the sudden punches of Daroya.

384
ISSUE:

Whether or not there is treachery present.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court holds that the prosecution has not proven that the killing was
committed with treachery. Indeed, other than their respective findings that Daroya suddenly
appeared and continuously punched Rolando, while holding a piece of metal wrapped in a towel
until the latter fell to the ground, the lower courts failed to indicate any circumstance which would
show that Daroya consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the
killing without risk to himself. The prosecution has likewise failed to present any evidence showing
that Daroya specifically chose to punch Rolando in his plan to kill him.

It appears that Daroya’s decision to punch Rolando, which eventually caused the latter’s
death, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment brought about by
their argument as to who among them should be first in line among the pedicab drivers. It is basic
that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

385
SPECIAL QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MENTAL DISABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Rico Niebres y Reginaldo

G.R. No. 230975, December 4, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The special qualifying circumstance of knowledge of the offender of the mental

disability of the victim in the commission of the crime of rape must be sufficiently alleged
in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court.

FACTS:

Niebres together with his wife and six children went to the house of his parents-in-law in
Camarines Sur to participate in a traditional palay harvesting called “basok/hasok”. After the
“basok/hasok”, Niebres went out to drink with the other members of the family and come home
at around midnight. Niebres went to the room where AAA, 16-year old (sister of Niebres’ wife)
and his family were sleeping and lied beside the victim to sleep. The next morning, the victim
woke up and noticed Niebres kissing her. Niebres proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her.
AAA did not tell her anyone about it. However, because of her complaint of abdominal pains, she
was brought to a health center where it was found out that she was 5-6 months pregnant and that
she was suffering from a mild mental retardation with an I.Q. equivalent to a 9-year old child. AAA
admitted to her parents that this is not the first time that Niebres raped her. The complaint was
then filed against Niebres.

RTC convicted Niebres of Simple Rape in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 sentencing
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and held him liable to P50,000 moral damages and
P50,000 exemplary damages. The RTC did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of
relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA since the same was not alleged in the
information.

The CA upgraded Niebres conviction to Qualified Rape considering that (1) the state of
mental retardation of AAA was established on the testimony of Dr. Laguidao; (2) Niebres failed to
dispute AAA’s mental retardation during trial.

386
ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Niebres for the crime of Qualified Rape proper?

RULING:

NO. The CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres' knowledge of AAA's
mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent
evidence to substantiate the same. Such qualifying circumstances must be sufficiently alleged in the
indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court. It must be proved
with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the
crime in its qualified form. In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of
AAA’s mental retardation was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was
adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA’s mental retardation during
trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty
that he knew of her disability at the time of its commission.

387
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Charlie Flores

G.R. No. 228886, August 8, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Charlie Flores, Daniel Flores, and Sammy Flores, along with their co-
accused, Gary Badeviso and Rodel Torestre who remain at large, were charged with murder in an
Information which reads: That on or about the 25th day of December, 2002, at Barangay Tignoan,
in the Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with bladed weapons, with intent to kill and
qualified by abuse of superior strength, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
simultaneously gang up upon a certain Larry Parcon and stab him several times with the use of
said bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon him multiple fatal stabbed wounds on the different
vital parts of his body which directly caused his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim is entitled to damages.

RULING:

YES. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously

388
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that
the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. In the instant case, the
prosecution clearly established that the accused-appellants, taking advantage of their number,
purposely resorted to holding Larry by the armpit so that all the knife-wielders would be free to stab
him, albeit successively.

389
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Mardy Aquino, Mario Aquino, Recto Aquino, Inyong Narv Ante,
Romy Fernandez, Felix Saplan, Bonifacio Caguioa And Juanito Aquino

G.R. No. 203435, April 11, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous
to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. The presence of several assailants does not ipso facto indicate an
abuse of superior strength.

FACTS:

Ernesto and Jackie Caguioa together with two others were waiting for a boat to transport
the fish, which they were able to catch, to Dagupan. A few meters away from them were Ernesto’s
twin sons, Edwin and Edward, together with two others who were washing their fishing nets.
Suddenly, the group of the accused arrived and threw stones at Edwin’s group. Edwin reported
the incident to his elder brother Jackie and his father Ernesto. Jackie went to the place where the
accused were having drinking session to ask them why they attacked Edwin’s group. Ernesto
followed Jackie. However, instead of answering Jackie, the group of the accused grabbed and
restrained Jackie who was then stabbed by Mardy and Recto. Ernesto attempted to help his son,
but he was likewise restrained by the group of the accused and was stabbed four times. Jackie
died while Ernesto survived.

The RTC found Mardy, Mario and Juanito guilty of murder and frustrated murder. It
reasoned that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses clearly showed that they took
advantage of their superior strength and conspired with one another when they assaulted Jackie
and Ernesto. In the frustrated murder, the RTC sentenced the accused to prision correctional
minimum to prision mayor maximum.

The CA affirmed with modification the conviction of the accused. The CA modified the
period of sentence in the frustrated murder to penalty of prision mayor minimum to reclusion
temporal maximum.

390
ISSUE:

Was the conviction of the accused for Murder and Frustrated Murder proper?

RULING:

NO. The accused are only guilty of Homicide for the killing of Jackie and Attempted Homicide
for the assault upon Ernesto. The RTC and CA erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. Evidence must
show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to
use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. The prosecution in
this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size, and strength, or force, except
for the showing that two assailants stabbed the victim while three others restrained him. However,
the presence of several assailants does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. Mere
superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this circumstance. It has not been clearly
established that the accused, taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding Jackie
by the arms so that two of them would be free to stab him. In view of the foregoing, the Court is
compelled to rule out the presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Hence,
accused-appellants' guilt must be limited to the crime of homicide.

As to the lower court’s conviction of frustrated murder, the Supreme Court noted that abuse
of superior strength was not alleged in the information for frustrated murder, hence the charge
must be downgraded to homicide. The court further held that the elements of frustrated homicide
are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in the
assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is present. If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted
homicide. Considering that Ernesto's wounds were not fatal and absent a showing that such wounds
would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, the Court declares
the accused-appellants' guilt is limited to the crime of attempted homicide.

391
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Esmael Gervero et. al

G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the

following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts
of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and
(2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by
the offender.

FACTS:

Based on the information filed, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they
were then provided, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit Hernando Villegas,
Jose Villegas and Benito Basug Jr. with said firearms inflicting numerous gunshot wounds on
different parts of their bodies which caused their deaths immediately thereafter.

Based on the testimony of the witnesses, Hernando, Jose and Benito were on their way to
attend the wake of their colleague’s wife when they were gunned down by the CAFGU officers.
The accused said that they made a mistake in shooting Hernando, Jose, and Benito because they
thought that the three were members of the New People's Army (NPA).

The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses straightforward, credible, and in accord with the physical evidence. With regard to the
defense of fulfillment of duty, the trial court ruled that the attendant circumstances leading to the
killing of the three victims by the accused clearly showed the absence of the two essential
requisites for such defense to prosper. The court said that they undoubtedly exceeded in the
performance of their duties by immediately firing successive shots on the three unsuspecting
victims. The court also held that the defense of misencounter due to mistake of fact was

392
unbelievable. Lastly, the RTC concluded that the suddenness of the attack and the lack of
opportunity for the victims to defend themselves constituted treachery.

The CA affirmed the decision of RTC with some modification as to the amount of damages.
It pronounced that even in cases of arrest, the use of unnecessary force, the wantonly violent
treatment of the offender, and the resort to dangerous means, when such apprehension could be
done otherwise, were not justified acts. The appellate court opined that the accused were entirely
careless in not first verifying the identities of the victims; such negligence diminished the defense
of mistake of fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery qualified the killing to murder.

RULING:

The Court held that the accused-appellants are guilty of murder qualified by treachery. In
order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must
be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of
the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the
latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."

The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired at the
three unsuspecting victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The victims, who were on
their way to attend a wake and happily conversing with one another, were caught off guard when all
of a sudden, they were met with multiple gunshots. In such a rapid motion, accused-appellants shot
the victims, affording the latter no opportunity to defend themselves or fight back. Without any
doubt, the manner of execution was deliberately adopted by the accused who were all armed with
heavily powered firearms. They positioned themselves in what they termed as "ambush position," at
a distance where their victims could not easily see them, thereby ensuring that they hit and
terminate their targets.

393
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Carpio Marzan y Lutan

G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack on an

unsuspecting victim thereby depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor.

FACTS:

Carpio, herein accused, entered the house of his bedridden brother, Apolonio who was
seen by Erlinda (Apolonio’s daughter). Erlinda heard her father screaming and thereafter saw the
accused emerge from her father’s house wearing a blood-stained shirt and holding a bladed
instrument dripping with blood. Apolonio eventually succumbed to his death.

After the incident, Lolita, the mother of herein accused and victim, came running towards
the house of Apolonio where she embraced the accused and fell down on the ground. The victim
helped his mother get up and let her sit in front of the house.

By way of defense, the wife of the accused testified that her husband was insane alleging
that her husband would often appear to be nervous and tulala. As regards the stabbing incident,
she recounted that, on that day, she saw her husband going back and forth mumbling something.
According to her, after the incident, the accused just sat down and remained tulala until the police
arrived and handcuffed him. Based on the accused’s psychological report, he was suffering from
Schizophrenia, which was temporary and occurs only intermittently.

Both RTC and CA found herein accused guilty of murder holding that treachery was
present. CA appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present in the commission of the crime.

394
RULING:

YES. Two conditions must occur for treachery to be appreciated, namely: (1) the employment
of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods, or manner of execution.

In this case, both requisites were present. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at
home, bedridden, recuperating from sickness, completely unaware of any danger and unable to
defend himself constituted treachery because the accused-appellant was thereby ensured that the
victim would not be in any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at him. Evidently,
the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate.

395
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP IN RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Benito Molejon

G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

In crimes against chastity, such as acts of lasciviousness, relationship is always

aggravating.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Benito Molejon was charged in five separate information, with five
counts of rape; three of which was committed against his own 13-year old stepdaughter AAA and,
two against his 11-year old stepdaughter BBB.

That the commission of the crime of rape was attended by the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances, to wit:

1. That the victim was only thirteen (13) years old during the commission of said crime;

2. That the offender is the stepfather of the offended party; and

3. That there was force, threat and intimidation.

ISSUE:

Whether the crime committed is aggravated by the circumstance of relationship.

RULING:

YES. Since the crime was committed by the stepfather of the offended parties, the alternative
circumstance of relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating. With the presence of this aggravating

396
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its maximum period,
i.e., sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months,
without eligibility of parole.

397
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

Martiniano B. Saldua vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Premeditation presupposes a deliberate planning of the crime before executing it.

There must be showing of a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated
and reflected upon his decision to execute the crime. Settled is the rule that when it is not
shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.

FACTS:

At 10:00 AM, Lalamunan, Vertudez and Saldua arrived at the kiosk owned by Palalon on
board a red motorcycle. At around noontime, they left the kiosk along with Palalon’s son-in-law
Flores. On the following day at 10:00 AM, Vertudez and Saldua returned to the kiosk. At 6:30 PM,
Lalamunan arrived and the three of them left on foot towards the national highway. Lalamunan
walked ahead to where the motorcycle was parked at a banana grove while Saldua and Vertudez
went to the house of the victim, Abella. Vertudez was next seen to be firing at the garage of the
house of Abella with an armed Saldua behind him. Abella was able to shoot back and hit Vertudez.
Saldua and Vertudez left the area on foot towards where the motorcycle was parked. Vertudez
collapsed due to his gunshot wound. Meanwhile, Saldua and Lalamunan left the area on board the
motorcycle, leaving Vertudez behind. Abella was found dead that day from gunshot wounds.
Vertudez was also found dead the next day at the banana grove from gunshot wound.

Saldua denied killing Abella and insisted that he was in another place. He narrated that he
was with his family in their home at Negros Oriental. He accounted for his whereabouts on the
entire day of the incident as follows: at 6:00 AM he went to his farm to weed out his peanut
shrubs; at 10:00 AM, he went home to eat lunch. At 2:00 PM, he went back to his farm; and at 7:00
PM, he tried to buy medicine for his ailing daughter.

The RTC convicted Saldua as an accomplice to the crime of murder and also considered the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as the attack appeared to be plan.

398
ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation is present.

RULING:

NO. To prove evident premeditation, three requisites are needed to be proven: (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.

There is no showing when Vertudez reflected on his decision to kill the victim. There was no
direct evidence whatsoever of any plan or preparations to kill the victim nor of the time when the
plot to kill was conceived.

399
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION IN
MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Gerry Agramon

G.R. No. 212156, June 20, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected. There must be proof that the accused intentionally sought the victim for the
purpose of killing him or that accused carefully and deliberately planned the killing in a
manner that would ensure his safety and success. Even if it was shown that the attack was
intended to kill another, as long as the victim's position was merely accidental, alevosia
will not qualify the offense.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, it is indispensable to show concrete

evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out.

FACTS:

On December 24, 2005 at about 6:00pm, Roger Agramon was inside his dwelling with
Pelita Aboganda, his common-law wife, when his brother Gerry Agramon, who appeared to be
drunk, came to their dwelling yelling "I will kill you all." Gerry entered the house armed with an
unsheathed bladed weapon and delivered a stab thrust against Roger, who was able to hold the
weapon with his hand causing him to sustain 4 wounds. Pelita, who was then 2 months pregnant,
tried to cover Roger in order not to be hit again. Pelita was stabbed by Gerry on her left breast.
When Roger was about to run, Gerry stabbed him, and the weapon got stuck at his back. Gerry
searched for another weapon inside the house and when the former saw the long bolo, he chased
Roger who ran towards the barangay hall. Upon reaching the barangay hall, Roger sought help
from the barangay officials who were then celebrating their Christmas party. Gerry arrived at the
barangay hall brandishing his weapon and roaming around the area. The barangay officials were
not able to pacify him, so they asked help from the police officials. When the police arrived, they
arrested Gerry. Pelita died while Roger was taken to the hospital for treatment.

400
 For his part, Gerry interposed self-defense. He asserted that in the morning of December
24, 2005, he was all alone gathering tuba as his primary job. While he was on his way to work, he
was chased by Roger who was then holding a long bolo. Roger was allegedly mad at him because
his 3 pigs destroyed Roger's plants the previous day. When he saw his brother chasing him, Gerry
ran towards the direction of his house and rested there for a while before going back to work.
After work, as Gerry was on his way home at around 6:00pm, Roger accosted him and
immediately delivered a hacking blow at him. Gerry was not hit as he was able to jump to a tree.
He then stabbed Roger with the scythe he was carrying for work. He tried to stab Roger again, but
he was unable to hit him as Pelita came to his defense and used her body as a shield to protect
Roger. Gerry then stepped back and was not able to go near the victims as his uncle held him and
brought him to their residence.

The RTC found Gerry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It held that
the number and nature of the wounds inflicted upon the victim disproves Gerry's claim of self-
defense. The number and location of the wounds of the victims as compared to the unscathed
accused was indicative of the treacherous execution of the crime, with the victims having no
opportunity to defend themselves. It also declared that evident premeditation was apparent from
the fact that the accused was armed with 2 scythes at the time of the incident and several hours
had already lapsed from morning to 6:00pm for him to reflect on his intentions to commit the
crime. On appeal, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The CA agreed that Gerry failed to prove
self-defense because the element of unlawful aggression is explicitly wanting. However, as
regards the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA found that
only evident premeditation was clearly established. It held that treachery cannot be appreciated
because the attack on Pelita was not sudden and unexpected as Roger and Pelita were aware of
the imminent danger to their lives. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that only evident premeditation was clearly
established in this case.

RULING:

NO. The SC holds that Gerry can only be convicted of homicide, not murder. The qualifying
circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, beyond
reasonable doubt. First, for treachery to qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: a)
the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said means, methods or

401
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. In this case, the
prosecution fell short of proving that Gerry consciously and deliberately adopted means which
would ensure that Pelita could not defend herself or seek help. As aptly noted by the CA, Pelita was
forewarned of the impending danger to her life. The fact that Gerry came yelling and threatening his
brother Roger and his family prior to the attack shows that there was no treachery, and that the
latter were aware of the imminent danger to their lives. The existence of a struggle before the attack
on the victim Pelita clearly shows that she was forewarned of the impending attack, and that she
was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. The prosecution also did not prove that Gerry
intentionally sought Pelita for the purpose of killing her. Treachery cannot be appreciated simply
because the attack was sudden and unexpected; there must be proof that the accused intentionally
sought the victim for the purpose of killing him or that accused carefully and deliberately planned
the killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success. Even if it was shown that the attack
was intended to kill another, as long as the victim's position was merely accidental, alevosia will not
qualify the offense.

Second, the SC ruled that the mere lapse of time is insufficient to establish evident
premeditation. For such qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it is indispensable to show
concrete evidence on how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out. Here, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's
evidence was limited to what transpired at 6:00pm of December 24, 2005, when Gerry came to his
brother's house yelling and threatening to kill them all. The prosecution did not present any proof
showing when and how Gerry planned and prepared to kill Pelita. Also, the mere fact that he was
armed at the beginning of the altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a
deliberate plot to murder the victim. To qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be
“premeditation” but must be “evident premeditation.” Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the
overt act of planning the crime, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical
and probable, would not be enough. Hence, evident premeditation cannot likewise be appreciated to
qualify the offense in this case.

With the removal of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation,
the crime committed by Gerry is homicide and not murder.

402
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Alberto Petalino alias “Lanit”

G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery is not appreciated against the accused despite the attack being sudden
and unexpected when the meeting between him and the victim was casual, and the attack
was done impulsively.

FACTS:

Johnny, the victim, on his way home from a party, passed through a narrow alley together
with his friend Franklin. While they were walking, Franklin saw a person, whom he later
identified as herein accused, walking towards them from the opposite direction. When accused
had passed the victim, he suddenly turned towards him, grabbed his hair and without warning,
stabbed the victim in the back which eventually caused his death.

Herein accused was found guilty of the crime of murder by RTC and CA. Both courts found
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present in the commission of the crime.

RULING:

NO. For treachery to be properly appreciated, the State must show not only that the victim
had been unable to defend himself, but also that the accused had consciously adopted the mode of
attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.

403
 In this case, there was no showing that the accused had consciously and deliberately adopted
such mode of attack in order to ensure the killing of the victim without any risk to himself arising
from the defense that the latter could possibly adopt. For one, the stabbing was committed when the
victim was walking together with Franklin, whose presence even indicated that the victim had not
been completely helpless. Also, the encounter between the victim and the accused had been only
casual because the latter did not purposely seek out the victim. In this connection, treachery could
not be appreciated despite the attack being sudden and unexpected when the meeting between the
accused and the victim was casual, and the attack was done impulsively.

404
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Evasco y Nugay and Ernesto Eclavia

G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

The determination of whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of

superior strength was attendant requires the arduous review of the acts of the accused in
contrast with the diminished strength of the victim. There must be a showing of gross
disproportionality between each of them. Mere numerical superiority on the part of the
accused does not automatically equate to superior strength.

FACTS:

The prosecution presented three witnesses, Lorna, Joan and Dr. Lim to establish the
following:

Lorna went to the house of their neighbor Armando, to fetch her husband, Wilfredo. When
Lorna arrived at Armando’s house, she saw accused Ernesto boxing Wilfredo. Thereafter, she saw
accused Jimmy hit Wilfredo’s head with a stone which caused Wilfredo to fall down with his face
up. While Wilfredo was on the ground, Jimmy continuously hit him with a stone and Ernesto was
boxing Wilfredo’s body. After mauling Wilfredo, the two accused walked away together. Wilfredo
was brought to a hospital but eventually died. Joan corroborated the testimony of Lorna. Dr. Lim
testified that the immediate cause of Wilfredo’s death was due to mauling.

RTC and CA found the two accused guilty of murder holding that treachery and abuse of
superior strength was present in the commission of the killing.

ISSUES:

405
 1. Whether or not treachery was present in the commission of the crime.

2. Whether or not there was abuse of superior strength.

RULING:

1. NO. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. The sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on the unsuspecting victim is of the
essence of treachery because such manner of attack deprives the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and at the same time ensures the commission of the assault without risk to the aggressor,
and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

In this case, there was no evidence adduced to show that Ernesto and Jimmy had deliberately
chosen their particular mode of attack to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal intention.
None of the Prosecution's witnesses had seen how the assault had commenced; hence, treachery
could not be held to have attended the assault that led to the untimely death of the victim.

2. NO. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the
crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that
the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative
strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely
sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.

In this case, there was no indication that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their
numerical superiority since there were no witnesses who could describe how the assault had
commenced. For sure, their having assaulted the victim together was not by itself a definite index of
their having deliberately taken advantage of their greater number.

406
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Corpuz

G.R. No. 215320, February 28, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is

inequality of force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of it in the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Corpuz filed an appeal on the decision of the CA which affirmed the
RTC judgement convicting the accused of two counts of murder.

Leonila told her son-in-law, Leonilo, that she would go to her farm situated in Barangay
Maitom, Abuyog Leyte. Later that afternoon, Leonilo went to the farm to check on his mother-in-
law. Upon reaching the farm, he saw Corpuz, 36 years old, hacking Leonila, 65 years old, and
Romana, 74 years old, with a bolo about 26 inches in length. Leonilo reported the incident to the
Barangay Captain and police officers. The victims were later autopsied where it was found that
the victims sustained fatal hack wound. In its defense, Corpuz sought to establish the defense of
alibi and denial. It also presented the police blotter report where it was stated that the suspect
was still unknown contrary to Leonilo’s testimony that he witnessed the actual hacking of the
victims.

The RTC found Corpuz guilty of two (2) counts of murder and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and P75,000 civil indemnity, P50,000 moral damages, and P25,000
exemplary damages.

The CA affirmed with modification the conviction of Corpuz. The CA ruled that treachery
and abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crimes thereby qualifying them to
murder. The CA sentenced Corpuz to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of
parole. The CA also modified the awarded damages by increasing the exemplary damages to
P30,000 and awarding P25,000 temperate damages.

407
ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Corpuz for two counts of Murder proper?

RULING:

YES. There is no reason to disturb the factual findings by the trial court. The crime
committed is Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is present whenever there is inequality of force between the victim and the aggressor,
assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the
latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. The appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. In
this case, the victims were defenseless old women. However, contrary to CA’s pronouncement, the
presence of treachery was not established in this case. For treachery to be appreciated, the
concurrence of two conditions must be established: first, the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and second, the means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the appreciation of treachery was
grounded on the suddenness of the attack. Mere suddenness of an attack is not sufficient to
constitute treachery.

408
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Oscar Mat-an y Escad

G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is

inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of it in the commission of the crime.

FACTS:

Oscar Mat-an was charged with the crimes of attempted homicide and murder for
attempting to kill Anthonette Ewangan and stabbing Minda Babsa-Ay. As a result, thereof, the
latter died. The Regional Trial Court found Oscar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted homicide and murder. As to the murder, it appreciated the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength noting that Oscar was about 5'10" tall, heavily built, and armed with a deadly
weapon; whereas Minda was only 4'11" in height, was already 61 years old, and was carrying a
child. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Oscar is guilty of murder for the killing of Minda
but he could not be held criminally liable for attempted homicide because there was no evidence
that he had the intent to kill Anthonette. Thus, Oscar could only be convicted of physical injuries;
and considering that the physician who treated Anthonette testified that her injury was only
superficial, Oscar is liable only for slight physical injuries therefor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Oscar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
slight physical injuries.

RULING:

409
 YES. In a plethora of cases, the Court has consistently held that the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is present when a man, armed with a deadly weapon, attacks an unarmed and
defenseless woman. In such case, the assailant clearly took advantage of the superiority which his
sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority when he
killed Minda. Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife, a deadly weapon,
while Minda was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend and repel the attacks of her
assailant. Furthermore, the trial court noted that Oscar was of heavy build and stood at 5'10" in
contrast to Minda's 4'11" frame. Clearly, Oscar abused his superiority afforded him by his sex, height,
and build and a weapon when he attacked Minda who was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts correctly convicted him of murder.

410
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Badillos

G.R. No. 215732, June 6, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur: first, the malefactor
employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from
the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and second, the said means, method, and
manner of execution were deliberately adopted.

FACTS:

Christopher Badillos and a “John Doe” were charged with the crime of murder for the
killing of Alex H. Gregory by stabbing him with a knife and hitting him with a piece of wood
thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his death. For the
prosecution, Domingo Gregory testified that he and Alex were walking home after attending a
barrio fiesta when suddenly, Christopher and an unidentified person appeared in front of them.
The unidentified person struck Alex with the wooden club, followed by Christopher stabbing Alex
once in his left chest.

The Regional Trial Court found Christopher guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Christopher is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

RULING:

NO. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to

411
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. It has been consistently held, however, that mere suddenness of an attack is not sufficient to
constitute treachery where it does not appear that the aggressor adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.

In this case, there was no showing that the mode of attack on Alex was consciously adopted
without risk to the assailants. In the first place, the trial court's observation that Christopher and his
companion deliberately waited for Alex in the alley would require the former to have a prior
knowledge of the latter's plan to pass through the said alley at Barangay Batia. Based on Domingo's
narration of events, however, there was no opportunity for Christopher to learn of such resolution.

Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder as the mode of
attack could not have been consciously or deliberately adopted. Without treachery, Christopher can
only be convicted of homicide.

412
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Decito Francisco y Villagracia

G.R. No. 216728, June 4, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of treachery,
even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the
victim's helpless position was accidental.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with murder for stabbing one Jaime Noriega III on his
body, thereby inflicting upon said Jaime Noriega III stab wounds which caused his death.

Jaime Noriega III (the victim) was watching a game of Lucky Nine at the wake of the
daughter of Anacleto Noriega at Baybay, San Jose, Tacloban City. During the game, accused-
appellant suddenly came from behind the victim and, without warning, stabbed him on the left
side of his body with a 13-inch knife, locally known as "pisao." The victim, who was then seated at
the table, fell down.5 Accused-appellant pulled out the knife from the victim's body. The victim
was able to utter the words, "I am wounded." Accused-appellant then fled while still holding the
knife he used to stab the victim. Meanwhile, the victim was brought to the hospital where he
expired.

While the accused appellant failed to prove that he acted in self defense. That while he was
riding his pedicab, two strangers accosted him. One of them suddenly stabbed him in his left arm.
Accused-appellant then jumped to the right side of his pedicab, but the other assailant hit his
back with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant was able to stab one of his assailants with his short
bolo. Thereafter, his assailants ran away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act was attended by treachery.

413
RULING:

NO. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present: 1) the employment of means of

execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

In this case, the victim was stabbed suddenly, and he was totally unprepared for the
unexpected attack as he was watching a card game at the precise time of the incident. He had
absolutely no chance to defend himself.

The prosecution, however, failed to prove the existence of the second condition. The mere fact
that the attack was inflicted when the victim had his back turned will not in itself constitute
treachery. It must appear that such mode of attack was consciously adopted with the purpose of
depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.

Treachery cannot be appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the
accused had pondered upon the mode or method to insure the killing of the deceased or remove or
diminish any risk to himself that might arise from the defense that the deceased might make. When
there is no evidence that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to commit the
crime, or there is no proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or
reflection, treachery cannot be considered.

The suddenness of attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of treachery, even if
the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless
position was accidental. It does not always follow that because the attack is sudden and unexpected,
it is tainted with treachery.

414
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

People of the Philippines vs. Ritz Baring Moreno

G.R. No. 217889, March 14, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following

requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.

On evident premeditation, in order that this qualifying circumstance may be

appreciated, the following requisites must be present, viz.: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of
time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.

FACTS:

An altercation between cousins Kyle, Reanne, and Tyke arose which was subsequently
separated by their neighbors. Later that night, the accused-appellant arrived, positioned himself
five meters away from Reanne and Kyle and fired at them twice, the second shot hitting Kyle in
the chest. The accused-appellant ran away because there were neighbors who saw him fire the
shots. Kyle was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Accused-
appellant surrendered voluntarily and confessed to the killing of Kyle upon a directive from Tyke.
He was then charged with murder.

The RTC convicted him for the crime of murder, appreciating treachery as a qualifying
circumstance. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the lower court. The CA noted that treachery
was properly appreciated; evident premeditation was not established by the prosecution; and
that the accused-appellant’s voluntary surrender was not accorded consideration.

415
ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation

were present in the killing of Kyle.

RULING:

NO, the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation in the killing of Kyle.

The existence of treachery should be based on clear and convincing evidence. Such evidence
must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself and its existence cannot be presumed. The accused-
appellant’s narration of the facts confirmed that the attack he made on Kyle was not preconceived
nor deliberately adopted; or that he reflected on the means, method, or form of the attack to secure
his unfair advantage.

It is emphasized that the essence of this circumstance of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry
out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Noteworthy,
the prosecution failed to show the lapse of time when the accused-appellant had intended to kill Kyle
to the point of his actual commission thereof, and which period of time would have allowed the
accused-appellant to contemplate on the outcome of his crime. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that
the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation had not been securely established through the
prosecution’s evidence.

416
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Colamat

G.R. No. 210435, August 15, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure
its execution with himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

FACTS:

Appellant, together with his co-accused, Jimbo Saladaga (Jimbo) and Ronilo Rondina
(Ronilo), was charged with the of murder m an Information dated May 10, 2002 which reads:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 2002, at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio
Simborio, Barangay Tayud, Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
Esmeralda Gelido with the use of an ice pick, thereby inflicting upon the victim the following, to
wit: "hemorrhage, acute, severe, secondary to multiple punctures wounds (R) and (L) clavicular
areas, and (R) chest," which caused the instantaneous death of the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present.

RULING:

YES. There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution
of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution with

417
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

In this case, appellant and two others held the victim in place, while Jimbo delivered the
stabbing thrusts on the victim's body. And of the five puncture wounds sustained by the victim, three
were fatal; the victim's left and right lungs, as well as his thoracic cavity, were punctured during the
stabbing incident.

Clearly, the victim's stabbing was attended by treachery, considering that (a) the means of
execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b)
said means of execution was deliberately adopted by appellant and his co-accused.

418
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Ardin Cuesta Cadampong

G.R. No. 218244, June 13, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting

victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.

FACTS:

The victim, his wife Alicia Napoles, and the latter's mother were having dinner in the
kitchen of the house of Alicia's nephew when Alicia suddenly heard two-gun bursts. Alicia then
saw his bloodied husband fall down. Alicia then stood up, peeped through the bamboo slats and
saw the accused-appellant running towards his house. Alicia was certain that it was the accused-
appellant because he passed by a lighted place and having known him for two years, she was
familiar with the accused-appellant's build, height and profile of the body.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act was attended by treachery.

RULING:

YES, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on
an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring

419
its commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victim.

420
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Gonzales y Con and Rene Gonzales y Con

G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The elements of treachery are: (1) the assailant employed means in the execution of
the criminal act which gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant.

FACTS:

Ricky and Rene were charged with murder. The prosecution presented Leo Garcia (Leo) as
its eyewitness.

Leo testified that he was awakened by a commotion outside of his house. He discovered
that the commotion was caused by Bobby Solomon (Bobby) and Rene, who were taunting each
other. The confrontation led to Rene punching Bobby who failed to retaliate. Ricky then emerged
and, without warning, stabbed Bobby three times. When people started arriving, Ricky and Rene
escaped together. Eventually, Bobby was brought to a hospital but unfortunately succumbed to his
death during surgery. Dr. Quinto testified that the victim was hit at his left forearm, middle of his
chest and at his stomach

On the other hand, Ricky admitted that he stabbed and killed the victim, but only because
it was necessary to defend himself. He testified that as he passed the house of Bobby, he observed
that Bobby was staring at him in a bad way. Ricky claimed that he saw Bobby was about to strike
him with a knife, but he was fortunate enough to stab him first. When someone fired a warning
shot to stop them, he ran away but later voluntarily surrendered himself to their barangay
captain upon knowing that Bobby died.

RTC found Ricky guilty of Murder, holding that treachery was present in the killing. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

421
ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery is present, thus making Ricky guilty of Murder.

RULING:

NO. Treachery is not present hence Ricky is guilty only of Homicide.

To prove treachery, there must be a showing, first and foremost, that the offender consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime
which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.

Indeed, it does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should
necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of the victim show
that the attack was frontal, which indicates that the deceased was not totally without opportunity to
defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between Bobby and Rene which
Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated act of the will.

422
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Roland Miraña y Alcaraz

G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

It has been stressed that for abuse of superior strength to be properly appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown that the advantage of superior strength was
purposely and consciously sought by the assailant.

FACTS:

The victim here was a 73-year-old widow who was found trembling and praying after
being chased by the accused-appellant with a bolo. The following morning, her neighbor heard a
loud cry and found the victim lying on the ground. The accused-appellant and his father were
present at the scene, too. When asked by the police officers who responded to the scene, the
accused-appellant admitted to killing the victim. He pointed to a bolo which he said he used to
hack the victim. He was brought to the police station and thereafter admitted to a mental hospital.

The family of the accused-appellant invoked insanity as a defense for the latter. Prior to the
death of the victim, the accused-appellant has been observed to be exhibiting odd behavior. He
would smile even when alone, call a chicken late at night, and claim that the victim was a witch.

The RTC and the CA agreed that accused-appellant failed to overcome the presumption of
sanity; and his bizarre acts prior to the incident cannot be considered insanity for the purpose of
exonerating him because not every aberration of the mind constitutes insanity. The aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was also appreciated to qualify the crime to murder,
in consideration of the fact that the victim was a 73-year-old unarmed woman as against a male
assailant in his early twenties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not abuse of superior strength is present in the case.

423
RULING:

NO, abuse of strength cannot be appreciated as it was not sufficiently proven. The
prosecution failed to proffer evidence that accused-appellant purposely sought such advantage. The
testimonies of the witnesses, on the whole, do not establish that accused-appellant made any
conscious effort to use his age, size, or strength to facilitate the commission of the crime, as in fact
the notorious disparity of these factors between the victim and the accused-appellant was not even
clearly shown.

424
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Generaldo M. Condino

G.R. No. 219591, February 19, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery when the offender employs mean, methods or forms in the execution of
any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of murder for stabbing several times one Isabelo D.
Arrabis with the use of [a] yellowish pointed metal, hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body thereby causing his instantaneous death. The appellant entered plea of not guilty. Appellant
appear before the Lupon Tagapamayapa for the alleged destruction of a plastic chair owned by
the barangay. After the hearing, appellant, who was just outside the gate of the Barangay Hall,
calmly walked toward the group, and with his left hand, grabbed the victim's neck from behind
and stabbed the latter three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal, hitting a portion just
below the victim's left breast.

The victim was taken to the Daanbantayan District Hospital, but he was pronounced dead
on arrival.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim's stabbing was attended by treachery.

RULING:

YES, the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and
unable to retaliate.

425
 There is treachery when the offender employs mean, methods or forms in the execution of
any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

In this case, appellant, coming from behind the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using
his left hand, and with his right hand, stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish
pointed metal. Clearly, the attack was attended by treachery, considering that: a) the means of
execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) said
means of execution was deliberately adopted by appellant.

426
QUALIFIED STATUTORY RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Ramirez

G.R. No. 219863, March 6, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of

age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Notably, the absence of free
consent in cases of statutory rape is conclusively presumed and as such, proof of force,
intimidation or consent is immaterial.

FACTS:

Richard Ramirez was charged with the crime of rape in 2 separate informations. During
the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. According to the version of prosecution, the
victim was then only 6 years old when she was raped and molested by her neighbor Ramirez.
Ramirez, a stay-in construction worker, was also a friend of the victim's uncle who would usually
sleep over at the victim’s house. On February 24, 2007, at about 12:00am, the victim was
awakened by Ramirez when he removed her pajama and panty and placed himself on top of her.
Ramirez licked her vagina before inserting his penis into it. She felt pain and cried. Since Ramirez
threatened her with harm if she told the incident to anybody, she remained silent. On March 18,
2007, at about 2:00am, the victim was awakened by the shout of her uncle. There, she saw
Ramirez standing at the corner of the house with her panty at the latter’s feet. Realizing that she
was naked, she instantly wore her short pants and ran and embraced her uncle. Thereafter, the
victim, together with her grandparents and uncles, went to the police to report what happened.
The medico legal examination of the victim’s private organ revealed no laceration in her hymen.

For his part, Ramirez alleged that on February 24, 2007, he was working as a construction
worker at Baliwag, Bulacan. On March 18, 2007, he was at home resting. At around 8:00pm of that
day, he went out to join his friends in a drinking spree in front of the house of the victim's aunt,
where the victim also lived. The drinking spree lasted until 12:00am when he started vomiting.
They slept at the house of the victim's aunt. He, together with his friends, slept, side by side with
each other in the living room, but before he fell asleep, he noticed that the victim was sleeping on
the sofa. At around 2:00am, he was awakened by the punches thrown at him by the victim's uncle,
who claimed to have seen him molesting the girl. Another uncle followed suit and both clobbered

427
him. His cousin Randy intervened to pacify and brought him home. Then, policemen arrived at
their house to arrest him, although without showing any warrant of arrest.

The RTC found Ramirez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this appeal. Ramirez contended that the
alleged acts of rape could not have been perpetrated by him as there were other persons present
when said acts were supposedly committed. Moreover, he argued that the absence of hymenal
lacerations on the victim casts doubt on his guilt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of Ramirez is proper.

RULING:

NO. To convict an accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: 1) the age of the
complainant; 2) the identity of the accused; and 3) the sexual intercourse between the accused and
the complainant. In this case, the prosecution successfully established that the first rape incident on
February 24, 2007 indeed took place when the victim was only 6 years old, and that Ramirez was the
perpetrator of the crime. The age of the victim at the time of the incident was evidenced by her
Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on September 7, 2000. Consequently, the crime
committed by Ramirez is qualified statutory rape. The SC rejected the contention of Ramirez that the
presence of other persons during the commission of the first rape incident rendered the victim’s
testimony unbelievable. The SC likewise rejected Ramirez's claim that the absence of lacerations on
the victim’s hymen negated sexual intercourse. The rupture of the hymen is not an essential and
material fact in rape cases; it only further confirms that the vagina has been penetrated and
damaged in the process.

As regards the second incident, the act of lasciviousness has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the victim, her aunt and uncle concerning the second rape
incident are not sufficient to convict Ramirez of rape or even acts of lasciviousness. The victim’s
narrative thereto clearly consisted of hearsay evidence which, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule.

WHEREFORE, Ramirez is found guilty of qualified statutory rape in the first criminal case.
However, he is acquitted with respect to the second criminal case.

428
ELEMENTS OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Michael A. Belludo and John Doe

G.R. No. 219884, October 17, 2018

A. Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:
For treachery to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, it must be shown to
have been present at the inception of the attack. Two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or
consciously adopted.

FACTS:

Accused was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and the Courts of Appeal of murder for
the killing of Francisco “Paco” Ojeda, while he and an unidentified driver of the motorcycle shoot
the victim on the back of the head causing the death of the same. The accused challenged the
conviction, consequently, the proper penalty imposable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was guilty of murder.

RULING:

NO, the accused is guilty only of homicide by reason that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. The contention of the prosecution that
the shot was made at the back of the head does not itself establish treachery. The following elements
must still concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or
consciously adopted.

429
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Glen Abina y Latorre and Jesus Latorre y Deraya

G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

There are two requirements in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) the
victim was in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and (2) the assailant
consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one’s attack against
the victim.

FACTS:

Herein accused-appellants were charged for murder for the killing of Anthony Asadon and
Rodolfo Mabag. The parties were in a party having a drinking spree when Anthony and his wife
asked permission to leave to which accused-appellant Glen disapproved. When Anthony and his
wife proceeded to leave, Glen suddenly took his gun and shot Anthony, hitting his right eye. When
Anthony fell to the ground, accused-appellant Jesus stabbed him with a bolo. Rodolfo went to his
Anthony’s aid, but he was also hacked and stabbed by the accused-appellants. Both Anthony and
Rodolfo died.

For his defense, Jesus claimed that it was Roberto Jongaya and Glen who killed the victims.
He said that he saw Roberto with a gun directed at the victims. While he tried to stop him,
Roberto shot the victims then immediately stabbed them with the help of Glen. Afterwards, Jesus
collected the weapons and surrendered it to the barangay captain. Later that evening, he was
arrested by some barangay tanod and members of the Philippine Army. He was interrogated but
he said his only contribution to the crime was the surrendering of weapons to the barangay
captain. However, during cross-examination, Jesus admitted that he and Glen killed Anthony and
Rodolfo but only to defend himself.

The RTC convicted Glen and Jesus of murder for the death of Anthony, and homicide for
the death of Rodolfo. It ruled that there was treachery in the killing of Anthony but none in
Rodolfo. The claim of self-defense was not appreciated because their denial of their involvement
in the killing was inconsistent with their claim of self-defense. The CA concurred with the RTC’s
ruling, hence this appeal.

430
ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of Glen for the murder of Anthony was proper.

RULING:

NO, we find that Glen should only be held liable for homicide for the killing of Anthony
instead of murder, there being no proof that treachery attended the commission of the crime,
contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA. If Glen deliberately intended that no risk would
come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to attack Anthony. As it is, the location
and time of the attack did not discount the possibility of retaliation coming from the other guests.
From all indications, it thus appeared that Glen did not consciously intend to employ a particular
mode of attack to kill Anthony. The attack was a spur of the moment decision caused by sheer
annoyance when Anthony and his wife left while the party was still ongoing. As such, in the absence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed was only homicide.

431
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Nady Magallano, Jr., et al.

G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on his part.

FACTS:

Pineda testified that at around1:00 AM, he was at home sleeping beside his wife when loud
voices outside roused him from sleep. He then heard a woman shout, “Romy, bakit mo siya
sinasaktan, inaano ba kayo?" Pineda peeked through his window and saw two men, whom he
identified Magallano and Tapar, who was then lying on the ground. He testified that he saw
Magallano repeatedly strike Batongbakal with a “dos por dos,” while Tapar watched.

As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a woman suddenly bolted from the fray. Magallano
and Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and chased the woman. By then, a still-conscious
Batongbakal began to crawl slowly towards a gate. Magallano and Tapar returned after a few
minutes carrying several stones, each about a volleyball's size. Magallano threw the stones on
Batongbakal's head and body, while Tapar prevented him from crawling away. Pineda attested
that he wanted to help Batongbakal, but his wife stopped him out of fear. He then shouted at
Magallano and Tapar, but his wife covered his mouth to muffle his voice. However, Magallano and
Tapar still heard him, so they stopped attacking Batongbakal, loaded him into the tricycle, and
sped off towards Poblacion. He also stated that the street outside their house, where Batongbakal
was mauled, was well-lit by a streetlight, and that there was a second streetlight near his house.

For Tapar’s defense, he testified that he worked the whole day at the time of the incident
and went home directly after his shift. He rested, ate dinner, and fell asleep at about 10:00 PM.
The following day, Tapar claimed that police officers woke him up, saying a certain Cristina
accused him of killing someone. They then ordered him to come with them to the municipal hall.
There, Tapar repeatedly proclaimed his innocence, but nobody believed him, and he was beaten
up. The police officers pressed him to tell them where he threw the victim's body, but he denied
doing this, let alone killing anybody. Tapar admitted knowing Magallano since they both worked

432
at the National Food Authority but denied being with him in the early morning of October 1, 2005
since he was home at that time and the night before.

For his part, Magallano testified that he was at Tyson Plant in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan with his brother and their helper, waiting for their truck to be loaded with feeds. While
he was at Tyson Plant, Nardo, the brother of his former common-law wife Cristina, borrowed
money because he supposedly ran into an accident with Batongbakal. Magallano gave money to
Nardo, who then huriedly left for Lucena City. On July 3, 2006, while Magallano was sleeping at a
garage in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, two (2) police officers shot him on his thigh. They said that Santos
pointed to him as Batongbakal's killer. They brought him to the police station for questioning and
treated his gunshot wound. During trial, Magallano denied knowing Batongbakal, much more
killing him. He claimed that Santos falsely accused him of murder to get back at him since he had
custody of their three (3) children. However, he could not explain why Pineda would point to him
as Batongbakal's killer.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim’s killing was attended by treachery.

RULING:

NO. Two (2) conditions must be established by the prosecution for a killing to be properly
qualified by treachery to murder: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or
form of attack employed by him.

In this case, Pineda’s testimony began when accused were in the middle of mauling the victim,
and there was no testimony to prove that the victim did not provoke them or expect their attack. The
prosecution did not present evidence that would show that accused-appellants reflected on and
decided on the form of their attack to secure an unfair advantage over the victim. Even when
accused-appellants returned after chasing the screaming woman and hit the crawling victim with
rocks, treachery is still absent. This is because the second attack was not a surprise, as shown by the
victim's attempt to go back to the safety of his own house.

433
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

PO2 Jessie Flores vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the successful prosecution of the offense of simple robbery, the following
elements must be established: (1) that there is personal property belonging to another; (2)
that there is unlawful taking of that property; (3) that the taking is with intent to gain; and
(4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.

FACTS:

On June 26, 2000 at around 6:00pm, Roderick France figured in a vehicular collision with a
passenger jeepney. A traffic enforcer arrived and prepared a sketch of the incident. Then, France
and the jeepney driver proceeded to the police station wherein PO2 Jessie Flores investigated the
incident. The jeepney driver was told to go home while France was asked to remain at the station.
He was told to return to the station after 2 days and prepare the amount of P2,000.00 so he can
get back his driver's license. Because France could not raise the said amount in 2 days, he was
told by PO2 Flores to just return on the third day in the evening because the latter was on a night
shift duty then. Subsequently, a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR) was issued and signed by PO2
Flores who told France that the same would serve as the latter's temporary driver's license.
France became suspicious as he recalled that on a previous occasion when his driver's license
was confiscated due to a traffic violation, the same was claimed from the office of the MMDA or
City Hall and not from the officer who confiscated his license. Sensing that something was not
right, France went to the headquarters of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) to file a complaint against PO2 Flores. France was asked to provide the amount of
P2,000.00 which was dusted with ultraviolet fluorescent powder. Then, the PAOCTF team
proceeded to the police station together with France. When France entered the station, PO2
Flores asked him if he brought with him the money. After an hour, PO2 Flores called France to his
table. He opened a drawer and told France to drop the money inside. PO2 Flores then counted the
money inside the drawer using his left hand. As soon as France asked for his driver's license, the
PAOCTF team suddenly materialized at the scene. They arrested PO2 Flores and confiscated the

434
things inside his drawer including the marked money. The team subsequently proceeded to Camp
Crame where PO2 Flores was turned over for ultraviolet examination.

For his part, Flores interposed the defense of denial and frame-up. According to him, he
received a report in his office on June 26, 2000 that there was a vehicular collision in his area of
assignment. Upon investigation, he determined that the accident was due to France's fault. He
confiscated the driver's license of France, issued a citation ticket and told France that he could
claim his driver's license from the Quezon City Redemption Center upon payment of the amount
of P2,000.00. On June 29, 2000 of evening, PO2 Flores had no idea why France returned to his
office. Because he had to interview Robert Pancipance at that time, France was told to wait.
However, France was persistent in giving him the TVR with the enclosed money, but he refused.
While PO2 Flores was at the comfort room, France took the chance to place the money inside PO2
Flores' drawer. When PO2 Flores returned, the operatives from the PAOCTF arrested him and
brought him to Camp Crame.

The RTC found PO2 Flores guilty of simple robbery and is sentenced to a penalty of 2 years,
10 months and 21 days as minimum to 6 years, 1 month and 11 days as maximum. PO2 Flores
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

The CA modified the penalty after appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
authority. It ruled that the penalty to be imposed is 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day as minimum to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,
PO2 Flores filed before the SC a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of PO2 Flores is proper.

RULING:

YES, the SC ruled that the prosecution has sufficiently established proof beyond reasonable
doubt of PO2 Flores’ guilt; therefore, the penalty prescribed by law must be imposed upon him for
abusing his power and blemishing the name of public service.

In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the elements of the crime charged.
France categorically testified that PO2 Flores demanded and eventually received from him the
amount of P2,000.00 in exchange for the release of his driver's license. When the marked money was
placed inside PO2 Flores’ drawer, who counted it afterwards, he was deemed to have taken
possession of the money. This amount was unlawfully taken by PO2 Flores from France with intent to

435
gain and through intimidation since the former was a police officer assigned as an investigator in
the traffic sector of his station. While he had the authority to confiscate the driver's license of traffic
violators, nowhere in the law is he authorized to keep an offender's license and receive any payment
for its return. The SC likewise agrees with the courts a quo that PO2 Flores employed intimidation to
obtain the amount of P2,000.00 from France as the act performed by the former caused fear in the
mind of the latter and hindered the free exercise of his will. For France whose daily living depends on
his earnings from driving a taxi, the thought of not having his driver's license back and the
possibility that he might not be able to drive a taxi and earn a living for his family prompted him to
give the amount demanded. PO2 Flores succeeded in forcing France to choose between parting with
his money or have his driver's license confiscated or canceled.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed.

436
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Bauit y Delos Santos

G.R. No. 223102, February 14, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

FACTS:

AAA, 12-year old daughter of the accused, was on her way to the bathroom when the latter
grabbed her and forced her to lie down. He then was on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. After the incident, she took a bath and went to school. Upon the arrival of BBB, AAA’s
mother and the accused live-in partner, she confided in her and they reported the same to the
police station. BBB presented AAA’s birth certificate to show that the accused is the biological
father of AAA. On his defense, the accused denied raping AAA, claiming that the latter was a
problematic child.

The RTC find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape under
Article 266-A paragraph l(a) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Upon appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape under
Article 266-A paragraph l(a) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.

437
RULING:

YES. Article 266-B of the RPC provides: 266-B. Penalties - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xx xxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.

In the case at bar, the twin qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her blood
ties to the accused-appellant were properly alleged in the Information, proved during trial, and duly
appreciated. The Birth Certificate of "AAA'' proved that she was the biological daughter of accused-
appellant. He was duly identified as the father of "AAA" and did not even impugn such relationship
during the trial.

438
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Japag and Alvin Liporada

G.R. No. 223155, July 23, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

"There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."

FACTS:

On March 16, 2009, Ramil Parrocho (Ramil), the victim's twin brother saw the appellant
blocking the way of the victim who was then about to the enter the school gate. Liporada punch
his brother while being held in place by Macalalag. Suddenly, the appellant, who was positioned
behind the victim, drew a bladed weapon from his pocket and stabbed the latter at the back.
Appellant, Liporada and Macalalag immediately fled towards the direction of the highway. The
victim was rushed to the hospital but was later on declared dead on arrival.

The appellant raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense stating that it was the
victim who attacked them by hitting and stabbing him using a bladed weapon. And that he was
just fortunate for being able to get the knife from the victim.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC found no merit in appellant's contention that he
had acted in self-defense which resulted in the victim's killing. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the
victim's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as the suddenness of
appellant's attack on the victim from behind rendered the latter defenseless and unable to flee or
escape.

The CA affirmed the assailed RTC Decision with modification. Like the RTC, the CA also
rejected appellant's claim of self-defense in the absence of proof of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim.

439
ISSUE:

Whether the victim's stabbing was attended by treachery.

RULING:

YES. In this case, the records clearly show that the victim's killing was attended by treachery,
considering that: (a) the victim was fatally stabbed by appellant from behind immediately after
receiving a punch in the face from Liporada; (b) the victim was held in place by Macalalag when the
stabbing blow was delivered by appellant; and (c) the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the
victim's brother and even the nearby security guards were unable to prevent it.

The totality of these circumstances clearly shows that the means of execution of the attack
gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and said means of execution
was deliberately adopted by appellant.

440
TREACHERY AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Ronelo Bermudo, Rommel Bermudo and Rolando Bermudo

G.R. No. 225322, July 4, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.

FACTS:

On March 7, 2012 at around 6:30pm, Ronelo Bermudo and Philip Bedrero were arguing in
front of the latter's house about George, the latter's nephew, for supposedly wrecking the
former's bike. After the argument, both parties parted ways and returned to their homes. At
around 8:30pm of the same day, Ronelo, this time armed with a bolo, stood in front of Philip's
house demanding the latter to come out so he could kill him. Philip went outside; and Gilberto
Bedrero, George's father, likewise came out of his house and tried to pacify Ronelo telling him that
they would fix his bike the next day. Suddenly, Rommel and Rolando Bermudo rushed towards
Gilberto and, without warning, Rommel struck Gilberto on the head with a small ax which made
the latter fall. As Gilberto lay prostrate, Ronelo hacked him in the stomach while Rolando beat
him with a piece of wood and stabbed him with a bolo. Philip tried to help Gilberto, but Rommel
swung his ax at him injuring his upper lip causing him to retreat to his house. Thereafter, Grace
Bedrero, the niece of Gilberto, ran towards a bloodied Gilberto and cradled him. Ronelo ordered
her to leave forcing her to step away from them. At this point, Ronelo continued to assault
Gilberto by hacking him in the chest and striking his face with a piece of wood. Rommel and
Rolando urged him to finish Gilberto. After the assailants had left, Gilberto was eventually
brought to the hospital where Philip was also being treated for his wounds. Unfortunately, the
former died after several hours of treatment. At the hospital, Philip also saw Ronelo receiving
treatment for his wounds. He notified police that the latter was one of those who attacked
Gilberto; consequently, Ronelo was brought to the police station. On the other hand, Rommel was
brought to the precinct after he was identified at the crime scene as one of the suspects —
Rolando eluded arrest and is still at-large.

441
 For their part, Rommel asserted that on March 7, 2012 at around 5:00pm, he and Ipecris
Bermudo were drinking with their friends in the house of a certain Jimmy Peñalosa. At around
8:30pm, they decided to go to Rommel's house for a videoke session; Ipecris left ahead to get
some money. Along the way, Ipecris saw Ronelo challenging Philip with a bolo. When Ronelo was
hit with a stone that Philip threw at him, he retaliated by striking the latter with a bolo hitting
Philip's upper lip prompting him to retreat. At this point, Gilberto came out of his house armed
with a weapon. Ronelo hacked him and continued to do so even when he was already on the
ground. When Ronelo fled, Philip rushed out again from his house to aid Gilberto. At this time,
Rommel arrived together with his friends on the way to a videoke session. Philip then challenged
Rommel to a fight while brandishing his bolo making him run away towards his house. A few
minutes later, policemen arrived at Rommel's house and invited him to the police station. There,
he was identified as one of Gilberto's assailants.

The RTC found Rommel and Ronelo guilty of murder. It found that Rommel conspired with
his co-accused because the manner by which Gilberto was attacked demonstrated unity of
purpose and community of design. In addition, the RTC ruled that Gilberto's killing was attended
by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

On appeal, the CA agreed that Rommel conspired with his co-accused as manifested by
their actions. However, it disagreed that abuse of superior physical strength should be
appreciated on account of the presence of treachery. It clarified that when abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not only treachery must be appreciated in this case.

RULING:

YES. Based on the testimonies of Philip and Grace, all the elements of the crime of murder
were proven beyond reasonable doubt: A) a person was killed; B) the accused killed the victim; C)
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstance in Article 248 of the RPC, i.e.,
treachery; and D) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide. In order to appreciate the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the following elements must be present: a) employment of
means, method or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive
or retaliating acts on the part of the victim; and b) deliberate adoption of such means, method or
manner of execution. Said elements of treachery were present in this case. It is apparent that
Gilberto was completely defenseless at the time of the attack because he was surprised by Rommel

442
with a blow to the head causing him to fall to the ground. Rommel and co-accused continued to
attack him causing him multiple injuries, including the fatal ones. From the inception of the assault
until the coup de grace was inflicted, Gilberto was never in a position to defend himself. Further,
Rommel and his co-accused consciously adopted the means of attack because, as noted by the CA,
they were already armed when they proceeded to the crime scene. In addition, Rommel suddenly,
without warning or provocation, attacked Gilberto from behind manifesting that their actions were
planned and orchestrated, and not merely impetuous.

Wherefore, the assailed decision of the CA is affirmed.

443
CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz

G.R. No. 225336, September 5, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they
thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose
without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.

FACTS:

At a public highway, a group of five persons, including the victim, Dave Alde (Alde), while
being asked by a barangay tanod, was confronted by another group of five persons consisting of
the accused Pilpa, a certain “JR” and three other persons. JR stabbed Alde in the chest with a knife,
while Pilpa poised to thrust Alde as well. Pilpa’s thrusts were parried by Alde’s friend, Choy.
However, Alde was able to run away. Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila
and underwent surgery. Unfortunately, twenty minutes into the operation, Alde went into cardiac
arrest and succumbed to death.

RTC found that treachery attended the killing of Alde, and thus held Pilpa guilty of murder,
being a co-conspirator of JR. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery is present in the killing of the victim.

RULING:

NO. It must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was
deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor. The attack

444
was made at a public highway and in the presence of a barangay tanod, while the victim was with
four other persons. The Court thus fails to see how the mode of attack chosen by the assailants
supposedly guaranteed the execution of the criminal act without risk on their end.

445
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF QUALIFIED THEFT

People of the Philippines vs. Belen Mejares

G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

While grave abuse of trust and confidence per se does not produce the felony as an
effect, it is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the commission of the crime of
theft"; hence, the imposition of a higher penalty is necessary.

FACTS:

According to Raquel Torres, the household helper of Mark Vincent and Jacqueline Gavino,
she was cleaning the dining area of the condominium unit at around 1:00pm on May 22, 2012
when she noticed that Mejares' cellphone kept ringing. Mejares answered it away from Torres,
and when the former returned, she was "pale, perspiring and panicky.” Mejares then told her that
Jacqueline met an accident and instructed her to get something from a drawer in the master’s
bedroom and since it was locked, the former was supposedly told to destroy it. When Mejares
emerged from the bedroom, she informed Torres that Jacqueline did not want other household
members to know what happened. Then, Mejares left with a green bag. When Mejares returned at
about 3:00pm, she asked Torres if there had been an incoming landline call while she was gone.
Torres answered in the negative. At 4:00pm, Torres started to receive calls from Jacqueline who
sounded "loud, normal and animated.'' On the other hand, Jacqueline testified that in the early
afternoon of May 22, 2012, she was at work. She tried calling but could not access her household
landline past 5:00pm so she decided to call Torres' cellular phone to have her instruct the driver
to pick her up. After the phone call was cut, she then received a call from Mejares, informing her
about receiving a call from a certain Nancy, who stated that Jacqueline wanted to avoid the
publicity that may arise from her supposed accident. Mejares thereafter claimed that she was
instructed to break the drawer in the master’s bedroom and to take all its contents. However,
Jacqueline clarified that she had neither a personal secretary nor an aide named Nancy. She also
affirmed that she did not figure in any accident. The stay-in driver of the Spouses Gavino,
Bonifacio Baluyot, claimed that on the said date, Mejares told him to bring her to Greenhills
Shopping Mall allegedly on Jacqueline's orders. He complied and he saw her carry a green bag.
After dropping Mejares at the mall entrance, he returned to the condominium. The condominium

446
security guard who was on duty at the lobby on the said date, Pedro Garcia, narrated that at
around 1:30pm, he saw Mejares about to leave the premises carrying a green bag. However, he
did not allow her to leave in the absence of a gate pass signed by her employer. After a few
moments, Mejares’ cellphone rang, and she rushed to the elevator. Then, Garcia saw Mejares leave
using her employer's car driven by Baluyot. According to him, he still attempted to stop them by
warning them that they could be victims of dugo-dugo gang, to no avail.

