TRANSPO CASES #1

Philamgem vs. PKS Shippinf Company

Facts:

Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent

PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventy-
five thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-
Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value with
petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). During the
transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank. Upon demand of
payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought
reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused.

Issue:

(1) Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and

(2) WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry.
Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable.

Held:

(1) PKS Shipping is a common carrier.

PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others,
although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The
regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its
part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because
individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier.

(2) PKS Shipping is not liable.

The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6)
to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of
water into the barge’s hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge
issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would
attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC, common
carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
due to any of the following causes, among others:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x

Baritua vs. Mercader

Facts:

The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of dry
goods in Laoang, N. Samar, boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded
from Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge in
N. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges,
among others, that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he was
issued any passenger-freight ticket.

Issue: WON a contract of carriage existed between petitioners and Mercader. Or,
WON petitioners are liable for the death of Mercader.

Held:
A contract of carriage exists, thus, petitioners are liable.

Petitioners failed to transport D. Mercader to his destination, because the bus fell
into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the fall,
he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning.

The Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning.
It must be noted that a common carrier, by the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.

United Airlines, Inc vs. CA

Facts:

Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through

the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets for himself,
his wife and his minor son Mychal. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned;
they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each for
himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles
Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were
issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words “CHECK-IN
REQUIRED,” for United Airlines Flight No. 1108. However, the Fontanillas were not
able to board said flight but instead were able to board United Airlines Flight No.
803.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidence
his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith; and

(2) What law is applicable, the Philippine Law or the US Law?

Held:

(1) No. Aniceto Fontanilla’s assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m.,
he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in
something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on
record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the
boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words “Check-In
Required.” Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the
Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they
not assigned seat numbers?

(2) The Philippine Law. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of
the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law.
Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the
tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the
tickets were “rewritten” in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the
nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila.

PhilAm vs. CA

Facts:
Coca-Cola Bottlers loaded on board MV Asilda, a vessel owned by respondent
FELMAN, 7,500 cases of 1-litter Coca-Cola softdrinks bottle to be transported from
Zamboanga City to Cebu City. The shipment was insured by petitioner PHILAMGEN.
The vessel left Zamboanga in a fine weather but the same sank in the waters of
Zamboanga del Norte. Coca-Cola Bottlers filed a claim for damages against FELMAN
which it denied, thus, filed an insurance claim with PHILAMGEN. PHILAMGEN now
seeks recourse against FELMAN.

Issue: WON FELMAN is liable for loss of the cargo due to its failure to observe the
extraordinary diligence required by Art. 1733, NCC.

Held: YES.

Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, “(c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case …” In the
event of loss of goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently.
FELMAN, the shipowner, was not able to rebut this presumption.

The sinking of the vessel was due to its unseaworthiness even at the time of its
departure from the port of Zamboanga. It was top-heavy as an excessive amount of
cargo was loaded on deck.

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company

Facts:

Herminio L. Nocum was a passenger in appellant’s Bus No. 120 then making a trip
within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence
of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared
to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
The injuries suffered by Nocum were not due to mechanical defects but to the
explosion of firecrackers.

Issue: WON the bus company was negligent, hence liable for the injuries suffered by
Nocum.

Held:

No. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by
showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its
passengers, “according to the circumstances of the (each) case.”

Article 1733 qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for
the safety of the passengers transported by them to be “according to all the
circumstances of each case.”

In this case, the circumstance that must be considered in measuring a common

carrier’s duty towards its passengers is the reliance that should be reposed on the
sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is
to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the
lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly
considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He
cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of
his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar.
(Hence, the bus company’s failure to confiscate the baggage cannot be considered
as a negligent act, but in accord to the circumstance of the case.)

N.B.
Thus, in other jurisdictions, and squarely applicable in the instant case: There is
need for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension
that the passenger’s baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common
carrier’s employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the
cornerstone of the common carrier’s liability in cases similar to the present one.

Elite Shirt Factory vs. Hon. Cornejo

Facts:

Elite Shirt Factory (shipper) delivered to Compania Maritima (common carrier)

several cartons of merchandise for shipment to several consignees. While such
cargo was stored in the bodega owned by Compania Maritima, a fire broke. Elite
Shirt, allegedly damaged, filed with the City Court of Manila a complaint against
Compania Maritima for reimbursement. The latter filed an answer impleading Phil.
Steam Navigation as third party defendant, on the ground that the fire started from
the section occupied by such.

Judge Cornejo of the city court favoured shipper Elite for the recovery of damages
from common carrier Compania Maritima, but thereafter denied the judgment of
execution and set aside its previous decision; the ground: Judge had no jurisdiction,
but rather the CFI within its exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

Elite Shirt Factory contends that the liability of the carrier, Compañia Maritima, from
the time the shipment was deposited in its warehouse, was no longer as a common
carrier but as a depository, hence, it is the City Court which has jurisdiction.

Issue:

Does the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on a Court of First instance over admiralty
and maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against the
carrier, the goods having been landed, stored in its bodega but subsequently
burned, no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result?