For her part, Mejares claimed that she was a victim of the dugo-dugo gang. She stated that
she received a phone call from the condominium unit's landline from a certain Nancy, who
introduced herself as Jacqueline's assistant and informed her that Jacqueline had met an accident.
Afterwards, she claimed that Jacqueline herself talked to her and instructed her to get something
from a drawer in the master's bedroom and to use a screwdriver to destroy its lock because the
other driver in the accident had a 50-50 chance of survival. She said that when the lobby guard
did not allow her to leave, Jacqueline called her and told her to return to the unit and to ask the
driver to take her to Virra Mall. From there, she took a cab going to Baclaran Church, where she
met an unknown woman. Before handing the bag to the unidentified lady, she was able to talk
again over the phone to Jacqueline, who told her to give the bag to the woman and return to the
unit.

The RTC found Mejares guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft of
assets amounting to P1,056,308.00, sentencing her to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Articles
309-310 of the RPC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether the conviction of Mejares is proper.

RULING:

YES. The CA is correct in pointing out that the actions of Mejares before, during, and after the
crime all belie her claim that she did not willfully commit the crime. While Mejares portrays herself
as the victim, prosecution evidence has established that she is the victimizer. Normal human
experience, as well as the consistency in and confluence of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
lead to no other conclusion than that Mejares, taking advantage of her being a domestic helper of
Jacqueline for approximately a year, committed the crime of qualified theft. If she honestly believed
that her employer had met an accident and was genuinely worried for her, she could have easily
sought the help of any of her co-workers in the household. When warned about the dugo-dugo gang,
Mejares could have paused to re-assess the situation. She failed to do all these security measures

447
with no convincing justification. Indeed, her persistence to leave the condominium with the
valuables and her refusal to let the security guard talk to her employer further belie her position. To
make matters worse, Mejares was a domestic helper who had been working for the Spouses Gavino
for at least 1 year when she committed the crime. By this fact alone, the offense committed is
qualified and warrants graver penalties pursuant to Article 310 of the RPC. The established facts
point to the soundness of the RTC and the CA’s conclusion that Mejares is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft. Thus, her conviction must be upheld.

However, the SC modifies the penalty to be imposed upon Mejares pursuant to RA No. 10951
which became effective during the pendency of this case. Said law increased the baseline amounts
and values of property and damage to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the
offenses committed in relation to them. Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value
of stolen personal properties, it is critical to ensure that the penalty is based on the value proven
during trial, and not merely on the Information or uncorroborated testimonies presented by the
prosecution. Here, the RTC err in setting the amount of the stolen items on the basis of nothing but
the allegations as they appeared in the Information and asserted by Jacqueline. The stolen items
were valued the way it is alleged in the Informaion since no other competent evidence was presented
to satisfactorily prove their value. Thus, in the absence of factual and legal bases, the amount of
P1,056,308.00 could not be the basis to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on Mejares. On
the same ground, Jacqueline is likewise not entitled to reparation. Hence, the SC is constrained to
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) of the RPC, as amended by Section 81 of RA No.
10951, which is arresto mayor. However, in view of Article 310 of the RPC concerning qualified theft,
Mejares must be meted a penalty 2 degrees higher which is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Mejares must only suffer a
minimum indeterminate penalty of 4 months 1 day of arresto mayor to a maximum of 3 years, 6
months, 21 days of prision correccional. In view of these considerations, the SC finds that Mejares is
now entitled to immediate release for having fully served her sentence, for having been confined
since February 10, 2014 until the promulgation of this decision. Evidently, she has been deprived of
her liberty for a period well beyond what the law has required, having already served her time for
almost 4 years.

448
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Nestor “Tony” Caliao

G.R. No. 226392, July 23, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery exists when the prosecution has sufficiently established the concurrence
of the following elements: (1) the accused employed means of execution that gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.

FACTS:

A day before the incident, the victim and the accused had confrontation over a garbage
placed by the accused beside the stall of the victim.

At three in the morning of the next day, accused called out to the victim and challenged
him to a fistfight, but the victim’s wife did not allow her husband to go out. In the afternoon of the
same day, the victim and his son were preparing puso when the victim told his son that he was
going to use the comfort room. As the victim approached their stall, the victim’s son saw the
accused suddenly appear and stab his father.

When the victim went inside the store, the accused followed and attempted to stab him
again, but the victim got hold of an electric fan that he used to fond off accused and to push him
outside the store. Accused kept shouting, "I will kill you!" The witness together with other stall
owner approached the accused and took the knife from him. They then brought the accused to
the police station.

In defense, the accused said that the victim went to his stall and poured kerosene over his
puso. He also said that victim bring a pipe into accused-appellant's store and repeatedly strike
accused-appellant with it, prompting the latter to strike back with a knife.

ISSUE:

449
 Whether or not qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the
felony.

RULING:

NO. The court finds that treachery was not sufficiently proven in this case. The court said that
treachery cannot be appreciated from the mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected. The
Court has held that "the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected on the person
assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it
did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused
did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of the
killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself."

The Court has also ruled that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the
attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including the
victim's family, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted
means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time.

Here, there is no showing that accused-appellant consciously adopted the sudden attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing. In fact, it was done in a public market, in the afternoon,
with the victim's family and other vendors nearby who could have foiled accused-appellant's actions.

450
DWELLING AGGRAVATES A FELONY

People of the Philippines vs. Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez

G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation, therefore. It is
considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that
the law accords to the human abode.

FACTS:

On the night of May 2, 2011, AAA was sleeping in her house together with her children,
house helper and niece. Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez (Fernandez) robbed and raped AAA inside
their house.

Later in the morning, AAA went to the police station to report the incident and submitted
herself for a medical examination. Thus, the following Information was filed against the appellant.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of crime of Robbery with Rape with no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.

On appeal before the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA also ruled that
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be appreciated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling
of the offended party.

RULING:

451
 YES, dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation, therefore.

In this particular case, robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victim
without provocation on her part. In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons,
dwelling is aggravating because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the
necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. It is considered an aggravating
circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to the human abode.
He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.

Therefore, the Court affirmed the decision of the CA finding Fernandez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape with aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

452
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

People of the Philippines vs. Teodolfo Grabador Jr., Roger Abierra, Dante Abierra and Alex
Abierra

G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

A lapse of 15 minutes preceding the attack is not sufficient to conclude that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the offense.

FACTS:

Noel Sumugat (Noel), brother of victim Dennis Sumugat (Dennis) saw his brother Dennis
at around 4 pm talking to Rodolfo. Noel was situated seven meters away from Dennis and Rodolfo.
The two had an altercation but shook hands after their argument. Thereafter, Rodolfo left for
home. Later on, at around 5:30 p.m., Rodolfo came back. He was accompanied by Alex, Roger and
Dante. All of them were carrying a homemade shotgun (sumpak). Suddenly, Alex shot Dennis.
Noel knew the assailants because they were his neighbors. The RTC rendered rendered a Decision
finding Alex guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder attended by evident
premeditation.

ISSUE:

Whether the act was attended by evident premeditation.

RULING:

NO. In order to establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following requisites must
be proven during the trial: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act,
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. Evident premeditation cannot be

453
presumed in the absence of evidence showing when and how the accused planned, and prepared for
the crime, and that a sufficient amount of time had lapsed between his determination and execution.
It bears stressing that absent any clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of
evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, shall be deemed insufficient.

In the instant case, the prosecution failed to identify the time when Alex decided to kill Dennis.
This is necessary to prove that indeed, a sufficient period of time passed between the determination
to kill and its actual execution, which would have allowed Alex to meditate and reflect on his plans,
and allow his conscience to overcome the determination of his will. Instead, the prosecution
randomly concluded that there was evident premeditation from the fact that Rodolfo left, and came
back after 15 minutes with Alex, and thereafter killed Dennis.

Exceptionally, a lapse of 15 minutes preceding the attack is not sufficient to conclude that
evident premeditation attended the commission of the offense. Court warned that there can be no
evident premeditation if the accused's act of leaving the crime scene was too short a time to
meditate or reflect upon his decision to stab the victim.

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the killing of Dennis was not attended by
evident premeditation. The prosecution failed to establish the fact that the plan to kill Dennis was
preceded by a deliberate planning, and that there was a lapse of ample and sufficient time to allow
Alex's conscience to overcome the determination of his will, if he had so desired, after meditation
and reflect

454
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

People of the Philippines vs. Rodel Magbuhos y Diola Alias "Bodil"

G.R. No. 227865, November 7, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to
kill the deceased in such manner as to ensure the commission of the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself.

2. To qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but

must be "evident premeditation." Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act
of planning the crime, mere presumptions and inferences thereon, no matter how logical
and probable, would not be enough.

FACTS:

Accused Rodel Magbuhos, was charge with the crime of murder of Enrique Castillo. The
prosecution contends that based on the testimony of several witnesses that, the accused armed
with a fan knife (balisong), with intent to kill, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, attack, assault and stab with the said fan
knife, suddenly and without warning the victim Enrique Castillo.

Rodel, on the other hand, raised self-defense, He argued that the victim Enrique being
under the influence of alcohol stood up and boxed him. Enrique then drew a fan knife but was
pacified by the people inside the billiard hall. While Enrique was uttering invectives, Rodel told
the latter not to utter those words at him. Rodel then noticed that Enrique drew his fan knife and
attempted to attack. Somebody from behind handed Rodel a fan knife but Rodel did not notice
who gave it to him because there were many people inside the billiard hall, and he was too drunk
at that time. As soon as he got hold of the knife, and while Enrique was approaching him, Rodel
was able to stab Enrique once in the chest.

The RTC charged Rodel with Murder, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation.
However, the RTC did not discuss the presence of the qualifying circumstances and yet found
Rodel guilty of the crime of Murder.

455
ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was
clearly established.

RULING:

NO, treachery and evident premeditation were not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
deceased in such manner as to ensure the commission of the killing or to make it impossible or
difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend himself. the prosecution in this case also failed
to prove that Rodel intentionally sought Enrique for the purpose of killing him or that Rodel
carefully and deliberately planned the killing in a manner that would ensure his safety and success.

456
WHEN QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE RECOGNIZE IN RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Orlando Tagle y Roqueta

G.R. No. 229348, November 19, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The qualifying circumstance of using deadly weapon in rape in order to be

appreciated must be committed before or during the incident.

FACTS:

AAA was invited by her friend to get some clothes from a certain "Mata" at xxxxxxxxxxx,
Las Piñas City. Upon arrival thereat, "Mata" invited AAA and her friend to join a drinking spree,
and thereafter, brought them to an unlighted grassy area, where Tagle and four (4) other male
individuals were drinking without any tables and chairs. The men offered AAA some beer and
forced her to drink, but she poured the contents at her back when no one was looking. AAA's
friend then momentarily left AAA with the group. After an hour, "Mata" and the four (4) male
individuals held AAA. Tagle and the others undressed AAA. According to AAA, she tried to resist
and run away, but she was boxed on her stomach and subsequently restrained. AAA claimed that
while she was lying down, Tagle touched her breasts, removed her short pants, mounted her, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. Meanwhile, the other five (5) male individuals did not do
anything except watch Tagle rape AAA. When Tagle was finished having carnal knowledge of AAA,
the other male individuals took turns in ravishing her as well. After the incident, they poked a
knife at AAA and warned her not to report what happened to anyone or else something might
happen to her family.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of using a deadly weapon must be

appreciated.

RULING:

457
 NO, the rape was committed through force and intimidation given that Tagle threatened AAA
with a knife and forced her to submit to his bestial designs, a close scrutiny of the records reveals
that Tagle's act of threatening AAA with a knife actually happened after the commission of rape and
not before or during the incident. Pertinently, the knife was not used to cause AAA to submit to
Tagle's bestial designs, as in fact, it was only used to threaten her into silence, so she would not
report the incident to anyone. The qualifying circumstance of using deadly weapon in rape in order
to be appreciated must be committed before or during the incident.

458
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Arnel Kalipayan y Aniano

G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery has long been defined by this Court, especially as to its character as a
qualifying circumstance for murder. It is a circumstance that must be proven as
indubitably as the crime itself and constitutes two (2) elements: (1) the employment of
means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate,
and (2) that said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC finding
accused-appellant Amel Kalipayan y Aniano (accused-appellant) guilty of murder. According to
the Prosecution, on June 25, 2008, Josephine Paraiso (Josephine), Glaiza's mother, testified that
she was watching television inside their house while Celestina and Glaiza were in the kitchen
preparing their dinner. Accused-appellant entered their house without permission, approached
Glaiza, stabbed her in the back and held her hair. Accused-appellant then made Glaiza face him
and continued stabbing her in the abdomen. Josephine tried to stop the accused-appellant but the
latter poked the knife at her, telling her not to interfere as it was none of her business. Josephine
then ran outside the house and asked for help. A neighbor, Dennis Alegre, tried to stop the
accused-appellant but the latter was undeterred, even when Josephine was begging him to stop.
Josephine decided to leave the house while the accused-appellant escaped. With the accused-
appellant gone, Josephine went back inside their house, where she found Glaiza still breathing.
Glaiza was brought to Remedios Trinidad Romualdez Medical Foundation Hospital where she was
declared dead on arrival.

The Medico-Legal Autopsy Report stated that the victim Glaiza Molina (Glaiza) suffered
one (1) puncture wound on her head, eight (8) stab wounds and one (1) puncture wound on her
chest, one (1) stab wound on her abdomen, two (2) incise wounds, and three (3) stab wounds on
her extremities. However, according to the accused, he confronted Glaiza because he believes that
the latter was having an affair with another man and the situation hurt him. Accused-appellant
and Glaiza then went to the balcony of the house near the kitchen, where they ended up arguing

459
and shouting. Glaiza was angry at him, and thereafter went to the kitchen, and he followed her.
Accused-appellant took a knife from the sink and threatened Glaiza, causing the latter to slap him.
Accused-appellant then lost control and started stabbing Glaiza, and he could not remember the
number of times he stabbed her. He could also not recall what happened until he surrendered
when the police saw him at V&G Subdivision. Nevertheless, both the MTC and the CA found her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of murder despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish any qualifying circumstance.

RULING:

NO. Based on the clear, consistent, and convincing testimonies of Josephine and Celestina,
accused-appellant entered the house and commenced stabbing Glaiza while the latter was
preparing dinner. Celestina was even in the same small vicinity where the attack was committed
while she was working with the gas tank that Glaiza needed to cook the rice. Accused-appellant's
version is belied by the testimonies of Celestina and Josephine, who averred that they did not notice
his presence and arrival at their home prior to the stabbing incident. Not only was his account of the
events riddled with inconsistencies, it is also self-serving and unsupported by any other circumstance
that would make the Court believe his story over that of Josephine's and Celestina's.

Treachery has long been defined by this Court, especially as to its character as a qualifying
circumstance for murder. It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself
and constitutes two (2) elements: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) that said means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. A swift and unexpected
attack on an unarmed victim that ensures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the
defense of his victim is an indication that treachery is present. What is decisive is that the execution
of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In that sense, even
attacks that occur from the front may be considered treacherous if the attack was so sudden and
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for self-defense. The mode of attack must also
be consciously adopted. The accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner
as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to
defend himself or retaliate. The attack, then, must not spring from the unexpected turn of events.

460
 Both elements of treachery are doubtlessly attendant here. Even in the short span of time
that Celestina turned her back to switch on the stove, accused-appellant already managed to start
his deplorable deed. This is a sign of his conscious choice to employ the specific means and methods
to kill Glaiza, and not the product of some sudden emotional response. There is also no proof to show
that he and Glaiza were engaged in a heated discussion immediately prior to the incident. On the
other hand, the courts a quo were thoroughly convinced that accused-appellant unexpectedly
entered the house, went straight for Glaiza, and immediately, without warning and through an
almost stealthy manner, stabbed the latter numerous times. The circumstances are typical of a
treacherous attack constituting of murder and not homicide.

Furthermore, the above details show that Glaiza was not expecting the attack. She was also
rendered helpless and unprotected not only by the swiftness of the attack, but also because she was
already stabbed in the back before even becoming fully aware that a reprehensible act was being
committed against her. From this, the first element of treachery is demonstrated without question.
The second element of treachery is likewise undoubtedly present. The time and place, and manner of
attack were deliberately chosen and accused-appellant was immediately cloaked with impunity to
ensure its successful execution. The time of the attack, at around 5:30 p.m., was a time in which
people usually prepare their supper and households are buzzing with activity. Accused-appellant's
mode of attack, of suddenly entering the house and going straight to where Glaiza was while the
latter was preparing food, is also clearly indicative of his nefarious plan to attack when Glaiza was
not in a position to defend herself.

With this finding that treachery is present, the conclusion that the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength is absorbed therein necessarily follows. Even without a definite finding as to
whether it exists in this case or not, it is beyond cavil that treachery, as a qualifying circumstance,
absorbs the aggravating circumstance abuse of superior strength even though the latter was alleged
in the information. Thus, the circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not be appreciated
as a separate aggravating circumstance.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the decision of CA is confirmed.

461
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Crisanto Cirbeto y Giray

G.R. No. 231359, February 7, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him.

FACTS:

Prosecution eyewitness Roger Dalimoos4 (Dalimoos) was outside a fast food restaurant in
front of Marikina Sports Center at the corner of Sumulong Highway and Toyota Avenue, Marikina
City, he saw his friend Ferdinand Casipit (Casipit) together with accused-appellant walking
towards a nearby mall. Dalimoos was on his way home then, so he boarded a jeepney by hanging
on to its end railings. Upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Sumulong Highway and Tuazon
St., from which vantage point he could still see Casipit and accused-appellant who were already in
front of the mall, Dalimoos saw the latter suddenly pull a knife from the right side of his back,
hold Casipit's shirt with his left hand, and stab him with the knife using his right hand. Accused-
appellant was able to stab Casipit once before the latter managed to run away. However, accused-
appellant ran after Casipit and caught up to him. Thereafter, the former held the latter's shirt
again, pulled him to the ground, and stabbed him repeatedly, resulting in the latter's death.

Shortly after the incident, accused-appellant tried to flee, but he was seized by Police
Officer 1 (PO1) Jayson Rael and Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Fabian Ribad of the Marikina
City Police Station, who responded to a radio message relaying the stabbing incident. They were
also able to recover the knife used to stab the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether treachery is present in the case.

462
RULING:

YES. Treachery is the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
crime against persons which tends directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is
that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be
properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.

The evidence in this case clearly show that the attack against Casipit was sudden, deliberate,
and unexpected. He was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with
accused-appellant on the date and time in question.

463
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. CCC

G.R. No. 231925, November 10,2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the victim of rape is a minor or that the perpetrator is the parent, the crime
committed is qualified rape.

FACTS:

On November 27, 2011, AAA was asleep when appellant carried her downstairs to his bed.
Appellant held AAA's hands and kissed her on the lips, neck and down to her abdomen. Thereafter,
appellant undressed-himself and took off AAA's dress. Appellant placed himself on top of AAA,
proceeded to kiss her and then inserted his penis inside her vagina.

According to AAA, appellant repeated the deed several times on different dates. The last
incident happened on December 30, 2012. On the evening of that date, appellant brought AAA
along the seashore of a nearby village using his boat. While on the seashore, appellant made AAA
lie down on the sand, and with her back on the sand, he brought himself down and kissed her.
Appellant inserted his penis in AAA's vagina, while he was on top of her. AAA tried to fight back,
but appellant delivered a fist blow on her abdomen. When appellant finished satisfying his lust,
he pulled out his penis, wiped it off and told AAA to get up. Appellant then instructed AAA to go
back to the boat. Unable to bear the burden, AAA confided to her twin sister. Her twin sister
sought help from their foster mother. Appellant was eventually arrested and held in custody.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime qualified rape.

RULING:
YES, the Certificate of Live Birth8 of AAA proves that she was 15 years old when she was

464
raped by appellant and that the latter is indeed her biological father, making the said crime
committed by appellant that of qualified rape. Thus, the rape was committed with qualifying
circumstance, consequently, the same is punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.

465
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Mario Bulutano y Alvarez

G.R. No. 232649, November 28, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery, just like any other element of the crime committed, must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for granted from a mere statement
that 'the attack was sudden;' there must be a clear showing from the narration of facts why
the attack or assault is said to be 'sudden’.

FACTS:

An information was filed against Mario Bulutano and Jhun Serad for the murder of Wilbert
Augusto. The prosecution contends that a commotion ensued between Allan and the group of
Bulatano including Serad. At first Allan inquired from the group what the problem was and tried
to talk them into settling it. Allan was then facing the group while Wilbert, who was just passing
by after making a phone call at a nearby site, stood next to him. At that moment, Vermel told his
group members not to hurt Allan because the latter was his classmate. Suddenly, Serad
surreptitiously went behind Wilbert and hit the latter with a piece of wood. Wilbert fell on the
ground, shaking. Allan was shocked and his immediate reaction was to punch Serad. However,
Serad was able to parry Allan's fist with the same piece of wood he had used to hit Wilbert.
Thereafter, a fight ensued. Allan was pulled away by one of his companions while the others
retreated upon seeing that their adversaries were armed with weapons. While Allan was
retreating from the place, he looked back and there he saw [Bulutano] hit Wilbert on the head
even if the latter was already lying on the ground gasping for breath. Pengpeng, Vermel and
Dennis likewise kicked and mauled the hapless Wilbert.

In his defense, accused-appellant Mario Bulutano presented a different version of the facts.
To disprove the charge filed against him, he denies participation in the crime yet points at his co-
accused, Jhun Serad, as the sole perpetrator thereof.

After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled to convict Bulutano for the crime of murder. The CA
then affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove

466
the elements of the crime charged and the element of treachery were present in the killing of
Wilbert.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in the case.

RULING:

NO, treachecy cannot be appreciated in the case. The Court ruled in favor of the accused,
Bulatano and held that It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the victim was suddenly
attacked by Serad, and he was already defenseless at the time that Bulutano continued attacking
him. As the Court held in People vs. Santos, "treachery, just like any other element of the crime
committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its
existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for granted from a mere
statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there must be a clear showing from the narration of facts
why the attack or assault is said to be 'sudden.".

In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the melee was only
a chance encounter between the warring groups. More importantly, the deceased Wilbert "was just
passing by after making a phone call at a nearby site" when he was hit in the head by Serad with a
piece of wood and then later on continually hit by Bulutano. The foregoing thus negates the
existence of the second requisite for treachery to be appreciated, namely, that the offenders
deliberately and consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him.

467
TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Cezar Cortez, et al.

G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Case law instructs that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.

The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent
to use this advantage.

FACTS:

In the evening of May 19, 1988, eyewitness Janet was sleeping with her cousins Baby and
Jocelyn in a room at the back of “Minda’s Bakery” owned by her sister Minda and brother-in-law
Mario. Minda and Mario were occupying the other room of the bakery while their bakers, Cezar
and Froilan, were staying in another room upstairs.

At around 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, Janet was awakened by a banging sound on the
wall. She peeped through the door of her room and saw Cezar hitting Mario on the head with an
object similar to a rolling pin while the latter was asleep. Subsequently, she witnessed Cezar
stabbing Minda with a knife and Froilan stabbing his co-baker Efren. Shortly thereafter, Cezar and
Froilan forcibly entered Janet’s room and proceeded to stab and kill Baby and Jocelyn. Fortunately,
Janet was able to immediately hide under a table just before Cezar and Froilan barged in, leaving
her unscathed. After Cezar and Froilan left, Janet came out of her hiding place and saw the dead
bodies of her relatives. Janet’s assertion was then corroborated by Mario and Minda’s son,
Richard, who was able to hide with her sister at the back of an electric fan during the whole
ordeal. Mario’s brother also corroborated Jane and Richard’s testimonies, stating that on the day
of the incident, he dropped by “Minda’s Bakery” before going to the market to check if they

468
needed anything. Upon arrival thereat, he saw Janet crying, with the later telling him that Mario,
Efren, Baby, and Jocelyn are already dead. Leonardo went to inspect the dead bodies and found
that Efren’s watch was missing. The police conducted a manhunt which killed Froilan in the
process. Finally, Leonardo claimed that Cezar was initially apprehended but was able to escape.

Cezar was arrested in 2010 wherein he claimed that he did not know Froilan or any of the
five victims, and that at the time of the incident, he was working for the husband of his sister as a
stay-in “tinapa maker”. He was convicted for two counts of Homicide and three counts of Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior

strength are present in this case.

RULING:

YES. To appreciate treachery, it must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed
gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.

Anent Mario’s killing, it is shown that Cezar killed Mario by hitting him on the head with an
object similar to a rolling pin while he was sleeping, thereby indicating that the former purposely
sought such means of attack against Mario so as the latter would have no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate and thus, ensuring the execution of the criminal act.

As to the killings of Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, it does not appear that Cezar and Froilan
specifically sought the use of deadly weapons – knives in this case – so as to be able to take
advantage of their superior strength against the said three victims. In fact, the deadly weapon was
used indiscriminately in killing whomever they encounter while raiding the house. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery may be appreciated in this case but not considering that the three victims
were attacked in the middle of the while they were sleeping, unarmed and defenseless.

As to Efren, the killings was not shown that there is attendance of treachery and/or abuse of
strength.

469
FACTS WHICH SHOW TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Don Vega

G.R. No. 216018, March 27, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

FACTS:

In the evening of Jan. 18, 2009, Manuel Padilla Isip, was at Malate, Manila because his
friend, Venus, was celebrating his birthday. Among his drinking buddies was Aldrin Roldan
Fernandez. They were around fifteen at that time including the celebrator. While drinking,
chatting, and listening to music, they spotted accused Don Vega who was about four arms' length
away sniffing rugby from a bottle. After a few hours, Don Vega approached them. He smashed
several items. Victim Manuel Isip tried to pacify the accused saying, "pre, huwag naman dito, kasi
may nagkakasiyahan dito" but accused harshly replied, "huwag kang makialam dito, baka ikaw
ang samain." Victim Manuel Isip did not comment and merely turned his back to avert a bigger
trouble. While the victim's back was turned on him, accused suddenly grabbed the victim from
behind, wrapped his left arm around victim's neck and using his right hand, plunged a knife to
Manuel's chest. Victim Manuel Isip was rushed to the Ospital ng Maynila but was declared "dead
on arrival."

The accused claimed that he requested victim Manuel Isip to play his theme song. The
victim asked him to wait because there were many who made similar requests. He then
approached the victim, but the latter punched him. He went back to his table and picked up a
bladed weapon. Victim Manuel Isip suddenly charged towards him, so he stabbed him. He then
dashed to his house because people were ganging up on him. He was apprehended inside his
abode and he voluntarily surrendered to those who arrested him. The victim was unarmed.

The RTC convicted Don of the crime of Murder. It also ruled that the defense was not able
to establish all the elements of self-defense. Lastly, the RTC ruled that treachery is present since

470
Don grabbed Manuel from behind and suddenly attacked the unarmed victim with a bladed
weapon. The CA affirmed the conviction by the RTC with modifications. The CA likewise held that
the elements of self-defense are lacking. The CA ruled that the killing of the victim was attended
by treachery qualifying the crime to Murder.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery
qualifying the crime to Murder.

RULING:

YES. It is established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Thus, for Don to be convicted of Murder, the prosecution must not only
establish that he killed Manuel; it must also be proven that the killing of Manuel was attended by
treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To
qualify as an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.

In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be present. It is not enough that the
attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must also be a
showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and
forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to
himself.

In the case at bar, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, the
stabbing incident happened during a drinking spree in which Don was already a part of. He did not
deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as he was already in the same vicinity as Manuel, joining
the merriment when he stabbed the latter.

Second, in killing Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was
no mention in the records as to who owned the said weapon. In a similar case, the Court held that
treachery cannot be presumed merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of

471
an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so
long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental.
Don's decision to attack Manuel was more of a sudden impulse on his part than a planned decision.

Lastly, the incident happened during a drinking spree where there were more or less 15
people, excluding Don and Manuel. If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him,
he could have chosen another time and place to stab Manuel. In another case, the Court held that
when aid was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that
there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, no treachery could be appreciated because if the
accused indeed consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have
chosen another place or time. Thus, the Court can reasonably conclude that Don acted impetuously
in suddenly stabbing Manuel.

472
THERE IS NO TREACHERY IF THE ATTACK WAS PRECEDED BY AN ALTERCATION

People of the Philippines vs. Romero Aseniero

G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

For treachery to qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which
give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said
means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on

the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself. There is no treachery if the attack was
preceded by an altercation between the accused and the victim. Each of them is
forewarned of an impending attack by either of them.

FACTS:

On August 23, 2003, at about 2:00 in the morning, Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn
Gomez and Mira Pagay were occupying one table at the dance hall. The accused, Romeo Aseniero,
was occupying a different table. At about 5:00 in the morning, Roel Pilo left the dancing hall
together with the group of Dominador Ranes. Loreto Gomez Papa also left the dance hall, together
with his two cousins and the accused, Romeo. On their way home, the group of Dominador passed
by a road in Brgy. Imelda, Bato, Leyte and were walking ahead of Loreto’s group at a distance of
about 10 arms-length. Since the road was too narrow, Dominador’s group did not walk side by
side. Mira Pagay trailed first, followed by Mario Pelago, then Roel Pilo, and behind him were
Dominador Ranes and Analyn Gomez.

According to Loreto, Analyn Gomez and the accused were still sweethearts and have not
broken up yet, but they were quarreling at that time. When the accused saw Analyn, he tried to go
after her and her companion. When the accused approached Analyn, he was kicked by Dominador.
Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in tum, unsheathed his bolo.

473
 Suddenly, Dominador shouted "Aray" (Ouch!). At that instant, Dominador run past Roel
followed by the accused Romeo Aseniero, who was carrying a long bolo. More or less four (4)
meters from where he was, Dominador stumbled, with his back on the ground. The accused
caught up with the victim and hacked him multiple times.

The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim and was thus guilty of
murder. It also held that although the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities,
such mitigating circumstance cannot be applied to lower an indivisible penalty. The CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC but has mentioned that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Romeo is guilty of the crime of murder.

RULING:

NO. Romeo is not guilty of the crime of murder. He is only guilty of the crime of homicide as
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing of the victim.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In
the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the elements of treachery in the
killing of the victim.

There is no treachery if the attack was preceded by an altercation between the accused and
the victim. Each of them is forewarned of an impending attack by either of them. The attack made
by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the victim who first attacked the former. In
addition, the victim was able to defend himself from the initial stabbing act as he had his own
weapon and was able to run away from the accused.

474
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Ponciano Espina

G.R. No. 219614, July 10, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender from the offended party's act
of retaliation in self-defense. It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the
crime itself.

FACTS:

On May 26, 2005, around 8:30 in the evening, appellant Ponciano Espina, Ernando Reyes,
Jr., Russel, Pio Manjares and a certain Dante were having a drinking spree inside Pio's house in
Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig City. While the drinking spree was ongoing, appellant left. When he returned,
he showed his drinking companions a .45-caliber gun and asked them to hold it, which they did.
He later retrieved the gun and tucked it on his waist.

After a while, appellant pulled out the gun and pointed it close to Ernando's chest, posing
these questions "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" Then right off, he shot Ernando in the upper right
chest. Everyone else in the group scampered away. But shortly after, Russel came back and helped
rush Ernando to the Rizal Medical Center. Ernando later died in the hospital. Appellant was
charged with murder for the killing of Ernando Reyes, Jr. On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not
guilty." During the trial, Russel Michael and Ernando's wife Evelyn Reyes testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, appellant alone testified for the defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed appellant’s conviction of
murder.

475
RULING:

NO. The appeal is devoid of merit. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender from the offended party's
act of retaliation in self-defense. It is a circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the crime
itself. Treachery has two (2) elements: (1) employment of means of execution which gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) such means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted. Its attendance cannot be presumed. Evidence must be as conclusive as the fact
of killing itself. The evidence must show that the offender prepared to kill the victim in such a
manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for the person
attacked to defend himself. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen
attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter's part. The victim must not have
known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. What is decisive is the offender
launched the attack without the slightest provocation from the victim, making it impossible for the
latter to defend himself or retaliate. In fine, treachery or aleviosa attended Ernando's killing.

476
TREACHERY AND/OR EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Elinjer Corpuz

G.R. No. 220486, June 26, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Evident premeditation requires the following elements: (1)
a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his acts.

FACTS:

On September 2, 2011, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Jerry left their house and rode his
motorcycle to buy feeds. Just after a few meters, he was flagged down by Porfirio Corpuz, Jr..
When Jerry stopped, Porfirio confronted him about a dog. Jerry's wife Ofelia saw the altercation
and she got worried. Together with her son Jerick, she walked toward the direction where Jerry
and Porfirio were arguing and pushing each other. She saw Jerry falling to the ground and Porfirio
immediately going on top of him. While the two were fighting, Porfirio's brother, appellant
appeared with a gun in hand. He walked up to Jerry and shot the latter twice. Ofelia shouted for
help and begged Porfirio to help bring Jerry to the hospital. But Jerry died even before they got to
the hospital.

Meanwhile, appellant, still holding his gun, walked away into the fields. Appellant denied
the charge and averred that on September 2, 2011, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, he was
cooking dinner inside his house in Pada-Pada, Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. He later stepped out to gather
malunggay leaves for the dish he was cooking. He saw his brother Porfirio who was holding a
"pamalo and pamingwit ng palaka". On his way back to the house, he also saw Jerry's motorcycle
parked by the roadside. When Jerry saw him, he blocked his path and angrily asked him, "Hoy!
Papanam?" (Where are you going?). He replied "Ni apay? Annia ti problema, uncle?" (Why, what is

477
the problem, uncle?). Jerry uttered, "Maysa kamet a gago." (You are also a fool.) Then, Jerry
suddenly drew out his .38 caliber gun. Appellant was shocked and tried to grab the gun from Jerry.
He was able to get hold of the gun, but Jerry pulled his shirt and whipped him with it. As a result,
appellant accidentally pulled the trigger and fired the gun. But Jerry persisted in taking back the
gun from him until they both slid and fell. While Jerry was down on his knees, appellant noticed
he was reaching for a knife from his back. He tried once again to wrestle the gun away from Jerry.
Then another shot was fired, hitting Jerry in the chest. He was shocked when he saw him falling to
the ground. Soon after, he heard people rushing toward them. He got scared and ran.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming appellant’s conviction for murder.

RULING:
NO. The appeal utterly lacks merit. Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, viz:

Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
x x x Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is not
parricide or infanticide.

Treachery attended the killing.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Here, Jerry was wrestling with his nephew Porfirio after a heated verbal altercation which became
physical. They both fell and Porfirio was able to pin his uncle down. Appellant suddenly came
carrying a gun and shot Jerry twice. Appellant's act of shooting the victim while the latter was

478
pinned down by another effectively denied the victim the chance to defend himself or to retaliate
against his perpetrators. Further, the victim was shot twice, as if making sure he would be mortally
injured or killed.

Evident premeditation did not attend the killing

Evident premeditation requires the following elements: (1) a previous decision by the
accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly indicating that the accused clung to
his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual
execution enough to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. To warrant a
finding of evident premeditation, it must appear that the decision to commit the crime was a result
of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt. The prosecution is tasked to show how or
when appellant's plan to kill was hatched and how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.
Here, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution was not able to
sufficiently establish evident premeditation.

We agree. The victim's slaying was more spontaneous than planned. Eyewitnesses testified
that when appellant saw the victim pinned on the ground by Porfirio, he walked to them and shot
Jerry twice. Hence, there was no showing that the killing was plotted or that there was enough time
for appellant to reflect on the consequences of killing his victim before actually carrying it out.

479
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Marcelino Saltarin y Talosig

G.R. No. 223715, June 3, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape.

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with murder for the killing of Joval Benavites De Jesus. The
prosecution presented Gerry Narido as lone witness. Narido considers the victim as his “tatay-
tatayan”. Narido and the victim were outside a junk shop when appellant asked for coins from
them. The victim obliged but refused to give more when appellant asked a second time. After
appellant left, he and the victim sat inside a kuliglig parked nearby. Appellant returned shortly
thereafter. Appellant then approached the parked kuliglig where Narido and the victim were
seated. Pretending to be a kind soul, appellant handed cigarette to the victim who even praised
him "mabait ka naman pala. " But like a wolf in sheep clothing, appellant, without any warning,
stepped back a bit obviously for momentum and instantly thrust a knife into the chest of the
unsuspecting hapless victim. Narido took the victim to the hospital but the victim died due to stab
wound hitting his heart.

The trial court convicted appellant of murder and appreciated treachery to have attended
the killing since appellant’s sudden and unexpected attack caught the victim off guard. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the trial court.

Appellant seeks affirmative relief from the Supreme Court praying for his acquittal.

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of appellant for the crime of murder proper?

480
RULING:

YES. Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide.

The Supreme Court held that treachery attended the killing. Appellant's sudden, swift and
unexpected attack rendered the victim totally unable to retaliate or defend himself. The means
employed by appellant ensured the commission of the crime without exposing him to any risk which
may come from the victim's act of retaliation or defense. This is treachery. The essence of treachery
is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the victim no chance to resist or escape. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or herself or retaliate, ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor.

481
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY OR ALEVOSIA

People of the Philippines vs. Noellito Dela Cruz y Deplomo

G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019

Zalameda, R.V., J.

DOCTRINE:

The mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily equate to treachery. The
accused must have knowingly, deliberately, and consciously adopted the means or methods
to ensure the execution of his criminal purpose without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the victim might offer, for the same to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance.

FACTS:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the Decision of Regional Trial Court in Makati City, finding accused-appellant
Noellito guilty of the murder of Ramir Joseph Eugenio.

According to the Prosecution, Ramir and the accused-appellant engaged in fistfight in the
room of the former. Ronald, Ramir’s roommate, rushed to the scene and found accused-appellant
and Ramir blocking the door. As he tried to open the door, Ronald saw Ramir lying in a pool of
blood, with accused-appellant holding a knife embedded on Ramir’s forehead. On the other hand,
Vilma Foronda corroborated with Ronald’s testimony in its material points. She lives near the
room of Ramir and saw accused-appellant knocked on Ramir’s door. The latter opened his door,
saw Noellito and cursed him. Suddenly, Noellito took a knife from his pocket and stabbed Ramir,
who then retreated to his room. She then saw Noellito emerged from Ramir’s room as if nothing
happened.

Moreover, Dr. Roberto Rey San Diego recalled that he conducted an autopsy of the victim
and found that Ramir sustained incised wounds on the forehead, as well as stab wounds and
contusions on his body. Anent the stab wounds, two (2) of these were fatal and two (2) were
classified as defense wounds.

482
 However, the defendant refuted the same stating that he was only sleeping in his room
when the incident happened and that he has no misunderstanding with Ramir. But both RTC and
CA convicted him on the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists qualifying circumstance of treachery in the crime charged.

RULING:

NO. Under the law, the essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the
slightest provocation of the on the part of the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Contrary to the findings of the trial and appellate courts, we hold that the second condition
(The accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of
attack employed by him.) was not proven with clear and convincing evidence. While the victim may
be unarmed and was stabbed at the doorstep of his room, there was nary any evidence to show that
the attack was preconceived and deliberately adopted without risk to accused-appellant. To be sure,
the attack was committed in broad daylight, inside a house shared with the other tenants, within the
immediate view and in proximity of the witness, Vilma. Thus, all these negate that the attack was
done deliberately to ensure the victim would not be able to defend himself, or to retreat, or even to
seek help from others.

Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated there must not be even the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim. However, from the prosecution’s own version of the events, the victim loudly
cursed at accused-appellant for knocking on his door. As such, the victim had an inkling that
accused-appellant may resort to retaliatory measures. Hence, the stabbing may have been triggered
by the provocative actuations of the victim; an act made on impulse or as a reaction to an actual or
imagined provocation.

In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, accused-appellant should be held liable for the crime of homicide, not murder.

483
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Roger Acabo

G.R. No. 229823, February 27, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the CA that the killing of Alberto was
attended with treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To
establish treachery, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of these conditions: (1)
that the victim was in no position to defend himself when attacked; and (2) the offender
deliberately adopted the specific manner of the attack.

FACTS:

Appellant and Pael Acabo (Pael) were charged with murder in an Information dated
November 20, 2014 which reads that in the morning of September 19, 2014 at Sitio Talatala,
Barangay Siit, Municipality of Siaton, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Roger Acabo and Pael Acabo,
conspiring, helping and mutually aiding one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, shoot and wound Alberto Oyhoc Paltingca with the use of a short firearm of an
unknown caliber, with which said accused were then armed and provided, inflicting upon the said
victim fatal injuries on the different parts of his body that caused his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.

The RTC found appellant guilty as charged. It lent credence to Josephine's positive
identification of the appellant as the person who killed Alberto. It appreciated the attendant
aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, having found that
"[Alberto], as revealed by the nature, condition and location of the gunshot wounds sustained by
him, proved that he was an easy prey of [appellant] x x x. "Appellant's defenses of denial and alibi
were disregarded by the RTC because the evidence of the defense failed to prove that appellant

484
reported for work at the time the crime was committed, thereby failing to show that it was
impossible for him not to be at the crime scene.

On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC that appellant killed Alberto with treachery. Like
the RTC, the CA gave full credence to Josephine's categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward
testimony that clearly narrated the killing of Alberto and positively identified appellant as the
assailant visa-vis appellant's weak defenses of alibi and denial. While the CA was doubtful
whether the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing, it found
that treachery qualified the killing to murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery is present in the killing of Alberto.

RULING:

YES. After a careful review of the records of the case, we find the appeal to be devoid of merit.
The Court finds no reason to reverse the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

We affirm the findings of the trial court and the CA that the killing of Alberto was attended
with treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. To establish treachery, the prosecution must establish
the concurrence of these conditions: (1) that the victim was in no position to defend himself when
attacked; and (2) the offender deliberately adopted the specific manner of the attack.

As established by the prosecution's evidence in this case, Alberto and Josephine were walking
uphill totally unaware of the impending attack upon their person. Suddenly, appellant and Pael
waylaid them. Appellant thereafter shot Alberto who fell downhill. Appellant then fired a second shot
to ensure his death. Certainly, Alberto had no opportunity to defend himself. He was unaware of the
attack and was caught off guard when his assailant suddenly approached and shot him with a gun.
The stealth by which the attack was carried out gave Alberto no chance to evade the same. Indeed,
the unexpected assault upon the victim and the fact that the assailant did not sustain any injury
evinces treachery. Undoubtedly, appellant consciously adopted the mode of attacking Alberto who
had no inkling of the forthcoming attack and was completely defenseless. The attack was executed in
such a manner as to ensure the killing of Alberto without risk to appellant. The fact that Alberto had

485
a bolo tucked in his waist was of no consequence. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in
a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

486
QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Jojit Arpon y Ponferrrada “Modio”

G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery is present when at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself, or when the offender consciously adopted the particular means of
attach employed.

FACTS:

Arpon was charged with an information for murder. The victim, Rodolfo R. Moriel (Rodolfo)
and Bernardo S. Insigne (Bernardo) were headed home walking side by side when they were
accosted by accused-appellant Arpon at 3:00 am. Using a short-bladed weapon, Arpon stabbed
Rodolfo on the left chest. Rodolfo tried to run, but he was stabbed for a second time on the right
chest by Arpon until he fell to the ground. Fearing for his own life, Bernardo fled the scene.
Rodolfo died due to hypovolemic shock resulting from acute blood loss caused by three multiple
stab wounds - two of which were deemed fatal. Arpon raised the defense of alibi.

The RTC found Arpon guilty as charged. It gave credence to the positive identification of
the eyewitness, Bernardo, who was only two yards away from Rodolfo when the latter was
stabbed, over Arpon's defense of alibi. On the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the RTC noted
that Arpon - who came out of nowhere - deliberately, suddenly, and unexpectedly attacked
Rodolfo - who was then unarmed and completely unaware of the danger to his life.

The CA affirmed in toto the conviction of the RTC. Accused-appellant, through counsel,
submitted his Supplemental Brief, wherein he insisted that no motive was proven by the
prosecution as to why he would attack and kill Rodolfo. He further claimed that treachery was not
present, because Rodolfo was then accompanied by Bernardo.

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Arpon for the crime of murder proper?

487
RULING:

YES. Treachery is present when at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself, or when the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attach employed.

In this case, Rodolfo and Bernardo were walking side by side when they were accosted by
accused-appellant who suddenly stabbed Rodolfo with a short bolo. Both Rodolfo and Bernardo
were unarmed and were totally unaware of the impending assault from the accused-appellant. The
contention of the accused that treachery should not be appreciated since Rodolfo was accompanied
by Bernardo was brushed aside by the Court following the ruling in People vs. Cagas that there was
treachery when accused-appellant stabbed the victim even if the latter had been talking or
conversing with his companion. It bears emphasis that the victim was truly clueless about the fatal
attack that was to befall him.

488
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE FOR MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Dexter Aspa Albino

G.R. No. 229928, July 22, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death
if committed with any of the following attendant: with treachery, taking advantage of
superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

FACTS:

Jerome Soriano testified that he and his siblings Maita and Marlon were attending a
benefit dance, when the appellant’s group danced and mixed with them. When an altercation
ensued just outside the dance area, he and Marlon tried to pacify them, but appellant drew a
revolver from his pocket and shot Marlon in the chest without any warning. As a result, Marlon
fell to the ground. He (Jerome) and his friends rushed Marlon to the hospital. Marlon eventually
died in the hospital. Arwin Terrado, who was also at the benefit dance, corroborated Jerome's
testimony. Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana testified that Marlon sustained a gunshot wound in the chest
causing the latter to massively bleed and get immobilized. Marlon eventually died due to massive
bleeding.

Appellant denied the charge against him, and that he did not see who shot Marlon. He got
arrested and the arresting officers informed him that he was the suspect in the killing of Marlon.
Pablo Flores corroborated appellant's testimony.

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the killing attended by treachery. It found that as
testified to by Jerome and Terrado, appellant pulled out a gun and fired it toward the victim
without any warning. The victim, therefore, was rendered totally unable to protect or defend
himself.

489
 On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict of conviction against
him despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The crime could not have been committed without risk of retaliation from the victim and his
companions since these persons themselves participated in the commotion. In the absence of any
qualifying circumstance, appellant prayed that his conviction be downgraded from murder to
homicide, and for his prison sentence be modified accordingly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the killing was attended by treachery as to convict the accused guilty of
murder.

RULING:

NO. Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the killing does not amount to parricide or infanticide.

The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a
swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance
to resist or escape.

Here, appellant's group and the locals were drawn into an altercation when Marlon
approached to pacify them. Then, appellant suddenly shot Marlon in the chest. Though sudden, the
attack did not amount to treachery. For at that moment, appellant was enraged and did not have
time to reflect on his actions. There was no showing that he consciously launched the sudden attack
to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. Hence, appellant may only be convicted of homicide.

The Court finds it difficult to agree that the assailants, including Pilpa, deliberately chose a
particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal purpose without
any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. To repeat, the victim was
with five persons who could have helped him, as they had, in fact, helped him repel the attack. The
Court thus fails to see how the mode of attack chosen by the assailants supposedly guaranteed the
execution of the criminal act without risk on their end.

490
ESSENCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph A. Ampo and Johnny A. Calo

G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by the aggressor without the slightest
provocation on the part of the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance
to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

FACTS:

In 2014, accused appellant Joseph A. Ampo (Ampo) was found guilty of Murder for killing
Carillo. Unfazed, accused appellant appealed the decision and argued that treachery is not
present in the crime because Carillo was facing Ampo at the time of attack.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the herein accused appellants are guilty beyond reasonable for the crime
of murder.

RULING:

YES. Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. To successfully prosecute the crime, the following elements must be established: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC, such as treachery; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.

491
 Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery, as the employment of means, methods,
or forms in the execution of the crime against a person which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate or escape; and (2)
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him. These elements are extant from the records. The deceased victim, Carillero, was
caught off guard when Ampo stabbed him. He thought all along that Ampo and Calo merely wanted
a ride. The stealth and swiftness by which the attack was carried out gave Carillero no opportunity
to evade when Ampo suddenly thrust the knife to his abdomen. Likewise, the assault was executed in
a methodical manner since Ampo made it certain that Carillero was already very near before he
stabbed him. The fact that Carillero was facing Ampo is of no moment. Even a frontal attack could
be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the
attack or avoid it.

492
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST ALSO BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Gayon y Ferreras

G.R No. 230221, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINES:

1. Qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as

the crime itself, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt as to its existence must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

2. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present.
For treachery to exist there must be a showing that the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the accused with a view of accomplishing the act
without risk to the aggressor. Furthermore, when aid was easily available to the victim no
treachery could be appreciated.

3. There is evident premeditation when the following elements concur: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a
sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of
planning the crime would not be enough to establish evident premeditation.

FACTS:

On July 19, 2004 at around 9:40 in the evening, Leyden Gayon was in their house in
Sulangan, Matnog, Sorsogon. While Leyden was having a conversation with Leonora Givera, she
saw accused-appellant Edgar, entered their house. Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly
stabbed Leonora several times, leaving the knife in her right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged
Leonora inside the house and heard Edgar told his father, Rodolfo "Papay we have no more
problem because I killed your sister. "

493
 The RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo. The RTC held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly proven due to the suddenness of the attack by
accused-appellant Edgar without giving the victim a chance to defend herself. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. The Court of Appeals agreed that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house and talking to Leyden, was very sudden.
Further, the CA ruled that the nature and the number of wounds sustained by the victim logically
indicate that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined aggression on the
part of accused-appellant Edgar.

Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgar was guilty of the crime of murder.

RULING:

NO. Edgard is not guilty of the crime of murder. He is only guilty of the crime of homicide.

Settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for accused-appellant Edgar to
be convicted of murder, the prosecution must not only establish that he killed Leonora; it must also
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Leonora was attended by treachery or evident
premeditation.

In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation was not
sufficiently established. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present. There is no showing in this case that accused-appellant Edgar carefully and deliberately
planned the killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. The victim was with
people who could have helped her repel the attack. Therefore, the mode of attack chosen by accused-
appellant Edgar, in a place familiar to the victim and in the presence of the latter's relatives, fails to
guaranty that the execution of the criminal act would be without risk on his end. Furthermore, the
attack against Leonora was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of
treachery, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance.

As for evident premeditation, it was not established because the prosecution did not present
any proof showing when and how accused-appellant Edgar planned and prepared to kill Leonora. To
qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident

494
premeditation." Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere
presumptions and inferences thereon, would not be enough.

495
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO PROVE TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION

People of the Philippines vs. Eric Vargas y Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina

G.R. No. 230356, September 18, 2019

Carpio, Acting C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, two conditions must necessarily occur
before treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (1) the employment of
means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods, or
manner of execution.

To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the
accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that
this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.

FACTS:

The accused in this case, Eric Vargas y Jaguarin and Gina Bagacina were charged with
murder aggravated by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation.
Miguel Belen, the victim in this case received mortal gunshot wounds that caused his subsequent
death days after the incident. The attack was made when Belen, was traversing a road in
Camarines Sur and was on his way home, he received several gunshots particularly on his back.
Belen was rushed to the hospital after the incident and three days after he was able to give his
testimony to the investigators where he positively identified his assailants in the person of Vargas,
the driver of the motorcycle and a woman as the gunman. Later on, the gunman was identified in
the person of Gina Bagacina. Weeks after Belen’s confinement, he passed away.

As a defense, the accused denied his presence at the crime scene and presented his alibi.
RTC found Eric Vargas y Jaguarin guilty of the crime charged which was attended by treachery
and evident premeditation. The CA affirmed the same with modification.

496
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the accused were correctly charged of murder aggravated by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.

2. Whether or not the accused were correctly charged of murder aggravated by the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.

RULING:

1. YES, the prosecution successfully established the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC, two conditions must necessarily occur before
treachery or alevosia may be properly appreciated, namely: (1) the employment of means, methods,
or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part
of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate
or conscious choice of means, methods, or manner of execution. In this case, the lower courts were
correct in finding both requisites present in the case - Belen was unsuspecting and unaware of the
threat to his life, when he was shot several times, inflicting upon him mortal wounds. The
suddenness of the attack shows that Belen, who was unarmed, had no opportunity to defend himself.
Moreover, the wounds sustained by Belen show that treachery attended his killing.

2. NO, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that the criminal act was
preceded by calm thought and reflection upon the commission of the crime. To warrant a finding of
evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior
to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation,
reflection, or persistent attempt. In this case, there was no showing as to whether or not sufficient
time had passed from the determination to carry out their criminal plan until the execution of such
plan. Thus, the accused was held guilty of murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

497
FACTS SHOWING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Angel Guro alias "Jason"

G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

FACTS:

While at their home in Cubao, Jefferson’s father, Jesus, received a call from one Venus de
los Santos. According to Jesus, a group of male persons were waiting for Joemarie, Jesus' brother,
in Marikina City. They arrived at Joemarie's school at 9:00 in the evening on board their
respective motorbikes. Joemarie rode with Jefferson.

While they were on their way home, Joemarie saw the group composed of around five
persons waiting for him. Joemari, Jefferson and Jesus approached the group. When they reached
the group, Jefferson asked a certain Yayi what their group's problem was with his uncle Joemarie.
Yayi stood up together with one of the members of the group and without saying any word,
pushed him in the chest. Jefferson saw his father kneeling and was about to stand when a group
of persons lifted a chair and threw the same at his father. His father was hit and fell to the floor.
He saw three persons continue to maul his father. At that time, he was about 15 meters away from
his father who had fallen to his right side. While these persons were mauling his father, the latter
was just kneeling with his hands on the ground. Suddenly, a male person arrived from the
direction of the church and stabbed his father twice at the back.

During the hearing, the person who stabbed his father was identified as Guro. Jefferson
admitted that at the time of the incident, he did not know the identity of Guro and that he came to
know the name of the latter only from his uncle Joemarie.

The RTC found Guro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder. The CA held that there is
no question that Guro killed Jesus. It also found that the RTC was correct in ruling that there was

498
treachery as Guro attacked Jesus in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner and that Jesus was
completely deprived of a real chance to defend himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the killing of Jesus.

RULING:

NO. As the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present in the killing of Jesus, the
Court affirms the conviction of Guro but for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To
appreciate treachery as a qualifying offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of
any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.

The RTC and CA erred when they ruled that treachery was present. The prosecution was
unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing him. Well settled
is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as
indubitably as the crime itself. There must be a showing, first and foremost, that the offender
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of
the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.

As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, only the following were established: (a) a
commotion was caused when Yayi pushed Jefferson; (b) Jesus was being mauled by a group of
persons; and (c) Guro stabbed Jesus twice at the back. Considering the foregoing, it was not proven
that Guro deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the
criminal act to ensure that Jesus could not defend himself. Indeed, it does not always follow that if
the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with
treachery. The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between the two groups, rather than from a
deliberated act of the will. As a matter of fact, it must be emphasized that the target of Guro's group

499
was Joemarie and not Jesus. It was just unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged up on.
Based on the foregoing, it is not possible to appreciate treachery against Guro.

500
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE FOR MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Alex Casemiro, et al.

G.R. No. 231122, January 16, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

In order to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that offenders employed means,

methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and especially to ensure
its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim might
make.

FACTS:

On April 16, 2010 at 9:00 pm, accused-appellants went to the victim’s house in Brgy.
Catorse de Agosto and invited him to butcher a duck. Twenty (20) minutes later, the deceased
wife decided to look for him and asked her 14-year old brother to accompany him. When they
were in barangay of Ngos, she witnesses at a distance of 15 meters that accused-appellant
Casemiro stab her husband 5 times on the chest using a four-inch knife and accused-appellant
Catalan held her husband’s arms. Catalan stabbed her husband 8 times at the back using an ice
pick when the latter fell down. She shouted for help but to no avail because it was already
nighttime and there were no houses nearby.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim’s killing was attended by treachery.

RULING:

YES. To appreciate treachery, it must be shown that offenders employed means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without
risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victim might make.

501
 In the instant case, the accused-appellant invited the victim under the pretense of butchering
a duck and brought him to a place where there were no houses nearby in the middle of the night; he
victim was unarmed while accused-appellants wielded a knife and an ice pick; the victim was
stabbed multiple times on the chest, held by the arms by the other, and again stabbed multiple times
on the back even after he had fallen down. These circumstances indubitably prove treachery;
execution of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and said
means of execution was deliberately adopted by accused-appellants.

502
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH

People of the Philippines vs. Jefferson Maron y Emplona, Jonathan Almario y Caygo and
Nestor Bulahan y Gutierrez

G.R. No. 232339, November 20, 2019

Inting, J.

DOCTRINE:

Following the discussion of Cuello Calon in Cabiling, abuse of superior strength and
employment of means are taken as one and the same aggravating circumstance. Further, it
appears that employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the very least, subsumed
under the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision which affirmed with modification the
decision of RTC finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. According to the Prosecution, on January 4,
2010 at around 10pm, the accused, suddenly approached Alma and pointed a knife to her neck.
Likewise, the person who hid behind the coconut tree approached Michael and pointed a knife at
him. The men announced holdup. The person who was then on his motorcycle approached
Michael and Alma. Said person was brandishing a “kawit”. Michael cried for help and attempted to
fight. The three men, however, repeatedly stabbed him until he slumped on the ground lifeless.
Then, the three persons scampered away, prompting Alma to ask help. A mobile patrol arrived,
and Michael was brought to Ace Funeral Homes where he was pronounced dead.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the accused-appellant Maron, who
is a construction worker; he said that he was at their house at San Pablo City with his parents,
aunt and six siblings. He allegedly watched the television going to bed at around 11pm. He was
then arrested the next day and was identified by the lady witness as one of the assailants.
Meanwhile, Almario claims to be magkakawit ng niyog and a co-worker of the father of the
accused Bulahan. He testified that on the day of the incident, he and his two children were at their
house located in San Pablo City. The following day, while he was taking a bath, he was arrested
and was brought to the police station where he was identified by Alma. Bulahan testified that on
the night of the incident he went home with his wife and had dinner with her and his parents, and
then they slept. The following day, he was also arrested.

503
 Nevertheless, both the RTC and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
the crime of murder that accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt and whether or not it was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.

RULING

NO. The CA was correct to convict the accused for the crime of murder; however, they were
wrong to conclude that it was attended with treachery. In order for treachery to qualify murder, the
following elements must be established: (1) the assailant employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend him or to
retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the assailants.

Thus, it is not enough for the prosecution to show that the attack was sudden, unexpected
and without warning. Rather, there must be a showing that the mode of attack was consciously
adopted and that the accused made “some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner as to insure
the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend him or
to retaliate.

Here, the RTC and the CA erroneously ruled that the killing of Michael was attended by
treachery. It cannot be said that Michael did not expect that he would be stabbed by appellants since
the latter already announced “hold-up” while Maron and Bulahan were poking their knives at Alma
and Michael, and while Almario was brandishing his kawit in front of them. Michael also had the
opportunity to shout for help. Further, there was no showing that appellants made some
preparations to kill Michael in the said manner since Alma’s testimony shows that appellants
originally planned to rob them.

However, the Court still finds the appellants guilty of murder since the killing of Michael was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense. In determining
whether the qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present in this
case, the Court shall be guided by the same standard in determining the presence of abuse of
superior strength, i.e., “notoriously inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that

504
plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor’s and purposely selected or taken advantage of
to facilitate the commission of the crime.

Here, Alma’s testimony is clear as to how appellants stabbed Michael successively using their
respective weapons. The fact that Michael was unarmed, that he was ganged up by the appellants
and that the latter were equipped with and took advantage of their respective knives and kawit in
inflicting fatal wounds on Michael, show a notorious inequality of forces which was obviously
advantageous to appellants.

505
TREACHERY AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Ronald Jaurigue @ “Ron-Ron” a.k.a. Ronaldo Vicente y
Jaurigue

G.R. No. 232380, September 4, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

There can be no treachery when the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in,
put on guard, or otherwise could anticipate aggression from the assailant as when the
assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or
when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.

FACTS:

Ronald Jaurigue was charged with the crime of murder for shooting one Charles Nabaza in
the chest with a “sumpak”, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. Ronald interposed the defenses of denial and
alibi. He averred that at the time of the incident, he was at his cousin's house in Las Piñas.

The Regional Trial Court found Ronald guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. It appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering Charles was shot
when he was trapped in his unit without any means of escape. On this note, the RTC found
Ronald's defense of denial and alibi unavailing in light of such positive identification of him as the
culprit. The Court of Appeals affirmed Ronald’s conviction but with modifications as to the civil
liability. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ronald is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

RULING:

506
 NO. Under the RPC, "[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make." Case law explains that the essence of treachery is that the attack was deliberate
and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.

In this case, records show that the killing of the victim was preceded by two (2) noisy
episodes, particularly: (a) when Aquiles initiated a noisy raucous in the compound by loudly
shouting for Charles to come out and threatening to kill him; and (b) after being driven away by
Charles' relative, the group returned moments later to instigate another raucous where Aquiles,
once again, challenged Charles to come out and face him in a fight. Evidently, the attack was not
sudden nor unexpected since, from the inception of the first raucous, Charles was already put on
guard and had been forewarned of the danger he was in. Moreover, it cannot be said that Ronald
deliberately nor consciously adopted particular means of carrying out the attack as the evidence on
record reveals that his companion, Aquiles, initially wanted to have a mere face-off with Charles, and
it was only when the latter failed to come out that Aquiles and Ronald tried to shoot the victim with
their sumpak.

In light of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to convict Ronald only for Homicide,
which is necessarily included in the crime of Murder.

507
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Pagkatipunan y Cleope

G.R. No. 232393, August 14, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

One's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect." Our laws regard our homes
with much respect, so much so that dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance in
determining the exact liability in criminal prosecutions.

FACTS:

The victim, a minor of eight years of age, was alone in her house when appellant
Pagkatipunan barged in, undressed her, told her to keep quiet, and then inserted his penis in her
vagina. Two days later, he again barged into her house when she was alone, undressed her, spread
her legs, and then licked her vagina. While he was doing this, the father of the minor arrived, saw
him in the act, and then punched him; but he managed to flee.

The Regional Trial Court found him guilty of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness with the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. This was affirmed with modification by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there should be an imposition of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

RULING:

YES. One's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect." Our laws regard our homes with
much respect, so much so that dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance in determining
the exact liability in criminal prosecutions.

508
 Here, it is clear that appellant purposely intended to commit his bestial act while the offended
minor party was alone in their house. His downright disrespect of the privacy and sanctity of his
neighbors' home aggravates the crime he committed. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling
attended the commission of the felony.

509
PRESENCE OF AGGRAVATING/QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF MINORITY AND
RELATIONSHIP OF THE VICTIM TO THE OFFENDER IS NECESSARY IN QUALIFIED RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Noel Navasero

G.R. No. 234240, February 6, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The perpetrator of the rape hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. In fact, incestuous rape
further magnifies this terror, for the perpetrator in these cases, such as the victim's father,
is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Moreover, in
incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, magnifying the sense of
helplessness and the degree of fear.

FACTS:

In 2015, accused-appellant Noel Navasero, after unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of his biological daughter AAA, was charged with fifteen (15) counts of qualified rape.
For his part, Navasero invoked denial as a defense. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility of parole.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused appellant was properly charged with qualified rape.

RULING:

YES. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that rape is committed: (1) By a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a)
Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the

510
circumstances mentioned above be present." In this relation, Article 266-B of the RPC provides that
the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Thus, to raise the
crime of rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the twin circumstances
of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur.

In the instant case, AAA was under twelve (12), as well as below eighteen (18) years of age,
when the alleged crimes occurred. In both cases, there need not be actual force, threat or
intimidation because in the former, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the
victim is below the age of twelve (12), while in the latter, the fact that Navasero was AAA's father is
enough because his moral ascendancy or influence over her substitutes for violence and intimidation.
In view of the fact that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of proving that Navasero
had carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter, AAA, at the times when she was ten (10), eleven
(11), twelve (12), and thirteen (13) years of age, the courts a quo committed no error in convicting
him of fifteen (15) counts of qualified rape.

511
ABUSE OF STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF FRUSTRATED MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Cresenciano Enojo a.k.a “Olpok”

G.R. No. 240231, November 27, 2019

Zalameda, J.

DOCTRINE:

An attack made by a man with deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend
herself.

FACTS:

That on November 20, 1999, at about 5:30 in the afternoon at Zamboanguita, Negros
Occidental, the accused with treachery and abuse of superior strength the victims being minors
and of tender age and unarmed, with the use of a bolo, assault and attack, Delfred Cuevas, a 9
yeard old; Carlfred Cuevas, a 2 year old; Chrocila Cuevas, a 2 year old which caused the death of
the victims. On the same day, the accused assault and attack 3 times Carmen Cuevas with the use
of a bolo, thereby inflicting upon the victim the injuries which could have cause the death of the
latter but nevertheless did not produce the crime of Murder by the timely medical assistance
given to said victim that prevented her death.

In Carmen’s testimony, she recounted how she heard her children, Alfred and Chrocila,
calling out to her after she fell to the ground. She yelled for them to run to their house, but the
accuse followed them. Carmen claimed she witnessed how the accused hacked Alfred and
Chrocila to death. As for Delfred, she maintained that her son almost escaped, but the accused
caught up with him and hacked him on the head twice.

After trial, the RTC found the accused guilty of 3 counts of murder and 1 count of
frustrated murder. The CA affirmed the accused-appellant’s conviction and agreed to the
appreciation of treachery and abuse of superior strength in wounding Carmen.

ISSUE:

512
 Whether or not the abuse of superior strength and treachery were present to qualify the
crime to frustrated murder.

RULING:

NO. Treachery was not present when accused attacked Carmen. Treachery is present when
the attack was carried out in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, the purpose of which is to
deny the victim of any opportunity to defend himself or herself. To sustain a finding in treachery, it
must be shown that the offender must have planned the mode of attack to ensure its execution
without exposing himself to any danger which may come from the victim’s act of retaliation or self-
defense. Here, while accused’ attack on Carmen wad described as sudden there is no treachery when
the suddenness was not preconceived and not deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the
killing is done at the spur of the moment.

On the other hand, the accused’s abuse of his strength over Carmen qualifies his crime to
frustrated murder. The pieces of evidence show that at the time of her attack, Carmen was unarmed
and without any means to fend off accused’ attacks with his bolo.

513
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Cromwell Torres y Palis

G.R. No. 241012, August 28, 2019

Reyes, J. Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that:
(1) the accused employed means of execution that gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate
or consciously adopted. A treacherous attack is characterized by a deliberate and
unforeseen assault done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution leaving the
hapless, defenseless, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or escape.

FACTS:

Two witnesses testified that they saw the victim Palumbarit in front of a store. Accused-
appellant walked towards the store, shifted to the victim’s direction, then shot him with a sumpak
which caused the latter to fall to the ground. Upon realizing that Palumbarit was still bleeding
from the gunshot wound, he rushed to his aid and carried and boarded him in a tricycle going to
the hospital where he eventually died. The medico-legal report confirmed that the cause of death
was multiple gunshot wounds entering around the area behind the armpit towards the back and
with no exit wound. It reported that the weapon used could be a shotgun or an improvised
weapon using shotgun ammunition.

Appellant denied all allegations, averring that he was merely passing by the area as he was
on his way to his father’s house. He alleged that he was picked up by the police at his father’s
house, brought to a hospital for medical examination, then was punched on the eye and forced to
admit his involvement in the shooting. When he denied any knowledge about the victim, he was
locked up in jail.

The RTC convicted him of murder after finding that treachery attended the commission of
the crime. It held that the prosecution established treachery by showing that despite a lack of
provocation from the victim, the appellant executed an attack that was so sudden as to ensure his
safety from any defense or retaliatory act from the victim. The defense of the appellant was

514
disregarded as it was not properly corroborated by clear and convincing evidence. The CA
affirmed the conviction.

Appellant raised this appeal alleging that the court erroneously appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present in the crime.

RULING:

YES, treachery is present in the case at bar. The swiftness and suddenness of the aggression
carried out by appellant deprived the victim the chance to ward off the attack or run or, at the very
least, mount a defense. Appellant consciously chose as weapon an improvised shotgun that can fire a
number of small pellets at once to attack the victim. He pulled the trigger right after he cursed the
victim giving the latter no time to repel the attack. Indeed, treachery is present in the case at bar.

515
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AS QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN MURDER

People of the Philippines vs. Wennie Pespenian

G.R. No. 242413, September 4, 2019

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Two armed assailants as against an unarmed victim and companions constitute

taking advantage of superior strength.

FACTS:

Wennie Pespenian and Ireneo Salili were charged with Murder for killing one Brigido
Colminas. The witnesses for the prosecution testified that they accompanied Colminas on his way
home because they heard from the other guests that Pespenian and Salili were planning to kill
Colminas. True enough, they met the two accused on their way. Pespenian stabbed Colminas
several times on the left and right chest down to his foot using an eight-inch knife, while Salili was
holding a pistol and stayed behind Pespenian.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Pespenian of Murder, while Salili remained at large. It
appreciated the presence of aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength
which was purposely selected to facilitate the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision with modifications as to the award of damages. Hence, this appeal.

In his Brief, Pespenian avers that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that
he purposely sought the advantage or deliberately used it in the attack. He asserts that Colminas
was not defenseless as he had two companions who were supposed to protect him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength can be

appreciated in this case.

516
RULING:

YES. There is abuse of superior strength when the perpetrators of a crime deliberately used
excessive force, thereby rendering the victim incapable of defending himself. The notorious
inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage for the aggressor.

In the case at bench, accused-appellant and his co-accused evidently armed themselves with
deadly weapons. Accused-appellant used a knife and with it stabbed Colminas inflicting no less than
eighteen (18) wounds upon the latter. Co-accused Salili, for his part, held a gun, which he pointed
towards Colminas' direction. On the other hand, Colminas was unarmed. While Colminas had
companions at that time, they were similarly unarmed and were overwhelmed by fear of assailants.
Accused-appellant and co-accused clearly exploited their superior advantage in number and
weapons to ensure the attainment of their hideous plan, i.e., death to Colminas.

517
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Lumahang

G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

A frontal attack would qualify as treachery when the assault is sudden and
unexpected and not even preceded by a dispute, to the point of incapacitating the person
attacked the opportunity to repel the assault or to escape from it.

FACTS:

Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Novaliches,
Quezon City. Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook
motion with a knife in his left hand. Pornelos was hit on the buttocks. Without warning, appellant
then turned his ire on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body which
caused him death. Examining physician of Pornelos, found a stab wound on the latter's right
buttocks, which to be a non-fatal wound that required treatment for around seven days.

The accused contended that five bystanders, one of which is Pornelos, approached him
and LL. Suddenly, two of them touched the hands, shoulders and breasts of LL. One of them
punched the accused while another pulled out a knife. He was hit on his left thigh and they
grappled with the knife. When he saw a chance to run away, he ran towards the direction of his
aunt's house with the bystanders running after him. He had also sustained injuries from being
punched in the head and had a stab wound on his left thigh. Due to these injuries, he was confined
in a clinic in Novaliches. When he voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities, no knife was
recovered from him.

RTC convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The
CA affirmed with modifications the RTC's conviction of Lumahang. The CA likewise upheld the
RTC finding that the attacks were attended with treachery. The CA also upheld the RTC's finding
that Lumahang was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because he
surrendered to the barangay at the night of the incident after having been convinced by his aunt,
Virginia Lumahang. The CA convicted Lumahang of only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos
needed only seven days of confinement in the hospital to recover from the injury.

518
ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the

killing of Velitario.

RULING:

YES. As the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present in the killing of Velitario,
the Court affirms the conviction of Lumahang but for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder.

Meanwhile, granted that Velitario noticed the commotion between Pornelos and appellant,
as he was not more than 2 meters away from Pornelos, the swiftness and unexpected attack of
appellant nonetheless caught Velitario off guard. Thus, instead of running away from appellant,
Velitario remained standing and was unable to defend himself. The mere fact that the attack on
Rodel was frontal does not negate the presence of treachery. A frontal attack would qualify as
treachery when the assault is sudden and unexpected and not even preceded by a dispute, to the
point of incapacitating the person attacked the opportunity to repel the assault or to escape from it.
Appellant's attack being sudden and unexpected, and with his right armed locked on Rodel's nape,
any attempt at escape by the latter would be all for naught.

Treachery undoubtedly exists on the attack against Pornelos because the parties were
attending a wake and were thus not expecting an attack from happening; the attack was made
suddenly and from behind. The attack on Pornelos was therefore clearly attended by treachery.

Suddenness of the attack by itself, is inadequate to support a Finding of treachery. It must be

coupled with proof that the victim was completely deprived of a real chance to defend himself
against the attack thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It is, thus, decisive that the attack was executed in a
manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

Treachery, just like any other element of the crime committed, must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is
not to be presumed or taken for granted from a mere statement that "the attack was sudden"; there
must be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden."

Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that he thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to
himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Specifically, it must clearly appear that

519
the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor.

520
REQUISITES OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Gerald Moreno Tazon

G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020

Hernando, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
especially ensure its execution, without risk to himself/herself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with murder of Cecil Mijares. The Prosecution averred
that on November 16, 2001 at around 2:15 in the morning, Alderiza Mijares, wife of the victim,
was awakened from her sleep when a hard object hit her head. When she turned on the lights, a
man wearing khaki shorts and white t-shirt, leap on their bed and repeatedly stabbed her
husband, Cecil Mijares, on the leg and chest. Cecil was able to kick the man out of the room and
even close the door. Thereafter, Cecil collapsed and fell on the floor. He was rushed to the hospital
with the help of their neighbors. Unfortunately, he died while undergoing treatment. During the
investigation, Ardeliza was able to give a detailed description since she vividly remembered the
face of his husband’s assailant. A police cartographer was able to prepare a sketch of the suspect
based on Ardeliza’s description. In that same day, the police received a tip from one of Alderiza’s
neighbors that a man who fits the description was seen within the vicinity of the house so the
police, acting on the same, invited the appellant for an interview regarding the killing incident.
They also summoned Ardeliza who positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed her
husband.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied the allegation and submitted an alibi that he
was sleeping in his house at the time of the incident. RTC and CA convicted of murder, hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

521
 Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in convicting the appellant of murder with the
attending circumstance of treachery.

RULING:

NO, the appeal has no merit.

We agree that treachery attended the attack on Cecil Mijares. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and especially ensure its execution, without risk to
himself/herself arising from the defense which the offended party might take. The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Appellant’s
sudden attack on the victim while asleep in his own home amply demonstrates treachery in the
commission of the crime.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is affirmed.

522
REQUISITES OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Glecerio Pitulan Briones

G.R. No. 226486, January 22, 2020

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

The essence of treachery is “in the suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring the commission of the offense without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.”

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso.
The Prosecution alleged that on April 20, 2003 the group of PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and PO1
Monteroso aboard their marked police patrol mobile responded to a report of a group of armed
men aboard a Hyundai van acting suspiciously along General Avenue, Quezon City. When the
officers arrived at the location and spotted the vehicle. They ordered the van to halt. However, the
van gave chase instead until the officers overtook and blocked its path along Road 20. The officers
ordered the passengers to step out of the vehicle to which all of them complied except the driver,
the accused-appellant. This caused PO1 Monteroso to open the door opposite the driver to check
up on him only to be shot thrice to the chest by the accused-appellant. This led to a wrestle
among the officers and the assailants which resulted to P01 De Vera being shot. The accused-
appellant attempted then to escape only to encounter PO3 Cortez and his team. The latter
ordered them to stop and attempted to approach the former. However, the accused-appellant
open fired at him which caused the officers to fire back. There was a shoot-out that ensued and
one of the officers hit the van’s left tire. The van then hit an island at the intersection of Visayas
Avenue and Congressional avenue. The other van passengers turned out dead and only the
accused-appellant was arrested.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied that he was the driver and claimed that he
was sleeping in the van and was only awakened by the shootout, where he sustained wounds that
caused him to fall unconscious on the floor of the van. The next thing he knew, he was already in
the hospital or so he claims.

523
 The RTC and the CA found him guilty of direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso,
citing treachery as a qualifying circumstance. In his appeal he argues that the Prosecution failed
to prove the corpus delicti of the crime by failing to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing and to
present the murder weapon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present.

RULING:

NO, though the lower courts, convicted the accused-appellant of direct assault with murder,
this Court will modify it to direct assault with homicide, there being no treachery to qualify the
killing of PO1 Monteroso. The essence of treachery is “in the suddenness of the attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without rick to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended part might make.” The following elements must be proven: “(1) that at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. The prosecution failed to
establish these elements. Po1 Monteroso was fully armed and was a trained police officer and given
the situation, he should have been warned and ready for violent behavior from the assailants.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is modified to guilty of complex crime of direct assault with
homicide.

524
REQUISITES OF TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Rico Dela Peña

G.R. No. 238120, February 12, 2020

Inting, J.

DOCTRINE:

Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter is
asleep and unable to defend himself. Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a position to
defend himself, take flight or otherwise avoid the assault, thus ensuring that the crime is
successfully executed without any risk to the attacker.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants was charged with Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. The Prosecution alleged that in the afternoon of
December 14, 2006, Ernie D. Amahit, son of the victim Olipio G. Amahit, went to their nipa hut
after tending to their carabaos. He was a few meters away when he saw the accused-appellant
stabbed his father in the back with a bolo while the latter was sleeping. He heard his father shout
while he watched the accused-appellant stab the former several times. Accused-appellant then
threatened to kill Ernie causing the latter to run home and tell his mother the incident.

The Defense, however, averred that there was an altercation between the victim and the
accused-appellant on the same date at around 5:30 AM, and that the victim confronted the latter
while he was walking to tell him that the banana plants were uprooted to which the latter
inquired into only to be answered by the victim that he should not be angry or else he would kill
him. When the accused-appellant answered no, the victim then pulled out his bolo and thrusted it
against him, which caused the former to wrestle with the latter for the bolo. When the accused-
appellant got a hold of the bolo, he stabbed the victim first in the stomach and then in the other
parts of the body.

RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of Murder with the attending circumstance of
treachery. The CA affirmed the same. Hence, this appeal.

525
ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present.

RULING:

YES, treachery was present. The RTC and CA properly ruled that treachery qualified the
killing to murder. In People vs Clariño, the Court discussed that the lower court correctly
appreciated the circumstance of treachery since the victim was asleep at the time of the assault.
Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter is asleep and
unable to defend himself. Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a position to defend himself, take
flight or otherwise avoid the assault, thus ensuring that the crime is successfully executed without
any risk to the attacker. Since the victim was sleeping at the time of the attack, he was in no position
to put up any form of defense against the assailant.

Wherefore, the accused-appellants’ conviction is sustained.

526
REQUISITES OF TREACHERY

Roel C. Casilac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020

Peralta, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack
is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for
treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by
him.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with murder of Ryn Loui Navarez and attempted murder of
Ramil Navarez. The Prosecution averred that on June 23, 2009 at about 5 o’ clock in the afternoon,
Ramil, the victim, and his younger brother, Ryn Loui were on their way home aboard a motorcycle
that upon reaching the curved portion of the road, Ramil saw his cousin, accused-appellant,
standing on the side of the road. The latter started shooting at Ramil and Ryn Loui. The former
was able run and get help from the Barangay, leaving the latter in the scene. Ryn Loui was then
discovered lifeless when the police responded to the scene.

The Defense, on the other hand, alleged that it was the brothers who shot at him first while
on board their motorcycle while he was cutting grass and that he borrowed the gun of his cousin,
Cirunay, who fled and continued to cut grass. When the two came back, he shot them first in self-
defense. He hit Ryn Loui while Ramil escaped.

The RTC found him guilty of murder of Ryn Loui Navarez, citing treachery as a qualifying
circumstance and guilty of serious physical injuries of Ramil Navarez. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
with modification, only finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder and less serios physical

527
injuries instead of serious physical injuries. In his appeal he argues that the CA erred in finding
him guilty of murder despite the presence of the elements of self-defense and also in considering
treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not treachery was present.

RULING:

YES, treachery was present. Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the
direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. All elements are present in this case. First, Ryn
Loui and Ramil were not in the position to defend themselves. Secondly, the accused-appellant
consciously adopted an attack that was deliberate, swift, and sudden. Hence, RTC and CA were
correct and determining that the crime committed was murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION to guilty of murder and
attempted murder.

528
REQUISITES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND TREACHERY

People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo “Jerry” Pigar Ambayanan and Reynaldo “Lawlaw”
Pigar Codilla

G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected of taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime.

The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow.

FACTS:

Accused-appellants were charged with murder of Feliciano S. Garces with attending

aggravating and qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength. The Prosecution alleged that on August 17, 2009 at around 6 o’ clock in the
evening, Edgardo Garces, son of the victim, had an altercation with Roy Pigar, brother of one of
the accused-appellants. They were pacified by a certain Gagante. After the incident, Edgardo went
home to warn his family of a probable revenge that Roy might take as he was drunk at that time.
The former even asked his sister, who was tending to her children inside their home, to move to
their hut just across the street in fear of said probable revenge. The victim, Feliciano, was sleeping
then in the room so he was left in the said house when Edgardo went to his uncle to seek help.
Subsequently, Roy did arrive with two other people and threw stones at their house, the victim
was roused and even shouted at them. However, not long after, 10 more men arrived and
surrounded the house, including the accused-appellants “Lawlaw” and “Jerry”. The victim then
ran back to his house only to be chased after by some of the men who hacked him in bolos. In a
desperate attempt to escape, the victim ran out only to be met by the other men who also hacked
him with bolos and stabbed him with bamboo spears. At this juncture, Edgardo arrived and a gun
shot was heard which made the suspects including the accused-appellants leave the area. The

529
victim then died with 17 stab wounds in his body. Only the accused-appellants were arrested and
a Buenaventura Pigar who passed away during the trial.

The Defense, on the other hand, averred that they passed by the victim’s house on August
17, 2009 when the victim suddenly hacked “Jerry” with a weapon to which the latter sustained
wounds. He then managed to get a hold of the victim’s weapon and used it on the latter while his
other companions helped hitting the same with pieces of wood. “Jerry” also testified that “Lawlaw”
did not perpetrate the incident which the latter corroborated.

The RTC found both accused-appellants guilty of murder with qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength and one ordinary aggravating circumstance of domicile. This was
sustained by CA, hence the appeal. The accused-appellants argue that the CA erred in affirming
their conviction stating that Lawlaw did not participate in the commission of crime and that CA
and RTC were wrong for appreciating both treachery and abuse of superior strength as it is
settled that if they concur, the latter is absorbed by the former.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not abuse of superior strength was present.

2. Whether or not treachery was present.

RULING:

1. YES, abuse of superior strength was present. Abuse of superior strength is present
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected of taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The inequality of forces in this case is beyond
doubt. The victim was a thin old man as against the appellants who were nine individuals armed
with bolos.

2. NO, treachery was not present. As for treachery, the appellants are mistaken in claiming
that RTC and CA appreciated this circumstance over abuse of superior strength as RTC did not
appreciate treachery as an attendant circumstance here. In any event, treachery did not attend the
victim’s killing. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. Records show that Roy already visited the house first and
already tried to hack the victim but missed, thereafter he sped off aboard his motorcycle. At that
time, Feliciano was already aware of Roy’s intention to harm him hence no treachery is present.

530
 Wherefore, the assailed decision is MODIFIED to guilty of murder with qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength.

531
 CHAPTER FIVE

Alternative Circumstances

ARTICLE 15. Their Concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken
into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the
crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship,
intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the
offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.

The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating

circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the
same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

532
MINORITY AND RELATIONSHIP AS AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CRIME OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. xxxxxxxxxxx

G.R. No. 225339, July 10, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the proper penalty is death.
Consequently, the death penalty should have been imposed were it not for the enactment
of RA 9346.

FACTS:

AAA, around 3 o'clock in the morning, was roused from sleep by the weight of a man on
top of her. She realized she was no longer dressed, and the man was making a push and pull
movement inside her vagina. She struggled to break free from his clutches, but he pinned her
down. She eventually managed to kick him off around two (2) minutes later when the push and
pull movement had finally stopped. The man threatened to kill her family if she reported the
incident. She recognized the man's voice as that of appellant, her uncle. From this testimony, the
prosecution positively established that appellant, through force and intimidation, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA against her will. The prosecution offered the following
documentary exhibits: AAA's birth certificate, Dr. Ng-Hua's medical certificate, letter-request for
medical check-up, and AAA's DSWD data record.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA persuasive and unwavering in giving
her testimony, thus, meriting full weight and credence. Indeed, a young girl's revelation that she
had been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness
to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of the assault on her
dignity cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.

The trial court found accused XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer a prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay unto private complainant [xxx]
P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages and; P30,000 as exemplary damages.

533
 The Court of Appeals modified the penalty, hence, appellant XXX shall not be eligible for
parole; and is ordered to pay interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.

RULING:

YES. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353, prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for simple rape. Where the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, the proper penalty is
death.

Here, AAA was sixteen (16) years of age when she got raped. The prosecution offered in
evidence her birth certificate to prove her minority at the time of the incident. Meanwhile, her blood
relation with appellant is undisputed. Appellant took the witness stand and admitted to being AAA's
uncle, and brother to BBB. Consequently, the death penalty should have been imposed were it not for
the enactment of RA 9346.36 The Court of Appeals therefore correctly sentenced appellant to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

XXX is found GUILTY of Rape, qualified by minority and relationship. He is sentenced to

reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

534
 TITLE TWO

Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies

ARTICLE 16. Who are Criminally Liable. — The following are criminally liable for grave and
less grave felonies:

1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.

ARTICLE 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.

ARTICLE 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

ARTICLE 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided
the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime
is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

535
PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT

Celerino Chua alias Suntay vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime are considered
principals in the commission of a crime.

FACTS:

The prosecution established that accused Arnold Lato and Leo Reyes, who were still at
large, broke into the private complainants’ house, assaulting and asking the complainants to give
them the “broker’s commission for the sale of the fishpond.” Thereafter, the two took the private
belongings of the complainants and loaded said belongings in a jeep, also owned by the private
complainants.

It was also established that herein accused Chua eavesdropped and listened intently when
the complainant told his compadre about the commission he received from the sale of fishpond.
That Chua referred both Arnold and Leo to one Gerry Ormesa for work. That the straw ropes
which were used in the commission of the crime were being used by Arnold and Leo in their work.
That prior to the incident, Chua resided about 20 meters from the complainants’ house and after
the incident, Chua went into hiding. That Chua told the private complainants’ to be quiet about
the incident otherwise harm would befall their family. An information was also received that the
jeep was brought by Chua to Pangasinan, and that Chua, claiming that the jeep belonged to him,
sold the same to one Jessie Tugas. Chua thereafter stayed at a nipa hut in Pangasinan, wherein
one Betamax unit was recovered, which was among the stolen items. Chua denied any knowledge
in the commission of the crime as well as the fact that he knows Arnold and Leo.

RTC held Chua guilty of carnapping and robbery. Chua appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision. Hence, Chua raised, in this petition, that CA erred in finding the existence of a conspiracy
between him and the two other accused.

536
ISSUE:

Whether or not Chua is a principal in the commission of the crimes.

RULING:

YES. SC held that the foregoing circumstances were sufficient to prove that Chua
masterminded the carnapping and robbery and that Arnold and Leo could not have committed the
crimes without Chua’s inducement. Article 17, RPC provides that the following are considered
principals: x x x

Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; x x x

537
PRINCIPALS IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Dillatan, Sr. y Pat and Donato Garcia y Duazo

G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

All those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although they did
not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the same.

FACTS:

Henry and Violeta Acob (Spouses Acob) are owners of a market stall. At around 6 o’clock in
the evening, Spouses Acob, together with their son, Homer, closed their stall and proceeded home
by riding together on a motorcycle. They were approaching the entrance of their barangay at
6:30pm, when they noticed the accused-appellants riding a motorcycle and tailing them. Accused-
appellants eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused Dillatan forced them to stop and
immediately declared a holdup. Violeta embraced Homer, while Dillatan grabbed her belt bag.
Thereafter, Dillatan uttered “barilin mo na.” Garcia then fired at the victims hitting, first, the left
hand of Violeta. The bullet went through the left hand of Violeta and pierced Homer's chest
causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. Henry tried to escape but Garcia also
fired at him hitting his right knee. Henry, Violeta and Homer were eventually hospitalized, but
unfortunately, Homer succumbed to his death by reason of his gunshot wound.

RTC held the two accused guilty of robbery with homicide. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dillatan could be considered as a principal in the commission of the crime.

538
RULING:

YES. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.

539
WHO ARE PRINCIPALS IN ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Labagala

G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Homicide by reason or on occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals
would also be liable of robbery with homicide even though they did not actually take part
in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.

FACTS:

Alvin J. Labagala and Romeo Labagala were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. Per the records, it was established that appellants, together with
their co-accused, entered the victim's yard where they took the victim's personal effects by means
of force, and with an obvious intent to gain. That they cooperated with each other to achieve this
purpose was plainly manifested by their actions, viz.:

[COURT:]

Q: So you said it was this Alvin Labagala who poked a gun on [the victim]
and who whipped a gun on him. How about the other companions, what
were they doing when Alvin Labagala ganged the old man?

A: While Alvin Labagala was whipping the old man, they were holding [the
latter in place].

Since it was not shown that appellants had endeavored to prevent the victim's killing, they
are both liable as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy to commit robbery with homicide.

540
RULING:

NO. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of [a] robbery, all those who
took part as principals in the robbery would also be liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.

541
ELEMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE HELD AS ACCOMPLICE

Petronilo Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People

G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites

must concur: (1) that there be community of design; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act; and (3) that there be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

FACTS:

On September 22, 1992 at about 8:00pm, Salvador and his son, Robert Espelita arrived at
the house of the former’s balae, Jocelyn Janioso, calling out for help. When Janioso came out of her
house, she saw Salvador whose forehead was oozing with blood, and Calib Napone likewise
bloodied on the face, mud-laden, and trying to extricate himself from Salvador who held him by
the back collar of his shirt. Calib is the son of Petronilo Napone Sr. and the brother of Petronilo
Napone Jr. and Edgar Napone. When Janioso asked what happened, Salvador replied that Calib
waylaid him and struck him with an iron bar while he and Robert were on their way home from
their farm. Thereafter, Janioso directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be used to bring
Salvador and Calib to the hospital. After a while, the Napones arrived in a vehicle. To avoid further
conflict, Janioso pulled Salvador inside her house but Petronilo Sr. followed them and
immediately hacked Salvador from behind using a big bolo, hitting Salvador at the back of his
head. Salvador, in retaliation, also hacked Petronilo Sr. Meanwhile, Edgar and Petronilo Jr. also
alighted from the vehicle. Edgar threw a fist-sized stone at Salvador. Petronilo Jr. then shot
Salvador 3 times with a small firearm, hitting the latter on the chest which caused him to fall. At
the hospital, Salvador was pronounced dead.

On the other hand, the Napones alleged that they acted in self-defense and in defense of a
relative. They alleged that on the date of the incident, while Petronilo Sr., Petronilo Jr. and Edgar
were in their house, a certain Ervin Tagocon came and told them that he saw Calib bloodied and
dragged by Salvador and Robert to the house of Janioso. Upon hearing the news, Petronilo Jr.
hurriedly ran towards Janioso's house, while Edgar and Petronilo Sr. immediately followed. Before
running to Calib's aid, Petronilo Sr. got hold of his bolo because he suspected that the Espelitas

542
had hacked Calib. Upon arriving at Janioso's place, the Napones saw Calib bloodied and being held
by the Espelitas who, upon seeing them coming, dropped Calib, who was then prostrate and
unconscious. The Espelitas then went inside the fenced premises of Janioso's house. When
Petronilo Sr. attempted to lift Calib from the ground, Salvador rushed towards him and hacked
him with a bolo multiple time. Unable to retaliate because he was lifting Calib, he parried the
attacks with his left hand but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, Petronilo Sr. fell to the ground and lost
consciousness. Edgar tried to defend his father from Salvador by throwing a stone at the latter.
Because of this, Salvador shifted his attention towards Edgar and chased him with a bolo.
Meanwhile, Petronilo Jr. was about to rush to his father’s aid when he was alerted that Robert was
aiming a firearm at him. He wrestled with Robert for the possession of the firearm. When he got
hold of the firearm, Robert allegedly shouted, "watch out, my firearm was taken" and ran away.
Salvador stopped chasing after Edgar, turned to Petronilo Jr., and hacked him three 3 times.
Petronilo Jr. fell to the ground facing down and while Salvador is still behind him, he crawled
away from his assailant. When he stood up and saw that Salvador was still coming after him, he
fired his gun at Salvador. Despite the first shot, Salvador kept advancing towards him; thus, he
again shot at Salvador hitting him in the chest. Thereafter, he took Petronilo Sr. and Calib to the
provincial hospital for treatment. Then, Petronilo Jr. surrendered to the authorities but the
firearm he used to shoot Salvador was never recovered.

The RTC found Petronilo Jr. and Edgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide. It rejected the Napones’ claim of self-defense and in defense of a relative ratiocinating
that they failed to establish the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Salvador. It further
ruled that: a) a conspiracy among the Napones existed as shown by their successive attacks on
Salvador; and b) no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the felony. However, the RTC
ordered the dismissal of the case against Petronilo Sr. due to his death a month after he
completed his testimony.

On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTC regarding the appreciation of modifying
circumstance. While it conceded that no aggravating circumstance attended the killing of Salvador,
it opined that the RTC failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It observed that the unfortunate incident occurred at the "spur of the moment" and because of
the Napones' "impulse reaction" upon seeing Calib wounded and lying on the ground. Likewise,
the CA ruled that conspiracy could not be appreciated considering that the incident happened at
"the spur of the moment." Thus, the CA reduced Edgar's liability to that of a mere accomplice
reasoning that his participation in throwing a stone at Salvador during the incident, while
showing community of criminal design, was otherwise not indispensable to the commission of
the felony.

ISSUE:

543
 Whether or not Edgar is liable only as an accomplice.

RULING:

YES, Edgar is liable only as an accomplice but to the crime of attempted homicide. The SC
disagrees with the CA that Edgar's act of throwing a stone at Salvador sufficiently showed that he
agreed with Petronilo Jr.’s criminal design to kill Salvador thereby establishing his complicity to the
felony. Edgar's act which ensued prior to the shooting of Salvador did not necessarily demonstrate
his concurrence with Petronilo Jr.’s criminal purpose. There was no showing that Edgar committed
the deed knowing that Petronilo Jr. would shoot or otherwise harm Salvador moments after.
Community of design was lacking. Thus, Edgar could not be held liable as an accomplice to the
consummated homicide because the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance knowingly
or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the principal's
criminal purpose. Nevertheless, while Edgar's complicity and participation in the consummated
homicide was not sufficiently shown, he should still be held liable for his participation in and
concurrence with Petronilo Sr.'s criminal purpose. The prosecution was able to prove that Petronilo
Sr. hacked Salvador at least four 4 times. Petronilo Sr.'s intent to kill Salvador was also established
by the nature of the weapon he used and the location of the wounds. However, there was no showing
that these hack wounds had caused or would have caused Salvador's death. Clearly, and considering
that conspiracy is not attendant in this case, Petronilo Sr. would not be liable for the death of
Salvador. Instead, he would have been held liable as a principal by direct participation in the crime
of attempted homicide, were it not for the total extinction of his criminal liability as a consequence
of his demise during trial. The SC opines that Edgar witnessed his father's assault on Salvador and
was thus knowledgeable of his criminal design. The simultaneous act of throwing a stone at
Salvador was made to assist Petronilo Sr. in achieving his criminal purpose, thus, Edgar's assent and
participation to the criminal acts of his father were sufficiently established. As Edgar's participation
was not indispensable to the felony, he must be held liable as an accomplice to the criminal acts of
Petronilo Sr. Therefore, Edgar is guilty as an accomplice to the crime of attempted homicide.

544
FACTS WHICH SHOW AN ACCOMPLICE TO A CRIME

Martiniano B. Saldua vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact that a person is present when a crime is committed, when such
presence does not have the purpose of encouraging the criminal and when there is no
previous agreement between them as to the commission of the crime, will make the
former responsible only as accomplice in the crime committed.

FACTS:

At 10:00 AM, Lalamunan, Vertudez and Saldua arrived at the kiosk owned by Palalon on
board a red motorcycle. At around noontime, they left the kiosk along with Palalon’s son-in-law
Flores. On the following day at 10:00 AM, Vertudez and Saldua returned to the kiosk. At 6:30 PM,
Lalamunan arrived and the three of them left on foot towards the national highway. Lalamunan
walked ahead to where the motorcycle was parked at a banana grove while Saldua and Vertudez
went to the house of the victim, Abella. Vertudez was next seen to be firing at the garage of the
house of Abella with an armed Saldua behind him. Abella was able to shoot back and hit Vertudez.
Saldua and Vertudez left the area on foot towards where the motorcycle was parked. Vertudez
collapsed due to his gunshot wound. Meanwhile, Saldua and Lalamunan left the area on board the
motorcycle, leaving Vertudez behind. Abella was found dead that day from gunshot wounds.
Vertudez was also found dead the next day at the banana grove from gunshot wound.

Saldua denied killing Abella and insisted that he was in another place. He narrated that he
was with his family in their home at Negros Oriental. He accounted for his whereabouts on the
entire day of the incident as follows: at 6:00 AM he went to his farm to weed out his peanut
shrubs; at 10:00 AM, he went home to eat lunch. At 2:00 PM, he went back to his farm; and at 7:00
PM, he tried to buy medicine for his ailing daughter.

The RTC convicted Saldua as an accomplice to the crime of murder and also considered the
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as the attack appeared to be plan.

545
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is an accomplice to the crime of murder.

RULING:

YES. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in
the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

At the time the crime of homicide was committed, it was established that petitioner Saldua,
who was armed, was present, as he was behind Vertudez when the latter fired his gun. However,
mere presence does not make one a co-conspirator in the crime. Other than being present, it was not
established what Saldua’s purpose was when he stood behind Vertudez bearing a firearm. By merely
standing behind Vertudez, it cannot be ascertained whether petitioner had prior knowledge of the
criminal design of the principal perpetrator or that he was there to give moral support. What was
clear is that he was armed, and he did not stop Vertudez from shooting the victim. The mere fact
that a person is present when a crime is committed, when such presence does not have the purpose
of encouraging the criminal and when there is no previous agreement between them as to the
commission of the crime, will make the former responsible only as accomplice in the crime
committed.

546
FACTS THAT MUST BE SHOWN TO DETERMINE PARTICIPATION IN A CRIME AS AN
ACCESSORY

Excel Gurro y Maga vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224562, September 18, 2019

Reyes, J. Jr, J.

DOCTRINE:

It must be remembered that for one to be regarded as an accomplice, it must be

shown that (1) he knew the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, and
concurred with the latter in his purpose; (2) he cooperated in the execution by previous or
simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) his acts bore a direct relation with the acts done by
the principal.

FACTS:

The accused in this case, namely Excel Gurro y Maga, Wennie Idian y Jamindang and Joel
Zosa were charged with Kidnapping for ransom with homicide. This was after they conspired in
kidnapping an 8-year-old minor and demanded ransom from his family amounting to
P3,000,000.00. The kid was killed while being unlawfully detained by his kidnappers. Before the
kidnapping was held, the kid was last seen with Wennie in their house. Wennie left her house
with the kid but when she returned home, she’s already alone. The family of the kid went
searching for the child and had received a text message from an anonymous person saying their
kid was kidnapped. The family provided ransom money amounting to P186,000.00. After the
release of the funds, they just knew that their kid was killed by his kidnappers. According to a
witness, Wennie’s acts had been suspicious since the kid went missing. She tried to cover up Joel's
contact information from Patrick, who is the witness in the case. They then found out that the
contact number of the kidnapper is the same as Joel’s number.

Wennie however denied the accusations against her. Joel admitted his guilt of the crime
but avers that Wennie and Excel is in no way involved in the crime he committed. The RTC held
Wennie and Joel guilty of kidnapping with homicide and declared Excel as an accomplice to the
crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

547
ISSUE:

Whether or not Excel shall be convicted for being an accomplice therewith.

RULING:

NO. Excel was held to be guilty as an accessory of the crime. It must be remembered that for
one to be regarded as an accomplice, it must be shown that (1) he knew the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, and concurred with the latter in his purpose; (2) he cooperated in
the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral
aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) his acts bore a direct relation with
the acts done by the principal. In the given case, the prosecution failed to prove that he directly
participated in the kidnapping of AAA. Excel's participation in the incident was limited to acts
committed after the abduction was already consummated. But the fact that he received the ransom
money and his suspicious acts committed to cover his participation in the crime is sufficient to
convict him as an accessory of the crime. Hence, Wennie and Joel are guilty of conspiracy to commit
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and Excel as an accessory thereof.

548
 TITLE THREE

Penalties

CHAPTER THREE

Duration and Effect of Penalties

SECTION TWO

Effects of the Penalties According to Their Respective Nature

ARTICLE 39. Subsidiary Penalty. — If the convict has no property with which to meet the
fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a
subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:

1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall
remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is
satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of
the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction
or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or
less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correctional, no
subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal
institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of
time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same
deprivations as those of which the principal penalty consists.

The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his
insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should
improve.

549
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY

People of the Philippines, thru Private Complainant Brian Victor Britchford vs. Salvador
Alapan

G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018

Maritres, J.

DOCTRINE:

If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3
of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the
prescribed rate under the law. Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be
expressly stated in the judgment of conviction.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of CA which dismissed
the petition seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for non-payment of fine in eight
(8) cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22). According to the Information, on
March 26, 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan and his wife Myrna Alapan were charged with eight
(8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Upon arraignment on 1 September 2006, they pleaded not
guilty to the charges. In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from petitioner
Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they would pay the said amount within
three (3) months. To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) post-dated checks.

When the checks matured, the petitioner deposited them at the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter, PNB informed the petitioner that the checks
were dishonored for the reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was closed.
Petitioner immediately informed the respondent of the dishonor of the checks. On their part, the
Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed only on the last week of October 2005
because they suffered business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they were willing to settle
their monetary obligation. Nevertheless, both the MTC and the CA found her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

550
 Whether or not respondent may undergo subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the
fine.

RULING:

NO. The first paragraph of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

“ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with which to
meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall
be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each
eight pesos, subject to the following rules: …”

Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which deals with the execution
and service of penalties, provides:

“ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall be

executed except by virtue of a final judgment.

A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed by law,
nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby.”

It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
the United States of America approved on August 29, 1916, which was still in force when the order
appealed from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due process of law. This
constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code
prescribing that no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. As the fact shows
that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency to pay the fine imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated
in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court could not legally compel him to serve
said subsidiary imprisonment.

A contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned. That subsidiary

imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for, according to article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code, it is imposed upon the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on
account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code from which it may be logically
inferred that an accused may automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case
where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found to be insolvent. Such would be
contrary to the legal provisions above-cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs.
Miranda (2 Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower court fails to impose

551
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for indemnification to the owner of the banca, but
only imposes subsidiary punishment as to the costs. In this respect the judgment is erroneous and
should be modified."

Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should only a fine be imposed and
the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does not sanction
indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the same must still comply with the law.

Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure
to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the
RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.

Wherefore, the petition is denied, and the resolution of CA is confirmed.

552
 CHAPTER FOUR

Application of Penalties

SECTION ONE

Rules for the Application of Penalties to the Persons Criminally Liable and for the
Graduation of the Same

ARTICLE 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
crimes, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Enrile Donio y Untalan

G.R. No. 212815, March 1, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the camapping or on the occasion thereof.

FACTS:

At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle abruptly stopped a few
meters from the checkpoint, headed by SP04 Leodegario Taberdo, causing for the latter and two
other police officers to approach the vehicle. The driver, who was later on identified as Donio,
introduced himself as Raul Layug. He then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license bearing
the said name. The police officers asked the driver and his companions, co-accused Paulino and
Ryan, to bring the vehicle to the checkpoint when they failed to produce its certificate of
registration and the official receipt. Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a
bloodstained mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricycle and the bolo, and then brought the

553
three to the police station. Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the registration papers,
however, he did not return.

Meanwhile on the same day, Rodrigo Layug was searching for his brother Raul, the victim,
who is the driver of the subject vehicle. In search, Rodrigo met with his tricycle driver cousin to
inquire his brother's whereabouts since he has not returned home since last night. His cousin
accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap where they found the remains of Raul. Thereafter, a
tricycle driver informed them that he saw a vehicle similar to Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police
Station. They went to the station and learned that Paulino and Ryan were released. On December
2003, Donio was apprehended and an information was filed against him.

On trial, the trial court convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Donio was guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. To prove special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, it must show that the
original criminal design of the culprit was camapping and that the killing was perpetrated"in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof".

In the case at bench, records show that all the elements of camapping are present; Donio
failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the
police officers when his identity was asked and left under the guise of getting the said documents.
Donio's unexplained possession, therefore, raises the presumption that he was one of the
perpetrators responsible for the unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death. Further, Donio's
intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven as he and his companions were using it as
means of transportation when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers. A
bloodstained mini jungle bolo was also found inside the tricycle, likewise, the victim's lifeless body
was found sprawled with multiple stab wounds. Based on the order of incident, Donio and the others
were in contact with Raul during the approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also, it was
during that period that they gained possession of the vehicle. Thus, it can be concluded that Donio
and his companions, are guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Raul in the course thereof.

554
 Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked permission from the
officers to get the registration papers but never returned. Donio's flight is an indication of his guilt
or of a guilty mind.

555
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Jesusano Arcenal y Aguilan

G.R. No. 216015, March 27, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

FACTS:

At around 11:00 in the evening on April 11, 2000, the victim Alvin de Rama was waiting
behind Jay Flores and the other drivers at the tricycle terminal. Although there were other drivers
waiting in line before him, Alvin left ahead with his lone passenger, Arcenal. Later on, Flores saw
Arcenal alone driving Alvin's tricycle coming from the direction of Forest Park Subdivision. At
6:05 a.m. on April 12, 2000, Alvin was found dead at the Forest Park. With assistance from the
elements of San Pedro PNP, Alvin's father Renato de Rama and SPO3 Rufino Anterola went to the
San Antonio barangay hall to identify the recovered vehicle which was the tricycle driven by Alvin.
The police officers were not able to locate Arcenal, who, according to witnesses, was the last
person seen with the victim. On May 17, 2000, Arcenal pleaded not guilty at his arraignment
arguing that he was staying at his sister Mildred Arcenal's house for a vacation.

On trial, the trial court convicted Arcenal for the crime of carnapping with homicide. It was
found that the presence of his fingerprint on the tricycle established that he took possession of
the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arcenal was guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide beyond
reasonable doubt.

556
RULING:

YES. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof
not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of
the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.

In this case, although there was no eyewitness to the act of killing, the elements of
carnapping as defined and penalized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539 was established when it
was proved that there was unlawful taking of the vehicle; Alvin was found dead on the side of the
road on Forest Park with his tricycle patently missing. When the vehicle was recovered, bloodstains
were noted on the motorcycle and the sidecar, which also proved that the assault happened while
Alvin was in the vehicle or was within its vicinity. The fingerprints, which was confirmed as identical
with Arcenal’s, found on the vehicle not only substantiated the testimonies of Flores and Meras that
he was indeed Alvin's passenger but also established that he had possession of the said vehicle. Also,
Arcenal's fleeing with Alvin's tricycle showed his intent to gain.

Furthermore, the police failed to locate Arcenal after learning from the witnesses that he was
last seen with Alvin and was driving the vehicle alone thereafter. The police even received
information that Arcenal was hiding in Mindoro.

It was held that flight is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind. Therefore, from the
foregoing facts and circumstances Arcenal is guilty of carnapping the tricycle and of killing Alvin in
the course thereof.

557
COMPLEX CRIME OF FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Sandy Domingo y Labis

G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of
the accused is to commit rape.

FACTS:

AAA was waiting for her cousin, when appellant approached and asked if he could
accompany her to her aunt's home, wherein the former agreed. The two boarded a tricycle and as
they were about to leave, appellant brought out a bladed weapon and poked the same on AAA's
right waist. Struck with fear, AAA was unable to ask for help. She realized that they were no
longer proceeding to her aunt's house because the tricycle made a different turn. They stopped at
a place that was not familiar to her and brought her to a house. Thereafter, AAA and the appellant
entered into a room where the latter ordered the former to undressed. AAA refused, hence the
appellant while still holding the knife, forcibly undressed AAA until the latter was completely
naked. From there, the appellant committed raped on the said victim.

On trial, appellant denied the incident and claimed that AAA was his girlfriend. However,
the trial court convicted him of the crime of forcible abduction with rape. On appeal, the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.

RULING:

558
 NO. There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the
accused is to commit rape.

In this case, although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should be
convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his
real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape.

Therefore, where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was
to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape.

559
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE

People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez

G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The phrase "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof" clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of
analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of
the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original
criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."

FACTS:

On the evening February 18, 2007, Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish
Mae Cervantes were at Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, aboard Frank's motorcycle. When
they were about to leave the place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly
approached them, followed by a third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the three
men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank. The same man pointed his gun at Kathlyn and
demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit
her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and saw that the men searched
the body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident was taking place, the second man took
Frank's motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as
the look-out. They all left together riding Frank's motorcycle. According to Dr. Gene Patrick De
Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the neck area which necessitated surgery.
Frank died on March 30, 2007. Information was filed against Jeffery Macaranas, Richard Lalata
and a certain John Doe for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Macaranas testified in his
defense that on that day, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father
Erning Macaranas' house According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day and
just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June, 2007,

560
barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they beat and mauled him in order to admit that
he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He was sentenced with the penalty
reclusion perpetua. While the case against Richard Lalata was archived as he remained to be at
large since the filing of the Information against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
decision modifying only the amounts of the damages he is liable for.

Hence the present case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the imposing of the RTC of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua considering that there were no alleged and proven aggravating circumstances.

RULING:

NO, the CA is correct in affirming RTC’s decision to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

According to the Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: “Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping… shall,... be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.” The phrase “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof"
clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis
paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to
prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that
the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.

561
 In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the
appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation
upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck
causing his death.

Thus, the RTC is correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua even in the absence of
alleged and proven aggravating circumstances.

562
IN COMPLEX CRIME, ALTHOUGH TWO OR MORE CRIMES ARE COMMITTED, THEY ONLY
CONSTITUTE ONE CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Patrick John Anticla

G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

FACTS:

The accused was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals for the crime
of murder when he using a baseball bat attacked his aunt and her live in partner, and set on fire
the house of the victim causing injury to them and consequently, their deaths. However, the Court
of Appeals changed the imposed penalty by the Regional Trial Court to two separate penalties for
the death of the victims. The accused challenged the said decision assailing that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the lower court failed to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper penalty was imposed by the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled that the proper imposable penalty is one which provided by the Regional
Trial Court when it imposed a penalty proper for a complex crime which is double murder and not
separate counts of murder as provided by the Court of Appeals. In a complex crime, although two or
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a

563
complex crime. Here, the act of the accused in burning the house of the victims which resulted to two
deaths is a complex crime.

564
COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION

Juvy Desmoparan a.ka. "Masyador," vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.

FACTS:

Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of P105,000.00 from Cebu CFI
Community Cooperative by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Mirasol, a loan clerk. He
presented his I.D. from the City Engineer's Office bearing the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura." The
accused submitted the following documents, namely: a) application for membership form of CFI;
b) SPA coupled with interest; c) deed of assignment; d) certification from the City Human
Resource Office; e) certificate of employment from the City Human Resource Office; f) service
record; and g) promissory note.

Desmoparan also presented his I.D. bearing the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Perocho,
Cashier/Teller of CFI. Perocho released to him the cash advances. However, the real Rodulfo
Cordura went to CFI to verify the information that somebody had fraudulently applied for a salary
loan. Cordura then requested an investigation.

Arden Sinco, branch manager of CFI, and his team caught one Mercado using the name and
credentials of a certain Aldrin John Z. Catan to apply for a loan. During the investigation, Mercado
revealed that it was Desmoparan who recruited him to submit bogus loan applications with CFI.
Desmoparan was eventually apprehended. He was charged with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents.

The RTC finds the accused, Juvy Desmoparan a.k.a. "Masyador," guilty of the offense of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The CA denied the motion for lack of
merit.

565
ISSUE:

Whether or not Desmoparan committed a complex crime of estafa through falsification of

commercial documents.

RULING:

YES. The falsification of loan documents was a necessary means to commit estafa. In general,
the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b)
by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
the offended party or third person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to
his legal injury.

In the instant case, Desmoparan used the falsified documents bearing the name and
qualifications of Cordura in fraudulently applying for a salary loan, which resulted in the eventual
release and withdrawing of the cash advance amounting to a total of P40,000.00 from CFI. Clearly,
Desmoparan employed deceit by falsifying loan documents in order to take hold of the money and,
thereafter, convert it to his own personal use and benefit, resulting in the damage and prejudice of
CFI and Cordura.

It must be emphasized anew that when the offender commits on a public, official, or
commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex
crime. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of a complex crime. A
complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or
to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.

In Domingo vs. People, the court held that falsification of a commercial document may be a
means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated; damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document.
In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually, utilizing that falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.

In this case, Desmoparan could not have succeeded in getting hold of the money without
falsifying the loan documents bearing the name and qualifications of Cordura, and make it appear
that he is actually the real Cordura. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit

566
estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to
defraud CFI.

567
COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

Florendo B. Arias vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 237106-07, June 10, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another. In a
complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public, Official or Commercial Document,
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another. The falsification is already
consummated, and it is the defraudation which causes damage or prejudice to another
that constitutes estafa.

FACTS:

Reimbursements were claimed and paid by DPWH in an amount totaling millions of pesos
covering 409 transactions purportedly for the emergency repairs of 39 DPWH service vehicles. Of
the 409 transactions, 274 transactions were made in the name of accused Martinez for which the
total sum of P5,166,539.00 were claimed and paid as reimbursements. The spare parts were
purportedly supplied by J-CAP Motorshop, owned by accused Capuz, and DEB Repair Shop and
Parts Supply owned by accused Dela Cruz. The transactions are covered by Disbursement
Vouchers with supporting documents to justify the release of checks. Of the 39 service vehicles,
only the Mitsubishi L300 was assigned to accused Martinez. The others were assigned to other
agencies or officials of the DPWH.

Arias, an OIC Assistant Director of the Bureau of Equipment, affixed his signature
approving and recommending approval of the falsified Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste
Materials, Requisitions for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE) and Certificates of Emergency
Purchase.

The Sandiganbayan found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa through
falsification of public documents under Article 315, in relation to Article 171 and Article 48, of the
Revised Penal Code.

568
ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Arias to estafa through falsification of public document proper?

RULING:

YES. All the elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial
Documents were established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) there must be a
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage. In this case, certain funding requirements were set forth by the DPWH for the payment of
claims for emergency repairs of DPWH service vehicles. It was proven that except for the Cash
Invoices issued by the suppliers, the documents required under the DPWH Memorandum, were
prepared, accomplished and signed by all the public officials concerned, taking advantage of their
official positions in making untruthful statements in the narration of facts. The said documents were
made to appear that the 39 service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or required purchase of
spare parts. In addition, in order to claim payment from DPWH, the Disbursement Vouchers were
also falsified to justify the release of checks. Hence, all the elements of the crime are present.

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another crime
like Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the
same law. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another. In a complex crime of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public, Official or Commercial Document, the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another. The falsification is already consummated, and it is the
defraudation which causes damage or prejudice to another that constitutes estafa.

569
FACTS SHOWING COMPLEX CRIMES

People of the Philippines vs. Anthony Mabalo

G.R. No. 238839, February 27, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under
Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes, a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense by a special law.