Held: YES, the instant case is included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI.

THE REASON: the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the time it was
burned was owned by the carrier, Compañia Maritima, itself. The cargo was burned
before Compania Maritima could deliver it to the consignees.

When, as in this case, the proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of
shipment, the jurisdiction of the court of first instance under the specific provision of
the Judiciary Act is undeniable.

N.B.

Hence, if the bodega was owned NOT by Compania Maritima, it is the City Court
which will have jurisdiction and not the CFI.

City court will have jurisdiction when: the common carrier is liable as DEPOSITORY;

CFI will have jurisdiction when: the carrier is liable as a common carrier, as in the
instant case.

Medina vs. Cresencia

Facts:

A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco post

resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. Guillermo Cresencia
is the registered owner of the jeepney as well as the registered operator. On the
other hand, Rosario Avorque, after the jeepney having been repeatedly sold from
one buyer after another, is its current absolute owner as well as the employer of
driver Brigido.

Issue:

(1) Who should be held liable for the death of Medina – the registered owner or the
absolute owner?

(2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary liability under the RPC for damages
arising from her driver’s criminal act.

Held:

(1) The registered owner.

The requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a
franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without
infringing the certificate issued to the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney was
admittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission, Guillermo
Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator thereof, continued to be liable
to the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation.

(2) No, she has no subsidiary liability.

Medina’s action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against
Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employer’s subsidiary liability under the
Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carrier’s contractual obligation to carry
his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this
reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido
Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa
contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but
direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

Facts:

Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad Co. As an employee of the
company, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon
the company’s train free of charge. One day, while Cangco stepped off the car, one
or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that
his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His arm was
badly crashed and lacerated.

Issue:

Whether the liability of Manila Railroad constitutes culpa aquiliana or culpa

contractual.

Held:

The liability constitutes culpa contractual (Contract of Carriage).

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the
duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its
trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault
was morally imputable to defendant’s servants.

N.B.

Contributory Negligence on the part of Cangco: None. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under
way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished: (read from full text)

1. culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere

incident to the performance of a contract

2. those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists
independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when
entering into the contractual relation.

3. the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the
duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between
the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it. On the other hand, the liability of masters and
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when
such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master’s negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does
not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

Test in determining Contributory Negligence of plaintiff: Thompson’s work on

negligence—-

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or
reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the
age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted
under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to
be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but
the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances,
to avoid injury.”

PAL vs. CA

Facts:

Private respondent Jesus Samson was a regular co-pilot of PAL. During one of his flights from
Manila to Legazpi with Captain Delfin Bustamante, they made a crash landing at Daet where
Samson suffered physical injuries in the head. Samson alleges that the accident was due to the
gross negligence of PAL in allowing Bustamante who was suffering from a long standing tumor
of the Nasopharynx but was also allowed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to fly as a co-
pilot; and that because of the tumor Bustamante has a slow reaction and poor judgment.

Issue:
WON PAL was negligent as a common carrier in allowing Bustamante to fly as a First Officer
the day of the accident. Or, WON the same carrier is liable for the accident even if Bustamante
was not sick.

Held: YES and YES.

For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty
of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable for the resulting accident.

(Even) assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing
the plane, the evidence shows that overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the
mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused
thereby. And for the negligence of defendant’s employee, it is liable. At least, the law presumes
the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employees.

As defined in Art. 1732, NCC, petitioner is a common carrier. The law is clear in requiring a
common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of
carriage and transportation under Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756, NCC.

The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of
passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the
airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will
certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane,
passengers and crew members alike.

Sarkies Tours Phil vs. IAC

Facts:

The Dizons purchased 6 round trip tickets from Sarkies for a tour to Corregidor form Manila,
and back. They were given two tickets both with the name SARKIES appearing therein. The
word “Edisco” was however handwritten on the white ticket. The white tickets were collected on
board by Julian Mendoza, while the blue tickets were collected upon boarding the Sarkies bus.
The MV Edisco owned and operated by Mendoza was not registered nor was it licensed to
operate as a watercraft. On return to Manila, the weather was the same as when they left. After
about thirty minutes of cruising, the boat leaned towards the starboard; the boat capsized. As a
result, Merceditas, the daughter of the spouses Dizon, among others, died. The Dizons filed a
complaint for damages against Sarkies. Sarkies, as an answer, included a cross-claim against
Mendoza.

Issue: WON, under the Civil Code, Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza.

Held: Yes.

Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of Merceditas was the responsibility of
Mendoza, it is but fair that Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza for
reimbursement. Although Article 2181 of the Civil Code is not technically invocable, its
principle should be applied in favor of Sarkies. The provision of the Civil Code on common
carriers is based on Anglo-American Law.

In Grand Trunk R. Co. vs Latham, 63 Me. 177, the following was said:
“Where a railroad company had been compelled to pay a judgment for damages for injuries
sustained by a passenger as a result of the maltreatment and misconduct of the conductor…the
Court (held) that the servant was liable to his master for all loss and damage sustained by it.”