FACTS:

In 2008, Mabalo was charged with rape under Article 266-A paragraph l(a) of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 after he allegedly raped AAA, a 14-year old minor.
According to the appellant, he was shocked to learn that he was being accused of raping AAA and
could not think of any reason why he was implicated in the said crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant Mabalo was properly charged with the above crime.

RULING:

NO. The Court instructs that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged
with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph l(d)) of the Revised Penal Code; but, he cannot be accused of both crimes. Otherwise, his
right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. Neither can these two (2) crimes be complexed.
Without the Certificate of Live Birth and other means by which AAA's age as alleged in the
Information could have been ascertained beyond doubt, the Supreme Court was constrained to
agree with the Court of Appeals and deem the crime committed as Simple Rape.

570
COMPLEX CRIME DOES NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

Neptali P. Salcedo vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 223869-960, February 13, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of official/public documents, the
RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a capital offense. Otherwise, the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in
Republic Act No. 7659.

FACTS:

In 2011, ninety-two (92) informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan indicting
petitioner Salcedo for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents
and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Sometime in 2013, Salcedo posted bail. In 2014,
however, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking the admission of
amended informations for the substitution of the phrase "NO BAIL RECOMMENDED" to the
original "BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED”. The Sandiganbayan granted the admission of the
Amended Informations. Salcedo filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and averred that the
penalty for malversation through falsification is not reclusion perpetua but reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua and thus, he should be allowed to post bail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Salcedo is entitled to bail.

RULING:

571
 YES. At the outset, record shows that the issue of the denial of Salcedo's right to bail has been
rendered moot after the Sandiganbayan granted his motion in accordance with the pronouncements
in People vs. Valdez. In said case, the Supreme Court declared that an accused charged with the
complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents that
involves an amount in excess of P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Falsification, like
an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail
proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime
since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of
committing malversation. It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and
grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed.

Likewise, it is unjust to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's

constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even considered as
inherently grievous, odious and hateful. If truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already
considered it as a special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with
homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

572
PENALTY OF COMPLEX CRIMES

People of the Philippines vs. Glecerio Pitulan Briones

G.R. No. 226486, January 22, 2020

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty for a complex crime is
the maximum penalty of the graver offense.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso.
The Prosecution alleged that on April 20, 2003 the group of PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and PO1
Monteroso aboard their marked police patrol mobile responded to a report of a group of armed
men aboard a Hyundai van acting suspiciously along General Avenue, Quezon City. When the
officers arrived at the location and spotted the vehicle. They ordered the van to halt. However, the
van gave chase instead until the officers overtook and blocked its path along Road 20. The officers
ordered the passengers to step out of the vehicle to which all of them complied except the driver,
the accused-appellant. This caused PO1 Monteroso to open the door opposite the driver to check
up on him only to be shot thrice to the chest by the accused-appellant. This led to a wrestle
among the officers and the assailants which resulted to P01 De Vera being shot. The accused-
appellant attempted then to escape only to encounter PO3 Cortez and his team. The latter
ordered them to stop and attempted to approach the former. However, the accused-appellant
open fired at him which caused the officers to fire back. There was a shoot-out that ensued and
one of the officers hit the van’s left tire. The van then hit an island at the intersection of Visayas
Avenue and Congressional avenue. The other van passengers turned out dead and only the
accused-appellant was arrested.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied that he was the driver and claimed that he
was sleeping in the van and was only awakened by the shootout, where he sustained wounds that
caused him to fall unconscious on the floor of the van. The next thing he knew, he was already in
the hospital or so he claims.

The RTC and the CA found him guilty of direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso,
citing treachery as a qualifying circumstance. In his appeal he argues that the Prosecution failed

573
to prove the corpus delicti of the crime by failing to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing and to
present the murder weapon.

ISSUE:

What is the appropriate penalty given this complex crime?

RULING:

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty for a complex crime is the
maximum penalty of the graver offense. Thus, the proper penalty to be imposed for the complex
crime of direct assault with homicide is reclusion temporal.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is MODIFIED to guilty of complex crime of direct assault
with homicide.

574
COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS

Hilario P. Soriano vs. People of The Philippines

G.R. No. 240458, January 8, 2020

Reyes, J. Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

The complex crime of estafa through falsification of documents is committed when

the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit estafa.

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged of securing an indirect loan from Rural Bank of San Miguel (RBSM)
while being an officer thereof by falsifying loan documents and making it appear that a certain
Virgilio Malang (Malang) obtained the same, and thereafter, converting the proceeds for his
personal gain and benefit.

Principio, witness, testified that he was tasked to ascertain the financial conditions of rural
banks and determine if these banks comply with the banking laws and the regulations, as well as
the directives of the BSP. He became in-charge of RBSM. Upon further investigation, it was
discovered that on June 27, 1997, RBSM released an unsecured loan with a principal amount of
P15,000,000.00 to Malang, without a co-maker and collateral; without approval from the Credit
Committee or the Board of Directors; and through an incomplete loan application, the same being
signed in blank except for the name and address. Principio demanded from petitioner's co-
accused, Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan), RBSM General Manager, to produce the credit folder of the
subject loan. Ilagan furnished Principio the following documents: (a) Loan
Application/Information Sheet, signed in blank and without any information except the name and
address of the alleged borrower; (b) Promissory Note No. 101-97-110 dated June 27, 1997, in the
principal amount of P15,000,000.00, purportedly executed by Malang; (c) Disclosure Statement
on Loan/Credit Transaction, purportedly signed by Malang; and (d) unnumbered Credit Proposal
Report dated May 14, 1997, for spouses Malang, which was prepared, recommended for approval
and signed by Hagan, approved by petitioner as member of the Board of Directors of RBSM, and
does not bear the signatures of the majority of the Board of Directors of RBSM.

575
 Malang, however, denied having applied for and received any proceeds of the said loan.
This was corroborated by an Affidavit executed by Hagan. The RTC rendered finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner's guilt in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000 for the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents proved beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of

committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being
an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually, utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.

Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation." "[D]eceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
it to his legal injury."

As in this case, the crime of falsification was already consummated, and the falsified
documents were, thereafter, used to defraud the bank to release money purportedly to Malang.
Records show that the elements of estafa obtain in this case. Petitioner falsely represented that
Malang pursued the loan application and promissory note that were signed in blank through
petitioner's prodding; and orchestrating the whole process until he, with his now deceased co-
accused Ilagan, succeeded in withdrawing the proceeds thereof from RBSM, coursing them through
MRBTI and Land Bank, and thereafter applying the same to his previous irregular loans also with
RBSM. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit to acquire money, on another person's account, and use
the same for his personal use and benefit, which resulted to the damage and prejudice of the RBSM
in the amount of P14,775,000.00.

576
 SECTION TWO

Rules for the Application of Penalties with Regard to the Mitigating and Aggravating
Circumstances, and Habitual Delinquency

ARTICLE 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. — In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of
the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such
compensation.

577
APPLICATION OF A SINGLE INDIVISIBLE PENALTY REGARDLESS OF MITIGATING OR
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
People of The Philippines vs. Abenir Brusola Baragwa

G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 63 provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

FACTS:

Abenir (father) and Delia's (mother) children, Joanne, Abegail, and Kristofer, testified that
they, together with their parents and other sister Jessica, were at home when Joanne noticed that
her father seemed restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir hit Delia on the head with a maso. A
second blow hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled, "Tay!" and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he
did it. When Kristofer awoken and emerged from the bedroom, he saw his father still holding the
maso while his sisters Joanne and Abigail were attending to Delia, who was on the floor and had
blood on her head. Delia was rushed to the hospital by their neighbors. Abenir was brought to the
police station. The next day, their neighbor Joy Tabarno informed the Brusola siblings that Delia
had passed away.

The trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide,
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This prompted Abenir to appeal on the ground that
the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of passion, obfuscation, and
voluntary surrender. The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this case to the Supreme Court
mainly on the issue of the applicable penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper.

RULING:

578
 YES. Indeed, Article 64 of the RPC provides that, in cases in which the penalties prescribed by
law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77,
the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether
there are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances
are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period
that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.

However, there is no basis to apply Article 64 to the crime of parricide. Considering that the
penalty for parricide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties—reclusion perpetua to death—Rule 63,
and not Rule 64, is applicable.

Article 63 provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it
shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed.

Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

579
FACTS WHICH SHOW THE APPLICATION OF A SINGLE INDIVISIBLE PENALTY

People of the Philippines vs. Pablo Luad Armodia

G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating

circumstances of minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would
still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
"in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed."

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Pablo Luad Armodia (accused-appellant) and his wife, BBB, had three
(3) children, the oldest of whom was AAA. They have a makeshift room beside the piggery they
own located in Cambanay, Danao City, Cebu which served as the venue for the material incidents
in this case. The first incident happened in the last week of March 2003 at about 8:00am, she was
then only 16 years old. The second incident happened in the same place on April 4, 2003 at
around 3:00am. The next day, on April 5, 2003, AAA finally revealed everything to her mother,
BBB. On April 6, 2003, AAA and BBB reported the incident to their punong barangay, who
thereafter informed the police. She was brought to Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, then
Southern Island Hospital, for examination. Dr. Elvie Austria (Dr. Austria) examined AAA and
issued a Medical Certificate which stated "Tanner IV, redundant.” and "medical evaluation is
suggestive of abuse." Accused-appellant was arrested on the same day and charged with two (2)
counts of rape of a minor under two (2) separate informations.

Accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the rape charges. On October
21, 2003, the State moved for leave to amend the information and add the phrase, "being the
father of the victim." The Regional Trial Court denied the State's motion, ruling that the requested
amendment was substantial and prejudicial to accused-appellant's right to be informed of the
charges against him. The criminal cases were tried jointly. The State presented three (3)
witnesses: pediatrician Dr. Naomi Poca (Dr. Poca), BBB, and AAA. Defense presented the accused-
appellant as its sole witness. He admitted that AAA was his daughter but denied the rape charges

580
against him. According to him, the criminal cases were filed in retaliation for his strict upbringing
of his children. Accused-appellant added that he was physically incapable of having sexual
intercourse as two (2) years before the first alleged rape, he sustained a gunshot wound on the
right portion of his body. Thus, whenever he had sex, "his wastes would go out of his intestines."

The Regional Trial Court convicted accused-appellant of two (2) counts of simple rape. It
cited People vs. Ilao that “accused cannot be convicted of qualified rape, because of the
prosecution's failure to include the relationship in the information.” The trial court did not give
credence to his defense of physical incapacity, as "his wife BBB testified that they had sexual
congress many times."

Accused-appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that "the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Regional Trial Court's Decision, adding the payment of six percent (6%) legal
interest in the award for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty can be changed given the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of minority and relationship.

RULING:

NO. Even if the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were present, the
appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed."

581
APPLICATION OF GREATER PENALTY WHEN CRIME WITH PRESCRIBED PENALTY OF TWO
INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES IS COMMITTED WITH ONE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Marlon Soriano y Narag

G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when
the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance.

FACTS:

Marlon Narag, nephew of the Spouses Ederlina and Perfecto Narag, went to the house of
the Spouses Narag with a bladed weapon asking Ederlina where Perfecto was. Perfecto was then
71 years old. Upon seeing the weapon, Ederlina shouted, informing Perfecto to close the door to
his room. Before Perfecto could close the door, Marlon stabbed Perfecto. Despite the Spouses plea
to stop, Marlon continued stabbing Perfecto which resulted in his death. Villamor, a tricycle driver
in their employ, heard the screams of Ederlina to which he tried to stop Marlon but failed. When
Marlon tried to stab Villamor, he ran out of the house to where he met Martin, brother of Marlon,
who threatened Villamor not to report the incident to the police. But Villamor nevertheless
reported the same. When the police officers went to the scene of the crime to investigate, they
found a lifeless Perfecto lying in a pool of blood in his room.

Marlon on his defense claimed that there was bad blood between his family and Perfecto’s.
That the latter went to the store near where he was living and yelled asking him to step outside.
When he stepped outside, Perfecto swung his knife which injured his knee. He then ran inside to
grab a chisel and before Perfecto could hurt him again, he stabbed him first. He also said that he
surrendered himself to Brgy. Councilman Lucas who brought him to the police and was
investigated. When Ederlina filed a criminal case against Marlon, he pleaded guilty.

The RTC found Perfecto guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder and found
one (1) qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two (2) generic aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and disrespect to the victim who is already old. RTC also accepted the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

582
Upon appeal, CA sustained the RTC’s decision finding Marlon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua is correct.

RULING:

YES. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. Under this state of facts, the
proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused should be death.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion
perpetua.

Hence, Marlon is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

583
APPLICATION OF LESSER PENALTY

People of the Philippines vs. Isidro Ragasa Sta. Ana alias “Nonoy”

G.R. No. 202863, February 21, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code states that when there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.

FACTS:

AAA, thirteen years old, was left alone in their house. She heard someone trying to open
the room to her door but even before she reached it, Nonoy was able to open it and he was
holding a knife. He had sexual intercourse with AAA four times and threatened to kill her if she
would tell anybody about it. After the incident he tied AAA in the bed, and he left through the
window. When BBB, AAA’s grandmother, got home, she untied AAA and was told by her friend,
Dongking, that he saw Nonoy coming out from the window.

On his defense, Nonoy said that he was staying at home on the day of the incident and that
he did not know AAA, BBB and Dongking.

The RTC finds Nonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape sentencing him
to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but modified the
sentence to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole as the RTC failed to consider the use
of deadly weapon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

RULING:

584
 YES. Pursuant to Art. 266-B of R.A. No. 8353, the penalty that should be imposed upon the
Nonoy is reclusion perpetua to death since the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon.
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code states that when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

Hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

585
APPLICATION OF LESSER PENALTY WHEN NO MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES

People of the Philippines vs. Nelson Nuyte y Asma

G.R. No. 219111, March 12, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 63 of the RPC finds application in that, when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of a deed, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed.

FACTS:

Nelson Nuyte, 29-years old and husband of Rowena Nuyte, was charged with six separate
information – one count of rape and five counts of violation of R.A. 7610 filed by AAA, a 14-year
old. All 6 acts done by Nelson, AAA testified that she was at knife point and the former warned
her that if she tells her mother, she will kill them both. DDD, sister of Rowena, fetched BBB and
CCC, AAA’s parents, alleging that Nelson was raping AAA.

On Nelson Nuyte’s defense, he raised that he and AAA was in a relationship for more than
a year and what occurred between him and AAA was consensual sex.

RTC find Nelson Nuyte guilty beyond reasonable doubt for one (1) count of rape under
Article 266-A paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and five (5) counts of violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No, 7610 and
likewise meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in
its medium period as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period as maximum.

CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

586
RULING:

YES. Article 63 of the RPC finds application in that, when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of a deed, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.

In the case at bar, there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information
and proven during the trial, hence, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant by the
trial court and affirmed by the appellate court is proper.

587
ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In
cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single
divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a
period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for
the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are
not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:

1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they
shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
reasonably offset those of one class against the other according to their relative
weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the
courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law, in its
maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.

588
OFFSETTING OF MITIGATING AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Marlon Soriano y Narag

G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender offsets one generic aggravating circumstance, thus leaving one more generic
aggravating circumstance.

FACTS:

Marlon Narag, nephew of the Spouses Ederlina and Perfecto Narag, went to the house of
the Spouses Narag with a bladed weapon asking Ederlina where Perfecto was. Perfecto was then
71 years old. Upon seeing the weapon, Ederlina shouted, informing Perfecto to close the door to
his room. Before Perfecto could close the door, Marlon stabbed Perfecto. Despite the Spouses plea
to stop, Marlon continued stabbing Perfecto which resulted in his death. Villamor, a tricycle driver
in their employ, heard the screams of Ederlina to which he tried to stop Marlon but failed. When
Marlon tried to stab Villamor, he ran out of the house to where he met Martin, brother of Marlon,
who threatened Villamor not to report the incident to the police. But Villamor nevertheless
reported the same. When the police officers went to the scene of the crime to investigate, they
found a lifeless Perfecto lying in a pool of blood in his room.

Marlon on his defense claimed that there was bad blood between his family and Perfecto’s.
That the latter went to the store near where he was living and yelled asking him to step outside.
When he stepped outside, Perfecto swung his knife which injured his knee. He then ran inside to
grab a chisel and before Perfecto could hurt him again, he stabbed him first. He also said that he
surrendered himself to Brgy. Councilman Lucas who brought him to the police and was
investigated. When Ederlina filed a criminal case against Marlon, he pleaded guilty.

The RTC found Perfecto guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder and found
one (1) qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two (2) generic aggravating circumstances
of dwelling and disrespect to the victim who is already old. RTC also accepted the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

589
Upon appeal, CA sustained the RTC’s decision finding Marlon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court was correct in appreciating the circumstances present in
the case.

RULING:

YES. Applying the provision of paragraph 4, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender offsets one generic aggravating circumstance, thus
leaving one more generic aggravating circumstance.

Here, only one qualifying circumstance of treachery with the two (2) generic aggravating
circumstances were proved. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659 murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties.

590
PROPER PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED

People of the Philippines vs. Michael A. Belludo and John Doe

G.R. No. 219884, October 17, 2018

A. Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium period (Art.64, RPC).

FACTS:

Accused was convicted by the Regional Trial Court and the Courts of Appeal of murder for
the killing of Francisco “Paco” Ojeda, while he and an unidentified driver of the motorcycle shoot
the victim on the back of the head causing the death of the same. The accused challenged the
conviction, consequently, the proper penalty imposable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper penalty was given.

RULING:

NO, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court downgrades the
conviction to the crime of homicide. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in
degree is prision mayor with a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

591
PROPER PENALTY IN THE ATTENDANCE OF A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Romero Aseniero

G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Pursuant to Article 64(2), when only a mitigating circumstance attended the

commission of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period.

FACTS:

On August 23, 2003, at about 2:00 in the morning, Dominador Ranes, Mario Pelago, Analyn
Gomez and Mira Pagay were occupying one table at the dance hall. The accused, Romeo Aseniero,
was occupying a different table. At about 5:00 in the morning, Roel Pilo left the dancing hall
together with the group of Dominador Ranes. Loreto Gomez Papa also left the dance hall, together
with his two cousins and the accused, Romeo. On their way home, the group of Dominador passed
by a road in Brgy. Imelda, Bato, Leyte and were walking ahead of Loreto’s group at a distance of
about 10 arms-length. Since the road was too narrow, Dominador’s group did not walk side by
side. Mira Pagay trailed first, followed by Mario Pelago, then Roel Pilo, and behind him were
Dominador Ranes and Analyn Gomez.

According to Loreto, Analyn Gomez and the accused were still sweethearts and have not
broken up yet, but they were quarreling at that time. When the accused saw Analyn, he tried to go
after her and her companion. When the accused approached Analyn, he was kicked by Dominador.
Instantly, Dominador unsheathed his knife and Romeo, in tum, unsheathed his bolo.

Suddenly, Dominador shouted "Aray" (Ouch!). At that instant, Dominador run past Roel
followed by the accused Romeo Aseniero, who was carrying a long bolo. More or less four (4)
meters from where he was, Dominador stumbled, with his back on the ground. The accused
caught up with the victim and hacked him multiple times.

The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing of the victim and was thus guilty of
murder. It also held that although the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities,
such mitigating circumstance cannot be applied to lower an indivisible penalty. The CA affirmed

592
the ruling of the RTC but has mentioned that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Hence this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance can be applied in lowering the imposition of
his penalty.

RULING:

YES. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following
requisites must be established: first, the accused has not been arrested; second, the accused
surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and third, the surrender is
voluntary. The said requisites were sufficiently proven by the defense. Given that Romeo voluntarily
surrendered, Article 64(2) states that when only a mitigating circumstance attended the commission
of the felony, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Thus, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, while the
minimum penalty shall be prision mayor in any of its periods.

593
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES WITH THREE PERIODS ABSENT MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES

Edwin Del Rosario vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that in cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, and there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty imposable shall be in its medium period.

FACTS:

Charlotte Diane Evangelista Casiano and Kim Evangelista Casiano were on a jeepney going
to G-Mall when the necklace of Charlotte got snatched by Roxan, who was also riding the same
jeepney, with Edwin. Roxan was apprehended and provided information to the police that his
companion is a bald person. At the police station, Charlottle and Kim identified Edwin as the bald
person who was the companion of Roxan in the alleged robbery of Italian Gold Necklace with
pendant worth P18,000.00.

The RTC convicted Edwin of the crime charged. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance and pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty, ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day, prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as maximum.

Aggrieved, Edwin appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Edwin,
however, modified the penalty imposed on the prison term which shall be six (6) months of
arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum by the CA is correct.

594
RULING:

NO. Under Republic Act No. 10951, which was promulgated on August 29, 2017, Article 309(4)
of the Revised Penal Code has been relevantly amended as follows:

ART. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

x x x x

Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccionalin its minimum

period, if the value of the property stolen is over Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) but does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000).

Accordingly, the Court modifies the penalty. Article 309(4) provides that the penalty shall be
arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, which consist of
the following periods:

(a) MINIMUM – arresto mayor in its medium period, that is from two (2)
months and one (1) day to four (4) months;

(b) MEDIUM – arresto mayor in its maximum period, that is four (4) months
and one (1) day to six (6) months; and

(c) MAXIMUM – prision correccional in its minimum period, that is six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.

Pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
the penalty imposable shall be in its medium period. Hence, the imposable penalty is arresto mayor
in its maximum period, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) months.

595
ARTICLE 66. Imposition of Fines. — In imposing fines, the courts may fix any amount
within the limits established by law; in fixing the amount in each case attention shall be
given, not only to the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to
the wealth or means of the culprit.

IMPOSITION OF PENALTY OF FINE FOR LIBEL CASES

Medel Belen vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court finds it appropriate to increase the fine imposed upon petitioner from
Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), considering the
following peculiar circumstances of the case: (1) then a practicing lawyer himself,
petitioner ignored the rules that in his professional dealings, a lawyer shall not use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, and should treat other
lawyers with courtesy, fairness and candor; (2) the barrage of defamatory statements in
his Omnibus Motion are utterly irrelevant to his prayers for a reconsideration of the
dismissal of his estafa case and for the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from
further acting thereon; (3) the baseless and scurrilous personal attacks in such public
document do nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of ACP Suñega-Lagman, as
well as undermine the faith and confidence of litigants in the prosecutorial service; and (4)
the lack of remorse on his part, as shown by his unfounded claim that he filed the Omnibus
Motion in self-defense to ACP Suñega-Lagman's supposed imputation of falsification
against him without due process of law.

FACTS:

On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 04-312 and assigned to then
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman for preliminary investigation.
Petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing. Without acting on the request, ACP Suñega-

596
Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the
dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify),
the contents of which later became the subject of this libel case.

Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary
of Justice, Manila. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the said office are first received
and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the records section before referral to the
City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor. ACP Suñega-Lagman first
learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen, the son of Nezer who the
respondent in the estafa complaint is. She was also informed about the motion by Joey Flores, one
of the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked the receiving section for a copy of the said
motion and requested a photocopy of it for her own reference.

ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for libel on the basis of
the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). Since ACP Suñega-
Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited itself
from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its records
to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable cause to file a libel case
against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court
entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1)
complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2) Michael Belen, the son and representative of respondent
Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores and Gayne Gamo Enseo, who are part of the
administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. The defense presented the accused petitioner as
its sole witness.

The trial court found the petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P3,000.00, with no pronouncement as to damages on account of ACP Suñega-Lagman's
reservation to file an independent civil action against him. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in imposing the penalty of fine amounting to P3,000.00 upon
the petitioner.

RULING:

597
 YES, the Court finds it proper to modify the penalty of fine of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) imposed upon petitioner.

The Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of
Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases, sets down the rule of preference on the
matter of imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:

This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the
crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

1. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of
justice;

2. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is
no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on
subsidiary imprisonment.

The penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from P200.00 to
P6,000.00, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. The
Court finds it appropriate to increase the fine imposed upon petitioner from Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), considering the following peculiar circumstances of
the case: (1) then a practicing lawyer himself, petitioner ignored the rules that in his professional
dealings, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, and
should treat other lawyers with courtesy, fairness and candor; (2) the barrage of defamatory
statements in his Omnibus Motion are utterly irrelevant to his prayers for a reconsideration of the
dismissal of his estafa case and for the disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting
thereon; (3) the baseless and scurrilous personal attacks in such public document do nothing but
damage the integrity and reputation of ACP Suñega-Lagman, as well as undermine the faith and
confidence of litigants in the prosecutorial service; and (4) the lack of remorse on his part, as shown
by his unfounded claim that he filed the Omnibus Motion in self-defense to ACP Suñega-Lagman's
supposed imputation of falsification against him without due process of law.

598
PREFERENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE PENALTIES

Mark Montelibano vs. Linda Yap

G.R. No. 197475, December 6, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

While petitioner's conviction is affirmed, this Court deems it proper to impose a

fine instead of the penalty of imprisonment meted by the MTCC and sustained by the RTC,
in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the application of
the penalties provided for in BP Blg. 22.

The Court has held that the policy of redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness should
be considered in favor of an accused who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mark Montelibano allegedly obtained a loan from private complainant Linda
Yap as additional capital for his business. Thereafter, petitioner issued a Metrobank - Cebu
Guadalupe Branch check dated May 31, 2001 in the amount of ₱2,612,500.003 (the check) as
partial payment. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored for because the
account was closed.

As petitioner failed to settle his obligation despite demands, he was charged with
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP Blg. 22).

The MTCC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because
the prosecution's failure to personally identify the petitioner during hearing can be attributed to
petitioner's failure to appear despite due notice. The decision was affirmed in toto by the RTC.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, but the petition was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

599
 Whether or not Montelibano should be convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.

RULING:

YES, Montelibano should be convicted for violation of BP Blg. 22. While petitioner's
conviction is affirmed, this Court deems it proper to impose a fine instead of the penalty of
imprisonment meted by the MTCC and sustained by the RTC, in view of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,
establishing a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in BP Blg. 22.

The Court has held that the policy of redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness should be considered in favor
of an accused who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. Here, there is no
indication that petitioner is a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. Forbearing to impose
imprisonment would also not depreciate the seriousness of the offense, or work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice.

Wherefore, the conviction of petitioner Mark Montelibano is affirmed with the following
modifications: The penalty of imprisonment is deleted. Instead, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of
P200,000.00, subject to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10159. Petitioner is also ordered to pay the
private complainant the amount of P2,612,500.00, at six percent (6%) legal interest per annum
from the date of finality of herein judgment until fully paid.

600
 TITLE FOUR

Extinction of Criminal Liability and of Civil Liability Resulting from Crime

CHAPTER ONE

Extinction of Criminal Liability

SECTION ONE

Total Extinction of Criminal Liability

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.

601
EFFECTS OF THE DEATH OF AN ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL

People of the Philippines vs. Porferio Culas y Raga

G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Corollary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (1) Law, (2) Contracts, (3) Quasi-
contracts, (4) x x x (5) Quasi-delicts.

FACTS:

In a Resolution dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision dated July 25, 2013 of
the CA finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Statutory Rape.

However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued, the Court received a Letter dated
September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's
death on February 8, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death attached thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Raga can be convicted of the crime charged.

RULING:

NO. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

602
 Corollary, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-delicts.

Where the civil liability survives, as explained above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in
connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in
which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.

603
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Agapito Dimaala

G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Accused’s civil liability based on
sources other than the subject delict survives.

FACTS:

Accused was found guilty of murder by the RTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. Accused then filed a notice of appeal from the CA’s decision, but later on decided to
withdraw his appeal with prayer for immediate issuance of entry of judgment, which SC granted
in its Resolution dated September 21, 2016. Thereafter, SC declared the finality of the aforesaid
Resolution and issued an Entry of Judgment. However, the accused died on August 23, 2016 at the
New Bilibid Prison.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused are extinguished.

RULING:

YES. It is settled that the death of the accused prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89, RPC provides that “by the death of the
convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.” In view of the development of the
case, the criminal action, as well as the civil action for recovery of the civil liability ex delicto, is ipso
facto extinguished.

604
EFFECTS OF THE DEATH OF AN ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL

People of the Philippines vs. Pala Toukyo y Padep

G.R. No. 225593, March 20, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed.

FACTS:

Tokyou delivered one piece of marijuana, a dangerous drug, in brick form wrapped in
brown packaging tape weighing 1,000 grams, to Agent Ryan Peralta, a member of the PDEA-CAR
who acted as poseur buyer, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug.

On November 23, 2010, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Toukyo of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs. On March 6, 2012, the RTC found Toukyo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA modified Toukyo's conviction that since no actual
transaction took place before Toukyo's arrest, he cannot be convicted of the crime of Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs. This notwithstanding, the CA convicted Toukyo of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Hence, the instant appeal.

The Director General of Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that Toukyo had already
died on October 15, 2014.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Toukyo can be convicted of the crime charged.

RULING:

605
 NO. Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Corollary, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.

Upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. Notably, there is no civil liability
that arose from this case, there being no private complainant to begin with.

Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby dismissed.

606
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Allan Jao y Calonia and Rogeliio Catitig y Robio

G.R. No. 225634, June 7, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

FACTS:

A police team planned a buy-bust operation after an informant notified them that Jao was
engaged in the sale of shabu. The planned transaction had occurred and arrested Jao. Thereafter,
when Special Investigator Manzanaris was about to prepare the inventory of the seized items, Jao
suddenly and voluntarily informed the policemen that Catigtig was his source of contraband and
agreed to cooperate for the latter's arrest. They instructed Jao to call Catigtig to order sachets
of shabu, to which the latter agreed to deliver. When Catigtig arrived, the operation was executed.
The other policemen then rushed into the scene and arrested Catigtig.

On trial, the trial court found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the appellate court, where the latter
affirmed the decisions of lower court, hence this petition. However, Catigtig had already
died pending appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Catigtig's criminal lability, in view of his supervening death pending
appeal, remains.

RULING:

607
 NO. The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

In this case, while Jao's criminal liability remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with
respect to Catigtig in view of his supervening death pending appeal. Upon Catigtig's death pending
appeal of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused.

As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared closed and
terminated.

608
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY DEATH

People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y Lantayan
alias "Jon-Jon"

G.R. No. 208651, March 14, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the accused.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court issued a judgment finding appellant Antido guilty of the crime of Rape.
However, before this was promulgated, the Court was notified that appellant had died and this
was evidenced by his Certificate of Death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the appellant before promulgation of the judgment
extinguished his criminal liability.

RULING:

YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused,
to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

609
 By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment[.]

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.

610
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY DEATH

People of the Philippines vs. Marcelino Crispo y Descalso alias "Gogo" and Enrico Herrera y
Montes

G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.

FACTS:

Two Informations were filed involving the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The
accused therein are herein appellants Crispo and Herrera. They were convicted by the Regional
Trial Court and this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. They appealed further.
However, appellant Herrera died during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused Herrera pending appeal extinguished his criminal
liability.

RULING:

YES. Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the consequences of Herrera's
death are as follows:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is

totally extinguished:

611
 By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Thus, upon Herrera's death pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action against him is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused. As such, the criminal case against him is hereby dismissed, and
declared closed and terminated.

612
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY DEATH

People of the Philippines vs. Wendalino Andes y Cas A.K.A. Windalino Andes y Cas

G.R. No. 217031, August 14, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the accused.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court issued a Resolution dated November 10, 2015 affirming with
modification the conviction of herein appellant Andes by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless,
appellant still moved for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution dated June
20, 2016.

Before an Entry of Judgement was issued, the Supreme Court was notified that appellant
had died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case against the appellant should be dismissed by reason of his death.

RULING:

YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

613
 Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in
connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in
which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules.

614
HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS TOTALLY EXTINGUISHED

People of the Philippines vs. Norieto Monroyo y Mahaguay

G.R. No. 223708, October 9, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished
by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.

FACTS:

This is an automatic review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and
one count of Qualified Rape.

Accused-appellant timely moved for reconsideration. However, in a letter dated November

23, 2018, Chief Correction Superintendent Richard W. Schwarzkopf, Jr. of the Bureau of
Corrections informed the court that the accused-appellant had already died on August 15, 2018
as evidenced by a copy of the Death Report signed by the Bilibid Prison Hospital’s Medical Officer
Dr. Benevito A. Fontanilla.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused-appellant is extinguished.

RULING:

Yes. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant’s death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

615
FACTS THAT SHOW HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS EXTINGUISHED

People of the Philippines vs. Susan Sayo And Alfredo Roxas

G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

How criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

FACTS:

AAA, BBB, and CCC known as the "plaza girls" disclosed that they have been under the
control and supervision of SAYO as commercial sex workers. AAA testified in open court that she
was only fifteen years old at the time she began working for SAYO. Same is true with BBB. The
"plaza girls" were introduced to SAYO by other "plaza girls." SAYO then started to act as a pimp for
a certain percentage. Whenever they have customers, SAYO would bring them either to a motel or
to ALFREDO ROXAS's house who provides them a room for a price.

The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Women and Children Complaint Division
CIDG-WCCD received a letter from the International Justice Mission requesting for police
assistance on the possible rescue of three minors exploited for prostitution. The "Oplan Sagip
Angel" operatives proceeded to the target area in Pasig City. After the negotiation, all of them
proceeded to the house of Roxas, who openly discussed with Sayo regarding the transaction.

The undercover agents, Sayo and Roxas talked about the payment for the girls' services.
When the Nine Hundred Pesos was handed by one of the customers to Sayo, the CIDG-WCCO
agents announced that it was a raid. The back-up operatives who were deployed rushed towards
them and arrested Sayo and Roxas.

RTC found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. 9208, insofar
as minor’s AAA and BBB are concerned. As for complainant CCC who was no longer a minor, both
accused were found guilty of the offense of trafficking in persons under R.A. 9208. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications.

616
ISSUE:

Whether or not Sayo is still criminally and civilly liable for the offenses she committed.

RULING:

NO. At the outset, the Court notes that Sayo had already died. Thus, the death of Sayo
extinguished her criminal liability. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

Likewise, the civil liability of Sayo arising from her criminal liability is extinguished upon her
death. The rules on the effect of the death of the accused on civil liability pending appeal are
summarized in People vs. Bayotas:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

617
 e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section I, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

Applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of Sayo extinguished her
criminal and civil liability inasmuch as she is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action is also extinguished, as it is grounded on the criminal action.

618
TOTAL EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY THE DEATH OF ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Magtuloy Santiago

G.R. No. 228819, July 24, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

FACTS:

In a Resolution dated September 4, 2017, the Court affirmed the Decision dated July 5,
2016 of the CA finding accused-appellant Jeffrey Magtuloy Santiago guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.

However, it appears that based on a letter dated June 13, 2017 from the Bureau of
Corrections, Santiago had already died on October 11, 2016, as evidenced by the Notice issued by
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital and Certificate of Death attached thereto. Notably, this means that
Santiago had already passed away during the pendency of the criminal case against him, since the
same was resolved by the Court only through the aforesaid Resolution dated September 4, 201 7,
which attained finality on December 6, 2017.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of Jeffrey Magtuloy Santiago should have
been extinguished by his death during the pendency of the criminal case against him.

619
RULING:

YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Santiago's death prior to his final conviction by
the Court should have resulted in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as
well as the civil liability, based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto
in senso strictiore."

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x x; e) Quasi-delicts.

620
DEATH OF ACCUSED EXTINGUISHES CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Robles, et. al.

G.R. No. 229943, March 18, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Edgar's death prior to his final conviction
by the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of
the accused.

FACTS:

In a Resolution dated November 19, 2018, the Court adopted the Decision dated November
29,2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01430 finding accused-appellants
Edgar Robles (Edgar) and Wilfredo Robles (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder.

However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in this case, the Court received a
Notice of Death dated January 4, 2019 from accused-appellants’ counsel informing the Court of
Edgar's death on December 15, 2018, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death attached thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether there is need to modify court’s Resolution dismissing criminal case against Edgar.

RULING:

YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Edgar's death prior to his final conviction by
the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

621
 Thus, upon Edgar's death prior to his final conviction, the criminal action against him is
extinguished. Consequently, the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto as to him is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that Edgar's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim may be based
on sources other than delicts; in which case, the victim's heirs may file a separate civil action against
Edgar's estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

622
DEATH OF ACCUSED EXTINGUISHED HIS/HER CRIMINAL LIABILITY

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Gallardo y Barrios

G.R. No. 238748, March 18, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Thus, upon Gallardo's death prior to his final conviction, the criminal actions
against him are extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil actions instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto
are ipso facto extinguished, grounded as they are on the criminal actions.

FACTS:

In a Resolution dated November 19, 2018, the Court affirmed the Decision dated July 17,
2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07547 finding accused-appellant Edgar
Gallardo y Barrios (Gallardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of the crime of
Qualified Rape.

Aggrieved, Gallardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, during the pendency of
such motion, the Court received a letter dated February 20, 2019 from the Bureau of Corrections
informing the Court of Gallardo's death on February 19, 2019 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital,
Muntinlupa City, as evidenced by the Notice dated February 19, 2019 issued by the said hospital
attached thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution dated November 19,
2018 and enter a new one dismissing the criminal cases against Gallardo.

RULING:

623
 YES. Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Gallardo's death prior to his final conviction by
the Court renders dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.

Thus, upon Gallardo's death prior to his final conviction, the criminal actions against him are
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil actions
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto are ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as they are on the criminal actions. However, it is well to clarify that Gallardo's civil
liability in connection with his acts against the victim may be based on sources other than delicts; in
which case, the victim may file a separate civil action against Gallardo's estate, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules.

624
ARTICLE 90. Prescription of Crimes. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusión perpetua or
reclusión temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception
of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be made the
basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of
this article.

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF AFFLICTIVE PENALTIES

Priscilla Z. Orbe vs. Leonora O. Miaral

G.R. No. 217777, August 16, 2017

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code states that crimes punishable by afflictive
penalties, such as the crime of estafa, prescribe in fifteen (15) years.

FACTS:

On March 6, 1996 Leonora O. Miaral agreed to engage in the garment exportation business
with her sister, Priscilla Z. Orbe. They executed a partnership agreement where they agreed to
contribute ₱250,000.00 each to Toppy Co., Inc. and Miaral Enterprises, and to equally divide the
profits they may earn. Petitioner later discovered that there was no exportation of garments to
the United States or any other transactions in the United States that took place. On February 7,

625
2011, petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine before the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City. The OCP of Quezon City issued a Resolution
recommending filing of Information for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code against respondents Leonora O. Miaral and Anne Kristine O. Miaral. The City
Prosecutor later filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Information. The RTC issued an Order
denying the Motion to Withdraw Information and directing the arraignment of respondent and
Anne Kristine. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the assailed Orders of the RTC. It further directed the RTC to issue
an order for the withdrawal of the Information for estafa against respondent and Anne Kristine

ISSUE:

Whether the action for estafa penalized under Article 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
has been barred by prescription.

RULING:

NO, the action for estafa penalized under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code has not yet been barred by prescription.

Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalties of prision mayor and reclusion
temporal are included in the enumeration of afflictive penalties. Furthermore, Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code states that crimes punishable by afflictive penalties, such as the crime of estafa,
prescribe in fifteen (15) years. The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code.

626
ARTICLE 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses. — The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.

INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION PERIOD

People of the Philippines vs. Mateo Lee, Jr.

G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Prescription is one of the modes of totally extinguishing criminal

liability. Prescription of a crime or offense is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to
prosecute an act prohibited and punished by law. On the other hand, prescription of the
penalty is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to punish the convict.

The period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint before the
fiscal's office for purposes of preliminary investigation against the accused.

FACTS:

Mater A. Lee, Jr. a public officer, was charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877,
or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The case was initially filed by his subordinate Diane
Jane M. Paguirigan in the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014. The alleged acts were committed
between February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014 where the accused was alleged to request for
sexual favors from the victim. The information was subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan
on March 21, 2017. Due to this, the accused moved for the dismissal of the case due to the lapse of
prescriptive period.

627
ISSUE:

Whether or not the case was rightfully dismissed due to the lapse of the prescriptive
period.

RULING:

NO. The court held that the case shouldn’t be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Under
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him. In the case of Panguiton v DOJ, the court held that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. In the given case, the case was filed before the Ombudsman on the same year
when the last act was said to be committed. Such violation prescribes in three years. Citing the
court’s previous decisions, the running of the prescription is said to have been interrupted upon
filing of the complaint before the Ombudsman for proper determination of probable cause. It
shouldn’t be attributable to the victim if the Ombudsman took their time before the information was
raised before the Sandiganbayan. Hence, due to the interruption of the running of the prescriptive
period, the case for Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 against Mateo Lee hasn’t prescribed yet
when it was elevated to the Sandiganbayan.

628
 TITLE FIVE

Civil Liability

CHAPTER ONE

Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies

ARTICLE 100. Civil Liability of Person Guilty of Felony. — Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.

CIVIL LIABILITY OF GUILTY PERSON

G.R. No. 216940, December 13, 2017

People of the Philippine vs. Rogelio N. Polangcus

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

As the accused is [criminally] liable, he should [also] be held civilly liable in

accordance with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. There is a need to modify the
damages awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. Appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages. In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages
awarded.

FACTS:

That at around 7:30 o'clock in the evening of June 9, 2010, while the victim Ruperto Huerta
and his sons Fernando and Ronan where in the waiting shed of Brgy. Tinag-an, Albuera, Leyte, he
was shot at the back; that the shot emanated from [the] sugarcane plantation; that in that
instance, Fernando Huerta, immediately looked to the direction where the gun burst emanated,
and he saw a person with a bull cap colored black with white stripes, and wearing an army jacket;
that [he] immediately took the knife of his father and chased the person; that when Fernando
Huerta overtook the person they have a face to face encounter; that the latter attempted to [shoot]

629
him but the firearm malfunctioned, and subsequently, they grappled for the possession of the gun,
but he retreated because the person had companions; that in the course of their encounter
Fernando Huerta was able to stab the person; that the victim was brought to the hospital but [he]
was pronounced dead on arrival; that at about 9:00 o'clock in the same evening the accused went
to Western Leyte District Hospital for treatment of his injury, and the following day he was
identified in the hospital by x x x Fernando Huerta as the person responsible [for] killing his
father; that the accused was the same person Fernando Huerta met face to face in the sugarcane
plantation; that in the same day June 10, 2010, the accused was submitted for paraffin test and
was found positive for the presence of gun powder bum on his right hand.

The RTC held the accused guilty. From the evidence presented and proffered by the
prosecution, there is no doubt that the accused perpetrated the killing of the victim with alevosia.
The victim Ruperto Huerta was facing the road at the time of the shooting, while his back was
exposed absolutely to his attacker without any opportunity to defend himself. The attack was so
sudden and perpetrated in such a manner as to afford impunity to the attacker arising from any
defense that the victim might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and
unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
latter. x x x Otherwise stated, there is treachery when the following conditions concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. x
x x The cited elements exist in this case. As treachery attended the killing of the victim, the
accused is liable for [murder]. As the accused is [criminally] liable, he should [also] be held civilly
liable in accordance with Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. As the prosecution had not
established by preponderance of evidence the other civil liabilities of the accused, this Court
cannot award any other damages except civil indemnity in the amount of Php75,000.00.

The CA however, rejected the appeal, and upheld the RTC's findings and conclusions
relative to the criminal liability of the appellant. It even upgraded the awards for civil liability
against the latter.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in modifying the civil indemnity or the award for
damages.

RULING:

630
 YES. We have carefully reviewed the evidence on record, and we are satisfied that the
findings of facts of both the RTC and the CA are thoroughly supported by the evidence on record.
Both courts are in agreement that the appellant had been positively identified by prosecution
witness Fernando Porlas Huerta (Fernando), a son of the victim, who testified that he in fact had a
face-to-face confrontation or meeting with the appellant at the sugarcane plantation in Brgy. Tinag-
an, Albuera, Leyte, that very evening of June 9, 2010; that this face-to-face encounter or meeting
occurred after he saw the burst of gunfire that caused his father to fall on the ground while his
father, his other brother and he were at the waiting shed that early evening of June 9, 2010; that
armed with his father's knife, he went after a man wearing a hat and an army jacket and who was
the source of the gunfire; that when he caught up with him, he stabbed the man with his father's
knife there at the sugarcane plantation; that the appellant attempted to shoot him (witness
Fernando) but the appellant's gun malfunctioned, and they grappled for possession of the gun; and,
that he did not press his attack against the appellant when he noticed that the latter had a
companion nearby.

All told, the CA's Decision is in accord with the evidence on record and with the law. However,
there is a need to modify the damages awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. Appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded.

631
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Sonny Buenaflor

G.R. No. 210435, August 15, 2018

Reyes Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Under the law, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

FACTS:

An Information for Rape was filed against Ramos. The accusatory portion of the said
Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 2007, [in the] Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with [AAA], against her
will and consent, to her great damage, prejudice and mental anguish.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the victim is entitled to damages.

RULING:

YES. In addition, jurisprudence holds that a victim of rape shall be entitled to an award of
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages. Significantly, the award of civil indemnity
for the commission of an offense stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

632
CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Raul Martinez and Lito Granada

G.R. No. 226394, March 7, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Article 100 of the RPC which states that "every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable."

FACTS:

AAA narrated that she was at home when Martinez barged in, dragged her outside the
house and threatened her 7-year old son, BBB, not to follow them. Then Martinez pulled AAA to a
bushy area where Granada was waiting, and there they took turns in having sexual intercourse
with her. As a result, AAA became pregnant, wherein Martinez offered to give support to the child.
During trial, a social worker and a psychologist testified the mental condition of AAA, revealing
that she does not act in accordance to her age and that she needed assistance in taking care of her
son, BBB. It was also said that even though AAA is aged 35, she nevertheless possessed a mental
ability of a 7-year old child.

Martinez denied the accusations and said that he and AAA engaged in sexual intercourse
as they were sweethearts. Granada likewise denied having raped AAA.

RTC interpreted Martinez's offer to support AAA's child, as a compromise which may be
viewed as an implied admission of guilt. RTC find Martinez and Granada guilty for the crime of
rape beyond, reasonable doubt sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of Php 75,000.00 as moral damages and Php
25,000.00 as exemplary damages. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Is the amount of damages proper?

633
RULING:

NO. The Court deems it necessary to modify the amount of damages awarded by the lower
court. The lower court erred by failing to award, civil indemnity, and for granting a meager sum of
Php 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The award of civil indemnity for the commission of an offense stems from Article 100 of the
RPC which states that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Civil
indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the
victim for the damage or infraction inflicted by the accused. Guided by the foregoing, an award of
civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 should be granted in favor of AAA.

In the present case, the inaction of "AAA" is understandable and may even be expected as she
was scared due to the threat on her and her mother if she would divulge the incident done to her.
Likewise, the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from Php 25,000.00 to Php
75,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence. The importance of awarding the proper amount of
exemplary damages cannot be overemphasized, as this species of damages is awarded to punish the
offender for his outrageous conduct, and to deter the commission of similar dastardly and
reprehensible acts in the future.

Finally, the Court affirms the award of moral damages in the amount of Php 75,000.00.
Notably, in rape cases, once the fact of rape is duly established, moral damages are awarded to the
victim without need of proof, in recognition that the victim necessarily suffered moral injuries from
her ordeal. This serves as a means of compensating the victim for the manifold injuries such as
"physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and
social humiliation" that the she suffered in the hands of her defiler.

634
AWARD OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN A CRIMINAL CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Michelle Parba-Rural

G.R. No. 231884, June 27, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of

monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was
done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Interest is
also imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

FACTS:

The accused Michelle Parba Rural and May Almohan-Daza was convicted by the Court of
Appeals and the RTC for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Nenita Marquez, the victim in this
case was abducted by the appellants together with 4 other persons who demanded money and
jewelry from her in exchange of her freedom. In defense, the accused denied the accusation and
reasoned that it is the victim who approached them and asked for their company since she was
then feeling weak. The accused were captured by the police while attempting to get money from
Lolita inside the bank. The RTC found that the accused was guilty of the crime and penalized her
with reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and are ordered to pay the private
complainant jointly and solidarily the amounts of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages and one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Michelle Parba Rural and May Almohan-Daza are guilty of kidnapping for
ransom.

RULING:

635
 YES. the court held that the accused were guilty of kidnaping for ransom. Under the Revised
Penal Code, kidnapping is committed when any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. In the given case, Nenita, a private person, was deprived of her liberty from the
time she was forcibly taken by the appellants and their companions for the purpose of extorting
money and jewelry from her until she relented to their demands. The court also ordered to pay the
private complainant, jointly and solidarity, the amounts of P100,000.00, as civil indemnity,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in accordance with People
vs. Jugueta, with an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid. In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended
party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Interest is
also imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

636
CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSON GUILTY WITH FELONY

People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Tulagan

G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Anent the award of damages in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, the
Court modify the same in line with the ruling in People vs. Jugueta, where it held that
"when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts
should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages." Also, in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. SCC-6210, Tulagan was charged as follows: That sometime in the
month of September 2011, at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength forcibly laid
complainant AAA,[3] a 9-year-old minor in a cemented pavement, and did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of the said AAA, against her
will and consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7610. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211, Tulagan was charged as follows: That on or about October 8,
2011 at x x x, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with complainant AAA, a 9-year-old minor
against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said AAA, against her will and
consent. Contrary to Article 266-A, par. 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7610.

The RTC finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of rape defined
and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d), in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No.
SCC-6211 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the victim in the amount of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00) pesos; moral damages in the amount of
fifty thousand (Php 50,000.00) pesos, and to pay the cost of the suit. Likewise, this Court finds the

637
accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for the crime of rape
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of thirty thousand
(Php30,000.00) pesos; and moral damages in the amount of twenty thousand (Php20,000.00)
pesos, and to pay the cost of suit.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification Tulagan's conviction of sexual assault and
statutory rape rendering in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 (Rape by Sexual Assault), appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 15 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, are likewise granted. In Criminal Case No. SCC-6211
(Statutory Rape), the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are increased to P100,000.00
each. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, too, are granted. All damages awarded
then are subject to legal interest at the rate of 6% [per annum] from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the award of damages or civil liability of
the accused.

RULING:

YES. The instant appeal has no merit. However, a modification of the nomenclature of the
crime, the penalty imposed, and the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual
assault, and a reduction of the damages awarded in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape,
are in order.

Pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. Hence, as to the civil liability in Criminal Case No. SCC-6210 for sexual assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, Tulagan
should, therefore, pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Anent the award of damages in Criminal Case No. SCC-6211 for statutory rape, the Court
modify the same in line with the ruling in People vs. Jugueta, where it held that "when the
circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being

638
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages." Also, in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.

Pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.

639
 CHAPTER TWO

What Civil Liability Includes

ARTICLE 106. Reparation — How Made. — The court shall determine the amount of
damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its special
sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.

CIVIL LIABILITIES: AWARD OF NOMINAL AND TEMPERATE DAMAGES

Roberto P. Fuentes vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual
damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." While temperate or moderate damages
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the Information filed against Fuentes of the violation of RA 3019
by complainant Fe N. Valenzuela for his refusal for an unreasonable length of time to renew the
latter’s business permit despite Valenzuela's payment of the renewal fees, all the other municipal
officers of the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying their approval thereto, and (c) a
Police Clearance certifying that Valenzuela had no derogatory records in the municipality. Initially,
Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Business Permit by securing
temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
However, Triple A's operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist Order
after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was involved in
smuggling and drug trading. Valenzuela likewise obtained certifications and clearances from

640
Isabel Chief of Police Martin F. Tamse (Tamse), Barangay Captain Dino A. Bayron, the Narcotics
Group of Tacloban National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Philippine National Police
(PNP). Despite the foregoing, no Business Permit was issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage
of its goods bought in early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited from boarding the said
goods to the vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations from
2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in Triple A's favor.

Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing rumors that
Valenzuela was engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not act
on the same. However, in 2002, he received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and
Progress and Isabel Chief of Police Tamse allegedly confirming the said rumors, which prompted
him to hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to issue the
unnumbered Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC.

The Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6)
years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from public office, and ordered to pay Valenzuela the amount of
P200,000.00 as nominal damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in awarding Valenzuela nominal damages.

RULING:

NO. The Sandiganbayan should have awarded temperate damages instead of nominal
damages.

According to the Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are "recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no
actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial
injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." On the other hand, as pronounced
by the Court in the case of Evangelista vs. Spouses Andolong, temperate or moderate damages may
be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.

641
 In this case, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to the
suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not proven with
certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper.

Under these circumstances, the Court holds that the award of temperate damages in the
amount of P300,000.00 is proper.

642
CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED IN CASE OF REPARATIONS

People of the Philippines vs. Hermin Romobio y Pauler

G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Consistent with Article 106 of the RPC, if the accused-appellant can no longer return
the things stolen, he is obliged to make reparation for their value. The trial court shall
determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing,
whenever possible, and its special sentimental value. That the determination of the
amount of the deterioration or of the diminution of value, as well as of the damages and
losses, has been commended by the law entirely to the discretion of the courts does not
mean that proofs are unnecessary and useless. On the contrary, evidence should, whenever
possible, be produced to enlighten the discernment of the judge, but with or without
proofs, the determination of the question always depends finally upon judicial discretion.

FACTS:

Based on the information filed, the accused (Hermin), armed with a deadly weapon steal
personal belonging of AAA and that by reason of robbery, the victim was tied and boxed by the
accused causing injury to the former. Also, it was alleged in the information that the accused,
armed with bladed weapon succeeded in having sexual intercourse inside the house of the victim.

Hermin pleaded not guilty in his arraignment. Trial ensued while he was under detention.
The witnesses for the prosecution were AAA, Dr. Vito C. Borja II, and P02 Alexander Sierra Lapid.
The defense presented Hermin, his mother Rosita Romobio, his brother Henry Romobio, and his
wife Annaliza Delos Reyes Romobio.

The RTC found the accused guilty of a special complex crime of Robbery with rape as
defined and penalized under Article 294, in relation to Article 266-A and B of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
damages.

Hermin elevated the case to the CA, however, it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the
appeal.

643
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable for the reparation of stolen items.

RULING:

Yes. However, the court was constrained to agree with Hermin that private complainant
neither stated the particular value of each and every item that was said to be taken nor adduced a
single receipt to prove the value of the items. Both the Information and AAA's direct testimony are
wanting of the essential details.

An ordinary witness such as private complainant AAA cannot establish the value of jewelry
(consisting of earrings, necklaces, wristwatches, rings, and bracelet in this case) and the trial court
cannot take judicial notice thereof because the value of jewelry is neither a matter of public
knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration. In the absence of receipts or any other
competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution witnesses, we cannot
award the reparation for the stolen jewelry. Similarly, there is no evidence to establish the value of
the cellular phones and the USB device since no proof as to their description, kind/model, and
competent evidence of value was given by prosecution witnesses. As to the sunglasses, bags, wallet,
imported perfumes and lotions, ATM cards, jacket, and other personal effects taken by Hermin, the
same could not be compensated as no value therefor was actually alleged in the Information or
testified to in court. Nonetheless, Hermin is ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱4,000.00,
representing the amount of cash stolen. This amount was alleged in the Information, established by
the prosecution, and not rebutted by the defense.

644
 CHAPTER THREE

Extinction and Survival of Civil Liability

ARTICLE 112. Extinction of Civil Liability. — Civil liability established in articles 100, 101,
102, and 103 of this Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law.

CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE OF ESTAFA

Estate of Honorio Poblador Jr. vs. Rosario L. Manzano

G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (2) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (3) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime
of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him."

Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the
estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case.

FACTS:

Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 9984
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Probate Court). Among its properties was one share
of stock in Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. The Probate Court authorized petitioner's
administratrix, Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), to negotiate the sale of certain properties of the petitioner,

645
including the Wack-Wack Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael (one of the heirs of the deceased
Honorio Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the services of
Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland). She faxed a computation for
the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner, showing a final net amount of P15,000,000.00, with
the final net amount to the seller was increased to P15,200,000.00. Manzano later introduced
Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. and the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
Wack-Wack Share for the gross amount of P18,000,000.00. Moreland directly paid Elsa the
amount of P15,200,000.00 through a Metrobank check. The balance of P2,800,000.00 was
allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and
other pertinent fees, as well as for her service fee. The Probate Court annulled the sale of the
Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the amount of P18,000,000.00 which the
latter paid for the Wack-Wack Share, plus interest, and applied with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise asked
Manzano to return the broker's service fee. Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a discrepancy in
the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return: while the typewritten portion of the Return indicated
P1,480,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected only
P80,000.00 as the amount paid. To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified true copy
of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR that reflected only P80,000.00 as the capital gains
tax paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. As a result, petitioner demanded. Manzano to
properly account for the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and
broker's fees, but to no avail.

This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information for the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before the
Regional Trial Court.

The RTC ruled granting Manzano’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint for
Estafa for the failure of the prosecution to “prove all the elements of estafa through
misappropriation as defined in and penalized under paragraph 1 (b)[, Article 315] of the Revised
Penal Code, x x x.” The RTC found that the element of deceit was absent. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration from RTC was denied, Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case before the
Court of Appeals.

The CA denied the petitioner's appeal as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged civil
liability of Manzano in the amount of P2,800,000.00. The prosecution's evidence failed to show
that Manzano personally received the P2,800,000.00 earmarked for the payment of taxes and
broker's fees. At most, such evidence only proved that Manzano tried to help broker and negotiate
the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. Finally, the CA observed that this is a case of pari delicto, as
petitioner's predicament would have been avoided if only Rafael sought the permission and
approval of the Probate Court prior to the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.

646
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in denying the petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex
delicto of Manzano.

RULING:

NO, the petition lacks merit.

It is a fundamental rule that "the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him." As the Court previously ruled in the case of Dy vs. People, when the element of
misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil
liability ex delicto does not exist. Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the
delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from
the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the
contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the
crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal case."

In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the
prosecution failed to prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in, and
penalized under, paragraph 1 (b), [Article 315] of the [RPC]. Rafael, as the representative of herein
petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the entire arrangement, including those which had
to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself admitted that it received the full amount of
P15,200,000.00 – the full amount to which it was entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-
Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the
element of fraud, there could be no misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the
charge of Estafa and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto. The CA correctly observed that
petitioner's evidence utterly failed to show that Manzano personally received the P2,800,000.00
from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In fact, Rafael

647
categorically admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that
Manzano's name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax
and documentary stamp tax.

Therefore, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling denying petitioner's appeal as
its findings and conclusion are well supported by the facts and are founded in law.

648
EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN A CRIMINAL ACTION

Estate of Poblador, Jr. vs. Rosario L. Manzano

G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused, or the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

FACTS:

Rafael engaged the services of Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated

(Metroland). Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. (Moreland), and later on
the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Out of the P18,000,000.00 purchase price, Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount of
Pl5,200,000.00 through a Metrobank check. The balance of P2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to
Manzano for the payment of the capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other pertinent
fees, as well as for her service fee.

Rafael demanded Manzano to properly account for the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to
her, but to no avail. This led to the filing of an Information for the crime of Estafa under Article
315 (1)(b) of the RPC against Manzano before the RTC.

In the course of the proceedings, Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence praying for the
dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution to establish the essential elements of estafa
with which she was charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a civil liability that can be awarded from the criminal case.

649
RULING:

NO. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused, or the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

In this case, the Court agrees with the that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of
estafa through misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under, paragraph 1 (b), [Article 315]
of the [RPC]. Rafael, as the representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with
the entire arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself
admitted that it received the full amount of ₱15,200,000.00 - the full amount to which it was entitled
to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not claim
that it was deceived.

Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no misappropriation or conversion to speak
of that would justify the charge of estafa and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto.

650
ACQUITTAL DOES NOT EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY IN VIOLATION OF BP 22

John Dennis Chua vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 195248, November 22, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

An acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the dishonored checks.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action
where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (2) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (3) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted.

FACTS:

Sometime in 2000, respondent Cristina Yao alleged petitioner's mother mentioned that
her son would be reviving their sugar mill business in Bacolod City and asked whether Yao could
lend them money. Yao acceded and loaned petitioner a total amount of P5 million in 2001.
Petitioner John Dennis Chua issued four checks as payment, but these checks were were
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Upon dishonor of the checks, Yao
personally delivered her demand letter to the office of the petitioner which was received by his
secretary.

Petitioner was thus charged with four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The MeTC found
the petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an acquittal in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 extinguish also the civil liability of
the accused.

651
RULING:

NO, petitioner's acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the dishonored checks. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua is acquitted of the crime of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on four counts on the ground that his guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. He is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Cristina Yao
the face value of the subject checks in the aggregate amount of P6,082,000.00, plus legal interest of
12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until 30 June 2013, and 6%
per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.

652
 OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Constitutional Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy

CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for
the same offense bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in
the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal becomes final
immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.
With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration
in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because
it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second
jeopardy despite their acquittal.

FACTS:

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision annulling the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan and dismissing the cases against Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and Benigno Aguas for insufficiency of evidence for charges of plunder. On
August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the
reconsideration of the decision, submitting that the Court’s giving due course to a certiorari
action assailing an interlocutory order denying demurrer to evidence violates rule 119, section
23 of the rules of court, which provides that an order denying the demurrer to evidence shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the
consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would

653
amount to their prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and
would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to
the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

RULING:

YES, the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State will
amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, stated that “No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.” Stating People vs. Tan, the Court ruled that the general rule that the grant of a demurrer
to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable. The rule on double
jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions: the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach
is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion (People vs. Laguio, Jr.) The constitutional
prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new
and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As
such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for
correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion
for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy
despite their acquittal. It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related protections, specifically: protection
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for
the same offense.

The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the

petitioners for insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged
against them.

Thus, the Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration by the State for lack of merit.

654
 B. Continuous Crimes

DELITO CONTINUADO OR CONTINUOUS CRIME IN OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CASES

Noel Navaja vs. Hon. Manuel A. De Castro and Atty. Borje

G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

"Delito continuado'" or "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of

acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In order
that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of
time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united
in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or
aim.

FACTS:

Magsigay, a material witness, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing. Petitioner, who

allegedly went to Magsigay's workplace and told her that as per instruction of Atty. Bonghanoy,
the counsel for petitioner, her attendance in the scheduled hearing is no longer needed. Thus, Ms.
Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled hearing where petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy
presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay. resultantly, the case where
Magsigay is a material witness was dismissed.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Borje found out from Ms. Magsigay herself that she would
have attended the scheduled hearing were it not for the misrepresentation of petitioner that her
presence therein was no longer required. This prompted Atty. Borje to file criminal complaints
and later on separate information were filed. First, charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice
under Sec. 1(a) of P.D. 1829 and the second one charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of
Obstruction of Justice under Sec. 1(f) of the same law.

655
 Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash arguing that to allow separate prosecutions of the
foregoing cases would be tantamount to a violation of his right to double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations
of the same law.

RULING:

NO. Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito
continuado'" or "continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a
single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. In order that it may exist, there
should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision
infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the
perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim.

Petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit was clearly motivated by a single criminal
impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation.

Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one
(1) count of violation of PD 1829, otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy,
which the Court cannot countenance.

656
FACTS WHICH SHOW TRANSITORY OR CONTINUING CRIMES

Ivy Lim vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224979, December 13, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is well-settled that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 cases are categorized as transitory or

continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in
their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.

FACTS:

Petitioners Raffy Brodeth and Rolan Onal were charged of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
issuing three Metrobank checks (two of which is the subject of the instant case) as payment for
the equipment and tugboats on behalf of Land and Sea Resources (L& Resources) to Vill
Integrated Transportation Corporation. When the subject checks were deposited to Vill
Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds”.
Despite repeated demands, L&S Resources did not settle its account. Hence, the filing of the
criminal complaint against petitioners.

As a defense, the petitioners alleged that L&S Resources' balance pertaining to the
subject checks were settled in cash duly received by Vill Integrated's officer but, only one of the
three checks was returned.

When the case reached the lower court, MeTC was not convinced that the two
dishonored checks were paid at all and found them guilty of the violation charged. The RTC
affirmed the decision in toto. The CA denied the petitioners' appeal, hence, the instant case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing crime under the Revised Penal Code.

657
RULING:

YES, B.P. Blg. 22 is a continuing crime under the Revised Penal Code. Their ruling in Morillo
vs. People, it is well-settled that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Thus, a person
charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed.

The Court also cited the same ruling in Yalong vs. People which stated that It is well-settled
that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means
that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur
in another. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed in any
of the places where any of its elements occurred in particular, the place where the check is drawn,
issued, delivered, or dishonored.

658
 C. Corpus Delicti

EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Jefferson Del Mundo and Mitos Lacson-Del Mundo

G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In illegal sale, the dangerous drug illegally possessed by and confiscated from the
accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. What is material, therefore, is proof
that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.

FACTS:

According to the prosecution’s evidence, a surveillance was conducted on the accused-

appellants, Jefferson and Mitos Del Mundo, after receiving information that they were selling
dangerous drugs in Barangay Calero, Calapan City. Upon confirmation, a buy-bust operation was
planned and proceeded at the house of the accused-appellants.

The accused-appellants were apprehended and the marked money and plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances were confiscated. At the police station, the seized items
were photographed, inventoried, and marked by PO3 Rodil with her initials “YEL” while the 4
plastic sachets recovered by SPO2 Espiritu were marked with the initials MDR1, MDR2, MDR3,
and MDR4, in the presence of the accused-appellants, a barangay kagawad, and the president of
Kill Droga movement in the area. Later on, the specimens yielded positive results for shabu.

The allegations were denied by the accused-appellants and countered that they were
framed-up and that the police officers had planted the evidence against them. Both the RTC and
the CA found Jefferson, guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and Mitos,
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Hence, this appeal.

659
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

RULING:

NO, the accused-appellants are not guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. In illegal sale,
the dangerous drug illegally possessed by and confiscated from the accused constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense. What is material, therefore, is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

In this case, although the prosecution's Formal Offer of Exhibits listed an Exhibit "F-1,"
purportedly referring to the confiscated five sachets of shabu, the records do not show that the
plastic sachet with the markings "YEL" was ever presented and identified in court by any of the
prosecution witnesses. The parties merely stipulated that PO3 Rodil would be able to identify the
specimen subject of this case which remained in the custody of the criminal laboratory.

The prosecution's failure to present the sachet marked as "YEL" is crucial to their cause
because it constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, absent the said corpus delicti, the Court
is unable to sustain the accused-appellants' conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Jefferson
and Mitos must therefore be acquitted of the charges against them in Criminal Case No. CR-05-8045.

660
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa

G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

In proving the existence of corpus delicti, the prosecution must establish compliance
with the chain of custody requirements outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act.

FACTS:

At around 2:30 p.m. of March 26, 2005, Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino and Police
Officer 3 Jose Fernandez parked their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area,
where the asset told them to wait since their target, Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police
officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's house. Soon after, Comoso
arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana in exchange for the
asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in tum, removed his hat - the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction had been consummated.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the scene
and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet from the asset, while
PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust money, one (1) used marijuana stick,
and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his
initials "FJA”. As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police Superintendent
Julita T. De Villa, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory
Office, MIMAROPA, confirmed that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.

The Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article
II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Comoso appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the poseur-buyer, the sole witness to the transaction, was never presented

661
as a witness. Court of Appeals dismissed Comoso's appeal and affirmed his conviction. Hence this
appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence. Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." In
buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

As held in prior cases, there was no need to present the confidential informant since the
testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who actually witnessed the transaction.
The case is different, however, if the confidential informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the
same person.

Nonetheless, PO2 Aquino testifying that he had witnessed the entire transaction suffices to
prove the offense's first element. This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of
innocence. To do so, the prosecution must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of
the corpus delicti. The prosecution must establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

Here, P02 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic sachet
from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that he had also
prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items to the crime laboratory.
However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the inventory before
accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned
the items over to an investigating officer.

Furthermore, Superintendent De Villa, the forensic chemist, only received the seized items on
April 8, 2005 or 10 working days after the buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously
beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to
explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic
chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution did not
justify the law enforcement officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody.

662
 The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption only applies
when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from the standard procedures
required by law.

Indeed, reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of
custody cannot be properly established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had not been
tampered with, substituted, or altered. Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-
appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

663
COMPLIANCE TO CHAIN CUSTODY NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Yagao

G.R. No. 216725, February 18, 2019

Bersamin, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Observance of the chain of custody is essential in the preservation of the identity of

the confiscated drug. This is because the drug, being itself the corpus delicti of the crime of
illegal sale charged, will be the factual basis for holding the accused criminally liable
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

FACTS:

In 2011, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drug. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant and ruled that while PO2
Yasay and PO2 Deloso failed to mark, photograph and inventory the seized marijuana at the crime
scene, PO2 Deloso, however, offered justifiable grounds for their non-compliance due to the
hostile crowd that amassed right after the buy-bust operations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

RULING:

NO. To convict the accused for the illegal sale or the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs must be clearly and competently shown because such
degree of proof is what was necessary to establish the corpus delicti. The marking after seizure by
the arresting officer, being the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon
the seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as practicable
under the obtaining circumstances. Here, the State presented no witness to testify on the

664
circumstances surrounding the marking of the confiscated drug, and on whether or not the marking
had been made in the presence of the accused-appellant. The omission further discredited the
evidence of guilt.

It was also disclosed that no inventory or pictures had been taken during the arrest of the
accused-appellant and seizure of the dangerous drug, and in the aftermath. The disclosure further
severely discredited the incrimination of the accused-appellant. In the present case, the prosecution
did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the required
physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs. In fine, the State did not establish the guilt of
the accused-appellant for the crime with which he was charged.

665
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Havib Saavedra Galuken

G.R. No. 216754, July 17, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done
at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with
by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity.

FACTS:

Havib Saavedra Galuken was apprehended by I01 Falle and I01 Llano, who conducted a
narcotic operation against him in a gasoline station in Tacurong City.

The team bought the appellant and the confiscated items at the Tacurong City Police
Station. I01 Falle marked the two (2) sachets with "RPF" and "RPF-1". The police officers likewise
prepared an inventory receipt signed by Barangay Poblacion Kagawad Pamplona and took
photographs of the seized items. In the evening of the same day, I01 Falle, I01 Llano and I03
Alvariño brought appellant to PDEA Regional Office in General Santos City. The two (2) sachets
remained in the custody of I01 Falle. At the PDEA Regional Office, I01 Falle prepared his affidavit
and endorsed the sachets of shabu to I01 Llano.

The following day, I01 Falle and I01 Llano delivered the sachets to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 12 in General Santos City for examination. PO2 Edmund Delos Reyes received

666
the sachets from them. On the same day, PO2 Delos Reyes endorsed the sachets with a letter
request for laboratory examination to Police Inspector Lily Grace Mapa, a Forensic Chemist. Police
Inspector Mapa personally examined the items, which yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, as reflected in her report. After the examination, she turned over the sachets to the
evidence custodian of the Laboratory Office, PO2 Sotero Tauro, Jr.

The RTC ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the
crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. The alleged poseur-buyer is not actually a buyer, but a
delivery man. Moreover, the prosecution was not able to present the confidential informant who
negotiated for the sale of the dangerous drugs. Although Havib may not be convicted of the crime
charged, he can however be convicted of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

The CA ruled that Havib should be convicted of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs as charged,
not Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. In stark contrast to the findings of the RTC, the CA
found that all the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs are present.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Havib is guilty of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

RULING:

NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their identity, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

In the case at bar, the police officers completely disregarded the requirements of Section 21.
First, none of the required witnesses was present at the place of arrest. The police officers merely
called-in a Barangay Kagawad and media representative when they were already at the police
station to sign the inventory receipt which they had already prepared prior to the arrival of said
witnesses. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law.

Second, the police officers did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the
seized items at the place of arrest. Their explanation that the crowd became uncontrollable is hardly

667
plausible considering that they conducted the buy-bust operation at a Caltex Station, and it is highly
unbelievable that there would be a crowd in the said area that would pose a danger to their lives.

Lastly, the conflicting testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team make their credibility
questionable. Thus, to the mind of the Court, there is doubt whether there was even really a buy-bust
operation. For one, IO1 Llano initially testified that they were able to recover three (3) sachets from
Havib – two (2) sachets were recovered by IO1 Falle and one (1) sachet was recovered by IO1 Llano
when he conducted a body search of Havib.

All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged due to the
multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody,
and handling of the seized drug.

668
CONFISCATED DRUG CONSTITUTES THE VERY CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Benjie Caranto

G.R. No. 217668, February 20, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established
with moral certainty.

FACTS:

In 2014, Benjie Caranto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
5 of RA 9165. Aggrieved, Benjie appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. It
ruled that in cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of having
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting
ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.

Since no proof of such ill-motive on the part of the buy-bust team was adduced by Benjie,
the RTC did not err in giving full faith and credence to the prosecution's account of the buy-bust
operation. Also, it held that the police officers' failure to take photographs of the seized items
while in the presence of the accused, a member of the media, a representative of the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and an elected Barangay official does not affect the admissibility of the seized
drugs. Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjie's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

669
RULING:
NO. It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the
apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because
their presence serves an essential purpose. Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 (RA
9165) committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. In the present case, the prosecution
neither recognized, much less tried to justify or explain, the police's deviation from the procedure
contained in Section 21. The police officers did not offer any justifiable reason for the absence of the
required witnesses during the buy-bust operation itself, especially where, as here, they had more
than sufficient time to secure their presence prior to the planned arrest.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised, thus
necessitating the acquittal of Benjie. All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
offense of sale of illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by
the buy-bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the
prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of Benjie.

670
IDENTITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Editha Tampan

G.R. No. 222648, February 13, 2019

Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE:

In both offenses (illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of

dangerous drugs), the existence of the drug is of paramount importance such that no drug
case can be successfully prosecuted and no judgment of conviction can be validly sustained
without the identity of the dangerous substance being established with moral certainty, it
being the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.

FACTS:

In 2015, Editha Tampan was found guilty for illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, accused-appellant argued that the marking, physical
inventory and photographing of the seized illegal drugs were not immediately done at the place of
seizure. The presence of a representative from the media, the DOJ, and an elected public official
were not secured to witness the inventory and photographing of the confiscated dangerous drugs
at the time of apprehension and seizure. The physical inventory and the photographing at the
PDEA Office were not conducted in the presence of a DOJ representative who is also required to
sign the inventory and to have a copy thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tampan is guilty beyond reasonable for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

RULING:

NO. Chain of custody is a procedural mechanism that ensures that the identity and integrity
of the corpus delicti are clear and free from any unnecessary doubt or uncertainty. It secures the
close and careful monitoring and recording of the custody, safekeeping, and transfer of the

671
confiscated illegal drug so as to preclude any incident of planting, tampering, or switching of
evidence.

Here, the prosecution was not able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items remained intact from the time of confiscation, marking, submission to the laboratory
for examination, and presentation in court. The marking of the seized items was conducted at the
PDEA Office for security reasons which was never substantiated nor proven as a fact. The marking
was not executed at the place of confiscation even if IO1 Labajo could have easily placed his initials
knowing fully well that there were back-up officers to respond to the scene. The absence of the three
required witnesses at the place of seizure for the immediate physical inventory and photographing
and the lack of a DOJ representative during the actual physical inventory and photographing
without offering a credible justification created another gap in the chain of custody.

Considering the miniscule amount of the confiscated illegal drugs involved, rigid compliance
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is expected from the apprehending officers. As aptly held in People
vs. Plaza, "[buy bust] teams should be more meticulous in complying with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
to preserve the integrity of the seized shabu most especially where the weight of the seized item is a
miniscule amount that can be easily planted and tampered with." There being no plausible reason
for the apprehending officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, Tampan must
perforce be acquitted.

672
CORPUS DELICTI IN THE CRIME OF ARSON

People of the Philippines vs. Nestor Dolendo y Fediles alias “Etoy”

G.R. No. 223098, June 3, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Arson requires the following elements: (1) a fire was set intentionally; and (2) the
accused was identified as the person who caused it. The corpus delicti rule is satisfied by
proof of the bare fact of the fire and that it was intentionally caused.

FACTS:

Appellant Etoy went to the house of complainant Deolina Perocho shouting “Leonardo, I
am already here”. Leonardo was Deolina’s husband. Deolina saw Etoy holding a gun and gathering
dried coconut leaves. Etoy then set their porch on fire. She and her three children jumped from
the rear window and hid in a grassy area. Deoline realized that she had totally forgotten about
Leonardo Jr. who was asleep when the house fire began. By the time they came out from their
hiding place, the house had been completely burned and Leonardo Jr. had died. Appellant and her
husband were not in good terms as they had a
previous altercation. Appellant was charged with arson resulting in the death of Leonardo Jr.

The trial court convicted Etoy of arson with homicide. This was modified to simple arson
by the Court of Appeals. Appellant seeks affirmative relief from the Supreme Court and prays
anew for his acquittal.

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of appellant for the crime of arson proper?

RULING:

673
 YES. The trial court gave full credence to the positive testimony of both Deolina and Jessie
Perocho on that it was indeed appellant who set their dwelling on fire, killing six-year-old Leonardo
Jr. as a result. The credible testimonies of these eyewitnesses are sufficient to prove the corpus delicti
and support a conviction for arson against appellant. Arson requires the following elements: (1) a
fire was set intentionally; and (2) the accused was identified as the person who caused it. The corpus
delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and that it was intentionally caused.

The modification of the conviction from arson with homicide to simple arson is proper. In
People vs. Malngan, it was held that in determining what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated, that
is whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but
death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building
or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate
and distinct crimes committed – homicide / murder and arson.

674
PRESERVATION OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Marylou Gumban

G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set (under the chain
custody rule) would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous
drugs as long as there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance and the integrity of
the corpus delicti was preserved.

FACTS:

In 2013, appellant Gumban was convicted for selling dangerous drugs. On appeal,
appellant raised doubt on the identity of the items confiscated from her arguing that there were
other personalities belonging to a so-called Compliance Team who touched and examined the
drugs. Thus, since the seized items were left for some time in the custody and possession of the
Compliance Team who failed to describe how and from whom the items were received by them,
the distinct possibility that the items were tampered with, contaminated, substituted or pilfered
could not be ruled out.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity the seized items were properly preserved.

RULING:

NO. Going over the records, the Court notes that the apprehending officers did not faithfully
observe the foregoing mandatory requirements. While admittedly there was marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized items, all these were done only in the presence of the elected public
officials and media representative. No representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) appeared
as witness thereto as required by law. In addition, the witnesses present during the inventory were

675
not given copies thereof, another mandatory procedural safeguard outlined by the law. Indeed, non-
compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the
seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs as long as there were justifiable grounds for the non-
compliance and the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.

In view of the failure of the arresting officers to comply with a mandatory requirement in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 coupled with the obvious break in the chain of custody of the seized
items as heretofore discussed, a serious doubt arises as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs.
There is no absolute certainty if the seized items were the very same drugs object of the sale,
transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually presented in court as evidence.

676
IDENTITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Royol

G.R. No. 224297, February 13, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Failing to comply with Article II, Section 21(1) of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti. It produces doubts as to the origins of the seized paraphernalia.

FACTS:

In 2015, accused-appellant Edgardo A. Royol, a garbage collector, was found guilty for
violating Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, accused appellant
argued that although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets submitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown by the
prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the presence of appellant
after their alleged confiscation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused appellant should be acquitted for failure to observe the chain
custody rule.

RULING:

YES. In the present case, although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic
sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown
by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked the seized drugs in the presence of
appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the substances seized from
appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court. R.A. No.
9165 had placed upon the law enforcers the duty to establish the chain of custody of the seized drugs

677
to ensure the integrity of the corpus delicti. Thru proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and
recording, the identity of the seized drugs is insulated from doubt from their confiscation up to their
presentation in court. This is but the latest in a litany of cases that demonstrate law enforcers'
wanton disregard for basic statutory guidelines. While not losing sight of the urgency of addressing
the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produces doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
corpus delicti.

678
CONFISCATED DRUG CONSTITUTES THE VERY CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE

People of the Philippines vs. Dondon Guerrero

G.R. No. 228881, February 6, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the
identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral certainty. The
prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the
accused is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to
the chain of custody must be accounted for.

FACTS:

Guerrero was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. Ultimately, the CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of Guerrero, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of the crime charged. In the present case, however, the records clearly show that the
physical inventory and photographing were not made before the three required witnesses.
Neither did the police officers or the prosecution — during the trial — offer any viable or
acceptable explanation for their deviation from the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guerrero is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of RA
9165.

RULING:

NO. Evidently, the manner on how the buy-bust operation was conducted creates doubt as to
the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. It bears emphasis that the presence of the

679
required witnesses at the time of the inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said
requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.

Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 of RA 9165 committed by the police officers,
left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised. As the Court explained in People vs. Reyes, to warrant the application of this
saving mechanism, the prosecution must recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them,
and failure to justify or explain underscored the doubt and suspicion about the integrity of the
evidence of the corpus delicti.

680
FACTS SHOWING CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Josh Joe T. Sahibil

G.R. No. 228953, January 28, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court has repeatedly elucidated that, in order for the accused to be convicted of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the elements of the crime
as well as the corpus delicti or the drug/s subject of the case.

FACTS:

In 2015, appellant Sahibil was found guilty for illegal sale of shabu. Undaunted, appellant
appealed before the Court reiterating his contentions before the CA. He insisted that he must be
acquitted as the chain of custody rule was not observed faulting the police for its failure to
immediately mark the subject items after confiscation. He also ascribed irregularity in the fact
that the necessary witnesses - an elective official, and representatives from the media and the DOJ
- were not present during the sale and seizure of the subject illegal drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the herein appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
shabu.

RULING:

YES. The marking of the seized items at the police station, not at the place of incident, did not
impair the chain of custody of the drug evidence. For one, the marking at the nearest police station is
allowed whenever the same is availed of due to practical reason[s]. For another, the prosecution had
explained the failure of the buy-bust team to immediately mark these items at the place where the
buy-bust operation was conducted. In addition, the inventory of these items was done in the
presence of appellant and the necessary witnesses - an elective official, a media representative; as

681
well as a representative from the DOJ. Taken together, all the foregoing circumstances showed that
the buy-bust team had fully observed the required chain of custody of the confiscated illegal drugs.
Without doubt, the existence of the corpus delicti was established in this case.

682
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Noel Cardenas y Halili

G.R. No. 229046, September 11, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
the aforesaid elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In
drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.

FACTS:

Noel Cardenas was charged with violation Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or
distributing zero point sixty-two (0.62) grams of dried Marijuana Fruiting tops, a dangerous drug.
Cardenas was apprehended from a buy-bust operation conducted where PO2 Santiago acted as
poseur-buyer.

The Regional Trial Court found Cardenas guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. According to the RTC, "[t]he evidences presented by the prosecution unequivocally
established that a successful buy-bust operation took place which resulted in the arrest of
[accused-appellant Cardenas]. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision ruling that the
totality of the evidence presented in the instant case indubitably confirms accused-appellant's
guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cardenas’ guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

683
 NO. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus
delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, in all drugs cases, compliance with the chain of custody
rule is crucial in establishing the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, after a careful review of the evidence on
record, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody of the
alleged seized drug specimen. Worse, the prosecution failed to recognize these lapses and offer
sufficient justification to warrant the non-observance of these mandatory rules.

The chain of custody of the specimen from PO2 Santiago to SPO1 Corea and from SPO1 Corea
to PO3 Carranza was not firmly established. The unequivocal testimony of the prosecution's first
witness, PO2 Santiago, reveals that, out of the three required witnesses, only the representative of
the media witnessed the buy-bust operation. No justifiable ground was offered to account for this
serious breach of the law. Further, as to the marking of the alleged seized drug specimen, the Court
observes that the police officers violated their own rules.

All told, Cardenas’ guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ruled in favour
of his acquittal.

684
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Orly Visperas

G.R. No. 231010, June 26, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

In a successful prosecution for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the

following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment. What is material is proof that the transaction actually occurred, coupled with
the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. More than that, the prosecution
must also establish the integrity of the dangerous drug, because the dangerous drug is
itself the corpus delicti of the case.

FACTS:

On September 29, 2010, SPO1 Roberto Molina (SPO1 Molina) and SPO1 Ronnie Quinto
(SPO1 Quinto) relayed to Chief of Police, P/S Insp. Dominick Soriano Poblete (PSI Poblete), a
report from a confidential asset that appellant was selling shabu in Mapandan, Pangasinan. PSI
Poblete ordered them to plan and conduct a buy-bust operation against appellant. SPO1 Molina
was designated as the poseur-buyer and to him were delivered three 100-peso bills marked as
buy-bust money.

At around 8 p.m. of the same day, the buy-bust team arrived at the house of appellant.
SPO1 Quinto occupied a vantage point a short distance away. The confidential asset introduced
SPO1 Molina to appellant and a transaction for the sale of shabu transpired. SPO1 Molina then
gave appellant the buy-bust money. Appellant went inside his house, and, upon his return, handed
a plastic sachet of shabu to SPO1 Molina. With the shabu in his possession, SPO1 Molina signaled
SPO1 Quinto that the sale was consummated. SPO1 Quinto rushed toward appellant and arrested
him. He also informed appellant of the nature of his arrest and his constitutional rights. SPO1
Molina then conducted a search on the person of appellant and recovered the buy-bust money.
After this, SPO1 Molina and SPO1 Quinto proceeded to the police station with appellant.

When they reached the police station, SPO1 Molina turned over the sachet of shabu and
the marked money to the duty investigator, SPO1 Jeffrey Natividad, who prepared the documents

685
needed for the prosecution of appellant and forwarded the sachet of shabu to the police crime
laboratory. Forensic Chemist Ma. Theresa Amor C. Manuel performed a chemical examination on
the contents of the sachet and the results confirmed that it was indeed shabu.

Appellant claimed that, on September 29, 2010, he was eating isaw with his niece and
nephew in front of his house at Brgy. Poblacion, Mapandan, Pangasinan, when SPO1 Molina
approached and invited him to the municipal hall to answer a complaint against him. He
voluntarily accepted the invitation, but, upon his arrival, he was frisked and told to remove his
clothes and sit on a couch. Two hours later, he was incarcerated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165.

RULING:

YES. The appeal is meritorious. In a successful prosecution for violation of Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. What is material is proof that the transaction actually occurred, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. More than that, the prosecution must also
establish the integrity of the dangerous drug, because the dangerous drug is itself the corpus delicti
of the case. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the records and cannot find any mention at all that
the physical inventory and that photographing of the confiscated shabu had been done or were done
in the presence of an elected public official, a representative from media and the DOJ. None of the
signatures of the elected public official, nor of a representative from the media, nor of a
representative from the DOJ appear in the Inventory Receipt. And the State has not given any reason
for the complete failure of the arresting officers to secure the attendance of these required witnesses.
To the foregoing must be added the fact that there is nothing on record to indicate that the arresting
team ever exerted an honest-to-goodness attempt to secure their presence.

Given the fact that no elected public official, no representative from the media and no
representative from the DOJ was present during the physical inventory and the photographing of the
seized shabu, the evils of switching of, "planting" or contamination of the evidence create serious
lingering doubts as to the integrity of the alleged corpus delicti.

686
IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED

People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Galisim

G.R. No. 231305, September 11, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally sold by the
accused is the same substance presented in court.

FACTS:

Alvin Galisim was charged with violations of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, delivering, giving away to
PO3 Julius Maynigo and having in his possession and under his control one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) centrigrams of white crystalline substance, which
was found positive to the test of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation
of the said law. Galisim was apprehended in a buy-bust operation where PO3 Maynigo acted as
poseur-buyer.

The Regional Trial Court found Galisim guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses
charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision ruling that the prosecution had
adequately and satisfactorily proved the elements of illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of
shabu. It also declared that lack of designated witnesses as required under Section 21 (1) of RA
9165 was not fatal to the prosecution's case, so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
illegal drugs were preserved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Galisim’s guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

687
RULING:

NO. To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for each
link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, there were several lapses on the elements required by the law. First, PO3
Maynigo failed to mention in his testimony that representatives from the media, DOJ, or an elected
Barangay Official witnessed the conduct of the post-operation procedures. Second, the photograph
requirement was not complied with. Third, the handling of the corpus delicti from the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist was not sufficiently established. Finally, the fourth link was likewise
not sufficiently established.

Unquestionably, the chain of custody here was broken from the time the illegal drugs were
confiscated up to their presentation in court. The repeated breach of the chain of custody rule had
cast serious uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain
did not link at all, albeit it unjustly restrained appellant's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict
of acquittal is in order.

688
FACTS SHOWING CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Arago

G.R. No. 233833, February 20, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is settled in our jurisdiction that uncorroborated defenses of denial and claims of

frame-up cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

FACTS:

In 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial finding accused Romulo
Arago guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. On appeal,
appellant argued that the prosecution was not able to establish the monetary consideration in
exchange of the dangerous drugs allegedly sold by him. He claims that in order for a charge of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing being sold
and the payment therefor. Thus, he avers that the second element has not been proven. Appellant
also argues that the offense charged against him is fabricated and that the testimony of the police
officer is full of inconsistencies and simply incredulous.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of R.A.
9165.

RULING:

YES. In People vs. De la Cruz, the Court held that the presentation of the marked money, as
well as the fact that the money was paid in exchange for the delivery of dangerous drugs, were
unnecessary to consummate the crime, thus: Even if the money given to De la Cruz was not

689
presented in court, the same would not militate against the People's case. In fact, there was even no
need to prove that the marked money was handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The
crime could have been consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law
proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited to, the act of delivering. In the
latter case, the act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and
by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense.

As to appellant's defense of denial and claim of frame-up, it is settled in our jurisdiction that
uncorroborated defenses of denial and claims of frame-up cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
The testimonies of police officers who caught Arago in flagrante delicto are usually credited with
more weight and credence, in the absence of evidence that they have been inspired by an improper
or ill motive, than the defenses of denial and frame-up of an accused which have been invariably
viewed with disfavor for it can easily be concocted.

690
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Augusto N. Maganon

G.R. No. 234040, June 26, 2019

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is axiomatic that the presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is a

basic requirement in every prosecution for the illegal sale and for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty the identity of the
prohibited drugs as this is the very corpus delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

On November 22, 2014, at around 3 p.m., PCI Renato Banas Castillo (PCI Castillo), Chief of
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG) of the Pasig City Police
Station, received a report from a confidential informant that appellant was involved in the
rampant selling of illegal drugs in C. Santos St., Purok 4, Brgy. Ugong, Pasig City. PCI Castillo, thus,
ordered that a buy-bust operation be made against appellant. PO1 Marvin A. Santos (PO1 Santos)
was designated as poseur-buyer and given two one hundred-peso bills to be used as marked
money. The next day, November 23, 2014, the buy-bust team proceeded to the barangay hall of
Brgy. Ugong to coordinate the planned operation and to place said operation on blotter.
Thereafter, PO1 Santos, together with the confidential informant, went to the house of appellant,
while the other members of the buy-bust team positioned themselves nearby.

Upon arriving at the target area, PO1 Santos and the confidential informant saw appellant
seated in front of his house. They approached appellant and PO1 Santos asked to
buy shabu worth two hundred pesos. PO1 Santos gave the marked money to appellant who,
thereafter, gave him (PO1 Santos) two plastic sachets which contained suspected shabu. PO1
Santos put the said two sachets in his pocket. He, then, made the pre-arranged signal and held the
hand of appellant while the buy-bust team converged thereat. PO1 Santos ordered appellant to
produce the marked money and empty his pockets; appellant did as told, and the marked money
and four plastic sachets which contained suspected shabu were recovered from appellant. PO1
Santos placed the said four sachets in his other pocket so it will not get mixed with the two
sachets he previously bought from appellant. Due to the sudden influx of people at the place of
the arrest, the buy-bust team decided to proceed to the barangay hall of Brgy. Ugong to secure

691
appellant and the evidence. At the barangay hall, PO1 Santos marked and inventoried the
aforesaid plastic sachets in the presence of appellant, Brgy. Capt. Engracio E. Santiago (Brgy. Capt.
Santiago) and Ms. Zenaida Concepcion, head of the Anti-Drug Abuse Council of Pasig City. Brgy.
Capt. Santiago and appellant signed the inventory.

Thereafter, the team brought appellant to the police station where the evidence was
turned over by PO1 Santos to the duty investigator, PO1 Lodjie Coz (PO1 Coz), who prepared the
necessary documentation. Thereafter, PO1 Santos and PO1 Coz went to the Eastern Police
District-Crime Laboratory Service in Mandaluyong City and submitted the seized sachets of
suspected shabu to the forensic chemist, PCI Rhea Fe Alviar (PCI Alviar), who conducted the
laboratory examinations which confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu in the said sachets.

The appellant claimed, however, that he arrived at his house from work. His common-law
spouse, Rosemarie Apinan, was eating lunch at the time. Thereafter, four police officers suddenly
entered appellant's house and searched it. When they found nothing, they arrested appellant and
brought him to the barangay hall of Brgy. Ugong. Appellant saw several sachets and two one
hundred-peso bills on top of a table in the presence of the Brgy. Capt. Santiago. After appellant
and Brgy. Capt. Santiago signed the inventory, the police officers brought him to the Pasig City
Police Station.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165.

RULING:
YES. The appeal is meritorious. It is axiomatic that the presentation of the dangerous drugs
as evidence in court is a basic requirement in every prosecution for the illegal sale and for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The prosecution must establish with moral certainty the identity of
the prohibited drugs as this is the very corpus delicti of the crime. Equally important, the
prosecution must prove that there has been an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs
to erase any lingering doubts as to its identity owing to or by reason of switching, "planting" or
contamination of evidence. Each link in the chain of custody of evidence must be accounted for from
the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation as evidence in court. In the case at bar, the
reliance of the police operatives on the lone witness, Brgy. Capt. Santiago, who was the very party
interested in the arrest, prosecution and conviction of appellant, as it was this barangay captain
himself who requested the buy-bust operation against appellant, and the police operatives' failure to

692
secure the presence of either a DOJ or media representative, without justifiable reasons and without
exerting earnest efforts to do so, effectively rendered nugatory the salutary purpose of the law,
which is designed to provide an insulating presence during the inventory and photographing of the
seized items, in order to obviate switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence. Needless to
say, this adversely affected the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets
of shabu subject of this case.

693
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

Macacuna Badio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 236023, February 20, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants
an acquittal.

FACTS:

In 2016, the RTC found Badio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. On appeal, the CA affirmed Badio's conviction with modification. It found the
sole testimony of PO3 Jimenez to be sufficient in convicting Badio of the crime charged. It
likewise pointed out that despite the absence of a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative and
an elected public official in the inventory and photography of the seized items, the prosecution
nonetheless was able to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of such items were
properly preserved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Badio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

RULING:

NO. To reiterate, the law requires that the conduct of inventory and photography of the
seized items must be witnessed by representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected

694
public official, and that the prosecution is bound to account for their absence by presenting a
justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. As the Court sees it, the prosecution
did not faithfully comply with these standards and unfortunately, failed to justify non-compliance.
Thus, in view of these unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore
constrained to believe that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Badio were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal.

695
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Alconde

G.R. No. 238117, February 4, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence,
warrants an acquittal.

FACTS:

In 2016, accused-appellants Querquela and Alconde were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
respectively. In this case, however, the inventory and photography of the seized items were not
conducted in the presence of the required witnesses under the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

696
 It is settled that non-compliance may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the
apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such witnesses,
albeit they eventually failed to appear. In this case, however, no plausible explanation was given by
the police officers as to why all the required witnesses were not around during the conduct of
inventory and photography of the confiscated items. Evidently, this procedure veers away from what
is prescribed by law. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from accused-appellants had been compromised, which consequently warrants their acquittal.

697
FACTS SHOWING CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Billy Acosta

G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree.

FACTS:

Acosta was convicted for the crime of Illegal Planting and Cultivation of Marijuana Plant
penalized under Section 16, Article II of RA 9165. In his defense, Acosta argued that the seized
marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence as the "plain view" doctrine is not applicable.
Acosta argued that the discovery was not inadvertent because it was Salucana who pointed out
the marijuana plants to the police. Furthermore, there was a violation of Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 since there was no proof of the photography of the marking and inventory of the seized
marijuana plants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acosta is guilty beyond reasonable for illegal planting and cultivation of
marijuana plant.

RULING:

YES. In People vs. Valdez, the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the
officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused’. Verily, it could not be gainsaid

698
that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be
marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge, they would naturally be more
circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him
for the mauling incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the
"plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized marijuana plants are
inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.

All told, since the marijuana plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence in
violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated plants
are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Acosta's conviction to be improper
and therefore, acquits him.

699
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Edson Barbac Retada

G.R. No. 239331, July 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each
link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation
in court as evidence of the crime.

FACTS:

After confirming that one Edson Retada (accused) is engaged in illegal drug activities,
Police Inspector Christopher Castro conducted a buy-bust briefing, where PO2 Catubig would act
as poseur-buyer while PO2 Dela Peña and PO1 Dialemas were the immediate back-up. PO2
Catubig approached the accused and gave two (2) pieces of Php200.00 marked money to the
accused. In exchange thereof, accused gave one (1) plastic sachet of shabu to PO2 Catubig and got
the money. PO2 Catubig raised his right hand as the pre-arranged signal to inform the other
members of the team that the sale has been consummated. PO2 Dela Peña and PO1 Dialemas
immediately approached them. Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Catubig made a thorough
body search on the accused and recovered on the latter one (1) plastic sachet of suspected shabu,
buy-bust money, coins in different denominations and a cellphone.

During the inventory of the seized drugs, only two councilors were present. Second, they
did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the place of arrest.
Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only at the police
station.

The RTC ruled that the defense of alibi and frame-up of the accused must simply fail. It
further ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the arresting officers' compliance with the
procedural safeguards under RA 9165.12 The prosecution clearly established an unbroken chain

700
of custody. Hence, the court finds accused Edson Barbac Retada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the offenses of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drug and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drug in
accordance with Sec. 5 and Sec. 11(3), respectively, both of Article II of RA 9165.The CA affirmed
Retada's conviction with modification on the penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Retada's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11(3) of RA 9165 was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, 22 Article II of RA 9165, the applicable
law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in me presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d)
a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).

In the case at bar, the police officers utterly failed to comply with the requirements of Section
21. Although there were two elected officials present during the inventory at the police station, the
two other mandatory witnesses were not present. Also, the mere fact that they tried to contact a
media representative and a DOJ representative when they arrived at the police station is not the
earnest effort that is contemplated by the law.

Moreover, they did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items
at the place of arrest. Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly accomplished them only
at the police station. When asked why they did so, they offered a flimsy excuse that there were
several persons in the place where they conducted the buy-bust operation.

All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drugs
due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Retada should be acquitted of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs.

701
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Bernido Acabo

G.R. No. 241081, February 11, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants
an acquittal.

FACTS:

In 2009, the members of the Provincial Mobile Group, Tagbilaran City, successfully
implemented a buy-bust operation against Acabo. Thereafter, Acabo and the seized items were
brought to the Garcia-Hernandez Police Station, where the inventory was conducted. On appeal,
however, it was found that there was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of
the inventory and photography was not witnessed by the DOJ and media representatives. The
absence of the DOJ representative is evident from the Certificate of Inventory, and although Media
Representative Responte signed thereof, he did not actually witness the conduct of the inventory
and photography of the seized items at the Garcia-Hernandez Police Station.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Acabo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165.

RULING:

702
 NO. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As earlier stated, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at
the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending
officers to secure their presence.

Here, while PO2 Tamara acknowledged the absence of the DOJ and media representatives
during the aforementioned conduct, he failed to provide any justifiable reason for said absence.
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses, cannot be considered as a justifiable reason for non-compliance. In view of this unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Acabo were compromised,
which consequently warrants his acquittal.

703
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Cohayco y Revil @ “Kakang”

G.R. No. 241324, September 11, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime.

FACTS:

Marivic Cohayco was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing
0.2075 gram of Metamphetamine Hydochloride contained in ten (10) small sachets. Cohayco was
apprehended from a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Region X. As the place of arrest is a known shabu hotbed, the PDEA took her and the seized items
to the PDEA Satellite Office where the seized items were marked, inventoried, and photographed
in her presence, as well as barangay officials and media representatives. Thereafter, the seized
items were brought to the crime laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof
yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a dangerous drug.

The Regional Trial Court found Cohayco guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. It found that the prosecution, through the testimonies of the PDEA operatives, had
established beyond reasonable doubt that Cohayco indeed sold plastic sachets containing shabu
to the poseur-buyer during a legitimate buy-bust operation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC’s decision and held that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime
charged, and that there was compliance with the chain of custody rule. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

704
 Whether or not Cohayco’s guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.18 Failing to
prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and hence, warrants an acquittal.

In this case, the Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings,
inventory, and photography of the seized items at the PDEA Satellite Office instead of the place of
arrest, considering that the same is a known hotbed of shabu, and that Cohayco's arrest and seizure
of the plastic sachets might be compromised. Nonetheless, it appears that the inventory and
photography of the seized items were not conducted in the presence of a DOJ representative, as
evinced by the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs, which only showed signatures from
barangay officials and media representatives, contrary to the mandatory procedure laid down in RA
9165.

Hence, Cohayco is acquitted.

705
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

Riel Aranas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 242315, July 3, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence,
warrants an acquittal.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC charging petitioner with the
crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the morning of May 13, 2015,
the members of the Tingloy Police Station proceeded to the residence of petitioner located at
Barangay Sto. Tomas, Tingloy, Batangas to implement Search Warrant No. 15-20 dated May 7,
2015 (search warrant) issued by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 3 for an alleged
violation of RA 9165.

Upon arriving thereat, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Benjie Casapao and PO1 Rolando Togonon
(PO1 Togonon) read the contents of the said warrant to petitioner, searched his house, and
accordingly, found two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu inside a Katialis ointment container,
as well as a rolled aluminum foil and lighter on the wall. After placing petitioner under arrest, the
police officers marked, inventoried, and photographed the seized items in the presence of
petitioner, Barangay Chairman Aileen Mendoza (Brgy. Chairman Mendoza), media representative
Benedicto Griño (Griño), and Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Judith Buhay (Buhay).
Afterwards, they brought petitioner and the seized items to the police station to prepare the
request for laboratory examination. Subsequently, PO1 Togonon delivered the letter-request and
the two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office,
where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

For his part, petitioner interposed the defense of denial, claiming that at around three (3)
o'clock in the morning of May 13, 2015, some police officers suddenly barged into his house and

706
began searching its premises against his consent. After the search, they found illegal drugs at the
second floor of his house and consequently, brought him to the police station.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165.

RULING:
NO. The petition lacks merit. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Possession of Dangerous Drugs
under RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be
established with moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part
of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the
evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and,
hence, warrants an acquittal. Notably, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral
certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the
moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the
chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the
same.

Records show that after petitioner was arrested, the police officers immediately took custody
of the seized items. They also conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography thereof
in the presence of an elected public official, i.e., Brgy. Chairman Mendoza; a media representative, i.e.,
Griño; and a DOJ representative, i.e., Buhay, right at the place where petitioner was
arrested. Subsequently, PO1 Togonon delivered the seized items to PSI Llacuna for laboratory
examination, who, in turn, brought the same to EC Barcelona for safekeeping. In light of the
foregoing, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the seized dangerous drugs remained
unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been properly
preserved. Perforce, petitioner's conviction must stand.

707
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Hilario De Castro y Santos alias “Dacoy”

G.R. No. 243386, September 2, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.

FACTS:

Hilario De Castro was charged with violations Sec. 5 and Sec. 11 Art. II of R.A. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing, delivering,
transporting or distributing 0.02 gram of Metamphetamine Hydochloride contained in two small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets and for having in his possession, custody and control 0.02
gram of the same drug. Lozano was apprehended from a buy-bust operation conducted where
PO3 Manuel Amodia Jr. acted as poseur-buyer.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all
the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s decision ruling that non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21
does not invalidate the seizure and custody of the contraband. What is important is that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not De Castro’s guilt for violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of RA 9165 was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

708
 NO. Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation: and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).

However, in this case, it is evident that the police officers blatantly disregarded the
requirements laid down under Section 21 and they had no valid excuse for their deviation from the
rules.

It is true that the police officers marked the seized drugs at the place of arrest. Thereafter, to
avoid any possible commotion since they noticed that people were starting to come out, they decided
to bring the accused and the seized evidence to their office for proper inventory. They also said that
they did not have the necessary documents to conduct the inventory at the place of arrest that is why
they decided to move to the police office. The Court points out that, as testified by PO3 Amodia, none
of the three required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the
drugs. Neither were they present during the inventory of the seized drugs at the police office.

In addition, they offered nothing but a flimsy excuse for their deviation from the
requirements laid down under Section 21. They merely alleged that they transferred to the police
station because people started to come out and there might be a possible commotion.

The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised, thus
necessitating the acquittal of De Castro.

709
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Vernie Antonio y Mabuti

G.R. No. 243936, September 16, 2019

Carandang, J.

DOCTRINE:

Mere lapses in procedures do not invalidate a seizure if the integrity and

evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown to have been preserved.

FACTS:

Vernie Antonio was charged with violations of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, trading, administering,
dispensing, delivering, giving away to another, distributing one heat-sealed plastic sachet
containing Methamphetamine Hydochloride with a weight of 0.06 gram, and having in his
possession and under his control one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrocohloride weighing 0.09 gram. Antonio was apprehended in a buy-bust
operation where PO1 Elbert Byron Atilon acted as poseur-buyer. Antonio offered denial as
defense, alleging that that he was taking a rest beside his tricycle in Barangay Tejeros, Makati City,
when a group wearing civilian clothes invited him to their office. He denied the accusation against
him.

The Regional Trial Court found Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses
charged and gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers who were presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. The absence of a media or a Department of Justice
(DOJ) Representative during the inventory is not fatal to the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC’s decision; hence, this instant appeal. Antonio argued that the corpus delicti and all the
documents presented by the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt were never
properly identified in open court by the prosecution witnesses.

ISSUE:

710
 Whether or not Antonio’s guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. R.A. 9165 provides reasonable safeguards to preserve the identity and integrity of
narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21,
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 clearly outlines the post-
seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs. Proper procedures to account for each specimen
by tracking its handling and storage from point of seizure to presentation of the evidence in court
and its final disposal must be observed. Immediately after seizure and confiscation, the
apprehending team is required to conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the seized items
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative
or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of R.A. 9165
by R.A. 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if
after the amendment of R.A. 9165 by R.A. 10640, an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media.

The corpus delicti in this case are: (1) one sachet of shabu sold to the poseur buyer; and (2)
the two additional sachets confiscated from Vernie. It is, therefore, necessary that the identity and
integrity of the dangerous drugs are established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the shabu
presented in court must be the same shabu seized from him during the buy-bust operation and the
body search after his arrest.

It is gathered from the Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO1 Atilon and PO2 Gimena and
from the testimony of PO1 Gimena in court, that the inventory was conducted not at the place of
seizure and arrest, but in the police community precinct in the presence of Chairwoman Brillante.
The police precinct was near the place of the buy-bust operation. While the police officers testified
that the inventory was conducted at the police station and not at the place of arrest, the records do
not show why Chairwoman Brillante was the only witness present during the inventory. No
explanation was given as to the absence of a representative from the NPS or the media. Neither was
there any statement to prove that genuine and earnest efforts were exerted to secure their presence.

The prosecution evidence also left unanswered questions about the forensic chemist's
handling of the seized plastic sachets.

All in all, the prosecution did not prove with moral certainty the guilt of the accused-
appellant on both charges. Hence, Antonio is acquitted.

711
PRESERVATION OF CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Niña Caray y Emmanuel

G.R. No. 245391, September 11, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

Absent any acceptable explanation for the deviation from the procedural
requirements of the chain of custody rule, the corpus delicti cannot be deemed preserved.

FACTS:

Niña Caray y Emmanuel was charged with violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting
or distributing 0.73 gram of Metamphetamine Hydochloride contained in two heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets. Caray was apprehended from a buy-bust operation conducted where
PO3 Alexander Arguelles acted as poseur-buyer.

The Regional Trial Court found Caray guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. It ruled that the prosecution successfully proved all the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs to a moral certainty. Despite the absence of an elected official and a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ) during inventory, the integrity of the seized
items had been duly preserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision. It found that:
first, the seized items were marked at the place of arrest, contrary to appellant's claim; second,
PO3 Arguelles marked the items with his initials and the date of seizure, in compliance with legal
requirements; third, despite the absence of the required witnesses during the inventory of the
items, the integrity of the corpus delicti was duly preserved; finally, the totality of the prosecution
evidence and the parties' stipulations led to an unbroken chain of custody over the items in
question. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Caray’s guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

712
RULING:

NO. In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the accused is
the same substance presented in court. Indeed, the presence of the insulating witnesses during
inventory is vital. In the absence of these persons, the possibility of switching, planting, or
contamination of the evidence negates the credibility of the seized drug and other confiscated items.
Non-compliance with the requirement is, therefore, fatal to the prosecution's case.

In this case, it is a matter of record that only appellant and media representative Maeng
Santos were present to witness the inventory of the seized items. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals even noted the absence of any elected official and representative from the DOJ during
inventory. No explanation was offered for this omission. Absent any acceptable explanation for the
deviation from the procedural requirements of the chain of custody rule, the corpus delicti cannot be
deemed preserved.

Hence, Caray is acquitted.

713
CORPUS DELICTI IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Analyn Piedad Advincula

G.R. No. 201576, July 22, 2019

Carandang, J.

DOCTRINE:

Even when the illegal sale of a dangerous drug was proven by the prosecution, the
latter is still burdened to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti. In order to remove all
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence, the prosecution must establish to the very
least substantial compliance with the chain of custody requirement.

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to
the court.

FACTS:

This is an appeal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal and
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting Analyn Advincula y Piedad (accused-
appellant) of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to
another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer
for sale to Police Officer Jackson Caballero, a poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO EIGHT (0.008) [gram] of white crystalline
substance, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride known as "shabu", a dangerous drug.
One P200.00 bill was marked with a dot on the nose of former president Diosdado Macapagal
according to the Pre-Operation Report and Coordination Form prepared by PO2 Ireneo Salazar.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and imposed upon her the
penalty of life imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00. However, Accused-appellant argues that

714
the prosecution failed to establish compliance with the indispensable requirement of proving the
corpus delicti due to substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized drug subject of this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused appellant should be acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution failed to prove the corpus deliciti.

RULING:

YES. Basic is the rule that, for a conviction of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to
stand, the prosecution should have proven the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment. The prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the prohibited or
regulated drug or the corpus delicti.

In the case at bar, the lapses of the arresting police officers are significant and cannot be
ignored. There was no photograph and inventory of the seized items, and no representatives from
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media, and any elected public official during the marking of
the shabu. Furthermore, no explanation/justification was given by the buy-bust team why they did
not comply or observe the rule laid down in Section 21.

With a broken chain of custody together with the non-compliance by the police officers of
Section 21 cited above, there is serious doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti which constitutes
a fatal procedural flaw that destroys the reliability of the corpus delicti.

For failure of the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the unbroken chain of
custody of the drugs seized from accused-appellant, acquittal is in order.

715
HOW TO PROVE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Glecerio Pitulan Briones

G.R. No. 226486, January 22, 2020

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:’

To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution only needs to show that: (1) a certain
result has been established…and (2) some person is criminally responsible for it.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant was charged with direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso.
The Prosecution alleged that on April 20, 2003 the group of PO1 De Vera, PO1 Dionisio, and PO1
Monteroso aboard their marked police patrol mobile responded to a report of a group of armed
men aboard a Hyundai van acting suspiciously along General Avenue, Quezon City. When the
officers arrived at the location and spotted the vehicle. They ordered the van to halt. However, the
van gave chase instead until the officers overtook and blocked its path along Road 20. The officers
ordered the passengers to step out of the vehicle to which all of them complied except the driver,
the accused-appellant. This caused PO1 Monteroso to open the door opposite the driver to check
up on him only to be shot thrice to the chest by the accused-appellant. This led to a wrestle
among the officers and the assailants which resulted to P01 De Vera being shot. The accused-
appellant attempted then to escape only to encounter PO3 Cortez and his team. The latter
ordered them to stop and attempted to approach the former. However, the accused-appellant
open fired at him which caused the officers to fire back. There was a shoot-out that ensued and
one of the officers hit the van’s left tire. The van then hit an island at the intersection of Visayas
Avenue and Congressional avenue. The other van passengers turned out dead and only the
accused-appellant was arrested.

The Defense, on the other hand, merely denied that he was the driver and claimed that he
was sleeping in the van and was only awakened by the shootout, where he sustained wounds that
caused him to fall unconscious on the floor of the van. The next thing he knew, he was already in
the hospital or so he claims.

The RTC and the CA found him guilty of direct assault with murder of PO1 Aldy Monteroso,
citing treachery as a qualifying circumstance. In his appeal he argues that the Prosecution failed

716
to prove the corpus delicti of the crime by failing to conduct paraffin and ballistic testing and to
present the murder weapon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecution proved the corpus delicti of the crime.

RULING:

YES, this Court finds the Prosecution proved the corpus delicti of the crime. In People vs
Tuniaco, this court held that the presentation of the murder weapon is not indispensable to prove
the corpus delicti, as its physical existence is not an element of the murder. To prove the corpus
delicti, the prosecution only needs to show that: (a) a certain result has been established…and (b)
some person is criminally responsible for it. Here the Prosecution was able to fulfill the twin
requirements by first, presenting the death certificate of PO1 Monteroso stating that the cause of
death is a gunshot to the chest and second, by establishing the identity of the shooter by a clear and
positive testimony of a credible witness.

Wherefore, the assailed decision is MODIFIED to guilty of complex crime of direct assault
with homicide.

717
 D. Downgrading of Penalties

DOWNGRADING OF THE PENALTY IMPOSED FOR FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS

OF THE CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Domasig

G.R. No. 217028, June 13, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

A conviction in the crime of robbery with homicide requires that robbery is the
main purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.

FACTS:

On September 5, 2004, Gerald Gloriana testified that he was outside the City Mart along
Magsaysay Street with his friend, the 14-year-old victim. They had just finished buying and selling
plastic bottles and scrap materials. The victim put his earnings for the day, amounting to P300.00,
inside a plastic container which he then placed inside the cart which served as his makeshift bed
as he often slept on the streets. At around 11:00pm, Gloriana went down a nearby bridge to
defecate, leaving behind the victim who was sleeping inside the cart. Later, as Gloriana was
climbing up from under the bridge, he saw Benjamin Domasig standing over the sleeping victim.
Domasig then stabbed the victim several times before running away. Gloriana, shocked and
terrified, went back under the bridge where he spent the night in hiding. When the victim's body
was discovered the following morning, the police officers recovered the plastic container inside
the cart, but the money was missing. Gloriana further testified that he was approximately 6 to 8
meters away from the incident, but he recognized Domasig because the area was well-lit and
because of a conspicuous tattoo on the latter’s right arm. He added that he and the victim used to
be friends with Domasig.

For his part, Domasig denied robbing and killing the victim. He claimed that on September
5, 2004, he was at Albay and was working as a caller in a bingo game at an amusement park
where he had been employed since 2003. The manager prohibited workers from leaving the
grounds during work hours. Further, he denied knowing the victim and Gloriana.

718
 The RTC found Domasig guilty of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Domasig did not present any witness to strengthen his defense of
alibi and that it was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be present in Sorsogon
City on September 5, 2004. The CA likewise affirmed the conviction of Domasig. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of Domasig is proper.

RULING:

NO. A conviction in the crime of robbery with homicide requires that robbery is the main
purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking
of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In this case, a closer look
at the testimony of Gloriana failed to convince that indeed robbery had taken place. Based on his
testimony, Gloriana merely saw Domasig stab the victim, but he did not see Domasig actually took
the money which the victim allegedly had. Even assuming that the victim had P300.00 in his
possession when he was assaulted, it is not impossible that someone other than Domasig took the
money. Thus, it appears that Gloriana had no personal knowledge that the victim was robbed. The
element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost and stolen by
Domasig, was not adequately established. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence
presented to prove the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, does
not show that robbery had actually been committed.

What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution
to firmly establish the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the
time when the homicide is actually carried out. In this case, there was no showing of Domasig's
intention, determined by his acts prior to, contemporaneous with; and subsequent to the commission
of the crime, to commit robbery. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery, the
killing of the victim would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the
absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with homicide.
The information failed to allege any circumstance which would qualify the victim's killing to murder.
Thus, Domasig should be held liable only for the crime of homicide.

Hence, the SC downgrades Domasig’s conviction to the crime of homicide. Consequently,

Domasig is instead meted with the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of 6 years

719
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the
concomitant accessory penalties.

720
 E. Mistake of Fact

MISTAKE OF FACT

People of the Philippines vs. Esmael Gervero et. al

G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. The following requisites for such defense: (1) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable; (2) that it be a matter of fact; and (3) that it negate the culpability required to
commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with
respect to an element of the offense.

FACTS:

Based on the information filed, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with one another, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they
were then provided, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit Hernando Villegas,
Jose Villegas and Benito Basug Jr. with said firearms inflicting numerous gunshot wounds on
different parts of their bodies which caused their deaths immediately thereafter.

Based on the testimony of the witnesses, Hernando, Jose and Benito were on their way to
attend the wake of their colleague’s wife when they were gunned down by the CAFGU officers.
The accused said that they made a mistake in shooting Hernando, Jose, and Benito because they
thought that the three were members of the New People's Army (NPA).

The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses straightforward, credible, and in accord with the physical evidence. With regard to the
defense of fulfillment of duty, the trial court ruled that the attendant circumstances leading to the
killing of the three victims by the accused clearly showed the absence of the two essential
requisites for such defense to prosper. The court said that they undoubtedly exceeded in the

721
performance of their duties by immediately firing successive shots on the three unsuspecting
victims. The court also held that the defense of misencounter due to mistake of fact was
unbelievable. Lastly, the RTC concluded that the suddenness of the attack and the lack of
opportunity for the victims to defend themselves constituted treachery.

The CA affirmed the decision of RTC with some modification as to the amount of damages.
It pronounced that even in cases of arrest, the use of unnecessary force, the wantonly violent
treatment of the offender, and the resort to dangerous means, when such apprehension could be
done otherwise, were not justified acts. The appellate court opined that the accused were entirely
careless in not first verifying the identities of the victims; such negligence diminished the defense
of mistake of fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of fact.

RULING:

NO. The Court held that mistake of fact finds no application in this case. In Yapyuco vs.
Sandiganbayan, the Court has laid down the requisites for such defense to prosper, to wit: (a) that
the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

In this case, not all the requisites are complied with. First, there was no reason for the
accused not to recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area which was
illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. Also, the court said that it was not the
first time that the accused had seen the victims. Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified
himself. However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused continued to fire at
them. Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they
could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed
them with bullets. Fourth, contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims
were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative. Fifth, the accused
would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word "Amoy" which must be uttered in
response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether they were members of the NPA. However,
the victims could not have known the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony
that only he and his co-accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the

722
safe words to be used in their operation. All these circumstances negate accused-appellants' claim of
mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to eliminate the victims.

723
 F. Presumption of Regularity of Acts Done by Law Enforcement Officers

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF ACTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

People of the Philippines vs. Eddie Barte y Mendoza

G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

Courts are cognizant of the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties

of public officers. This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove
either of two things, namely: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2)
that they were inspired by any improper motive.

FACTS:

P02 Rico Cabatingan and other police officers conducted the buy-bust operation on the
basis of information received that the accused-appellant was engaged in the sale of shabu. At the
target area, PO2 Cabatingan, who acted as a poseur buyer met with the accused-appellant,
wherein he handed the buy bust money to the latter in exchange for a small sachet with white
colored contents. The other officers rushed at the scene and arrested the accused-appellant. P02
Cabatingan delivered the confiscated substance to the crime laboratory for laboratory
examination, which later on found the substance to be positive for the presence of a dangerous
drug.

On trial, the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused-appellant for violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. It ruled on the legal presumption that the official
duties had been regularly performed by the police; although no evidence has been produced to
prove compliance of the procedure, it held that it is not fatal to the State's cause on the validity of
the entrapment. On appeal, the appellate court, affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto.

ISSUE:

724
 Whether or not the accused was guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. Although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would not
automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only when there
is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved.

In this case, the State's agents who entrapped the accused-appellant and confiscated the
dangerous drug from him did not tender any justifiable ground for the non-compliance with the
requirement of establishing each link in the chain of custody from the time of seizure to the time of
presentation. Such non-compliance with the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal
because it cast doubt on the integrity of the evidence presented in court and directly affected the
validity of the buy-bust operation.

Likewise, anything short of observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what
the law required meant that the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the
State did not overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant.

The failure to prove the chain of custody should mean, therefore, that the Prosecution did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the sachet of shabu presented during the trial was the very
same one delivered by the accused-appellant to the poseur buyer.

725
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF ACTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

People of the Philippines vs. Stephan Cabiles y Suarez A.K.A Kano

G.R. No. 220758, June 7, 2017

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court stated that the direct account of law enforcement officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. It should be noted that
"unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any
improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the
operation deserve full faith and credit." Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive.

FACTS:

On November 3, 2005, an Information for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, was filed against accused-appellant
for the illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu. During
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The prosecution
presented the evidence stating that SPO4 Ernesto Gonzales (SPO4 Gonzales) of the Office of Chief
of Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Force (CAIDSOTG) received an
information that a certain "kano", herein accused-appellant, of Purok Narra Baybay, Barangay 8,
Bacolod City, was engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. He formed a team and conducted
a briefing for a buy-bust operation against the accused-appellant.

During the operation, PO1 Piano handed the buy-bust money to the accused-appellant,
which he placed in his pocket. Accused-appellant in turn handed to PO1 Piano a plastic sachet.
Immediately after the exchange, PO1 Piano called SPO4 Gonzales, as the pre-arranged signal that
the sale was consummated. Thereafter, PO1 Piano placed the accused-appellant under arrest.
While being frisked, police officers recovered the buy-bust money from his pocket. However,
according to the accused-appellant, at the time of the incident, he was at a "sari-sari" store buying
rice and sardines, when suddenly three men were looking for a certain Pablo Bautista. Accused-
appellant told the three men the location of the house of Pablo Bautista, but they frisked the
accused-appellant and placed him in handcuffs. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was brought to
police headquarters at Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City, and was subjected to a body search. But

726
when nothing was recovered from him, suddenly a policeman got an empty plastic sachet from
his drawer, and a certain Police Officer Grijaldo took out from his pocket a PhP 200.00 bill, which
was used as evidence in this case.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The CA
upheld the conviction of accused-appellant. Hence the present appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts erred in giving credence to the testimonies of PO1 Piano and
SPO4 Gonzales to establish the accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, the Court finds no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

The Court stated that the direct account of law enforcement officers enjoys the presumption
of regularity in the performance of their duties. It should be noted that "unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper motive or did not
properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit." Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.

Since in this case, the accused-appellant failed to present or refute the evidence presented
against him, therefore, the conduct of the operation of the police officers prevails and is presumed
regular. Time and again, this Court has accorded great weight to factual findings of the trial court,
particularly as regards credibility of witnesses, for it had the opportunity to observe first hand the
deportment and demeanor of witnesses and it was in a position to discern whether or not they were
telling the truth.

Hence, the Court finds no error on the part of the RTC and CA in upholding the presumption
of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.

727
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES OF THE
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

People of the Philippines vs. Rodel Belmonte

G.R. No. 224588, July 4, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties can be rebutted

by contrary proof, being a mere presumption: and more importantly, it is inferior to and
could not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

FACTS:

On July 3, 2010, a confidential informant came to the PNP Station 5 of Cagayan de Oro City
to inform precinct commander Gilbert Rollen that Rodel Belmonte was engaged in the selling of
drugs in Barra. Rollen then instructed SPO1 Gilbert Sabellina, PO1 Linard Carna and PO2 Jonrey
Satur to conduct a buy-bust operation. At about 1:30pm of that same day, the police officers and
the informant proceeded to Barra. When the informant saw Belmonte, he approached him and
asked if he would buy P500.00 worth of shabu. After receiving the P500.00 buy-bust money from
the informant, Belmonte got a sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his right
pocket and gave it to the informant. At that instance, PO1 Carna introduced himself as a police
officer to Belmonte and the latter was handcuffed and bodily frisked by PO1 Carna who found the
following: from his right pocket, 2 sachets containing a white crystalline substance and the
P500.00 buy-bust money; and from his left pocket, another 4 sachets containing traces of a white
crystalline substance. PO1 Carna was in possession of the confiscated items from the crime scene
until they reached the police station. At the police station, PO1 Carna, in the presence of SPO1
Sabellina, commander Rollen, and Belmonte, placed the markings "A LBC" on the sachet handed
by Belmonte to the informant; "B LBC" and "B1 LBC" on the 2 sachets found in Belmonte's right
pocket; and "C LBC," "C1 LBC," "C2 LBC," and "C3 LBC" on the 4 sachets found in his left pocket.
The letters "LBC" stood for PO1 Carna's initials. Instead of the inventory and the taking of
pictures of the confiscated items, PO1 Carna recorded in the police blotter the buy-bust operation
report. Then, the requests for the laboratory examination and the confiscated items were
delivered by PO1 Carna and PO2 Satur, the former having the possession of the confiscated items,
from the police station to the laboratory. However, because PO1 Carna was not in uniform that

728
time, PO2 Satur had the items received by the laboratory. On that same day, the qualitative
examination was conducted on said confiscated items which all gave positive results to the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

For his part, Belmonte asserted that at about 11:30am of July 3, 2010, he was at his
mother's house to pawn his live-in partner's cellphone. When his mother declined as she did not
have any money, he proceeded to his cousin's house which was adjacent to his mother's house.
While he was waiting inside his cousin's house, SPO1 Sabellina started kicking the door from the
outside and thereafter entered the house with PO1 Carna and PO2 Satur. PO1 Carna hit Belmonte
in his stomach and asked him, "Where is the shabu?" He was frisked but when the 3 police
officers did not find anything on him, they proceeded to his cousin's bedroom and upon coming
out therefrom showed him 3 empty sachets. The police officers asked him about the contents of
the sachets and when he answered that he did not know anything about it, he was handcuffed and
brought to the police station where he was questioned. Then, PO1 Carna and PO2 Satur arrived
informing him that they found 3 sachets of shabu, wrapped in cellophane and had markings, in
Belmonte’s house. The police officers asked P30,000.00 from him for his release; when he refused
to give in to their demand, he was brought to the crime laboratory.

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the police officers who were presumed to have
regularly performed their duties. It noted that Belmonte did not even attempt to present a
character witness to prove that he was a good person and was not engaged in any wrongdoing.
Hence, the RTC found Belmonte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

In affirming the decision of RTC, the CA ruled that despite Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165
was not strictly followed, the police officers substantially complied with the requirements therein
and sufficiently established the crucial links in the chain of custody. It held that the
noncompliance with some of the requirements did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs
seized as the chain of custody of the evidence was shown and proven to be unbroken. Thus, it
ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs were properly preserved
and remained unimpaired.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of Belmonte is proper.

RULING:

729
 NO. Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that the apprehending team shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the confiscated items in the
presence of the accused who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours
from confiscation for examination. The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with this
procedure does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: a) there is justifiable ground for
noncompliance; and b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
Nowhere in the law is it provided that the entry in the blotter is a valid substitute for the
requirement of an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items. In fact, their testimony
undoubtedly buttresses the fact that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
compromised. The conflicting testimonies of the apprehending team as to who had custody of the
confiscated items from the police station to the laboratory generate uncertainty and create doubt on
whether the evidence presented before the RTC were exactly the same items seized from Belmonte.
The obvious failure of the prosecution to establish through its witnesses the manner by which the
confiscated items were delivered by the forensic chemist to the RTC for presentation during the trial,
reinforces the conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been
compromised. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the procedure under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165
is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. Hence, the identity of the
corpus delicti in this case was not clearly established; there was a broken chain in the custody of the
confiscated items.

The SC cannot agree to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties by the police officers in this case. The police officers who entrapped Belmonte and confiscated
the dangerous drug from him failed to offer any justifiable ground for their patent failure to
establish each of the required links in the chain of custody; thus, compromising the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items. Simply put, the regularity in the performance of duty
could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records were replete with
indicia of their serious lapses. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
can be rebutted by contrary proof, being a mere presumption: and more importantly, it is inferior to
and could not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. If the prosecution has not
proved in the first place, all the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti,
then Belmonte deserves no less than an acquittal.

Wherefore, Rodel Belmonte is acquitted of the crimes charged.

730
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY VS. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Orlando Ramos Ordiz

G.R. No. 206767, September 11, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the conduct of police officers cannot trump the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

FACTS:

Orlando Ramos Ordiz was charged with violation Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing, delivering, transporting
or distributing a plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of a white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly called shabu, in a buy-bust operation conducted by
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at about 1:00 p.m. at Sampaguita Street,
Barangay Capitol Site, Cebu City.

The Regional Trial Court found Ordiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. According to the RTC, the prosecution was able to fulfill its burden of proof in
establishing all the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of RA
9165. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision ruling that the totality of the evidence
presented in the instant case indubitably confirms accused-appellant's guilt of the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordiz’s guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

731
 NO. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.

A closer look at the testimonies of SPO1 Ursal, Jr. and PO2 Capangpangan reveal that they did
not actually see firsthand the alleged sale of illegal drugs between accused-appellant Ordiz and the
alleged poseur-buyer, SPO1 Cerna, as they were positioned at some considerable distance away from
the area where SPO1 Cerna purportedly transacted with accused-appellant Ordiz. For this reason
alone, as there is reasonable doubt as to the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, accused-
appellant Ordiz's acquittal is warranted.

Aside from the foregoing, the acquittal of accused-appellant Ordiz is likewise warranted due
to the patent non-observance of the chain of custody rule. Moreover, there is no evidence providing
details on how the specimen was returned by the forensic chemist back to the evidence custodian. In
fact, the identity of the evidence custodian, assuming there was even a custodian, is unknown.

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, the Court stresses that the authorities
failed to observe literally ALL the mandatory requirements under Section 21 of RA 9165. Worse, the
prosecution failed to recognize these lapses and offer sufficient justification to warrant the non-
observance of these mandatory rules.

In convicting accused-appellant Ordiz, both the RTC and CA relied so much on the
presumption of regularity and the weak defense offered by accused-appellant Ordiz. It is well to
point-out that while the RTC and CA were correct in stating that denial is an inherently weak
defense, it grievously erred in using the same principle to convict accused-appellant Ordiz. The Court
stresses that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

Premises considered, the Court acquits Ordiz of the crime charged.

732
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY CANNOT OVERCOME PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline Garcia y Suing

G.R. No. 215344, June 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

FACTS:

A confidential informant went to the office of PDEA reported the illegal drug activity of
Garcia in Ilocos Norte, San Fernando City, La Union. The Regional Director organized a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation with IO1 Ancheta as the poseur buyer and I02 Gayuma as her back-
up, and five other members as perimeter back-up. The team together with the confidential
informant proceeded to the house of Garcia around 12:45am. They saw Garcia outside the house
and approached her. The CI introduced I01 Ancheta saying in Ilocano: “Manang Vangie, addatoy
dan, gumatang da ti shabu”. Garcia asked for the money and after I01 Ancheta handed her the
P500 buy bust money, Garcia gave I01 Ancheta one transparent plastic sachet containing shabu.
Immediately thereafter, they arrested Garcia and apprised her of her constitutional rights. I01
Ancheta searched Garcia and recovered from her the PS00 bill. I01 Ancheta marked the plastic
sachet and prepared the Certificate of Inventory outside the house of Garcia, in the presence of
Rico Valdez of DZNL and Danilo Nisperos, a Barangay Kagawad of Sevilla, San Fernando City who
affixed their signatures on the document. They took photographs of the evidence then proceeded
to their office. The confiscated items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

The RTC held that Garcia is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the conviction of Garcia stressing the presumption of
regularity on the part of the PDEA agents.

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Garcia proper?

733
RULING:

NO. The Court acquits Garcia for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Garcia was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. In order to convict a person charged with the crime
of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required
to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

In this case, there is serious doubt that the physical inventory of the seized illegal drugs and
the photographing of the same were conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the
place of the apprehension as required under Section 21 of RA 9165. According to the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest executed by I01 Ancheta and I02 Gayuma "that inventory and photograph of the items
confiscated from the subject was made at the place of arrest." On cross examination, IO1 Ancheta
confirmed that the place of arrest was outside the house of Garcia and that the inventory
immediately took place thereat. The prosecution offered into evidence a mere black and white
printed copy of a photograph. However, in the said photograph, it appears that the supposed taking
of inventory was not conducted outside the house of Garcia, as alleged by the prosecution. The
photograph depicts three persons situated inside a room enclosed by a wall. The photograph also
shows that the two women depicted therein were sitting on furniture situated in a room. The
photograph does not show that the seized items were placed on the cemented floor, as testified by
I01 Ancheta. Instead, the photograph shows a small table or cabinet being utilized by the PDEA
agents. Hence, the photograph submitted by the prosecution does not show that the alleged
inventory was conducted at the yard outside the house of Garcia, the alleged place of arrest.

Moreover, IOI Ancheta, testified that none of the witnesses required under Section 21 of RA
9165 was present at the time of the seizure and apprehension and that only Garcia; Valdez, a media
representative; and Nisperos, a Brgy. Kagawad of Brgy. Sevilla were present during the conduct of
the inventory. There was no representative from the DOJ. Further, the elected public official and
representative from the media appeared and participated only after the transaction occurred. No
valid justification was provided for such absence.

RTC and CA erred in convicting Garcia by relying on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

734
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

People of the Philippines vs. Jose Jamillo Quilatan y Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 218107, September 9, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties is not a tool designed to

coddle State agents unjustifiably violating the law or an excuse for the courts to shy away
from their duty to subject the prosecution's evidence to the crucible of severe testing to
ascertain whether it is enough to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.

FACTS:

Jose Jamillo Quilatan was charged with violations of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, trading, administering,
dispensing, delivering, giving away to another, distributing, dispatching in transit or transport
and having in his possession and under his control one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrocohloride weighing 0.12 gram. Quilatan was apprehended in a buy-bust
operation where PO2 Elbert Ocampo acted as poseur-buyer. Quilatan offered denial and alibi as
defense, and averred that his arrest was illegal.

The Regional Trial Court found Quilatan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses
charged and ruled that in the face of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions in favor of the police officers, Quilatan's alibi could not prevail. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC’s decision; hence, this instant appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Quilatan’s guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

735
RULING:

NO. Among the essential requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR are the presence
of the three required witnesses - namely, a media representative, a representative from the DOJ, and
any elected public official - and the immediate conduct of the physical inventory and photographing
of the seized items in the specified places allowed under the law.

Here, however, the buy-bust team miserably failed to comply with these requirements. A
perusal of the records and the evidence presented by the prosecution would show that, even
believing its version of a buy-bust operation, the buy-bust team made no effort at all to secure the
three required witnesses.

The practice of eagerly ascribing the veil of regular performance of duty in favor of the
apprehending officers - even in the face of their evident lapses in following the prescribed procedure
laid down by law - should not be tolerated. Here, the presumption of regularity cannot stand
because of the buy-bust team's brazen disregard of established procedures under Section 21 of RA
9165 and its IRR.

The above unjustified procedural deviations bring into question the identity and integrity of
the seized drugs. Hence, it is erroneous to state that the chain of custody remained intact and that
the guilt of Quilatan was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Quilatan's right to be
presumed innocent is upheld and he must be acquitted.

736
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY

Ma. Carmen Rosario Abilla vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227676, April 3, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the

context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty
or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when
nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct
of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the
presumption cannot arise.

FACTS:

NBI Agent Dungog informed SI Kintanar about an illegal drug activity. Dungog and
Kintanar, together with two officers meet an informant. The informant assured the team that he
could transact with “Chicky” for the purchase of shabu. Chicky instructed the informant to meet
her at Villa Fortunata. After inspecting the sachet of shabu, SI Kintanar handed the marked money
to Chicky. Thereafter, Agent Dungog and the rest of the team rushed to their location and arrested
Chicky. Agent Dungog handcuffed Chicky and then informed her of her constitutional rights. SI
Kintanar inspected Chicky's black leather bag and found the marked money and another sachet of
shabu inside the bag. From the crime scene up to the NBI Office, SI Kintanar had in his custody all
the seized items.

The accused contended that she was in their rented apartment having dinner with her
live-in partner, Mark Solon when her former live-in partner, Wedmark Merced called her up. She
told Mark Solon, that Wedmark asked money from her. Mark Solon allowed her to meet Wedmark.
When she arrived at the agreed place, she saw Wedmark and had a short conversation during that
time. Thereafter, Wedmark immediately hugged her tight as she struggled so hard. Wedmark told
her that he was arrested a while ago and advised her to tell them where Mark Solon is. She saw
Miguel Dungog who was her former suitor and asked what it was all about. Then, she was
handcuffed by Dungog. She also noticed that somebody took her bag. She was brought to the NBI
office.

737
 RTC convicted Abilla of the crimes in violation of Section 5 and 11 of Republic Act No.
9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Abilla, holding that the prosecution was able to
prove the elements of the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies
in this case.

RULING:
NO. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot apply. In such
case, the innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.

Considering the procedural lapses which the buy-bust team committed in handling the
confiscated drugs, a presumption of regularity cannot arise in the present case. This was settled in
People vs. Kamad, where the Court held that "presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance
of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies
when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot
arise."

Therefore, there is no such presumption that may arise in the present case. The presumption
that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers simply cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence granted to the accused by the Constitution. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt and overcome his
presumed innocence.

This burden of the prosecution does not change even if the accused's defense is weak and
uncorroborated. Such weakness does not add strength to the prosecution's case as the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight. It is settled that the conviction of an accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.

In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's
deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, Abilla must perforce be acquitted.

738
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY

People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Lozano y Leanado

G.R. No. 227700, August 28, 2019

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

Absent clear and convincing evidence of ill-motive on the part of the police officers,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. However, such
presumption obtains only where there is no clear deviation from the regular performance
of duty.

FACTS:

Reynaldo Lozano y Leanado was charged with violations Sec. 5 and Sec. 11 Art. II of R.A.
9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for selling, dispensing,
delivering, transporting or distributing 0.04 gram & 0.03 grams of Metamphetamine
Hydochloride, a dangerous drug and for having in his possession, custody and control eight (8)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing 0.02 gram, 0.02 gram, 0.02 gram, 0.03
gram, 0.02 gram, 0.02 gram, 0.03 gram, & 0.02 gram of the same drug. Lozano was apprehended
from a buy-bust operation conducted where SPO1 Allan Llantino acted as poseur-buyer.

The Regional Trial Court heavily relying upon the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers' duty, found Lozano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
sale and illegal possession of prohibited drug. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision
ruling that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offenses charged. Hence,
this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lozano’s guilt for violation of Section 5 and Section 11 of RA 9165 was
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

739
RULING:

NO. Jurisprudence states that it is essential that the State establish with moral certainty the
identity of the prohibited drug, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of
the corpus delicti of said offenses. The prosecution has the burden to show beyond reasonable doubt
an unbroken chain of custody over the seized items and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

In this case, we find certain unjustified deviations from the mandatory procedure laid down
in the chain of custody rule, which create clouds of doubt with regard to the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items presented in court.

While the apprehending officers were able to give an explanation as to their failure to
conduct the inventory and photographing immediately in the place of arrest, the records, including
the courts a quo's assailed decisions, are strikingly silent as to the presence of two of the three
mandatory witnesses during the inventory of the seized items. Here, the prosecution submitted that
the inventory at the police station was conducted in the presence of a certain Ka Maeng Santos, a
media representative. It is undisputed that no DOJ representative and elective public official were
present. Neither was there an explanation offered for such non-compliance nor an allegation that
earnest efforts were done to prevent such critical procedural lapse.

Foremost, as correctly cited by the RTC in its Consolidated Decision but not properly applied,
it may be true that absent clear and convincing evidence of ill-motive on the part of the police
officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails. However, such
presumption obtains only where there is no clear deviation from the regular performance of duty.
The presumption arises only when nothing in the record suggests that the police officers deviated
from the standard conduct of official duty required by the applicable law. Here, as stated above, the
police officers committed unjustified deviations from the clear and simple requirements of R.A. No.
9165 and its IRR. Hence, such presumption cannot be applied.

740
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

People of the Philippines vs. Garry Briones

G.R. No. 239077, March 20, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the

stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.

FACTS:

An asset arrived at the police station and reported that there was a person who was selling
shabu. SPO1 de Chavez, decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. They proceeded to the barangay
hall of Brgy. Gulod. Afterwards, the team proceeded to the Fil Oil Gasoline Station. After five
minutes, alias "Garry" arrived. The asset and Garry talked, and latter handed the asset a plastic
sachet and uttered, "point three yan, two five yan." Thereafter, PO1 Carandang arrested Garry.

At the police station, SPO1 Adelantar prepared the request for laboratory examination and
for drug test. Then, he delivered the documents and the confiscated item to the Batangas
Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. As shown in the Chemistry Report the specimen tested
positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

As for the accused; his mother asked him to buy viand at the carinderia in front of their
house. When he reached the carinderia, police officers Chavez and Yap arrived and handcuffed
him. The two police officers were looking for Garry's neighbor, Ranie, who was in Mindoro at that
time. Accused was brought to the police station where he learned that he was charged with
violation of R.A. 9165. Accused testified that prior to his arrest, he knew SPO1 de Chavez and
SPO1 Yap because he saw them at the cockpit. Occasionally, PO1 Carandang, who was also known
as "Buttercup," joined the two at the cockpit. Accused did not have any altercation with the police
officers prior to his arrest.

RTC find the accused guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The CA
affirmed in toto Garry's conviction.

741
ISSUE:

Whether Garry's guilt for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

NO. The accused is accordingly acquitted. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty is a constitutionally protected right. The burden lies with the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by establishing each and every element of the crime
charged in the information as to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.

Here, reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the
lapses in the procedures undertaken by the buy-bust team is fundamentally unsound because the
lapses themselves ire affirmative proofs of irregularity. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent.

In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's
blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165. The Court has ruled in
People vs. Zheng Bai Hui that it will not presume to set an a priori basis what detailed acts police
authorities might credibly undertake and carry out in their entrapment operations. However, given
the police operational procedures and the fact that buy-bust is a planned operation, it strains
credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the presence of the required witnesses
pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked, photographed and inventoried the seized item
according to the procedures in their own operations manual.

All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of illegal drugs
due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-bust team in the
seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug. In other words, the prosecution was not able to
overcome the presumption of innocence of Garry.

742
 G. Quantum of Proof in Criminal Cases

QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Arnel Calahi, Enrique Calahi, and Nicasio Rivera vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 195043, November 20, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Owing to the basic constitutional principle that an accused in a criminal prosecution

is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, it is well-established that the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.

FACTS:

Enrique Calahi, Arnel Calahi, and Nicasio Rivera (Nicasio), including accused Nicolas
Macapagal were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In the course of the
proceedings, petitioner posits that the integrity and identity of the seized items were tarnished
because the arresting officers failed to inventory and photograph the seized items in petitioners'
presence. That the prosecution also failed to show that the arresting officers marked the items
immediately after the alleged seizure; and that the identity of the drug is consequently suspect.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that noncompliance thereof
will not necessarily render the seized items inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

RULING:

743
 NO. Owing to the basic constitutional principle that an accused in a criminal prosecution is
presumed innocent until proven otherwise, it is well-established that the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. When the
prosecution fails to overcome the presumption of evidence by failing to present the required amount
of evidence, the defense need not even present evidence on its behalf.

The records reveal that the instant case does not merely involve irregularities in the marking
of the confiscated shabu, but also the complete absence of evidence indicating that it was even
marked in the first instance. The lack of due marking upon confiscation renders the identity of the
shabu, the corpus delicti presented in court, highly questionable. It cannot satisfy the standard of
proof required in criminal cases and thus warrants the acquittal of petitioners.

744
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN DRUG CASES

Rolando Dacanay y Lacaste vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017

Leonardo-De Castro, J.

DOCTRINE:

In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by
law and, (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. To warrant
conviction of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession
or control of said articles.

FACTS:

On October 23, 2002, the members of Task Force Anti-Vice (TFAV) Unit were patrolling at
Fernandez and Samat streets in Mandaluyong City. They noticed petitioner, Rolando Dacanay,
whom they knew had previous criminal drug record, holding a plastic sachet in his right hand.

As the TFAV Unit neared petitioner, the latter ran away and tried to throw away the
plastic sachet as he was boarding a tricycle. The TFAV Unit members caught up with him and
Genguyon arrested the petitioner.

Upon arrest, a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was recovered from
the petitioner where Genguyon placed his initials. Later on, petitioner was charged of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs when the seized item yielded positive results for shabu.

As a defense, petitioner argued that he was working as a tricycle driver that day and he
was being framed-up. He stated that the member of the TFAV Unit picked up a small plastic sachet
near him and illegally arrested him. The RTC and the CA found him guilty of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

745
 Whether or not petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drug.

RULING:

YES, the petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drug. In a prosecution for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1)
that the accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that
such possession is not authorized by law and, (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug. To warrant conviction of the accused or that animus possidendi existed together with
the possession or control of said articles.

In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it must be shown that
petitioner was in possession of an object or item that is identified to be a prohibited drug and that
his possession was not authorized by law. These elements have been satisfactorily established.
Genguyon who apprehended petitioner testified that from three meters or thereabouts, he sighted
petitioner holding a plastic sachet on his right hand. When they approached him, he ran away to
ride a tricycle and was about to throw the plastic sachet. In People vs. Suzuki, the Supreme Court
held that mere possession of a prohibited substance is a crime per se placing the burden of the
evidence on the accused to prove that his possession was lawful.

Evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of its witnesses, chiefly that of
Genguyon; documentary evidence, particularly, Genguyon's Sworn Statement and P/Sr. Insp. Forro's
Chemistry Report No. D-2096-02E; and the corpus delicti, the plastic sachet of shabu confiscated
from petitioner.

Notably, petitioner did not offer any evidence to prove that he had authority to possess the
said drug, and it is well-entrenched that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi of the prohibited drug, sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of satisfactory explanation.

746
QUANTUM OF PROOF FOR CASES FOR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

Virgilio Labandria Awas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

In prosecutions for acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if
credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Youth, and, as is more applicable
herein, immaturity of the victim is generally a badge of truth that the courts cannot justly
ignore.

FACTS:

The information charged Petitioner with rape through sexual abuse. It was alleged in the
information that on or about January 24, 2010 in Valenzuela City, above-named accused with
lewd design, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of one AAA, 10 years
old. Petitioner entered his plea of not guilty. AAA declared that Petitioner is the boyfriend of her
sister. Sometime in January 2010, he was in their house in Valenzuela City. Petitioner called her
and brought her inside the room. He then made her lie down beside him and again touched her
vagina. Petitioner then put on his shoes and warned her not to tell her mother and father about
the incident. AAA was wearing leggings and a pair of panties at the time of the incident. Petitioner
never removed anything from her when he touched her. At the time of the incident, they were the
only person inside the room. AAA's brother came to know about the incident when he saw her
crying in a corner of their house. Her brother told her mother about the incident. Her mother
called the police and Petitioner was later apprehended. Her mother gave her statements at the
police station. A medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, received a request for
Physical/Genital Examination on the person of AAA. His examination states: "ano-genital
examination reveals essentially normal gross findings."

In his defense, Petitioner stated that his girlfriend called him up and told him to go to their
house to give him something. While he was in front of his girlfriend's house, the mother and
brother of his girlfriend went out of the house and accused him of raping AAA. He denied having
entered the house of his girlfriend on January 24, 2010. There were occasions, however, prior to
January 24, 2010 that he was able to enter his girlfriend's house.

747
 The RTC found the Petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness. CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt Petitioner’s guilt.

RULING:

NO, the Prosecution did not fail to prove beyond reasonable doubt Petitioner’s guilt.

In prosecutions for acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible,
is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. Youth, and, as is more applicable herein, immaturity
of the victim is generally a badge of truth that the courts cannot justly ignore.

The contention of the Petitioner that the charge was a mere fabrication of the victim's
mother who held a grudge against him deserves scant consideration. The contention is nothing but a
desperate attempt to escape the consequences of his depravity. No mother would contemplate
subjecting her very young daughter to the humiliation, disgrace, exposure, anxiety and tribulation
attendant to a public trial for a crime against chastity that in all likelihood would result in the
incarceration of the accused unless she was motivated solely by the honest and sincere desire to have
the person responsible apprehended and punished.

Therefore, Petitioner is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for acts of lasciviousness.

748
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Jaime Segundo y Iglesias

G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires "that unwavering exactitude be observed

in establishing the corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit
drug." Moreover, "every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established." The
rule on chain of custody plays this role in buy-bust operations, warranting that there are
no doubts on the identity of evidence.

FACTS:

A tip was received by the Mandaluyong Police Station from a confidential informant about
Segundo's sale of illegal drugs in Barangay Malamig, Mandaluyong City to which a buy-bust team
was created. Two P100.00 bills served as marked buy-bust money. A police officer gave the buy-
bust money to Segundo. In return, Segundo handed him one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet with shabu which prompted the other members of the team to make the arrest. He was
charged and later on found guilty by the RTC of selling dangerous drugs.

In his appeal, Segundo assailed the broken chain of custody in handling the alleged
confiscated shabu. It was shown that when the items were marked, no representative of the
media and the barangay were present. It was also admitted that no pictures of the alleged
confiscated items were taken.

Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling on the ground that non-compliance
with the rules was permissible provided that the reasons were justifiable.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Segundo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

749
RULING:

NO. Every criminal prosecution begins with the constitutionally protected presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused that can only be defeated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment" is crucial in defeating the
presumption of innocence.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires "that unwavering exactitude be observed in

establishing the corpus delicti-the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug."
Moreover, "every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established." The rule on chain of
custody plays this role in buy-bust operations, warranting that there are no doubts on the identity of
evidence.

Although the miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs is solely by itself not a reason for
acquittal, this instance accentuates the importance of conformity to the chain of custody, that the
law enforcers in this case miserably failed to do so. A doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti
concomitantly exists.

For this reason, this Court acquits Segundo as his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

750
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Pablo Arposeple y Sanchez and Jhunrel Sulogaol y Datu

G.R. No. 205787, November 22, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental

constitutional right that should be upheld at all times. In convicting the accused all the
elements of the crime charged must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of
proof rests upon the prosecution and the accused must then be acquitted and set free
should the prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. The
burden is not on the accused to prove his innocence.

FACTS:

Arposeple and Sulogaol were both charged with three counts of violation of certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9165 or otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Nothing was mentioned in the certificate of inventory as to the marking of the seized items.
There were already markings on the seized items when these were submitted to the laboratory
for examination but not one of the prosecution witnesses testified as to who had made the
markings, how and when the items were marked, and the meaning of these markings. P/Supt.
Agas also stated that the evidence was obtained on 21 September 2005 at around 4:00 a.m.
Bagotchay delivered the evidence to the laboratory, notably already marked, on the same day at
3:05 p.m.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arposeple and Sulogaol are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.

RULING:

751
 NO. In all criminal cases, the presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental
constitutional right that should be upheld at all times. In convicting the accused all the elements of
the crime charged must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof rests upon the
prosecution and the accused must then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution not
overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. The burden is not on the accused to prove his
innocence.

Equally significant as establishing all the elements of violations of R.A. No. 9165 is proving
that there was no hiatus in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs and paraphernalia. It would
be useless to still proceed to determine the existence of the elements of the crime if the corpus delicti
had not been proven beyond moral certainty.

In this case, the prosecution failed to explain how and when the seized items were marked.
Also glaring was the hiatus from the time the seized items were inventoried to the time these were
delivered to the laboratory. The lapse of eleven (11) hours for the submission of the seized items to
the laboratory was significant considering that the preservation of the chain of custody vis-a-vis the
contraband ensures the integrity of the evidence incriminating the accused, and relates to the
element of relevancy as one of the requisites for the admissibility of the evidence. The records of
these cases were also bereft of any showing of the required photographs.

This much is clear and needs no debate: the blunders committed by the police officers
especially on the highly irregular manner by which the seized items were handled, generates serious
doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value of the items. Considering that the seized items
constitute the corpus delicti of the offenses charged, the prosecution should have proven with moral
certainty that the items confiscated during the buy-bust operation were actually those presented
before the RTC during the hearing

Under the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the government, stringent
compliance with Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR is fully justified. The breaches in the procedure
committed by the police officers, and left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the appellants as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.

The Court is thus constrained to acquit the appellants based on reasonable doubt.

752
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Emma Bofill Pangan

G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

The illicit drugs, itself, comprise the corpus delicti of the charge and its existence is
necessary to obtain a judgment of conviction. Therefore, it is important in these cases that
the identity of the illegal drugs be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must
establish the existence of the illicit drugs. It must also prove that the integrity of the corpus
delicti has been maintained because the confiscated drug, being the proof involved, is not
promptly recognizable through sight and can be tampered or replaced.

FACTS:

On April 10, 2003, morning, PO1 Carillo, an Intelligence Operative of the Capiz Police
Provincial Office, conducted a test-buy operation on Pangan at B&T Merchandising. PO1 Carillo
was able to buy a sachet of shabu worth P1,000.00 from Pangan and was also instructed to return
in the afternoon of that day as more shabu would allegedly be delivered to her via Fastpak.

PO1 Carillo reported the information and applied for a search warrant which was later
issued. In the afternoon, the team went to Pangan's store and they saw Pangan went out to get a
delivery package from Culili and placed the delivered Fastpak pouch on top of a table. By virtue of
the warrant, PO1 Carillo’s team went to the store and inspected the Fastpak package. Pangan
suddenly became unruly, trying to grab the package which prompt the police officers to bring
Pangan out of the store to continue the search.

A Noli Me Tangere book was found inside the package wherein the pages of which were
intentionally cut to serve as "compartments" for the three big sachets of suspected shabu.
Another small pack of suspected illicit drugs, magazines of a 0.45 caliber pistol, ammunition, a
magazine pouch, and a holster were also found on the drawer. The confiscated items were turned
over for marking and the inventory was prepared, which was signed by the third-party witnesses,
who were present during the search. Pictures of the premises and the seized items were also
taken. Later on, it was verified that the seized items tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

753
ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the corpus delicti of the
crime charge beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES, the prosecution was able to prove the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime charge
beyond reasonable doubt. The illicit drugs, itself, comprise the corpus delicti of the charge and its
existence is necessary to obtain a judgment of conviction. Therefore, it is important in these cases
that the identity of the illegal drugs be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must
establish the existence of the illicit drugs. It must also prove that the integrity of the corpus delicti
has been maintained because the confiscated drug, being the proof involved, is not promptly
recognizable through sight and can be tampered or replaced.

Sufficient evidence to prove the following elements should be presented:

1. the actual possession of an item or object which is identified to be a

prohibited drug;

2. such possession is not authorized by law; and

3. the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug.

The prosecution presented evidence that in the morning of April 10, 2003, PO1 Carillo
initially conducted a successful test-buy which served as basis for the application of a search
warrant. In the test-buy, Pangan disclosed to PO1 Carillo that more drugs would be delivered to her
via Fastpak in the afternoon that day. Her words were confirmed when indeed, Culili delivered a
Fastpak package to Pangan, which prompted PO1 Carillo and other members of the buy-bust team
to effect the search leading to the seizure of the illegal drugs.

This Court is not persuaded with Pangan's defense. She was found to have been in possession
of the illicit drugs without authority to do so. Her mere possession establishes a prima facie proof of
knowledge or animus possidendi enough to convict her as an accused in the absence of any
acceptable reason for its custody.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody
from the time the sachets of illicit drugs were confiscated until they were forwarded to the

754
laboratory for examination and presented as evidence in court. Minor deviations from the mandated
procedure in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a guilty defendant.

755
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Sagana y De Guzman

G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of
the crime, be established beyond doubt. Its identity and integrity must be proven to have
been safeguarded. Aside from proving the elements of the charges, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold was the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.

FACTS:

On July 21, 2010, police officers coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency to act on a tip by a confidential informant. A buy-bust operation will be carried out in
Ernesto Sagana's residence at Muslim Tondaligan, Dagupan City. Sagana was arrested with his
wife and another lady who also peddled him shabu.

During the operation, body search was conducted where the marked money and five
more plastic sachets of shabu were retrieved. PO3 Salonga marked the articles with his initals,
"LCS." and made the confiscation receipt before delivering Sagana to the police station. The was
entered in the police blotter and the confiscated items were taken photos in the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice, media representatives, and an elected barangay
official. The plastic sachets tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride based on the
chemistry reports afterwards.

On the other hand, the defense posed frame-up and extortion against the police officers
in their version of the events. Sagana was charged of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs and was found guilty thereof by the RTC which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

756
 Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the existence of the corpus delicti of
the crime beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, prosecution was not able to establish the existence of the corpus delicti of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt. It is of paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus
delicti of the crime, be established beyond doubt. Its identity and integrity must be proven to have
been safeguarded. Aside from proving the elements of the charges, the fact that the substance
illegally possessed and sold was the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

In a criminal case, this Court commences with the law's own standpoint on the standing of
the accused that "in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt." The burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Thus, it
must depend "on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense."

The prosecution has the burden of establishing the identity of the seized items. Considering
the sequence of the people who have dealt with the confiscated articles, the prosecution failed to
justify why three other significant persons were not presented as witnesses. In effect, there is no
reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility
of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.

Furthermore, the prosecution cannot simply rely on the saving clause provided for under
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. While non-conformity with the
strict directive of Section 21 is not essentially prejudicial to its claim, the lapses committed by the
police officers "must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved."

In this case, however, the prosecution failed to offer any justifiable reason why the police
officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21. It also failed to prove that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items were maintained despite the failure to conform to the
directives of the law. "The prosecution's sweeping guarantees as to the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs . . . will not secure a conviction."

The prosecution in this case offered testimonies corroborating the narration of the alleged
sale of illicit drugs that paved the way for Sagana's arrest. However, there were apparent lapses in
the chain of custody that cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. Hence, the
prosecution failed to establish that the miniscule amounts of 0.12 grams and 0.59 grams of

757
dangerous drugs presented as evidence in court were the very same ones allegedly seized and
retrieved from Sagana.

758
FACTS WHICH SHOW PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Willington Rodriguez y Hermosa

G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as,
excluding the possibility of error, to produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In
other words, the conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.

FACTS:

Police Officer I Raymond Escober and other police officers were on an entrapment
operation called Oplan Bugaw to eliminate prostitution in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.

While parking their vehicles at the target area, PO1 Escober was flagged down by
Willington Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three pickup girls. PO1 Escober
readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked P500.00 bill as payment which signaled his backup to
enter the scene and aid in the arrest of Rodriguez.

In his defense, Rodriguez denied that he had offered a girl for sexual purposes to PO1
Escober and said that he was only selling cigarettes in that area when he was arrested by the
police officers.

Rodriguez was charged and later found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large-scale
trafficking by the RTC. The accused-appellant appealed that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to lack of evidence, but the CA affirmed the trial court's
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rodriguez is guilty of trafficking in persons beyond reasonable doubt.

759
RULING:

NO, Rodriguez is not guilty of trafficking in persons beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error,
to produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. In other words, the conscience must be satisfied that
the accused is responsible for the offense charged. Reasonable doubt does not refer to any doubt or a
mere possible doubt because everything in human experience is subject to possible doubt. Rather, it
is that state of the case which, after a comparison of all the evidence, does not lead the judge to have
in his mind a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused, there must be an acquittal.

PO1 Escober's direct testimony showed the fact that he had in his possession the pre-marked
P500.00 bill and that he was able to retrieve it from Rodriguez after the arrest. There was no
mention about how Rodriguez allegedly called on the three pickup girls and offered them for sexual
purposes. We must remember that suspicion, no matter how strong, must never sway judgment. It is
pivotal in criminal cases that we evaluate the evidence for the prosecution against the required
quantum of evidence in criminal cases. When there is reasonable doubt, the evidence must be
interpreted in favor of the accused. Under the equipoise rule, if the evidence admits two
interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must
be given the benefit of the doubt and should be acquitted.

Where there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even
though his innocence may be doubted since the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can only be overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

To conclude, because of this doubt that lingers in our mind, Rodriguez must be acquitted.

760
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CASES OF RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez

G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof rests on the State.
Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles
appellant to an acquittal.

FACTS:

Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez was charged with rape through sexual intercourse under
paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A against AAA. According to the Information filed against him the
said incident happened in the City of Manila. It was stated therein that they made her drink liquor
which made her dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise unconsciousness, bringing
her to a room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will. Tionloc pleaded
"not guilty in his arraignment. "AAA" testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she
was having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After some
time, she felt dizzy, so she took a nap. She then woke up seeing Meneses raping her. She felt pain
but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife now lying on top of a table nearby would be
used to kill her if she resisted. Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and
shivering, appellant approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did
not reply, the appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to
reposition her body. "AAA" then left the appellant's house and immediately returned to the house
she shared with her live-in partner.

Appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a
drinking session with his cousin, Gerry Tionloc. After a while, Meneses and "AAA" arrived and
joined in their drinking session. Meneses and "AAA" then went inside his bedroom and continued
drinking while he went out of the house to buy food. When he returned and entered his bedroom,
he saw Meneses and "AAA" having sex. They asked him to leave. Meneses then came out of the
bedroom followed by "AAA" who was holding a bottle of "rugby," which she brought home with
her.

761
 The Regional Trial Court ruled that the prosecution successfully established the crime
through the testimony of "AAA," which was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC with
modification that interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of finality of the CA's Decision until fully paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted of rape since the prosecution was not
able to establish the required quantum of evidence in order to overcome the presumption of
innocence.

RULING:

YES. The prosecution had to overcome the presumption of innocence of appellant by

presenting evidence that would establish the elements of rape by sexual intercourse under
paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, to wit: (1) the offender is a man; (2) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (3) such act was accomplished by using force, threat or intimidation. Force,
as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in
mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter
as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral
kind as the fear caused by threatening the girl with a knife or pistol." The evidence of the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The
burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of
evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.

It this case, the prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had
sexual intercourse with "AAA," a woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there
was no evidence to prove that appellant used force, threat or intimidation during his sexual congress
with "AAA." She testified that appellant and Meneses are her good friends. Thus, she frequented the
house of the appellant. No allegation whatsoever was made by "AAA" that Meneses or appellant
employed force, threat or intimidation against her. No claim was ever made that appellant
physically overpowered, or used or threatened to use a weapon against, or uttered threatening
words to "AAA." While "AAA" feared for her life since a knife lying on the table nearby could be
utilized to kill her if she resisted, her fear was a mere product of her own imagination. There was no
evidence that the knife was placed nearby precisely to threaten or intimidate her.

762
 Therefore, the Court ruled that Juan Richard Tionloc is acquitted due to insufficiency of
evidence.

763
QUANTUM OF PROOF FOR RAPE CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Ludigario Belen y Marasigan

G.R. No. 215331, January 23, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially

in sensitive cases of rape, as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not
to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.

FACTS:

Belen is charged in two separate information with Qualified Rape against AAA, an eight (8)
year-old minor. It was aggravated by the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and dwelling. Belen, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to each
charge. The defense presented AAA, Police Senior Inspector Cabrera, the medico-legal officer, and
BBB, AAA’s mother. Belen denied the charges and AAA is BBB’s daughter.

The Regional Trial Court decided finding Belen to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of simple rape. Appellant filed his appeal with the CA.

CA rendered its Decision which denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Prosecution has proven Belen guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES, it is proven that Belen is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

764
 Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, states the elements of the crime of
rape as follows:1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances: a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; b. When the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse
of authority; and d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

It was clearly established that the first rape incident was accomplished with the use of a knife
which proved that appellant employed threat in AAA's life. As to the second rape, while there was no
force and intimidation used by appellant on AAA, the fact that appellant is the live-in partner of her
mother and with whom she had been living with since she was 2 years old, established his moral
ascendancy as well as physical superiority over AAA. It is doctrinally settled that the moral
ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and
intimidation since, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation. We have been consistent in giving credence to testimonies of child victims especially in
sensitive cases of rape, as no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of
her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma
and scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.

765
QUANTUM OF PROOF FOR CRIMINAL CASES - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES, WHEN
ADEQUATE

People of the Philippines vs. Jose Belmar Umapas y Crisostomo

G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

The consistent rule has been that circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction
if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

FACTS:

In the evening of November 30, 1998, around 11 o'clock, appellant mauled his wife
Gemma Gulang Umapas (Gemma) and, with the use of alcohol intended for a coleman or lantern,
doused her with it and set her ablaze at their home located at Lower Kalakhan, Olongapo City.
Gemma was brought to James L. Gordon Memorial Hospital for treatment by a certain Rodrigo
Dacanay who informed the attending hospital personnel, which included Dr. Arnildo C. Tamayo
(Dr. Tamayo), that it was appellant who set her on fire. Gemma was found to have suffered the
following injuries: contusions on the left cheek and on the lower lip, lacerations on the right
parietal area and on the left temporal area, and thermal burns over 57% of her body. Due to the
severity of the injuries, the victim died on December 5, 1998 from multiple organ failure
secondary to thermal burns. On December 1, 1998, SPO1 Anthony Garcia (SPO1 Garcia) was able
to interview the victim at her hospital bed. Though she spoke slowly with eyes closed, Gemma
was said to be coherent and agreed to give a statement about the incident which included her
identifying her husband, Umapas, as her assailant. Gemma was asked if she felt that she was
dying, and she said "yes.” SPO1 Garcia reduced her statement in writing and the same was
attested thru the victim's thumbmark. A nurse who was present when the statement of the victim
was taken was signed as a witness. Appellant, for his part, narrated that on November 30, 1998,
he was with a certain Rommel fishing in Kalakhan. When appellant went home, there was a

766
commotion, but he claimed not to know what the commotion was all about. There were many
people in the vicinity of their house. He then learned from the neighbors who were outside their
house that his wife was brought to the hospital but was not told why. His four children were in
their house and they told him that their mother is in the hospital. When he learned about this, the
appellant allegedly dressed up to go to the hospital, but he was not able to go because he was
stopped by the people from the barangay. He was instead brought to the police precinct and was
detained. Appellant later on learned that he was a suspect in his wife's death. He claimed that he
was not able to talk to his wife before she died or visit her at the hospital. He was not even able to
visit the wake of his wife because he was already detained. He, however, believed that his wife
pointed him as the one who did wrong to her because his wife suspected him of womanizing
while he was working at EEI. Appellant averred that they had petty quarrels and his wife was
always hot tempered, and she even asked him to choose between work and family. Appellant
added that he just chose to ignore her and took a vacation. While he was on vacation from work,
he earned a living by fishing. He maintained that he was out fishing, and not in their house, on
November 30, 1998 when the incident occurred. Upon arraignment, the appellant pleaded not
guilty.

RTC found the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide. Appellant appealed the trial
court's decision before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed
the appealed decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court and CA erred in convicting the appellant in the basis of
circumstantial evidence.

RULING:

NO, the trial court and CA is correct in convicting the appellant in the basis of circumstantial
evidence.

Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when
circumstantial evidence can also sufficiently establish his guilt. The consistent rule has been that
circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the

767
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in
whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Evidence
as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is the
doctrine of independently relevant statements.

In the instant case, the testimonies of: (1) SPO1 Belisario that during his investigation
immediately after the crime was reported, he went to the crime scene and was able to talk to
Ginalyn Umapas, the daughter of the victim, wherein the latter told him that Umapas was the one
who set her mother ablaze inside their house, (2) Dr. Tamayo that a certain Rodrigo Dacanay told
him that Umapas was the one who mauled and set Gemma ablaze, and (3) SPO1 Garcia that he took
the statement of Gemma which he reduced into writing after the same was thumb marked by
Gemma and witnessed by the hospital nurse, can be all admitted as circumstantial evidence. While
Ginalyn Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay or the hospital nurse were not presented to prove the truth of
such statements, they may be admitted not necessarily to prove the truth thereof, but at least for the
purpose of placing on record to establish the fact that those statements or the tenor of such
statements, were made. Thus, the testimonies of SPO1 Belisario, Dr. Tamayo, and SPO1 Garcia are in
the nature of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Ginalyn
Umapas and Rodrigo Dacanay made such statement, and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial.
In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not
apply.

768
FACTS WHICH SHOW MORAL CERTAINTY

People of the Philippines vs. Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim

G.R. No. 222965, December 6, 2017

Marites, J.

DOCTRINE:

In order that identification be deemed with moral certainty enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence, it must be impervious to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. Such distinctiveness is achieved through identification evidence which
encompass unique physical features or characteristics like the face, voice or any other
physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

FACTS:

Antonio Lim, Mary Lim and Cherry Lim were on their way to their house on board a Nissan
vehicle. With them were their driver Rene Igno and Oliz, their helper. When they were near Edwin
Andrews Airbase, Igno stopped the car to avoid bumping into a motorcycle with three persons on
board. The three men, later identified as Ali, Hassan, and Amat, approached the Nissan vehicle
and told the passengers that they were policemen. They ordered Antonio and Igno to transfer to
the back of the vehicle and sit with Oliz, Mary, and Cherry. The passengers were told that they
would be brought to the police station. Thereafter, the three-armed men boarded the Nissan
vehicle with Amat in the driver's seat, Ali beside him, and Hassan at the back with the other
passengers. Once inside, Ali instructed Hassan to handcuff Igno and Antonio.

Due to the buildup of traffic at the intersection after the Sta. Maria police station, Mary was
able to escape. Amat continued to drive towards Pitogo and then veered towards the beach. There,
the occupants were ordered to alight from the vehicle. Oliz was able to escape when she saw a
woman walking nearby. She then told the woman that her employer was being kidnapped. Thus,
they contacted the authorities.

Before the police arrived, Oliz heard a commotion outside and saw bystanders mauling Ali.
Oliz told the people around that he was their abductor. When the police arrived, Ali was turned
over to the authorities who brought him to the police station together with Oliz.

RTC found Ali guilty of violating Article 267 of the RPC. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

769
ISSUE:

Whether the accused was identified with moral certainty.

RULING:

YES. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity. In order that

identification be deemed with moral certainty enough to overcome the presumption of innocence, it
must be impervious to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. Such distinctiveness is achieved
through identification evidence which encompass unique physical features or characteristics like the
face, voice or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity. In the
case at bar, it is unquestionable that Ali was identified with moral certainty. Oliz was able to
distinguish and identify accused considering their proximity inside the vehicle and the duration of
the captivity. Thus, she was intimately familiar with Ali's facial features and voice-enough to lend
credibility to her identification of the accused.

Ali's contention that Oliz was only able to identify him after reading the newspaper is
erroneous. During cross-examination, she merely stated that she became aware of Ali's name after
reading the dailies.

Clearly, the only information Oliz derived from newspapers or third-party sources is the
name of the accused. It was reasonably expected that she would be oblivious of Ali's name because
the latter was a stranger to her prior to the abduction. Nevertheless, Oliz was able to sufficiently and
consistently identify Ali as her abductor even if she did not know his name. Further, Ali challenging
his identification is absurd considering that he himself admits his presence during the abduction.
Instead of refuting the version of Oliz, Ali's testimony in fact corroborates its material points. He
admitted that he was with Hassan and Amat when their motorcycle stopped in front of the Nissan
vehicle; and that the three decided to board the vehicle and take control. Ali merely denied his
participation feigning that Hassan coerced him.

This, however, is refuted by the categorical and straightforward testimony of Oliz that it was
Ali who was giving commands to his companions. Thus, he could not have been an unwilling
participant as he was in fact the one calling the shots. Further, even if Ali were to be believed,
nothing in his testimony shows that Hassan exerted such force or coercion or uttered threats that
would have deprived Ali with the free exercise of his will. Absent any showing that Oliz was
motivated by ill will to falsely testify against Ali, her testimony should be granted credence especially
since it was candid, straightforward, and devoid of any material inconsistencies.

770
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Ariel Calvelo y Consada

G.R. No. 223526, December 6, 2017

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

In all prosecutions for violations of R.A No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous
drug itself. The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the
subject matter of the sale, i.e., the prohibited or regulated drug, has been preserved; hence,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous
drug to prove its case against the accused. The prosecution can only forestall any doubts
on the identity of the dangerous drug seized from the accused to that which was presented
before the trial court if it establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item.

FACTS:

The accused-appellant Ariel Calvelo was charged with violation of Section 5 of RA 9165.
Evidence for the accused showed that an informant gave the tip to the Laguna Police that accused
was selling shabu. A buy-bust operation was conducted where PO2 Villanueva acted as the
poseur-buyer and the informant was the middleman. The accused was apprehended immediately
after the sale and the shabu was marked on board the vehicle in the presence of Ariel. In his
defense, Calvelo argued that he was framed-up and the evidence against him were planted.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged, which was later affirmed by the
CA. In this appeal, he challenged his conviction and claimed that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity and integrity of the confiscated drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the corpus delicti
with proof beyond reasonable doubt.

771
RULING:

YES, the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the corpus delicti with proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In all prosecutions for violations of R.A No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drug itself. The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the
subject matter of the sale, i.e., the prohibited or regulated drug, has been preserved; hence, the
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug to prove its
case against the accused. The prosecution can only forestall any doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drug seized from the accused to that which was presented before the trial court if it
establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item.

What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the
object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same
drugs seized from the accused. Valuation of the records applying the "objective test" will prove that
the prosecution was able to establish beyond moral certainty the details of the transaction that took
place between Villanueva and Ariel from the offer to purchase shabu until the consummation of the
sale. Consequently, the claim of Ariel that the poseur-buyer failed to present evidence on how the
illegal drugs were recovered - raising doubts about a buy-bust having been actually conducted and
warranting a suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted - miserably weakened in the light of
the convincing and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Villanueva had first-hand knowledge of what transpired during the transaction with Ariel.
She actually dealt with Ariel, i.e., from receiving the shabu from him to her actual payment for the
delivered item. Indeed, the prosecution was correct in presenting Villanueva to fortify its case
against Ariel as she personally knew the details of the transaction that took place on the night of 27
November 2005. There was apparently no need for the prosecution to present the informant if only
to determine whether there was a prior drug deal between him and Ariel. The sale, to stress, was
between Ariel and Villanueva.

772
ESTABLISHING PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Lim Ching

G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the
seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain
of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody
over the dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation
in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

FACTS:

On June 29, 2003, a buy-bust team was formed after the conduct of surveillance on the
suspected illegal drug activities of Manuel Lim Ching, as well as a test-buy wherein a civilian asset
purchased one sachet of suspected shabu worth ₱300.00. On the afternoon of the same day, the
team proceeded at the house of Ching and PO1 Lim bought a sachet of suspected shabu worth
₱500.00 from Ching. Later, Ching was arrested for selling shabu.

After a subsequent search of the premises, sachets of alleged drugs were found inside
and outside the house as well as drug paraphernalias. The sachets of shabu were sealed and
labeled "MLC-1 to MLC-9" afterwhich, they were brought to the Northern Samar Police Provincial
Office, Camp Carlos Delgado, where P/Supt. Tonog signed four Receipts for Property Seized as
witnessed by barangay officials.

On July 9, 2003, the drug specimens were delivered to PDEA office in Tacloban where it
was received and acknowledged and was later turned over to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory
Office for examination. Later on, it was confirmed that the substance inside eight out of the nine
sachets (marked as MLC-1 through MLC-6, MLC-8 and MLC-9) were positive for
methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu, an illegal drug.

Upon arraignment, Ching pleaded not guilty and proceeded to deny the charges leveled
against him. He claimed that he was framed-up and that he was very close with P/Supt. Tonog,

773
but the latter bore personal grudges against him. The RTC found him guilty of of violating
Sections 11, 12, and 5 of RA No. 9165, which was upheld by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish the corpus delicti of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, prosecution was not able to establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt. Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the
seized drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over
the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the
corpus delicti.

The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved.

In this case, Ching prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance
with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in that: (a)
the sachets of drugs seized from his house were not properly identified as to which among them
were connected to his particular offense; (b) no photographs were taken of the items taken from his
house; (c) no sealing of the seized drugs took place; and, (d) it was not established who was
entrusted with the safekeeping of the specimens before their presentation in court and what
precautions were taken to ensure their integrity and value.

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
seized dangerous drugs/paraphernalia which were left unjustified, thereby casting reasonable
doubt on their integrity.

All told, the breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary

774
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Case law states that the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.

775
ESTABLISHMENT OF MORAL CERTAINTY IN DRUGS RELATED CRIME

People of the Philippines vs. Jonas Geronimo y Pinlac

G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same.
It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug
from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

FACTS:

In April 2010, the police officers received a tip from a confidential informant that Jonas
Geronimo was peddling illegal drugs in Caloocan City. A buy-bust operation was organized in
cooperation with PDEA and PNP.

Geronimo arrived at the target location, took out from his right pocket a transparent
plastic sachet containing a suspected shabu, and handed it over to the poseur-buyer, who, in turn,
paid him with the buy-bust money. At the signal of the officer, Geronimo was later on arrested and
subsequently frisked. The buy-bust money was recovered as well as marijuana leaves wrapped in
a newspaper.

The team proceeded to the headquarters in Quezon City, and the confiscated items were
supposedly marked, photographed, and inventoried by IO1 Crisanto Lorilla in the presence of
Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz. Afterwards, the specimens were delivered to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for testing and were later revealed to have tested positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other wrapped specimen tested
positive for the presence of marijuana, all dangerous drugs.

Geronimo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of RA 9165 and this was affirmed by the appellate court in toto. Hence, this appeal.

776
ISSUE:

Whether or not the identity of the prohibited drugs has been established with moral
certainty to convict the accused-appellant of violation of RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, the identity of the prohibited drugs has not been established with moral certainty to
convict the accused-appellant of violation of RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt. It is essential that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any
unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of
RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds -will not
render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. In
other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. In People vs. Almorfe, the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity
and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People vs. De Guzman, it
was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because
the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.

There were inconsistencies in the statements of the members of the apprehending team as to
why the requisite inventory and photography were not done immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the dangerous drugs and at the place of Geronimo's arrest. While the law allows that
the same may be done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, the police

777
officers must nevertheless provide justifiable grounds therefor in order for the saving clause to apply.
Here, the apprehending officers failed to discharge that burden.

Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance
with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Geronimo's acquittal is
perforce in order.

778
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Hilario Lamsen vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227069, November 22, 2017

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

FACTS:

The prosecution alleged that Aniceta owned a parcel of land located at Valenzuela City,
covered by a TCT and registered under her name. On September 7, 2001, Aniceta passed away,
leaving behind her nieces and surviving heirs, Teresita and Carmelita. After Aniceta's death,
Teresita went to the former's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of the subject property,
but the same was allegedly nowhere to be found.

Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of loss, and concurrently executed an

extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Aniceta. Teresita also filed a petition for the issuance of
second owner's duplicate copy before the RTC. The said petition, however, was dismissed on the
basis of the opposition of Lamsen, accused herein, who claimed that the original copy of the
owner's duplicate title could not have been lost because it was with him.

Meanwhile, the RD informed Teresita that somebody requested for the registration of a
deed of sale involving the subject property. Thus, she proceeded to the RD but was informed that
the requesting party had withdrawn all the papers; hence, she asked for the Book of the RD to
photocopy the withdrawal aforementioned. Thereafter, she went to the Notarial Section of Manila
to get a certified true copy of the subject deed but was given a mere photocopy thereof, since the
original was no longer on file. She then submitted the photocopy of the deed to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination, as the signatures of Aniceta and Nestor thereon appeared to be
forged. Hence, Lamsen was charged with the crime of falsification of public documents.

779
ISSUE:

Whether or not Lamsen is guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged.

RULING:

NO. In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise establish the fact of falsification or forgery by clear,
positive, and convincing evidence, as the same is never presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only
be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine
signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.

In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of
falsification or forgery. While Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person, and that there is a certainty that the
subject deed was falsified, the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and inconclusive, as it
is inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report. In the said Report, which Batiles himself
issued after examining the allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles found that no definite conclusion
can be rendered because the documents submitted by the prosecution were mere photocopies of the
original.

While it is true that the courts can rely on circumstantial evidence in order to establish the
guilt of the accused, the circumstantial evidence which the courts a quo relied upon in this case did
not sufficiently create moral certainty, since they appear to be too insignificant and unconvincing.

Thus, the accused shall be acquitted.

780
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Anastacio Hementiza y Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 227398, March 22, 2017

Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE:

While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

FACTS:

Palconit and other police officers conducted a buy-bust operation with SPO2 Abalos as a
leader, when a confidential informant told them that a certain Anastacio was selling drugs.
Palconit as the poseur-buyer approached accused-appellant and proceeded to commence the
operation. Thereafter, Abalos and the other police officers rushed to the scene where they
recovered the marked money and plastic sachets containing shabu. Subsequently, accused-
appellant and the seized items were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
After examination, a report was issued confirming that the substance was identified for shabu.

On trial, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the accused-
appellant and added that the failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Section 21 of the
said law, on the handling of confiscated illegal drugs, as well as its IRR, was not fatal and would
not render accused-appellant' s arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was guilty for the crimes charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

781
 NO. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug
must be established with moral certainty.

In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the
apprehending officers provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards to the rule on chain of custody. The
records are bereft of showing that an inventory of the seized items was made; the marking was not
done at the place of seizure, neither the apprehending team photographed the contraband in
accordance with law. Further, there is no evidence as to how the illegal drugs were brought to court.
Fabros merely testified that she made a report confirming that the substance contained in the
sachets brought to her was positive for shabu.

Due to the procedural lapses committed by the apprehending team the chain of custody was
not established, therefore creating a reasonable doubt on whether the shabu seized from accused-
appellant was the same shabu that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and
eventually offered in court as evidence.

The Court concluded that the apprehending team's omission to observe the procedure
outlined by R.A. No. 9165 in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impaired
the prosecution's case.

782
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Patricio y Castillo, Alias “Ningnay”

G.R. No. 202129, July 23, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is true that where no improper motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. Such
presumption, however, obtains only where there is no deviation from the regular
performance of duty. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the
standard conduct of official duty required by law. Conversely, where the official act is
irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. Hence, given the obvious evidentiary
gaps in the chain of custody, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
cannot be applied in this case. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of
custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence
of the accused.

FACTS:

On 23 April 2004, Police Officers of Capiz Police Provincial Office conducted a buy-bust
operation at Capiz Emmanuel Hospital. There, police officer handed Evelyn a pouch containing
money amounting to ₱20,000.00. In turn, Evelyn gave him a brown envelope supposedly
containing shabu. Immediately after the exchange, Evelyn was arrested. Thereafter, Evelyn was
led to the parking area where the rest of the apprehending team converged. The brown mailing
envelope was opened in front of her, revealing two (2) large transparent plastic sachets of
supposed shabu, weighing 4.37 and 4.31 grams, respectively.

Afterwards, Evelyn was brought to the Roxas City Police Station. She was bodily searched
by two policewomen and found another big plastic sachet of suspected shabu, weighing 4.37
grams, inside the secret pocket of her pants. The seized items were turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Iloilo City. After laboratory examination, the specimens were found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

783
 For the defense, the accused denied the allegations and said that she was just framed up by
Ronnie whom she lends money two months ago.

The RTC found Evelyn guilty of the crimes charged. The trial court was unconvinced that
Evelyn was framed up. It ruled that an illegal sale of dangerous drugs had indeed taken place; and
that the corpus delicti was positively identified during its presentation in court. The CA affirmed
the decision with some modification as to the penalty imposed. According to the CA, there was no
reason for PAIDSOFT and PDEA to accuse Evelyn of something she was not guilty of; and, besides,
she failed to cite any motive for the arresting officers to frame her up. It also opined that
testimonies of police officers who conduct buy-bust operations are generally accorded full faith
and credit as they are presumed to have performed their duty in a regular manner.

ISSUE:

Whether Evelyn’s guilt for the crimes charged was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The court cited the case of People vs. Gatlabayan wherein the Court had the occasion to
state that it is not unaware of the drug menace besetting our country and the direct link of certain
crimes to drug abuse. The unrelenting drive of our law enforcers against trafficking and use of
illegal drugs and other substance is indeed commendable. Those who engage in the illicit trade of
dangerous drugs and prey on the misguided members of the society, especially the susceptible youth,
must be caught and properly prosecuted. Although the courts are committed to assist the
government in its campaign against illegal drugs, a conviction under the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 can only be obtained after the prosecution discharges its constitutional burden to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Also, the Court held that, as vanguard of constitutional guarantees, they are duty bound to
uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence, without prejudice to how notorious or
renowned a drug personality an accused is perceived to be.

All told, The Court find that the prosecution failed to: (1)overcome the presumption of
innocence which accused-appellant Evelyn enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3)
establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (4) offer any explanation as to why
the provisions of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with. Consequently, we are constrained
to acquit Evelyn based on reasonable doubt.

784
FACTS WHICH SHOW PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Viray

G.R. No. 206398, November 5, 2018

Tijam, J.

DOCTRINE:

Jurisprudence dictates that the identity of the prohibited drug must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, since it is an integral key part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Consequently, there must be compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 in order to prove such
identity.

FACTS:

Accused was allegedly apprehended by the police when the accused sold a sachet of
“shabu” to an undercover agent. However, the apprehending team failed to comply with the
safeguards provided under Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165. Moreover, the apprehending team did not
provide any justifiable reason for non-compliance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, jurisprudence dictates that the identity of the prohibited drug must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, since it is an integral key part of the corpus delicti of the crime.
Consequently, there must be compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 in order to prove such identity or
at least a justifiable reason for such non-compliance which is not present in the case.

785
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Hilario Nepomuceno y Visaya

G.R. No. 216062, September 19, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The only way by which the State could lay the foundation of the corpus delicti is to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the illegal sale or illegal possession of the dangerous
drug by preserving the identity of the drug offered as evidence against the accused.

FACTS:

In this case, the arresting officers who conducted the buy-bust operation failed to take
photographs and make inventories of the seized drugs as directed by Section 21 of RA 9165. To
justify such failure, the arresting officers testified that there was no camera available.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused may still be convicted for violation of RA 9165.

RULING:

NO. The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
and of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs. To discharge its burden of proof, the State should
establish the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself.

In fine, the dangerous drug is itself the corpus delicti. The only way by which the State could
lay the foundation of the corpus delicti is to establish beyond reasonable doubt the illegal sale or
illegal possession of the dangerous drug by preserving the identity of the drug offered as evidence
against the accused. The State must see to it that the custody of the seized drug subject of the illegal
sale or of the illegal possession was safeguarded from the moment of confiscation until the moment
of presentation in court by documenting the stages of such custody as to establish the chain of

786
custody, whose objective is to remove unnecessary doubts about the identity of the incriminating
evidence.

Although strict compliance with the requirements of Sec. 21 of RA 9165 may not always be
possible, the lapses must be recognized and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.

Although the testimony seemingly indicated that the arresting officers were thereby
attempting to explain their lapses, particularly the failure to take photographs of the confiscated
drug as directed in the law, the supposed unavailability of a camera was obviously improbable
simply because almost every person at that time carried a mobile phone with a camera feature.

787
IDENTITY OF THE DRUGS IN DRUGS CASES IS ESSENTIAL FOR CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Alecarte

G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The identity of the drugs in drug cases is needed to be established in order to

convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

The accused was apprehended after a successful buy-bust operation after the accused sold
drugs to the poseur-buyer. However, the inventory and photographing of the seized drug was not
done in the presence of any witness as provided by the law and the same non-compliance was not
given any justification by the apprehending officers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, in cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty. The prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the
accused is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to the chain of
custody must be accounted for. Here, there is no compliance under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 because
there were no witnesses present as required by law. Consequently, the guilt of the accused cannot be
established beyond reasonable doubt.

788
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Marcelo Sanchez y Calderon

G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.

FACTS:

The prosecution testified on the following facts:

On December 2016, Police Inspector Alberto Gatus (PI Gatus) directly received an
information from an informant that a certain “Kiting” was engaged in illegal drug trade.
Thereafter, PI Gatus assigned PO1 Bautista to coordinate with PDEA to conduct a buy-bust
operation. PO1 Ignacio was designated as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Flores as his backup.

At 7 o’clock in the evening of the same date, the buy-bust team arrived at the place of
operation. They approached Kiting and PO1 Ignacio handed the buy-bust money to him who, in
turn, placed the money inside his right pocket and, thereafter, gave PO1 Ignacio the plastic sachet.
PO1 Ignacio then lit a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal, prompting PO1 Flores to approach them.
PO1 Ignacio showed the plastic sachet to PI Gatus and placed it inside another plastic sachet of
suspected shabu and marked the same with his initials "AI." After the arrest, the buy-bust team
proceeded to take the pictures of Kiting and the plastic sachet of suspected shabu. At the police
station, investigator PO1 Bautista booked Kiting and asked the latter to identify himself to which
he answered, "Marcelo Sanchez." PO1 Bautista also received the buy-bust money and the plastic
sachet of suspected shabu from PO1 Ignacio. He then prepared the inventory of the seized items
and the requests for laboratory examination and drug dependency examination. The specimen
tested positive for methylampethamine hydrochloride as per the Chemistry Report.

The specimen contained in a plastic sachet presented in court was marked “AI-MS”. RTC
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision. Hence, the present appeal.

789
ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance
that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved.

In this case, nowhere in the testimony was it mentioned that PO1 Ignacio marked the
specimen with "AI-MS." There is now doubt whether the sachet marked with "AI," as testified to by
the very witness who placed the said marking, was the same sachet marked with "AI-MS" which was
brought to the crime laboratory and ultimately presented in court.

Conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The
identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.

790
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Allan Lumagui y Maligid

G.R. No. 224293, July 23, 2018

Martires, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of innocence of an accused is a fundamental constitutional right

that should be upheld at all times.” In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.”

FACTS:

On 25 March 2010, the PNP Cabuyao form two teams to separately conducted buy-bust
operations on Rueda and alias "Ninang." On that same day, the team proceeded to an abandoned
resort at Calamba where the sale transaction was to take place. The asset proceeded to the resort
gate where Rueda was waiting. Rueda asked the asset if he would "get" and the latter replied that
he would "get worth P200.00" at the same time handing to Rueda the P200.00 marked money.
When Rueda called out someone and the accused came out with a plastic sachet which he handed
to Rueda who, in turn, gave it to the asset. Immediately after the asset parted from Rueda and
accused-appellant, the buy-bust team rushed to arrest Rueda and accused. The policeman
handcuffed Rueda and confiscated the buy-bust money from him. The plastic sachet sold by
Rueda to the asset was also marked by the police.

The buy-bust team bodily searched accused-appellant and found five plastic sachets of
drugs. It was only after the marking of the seized items that the Pansol barangay officials were
called to the crime scene and the incident was entered in the barangay blotter. Forensic
examination revealed that the specimen mentioned were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

791
 The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. The court held that the prosecution was able to
prove that accused was arrested in a legitimate buy-bust operation. The court further ruled that
the defense failed to overcome the presumption that the police officers had performed their duty
with regularity.

The CA denied the appeal. The court held that the defense failed to show that the buy-bust
team was stirred by illicit motive or failed to perform their duty, hence, their testimonies deserve
full faith and credit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lumagui’s guilt for violation of Sections 11 and 26 of RA 9165 was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The Court held that the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and the accused must
then be acquitted and set free should the prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in
his favor. Concomitant thereto, the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own strength and
not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Rule 133, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence specifically provides that the degree of proof required to secure the accused's conviction is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, which does not mean such a degree of proof that excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

The fact is underscored that the records of these cases are replete with proof showing the
serious lapses committed by the police officers. "Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of
the shabu in view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody; thus, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty accorded to the apprehending officers by the courts below cannot
arise." Even granting that the defense presented by accused-appellant was inherently weak or that
the record is bereft of any showing that there was ill motive on the part of the police officers in their
conduct of the alleged buy-bust operation, these matters cannot outweigh the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent, of which great premium is accorded by the fundamental law.

792
PROVING GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Juliet Rivera Otom

G.R. No. 225786, November 14, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but
more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. Non-compliance of which will
result to the acquittal of the accused by failing to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Rivera was successfully apprehended by the buy bust team and filed an information
against her under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, as amended. However, there was no compliance
with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of PO 1 De Leon, not one of the witnesses
required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachet was allegedly seized from
Rivera. They only called a representative from the media at the police station. They also did not
give any justifiable reason for the absence of the three required witnesses during or immediately
after the buy-bust operation for purposes of physical inventory and photograph of the seized item.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused can be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, the presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but
more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the
three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that
would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust
operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert

793
the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation
and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA
9165. Consequently, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

794
QUANTUM OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH GUILT OF ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Dominador Espinosa y Pansoy

G.R. No. 228877, August 29, 2018

Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE:

Only moral certainty, and not absolute certainty, is required for a conviction.

FACTS:

Dominador, herein accused-appellant was charged with parricide. As witness of the

prosecution, the mother of the 6-months old victim Junel and live-in partner of accused, testified
that she left Junel under appellant’s care. That appellant called her from the phone to inform her
that Junel had fallen off the cradle and died; and that when she immediately went home, she
found appellant seated before the lifeless body of Junel, noting that Junel’s mouth had injuries, his
upper lips and chest had cigarette burns and his chest had hematomas, she was unconvinced that
Junel had really fallen off the cradle. The prosecution also presented the Medico-Legal report of
Dr. Felimon. Dr. Felimon testified that the injuries were not sustained merely from falling off a
cradle.

By way of defense, Dominador testified that Junel had fallen off a cradle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dominador is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide.

RULING:

YES. Only moral certainty, and not absolute certainty, is required for a conviction.

Here, the circumstances bear restating. First, appellant was the only adult present at the
time of the incident. Second, Junel suffered several hematomas and cigarette burns on different parts

795
of his body which were inconsistent with the alleged accidental falling off the cradle. Third, the
medico-legal report revealed that Junel had sustained injuries which could not have been caused by
mere falling off the cradle. Thus, even if there was no direct evidence presented the attendant
circumstances as enumerated all point to appellant as the guilty person. The Court is morally
convinced that the appellant is guilty.

796
REASONABLE DOUBT ENTITLES THE ACCUSED TO AN ACQUITTAL

People of the Philippines vs. Pacifico Sangcajo, Jr.

G.R. No. 229204, September 5, 2018

Bersamin, J.

DOCTRINE:

The State must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To do so,
the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence, not on the weakness of his
defense. Every reasonable doubt of his guilt entitles him to an acquittal.

FACTS:

The factual antecedents according to the prosecution are as follows:

On January 30, 2009, then 24-year old AAA was at accused's house. Accused and AAA were
drinking beer because it was AAA's birthday. After consuming two large bottles of Red Horse beer
together, AAA felt dizzy and sleepy. AAA fell asleep on accused’s “papag”. However, AAA was
awakened when she felt someone on top of her, who turned out to be accused. AAA struggled to
get up from the "papag" and from the hold of accused, but the latter held her hands and pinned
down her feet with his thighs. She could not shout as she was so weak. Accused then pulled down
AAA's shorts and panty and spread her legs. Thereupon, accused inserted his penis into AAA's
vagina, which caused her pain.

On February 1, 2009, AAA submitted herself to medical examination. The medico legal
report showed the following remarks: "fresh healing deep laceration of the hymen at eight o'clock
position", "bleaded posterior position" and "findings are compatible with recent vaginal
penetration".

Accused denied the charges and alleged that it was a consensual sexual intercourse. RTC,
found accused guilty of rape. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

797
RULING:

NO. The presumption of innocence in favor of an accused in a criminal case is a basic

constitutional guarantee. It demands that the State must establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. To do so, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence, not on the weakness of his
defense. Every reasonable doubt of his guilt entitles him to an acquittal.

SC held that there are several circumstances that cast serious doubt on the finding of
Pacifico’s guilt for rape.

First, AAA recalled being roused from sleep by Pacifico's holding both her hands down with
his hands and pinning her legs down with his thighs and removing her shorts and undergarments at
the same time, spreading her legs, and then sexually penetrating her. The scenario thereby depicted
was palpably improbable, if not physically impossible.

Second, the medico-legal report did not contain any reference to any injury to her hands or
any other part of her body. It appears without doubt, too, that she tendered no showing of her
resistance except her bare assertion.

And, lastly, the lower courts' justification for their rejection of Pacifico's defense that the
sexual intercourse had been consensual was unfair and unreasonable. The lower courts should not
wonder why he did not present independent evidence of his romantic relationship with
AAA. Consensual sexual intercourse may also emanate from mutual lust.

798
QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED

People of the Philippines vs. Federico Seneres

G.R. No. 231008, November 5, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Compliance to Section 21 of R.A. 9165 is required in order to prove that the accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in drug cases.

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of violation of
R.A. 9165 because he was apprehended selling shabu to undercover police as tipped by the
informant. However, the apprehending team failed to comply with Sec. 21 of the R.A. 9165 as
amended which requires that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (2) an elected public official; and
(3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, there is non-compliance Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 as amended and the same non-compliance is
not justifiable in the present case which is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, the quantum of proof required to convict the accused is not
satisfied, therefore, he must be acquitted.

799
IDENTITY OF THE DRUGS IN DRUGS CASES IS ESSENTIAL FOR CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Nader Acmad

G.R. No. 231843, November 7, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The identity of the drugs in drug cases is needed to be established in order to

convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACSTS:

The accused was successfully apprehended in the buy-bust operation after he allegedly
sold drugs to the poseur buyer. However, during the inventory and photographing there is non-
compliance to the three-witness rule as provided by Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and there is no
justifiable reason for non-compliance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, in cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is
essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be established with moral
certainty. The prosecution must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the
accused is exactly the same substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to the chain of
custody must be accounted for. Here, there is no compliance under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 because
there were no witnesses present as required by law and there is also no justifiable reason for non-
compliance. Consequently, the guilt of the accused cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt.

800
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

Lamberto Marinas y Fernando vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 232891, July 23, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (2) such possession was not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.

The prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited drug,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs so as to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs on account of
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment that the illegal drugs
are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

FACTS:

On October 5, 2010, Police officers of PNP San Pedro Laguna responded to the report and
conducted a monitoring of the area. While on their way to the house of their asset, they saw two
male persons, the one at the doorway was showing to the other person standing outside the door,
a plastic sachet which appeared to be shabu. The police officers immediately approached the two
suddenly one person ran away and fled while the other person (petitioner) was held by the
policeman. On the other hand, the other police saw from the open door [Hermino], inside the
house, holding a plastic sachet of shabu and a pair of scissors. Another empty plastic sachet was
confiscated from Hermino, which was lying on top of the table, in plain view from the open door
of his house.

The two were then arrested and brought to the Police Station. Afterwards, the confiscated
items were inventoried, and a certification of inventory was issued. Appellants and the

801
confiscated items were likewise photographed. Mediaman was present in the inventory and also
took photographs of the confiscated items and of appellants.

Police officers then requested for laboratory examination for drug analysis. After
examination, the confiscated specimen was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

RULING:

NO. The court held that the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
arresting officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as well as the IRR. The
unjustified absence of an elected public official and DOJ representative during the inventory of the
seized item constitutes a substantial gap in the chain of custody. There being a substantial gap or
break in the chain, it casts serious doubts on the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
As such, the petitioner must be acquitted.

For the arresting officers' failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from
the totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately
disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious doubts
on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-up.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, as every
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve
and so it has previously ruled that minor procedural lapses or deviations from the prescribed chain
of custody are excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the arresting officers put in
their best effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-compliance is proven as
a fact.

The court reiterate its past rulings calling upon the authorities to exert greater efforts in
combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for
the greater benefit of our society. The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing the
evidence of the prosecution especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-bust
operation redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties and at
the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors.

802
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE PROVEN IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Victor Velasco y Porciuncula

G.R. No. 233084, October 8, 2018

Perlas- Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC charging Velasco with
the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and
penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around
nine (9) o' clock in the evening of May 13, 2010, a team comprised of members of the Philippine
National Police Muntinlupa City, Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group (PNP
Muntinlupa SAID-SOTG) conducted a buy-bust operation against Velasco, during which: (a) he
allegedly sold to the poseur-buyer a plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of suspected
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; and (b) during his arrest, another sachet containing
0.02 gram of suspected methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, was recovered from him.
The team, together with Velasco, then proceeded to the PNP Muntinlupa SAID-SOTG headquarters
where the seized items were photographed and inventoried in the presence of one Jemma V.
Gonzales of the Muntinlupa City Government's Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Office (DAPCO
Operative Gonzales). Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory where,
after examination, they tested positive for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity of the identity of the drugs were established.

803
RULING:

NO, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized
items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law further requires
that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media
AND the DOJ, and any elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
"[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the
media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

804
MOTIVE WHEN MATERIAL IN PROVING GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Ariel Cadenas and Gaudioso Martije

G.R. No. 233199, November 5, 2018

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Generally, motive is immaterial in felonies, however, it is material in cases where the

identity of the accused is unknown and when the evidences are only circumstantial.

FACTS:

Both accused appealed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
finding them guilty of Rape with Homicide committed against AAA. The conviction was mainly
founded upon the testimonies of the witness named Escrino that he saw both the accused
running away from the house of the said victim, then he went to the victim’s husband and did not
immediately checked the house.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

RULING:

NO, the prosecution failed to prove that they are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the fact
that the testimony of the witness is not credible for the reason that it is unnatural and contrary to
ordinary human experience, consequently, the identity of the perpetrator is not known because it
was not clearly established how the witness identified the accused as the perpetrator given the fact
the place of incident is in the mountainous portion of the barangay and it can be assume that the
perpetrators are running while their backs are turned against said witness. Thus, in order to convict
both the accused, motive is material because the identity of the perpetrator is unknown, and the
evidence of the prosecution are mere circumstantial. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove
the motives of both the accused.

805
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Guanzon y Ceneta

G.R. No. 233653, September 5, 2018

Cruz, J.

DOCTRINE:

In drug cases, The State bears the obligation to prove the identity of the seized drug,
failing in which, the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

PNP Antipolo received an information that Guanzon was selling dangerous drugs. To
apprehend Guanzon, the PNP formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO2 Abalos, PO2 Hernandez,
PO3 Paulos and PO3 Baulan.

The team conducted the buy-bust operation wherein Guanzon handed a sachet of alleged
shabu to PO2 Hernandez after receiving the marked money. PO3 Paulos frisked Guanzon and
recovered from him another plastic sachet of alleged shabu. Thereafter, they brought Guanzon,
together with the confiscated sachets, to their office. Both plastic sachets of white crystalline
substance yielded positive results for the presence of shabu.

However, PO3 Paulos narrated that after introducing themselves to Guanzon, he conducted
bodily search on the suspect and recovered a sachet of alleged shabu; that SPO3 Abalos was in
possession of such confiscated drug from the area of operation up to the police station; and that
he did not know what happened to the shabu bought by the poseur-buyer.

On the other hand, SPO3 Abalos testified that PO3 Paulos was in possession of the
confiscated drug from the area of operation up to the police station; that PO2 Hernandez was in
possession of the bought drug from the area of operation up to the police station; and that when
the confiscated drug and bought drug were both marked by PO2 Hernandez, he was beside him.

ISSUE:

806
 Whether or not the identity and integrity of the seized drugs were established beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. In drug cases, The State bears the obligation to prove the identity of the seized drug,
failing in which, the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. To ensure that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs in buy-bust
operations have been preserved, the procedure for custody and disposition of the same is clearly
delineated under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

SPO2 Abalos's testimony totally contradicts PO3 Paulos's testimony as to who had possession
of the confiscated drug from the area of arrest up to the police station. Clearly, there is a gap in the
chain of custody.

Also, based on the testimonies of both SPO2 Abalos and PO3 Paulos, no one explicitly testified
to seeing the bought drug from the hands of Guanzon to PO2 Hernandez. Only PO2 Hernandez can
testify on the chain of custody of the said specimen. However, nowhere in PO2 Hernandez's direct
examination did he mention the handling of the bought drug after the arrest.

Given the foregoing observations, the testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution, on its
own, clearly failed to establish the chain of custody of both drug specimens in violation of Sec. 21 RA
9165.

807
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Arbuis y Comprado a.k.a “Ontet”

G.R. No. 234154, July 23, 2018

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

For the successful prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the

following essential elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said
drug.

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt not only every element of the
crime or offense charged but must likewise establish the identity of the corpus delicti, i.e.,
the seized drugs. To convince the Court that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
has been preserved, the prosecution must prove that there was compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, specifically the requirements from the
time of seizure up to the time the seized item is presented in court as this will ultimately
determine the fate of the accused.

FACTS:

On March 1, 2012 Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) together with the Naga
City Police Station and conducted a joint operation regarding the implementation of search
warrant against accused-appellant. Upon arrival to the target site, they immediately secured the
area, and waited for the arrival of the accused-appellant and the witnesses whose presence are
required during searches. When the accused-appellant arrived, he was informed of the
implementation of the search warrant against him. Shortly thereafter, the required witnesses
arrived. After the content of the warrant was read to the accused-appellant, the composite team
started to search his house. During the search, police officer found five plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance. She placed the markings on the plastic sachets seized from the
accused-appellant. Photographs were likewise taken. Thereafter, the Certificate of Inventory were
signed by the three witnesses. A receipt of property seized, and Certificate of Orderly Search was
likewise prepared in the presence of the accused and the three witnesses. The team brought the
accused appellant to the Naga police station for further investigation and proper documentation.

808
From the time of seizure until turnover to the forensic chemist of the crime laboratory, the police
officer had full and uninterrupted custody of the drugs

The RTC finds the accused guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC
stating that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict the accused-appellant of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arresting officer complied with the requirements of Section 21 of RA
9165.

RULING:

YES. The court held that contrary to the claim of the accused that there was a "break" in the
chain of custody, perusal of the records reveal that the arresting officers complied with the
requirements of Section 21. First, it is not disputed that IO2 Laynesa had custody of the seized items
from the time of seizure up to the time it was brought to the crime laboratory for examination.
Second, the requirements of marking, inventory and photograph were complied with and was
conducted in the presence of the accused-appellant and the required witnesses from DOJ, elected
public official, and media. Third, the sole reason why IO2 Laynesa was unable to immediately
turnover the seized item to the crime laboratory was because it was already 3:00 a.m. - clearly
beyond office hours. Moreover, the seized items remained in her custody as she locked it up in the
meantime and had the lone key to the drawer. The fact that she brought it to the crime laboratory
for testing that very same morning negates the accused-appellant's claim that such deviation
destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty.

A perfect chain of custody is almost always impossible to achieve and so the Court has
previously ruled that minor procedural lapses or deviations from the prescribed chain of custody are
excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the arresting officers put in their best
effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-compliance is proven as a fact.

In the case at bench, it is clear that the prosecution was not remiss in its duty to prove the
arresting officers' compliance with Section 21. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty must be upheld.

809
INTEGRITY OF DRUGS IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

People of the Philippines vs. Arman Gutierrez

G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence
for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and,
hence, warrants an acquittal.

FACTS:

The elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Binmaley, Pangasinan, in

coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regional office, planned a
buy-bust operation against Gutierrez who was in the police's drug watch list. After the buy-bust
team was organized, the operatives went to the agreed place in Canaoalan, Binmaley, Pangasinan,
coordinated with the barangay officials, and briefed them about the operation. They were
likewise joined by Prosecutor Jeffrey Catungal of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. Further, they invited and informed Michelle Soriano (Soriano) of ABS-CBN
Dagupan, Pangasinan, as the required media person to witness the inventory and photography of
the item/s to be seized pursuant to law. Consequently, the accused was arrested after he handed
down to PO1 Antonio Tadeo, Jr. (PO1 Tadeo), the designated poseur-buyer, one (1) plastic sachet
with white crystalline substance and one (1) piece of aluminum foil, in exchange for the marked
P500.00 bill. However, Soriano from ABS-CBN, failed to witness the inventory and photography of
the seized items.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity of the identity of the drugs were established.

810
RULING:

YES, there were proper compliance to Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 because while the Court observes
that the media representative, i.e., Soriano from ABS-CBN, failed to witness the inventory and
photography of the seized items, her presence during the said activities was not actually necessary
since the witness requirement under RA 10640 had already been complied with. As earlier stated,
under RA 10640, the presence of "[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service [OR] the media," and of course, the accused himself, during the conduct of the
inventory and photography is required. Consequently, the quantum proof required to convict the
accused is present.

811
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE PROVEN IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Zacarias Lesin Misa

G.R. No. 236838, October 1, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from Informations filed before the RTC charging Misa with the crimes
of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized
under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around eleven (11)
o'clock in the evening of March 1, 2015, a team composed of members of the Philippine National
Police Cebu Police Station, with coordination from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
conducted a buy-bust operation against Misa, during which two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected shabu weighing 0.03 gram each were recovered from him. Consequently, a
search incidental to his arrest yielded five (5) more heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
suspected shabu weighing 0.03 gram each. The team, together with Misa, then proceeded to the
police station where the seized items were marked, photographed, and inventoried in the
presence of Municipal Councilors Raul Butron and Teodoro Mirasol. Notably, the conduct thereof
was not done in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and/or the
media, as police officers claimed that it was difficult to contact them "as their telephone lines
were always busy" and that they had to beat the 24-hour deadline in submitting the evidence to
the crime laboratory. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory where,
after examination, they tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.

ISSUE:

812
 Whether or not the integrity of the identity of the drugs were established.

RULING:

NO, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized
items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law further requires
that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media
AND the DOJ, and any elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
"[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the
media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

813
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE PROVEN IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Maricar Isla y Umali

G.R. No. 237352, October 15, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC accusing Isla of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around 12:30 in the morning of
November 28, 2010, a buy-bust team composed of members of the District Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operations Task Group of the Quezon City Police District conducted a buy-bust operation
against Isla, during which a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was recovered
from her. The buy-bust team, together with Isla, then proceeded to their headquarters, where the
seized item was marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of Isla and a radio
reporter from DWAD 1098 Radyo Ngayon. Thereafter, the seized item was brought to the crime
laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for 0.04 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

In defense, Isla denied the charges against her, claiming instead, that she and her live-in
partner were sleeping inside their house when three (3) men in civilian clothes, identifying
themselves as police officers, dragged them to the police station wherein they were questioned
regarding the identities of a certain "Bhoy Payat" and Beth. When she denied knowing these
people, a police officer asked for P200,000.00 for her release, but since they didn't have that
much money, she was criminally charged in court.

Hence, this appeal.

814
ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity of the identity of the drugs were established.

RULING:

NO, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized
items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law further requires
that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media
AND the DOJ, and any elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
"[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the
media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive
law." This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment."

815
IDENTITY OF THE DRUGS IN DRUGS CASES IS ESSENTIAL FOR CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Joey Reyes Lagman

G.R. No. 238594, November 5, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence
for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and,
hence, warrants an acquittal.

FACTS:

Accused Lagman allegedly apprehended by the buy-operation while selling shabu. After
marking the seized items at the place of arrest, the buy-bust team, together with Reyes, went to
their headquarters where the inventory and photography were witnessed by a media
representative. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory where, after
examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO, in cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is
essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering
that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to
prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the

816
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, hence, warrants an acquittal. Here, the identity of
the dangerous drugs was not established by reason of non-compliance to Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165
because no elected public official and DOJ representative were available to witness the concurrent
conduct of inventory and photography of the items purportedly seized from Reyes.

817
INTEGRITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI MUST BE PROVEN IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Sembrano y Cruz

G.R. No. 238829, October 15, 2018

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC accusing Sembrano of
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in
the evening of December 13, 2011, the operatives of the Baguio City Anti-Illegal Drugs – Special
Operation Task Group (CAID-SOTG) conducted a test-buy operation to ascertain the veracity of a
report regarding Sembrano's alleged illegal drug transactions. In the said operation, the
confidential informant was able to acquire a plastic sachet from Sembrano in exchange for
P5,000.00, which sachet was marked by PO2 Geoffrey Bantule with his initials "GBB." After the
plastic sachet with the "GBB" marking was sent to the crime laboratory and confirmed upon
examination to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug, the CAID-
SOTG conducted a buy-bust operation against Sembrano at around eight (8) o' clock in the
evening of even date, wherein the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Reynaldo Badua (SPO1 Badua), was
instructed to buy illegal drugs worth P7,000.00. As a result, a plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance – later marked by the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Reynaldo Badua (SPO1 Badua)
with his initials "RCB" – was recovered from her. The apprehending officers together with
Sembrano then proceeded to the CAID-SOTG Office and conducted an inventory and photography
of the seized item and marked money which were witnessed by an elected public official and
representatives from both the Department of Justice and the media. Thereafter, the seized item
was brought to the crime laboratory where it was confirmed to contain shabu.

In defense, Sembrano denied the charges against her, claiming instead that she was on her
way with her friend, Bong Ancheta (Bong), to a wake when suddenly, the companion of Bong's
friend pointed a gun at them and introduced himself as a police officer. This prompted Bong to

818
run away. She was then brought to the police station where police officers asked for money from
her. After being detained for hours, she was brought to the hospital to urinate but was unable to
do so. This angered a police officer who then ordered her to sign a document, and thereafter,
brought her to the city jail.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity of the identity of the drugs were established.

RULING:

NO, to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and photography of the seized
items be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation of the same. The law further requires
that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from
whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses,
namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, "a representative from the media
AND the DOJ, and any elected public official"; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
"[a]n elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) OR the
media." The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the establishment of
the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence."

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive
law." This is because "[t]he law has been crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address
potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment.

819
PROOF OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS NECESSARY IN CONVICTING AN ACCUSED
IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa

G.R. No. 227497. April 10, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To secure conviction,

the prosecution must overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of the accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. A guilty verdict relies on the strength
of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. The burden of proof lies
with the prosecution. Failure to discharge this burden warrants an accused's acquittal.

FACTS:

At around 2:30 p.m. of March 26, 2005, Police Officer 2 Ferdinand Aquino and Police
Officer 3 Jose Fernandez parked their motorcycle and walked about 50 meters to the target area,
where the asset told them to wait since their target, Comoso, was still playing tong-its. The police
officers waited by a store, while their asset waited in front of Comoso's house. Soon after, Comoso
arrived. There, he handed a plastic sachet supposedly containing marijuana in exchange for the
asset's buy-bust money. The asset, in tum, removed his hat - the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction had been consummated.

Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Aquino and PO3 Fernandez rushed to the scene
and arrested Comoso and the asset. PO2 Aquino recovered the plastic sachet from the asset, while
PO3 Fernandez frisked Comoso and recovered the buy-bust money, one (1) used marijuana stick,
and a lighter. PO2 Aquino then marked both the plastic sachet and the buy-bust money with his
initials "FJA”. As they reached the police station, PO2 Aquino also marked the used marijuana stick
and lighter. He then prepared an Inventory of Confiscated Items.

On April 8, 2005, about two (2) weeks after the buy-bust operation, Police Superintendent
Julita T. De Villa, a forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory
Office, MIMAROPA, confirmed that the specimens tested positive for marijuana.

820
 The Regional Trial Court found Comoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article
II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Comoso appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the poseur-buyer, the sole witness to the transaction, was never presented
as a witness. Court of Appeals dismissed Comoso's appeal and affirmed his conviction. Hence this
appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) proof that
the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence. Evidence proving that a transaction took place "must be credible and complete." In
buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the testimony of the poseur-buyer.

As held in prior cases, there was no need to present the confidential informant since the
testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who actually witnessed the transaction.
The case is different, however, if the confidential informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the
same person.

Nonetheless, PO2 Aquino testifying that he had witnessed the entire transaction suffices to
prove the offense's first element. This, however, does not suffice to overcome the presumption of
innocence. To do so, the prosecution must prove the second element of the offense, or the existence of
the corpus delicti. The prosecution must establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.

Here, P02 Aquino, the apprehending officer, testified that he had seized the plastic sachet
from accused-appellant and marked it with his own initials, "FJA." He added that he had also
prepared the Inventory of Confiscated Items and brought the seized items to the crime laboratory.
However, it remained unclear from PO2 Aquino's testimony if: (1) he conducted the inventory before
accused-appellant; (2) the inventory was signed by accused-appellant; and (3) PO2 Aquino turned
the items over to an investigating officer.

Furthermore, Superintendent De Villa, the forensic chemist, only received the seized items on
April 8, 2005 or 10 working days after the buy-bust operation on March 26, 2005. This is obviously
beyond the 24-hour period required by law, a delay for which the prosecution has not been able to

821
explain. This creates reasonable doubt on whether the illegal drug turned over to the forensic
chemist was the same illegal drug seized from accused-appellant. Moreover, the prosecution did not
justify the law enforcement officers' noncompliance with the chain of custody.

The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers' lapses under the mantle of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This presumption only applies
when nothing in the evidence shows that the police officers deviated from the standard procedures
required by law.

Indeed, reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution's narrative when the links in the chain of
custody cannot be properly established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had not been
tampered with, substituted, or altered. Because the prosecution was unable to establish accused-
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence must prevail. Accused-
appellant must, thus, be acquitted.

822
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AS A REQUIREMENT TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Elizabeth Saranillas-Dela Cruz and Henry Dela Cruz vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 193862, October 1, 2019

Bersamin, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

In order to secure the conviction of any person charged with the crimes of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. No. 9165, it
is imperative for the Prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody vis-a-vis the
drugs as the means to prove the identity of the drugs presented in court beyond
reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Elizabeth Dela Cruz and Henry Dela Cruz were charged for illegal possession and control
of dangerous drugs. The team from PNP conducted a buy bust operation where the accused were
caught of the said crime. Subsequently, they were brought in the nearest police station and the
drugs seized were marked.

Henry on the other hand, pleaded not guilty and testified that during the incident, he was
just preparing the beddings for his children. He and Elizabeth denied peddling and possession of
the shabu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty for committing a violation of RA 9165 beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The held that the accused not guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Under section 21 of RA 9165 the law provides, The apprehending officer/team having initial custody

823
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation; physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures
of and custody over said items. In the given case, PO1 Jose Teranas failed to marked the items seized
in the crime scene and such marking was just done in the police station and moreover, the marking
was not done in the presence of the accused and did not provide any justification thereof. In addition,
the arresting team did not ensure the presence of the representative from either media or the
Department of Justice, and that of an elective official prior to the operation against Dela Cruz. Hence,
the court found the accused to be properly acquitted from the charges raised.

824
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Lacdan y Perez @ “Edwin” and Romualdo Vierneza y
Bondoc @ “Ulo”

G.R. No. 208472, October 14, 2019

Carandang, J.

DOCTRINE:

In addition to the questionable conduct of the buy-bust operation using boodle

money, in cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, it is also essential that
the identity of the dangerous drugs be established with moral certainty, considering that
the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime.

FACTS:

This case is an ordinary appeal filed by the accused-appellants assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of Regional Trial Court finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 and penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine
of P500, 000 each.

According to the Prosecution, on February 9, 2004, at around 5:00pm, a confidential

informant went to PDEA in Laguna, that he was able to negotiate a drug deal with accused-
appellants involving 10.03 grams of shabu worth of P18, 000. Sgt Marquez referred the matter to
Police Senior Inspector Julius Ceasar Ablang who verified the information and formed a buy-bust
team to conduct the operation against accused-appellants. It was agreed that once the arresting
officer sees (SPO4 Villanueva) the poseur-buyer (PO3 Garcia) give the money (two pieces of P500
bills marked with “MAG”; P18,000 consists of “boodle money) to accused-appellants, the team
would come forward and arrest them.

The team proceeded to the target location and the confidential informant, through cellular
phone, was in constant communication with accused-appellants. The latter introduce PO3 Garcia
to the accused-appellant and handed the buy-bust money in exchange of one big-heat sealed
transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance. Upon the consummation, PDEA
apprehended accused-appellants and they were brought to the PDEA Office in Camp Vicente Lim.
At the PDEA Office, PO3 Garcia placed his initials on the plastic sachet and inventoried the same
in the presence of an elected official and a representative from media. Thereafter, the plastic

825
sachet was submitted to the crime laboratory for testing. The forensic examination yielded a
positive result that it was indeed “shabu”.

However, the defense refutes claims above, the defense presented testimony of Lacdan that
he was only forced to be in the place where a certain “Arnel” lives. Viernieza, for his part, stated
that he was forced to come with the armed group due to threat against his life. RTC and CA
rendered its decision finding that the elements of illegal of illegal sale of shabu were proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was lack of compliance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of RA 9165 in the conduct of the buy-bust operation and their subsequent arrest.

RULING

YES. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt which therefore warrants an
acquittal. In order to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, there must
be observance of the “chain of custody” rule enshrined in Section 21 R.A. 9156.

Under the law, in order to establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty,
that there must be observance of the chain of custody rule enshrined in Section 21 of RA 9165. Since
the buy-bust operation was conducted prior to the amendment of RA 9165, the apprehending team
is mandated, immediately after seizure and confiscation, to conduct physical inventory and to
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person frim whom the intent were
seized, or his represent or counsel, as well as certain required witness, namely: (1) a representative
from the media; (2) a representative from the DOJ and (3) any elected public official.

In this case, the records provide that the inventory of the illicit drugs was made in the PDEA
Office in Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba City, Laguna when the buy-bust operation was conducted in
San Pedro Laguna, or some 20 kilometers away from the former. Further, the inventory was only
witnessed by the accused, a representative from the media and elected public official. The illicit drug
was not even photograph as required by Section 21. There was no explanation offered as to (1) why
the inventory was made in Calamba and not in San Pedro; (2) why there was no photograph of the
illicit drug; and (3) why the inventory was not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ. These
glaring non-compliance with the provisions of Section 21 RA 9165 render the integrity and the

826
evidentiary value of the seized items to be highly compromised, consequently warranting accused-
appellants’ acquittal.

Moreover, in the absence of adherence to the rule on chain of custody creates doubt as to the
guilt of the accused; therefore, the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Since in this case, the rule on chain of custody was broken, the appeal is granted, and the decision of
CA was reversed and set aside. Accordingly, the accused-appellants are acquitted for the crime
charged against them.

827
PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IS NECESSARY FOR CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Ternida y Munar

G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
not only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence.
Failure to do so creates doubt as to whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

FACTS:

On November 12, 2009, a confidential informant told the San Fernando City Police that an
illegal drug transaction involving Ternida would take place in five (5) days at Quezon Avenue, San
Fernando City, La Union. Acting on the tip, the San Fernando City Police formed a buy-bust team
composed of Police Officer 2, Ricardo Annague, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, Police
Inspector Quesada, PO3 Raul Dapula, and PO3 Paul Batnag, who was designated as back-up.

On November 17, 2009, the team carried out the operation. At around 10:40 p.m., the
officers spotted Ternida along Quezon Avenue. PO2 Annague approached him, while PO3 Batnag
stayed at a distance where he could observe the transaction.

Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said Pl,000.00
worth. Ternida then gave P02 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of crystalline substance
in exchange for PO2 Annague's Pl,000.00 bill, which had been designated as the buy-bust money.
After securing the sachet, P02 Annague gave the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who
immediately approached and arrested Ternida. A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently
prepared. The seized plastic sachet was then sent to the crime laboratory for forensic
examination, where it tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

In his defense, Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed that
on November 17, 2009, he was about to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to Golden Society
Restaurant when three (3) men, whom he later identified as Inspector Quesada, P03 Batnag, and
P02 Annague, arrested him. Inspector Quesada held his neck, while P03 Batnag and P02 Annague

828
handcuffed him. The Regional Trial Court found Ternida guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s finding. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused has been sufficiently established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The arresting officers' failure to photograph the seized drugs, to explain this failure, and
to establish that the integrity of the seized drugs was preserved despite the failure, are sufficient to
reverse accused-appellant's conviction based on reasonable doubt

To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not only
prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In doing this, the
prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized items.

The prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs were
photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. Conviction may be sustained despite
noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements if there were justifiable grounds provided.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish its reasons for the procedural lapses.

829
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Cesaria Basio Vertudes and Henry Basio Vertudes

G.R. No. 220725, October 16, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 may not always be possible; and the
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section
21 of R.A 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and
invalid, this has always been with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to
satisfactorily prove that: (1) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (2) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly served.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC finding
the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section5 and Section 11,
Article II of R 9165.

According to the prosecution, on April 16, 2010 at around 10pm, PO2 Ocampo was on duty
at the station Anti-illegal Drugs-Special Operations Task Group of Parañaque, when one of their
regular assets came to their office to give information about the illegal selling of drugs in the area
of Brgy. Baclaran. A buy bust team was then organized and after coordinating with PDEA, the
team together with their informant proceeded to their target location. PO2 Ocampo and
informant proceeded to Henry to buy shabu. PO2 Ocampo handed Henry the marked money
amounting to P2, 000.00 which the latter handed to his mother, Cesaria. The latter then handed
Henry two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he in turn handed to
PO2 Ocampo. Upon consummation of sale, SPO1 Macaraeg and PO2 Ocampo apprehended Henry
and Cesaria, respectively. PO2 Ocampo marked at the scene of the arrest the two plastic sachets
subject of the sale and the other one recovered from the pocket of Cesaria. However, since there
was already crowd forming the area, the team proceeded to the Barangay Hall of Baclaran. There,
PO2 Ocampo prepared an inventory of the recovered evidence which was witnessed by Brgy. Ex-O
Marzan and Brgy Tanod Eliserio. Photographs of the inventory were also taken by PO2 Julaton.

830
The team then proceeded to their office to prepare the request for laboratory examination of the
contents of the recovered plastic sachets.

However, the accused-appellants refuted the facts above and testified that she was
watching TV when several persons entered her house and handcuffed her. When she asked them
what crime she committed, she was just told to go with them and explain at their office.
Thereafter, they were taken to the Coastal Jail. Because of this incident, she and her son filed a
complaint against the policemen who arrested them before the People’s Enforcement Board.

Both the RTC and CA found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of Henry for violation of Section 5 and of Cesaria for violation of
Section 5 and 11 of R.A. 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. Under the law, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again must be immediately done at
the place of seizure and confiscation -- a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-
bust team considering that the buy-bust operation, is by its nature, a planned activity.

In the case at bar, it is evident that the police officers, assuming that their story of a buy-bust
operation is even true, blatantly disregarded the requirement laid down under Section 21. The buy-
bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in the conduct of the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of the seized drug, which thus compromised the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated drugs. More importantly, they had no valid cause for their deviation from
the rules. The Court points out that, as testified by PO2 Ocampo, none of the three required witnesses
was present at the time of the arrest of the accused-appellants and the seizure of the drugs. Only two
Brgy Tanods were present at the inventory of the seized drugs at the Brgy Hall. They are not the
required witnesses contemplated by law. It should be emphasized that the law requires the presence
of an elected public official is not an elected official; they are merely appointed by the Sangguniang
Barangay.

In addition, the prosecution did not offer any justifiable reason for the deviation by the buy-
bust team. They merely alleged that they decided to transfer to the Brgy Hall to conduct the
inventory and photography of the seized items because the relatives of the accused were allegedly
meddling with their operation. However, they did not even allege that their safety was threatened by

831
an immediate retaliatory action by the accused or the crowd that allegedly meddled with their
operation. Neither did they state that they made an earnest effort to secure the presence of the
required witnesses at the placed of seizure and arrest.

Compliance with Section 21 being integral to every conviction, the appellate court, this Court
is included, is at liberty to review the records of the case to satisfy itself that the required poof has
been adduced by the prosecution whether the accused has raised, before the trial court or appellate
court, any issuance of non-compliance. Wherefore, the appeal was granted, and the decision of CA
was reversed and set aside, and the accused-appellants are thereby acquitted.

The court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that: (1) the seized items to be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/ her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media and the
(d) a representative from the Department of Justice.

832
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Norman Angeles y Miranda

G.R. No. 224223, November 20, 2019

Inting, J.

DOCTRINE:

In resolving a criminal case, the burden of proof rests with the prosecution, which
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty as to convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment is
indispensable to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision which affirmed the decision of RTC
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on October 26, 2012, PNP received information from
confidential informant that the appellant is engaged in selling illegal drugs in Brgy. Layunan,
Binangonan, Rizal. The police officers of the Binangonan Rizal successfully conducted a buy-bust
operation against appellant. They seized one (1) plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white
crystalline substance was recovered from accused. After the arrest, police conducted the required
marking, inventory and photography in the presence of a media representative, Tata Rey Abella of
DWDO Radio. Thereafter, the seized item was brought for laboratory examination where the
forensic chemists found its contents tested positive for shabu, an illegal drug.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the petitioner he was laying on his
bed when he noticed three men inside their compound. A man suddenly pointed a gun at him,
frisked him, searched his house and arrested him without any valid reason. Appellant asserted
that he was illegally charged, tried, and convicted for an offense that he never committed.

Nevertheless, both the RTC and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged.

833
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 that accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

In deciding cases involving miniscule amounts of illegal drugs, courts are reminded to
exercise a higher level of scrutiny. The Court mandated that there should be stricter compliance with
the rules when the amount of the dangerous drug is minute due to the possibility that the seized
item could be tampered. In the case at bench, the seized plastic sachet of shabu is 0.05 grams; thus
the Court has every reason to carefully scrutinize whether the law enforcers complied with the
procedures outlined by the law. The Court is aware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to
the practice of planting evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians. The Court
has repeatedly been issuing warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases,
lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

To successfully prosecute a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs the following elements
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the
illicit drugs to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of marked money by the seller successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, as evidence.

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession, failing to prove the integrity of the corpus
delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, warrants an acquittal. The prosecution must establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law.
However, the court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance may not be
always possible. Failure to comply does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items

834
as void and invalid provided that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence of the required witnesses by
presenting justifiable reason therefore, or at the very least, by showing that the apprehending
officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their presence. Here, the absence of a DOJ
representative during the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized drugs was not
acknowledged by the prosecution, much less justified. In view of such unjustified deviation from the
chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the evidence to prove the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused is insufficient.

Here, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged. The law
enforcers ignored the requirements provided under Section 21 of RA 9165. They violated the chain of
custody by failing to comply with the witness requirement. Records reveal that that only a media
representative witnessed the alleged inventory of the seized shabu. Likewise, it is apparent that not
a single photograph of the seized sachet of 0.05 gram of shabu was presented. The records were
bereft of any slight indication that photographs of the sachet of shabu were duly taken during the
inventory. Neither was it proven by the prosecution that the police officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure the presence of the required witnesses. The failure to follow the witness
requirement under Section 21 was completely ignored and was left unjustified by the prosecution.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted on the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

835
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Larry Sultan y Almada

G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

The chain of custody rule removes unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs presented in court. Unless an unbroken chain of custody over items
allegedly seized during drug operations is established, the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent prevails.

FACTS:

Appellant Sultan was allegedly involved in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of them. PO2 Hechanova testified that an elongated sachet containing white
crystalline substance was handed by appellant to him in a buy-bust operation. As such, other
police officers rushed to the scene and arrested appellant. When PO2 Hechanova frisked the
appellant, three (3) plastic sachets of suspected shabu were recovered in his left pocket. PO2
Hechanova then asked for the contents of the sachets to be examined. Nonetheless, appellant
alleged that he was brought to a barangay hall, where the police officers opened his sling bag and
marked its contents, which, according to Sultan, did not include shabu.

The Regional Trial Court convicted the appellant, and this was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted.

RULING:

836
 YES. As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.

Here, the prosecution established that from the place of seizure to the barangay hall, PO2
Hechanova had sole custody of the supposedly confiscated items. But this alone cannot be taken as a
guarantee of the items' integrity. On the contrary, an officer's act of personally and bodily keeping
allegedly seized items, without any clear indication of safeguards other than his or her mere
possession, has been viewed as prejudicial to the integrity of the items. These put in serious suspicion
the identity of the objects of the offenses attributed to accused-appellant, leaving reasonable doubt
on his guilt. His constitutional right to be presumed innocent prevails.

837
QUANTUM OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH GUILT IN CRIMINAL CASES

Carlos Catubao vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227371, October 2, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's
duty is to prove each, and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.

FACTS:

The accused in this case was the handling prosecutor of the estafa cases filed against
Cornelio Ragasa. The case has been pending for some time and whenever Ragasa thru his counsel
follow up Catubao would often ask for money. After handing out the amount being requested by
Catubao, the resolution was released which was denied by the chief provincial prosecutor. The
accused denied the allegations. He claims that the money he received was what he thought the
payment of Ragasa to the P1000 he lended him. When he found out that it was more than the
amount expected, he contacted the counsel of Ragasa. Atty. Perito replied that he was just
repaying the favor that accused extended to him and that he also won a case. Ragasa’s party keep
on following up on the case while Catubao kept on pushing back stating that he has a lot more
cases at hand. Catubao tried to avoid the Atty. Perito. Atty. Perito became unfriendly and angry
about it. He claims that money setup to him is actually a setup against him. Sandiganbayan
convicted Catubao guilty of violating Art 210 of the RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Catubao of the crime of Direct
Bribery beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

838
 YES. The court held that the guilt of Catubao was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each, and
every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or
for any other crime necessarily included therein. Direct Bribery requires that the gift be in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which is his official duty to do. Receiving a balato from a party litigant is not
punishable in direct bribery. Failure of the prosecution to establish all the elements of the crime of
Direct Bribery beyond reasonable doubt, Catubao must thus be acquitted of the charge.

839
QUANTUM PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Ma. Carmen Rosario Abilla vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227676, April 3, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the

context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty
or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when
nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct
of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the
presumption cannot arise.

The presumption that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers simply
cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence granted to the accused by the
Constitution. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and overcome his presumed innocence.

FACTS:

NBI Agent Dungog informed SI Kintanar about an illegal drug activity. Dungog and
Kintanar, together with two officers, meet an informant. The informant assured the team that he
could transact with “Chicky” for the purchase of shabu. Chicky instructed the informant to meet
her at Villa Fortunata. After inspecting the sachet of shabu, SI Kintanar handed the marked money
to Chicky. Thereafter, Agent Dungog and the rest of the team rushed to their location and arrested
Chicky. Agent Dungog handcuffed Chicky and then informed her of her constitutional rights. SI
Kintanar inspected Chicky's black leather bag and found the marked money and another sachet of
shabu inside the bag. From the crime scene up to the NBI Office, SI Kintanar had in his custody all
the seized items.

The accused contended that she was in their rented apartment having dinner with her
live-in partner, Mark Solon when her former live-in partner, Wedmark Merced called her up. She
told Mark Solon that Wedmark asked for money from her. Mark Solon allowed her to meet
Wedmark. When she arrived at the agreed place, she saw Wedmark and had a short conversation
during that time. Thereafter, Wedmark immediately hugged her tight as she struggled so hard.

840
Wedmark told her that he was arrested a while ago and advised her to tell them where Mark
Solon is. She saw Miguel Dungog who was her former suitor and asked what it was all about. Then,
she was handcuffed by Dungog. She also noticed that somebody took her bag. She was brought to
the NBI office.

RTC convicted Abilla of the crimes in violation of Section 5 and 11 of Republic Act No.
9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Abilla, holding that the prosecution was able to
prove the elements of the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies
in this case.

RULING:

NO. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot apply. In such
a case, the innocence of the accused, as presumed, must be upheld.

Considering the procedural lapses which the buy-bust team committed in handling the
confiscated drugs, a presumption of regularity cannot arise in the present case. This was settled in
People vs. Kamad, where the Court held that "presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance
of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption applies
when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot
arise."

Therefore, there is no such presumption that may arise in the present case. The presumption
that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers simply cannot prevail over the
presumption of innocence granted to the accused by the Constitution. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt and overcome his
presumed innocence.

This burden of the prosecution does not change even if the accused's defense is weak and
uncorroborated. Such weakness does not add strength to the prosecution's case as the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight. It is settled that the conviction of an accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.

841
 In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending team's
deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of this, Abilla must perforce be acquitted.

842
CHAIN OF CUSTODY TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Benson Tulod y Cuarte

G.R. No. 227993, September 25, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

In illegal drugs cases, the drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. The
prosecution is, therefore, tasked to establish that the substance illegally possessed by the
accused is the same substance presented in court.

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for
each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.

Indeed, the presence of the insulating witnesses during inventory is vital. In the
absence of these persons, the possibility of switching, planting, or contamination of the
evidence negates the credibility of the seized drug and other confiscated items. Non-
compliance with the requirement is, therefore, fatal to the prosecution's case.

FACTS:

The accused was charged for violation of Sec 5 and Sec 11 of RA 9165. The police had been
receiving reports about numerous illegal drug trades being conducted in the residence of the
accused in Olangapo City. In this view, a buy bust operation was conducted in the house of the
accused. After the operation, the marked money and the drugs were seized upon the accused. The
items where marked at the crime scene, until it was turned over to the designated investigator at
the place of operation for inventory. Subsequently, a request for laboratory examination was
released and seized items were delivered to the crime laboratory.

The accused on the other hand claims that when the incident happened, he was just at
home doing household work. The police suddenly came, no drugs were seized from him but he

843
was still taken to the police station. He further claims that the case is clearly a scheme of “palit-
ulo”. Some witnesses corroborated to his testimony. RTC held that Benson is guilty of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals found that appellant was arrested inflagrate
delicto selling dangerous drugs during a buy-bust operation and is rightfully convicted by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The court held that the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established in
this case. Sec 21 of RA 9165 provides the apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. In addition, to ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the
prosecution must account for each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court. In the given case, the inconsistent testimonies of the arresting officers pertaining to where
they turned over the seized items to SPO2 delos Reyes cast doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti.
In addition, the prosecution failed to provide an explanation as to why the inventory and
photographing of the drugs was not done in the presence of a media. Such facts established the
failure of the prosecution to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. Hence, the accused was
acquitted from the crime charged.

844
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Esrafel Dayon y Mali a.k.a “Bong”

G.R. No. 229669, November 27, 2019

Zalameda, J.

DOCTRINE:

The purpose of the law in requiring the presence of certain witnesses at the time of
the seizure and inventory of the seized items is to insulate the seizure form any taint of
illegitimacy or irregularity. Such omission casts suspicion on the corpus delicti of the
offense charged.

FACT:

On August 6, 2013, accused “Bong” sold and handed to the poseur-buyer heated-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. The
team photographed, marked, and inventoried the seized item at the place of arrest in the
presence of accused, as well as a member of the media, and claimed efforts were made to
summon barangay officials, but the latter refused due to fear of reprisal and notoriety of the place
of arrest. Thereafter, the seized item was brought to the crime laboratory, which confirmed that
the plastic sachet contained 0.040 gram of dangerous drug.

Accused denied the charges against him and averred that he was arrested on August 5
while on his way to 168 Mall in Divisoria. He was approached by 3 men in civilan clothing and
frisked. When confronted with the marked photograph of his arrest with another man, accused
explained that the photograph was taken at the precinct where the police officers just placed
evidence on his lap, and the name of the other man in the photograph was Bong. He insisted that
his nickname was “Piyel”.

The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged. The CA affirmed that assailed
decision. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

845
 Whether or not the court a quo correctly convicted accused for the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

RULING:

NO. The Court finds the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension by the police officers flimsy and
insufficient to explain procedural lapse. First, it fails to establish that an actual serious attempt to
contact the required witnesses was made by the apprehending officers. Second, it only mentions an
effort to summon barangay officials, but the law then prevailing law required the presence of DOJ
representative during the inventory and photographing. Finally, the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proved beyond as a fact because the Curt cannot presume what these grounds
are or that they even exist.

In this case, the arresting officers failed to secure the presence of a DOJ representative and an
elected public official without providing any justifiable reason and without proving that they exerted
earnest efforts to do so. This failure adversely affected the integrity and credibility of the seized
sachet of shabu. The prosecution had sufficient opportunity during trial to explain procedural lapses
but glaringly left the same unacknowledged and unjustified.

Vigilance in eradicating illegal drugs must not come at the expense of disregarding the law,
rules and established jurisprudence on the matter.

846
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MUST ALSO BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Gayon y Ferreras

G.R No. 230221, April 10, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

Qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt as to its existence must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

FACTS:

On July 19, 2004 at around 9:40 in the evening, Leyden Gayon was in their house in
Sulangan, Matnog, Sorsogon. While Leyden was having a conversation with Leonora Givera, she
saw accused-appellant Edgar, entered their house. Edgar sat on the lap of Leonora and suddenly
stabbed Leonora several times, leaving the knife in her right shoulder. Thereafter, Leyden dragged
Leonora inside the house and heard Edgar told his father, Rodolfo "Papay we have no more
problem because I killed your sister. "

The RTC convicted accused-appellant Edgar but acquitted Rodolfo. The RTC held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly proven due to the suddenness of the attack by
accused-appellant Edgar without giving the victim a chance to defend herself. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of RTC. The Court of Appeals agreed that the attack on the
unsuspecting victim, who was merely inside the house and talking to Leyden, was very sudden.
Further, the CA ruled that the nature and the number of wounds sustained by the victim logically
indicate that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined aggression on the
part of accused-appellant Edgar.

Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgar was guilty of the crime of murder.

847
RULING:

NO. Edgard is not guilty of the crime of murder. He is only guilty of the crime of homicide.

Settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be proved with the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself, that is, beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for accused-appellant Edgar to
be convicted of murder, the prosecution must not only establish that he killed Leonora; it must also
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the killing of Leonora was attended by treachery or evident
premeditation.

In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation was not
sufficiently established. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present. There is no showing in this case that accused-appellant Edgar carefully and deliberately
planned the killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. The victim was with
people who could have helped her repel the attack. Therefore, the mode of attack chosen by accused-
appellant Edgar, in a place familiar to the victim and in the presence of the latter's relatives, fails to
guaranty that the execution of the criminal act would be without risk on his end. Furthermore, the
attack against Leonora was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the existence of
treachery, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance.

As for evident premeditation, it was not established because the prosecution did not present
any proof showing when and how accused-appellant Edgar planned and prepared to kill Leonora. To
qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident
premeditation." Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere
presumptions and inferences thereon, would not be enough.

848
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Cocoy Catubay, Joneper Jaime y Duran

G.R. No. 232083, November 27, 2019

Zalameda, J.

DOCTRINE:

In prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the
proof that transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.

FACTS:

Accused and his co-accused, Catubay, were charged with violation of Sec 5, Art II of RA
9165. At trial, the accused Duran is found guilty of illegal selling of 0.16 gram of shabu to P02
Magsayo who acted as poseur-buyer and found guilty of illegal possession of 0.78 grams of shabu
in violation of sec 11, Art II of RA9165. The RTC held that there was compliance with the law as to
the preservation and disposition of the dangerous drug and the chain of custody requirements
contrary to the accused’s bare denial and contention that there was ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers. The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the police officers complied with the procedures laid down in Section 21 of
RA 9165 as to the custody and disposition of the seized items from its seizure up to its
presentation in court.

RULING:

YES. The procedural rules on the chain of custody were properly observed. First, the buy-bust
team immediately marked the seized items at the place of seizure and took custody of the same.
Second, considering that onlookers have started to gather, the inventory and taking of photographs
were done at the buy-bust team’s office in the presence of the three (3) mandatory witnesses, i.e. an

849
elected public official, representatives from the DOJ and the media, together with the accused-
appellant. Third, the members of the buy-bust team promptly brought the seized items to the crime
laboratory, duly received by PCI Llena. And fourth, after the seized items tested positive for shabu,
the same were then turned over to the custodian before they were presented in court. As such, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been properly preserved. Necessarily,
accused-appellant’s conviction for the offenses charged must stand.

850
CHAIN OF CUSTODY TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Charles Roales y Permejo

G.R. No. 233656, October 2, 2019

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases that involve the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of the charges. It is of
paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt and it must be proven with certainty that the substance bought and
seized during the buy bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence for
the court.

FACTS:

The accused, Charled Roales Permojo, was charged for violation of Sec 5 and Sec 11 Article
II of RA 9165. The accused was caught after the buy bust operation conducted by the police
officers where it was seized from him the marked money and illegal drugs. The team conducted
the inventory at the place of the arrest in the presence of elected barangay official and the
accused.

The accused on the other hand claims that he was falsely charged. He claims that on the
day of the incident he was in front of his house when 6 men suddenly appeared and handcuffed
him. He was beaten up and forced to admit that he is the man named Tolits. He was brought to the
police station and was charged of the crime 4 days after his arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is correctly charged for violating RA 9165.

RULING:

851
 NO. The court held that the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established in
this case. Sec 21 of RA 9165 provides the apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. In the given case, the absence of the representative of the National
Prosecution Service or media was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. Hence, the accused
was acquitted from the crime charged for to failure to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti.

852
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Annabelle Baculio y Oyao and Floyd Jim Orias y Carvajal

G.R. No. 233802, November 20, 2019

Inting, J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This is an appeal assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
consolidated judgment of RTC for the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on April 1, 2009, a team composed of PDEA
operatives successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against accused. During the seizure, one
(1) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance weighing 0.22 gram was recovered
from accused. After the arrest, they then marked the plastic sachet recovered from Orias
suspected to be shabu and other six sachets recovered from Baculio; and the marked money
amounting to P500.

Thereafter, Jumilla, a barangay Kagawad, Boro, a barangay tanod, and Dela Cruz, a member
of the media witnessed the physical inventory, photography and marking in the presence of Orias
and Baculio in Oria’s house. They then brought the arrested persons and the seized sachets to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the seized sachets yielded positive for
shabu, a dangerous drug.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the accused Orias; he went home
after from his work on the night of the incident. Orias saw Baculio in his house to get her bicycle.
Orias told Baculio to wait for him since he wanted to rest and drink beer. As he was about to get
beer, group of men which consisted the PDEA team entered his house and arrested them pointing
their guns to them. Thereafter, PDEA agents ordered them to stand up and accused them of
possession of dangerous drugs.

853
 Nevertheless, both the RTC and the CA found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the accused’s conviction for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and concluded that they were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

YES. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As a general rule, compliance with the
chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded not merely as a
procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law. However, the court has recognized that
due to varying field conditions, strict compliance may not be always possible. Failure to comply does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid provided that: (a)
there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. Moreover, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the
absence of the required witnesses by presenting justifiable reason therefore, or at the very least, by
showing that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their
presence.

Based on the records of the case, the provisions of Section 21 were not observed. Although
both PDEA agents in-charge testified that there was a marking of the evidence, there was no definite
statement as to where the marking of the seized items took place. More importantly, the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses disclosed that there was non-compliance as to the presence of the
mandatory witnesses to the inventory as decreed under Section 21 of RA 9165. Specifically, the
prosecution witnesses testified that a barangay Kagawad, a barangay tanod and a media
representative witnessed the inventory of the seized items. However, their testimonies and the
records do not show that all the mandatory witnesses required during the conduct of the inventory,
i.e., a representative from the DOJ were present.

Further, the prosecution did not even bother to explain as to why the presence of a
representative from the DOJ was not secured during the conduct of inventory. This loophole casts
doubt on the identity and the integrity of the corpus delicti, which was the drugs seized from Baculio
and Orias.

854
 Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and accused are
acquitted on the crime charged.

855
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Arnel Ambrosio y Nidua a.k.a. “Arnel”

G.R. No. 234051, November 27, 2019

Zalameda, J.

DOCTRINE:

In prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Hence, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been
duly preserved.

FACTS:

Accused was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, as defined
and penalized under Sec 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. On June 18, 2013, the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Group (SAIDTOGP) received information that the accused-
appellant engaged in illegal drug pushing in Barangay Tejeros, Makati City. On the basis thereof, a
buy-bust team was organized. When the buy-bust team proceeded to the target, the accused did
not have shabu at the time, so he encouraged the poseur-buyer, Venalon, to purchase One
Hundred Pesos worth of Marijuana instead. Venalon acceded and after parting with the marked
money as payment, the accused handed two plastic sachets allegedly containing marijuana. The
arresting officers brought the accused, together with seized items, to the barangay hall and
summoned the Barangay Desk Officer, Fernando, to witness the inventory. The seized items were
marked, inventoried, photographed and listed in the Inventory Receipt in the presence of the
accused and signed by the member of team and Fernando. Later, the subject specimens were
turned over to the SAIDSOTG office for preparation of the requests for laboratory examination
and drug test on the accused.

The accused contended that he was ordered to admit the plastic sachet belonged to him,
but he refused. He was bodily searched, but nothing was recovered from him. The RTC found the
accused guilty. The Court stated that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crimes charged and held that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved by the buy-bust team. The CA affirmed the accused's conviction.

856
ISSUE:

Whether or not the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 are complied with.

RULING:

NO. The following links should be established in the china of custody of the confiscated item:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for the laboratory examination; and fourth, turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, there is a glaring gap in the fourth link of the chain. The trial court dispensed
with the testimony of the forensic chemist in view of the stipulation entered into by the prosecution
and he defense during the pre-trial conference. Moreover, the seized items should have been marked
with initials of Venalon, as well as the date, time and place where the evidence was seized but the
apprehending officers disregarded this. Also, the marking and inventory of the seized items were not
attended and witnessed by any representative form the media and the DOJ, as well as any elected
official. The presence of the 3 required witnesses should not only be during the inventory but, more
importantly during accused’s apprehension.

The prosecution’s failure to give justifiable grounds for the police officers’ deviation from the
procedures laid down in RA 9165, and its failure to account the fourth link in the chain of custody,
have compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti in this case, thereby
raising a cloud of reasonable doubt warranting accused’s acquittal.

857
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUGS CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Almaser Jodan y Amla

G.R. No. 234773, June 3, 2019

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of
the corpus delicti is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the
dangerous drug must be clearly established.

The prosecution's unjustified non-compliance with the required procedures under

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and the IRR raise questions into the integrity and evidentiary
value of the drugs seized. Consequently, the appellant must be acquitted of the crime
charged for failing to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

A confidential informant (CI) informed Police Inspector Palisoc regarding the illegal drug
activities of appellant Almaser in Barangay Culiat, Quezon City. A buy-bust team was formed. The
following day, PO1 Reyes, as poseur-buyer, and the CI when to Culiat, Quezon City and
approached Almaser. The CI introduced PO1 Reyes as a shabu buyer. Appellant took the marked
money from PO1 Reyes and handed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO1
Reyes then executed the pre-arranged signal. At this point, the rest of the buy-bust team
approached and introduced themselves as police officers. PO3 Ramos then proceeded to search
appellant's pocket and was able to recover the buy-bust money and two more plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. While at the crime scene, POI Reyes marked the sachet
she bought from appellant with her initials "TBR," and PO3 Ramos marked the two other sachets
recovered from appellant's possession, with his initials "LRR-10-04-07 and LRR 10-04-07-1," as
well as the buy-bust money. An inventory receipt was also prepared at the crime scene where the
same was signed by PO3 Ramos and by the other
policemen. Thereafter, the team brought appellant and the seized items to their police station.
The seized items and the inventory receipt were all turned over to the investigator. The

858
specimens submitted tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride issued by the Forensic
Chemist, Police Chief Inspector Banac.

Appellant was convicted by the RTC of violation of Sec. 5, Article II, of RA No. 9165. This
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of the appellant proper?

RULING:

NO. In all drug cases, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and to presentation in court for destruction. The rule is
imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the
very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with
the same unwavering exactitude as that required to make a finding of guilt.

In this case, Appellant committed the crime charged in 2007 and under the original provision
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR, the apprehending team was required to immediately
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the drugs after their seizure and confiscation in the
presence of: (a) appellant or his counsel or representative; (b) a representative from the media; (c) a
representative from the DOJ; and (d) any elected public official, all of whom shall be required to sign
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The presence of the three witnesses was intended
as a guarantee against planting of evidence and frame up, as they were "necessary to insulate the
apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. An
examination of the records failed to show that photographs of the drugs inventoried were taken and
done in the presence of the required witnesses. The prosecution's unjustified non-compliance with
the required procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and the IRR resulted in a substantial gap
in the chain of custody of the seized items from appellant; thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the drugs seized are put in question. Consequently, the appellant must be acquitted of the crime
charged.

859
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN ORDER TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED IN A RAPE CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Anthony Chavez y Villareal

G.R. No. 235783, September 25, 2019

Carpio, Acting C.J.

DOCTRINE:

If the woman is twelve (12) years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual
intercourse through force, violence, intimidation or threat must be proven by the
prosecution.

FACTS:

Anthony Chavez also known as Estong, was charged for committing rape and violation of
7610 also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act. Anthony allegedly raped a 14-year-old girl by means of force and intimidation
and sexually abused a 12 year old minor. Michelle Bautista, Anthony’s partner was charged for
being an accomplice who was just watching while Anthony performs the sexual abuse against the
14 yr old minor. One of the witness, AAA, the 12 year old girl who narrated that when the accused
invited her to his house to watch television., Estong suddenly played an x-rated movie and started
to rape her against her will. AAA also testified that there has been a series incident between them.
BBB in addition testified that he was sexually abused by Estong. This happened when Bautista,
the alleged accomplice in this case asked her to buy soft drinks and when she got to Michelle’s
house, Michelle locked the door. Estong then sexually abused her. BBB’s neighbor saw the act and
got Estong arrested.

Estong pleaded not guilty and averred that he was sleeping in their house when the
alleged incidents happened. RTC found guilty for committing rape while both Estong and Michelle
were convicted for violating RA 7610. The RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of rape and child abuse. CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for raping AAA.

860
RULING:

NO. The court held that Estong's guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The
court held that the element of force and intimidation is absent to grant a conviction. Art. 266-A
provides that rape is committed when a man shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under the
following circumstances, through force of intimidation. If the woman is twelve (12) years of age or
over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse through force, violence, intimidation or threat
must be proven by the prosecution. In AAA's testimony, she claimed that she freely and voluntarily
went to Estong's house to watch television. AAA also alleged that it was not the first time she had
carnal knowledge with Estong. As a matter of fact, in AAA's testimony, despite the alleged previous
incidents of carnal knowledge with Estong, AAA still voluntarily went to Estong's house when she
was invited to watch television. Reasonable doubt exists that Estong exerted force or intimidation
on AAA when Estong had carnal knowledge of AAA. The court finds that the acts done by Estong is
more equivalent to violation of RA 7610. The existence of willingness on the part of the victim, AAA,
shows reasonable doubt that the carnal knowledge between AAA and Estong was not un-
consensual. Hence, Estong was acquitted from the charge of rape but was held guilty of violation of
RA 7610.

861
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Jomar Castillo y Maranan

G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE:

To secure a conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that "every
fact necessary to constitute [a] crime . . . be established." Complying with the chain of
custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed."

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was conducted which entrapped appellant Castillo for illegal
possession and sale of dangerous drugs. The police recovered four (4) plastic sachets containing
crystalline substances suspected to be shabu, which were all placed inside a plastic case of
playing cards and these were brought inside the police vehicle that was still parked near the place
of arrest. While inside the vehicle, a police officer marked the items.

The Regional Trial Court found Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted.

RULING:

YES. To secure a conviction in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires that "every fact
necessary to constitute [a] crime . . . be established." While not requiring absolute certainty, this

862
standard requires that the prosecution establish moral certainty, "or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." The need to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt
proceeds from the due process clause and the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed
innocent.

Complying with the chain of custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." The requirement of conducting inventory and
taking of photographs immediately after seizure and confiscation necessarily means that the
required witnesses must also be present during the seizure and confiscation. Far from a passive
gesture, the attendance of third-party witnesses ensures the identity, origin, and integrity of the
items seized.

863
INTEGRITY OF CORPUS DELICTI ESSENTIAL IN ESTABLISHING GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Roger Rodriguez

G.R. No. 238516, February 27, 2019

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

In a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential

elements must concur: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
On the other hand, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the elements of the offense
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

FACTS:

In 2015, appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. Aggrieved,
appellant appealed to the CA. However, CA affirmed appellant's conviction and declared that the
police officers' noncompliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal despite the absence of
the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected public official
as witnesses during the inventory.

ISSUE:

Whether or the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs under R.A. 9165.

RULING:

864
 NO. For both illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, it is essential that the
prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that its integrity has
been well preserved from the time of seizure or confiscation from the accused until the time of
presentation as evidence in court. This chain of custody requirement is necessary to ensure that
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of
the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally
to the court.

In the present case, a review of the records would show that the procedures laid down by R.A
No. 9165 and its IRR were not followed, thereby putting doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary
value of the illicit items allegedly seized from appellant. The consequences of the failure of the
arresting lawmen to comply with the requirements of Section 21(1), were dire as far as the
Prosecution was concerned. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the
sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted
the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of
the sachets of shabu that were evidenced herein of the corpus delicti, and, thus, adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.

865
BURDEN OF PROVING GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Paulo Jackson Polangcos y Francisco vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 239866, September 11, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on

the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

FACTS:

Paul Jackson Polangcos was charged with violation Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002 for having in his possession, direct custody and
under his control one plastic sachet containing 0.05 grams of white crystalline substance, which
was found positive to the test of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation
of the said law. Polangcos was apprehended by SPO2 Juntanilla when he was spotted driving a
motorcycle without a plate number. Juntanilla frisked Polangcos first before issuing the
Ordinance Violation Receipt and there he found said drugs.

The Regional Trial Court found Polangcos guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense
charged. The RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to
hold that the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized item were preserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision ruling that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Hence,
this instant appeal.

ISSUE:

866
 Whether or not Polangco’s guilt for violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. This presumption in favor of
the accused remains until the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory. Hence, even if a
judgment of conviction exists, as long as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the defense was not able to present any evidence, not even the testimony of the
accused. Despite this, the Court still acquits Polangcos for failure of the prosecution to offer proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This is the essence of the presumption of innocence; the accused need not
even do anything to establish his innocence as it is already presumed. The burden to overcome this
presumption rests solely on the prosecution, which, in this particular case, clearly failed to discharge
said burden as it essentially had no evidence against the accused with the ruling on the
inadmissibility of the corpus delicti of the crime. Unquestionably, the chain of custody here was
broken from the time the illegal drugs were confiscated up to their presentation in court. The
repeated breach of the chain of custody rule had cast serious uncertainty on the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti. The metaphorical chain did not link at all, albeit it unjustly restrained
appellant's right to liberty. Verily, therefore, a verdict of acquittal is in order.

That Polangcos was found guilty by both the RTC and the CA is likewise irrelevant, for while
the Court is generally bound by the findings of the lower courts, it is equally true that, as earlier
discussed, the accused is presumed to be innocent until the judgment of conviction has become final.
To be sure, the Court, in the course of its review of criminal cases elevated to it, still commences its
analysis from the fundamental principle that the accused before it is presumed innocent. Thus, each
accused, even those whose cases are already on appeal, can hide behind this constitutionally
protected veil of innocence which only proof establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt can pierce.

All told, the Court acquits Polangcos of the crime charged as the prosecution failed to
overcome this presumption of innocence, more specifically because the evidence it offered to try to
overturn that presumption is inadmissible for violating the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

867
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND CORPUS DELICTI: ITS EFFECTS ON PROVING THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Fayo y Rubio

G.R. No. 239887, October 2, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the
time of the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence at the place of seizure or at
a nearest police station at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team is
mandatory and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves
and essential purpose.

Jurisprudence has held that breaches outlined in Section 21 committed by the police
officers left unacknowledged and unexplained by the state, militate against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the corpus delicti would have been
necessarily compromised.

FACTS:

The accused in this case was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs. A
buy bust operation was conducted by the police where the accused was caught in selling illegal
drugs. At the place of arrest the marked subject of the buy bust operation was marked. The police
proceeded to the Barangay hall where they conducted the inventory of the seized items.

Fayo denied the allegations and claimed that on the day of the incident he was being dealt
with by the police after having a traffic altercation with them. He was also asked to produce
P100,00 by the police to avoid the criminal charges that will be filed against him. The RTC found
the accused guilty for committing illegal sale, and possession of dangerous drugs. The CA
affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty for violating RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

868
RULING:

NO. The accused can’t be held guilty for the commission of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. Under section 21 Article II of RA 9165 the law requires the apprehending officer to conduct
an inventory and photography of the seized item at the place of seizure or at a nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending team /office, whichever is practicable and the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of the accused or his/her representative
or counsel, an elected public official, a representative from the national prosecution or the media. In
the given case, the police operatives failed to comply with the required rules laid down in the said
provision. The police operatives failed to seek for the presence of a representative from the national
prosecution or the media when the inventory and the photographing was conducted. Moreover, the
photographing was conducted at the Barangay Hall and not to the places required by law. Failure of
the prosecution to prove its compliance, it will render an acquittal on the part of the accused.
Considering the lapses for compliance of the law, the court acquitted the accused from the crimes
charged.

869
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Jake Mesa y San Juan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 241135, October 14, 2019

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of RTC for the conviction of petitioner for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on November 25, 2012, at around
8:30 am, while PO1 Bilog was on duty at the Binangonan Police Station, a confidential informant
arrived and relayed to the police officers that a certain alias “Sapyot” was selling illegal drugs in
Brgy. Mahabang Parang, Binangonan, Rizal. PO1 Bilog and PO1 Raul Paran were then instructed to
verify the report.

When the police officers advanced to investigate further on the designated location,
firecrackers suddenly exploded alerting Sapyot and his companion and they ran away, but the
police officers got hold of the male companion who was later identified as Jake Mesa. Sapyot was
unfortunately able to evade arrest. Police officers ordered the petitioner to empty his pockets
revealing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Upon confiscation, PO1 Bilog
marked the sachet with “JAK”, made an inventory of the evidence seized as witnessed by Cesar
Barquilla, a media representative and brought the petitioner to the police station. The seized item
was positive for “shabu” after qualitative examination.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the petitioner. He was in the house
of Eric Mesa when he heard an explosion and thought that an accident occurred. When he looked
around, he saw four armed men running towards the house of Sapyot, Eric’s neighbour. Startled,
he hid at the back of Eric’s house and thereafter saw Sapyot being chased by two police officers.
When the latter failed to catch Sapyot, they turned towards him and accosted him instead. Both
the RTC and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

870
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

RULING:

NO. The elements of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution must establish are
the following: (a) that the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (b) such possession was
not authorized by law: and (c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession
of dangerous drugs. The prosecution must prove with moral certainty the identity of the prohibited
drug, considering that dangerous drug itself forms part of the corpus delicti of the crime. The
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous drugs and the
prosecution must be able to account for each link the chain of custody

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, and its amendment provided under RA 10640 laid down the
procedure that must be observed and followed by police officers in the seizure and custody of
dangerous drugs. Said law requires that an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service (DOJ) or the media. These witnesses must be present during the
inventory stage and are likewise required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copy of the
same, to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized items are preserved and that the police
officers complied with the required procedure. Failure of the arresting officers to justify the absence
of any of the required witnesses shall constitute as a substantial gap in the chain of custody.

In the case at bar, since the offenses subject of this appeal were committed before the
amendment, the old provisions of Section 21 should apply stating that the physical inventory and the
taking of photograph must be made in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or
counsel and the following indispensable witnesses: (1) an elected public official, (2) a representative
from the media. The presence of these witnesses would preserve an unbroken chain of custody and
prevent the possibility of tampering with or “planting” evidence. However, in this case, only one out
of three of the required witnesses were present during the inventory stage – media representative
Barquilla. There was no elected barangay official or representative from the DOJ. Neither was it
shown nor alleged by the police officers that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance of
the other witnesses. The Court is well aware that a perfect chain of custody is almost always
impossible to achieve and so it has previously ruled that minor procedural lapses or deviations from
the prescribed chain of custody are excused so long as it can be shown by the prosecution that the
arresting officers put in their best effort to comply with the same and the justifiable ground for non-
compliance is proven as fact.

871
 Moreover, the absence of adherence to the rule on chain of custody creates doubt as to the
guilt of the accused; with its absence, the guilt of the accused would not be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Since in this case, the rule on chain of custody was broken, the petition is granted,
and the decision of the CA is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the crime
charged.

872
CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE IN RELATION TO QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Albert Perez Flores

G.R. No. 241261, July 29, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly

enjoined as the same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a
matter of substantive law. This is because "[t]he law has been 'crafted by Congress as safety
precautions to address potential police abuses, especially considering that the penalty
imposed may be life imprisonment.'"

Failure to comply with the chain of custody rule raises the question on the
credibility of the evidence seized, hence warranting the acquittal of the accused for failing
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was implemented against herein appellant Flores during which two
(2) sachets of white crystalline substance were recovered from him. He was then brought to the
police station where he was frisked in the presence of two barangay councilors and eight (8)
more sachets were recovered from him. The markings, inventory, and photography of the seized
items were then conducted in the presence of Flores and the barangay councilors.

The Regional Trial Court convicted him for violating R.A. 9165 and this was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted.

RULING:

873
 YES. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative
or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses.

In this case, it appears that the inventory and photography of the seized items were not
conducted in the presence of representatives either from the DOJ or the media, contrary to the
express mandate of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. Accordingly, since it was not properly shown
that genuine and earnest efforts were made to comply with the witness requirement of the chain of
custody rule, the Court is constrained to hold that there was an unjustified deviation from the same,
resulting in the conclusion that the integrity arid evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from Flores were compromised. Perforce, his acquittal is warranted under these circumstances.

874
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Fernando N. Fernandez vs. People of The Philippines

G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019

Reyes, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual

cannot be convicted if there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the
accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even
if there is no other possible or identifiable perpetrator in the records despite there having
been a crime committed.

FACTS:

Garino and an unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked in
front of Fernandez's house, when Garino saw someone go out of the gate. When they heard a
gunshot, they immediately alighted from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the
person who fired the shot was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time.
As the two ran away, Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his "buttocks".
Garino presented his doctor as a witness. When questioned if he knew who his assailant was,
Garino testified that he previously saw him at the salon where he and a certain Me-Ann Barcenas
worked. He found out his assailant's name only when Barcenas visited him at the hospital a few
days after his surgery. Of note, however, neither Barcenas nor Garino's companion during the
night of the shooting was presented as witness for the prosecution, as only Garino, his brother
Albert, who had the incident blottered at the police station.

For its version of the facts, Fernandez, a retired police officer, vehemently denied the
prosecution's version of the events and claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the time of
the incident.

After trial, the court held the guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
murder. The CA affirmed.

875
 In this appeal, Fernandez argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime charged in the Information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Fernandez is indeed guilty of the crime of Frustrated Murder, for shooting
Garino and failing to kill the latter despite inflicting a deep wound on the victim.

RULING:

NO. In all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each,
and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that
crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution
must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the
evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed.

Here, the tale of this case's tape is that the prosecution relied solely on Garino's testimony
that Fernandez was the one who shot him. Aside from his positive identification, which the Court
finds too unconvincing, no legitimate and convincing evidence was offered to prove the veracity of
the events as Garino alleges. With this, Fernandez's justification of alibi finds stronger ground, and
the Court is thus obliged to favor it while taking into absolute consideration the promise that
reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused individual of the crime. Henceforth, the Court is
constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts which are
inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to
convict an accused in a criminal case. Fernandez is entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right,
because the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

876
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Norin Sendad y Kundo a.k.a “Nhorain Senday y Kusain”

G.R. No. 242025, November 20, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This is an ordinary appeal assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the judgment of RTC for the conviction of accused-appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on January 11, 2013several officers of the San Narciso
Police successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against the accused. During the seizure, two
(2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were recovered from the accused. After
the arrest, she was bodily searched, and four (4) more plastic sachets wrapped in paper
containing a combined weight of 0.2613 gram of suspected shabu were recovered. They then
marked (PO3 Gonzales) the six (6) plastic sachets recovered and the cellphone.

Thereafter, they brought Sendad and the seized items to the investigator who conducted
the inventory and photography of the same in the presence of Sendad, Barangay Kagawad Casama
and Diaz, a media representative. Notably, there were no Department of Justice personnel present
during such inventory and photography. Afterwards, the seized items were returned to PO3
Gonzales who kept the same on his person until the next day when he turned it over to the crime
laboratory where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the accused she was at Kimsan
Plaza to buy some household supplies when suddenly PO3 Gonzales put his arm on her shoulder,
told her not to resist and to just go with them. She was then brought to Tacurong Police Station
where she was frisked. They took her money and cellphone, made her sign a document and
detained her in the lock-up cell. Nevertheless, both the RTC and the CA found her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

877
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and concluded that she was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

YES. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As a general rule, compliance with the
chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded not merely as a
procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law. However, the court has recognized that
due to varying field conditions, strict compliance may not be always possible. Failure to comply does
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid provided that: (a)
there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved. Moreover, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the
absence of the required witnesses by presenting justifiable reason therefore, or at the very least, by
showing that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their
presence.

In the case at bar, there was a deviation on the witness requirement as the conduct of the
inventory and photography was not witnessed by a representative of DOJ. This may be easily gleaned
from the Inventory of Property Seized which only confirms the presence of an elected public official,
i.e. Barangay Kagawad Casama, and a media representative, i.e., Diaz. Here, the absence of a DOJ
representative during the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized drugs was not
acknowledged by the prosecution, much less justified. In view of such unjustified deviation from the
chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Sendad were compromised, which
consequently warrants her acquittal.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted on the crime charged.

878
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND ITS EFFECT IN PROVING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Nor Jelamin Musa, Ivan Usop Bito, Monsour Abdulrakman Abdilla vs. People of the
Philippines

G.R. No. 242132, September 25, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment
the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly

enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural technicality but as a
matter of substantive law."

The failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would
not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (1) there is a justifiable ground for non-
compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

FACTS:

The accused in this case were charged with violation of RA 9165 also known as the
Comprehensive and Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Police Chief Inspector Aldrin Quinto Juaneza
(PCI Juaneza) of the Governor Generoso Municipal Police Station in Davao Oriental received
confidential information that there will be illegal drugs to be transported using a white multi-cab
vehicle with plate number NBD-279. With the aid of this information, the police setup a
checkpoint near and around the area. When the subject multi cab came, they checked it. The multi
cab halted and the three accused were seen alighted from the vehicle. Shabu was seized from
Abdilla. The police brought the shabu to their police station and was marked in the presence of
the vice mayor, a brgy kagawad, and a media personality.

879
 In defense, Abdilla claimed that he was at the location to check for fish and when he saw
none, he asked his in laws to bring a vehicle for him. The vehicle arrived driven by zbito and
accompanied by Musa, the three of them were still at the waiting shed when the police arrived.
Abdilla also claims that when they were frisked by the police, nothing was taken from them. The
RTC convicted the accused and CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty for violating RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The accused can’t be held guilty for the commission of the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be
able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As a general rule, compliance with the chain of
custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the same has been regarded "not merely as a procedural
technicality but as a matter of substantive law". The failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the same would not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and
invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for
non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. In this case, the police testimony shows a significant gap in the chain of custody of the
seized item, when the drugs were in the possession of PO3 Cabillan until it was taken over by Police
Inspector Ryan Pelayre Bajade, the forensic chemist, for qualitative examination. No document was
shown that the seized item was endorsed by Cubillan to the forensic chemist. Because of this gap,
there is no certainty that the sachet of drugs presented as evidence during trial was the same drugs
found in Abdilla's possession, thereby creating reasonable doubt. Moreover, there was no
representative from the DOJ when the inventory for the seized item was conducted. It shows that
there was not enough effort on the part of the police to secure the needed witnesses stated in the law
to prove the actuality of the incident. Non-compliance with the required witnesses’ rule may be
permitted only if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and
sufficient efforts to secure their presence. Hence, given the circumstances the accused were acquitted
from the charges laid.

880
QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE GUILT IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Michael Roxas y Camarillo

G.R. No. 242817, September 16, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA
9165, it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral
certainty, considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus
delicti of the crime.

Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants
an acquittal.

To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the
prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment
the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.

The law further requires that the said inventory and photography be done in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (1) if prior to the
amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official; or (2) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an
elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or
the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily "to ensure the
establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence."

FACTS:

Michael Roxas Y Camarrillo is accused of the crime illegal sale of dangerous drugs. He was
caught after a buy bust operation conducted on November 20, 2013, where one plastic sachet of
shabu was seized upon him. The said drug was subjected for inventory in the nearest barangay
hall and in the presence of Barangay Captain Raulito R. Datiles and media representative Rey

881
Argana. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Camp Karingal for the photographing of
Roxas, the marked money, and the suspected shabu, as well as the preparation of the necessary
paperwork for examination. Subsequently, the seized item was taken to the crime laboratory
where, after examination, the contents thereof yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Roxas, on the other hand claims that on November 30, 2013, he was playing basketball at a
plaza in Quezon City, when suddenly four police officers approached him and arrested him for no
reason at all. He did not complain about it due to his fear that the police may do something bad
against him and his family.

RTC convicted Roxas for the crime charged and the Court of appeals affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roxas shall be acquitted of the crime charged for failure to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. Roxas’ guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt and must be acquitted. In
cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, it is essential that
the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty, considering that the
dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Failing to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence, warrants an acquittal. To establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime, in addition the law requires that the said inventory and photography of the be done in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by
RA 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after
the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media. In this case, an examination of the Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Item/Property would show that the inventory of the seized items was not done in
the presence of a DOJ representative, as said inventory form only contains the signatures of an
elected public official and a media representative. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain
of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary

882
value of the item seized from Roxas were compromised. Hence, Roxas was cannot be proven to be
guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt and thus acquitted.

883
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Edwin Gementiza Matabilas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 243615, November 11, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decision of RTC for the conviction of petitioner for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on September 6, 2012, several
officers of the Kidapawan City Police Station successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against
petitioner at the Villanueva Subdivision in Kidapawan City, Cotabato. During the seizure, one (1)
plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white crystalline substance was recovered from accused.
After the arrest, police conducted the required marking, inventory and photography in the
presence of the accused, as well as Anima, a Kagawad of Barangay Poblacion and Cabaron, a
member of radio station DXND. Thereafter, the seized item was brought to the PNP Provincial
Crime Laboratory where its contents tested positive for shabu after the examination.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the petitioner he was at Kidapawan
City looking for potential customers of coconuts during the time of the alleged incident. Two (2)
police officers suddenly approached him and conducted a futile search on his person and
motorcycle, then forcibly brought him to the store of certain Clifton, where they falsely made it
appear that a P500.00 bill and a sachet containing white crystalline substance were recovered
from his positions.

Both the RTC and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

884
 Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING

YES. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession, failing to prove the integrity of the
corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, warrants an acquittal. The prosecution must establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law.
However, the court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance may not be
always possible. Failure to comply does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid provided that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In the case at bar, there was a deviation on the witness requirement as the conduct of the
inventory and photography was not witnessed by a representative of DOJ. This may be easily gleaned
from the Inventory of Confiscated Drugs/Seized which only confirms the presence of an elected
public official, i.e. Anima, and a media representative, i.e., Cabaron. Such finding is further supported
by the testimony of Anima on direct examination, where he mentioned that only he and Cabaron
were the civilian witnesses present

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence of the required witnesses by
presenting justifiable reason therefore, or at the very least, by showing that the apprehending
officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their presence. Here, the absence of a DOJ
representative during the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized drugs was not
acknowledged by the prosecution, much less justified. In view of such unjustified deviation from the
chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the evidence to prove the
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused is insufficient.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted on the crime charged.

885
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Xandra Santos y Littaua

G.R. No. 243627, November 27, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

In cases for illegal sale and/or illegal possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165,
it is essential that the identity of the dangerous drug be established with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the
crime. Failing to prove the integrity of the corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State
insufficient to prove the guilty of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hence
warrants an acquittal.

FACTS:

On January 16, 2016, the team successfully conducted a buy-bust operation against the
accused, during which 1 plastic sachet containing 0.20 gram of white crystalline substance was
recovered from her. When the accused was searched after her arrest, police officers found 1 more
plastic sachet containing 0.10 gram of the same substance from her possession. Officers
immediately brought the accused back to the police station where they marked, inventoried, and
photographed the seized items in her presence as well as that of Kagawad Dawat of the Barangay.
Subsequently, the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Lab where, after examination,
their contents tested positive for shabu.

In defense, Accused claimed that at the time of the incident, while waiting for the tricycle
that carried the grandchildren of her live-in partner’s mother to arrive, she was accosted by
several police officers in civilian clothes who forcibly brought her to a police station and falsely
made it appear that she had sold shabu.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Accused appealed to the CA,
arguing that she should be acquitted on account of the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, as well as non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody, particularly because the
marking of the alleged drug was not immediately done at the place of arrest, nor was the inventor
of the same witnessed by a representative of the media of the National Prosecution Service. The
CA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence, this appeal.

886
ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution complied with the rule on chain of custody to prove the
integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime.

RULING:

NO. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution
must be able to account for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized
up to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires that said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, or his counsel, as well as certain required witnesses
namely : (a) if prior to the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media
and the DOJ, and any elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640,
an elected public official and a representative of the NPS or the media.

In this case, the arresting officers’ acts of performing the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items not at the place of arrest but at the police station were justified as a
crowd was already forming at the place of arrest. This notwithstanding, the Court observes that
there was still a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and
photography was not witnessed by a representative from NPS or the media. This may be gleaned
from the Inventory of Seized Properties which only confirms the presence of an elected public official,
i.e. Kgd. Dawat.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from the accused, which constitute the corpus delicti of the
crimes charged, have been compromised; hence, her acquittal is perforce in order.

887
PRESERVATION OF CORPUS DELICTI REQUIRED TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Jose Rasos Jr., y Padollo

G.R. No. 243639, September 18, 2019

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the
time of the inventory and photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory, and that the
law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose.

To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and
confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless
arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and
confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation.

FACTS:

The accused in this case in the person of Jose Rasos was charged with violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Rasos was
subjected to a by bust operation where he was caught in the commission of the crime of selling
shabu. After the buy bust operation, the drugs were taken to the police station for photographing
and inventory. The said inventory was done in the presence of the accused and a member of a
press corps. Only the members of the press corps signed the inventory.

On the contrary, Jose Roses invoked that he is not guilty of the crime. He avers that at the
time of the incident, he was at the house sleeping when suddenly agents came to his house. He
was searched and arrested and only after one day he was informed of the charge against him. His
wife also claims that the police attempted to extort them P5000 in exchange for the release of
Rasos. RTC held Rasos was guilty of the crime charged. CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE:

888
 Whether or not all the accused is guilty of violating RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable. Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165 requires the following elements to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti to establish
guilt beyond reasonable doubt: requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed
at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done
in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official,
and (c) a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media; and (3) the accused
or his/her representative and all of the aforesaid witnesses shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the given case, the prosecution's witnesses do not offer any
justifiable reason why the presence of an elected public official was not obtained during the conduct
of the arrest the inventory of the corpus delicti. Worse, the prosecution's witnesses failed to
acknowledge or recognize the failure to secure the presence of an elected public official. The Court
cannot stress enough that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the inventory and
photographing of the seized evidence is mandatory.

Hence, due to its failure, the accused in the case was deemed acquitted of the crime charged.

889
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN DRUG CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Sta. Cruz y Ilusorio

G.R. No. 244256, November 25, 2019

Reyes, J. Jr., J.

DOCTRINE:

In prosecution of a case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug itself
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Hence, it is of utmost
importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown to have been
duly preserved.

FACT:

Accused was charged with illegal possession and illegal sale of shabu. On November 5,
2010, PO2 Bagain intimated to accuse his intention to buy P500.00 worth of shabu. He then
handed the money while the accused gave him a plastic sachet. Bagain arrested and handcuffed
accused and found 2 more plastic sachets containing crystalline substance from the possession of
accused. Thereafter, the police proceeded to the police station for inquest proceedings. Thereat,
Bagain made an inventory of the seized items which could not be done at place of arrest because
there were several persons at that time. The plastic sachets were turned over to PO3 Rana who
prepared the request for laboratory examination. A media representative was present at the
police station when the inventory and marking were being made. The policemen brought the
seized specimens to the PNP Crime Lab for qualitative examination. Upon laboratory examination,
the specimen tested positive for shabu.

Accused denied the accusations against him and averred that he decided to go outside to
watch people playing mahjong. Thereafter, the policemen returned to the area where he was
standing, and he was then brought to Police station where he was detained.

The RTC found the accused guilty. The CA affirmed the ruling. Accused reiterated that the
buy-bust team failed to follow the procedure mandated in Sec 21 (1), Article II of RA 9165. Hence,
this appeal.

890
ISSUE:

Whether or not the buy-bust team failed to follow the procedure mandated in Sec 21 (1),
Article II of RA 9165.

RULING:

YES. Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165 strictly requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photograph immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the (a) presence of the accused or his counsel; (b) an elected public
official; (c) a representative from the media; and (d) a representative from the DOJ.

In this case, the physical inventory was done at the police station and only a media
representative was present. In fact, it was not even made in the presence of the accused. Without the
insulating presence of the three witnesses during the seizure, marking and physical inventory of the
sachets of shabu, the evil of switching, “planting”, or contamination of the evidence arise as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seized drugs that were evidence herein of the corpus
delicti.

The procedure enshrined in Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

891
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Rowena Padas y Garcia @ “Weng” vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 244327, October 14, 2019

Gesmundo, J.

DOCTRINE:

There is a saving clause under the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 in case of non-compliance
with the Chain of Custody Rule. This saving clause, however, applies only (1) where the
prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited
justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses
the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the burden of proving —
with moral certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was
confiscated from the accused during his arrest.

FACTS:

On July 20, 2013, PO1 Villanueva and SPO2 Sanchez wen to Bohol Street, Balic Balic,
Sampaloc on board a tricycle to conduct a surveillance against one alias “Manok”. They allegedly
saw a woman taking out, form her right front pocket, one (1) hot-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance and showing the same to an unidentified man.
Upon seeing this, they alighted from the tricycle and arrested petitioner. The unidentified man,
however, escaped. PO1 Villanueva marked the plastic sachet with “RGP” and the two other
sachets found in petitioner’s possession with “RGP-1” and “RGP-2”. The physical inventory and
taking of photographs of the seized evidence were conducted at the place of arrest in the
presence of petitioner and Rene Crisostomo, a media representative.

PO1 Villanueva then brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the police station. PO3
Baladjay, the investigator on duty, prepared the request for laboratory examination, booking
sheet, and arrest report. PO1 Villanueva thereafter brought the seized evidence to the crime
laboratory. PCI Ballesteros conducted an examination of the three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets
and found the contents to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above and testified that on July 20, 2013, while
she was washing clothes in front to her house, a police officer placed his hand on her shoulder

892
and forced her to board a vehicle. She was also ordered to empty her pockets. The police officers
took her money, bracelet and earrings. Petitioner claimed that her husband saw the apprehension,
but she refused to file a complaint due to fear.

The RTC and CA found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner
despite the failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES. Under the law, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
seized drug, it is imperative to show that the substance offered and identified in court. This
requirement is known as the Chain of Custody Rule under RA 9165 created to safeguard doubts
concerning the identity of the seized drugs. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded, authorized
movements and custody of the seized drugs at each state, from the moment of confiscation to the
receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination until it is presented to the court. Under Section 21
of RA 9165, it is necessary that during the apprehension, the following witnesses are present: (1) a
representative from the media, (2) representative from the DOJ and (3) any elected public official.

In this case, no DOJ representative and elected public official were present at the time of the
physical inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the evidence seized from petitioner.
Additionally, POI Villanueva testified that Crisostomo, the media representative, was not present
when petitioner was arrested, and the seized evidence was marked. Crisostomo merely signed the
inventory after the marking of the evidence. It is therefore unclear whether he witnessed the actual
physical inventory of the seized drugs. Moreover, the prosecution offered no justification as to the
absence of a representative from DOJ and the elected public official. The prosecution did not even
recognize their procedural lapses or give any justifiable explanation on why the apprehending team
did not conduct the inventory, marking and taking of photographs of the seized evidence in the
presence of an elected public official and DOJ Representative. Thus, they could not claim the saving
clause under the IRR of RA 9165 in case of non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule.

In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there was no proper inventory, marking,
and taking of photographs of the seized items considering the absence of the required witnesses
under the law and the prosecution's lack of justification for their absence. Given the procedural

893
lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the corpus delicti that the prosecution
introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

Wherefore, the appeal is granted, and the decision of CA was reversed and set aside. The
petitioner is thereby acquitted on charges against her.

894
GENERAL PROVISION ON QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES

Melanie Grefaldo y De Leon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 246362, November 11, 2019

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE:

To convict an accused who is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must
establish the elements by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of RTC for the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165. According to the Prosecution, on March 22, 2012, police officers went to La Colina
Subdivision in Antipolo City to investigate reports of purported illegal gambling activities. They
encountered petitioner, who was acting suspiciously as if she was accepting bets for jueteng. But
then, they saw two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance fall from her right
pocket. They arrested her, seized and marked the sachets and brought her to the police station
where they photographed and inventoried the seized items and forwarded the same to the crime
laboratory. After examination, the contents tested for shabu.

However, the petitioner refuted the facts above, as per the petitioner she was on board her
motorcycle heading to her friend’s house when several male individuals abruptly surrounded her
outside the La Colina Subdivision. They forced her to board one of the motorcycles and brought
her to the police station where she was detained.

Both the RTC and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave error in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for
violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

895
RULING:

YES. In cases for Illegal Sale and/or Illegal Possession, failing to prove the integrity of the
corpus delicti renders the evidence for the State insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, warrants an acquittal. The prosecution must establish the identity of the
dangerous drugs with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the
chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as evidence
of the crime.

As a general rule, compliance with the chain of custody procedure is strictly enjoined as the
same has been regarded not merely as a procedural technicality but as a matter of substantive law.
However, the court has recognized that due to varying field conditions, strict compliance may not be
always possible. Failure to comply does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
as void and invalid provided that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In the case at bar, there was a deviation on the witness requirement as the conduct of the
inventory and photography was not witnessed by any of the three (3) witnesses provided under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to account for the absence
of the required witnesses by presenting justifiable reason therefore, or at the very least, by showing
that the apprehending officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure their presence.
Markedly, the absence of an elected public official was left unacknowledged, much less justified.

Meanwhile, to justify the absence of the respective representatives from the DOJ and media,
they executed a sworn written explanation that it was due to “lack of material time”. The Court
however finds such reason as untenable because it is not a justifiable reason and they failed to
convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. The
prosecution failed to exert genuine and sufficient efforts to comply with the witness requirement.
Hence, the evidence to prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused is insufficient.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and accused is
acquitted on the crime charged.

896
FACTS NEEDED TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN ILLEGAL DRUGS
CASES

People of the Philippines vs. Arsenio Salmeron y Amaro and Ma. Lourdes Estrada y Cruz

G.R. No. 246477, October 2, 2019

Lazaro-Javier, J.

DOCTRINE:

To ensure the integrity of the seized drug item, the prosecution must account for
each link in its chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.

FACTS:

The accused was charged for violation of Sec 5, Art 2 of RA 9165. The accused were caught
during a buy bust operation conducted by the police through a confidential information provided
by an informant. The accused were sized with the possession of the marked money and drugs. At
the site, the police marked the seized items. Subsequently the inventory was done in the barangay
hall due to the commotion at the situs of the incident. Then, the police went back to their office
and requested for a laboratory examination of the items.

The accused on the other hand claims that the day before their arrest, they were at home
when the police suddenly came looking for a certain “Yangyang” and “Balonggoy”. The next day
they were brought by the police in the barangay hall the said illegal drugs were shown. The RTC
held the accused guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

897
 Whether or not the accused were guilty of violating RA 9165 beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

NO. The court held that the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established in
this case. Under Section 21 RA 9165, the law requires the apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In this case, when the drugs were seized, it was
only made in the presence of appellants and Barangay Chairman Crissel Beltran. Hence, due to the
lapse in procedure, the court for the acquittal of the accused.

898
 H. Retroactivity of Laws

RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS WHEN FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED

Ophelia Hernan vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017

Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

RA 10951 shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the
affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things,
malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in
the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances
attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent
legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time
when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already
begun.

FACTS:

In 2009, petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Malversation by the Sandiganbayan. After the finality of judgment, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951
was passed into law which reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged to prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation
or malversation does not exceed forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 10951 can be applied retroactively.

899
RULING:

YES. While RA 10951 was passed into law long after the finality of judgment, the law being
favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Accordingly, Petitioner's sentence must be
modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being
favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any
ground for disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707 entitled An
Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, Otherwise Known As The "Probation Law Of 1976," As
Amended. Allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she is sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
through the imposition of a probationable penalty.

900
 I. The State as the Offended Party

THE STATE IS THE OFFENDED PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASES

People of the Philippines vs. XXX

G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018

Caguioa, J.

DOCTRINE:

In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private
complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused.

FACTS:

AAA, the 16-year-old daughter of accused XXX, testified that her father raped her 3 times
on April 2001. However, on January 2003, Public Prosecutor Macarubbo informed the court that
AAA died. On May 2003, Ms. Banzuelo, a social worker at the DSWD, presented to the court the
Death Certificate of AAA. Upon motion by the defense, the direct testimony of AAA was ordered
expunged from the records on the grounds that AAA was not subjected to cross examination.

However, in spite of the death of AAA and her testimony being expunged, the prosecution
presented EEE, Gelmie Calug, Lovella Opada and Vicente Tiengo as prosecution witnesses. All of
their testimonies corroborated the expunged testimony of AAA. RTC found accused XXX guilty of
3 counts of rape. CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of XXX, despite the death of AAA, was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:

901
 YES. In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant
is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. Hence, in this case, considering
that the death of AAA did not extinguish the criminal liability of XXX, the trial rightfully ensued with
the rest of the evidence for the prosecution.

902
CRIMINAL LIABILITY NOT SUBJECT TO COMPROMISE

Rosien Osental vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 225697, September 5, 2018

Carpio, J.

DOCTRINE:

Criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise, for a criminal case is

committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for its commission.

FACTS:

Sometime during August 2008, Osental approached Maria Te (Te) and convinced her to
sell ready-to-wear (RTW) goods. Te agreed and delivered P262,225 to Osental for the purchase of
the RTW goods. On the same date, Te entered into a trust receipt agreement with Osental in
which the latter agreed to deliver the proceeds of the sale minus her commission and/or return
the goods unsold on 21 October 2008. The agreement also mentioned that should Osental fail to
perform the obligations included therein, she will be liable for the crime of Estafa under Article
315 of the RPC.

On the agreement's due date, Osental failed to present the RTW goods, deliver the
proceeds of the sale of the RTW goods sold, or return the money that was given to her by Te. Te
sent a letter to Osental requiring the return of the P262,225. Osental did not return the money
despite repeated demands. Te filed a Complaint against Osental.

On December 2012, RTC found Osental guilty of Estafa. On August 2014, Osental and Te
entered into a Compromise Agreement to settle the civil aspect of the case. On October 2015, CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition wherein Osental alleged that the execution of the
compromise agreement and her payment of the amount of P345,000 representing the principal
amount and litigation expenses extinguished her civil as well as criminal liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise agreement extinguished Osental’s criminal liability.

903
RULING:

NO. It is a fundamental rule that criminal liability is not subject to compromise. A criminal
case is committed against the People and parties cannot waive or agree on the extinguishment of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code does not include compromise as a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability.

904